We are pleased to welcome Alec Walen as a contributor here at PEA Soup.  Alec is Associate Professor at Rutgers University, jointly appointed in Law, Philosophy, and Criminal Justice, and he works in both moral theory and legal theory.  Welcome aboard, Alec!

I disagree with one of my fellow PEA Brains about something. Part of what our disagreement hinges upon is our differing intuitions about the following sort of case. Although it's clear that we have differing intuitions about this case, it's not clear whose intuitions are more widely shared. Of course, I don't think that because an intuition is widely shared that means that it must be true, but I do think how widely an intuition is shared among fellow philosophers does affect how persuasive certain arguments that rely on those intuitions will be. So here's a survey that tests people's intuitions.

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/QGF6XDD

If you have the time, please take the survey. In a few days (after there have been several responses), I'll explain what the disagreement is and what of philosophical interests hangs on it. I post below the fold the set up for the survey in case people want to ask questions about it.

It is now t1. I will experience agonizing pain in my right pinky at t10 unless I take at t5 either the anesthetizing pill or the amputating pill. If I take the anesthetizing pill at t5, I’ll be anesthetized at t10. If I take the amputating pill at t5, I’ll be missing my right pinky at t10. Either way, I’ll avoid experiencing agonizing pain in my right pinky at t10. Assume that my obtaining the anesthetizing pill is costless, but that it is only be obtained now. Assume that my obtaining the amputating pill will be costly; I can obtain it only at t4 and only by either purchasing it for $20,000 or by trading ITEM in for it. Lastly, assume that I can purchase ITEM only at t1 at a cost of $10,000. There are then five salient states of affairs:

1. I obtain the anesthetizing pill now and take it at t5, thereby avoiding agony at t10 without incurring any costs.
2. I purchase ITEM now for $10,000, trade it in for the amputating pill at t4, and take the amputating pill at t5, thereby avoiding agony at t10 at the cost of $10,000 and my right pinky.
3. I purchase the amputating pill at t4 for $20,000 and take it at t5, thereby avoiding agony at t10 at the cost of $20,000 and my right pinky.
4. I take neither pill at t5 and suffer agony at t10.
5. I take both pills at t5 in which case I immediately die.

 Assume that the states of affairs rank in the order given. Thus assume that the agony is so great that (2) and (3) are both better than (4). Assume that ITEM is only potentially good as a means to obtaining the amputating pill at t4. Otherwise, it’s completely valueless. Assume that everything else is equal.

Now suppose that, as a matter of fact, I’m presently forming both the intention to refrain from obtaining the anesthetizing pill and the intention to instead purchase ITEM, trade it in for the amputating pill, and take the amputating pill at t5. And, assume that as matter of fact, I will follow through with whatever intention I now form and that, therefore, I will not obtain the anesthetizing pill. It’s not that I couldn’t now respond appropriately to my reasons and form the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill and thereby obtain it; it’s just that, as a matter fact, I’m not responding appropriately to my reasons and so I’m not forming the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill and so I’m not going to obtain the anesthetizing pill.    

THE QUESTION: Do I now have a reason, indeed most reason, to purchase ITEM? Is purchasing ITEM what I ought to do?

ARGUMENT FOR YES: Given that I will, as a matter of fact, not obtain the anesthetizing pill, I will later on have a reason, indeed most reason, to obtain the amputating pill. After all, if I don’t obtain the anesthetizing pill (and I won’t), then, later on, taking the amputating pill will be the only way for me to avoid agonizing pain in my right pinky at t10. And I can facilitate my later obtaining that amputating pill by purchasing ITEM. Therefore, in virtue of the fact that I will have a reason later on to obtain the amputating pill, I now have a reason, indeed most reason, to facilitate my later obtaining the amputating pill by presently purchasing ITEM.  

THE ARGUMENT FOR NO: We should not hold fixed the fact that I will not obtain the anesthetizing pill when deciding what my present reasons and obligations are, for whether or not I will obtain the anesthetizing pill depends on whether I presently respond appropriately to my reasons. If I were now to respond appropriately to my reasons, as we’re assuming that I’m capable of, I would now be forming the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill. The fact that I’m not forming the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill doesn’t mean that my forming this intention isn’t an option for me, nor does it mean that I shouldn’t form the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill. Indeed, I should form the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill. So I have no reason to purchase ITEM, because I should just form the intention to obtain the anesthetizing pill, obtain the anesthetizing pill, and take it at t5, thereby avoiding agony at t10 without incurring any costs.

From both (1) the fact that I have a conditional obligation to obtain the amputating pill if I’m not going to obtain the anesthetizing pill and (2) the fact that I’m not going to obtain the anesthetizing pill, it doesn’t follow that (3) I have an unconditional obligation to obtain the amputating pill.

I’ve been reading David Enoch’s great Taking Morality Seriously. Enoch defends Robust Realism according to which there are judgment-independent non-natural (causally inert) normative properties. One of the objections to Robust Realism briefly discussed in the book is the problem of semantic access. Enoch is explicitly very modest when he responds to this objection (he merely explains how a response might go). I still want to raise a question about this response as I think that we are getting here into very deep and interesting questions about normative concepts and properties.

The problem of semantic access is the question of how our talk and thought came to refer to the non-natural normative properties. The standard stories of how many other terms come to refer to ordinary objects and properties often make use of our causal interaction with those objects and properties. Obviously a Robust Realist cannot give a similar story of how the reference of our normative language gets fixed, as according to her there are no causal connections between our concepts and the denoted properties.

Enoch borrows the response to this challenge from Ralph Wedgwood and his version of Conceptual Role Semantics. Here’s a rough sketch of Wedgwood’s view as a starting point. It begins from logical connectives. Take conjunction. There are basic rules that govern the sentences of the type ‘A&B’. If you accept A and you accept B and the question arises, then you are committed to accepting also A&B. And, if you accept A&B, then you are committed to accepting A and accepting B. Furthermore, if you grasp the concept &, then you must also understand these basic rules that govern the relevant sentences. This also makes the previous basic rules rules of rationality; it is irrational to violate them if you understand the concept (and thus are aware of the rules). 

On Wedgwood’s view, the conceptual role of a concept – the basic rules governing its use in inferences – also determines the reference/semantic value of the concept. And, in the case of logical connectives this is plausible. The assumption is that the reference/semantic value of a basic sentence is a truth-value, and that the reference/semantic values of the complex sentences are truth-values too but ones that are functions of the truth-values of the basic sentences. They also have to be the specific functions that make certain inferences in which the connective are used valid, namely ones that make best sense of the basic rules governing the connectives. And, this is how the conceptual role of the connectives fix their references to certain truth-functions. 

Enoch and Wedgwood both want to use this view to explain how the reference of normative terms too gets fixed to the non-natural properties. There are basic rules that govern expressions such as ‘I have most reason to phi…’. One of them might be that if I accept the sentence, then I am committed to intending to phi. If I grasp the concept, I understand this basic rule and thus I will be irrational not to conform to it. Now, how does this get to the reference? Well, we must first ask what would make best sense of the basic inferential rules governing the concept? Some basic moves from ordinary beliefs to the reason-belief and from them to the intentions are correctness-preserving (this is analogical to truth-preservingness and based on whatever the goal of practical reasoning is). The solution to the reference-fixing problem for Enoch is then provided by the thought that, if the concept of reasons didn’t really refer to some non-natural sui generis causally inert normative reasons-relations, then the basic rules would not lead from correct input of practical reasoning to correct intentions (relative to whatever the goal of practical reasoning is). And, so, because that reference would be the best validation of the conceptual role of ‘reasons’, therefore it must be the reference. Thus, the conceptual role has again explained how the reference got determined. 

