Many of these prize catches of the Special Cell happened to be either police or IB informers, surrendered militants, or men with whom one agency or the other had a score to settle. To that extent, Special Cell’s latest, sensational Holi gift – of having foiled a major terror attack in the capital city by Hizbul Mujahideen – follows the set narrative. What the Special Cell did not bargain for was the contestation of their great feat by the J and K police, who clearly said that Liaqat Shah was a former militant who was returning to Kashmir as part of the state government’s rehabilitation policy for surrendered militants. So, to its utter surprise, the Special Cell was not greeted by instant glory, but by an unusual bad press.

But again, predictably, the MHA has rushed to the defence of the pampered Special Cell. It is this continuing impunity which has emboldened agencies to pick, detain, arrest and charge people with terrorism. Three of the four officers of the Special Cell in the current ‘Hizb operation’ feature rather prominently in the JTSA report: DCP Sanjeev Yadav was key player in five of the 16 cases in Framed, Damned, Acquitted; Sanjay Dutt in six and Rahul Kumar in seven. It should be recalled also that DCP Sanjeev Yadav was indicted by the NHRC for masterminding the fake encounter at Sonia Vihar in 2006 (when he was an ACP). We demand that the magisterial enquiry into the encounter conducted by the then Divisional Commissioner, Shri Vijay Dev, be made public immediately. We fear that there is a concerted attempt to suppress the report of the magisterial enquiry.

Till this impunity ends, we shall continue to witness these press conferences, the display of seized arms and explosives, the conferring of medals and gallantry awards, and the manufacturing of fidayeens.

Released by jamia teachers solidarity association
www.teacherssolidarity.org
23 March 2013

A hypothetical exercise as to what could have been done by the clever brains in SIT for building an impenetrable defense for the brigands liable for riots will be rejoicingly rewarding. Any police officer with the Satanic motive to defend the indefensible accused of the riots would travel through the following road map to denigrate, marginalize and invalidate copious of evidence available on (1) scheming and consummation of anti minority carnage, (2) subversion of the State Administration to delay and deny justice to riot victims and (3) intimidation of witnesses to block the flow of evidence against the State Government functionaries, narrated in Mrs. Zafris FIR.

Witnesses, had, reportedly, tried to prove the conspiracy by the State Govt., by stressing on facts, i.e. (A) CM giving instructions in a late evening meeting on 27-2-2007, of officers at Gandhinagar, to give a free play of Hindu revengefulness, in the context of killing 59 Hindus in Godhra train fire incident.

SIT would find contradictions in the semantics of three versions about the above CM’s instructions, in the depositions of the late Haren Pandya (to the Citizens Tribunal), R B Sreekumar and Sanjeev Bhatt (both before the judicial bodies). