1.  Was Tinbergen awarded the first Nobel Prize in Economics?   No, strictly speaking.  Because there is no such thing as a Nobel Prize in Economics.  Alfred Nobel did not envisage it, or endow any.  Instead, well over seventy years after Alfred Nobel passed away, a financial institution in Stockholm steps in, inaugurating the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences (in memory of Alfred Nobel).   In 1969, Jan Tinbergen, at age 66, becomes the first recipient of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences, shared with Ragnar Frish.

2.  Consequently, neither Tinbergen (at age 66, nor Frish), were jointly awarded a real Nobel Prize?   Actually, believe it or not, Tinbergen and Frish did end up being jointly awarded a real Nobel Prize (with a twist):  Nico Tinbergen, Jan’s younger brother, was awarded the (bona fide) Nobel Prize for Medicine four years later, when he was also 66.  He shared his Nobel in medicine with Karl von Frish, who was not Ragnar Frish brother (and with Konrad Lorenz)…

3.  When an economist has been awarded alone the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Nobel, then such economist has always received the full award without having to share a cent?   No, again.  When University of Chicago professor Robert Lucas won the Nobel in economics in 1995, he had to give half of his $1 million prize money to his ex-wife because of a clause in their divorce settlement.

As CNN.com states now:  ‘If there were a Nobel Prize for Foresight or Timing, she should be nominated, based on a clause in their divorce settlement from seven years earlier: “Wife shall receive 50 percent of any Nobel Prize.”   The clause expired on October 31, 1995.  Had Lucas won any year after, he would have kept the whole million.’

Clearly, Lucas first wife had aptly applied his path-breaking theory of Rational Expectations.

Lucas was in good company.  Albert Einstein’s Nobel Prize money went to his ex-wife as part of their (ex-post) divorce settlement.

4.  Yesterday we heard that for the first time a woman economist won the Prize in Economics.  Wrong.  One of the 2009 Economics Prize recipient is Elinor Ostrom, who is actually a political scientist.  She is one of the pioneers in Public Choice theory, in introducing economic tools in political science, and in addressing the tragedy of the commons and the wonders of collective action.

5.  A dead person cannot receive a Nobel Prize.  Mistaken, again.   The alleged coiner of the notion of the ‘planned economy’, and co-drafter of legislation that paved the way of the so-called “welfare state”, actually received a bona fide Nobel Prize (not the Economics Prize), after his death.   I am talking about the former U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold, who received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1961 after he was killed in a plane crash in Africa.  The Nobel Prize rules were amended in 1974 to ban posthumous prizes.

6.  So where does this leave us all in Economics today?  Is it out of the question then that Lord John Maynard Keynes could have received the Economics Prize this year?  Traditionalists, who go according to strict rules, say ‘No way’ — because Keynes has been long dead in the long run.  Or in any run.

Wrong again?  Stockholm may not have realized that in essence Keynes today is more alive than ever.   The unprecedented mega-trillion stimulus plans in many countries, the social welfare, housing and infrastructure investments, the growing role of the State in the economy, both by owning formerly private assets as well as regulating, have revived Keynes in ways that were regarded unthinkable two years ago.

Ending on a serious note, as I have been arguing, this new overarching role of government poses fresh governance challenges around the world.  They have been largely ignored so far.  If today we could only speak to Lord Keynes, contradicting some of his interpreting disciples and critics, he would remind us of the importance of sound and reformed public finances, of removing many market distortions, of sound governance.

As the global economy is stabilizing, and the recession is virtually over, so are the excuses of inaction on the governance front.

The G-20 had just finished their third meeting, and there was a lot of buzz surrounding the demise of the G8 and it being replaced by the broader G-20.  Accolades were also given to this Pittsburgh Summit on the progress of IMF and World Bank governance reforms and on climate change.

But, I argued against the irrational exuberance by some pundits.  Uncorking of the champagne would have been premature.

For starters, during the G-20 London Summit last April, it was already obvious that the G-8 was effectively displaced.  While the G-20 was grappling with the gravest phase of the financial crisis, the Italian prime minister announced that he would host the forthcoming G8 summit in a ship. Thus, Pittsburgh may have merely formalized what long ago was already inevitable, given the changed geopolitical and economic reality…

While broadening the “voice”of emerging economies in these elite clubs is obviously welcomed, there is less than meets the eye. First, let us keep in mind that while more “voice” is being given, some of those very governments are not particularly adept at giving “voice” to their own people. It is still an elite club of governments, representing 19 countries and the EU.