Now, as you notice, this sketch is missing a lot details (many of which have been provided by Wedgwood). In the case of logical connectives, we know a lot about validity, truth and truth-preservingness, and so on. But, in the normative case, there’s less agreement about what the basic rules are, that it is what it is for the practical inferences to be ‘valid’ as in correctness-preserving (and what it is for the states to be correct too).  This is because there is disagreement about the goals of practical reasoning. There are also questions of why and how Enoch's non-natural normative properties would be the best vindication for the inferential patterns. 

I want to pursue another line of thought. With many concepts, it seems like the conceptual role is not enough to fix the reference of the concept. Consider water. There are basic transition rules that govern the use of the concept that anyone who understands the concept must grasp – this falls from the sky -> this is water, this is water -> this extinguishes thirst, and so on. The reason why these rules cannot determine the reference is that presumably the basic inferential rules that govern the concept on Twin Earth are the same as here. So, if the conceptual role determined the reference, our concept of water and theirs would have the same reference, and that’s just not true.  

To deal with this problem, the conceptual role semanticists have to either admit that something other than the conceptual role fixes the reference or part of the conceptual role is our causal interaction with the substance (which creates problems elsewhere).  This is to think that not only intralanguage rules determine the conceptual role but also extra-linguistic transitions. 

So, now, the question I have is why the normative terms are supposed to be more like the logical connectives where the conceptual role is able to determine the reference without any causal connection and less like the term water where it isn’t (or where the role must be specified in terms of causal interaction)? I guess this is a question I would like to ask from those who are attracted to conceptual role semantics about normative terms. 

For what it's worth, and I’m very uncertain about the rest, there seems to be one relevant difference between the conjunction case and the water case. In the conjunction case, given that we know the conceptual role is – which specific inferences the reference of the concept is supposed to make valid, there’s only one candidate for what the reference could be. There can be just one truth-function that could deliver the validity of those inferences. So, there’s no room for Twin Earth cases.  Whatever the metaphysical realisation of the truth-function happens to be (and maybe there are many), we still essentially have the same function in terms of it making the same inferences valid. So, in a sense, what the reference is in the metaphysical sense just doesn’t matter as much as what the function does – spurns out certain truth-values from other truth-values. As Wedgwood notes, we can do this even without truth-values and truth-functions in terms of sets of possible worlds and set-functions (and of course there are many understandings of those).

So, what about the normative properties case? I can think of three options. Firstly, the Robust Realist could say that there could be in principle only one kind of non-natural causally inert properties, so therefore we need those properties as references to make ok our practical inferences. This is to say that differently constituted ‘normative XYZ’ that does all the same things as good old ‘normative H₂O’ is impossible for some reason. Given how little we know of the constitution of the non-natural normative properties I find this option difficult to motivate. The second option is to say that (i) there are many possible non-natural normative properties in terms of their constitution and (ii) some magical non-causal mechanism fixes the references of our concepts to reasons, oughts, and good rather than to treasons, toughts, and tgood.  

The final, and perhaps most plausible, model is to follow the logical connectives case again. What we really are after are certain functions – ones that take thoughts about circumstances and their correctness-values as arguments and give correctness-values of practical attitudes as outputs (as familiar, these inputs and outputs could be fact-plan worlds). Admittedly, just like in the case of truth-functions and truth-values, these correctness-values and correctness–functions could be perhaps realised in different ways on the metaphysical level. 

But, with respect to making ok the practical inferences, it’s not that the metaphysical nature of the correctness-functions matters but rather only what correctness-values the functions give for the practical conclusions out of the correctness-values of their arguments. Perhaps even something natural (or abstract, or fictional, or) could realise those functions, but even this would not mean identifying the normative properties with natural properties given that the realiser of the function is not the same as the function itself. So, in the same way as the metaphysical nature of the truth-functions is irrelevant, the proper reference of the normative terms and thus the metaphysical nature of the normative properties drops out here again as something that doesn’t do much work and isn’t very interesting. Thus I’m starting to think that the conceptual role semantics undermines the metaphysical picture of Robust Realism which seems to be far more picky about the metaphysical nature of the relevant properties. 

