In their first study, Dr Lammers and Dr Galinsky asked 61 university students to write about a moment in their past when they were in a position of high or low power. Previous research has established that this is an effective way to “prime” people into feeling as if they are currently in such a position. Each group (high power and low power) was then split into two further groups. Half were asked to rate, on a nine-point morality scale (with one being highly immoral and nine being highly moral), how objectionable it would be for other people to over-report travel expenses at work. The other half were asked to participate in a game of dice.

The dice players were told to roll two ten-sided dice (one for “tens” and one for “units”) in the privacy of an isolated cubicle, and report the results to a lab assistant. The number they rolled, which would be a value between one and 100 (two zeros), would determine the number of tickets that they would be given in a small lottery that was run at the end of the study.

In the case of the travel expenses—when the question hung on the behaviour of others—participants in the high-power group reckoned, on average, that over-reporting rated as a 5.8 on the nine-point scale. Low-power participants rated it 7.2. The powerful, in other words, claimed to favour the moral course. In the dice game, however, high-power participants reported, on average, that they had rolled 70 while low-power individuals reported an average 59. Though the low-power people were probably cheating a bit (the expected average score would be 50), the high-power volunteers were undoubtedly cheating—perhaps taking the term “high roller” rather too literally.

Taken together, these results do indeed suggest that power tends to corrupt and to promote a hypocritical tendency to hold other people to a higher standard than oneself.

Fortunately, Drs. Lammers and Galinsky’s second conclusion suggests a route to remedy:

Half of 105 participants were asked to write about a past experience in which they had legitimately been given a role of high or low power. The others were asked to write about an experience of high or low power where they did not feel their power (or lack of it) was legitimate. All of the volunteers were then asked to rate how immoral it would be for someone to take an abandoned bicycle rather than report the bicycle to the police. They were also asked, if they were in real need of a bicycle, how likely they would be to take it themselves and not report it.

The “powerful” who had been primed to believe they were entitled to their power readily engaged in acts of moral hypocrisy.

In short, it would seem the Navy should integrate into its regular leadership training some way of identifying those with a sense of entitlement and bring them back to earth before it causes problem on the deckplates.

National Security Strategy: Incomplete, and my sense is the due date on this assignment is not far off. I suspect that Gen. Jones is laboring mightily on one, but excessive delays may send a message that global security problems are something to be reacted to and not planned for. You can’t shape the world if you don’t have any blueprints from which to work.

Now, the broader policy community is starting to notice and making the same arguments.

When President Obama announced his decision to deploy 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, he presented a clear argument for why he believes U.S. national security is threatened by violence and extremism in that country and in the region.

What was missing from the speech, however, was a sense of how and to what degree continued U.S. involvement in that region fits into the United States’ comprehensive national security agenda. That evaluation is the key to keeping U.S. foreign policy consistent and balanced, and should be based on the president’s national security strategy (NSS).

Almost one year has passed since Mr. Obama’s inauguration, and the White House has yet to issue that seminal document.

A new strategy is not only a practical requirement; it’s a legal obligation. Congress mandates that a new president issue an NSS within five months of taking office, and annually thereafter. Mr. Obama has passed the deadline without delivering, yet several Cabinet agencies are developing key tactical documents, such as the Defense, Homeland Security and State departments’ quadrennial reviews, which should be based on the White House’s overall strategy.

This process is entirely backward. Mr. Obama needs a new NSS to make sure the country, Cabinet agencies and, most important, the men and women in the field have clear and comprehensive guidance on their role within broader U.S. national security efforts.

Personnally, my observations make me wonder whether there’s a vision behind this administration’s policies. I get no sense they are trying to shape the world; it seems like they’re merely trying to shape the processes and are ambivalent about the results. So, I have two questions for the group:

1) Is the National Security Strategy an essential component in the big picture or just a formality, and;

2) From your perspective, does this administration have a coherent grand strategy?

Midshipmen entering the Naval Academy from its preparatory school were arriving with badly underdeveloped study skills for the past two years, the academy’s superintendent said, which is why the prep school curriculum got a major overhaul this autumn.

Vice Adm. Jeffrey Fowler said plebes who had come from the Naval Academy Preparatory School in Newport, R.I., had so much trouble with basic studying that academy officials decided to redesign the courses at NAPS to focus on completing assignments and asking for help.

“We decided the first thing that was most important was, get young people to do homework, supervised homework, in class, because that seemed to be the biggest thing over my two previous years: They’re not turning in any homework,” Fowler said. “We found out they didn’t know how to do the homework, or they had questions on it, and at nighttime even if they wanted to ask, the support [at NAPS] wasn’t as robust as we would like.”

Unfortunately, with the news that 75% of potential recruits are unfit to serve, I think there are much more serious problems lurking behind this story. Any thoughts on how the services should be resolving these problems, or whether they should be in this business at all?

In the grand sweep of American history, the “War of 1812” seems to rank near the bottom of the list of events of possible importance. Just the name given to war seems to reflect this – naming nothing in particular to associate with that war, other than the year in which it began.

However, the “War of 1812” (which actually stretched on until the end of 1814) was anything but trivial. Circumstances concatenated to a fever pitch in the later part of 1814, as the fledgling United States of America frantically fought off a three-pronged British attack of continental scope.

And while today we mark more recent events, we should also note that perhaps the most crucial of those moments occurred on this date in 1814 – in the waters near (of all places) Plattsburgh, New York.

Skanderbeg goes on to provide an excellent overview of Commodore Thomas MacDonough’s ingenious plan to turn back a British invasion from Canada.

From the start of the 20th Century to the beginning of WWII, deterrence relied upon conventional arms races and preventive war. The German pre-WWI posture serves as an excellent example. The Germans relied on starting a preventive war against Russia and France to prevent being attacked itself. The Germans could see they were gradually being eclipsed by French and Russian military power and believed war was inevitable, so Germany chose to fight while they were still relatively strong. Similar thinking is documented in Germany and Japan at the start of the Second World War, and one can argue that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was itself a preventive war.

Later, following the advent of atomic weapons, theories of nuclear deterrence arose. Of these theories, there were two major schools of thought: 1) deterrence by punishment–retaliation against population centers in the event of an attack—and 2) deterrence by denial–a successful first strike against an opponent’s arsenal. The U.S. and Russia pursued both strategies at one time and another.

A third theory, existential deterrence, emerged following the Cuban missile crisis and argued it was the fear of nuclear war that made deterrence work and resulted in a “tradition of non-use.” These theories worked well to prevent nuclear conflict and direct confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but as McGeorge Bundy pointed out in “The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy”, this nuclear stalemate did little to prevent any of the large number of proxy wars between the two superpowers.

As stated before, it seems little has changed in the postures of the major nuclear powers, despite the end of the Cold War and emerging American nuclear primacy. Surely, the U.S. and Russia have dramatically cut their stockpiles since the end of the Cold War and removed tactical nuclear weapons from forward bases and deployed ships and submarines, but both nations maintained strategic missile submarines (as do the Chinese, French and British), the U.S. and Russia still maintain large stockpiles, and strategic forces remain on high alert.

In recent years, however, a number of developments have challenged the hopes of those pursuing complete disarmament. American success in developing ballistic missile defense systems has Russia seeking to block full deployment of the system, and Russia and China both developing means to counter an American shield should it be deployed. In addition, ongoing unilateral and bi-lateral disarmament efforts by the U.S. and Russia have not deterred nations like India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, and China from expanding its strategic forces. And most recently, a deputy chief of staff for the Russian Navy told state-run media that Moscow was reconsidering its decision to not deploy tactical weapons aboard ships.

Going forward into the 21st Century, a number of changes in the balance of nuclear power have resulted in doubts about the utility of current doctrines of nuclear deterrence. Today there are three major challenges to future nuclear deterrence: 1) the small nuclear forces of new atomic states, 2) anti-state or non-state actors, and 3) the return of preventive war as an acceptable deterrence doctrine.

In the case of nations possessing SNF, like Pakistan and India, the applicability of traditional theories of deterrence are shaky at best. Deterrence by denial by a SNF is useless against opponents with large nuclear forces (LNF), and against other SNF powers the applicability depends upon many other factors, like intelligence, delivery and early warning systems. Deterrence by punishment, again, may be effective against other SNF states, but against LNF states it has minimal value. And existential deterrence’s effectiveness depends heavily on the cultural and religious values of the SNF state and might be impossible to quantify.

The dangers posed by anti-state actors in the nuclear balance of power are even more troubling. Deterrence is based on reason, and while states are generally “rational actors”, terrorist organizations (essentially “anti-state” actors) are often “irrational actors.” States have stable political and military systems and organizations, with checks and balances, populations, territory and resources to protect, and have a vested interest in being rational and predictable. Anti-state actors, however, have none of these elements, usually possess radical political or religious ideologies, and often take pride in their unpredictability and willingness to escalate conflicts.

Complicating this is the fact that anti-state actors also work to destabilize the very systems and organizations that make state actors rational. In The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash Between State and Antistate Actors, Mohan Malik concludes that South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the influence of anti-state actors, as the nations in the region have yet to fully develop the checks and balances in their political systems and mature, redundant controls over their arsenals.

There appears to be some progress with respect to the SNF problems. India has made gains in stabilizing and securing their arsenal to address the dangers of SNF and anti-state actors as an example to other new nuclear powers. First, India has adopted a strict policy of no first use. Second, India asserts that it will not resort to nukes against non-nuclear and non-aligned states. India’s current doctrine is focused on denial by punishment, and they are pursuing a triad of air, land and sea based systems to ensure second strike capability. Third, India has enforced strict civilian control by democratically elected leaders through a survivable command and control system, and their arsenal is protected by adequate security and safety systems to prevent unauthorized use. And fourth, though India will not accept limitations on its maintenance, testing and research and development, its stated goal is to continue to emphasize and pursue global nuclear disarmament.

Where no progress has been made is with regard to the irrational state and anti-state actors. The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive war was intended as a step towards addressing the new security threats, but there are many dangers inherent in this approach. With the invasion of Iraq the Global War on Terror became as much a war of counterproliferation as a war on terrorism.

In the past nonproliferation and counterproliferation entailed diplomacy, sanctions, deterrence, defenses and the capacity to strike at another nation’s nuclear arsenal, command and control and delivery systems. This shift is a tacit acknowledgement that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not guarantee a nation will not develop or acquire nuclear arms. Deterrence now, at least for the time being, has broadened to include not just deterring a nuclear state from using their weapons, but also includes preventing non-nuclear states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, the traditional approach failed miserably and with respect to Iran, this approach appears destined to fail. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine and preoccupation of America’s conventional military on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have actually had the opposite effect and accelerated development efforts by states that were already pursuing nuclear weapons.

All of which raises an obvious question: where do the nuclear powers and deterrence go from here? The current global security situation has been and will continue to be a challenge to large and small powers alike. Major powers are confronted with threats that their vast arsenals appear useless to deter, and have reverted to risky, offensive doctrines of the past. In response, small powers and anti-state actors are deciding to pursue nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in attempts to deter powers they believe are irrational, uncontrollable threats.

So, with the vexing problem of irrational states and anti-state actors rendering deterrence by denial and existential deterrence too difficult to rehabilitate, deterrence by punishment seems to be the only remaining option. And, given the inherent differences between irrational states and anti-state actors, a rehabilitation of deterrence by punishment requires two distinct doctrines.