Aabout 1.5 billion citizens living in three of these countries are severely “voice deprived,” while another 400 million living in another three countries have it only a tad better, living in a “voice challenged” environment. This “people-friendly voice” (and not merely government-focused) perspective is also important in looking at the “voice reforms” at the IMF and the World Bank. So far, these reforms are marginal, and again, focused on government representation. Many of these governments are not necessarily fully representative of their own people. Other country governments, such as Belgium, are representative of their citizenry, but are tiny, and yet are holding on to their executive chairs in these organizations.

Further, a larger group may enhance voice and participation, but important decision-making is unlikely. The Pittsburgh communiqué is illustrative with “encouragements,”exhortations and principles, and even a bit of “peer review.” But there are no sanctions or other clear incentives or enforcement mechanisms to engage in concrete collective action for the public global good.

Witness for instance the bit on trade in the communiqué. It is last, an afterthought, and simply reiterating what was already exhorted in the London Summit in April, including the customary “commitment to Doha.” In reality, the world continues to move further into protectionism. U.S. duties on Chinese tires illustrate just this. Likewise, the outcome of the G-20 meeting is rather weak on the expected revamp of financial regulations. Granted, there was so much focus on compensation reform. But this is neither the crux of the matter, nor best resolved by 20 governments.

To give credit where it is due, the London Summit did further convergence among key players toward the need for stimulus plans in their economies. But this is an exception, which was forced by the dire magnitude of the crisis. And during Pittsburgh, an emerging consensus to phase out inefficient energy subsidies may turn out to be a non-trivial achievement as well. And there was again a long list of calls to help the vulnerable and poor. While laudable, they were mostly exhortations for voluntarism, again.

Finally, consider a very different “Group-of-8:” Botswana, Chile, Mauritius, Uruguay, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland. Do they have any relevance for the G-20? Little, at first. None of them were invited to the previously G-20 summits since neither their economic size nor their population are large enough, and they lack the global “systemic significance” of most G-20 members. This particular “Group-of-8” does not even really exist as a formal body.

But there is a rationale for G-20 leaders to pay attention to this particular set of uninvited countries. Like the G-20, they comprise a rather diverse group of developing and developed countries from different regions of the world. But, unlike most of the G-20, this particular group of eight countries exhibits high quality of national governance. In fact, their levels of governance, on average, exceed the now defunct G8.  This good governance group is not perfect either, but their experiences and lessons ought not be ignored. In a recent article, I emphasized the need to look for good practices outside of the G-20.

We need to keep in mind that it is rare for any organization to be better than the sum of its parts. Too often we assess global governance institutions without first having a serious look at the governance (and set of incentives) of each individual country member—in this case governments.

The Pittsburgh Summit was very weak on national governance and integrity issues, even though they are critical to solving other global challenges.  Perhaps the G-20 may focus better on governance when it next meets in Seoul, while also humbly drawing from important lessons from countries and experiences outside the G-20.

The notion of “Rashomon” today refers generally to when there is no consensus on the “truth” around an event.  I was just reminded by it when scanning the world news…

Hillary Clinton has just landed in Nairobi, Kenya, where she will be opening the Agoa Forum on Wednesday.  Agoa stands for Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, and was introduced in 2000 by then President Bill Clinton.

First, witness two vastly different media accounts of the same visit to Kenya that is now getting started…

One such ‘witness account’ by allafrica.com, which reports that:  “Mrs Clinton’s presence signals the level of support and endorsement the new administration of President Barack Obama is according what is by far the most friendly trade deal ever offered by the US to any region of the world…  The forum is an annual event but the choice of Kenya as the host and the high-level US representation reflects a recognition of Kenya’s strategic importance as the region’s economic linchpin…”

Indeed, some are interpreting Hillary Clinton’s visit as a rapid way of making up to Kenya (and Nigeria) after Obama, Kenya’s prodigal son, snubbed the government by opting to visit Ghana instead in his presidential visit.

That much for the account of one ‘media witness’.