We are pleased to present the latest installment of our partnership with Ethics, in which we host a discussion on one, or in this case more than one, article from each issue of the journal.  The articles selected from Volume 122, issue 1, are John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud's "Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense" and Jeff McMahan's "Duty, Obedience, Desert, and Proportionality in War: A Response" (particularly section IV).  We are very grateful that Victor Tadros has agreed to provide the critical précis, which appears below the fold.

In their rich, imaginative and complex paper, John Gardner and Francois Tanguay-Renaud (GTR) explore the idea that desert is relevant to self-defence. In his careful and typically pellucid response McMahan continues to defend the view that desert is irrelevant to self-defence. Obviously, there is a great deal in these papers to discuss, and any summary will be inadequate. I hope both to provide the main issues of debate and raise issues and questions to help advance the debate further. Apologies for any misunderstandings, which may be many and serious.

GTR think that desert provides an explanation of the asymmetry in self-defence cases – that we hope that the person defending herself succeeds against a culpable attacker, and will typically wish to support her in her defensive aims. McMahan denies that desert is important in self-defence.

What is desert? GTR don’t identify clearly what they mean by desert. They endorse the following: if D deserves x there is always a reason for x to be given to D. McMahan believes that ‘D deserves x’ implies that it is intrinsically good that D gets x. GTR reject McMahan’s idea. GTR may be right. We could replace the words ‘intrinsically good’ with ‘impersonally valuable’, leaving open the possibility that there are ways in which it can be valuable that D gets x which are not grounded in the intrinsic goodness of D getting x. In this GTR only clarify a possibility. They leave untouched the difficult question how it can be impersonally valuable that a person is harmed. Unlike GTR, I find this idea both implausible and barbaric (let’s call it the ‘barbaric thesis’ for short).

Why does McMahan think Desert is Irrelevant? McMahan seems to accept the barbaric thesis. Here is a question for him. If the barbaric thesis is valid, why rule out the idea that desert plays a role in self-defence? Why can’t it provide some reason to harm the aggressor in self-defence, at least in circumstances where it is clear that D will not later be punished for what he has done? McMahan claims that harming the person would have nothing to do with self-defence. But this evades the issue only by terminological fiat.

Even if the impersonal value of the person suffering were not a ‘defensive reason’, it would still have a role in determining the permissibility of self-defence. It seems hard to believe that it is intrinsically good that bad people suffer and yet that this plays no role in determining whether defending oneself against a culpable person in a way that makes them suffer is permissible. This conjunction of views seems difficult to motivate.

Furthermore, McMahan thinks that culpability is relevant to proportionality. Desert would provide an explanation why this is so. Of course, there are other explanations available grounded in the significance of responsibility and the importance of kinds of responsibility to questions of liability. But desert is at least a contender for an explanation why culpability makes a difference. More could be done by both GTR and McMahan to outline the range of possible explanations why culpability matters, and to defend one contender in the range. McMahan’s claim that culpability matters because it is a special kind of responsibility seems attractive to me given my antipathy to desert, but needs more defence.

Is desert sufficient reason to harm others? McMahan notes that it is intuitively wrong to harm a person in self-defence where no instrumental good is served. GTR reject the following claim that drives McMahan to reject the significance of desert to self-defence on this basis:

Desert excludes instrumental considerations (DEIC): If D deserves to be harmed it is permissible to harm D even if no further goal is served.

 McMahan suggests that self-defence is instrumental in ambition and that desert is non-instrumental, hence rejecting the significance of desert. In rejecting DEIC, GTR note that defenders of plural theories of punishment sometimes claim that punishment is justified only if both D deserves to be punished and some further goal is served. Here is one explanation GTR offer: the impersonal value of D being harmed may never provide sufficient reason to harm D. This is because, in cases of deserved harm, there are always conflicting reasons – reasons of justice to give D what he deserves are always counterbalanced by reasons of humanity against doing so.

 Whilst not incoherent, this view is hard to motivate and defend. GTR appeal to accounts of punishment by HLA Hart and John Rawls. This is not ideal. For brevity, let’s focus on Hart. Hart believed that deterrence was the general justifying aim of punishment, but that it was to be distributed on retributivist grounds. This seems to imply that desert had a role in Hart’s theory. But it is not obvious that it did – Hart was unclear about what he meant by retributivism, and probably rejected the idea that deserved suffering of offenders was intrinsically good or impersonally valuable, or even not bad (recall this excellent claim: retributivists appear to believe in ‘a mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of the two evils of moral wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good’ Punishment and Responsibility 234-5). One question for GTR, then, is how to clarify and motivate plural theories of punishment in a way that can provide support for the role of desert in self-defence. It seems unsatisfactory to defend a highly controversial account of self-defence by appealing to Hart’s highly controversial, unclear and inadequately defended account of punishment.

Intentional harming and Non-comparative Justice. GTR then explore the idea that desert might play a similar role in self-defence – as a matter of non-comparative justice, it is permissible to harm a person intentionally only if that person deserves to be harmed. Only wrongdoers deserve to be harmed. Here are their principles, which are general principles of harming:

(NCJ1) It is morally permissible intentionally to inflict suffering or deprivation (we will say ‘harm’ for short) only on those who deserve such an infliction and only to the extent that they deserve it.

 (NCJ2) Those who deserve such an infliction are all and only guilty wrongdoers, to the extent and only to the extent that the infliction is proportionate to their guilty wrongs.

As McMahan suggests, taken literally, these principles seem implausible even if one accepts the barbaric thesis. They would at least need to be revised to accommodate cases where a person consents to be harmed. Here is a further reason in support of the idea that these principles are implausible. Suppose that D culpably attacks E with lethal force. E shoots D in the head. Shooting D in the head was necessary to avert the threat. E is an attempted murderer. E would deserve to die only if attempted murderers deserve to die. That seems implausible. If intentional harming is permissible only if it satisfies GTR’s principles of non-comparative justice, this would seem to imply that it is wrong for E to shoot D in the head. That also seems implausible.

Perhaps GTR will appeal to considerations of comparative justice here. NCJ (1 and 2) might be understood as exclusively governing the all things considered permissibility of intentional harming. If so, the example in the previous paragraph seems decisive against this view. But GTR leave open the possibility that there might be other grounds for acting in self-defence, as a matter of comparative justice, for example in mistaken attacker cases. In such cases GTR believe that the person harmed is wronged, but wronging her may be permissible. This suggests that ‘permissible’, in NCJ (1 and 2) is not to be understood as ‘all things considered’ permissible. It is about whether the conduct is prima facie wrong, leaving open whether that conduct may nevertheless be justified all things considered. It is not clear whether GTR believe that intentional harming may be all things considered permissible on a comparative justice basis.

If NCJ (1 and 2) are to be understood as governing intentional harming exclusively, much will depend on how to understand intentional harming. This is how I interpret the dispute between McMahan and GTR about intentional harming. McMahan reports that GTR believe that enforcing compensatory duties does not involve intentional harming. It is somewhat unclear whether GTR believe that harming in self-defence involves intentional harming, given that harm is only imposed to avert the threat faced, and if non-harmful means were available they would be used. If they do not, NCJ (1 and 2) seem less relevant for self-defence, as McMahan implies.

I agree with McMahan that harming, in compensation or in self-defence, is typically best understood as intentional harming, though there are difficult problems to solve here: specifically, if D intends x and x is very close (in some sense to be specified) to y, does D also intend y.

It is worth noting that in the case of punishment, unlike the case of self-defence, harm itself is typically aimed at. A person does not necessarily fail to defend himself if he fails to harm his attacker. He may succeed simply by disarming him. In contrast it is plausible that a person necessarily fails to punish another if he fails to harm him (the failure test of intent may not be perfect, but it will do here).