With respect to the threat from current and aspirant SNF nations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently made a comment about extending the U.S. defense “umbrella” to unnamed nations in response to Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal. Though forced to backtrack quickly when her statement was interpreted as an acceptance of Iran becoming a nuclear power, her idea was close to the mark. It only missed by making the defended class too narrow. The U.S. and its nuclear allies in NATO could easily revive the doctrine of deterrence by punishment by declaring they would individually or jointly execute nuclear reprisals against any nation that initiates a first strike without an unambiguous and immediate threat to the attacking state’s national survival. Such a policy would even bring Iran under the defense umbrella of NATO’s nuclear powers should they be the victim of an uninvited first strike.

Finally, with respect to the problem of anti-state actors, the nuclear powers of NATO could warn all nations that, should an unexplained nuclear detonation take place in the world, any nation found to have willfully provided nuclear materials or technology to the perpetrators would be subject to the severest of sanctions, including suspension or expulsion from international organizations and programs, complete economic isolation, a freezing of all the state’s assets, being disconnected from international communications networks, and even nuclear reprisal.

An Asymmetric Yet Mahanian PLAN

Even if China does interpret Mahan in warlike fashion, it need not construct a navy symmetrical to the U.S. Navy to achieve its maritime goals, such as upholding territorial claims around the Chinese nautical periphery, commanding East Asian seas and skies, and safeguarding distant sea lines of communication. Beijing could accept Mahan’s general logic of naval strategy while seeking to command vital sea areas with weaponry and methods quite different from anything Mahan foresaw. If the much-discussed anti-ship ballistic missile pans out, for instance, the PLA could hold U.S. Navy carrier strike groups at a distance. Medium-sized Chinese aircraft carriers could operate freely behind that defensive shield, sparing the PLAN the technical and doctrinal headaches associated with constructing big-deck carriers comparable to the U.S. Navy’s Nimitz or Ford classes. Beijing would fulfill its Mahanian goal of local sea control at a modest cost—an eminently sensible approach, and one that Mahan would have applauded. Thus, Western observers should avoid projecting their own assumptions onto Chinese strategic thinkers.

Strategic theory, then, gives Westerners an instrument to track China’s maritime rise, complementing more traditional techniques of net assessment. If Chinese scholars and seafarers continue ignoring the cooperative strands of Mahanian thought, mistaking his writings for (or misrepresenting them as) bloody-minded advocacy of naval battle, Chinese strategy will incline toward naval competition and conflict. On the other hand, a China whose leadership fully grasps the logic governing Mahanian theory may prove less contentious.

I, like many current thinkers, am unconvinced that the United States and China must out of necessity become strategic adversaries. Indeed, given the ever-expanding economic interdependency between our two nations, an adversarial relationship would likely benefit neither. However, the ambiguity in the relationship and China’s strategic goals remain the key problems. And of course, U.S. naval planning and force structure will and must continue to consider the PLAN a potential threat to access until the ambiguity is resolved.

In what a U.S. military official calls an “inadvertent encounter,” a Chinese submarine hit an underwater sonar array being towed by the destroyer USS John McCain on Thursday.

The USS John S. McCain, left, anchored at the port of Incheon 40 km west of Seoul, Korea in March 2004.

The array was damaged, but the sub and the ship did not collide, the official said. A sonar array is a device towed behind a ship that listens and locates underwater sounds.

The incident occurred near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines.

The official, who declined to be named because the incident had not been made public, would not say whether the U.S. ship knew the submarine was that close to it.

It’s starting to feel more and more like the U.S.-Soviet relationship of the 1950s.

Overall: C As someone who tries to adhere to the admonition to be “quick to listen, slow to speak and slow to anger”, I see little harm in listening more and talking to all the players on the world stage; however, implied in that admonition is forceful talk and action when required. In this light, there’s been little talk or anger of consequence on the national security front in the first 100 days, despite all that has transpired. Considering the President’s inexperience with national security issues, and the deluge of problems he’s faced, a passing grade is a praiseworthy achievement.