Now onto a different ‘media witness’ account, which is online in the daily Standard of Nairobi.  At first one imagines that it is referring to a totally different visit, time and place.    Wrong.  Like in Rashomon, it is the same visit by Hillary, same place, now.  The article is entitled: “Clinton lands as US breathes fire”.  Worth reading here, and so that nobody thinks I am making this up, it states (among others):

“US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton landed in style as Washington and London warned Kenya’s Cabinet they would hold accountable those who frustrate reform agenda and punishment of post-election violence suspects.  US ambassador Michael Ranneberger set the stage for Mrs Clinton’s arrival, shadowed by the many calls by President Barack Obama to Kenya to hurry up reform agenda and end to impunity, by releasing a statement coached in hard language and with limited options for Kenya.

“The British High Commissioner Rob Macaire in addition revealed the combined number of ministers, top civil servants, and entrepreneurs banned from stepping on British soil because of their conduct and dealings now stands at 20.  Also training his gun on Kenya was Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnie Carson who said Mrs Clinton would speak on Kenya’s governance problems, corruption, human rights and impunity.  Carson said: ‘Under the watchful eye of Kenya’s long serving Attorney General (Amos Wako) — a man who has served loyally under President Kibaki and President Moi — not one government official or serving politician has been successfully prosecuted for corruption in two decades.’

The article continues:  “Traditionally, the rest of the 27 European Union states reciprocates visa bans on foreigners by one of their members, which raises the prospect some Kenyan ministers, despite their official assignment, would never be allowed to step in EU states, and in all probability, the US, too.  US and UK’s anger stemmed from last week decision by the Cabinet to kill local tribunal option as a means of punishing post-election offenders, leaving but a small window for The Hague option, and going for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s way.”

“[F]ormer US ambassador [Carson to] Kenya did not spare the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission: ‘Kenya’s six-year-old Anti-Corruption Commission has demonstrated a record similar (to Wako’s) success rate’… “Kenya’s court system has also shown a willingness to play along with the Attorney General’s style of politics. On the rare occasions when corruption cases are presented to the courts, they are thrown out on procedural grounds or are allowed to die in a sea of judicial bureaucracy. In Kenya, there is a saying that sums up the public attitude towards the nation’s courts: ‘Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?’ said Carson”…

So here we are, two different accounts so far.   Of course it is the case that furthering US (and EU for that matter) trade with Africa is crucial at this juncture, and the fact that Nairobi is hosting this large international gathering should not be sneered at.

And of course it is also the case that Kenya has exhibited very poor governance standards in recent, and not-so-recent, times, at a vast socio-economic cost to the population.

But if we are speaking of various ‘witnesses’ having different perspectives, it is no secret that the US embassy in Nairobi, alongside some key international donor agencies, committed major mis-steps around the time of the ill-fated elections in late 2007.   In spite of their glaring biases and policy mishaps, the US, UK and the World Bank have largely been ’silent witnesses’ regarding what transpired on their own roles and actions at the time.

A tad of introspection by the US, UK (DfID) and the World Bank regarding their own governance failures in Nairobi before, during and immediately after the violent elections would help draw lessons for more effective aid strategies for the future.  The benefit would be beyond Kenya, in fact, as part of the pending revamp of aid strategies more generally.

As importantly, such an honest review of the role of donors in the Kenya crisis would enhance the credibility of a tough message on good governance being delivered by the US and UK governments to Kenya.

By the way, the movie Rashomon, which attained virtual introspective perfection sixty years ago already, has just made a comeback in a superbly restored version.

Back to the future.

A month before his momentous trip to Accra to address the Ghanian Parliament, Obama had gone to Cairo to deliver a major address to the Arab world.  It is a speech which is also worth studying in depth.  But it was more muted and unfocused, refraining from being too direct on the governance and freedom deficits in the Arab world. For one, Obama is not seen as a prodigal son there, in contrast with how he is regarded by Africa…

Further, the legacy of the jarring (and often arrogant) admonitions of the Bush regime forays into the Middle East did call for a subtler approach, so to restart repairing the damaged reputation and relationship between the US and the Arab world.

Yet it will be important to follow closely how the Obama administration addresses the failings in many Arab governments as the healing process in their relationship advances, because a soft approach to that part of the world, contrasting the stance he took in Africa, would be viewed as a politically (and economically) convenient double-standard, not to speak about the prospect of disappointing outcomes resulting from an excessively accommodating US strategy vis-a-vis authoritarian governments.

But irrespective of what Obama’s stance is towards either the  Arab or African countries, the drivers for governance change will have to come from within.  It is in this context that I always look forward to reading every new issue of the Arab Human Development Report, ever since its first pathbreaking publication in 2002.

Indeed, the Arab Human Development Report 2009 has just been issued by the UNDP.  It is the fifth in the series launched in the trail-brazing 2002 report, which made a strong case for freedoms and gender equality in the Arab world.  That was bold for an official multi-governmental institution such as an UN agency.  That Report also innovated by engaging independent Arab scholars in its drafting.  Such tradition has continued until this day:  the report just released is based on contributions from recognized experts in Arab countries.

The current report is not as sharply written as the famed one in 2002, and does not flesh out as clearly and explicitly the major deficits in governance and freedoms afflicting the Arab world, which were starkly depicted in their inaugural report seven years ago.

The focus of the current report is on the importance of enhancing ‘human security’.  However, by digging a bit deeper and reading in between the lines, the message of a continuing governance deficit does come across.  In fact, the emphasis on ‘human security’, in addition to having some merits on their own (even if it is is interpreted too broadly) may be a clever ploy to subtly and less frontally revisit politically sensitive governance failures such as those related to basic freedoms and gender rights.

Among a number of carefully crafted qualifiers, in the Report’s foreword by Helen Clark, the brand new UNDP administrator, one does find this statement:

“[This Report] argues for governments and other partners to prioritize the “liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable”.

Towards the end of the long report, it briefly states that there is a need for:  ”Strengthening the rule of law: the guarantees of essential rights, freedoms and opportunities without discrimination that only a well-governed, accountable and responsive state ruled by just laws can provide; and the mitigation of identity conflicts rooted in competition for power and wealth that becomes possible when such a state wins the trust of all citizens”

And before concluding, the Report states:  ”All Arab countries need to widen and deepen democratic processes to enable citizens to participate in framing public policy on an equal footing.  A political system controlled by elites, however decked out with democratic trappings, will not produce outcomes conducive to human security for all citizens…”.   And it makes the case for “widening women’s participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and educational fields and reinforcing their rights and status in society…”.

The larger problem of course is that this decade is almost over now.  Throughout there has been precious little progress on most dimensions of governance in the region.  The initial 2002 Report could have been written today, presenting an even starker reality on voice, democratic accountability, and women rights.

Whether the chosen starting point for comparison is 1998, 2000, or 2002, we find that not only there has been precious little progress until today, but in important areas such as basic civil liberties and ‘voice’ many countries have moved backwards.  And the starting point was subpar to begin with.

Based on the latest Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the first chart below shows how deficient the performance in the ‘Voice & Accountability’ component is nowadays, measuring the extent of civil liberties, political and human rights, and media freedoms.  The second chart, at the very bottom, depicts the troubling trend for many countries since 1998, showing the percentile rank for each country today in the top bar in each case, and the percentile rank for that country in 1998 in the bar below it.  Detailed country-by-country governance data can be found here in the WGI site, for any dimension of governance (and some of it is also included the appendix of the UNDP Report).

From the telling writings by some of the Arab scholars in the report, and studying the data trends on governance on this group of countries, it would be easy to see why some despair.  And the stark realities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, persisting for generations (and also addressed in the new Report), do not provide any relief to an otherwise rather troubled picture already.

A fatalistic stance would be unfortunate and unwarranted, however.  There are glimmers of hope and important voices for reform in each and every country.  Many of them are among the young.  Some are among the not-so-young.  Many women are standing out, demanding their rights.  Continuing to support such dedicated Arab agents for change, who corageously work within their own countries (a some of them contributed to the Arab Human Development Report), is called for.  And the ongoing IT revolution, blogging and twittering included, is crucial to spur open debate and transparency, and crucial for protecting and supporting reform champions as catalysts for change.  The younger generation is aboard.

………………………………………………………………….

Namibia Governance Indicators (top bar in each pair) vs. China

Namibia is one of the countries in Africa that has been serious about governance.  We see this in the latest Governance Indicators.  Such commitment to good governance includes anti-corruption efforts.

Yet often it is hard to figure out where fighting corruption may lead to, in today’s globalized world.  A large bribery case is being investigated in Namibia, stemming from a new money-laundering law that requires their own banks to routinely report large money transfers to investigators.  Evidently they did not foresee the ramifications.

As being reported by the New York Times now:…

“To the likely consternation of diplomats in both Beijing and faraway Windhoek, a newly minted initiative by Namibia’s government to root out official corruption has snared an early catch: three people who, Namibian prosecutors charge, helped win a lucrative contract for a Chinese company recently headed by the son of Hu Jintao, China’s president… There is no public evidence that President Hu’s 38-year-old son, Hu Haifeng, or other high officials of the company, Nuctech Company Limited, knew of the Namibian dealings.  But mere reports of the charges have already prompted Chinese government censors to block Internet surfers from searching for news about the younger Mr. Hu, Namibia or Nuctech…”

Indeed, see here a report from AP on heightened Chinese internet censorship at present, partly resulting from this politically sensitive case.

Among emerging economies, China does relatively well on Government Effectiveness, as also seen in the same chart (comparing Namibia with China on all six dimensions of governance).  Yet China’s governance deficit in Corruption, and also in ‘Voice’ (which includes media censorship), is glaring.

So an initiative in a small African country half the world away sheds light (and internet darkness) on China’s governance deficit.

None of these developments pleased bureaucracies in a number of prominent donor aid institutions.  Internal rumblings could be heard beyond their walls, and the customary call for more ´balance´ and ´perspective´ were taking place (read: do not highlight the political sensitive issues of governance and corruption; instead the traditional technocratic approach channelling funds to governments with little selectivity ought to continue)…

But not all is that well, or homogenous, in such bureaucracies and among other donors, including privates.  My sense in recent times has been that the era of political correctedness, where among many official circles it was unwelcomed to seriously focus on these problems, may be coming to an end.  Important circles may now starting to ponder whether all is as well as the spin dictated, as a  number of influential media articles and books were coming out.  The aid industry could not go on pretendong that it was business as usual,  underplaying and misunderstanding the importance of governance and corruption.

Now Obama has gone to Africa, first time as President.  He  has chosen to visit Ghana, a country exhibiting sustained progress on governance.  He has chosen not to visit either Nigeria, by far the most populous country in the continent, or Kenya, the birthplace of his father.  Both countries may be very prominent in Africa, yet have been plagued by poor governance and corruption.

As telling as Obama’s choice of country to visit (and to bypass) are his explicit messages in his statements and speeches during this trip (here, and particularly here, in his speech before the parliament in Accra).  The explicit messages are on both governance (which he has labelled as the key driver of development), and corruption.  That President Obama has minced now words on these issues in an age of misguided political correctness in official circles carry particular weight, given his background and ancestry, not to speak about his position and reputation.

However implicit, in due course the message from Obama during his current trip to Africa may also be properly interpreted as a wake-up call to the aid industry, which (with the exception of a few donors) has tended to depict a glossy and politically correct picture of what is transpiring in African governments,  thereby masking a huge variation in governance performance across Africa, and, particularly in recent years, downplaying the priority of good governance and anticorruption for development.

In French, here.

In Arabic, here.

In Japanese, here.

In Chinese (last year), here.

In Russian (last year), here.

In Português (last year), here.

For access to the most current Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) materials in English, here.

And for recent presentation on Governance Matters in Hanoi (in English and Vietnamese), here.

Today we are releasing the report Governance Matters VIII, which includes the new update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).   Now collaborating from the Brookings Institution, I continue to take part in this research project with my former World Bank colleagues Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi.

In the WGI we construct and measure six dimensions of governance, namely: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.

The new WGI is based on 35 different data sources, aggregating data from hundreds of disaggregated questions posed to tens of thousands respondents, covering 212 countries around the world.

Access to the new Governance Matters report is here, and to the data is here. A synthesis can be found here.

While we find little evidence of improved governance worldwide on average over the past decade, there is a very pronounced variation in performance across countries.   Some countries have markedly improved markedly, other have deteriorated.  The all mighty countries in the G-8 are not the models of good governance; instead the Nordics and New Zealand are.  Some emerging economies do better in governance that some rich OECD countries.

Access to a synthesis in Chinese, here. En Español, aqui

But at times some in the audience are particularly interested in the finding that on average there is no evidence that over the past decade the world has improved on governance.  Some find such finding of stagnating governance around the world (on average) hard to believe, pointing to some countries making strides.  Yet the developments in Iran is a stark reminder of how prone countries can also be to deteriorate on governance… 

But are there perhaps some other glimmers of hope in the Middle East vicinity?  The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dared to utter the words ’Palestinian state’ about a week ago, a happening lauded as a breakthrough.  Progress towards a two-state solution following such long nightmare, one systematically exploited by countries in the region to mask their own governance failures, could signal the dawn of a new era in the Middle East. 