Perhaps GTR mean NCJ (1 and 2) only to govern intentional harming in the very strict sense that harm itself is aimed at. Even on the strict reading of intentional harming, the claim that intentional harming is permissible only if the person harmed deserves it seems implausibly restrictive. Consider:

Deterring the Mistaken Attacker: A reasonably mistaken attacker will          repeatedly attack me unless I deter him. I can deter him only by harming him.

Surely I can harm him to some degree in order to deter him. Yet he is not a guilty wrongdoer. I doubt I necessarily wrong him if I do this, even prima facie. He has no right that I not harm him in this way to at least some degree - that he is liable to be harmed.  

Here’s an explanation. He would have a duty to accept being harmed, or even to harm himself, to some degree for this end had he been, by some magical twist of fate able, in advance, to cause this to happen. It seems odd to say that this person has (or would have, were he to know the facts) a duty to cause himself to be harmed and yet a right that he not be harmed. It follows that this person is not wronged if an equivalent harm is imposed on him.

Conclusion. GTR could do more to clarify and defend their version of the barbaric thesis. They could also do more to explain the relationship between principles of non-comparative and comparative justice in self-defence claims and show that this relationship has plausible implications. And they could clarify whether NCJ (1 and 2) are intended exclusively to govern the permissibility of intentional harming, and if so what ‘intentional harming’ means. McMahan could do more to explain why he endorses the barbaric thesis if he does, and why he thinks it plays no role in self-defence. He could also defend his alternative account of why culpability matters to proportionality more deeply to demonstrate that desert is not doing the work.

Nothing that I say here should cast doubt on my admiration for both pieces. They do much to advance our understanding of a neglected issue in the philosophy of self-defence.

(Moving to the front from Dec. 10)

We are pleased to announce the next installment in our collaboration with Ethics, where we host a discussion of one article from each issue of the journal, and the journal makes a copy of that article freely accessible (for a limited time) to our participants. 

Because the current issue (Volume 122, issue 1) features a symposium on Jeff McMahan's Killing in War, this time around we are focusing on two articles, John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud's "Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense" and McMahan's reply.  Ethics has generously agreed to provide open access to both articles, which are now available here.  We are also pleased that our own Victor Tadros will provide a précis of the article to kick off the discussion.  Professor Tadros'  précis will appear, and discussion of the article will begin, Wednesday, January 4, 2012.

Guy Fletcher and Mike Ridge are organising a conference on hybrid theories in metaethics in Edinburgh this summer from 2nd of July to 4th of July. As you all know, these are views according to which telling a complete story of normative judgments requires talking about both beliefs and desire-like attitudes. The line-up is incredible: Dorit Bar-On (UNC-Chapel Hill), Stephen Barker (Nottingham), Dan Boisvert (UNC-Charlotte), Matthew Chrisman (Edinburgh), David Copp (UC-Davis), John Erikkson (Gothenberg), Steve Finlay (USC), Guy Fletcher (Edinburgh), Ryan Hay (Occidential College), Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck), Mike Ridge (Edinburgh), Mark Schroeder (USC), Laura Schroeter (Melbourne), Francois Schroeter (Melbourne), and Jon Tresan (UNC-Chapel Hill). Phhew! More information about the conference HERE. Just after the conference, there's also Joint Session and BSET in Stirling (see HERE and HERE).

The "smoker" has been getting a lot of bad press and deservedly so. See here for some of the relevant links. I have a proposal. Either members of the interview teams should not attend the reception/"smoker" or they should refuse to talk to prospective job candidates during the reception. They should, then, let all their interviewees know that they will not be attending (or talking to them during) the reception. This is what I would propose to my department if we were conducting APA interviews.

I take it that there is no point in getting rid of the reception. What's problematic is not the reception itself; rather, it's that many schools treat the reception/"smoker" as an extended part of the interview process. We should put an end to that, and it seems that my proposal would do that. What do others think?