National Security Strategy: Incomplete, and my sense is the due date on this assignment is not far off. I suspect that Gen. Jones is laboring mightily on one, but excessive delays may send a message that global security problems are something to be reacted to and not planned for. You can’t shape the world if you don’t have any blueprints from which to work.

Maritime Strategy: B With the current strategy being relatively new and day-to-day operations continuing to align with the strategy, the working assumption is that the last order will remain in force. I have some concerns, however, that resources may continue to be short and not necessarily optimized for the strategy. Increased counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa are promising, though they remain a treatment for the symptoms rather than a cure.

Afghanistan/Pakistan: A Efforts in Af/Pak have been well played to date. Pressure is up on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Washington seems to have finally convinced Lahore that they can’t just look the other way on the problems building in their western provinces. The nation building and stabilization proposals have promise, but the execution is in doubt.

Iraq: B While the current plan differs little from the previous administration’s, I was not enthusiastic about it then, either. Right now in Iraq, to get an A one must only not screw it up or allow someone else to screw it up. Recent upticks in bombings and Sunni discontent threaten to screw it up, and there are no signs the current administration is reassessing.

The Middle East: B While the Administration has not undercut Israel’s desire that any Palestinian state recognize Israel and has voiced its support for a two-state solution, the resumption of funding for Iranian-backed Hamas and efforts to make an end run around legal limits are troubling and unlikely to produce any useful concessions. In addition, with Iran pulling most of the strings on the Palestinian side, it’s unlikely the Administration will be able to make a deal possible without taking on Iran.

North Korea/Iran: D The Administration appears to have resigned itself to Iran, and as a result, North Korea and probably Syria going nuclear. Scaling back plans for land-based missile defense only magnify the potential consequences of the failure. Lots of talk was dedicated to increasing dialogue and trying new ideas, but nothing significant has been produced—or even proposed—to date. North Korea and Iran desperately want to be recognized as being legitimate and influential, so in that context silence is assent and expanding ties is approval. The good news for the White House is, this grade is probably capped at a “B”.

China: C The Impeccable incident was a strong signal from the PRC that America is not necessarily welcome to operate in China’s desired sphere of influence. The response from Adm. Blair that the incident represented a serious problem was the right one, but it should have come from the mouth of the President. In addition, the signal that the U.S. would not publicly hold the PRC accountable over a safe issue like human rights leaves me wondering in what area the Administration would ever express criticism. In the positive column, however, the U.S. continues to press China to explain the purposes behind the rapid expansion of its naval forces and maintain an increased presence in the region to counterweight China’s growing influence. The signals are mixed and inconsistent between Defense and State, which is never good.

Russia: D In 100 days the Administration has managed to give away its best leverage against Russia—missile defense and NATO expansion—and probably send a signal that Russia has a free hand in its near abroad. Russian meddling in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have gone unacknowledged in Washington, and if Russia consummates a de facto takeover of any of these states, this grade will tip to an F.

Though officer retention rates have generally increased, there remain select shortfalls in the control grades,” he wrote, referring to aggregate numbers across all the officer communities. “Commander and lieutenant commander inventories are below requirements; though, for the first time in many years, unrestricted line captain inventory exceeds officer programmed authorizations.

While that may be true across all communities, the outlook for the Surface Navy is still pretty poor. And, according to the most recent community brief to Commanding and Executive Officers, the problem looks like it will take at least a decade to correct. Slides 2 and 20 show the numbers.

The Navy announced plans April 14 to place a temporary hold on selected permanent change of station (PCS) moves in order to remain within budget.

The decision means that as many as 14,000 Sailors who have not already received orders may not be able to transfer until after Oct. 1 when the new fiscal year begins.

Individuals currently under orders will be allowed to rotate as planned.
…
Exceptions to the PCS hold include orders for Sailors separating from the service, individual augmentees and Global War On Terrorism Support Assignments (GSA), new accessions, organization moves as well as selected Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), graduate education moves and readiness moves.

I can recall this happening when cash was tight in the past, but never with five and a half months left in the fiscal year.