   Unfortunately, it is difficult to see yet how Netanyahu would be genuinely prepared to make the kind of concessions required to carry out such a project.  He would have to be ready to scale back Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and also accept a divided Jerusalem (or variant thereof).  

And right now Netanyahu is unlikely to be under much pressure to take concrete forward steps towards supporting the creation of a Palestinian state, given that the Obama administration attention has had to shift to the Iran crisis.  For this reason, and also because it backstops the Israel’s longstanding hardline position towards Iran (which is mutual, obviously), Netanyahu and his government is unlikely to be displeased by the developments in Iran, in fact.  

I would like to proven wrong, but at least in the near future I don’t see the conditions present for Israel to take the necessary steps.  Hamas and a number of key Arab governments are not helping either (mildly put…).  

The other day I was reminded of a reason that I remain skeptical about an imminent breakthrough on improved governance in the Middle East in general, or progress towards a Palestinian state in particular.  I was sent a link to an article I wrote, making the case for an Israeli initiative towards the creation of a Palestinian state’, where I argued that such a move also made sense from a pragmatic Israeli self-interest.   

    Of course it is not such a big deal to write arguing for a Palestinian State, which is not such a radical thought even by somebody who has lived in Israel…  Except that the article published in the Harvard Crimson on the Palestinian state proposal dates back to 33 years ago, when I was a graduate student (struggling with english).  At the time evidently I shocked quite a few, and was vilified by a number of people for holding such a ‘radical’ view — and for writing publicly about it having just arrived to the US… 

More to the point, receiving this link now to that article reminded me of the lack of progress in the Middle East over such a long period of time.  Over a generation, in fact.  We shouldn’t be that surprised when the data on governance also points in that direction as well.

In today’s NYT own editorial page, their Opinion piece makes the responsibility of donors rather clear.

Sharply titled Grand Larceny Africa, this NYT editorial may perhaps serve as yet another wake up call to the donor community and the ‘aid effectiveness’ industry.  There is a need for revamp in the outmoded (and in many instances waning) approach to governance and anticorruption in general — Africa being no exception…

Since I am quoted in the editorial, let me say that special care ought to be exercised in not generalizing about the whole continent.  There are countries where progress has been taking place over the past decade, while others exhibit nowadays relatively high quality of governance and corruption control.  In the case of Botswana, for instance, corruption control levels are similar to countries in Southern Europe.

Grand larceny among top officials is taking place in some countries in Africa, but in others the main governance challenges lie elsewhere, including democratic accountability and freedom of the press, for instance.   And at times it is a governance deficit in all of these that creates a vicious circle of under-development.

It is the case, however, that there are high profile countries, such as Kenya and Nigeria, where major setbacks have taken place, while in a number of other countries corruption continues to be rife.  The donor aid community has not been capable to formulate an appropriate response.

Indeed, where courageous Anti-Corruption fighters have started to make inroads, as in Kenya and Nigeria among others, the political backlash from the ruling elite has been swift and often ruthless.  The technocratic and bureaucratic ‘capacity building’ donor aid model to supporting Anti-Corruption plans, campaigns and commissions needs a major reboot.  The challenge in these countries is not due to a massive technical deficiency, but it is deeply political instead, and often from the top.  These campaigns, plans and commissions tend to be captured or emasculated by the same elite interests that are part of the corruption problem in the first place.

Let me reiterate that the challenge of corruption is far from unique to some prominent African countries.  At last the world has seen irrefutable evidence that such corruption exists in the US, Europe, Asia and other regions.   This prevalence across continents is no excuse, of course, to continue downplaying the need for serious action on this front in Africa, particularly since the socio-economic price paid for this scourge is so dire.

In this context, I received here a substantive comment from Jim Wesberry, an Anti-Corruption expert who spend decades working for donors, who is of the view that last week’s NYT story on Africa corruption could have been written virtually as is for Latin America.

Either way, it may be high time to take a deep (and honest) breath and start afresh on donor aid strategies on Governance and Anti-Corruption.  Not just for Africa.  And donor organization ought not being terrified any longer from making a distinction between corrupt regimes, on the one hand, and those where the leadership is committed and making inroads, on the other.  In each continent, they co-exist, often neighbouring each other.  This is no excuse for donors to paper over sharp differences across countries, necessitating clearly differentiated strategies and much higher selectivity.  Even if it is not very politically correct…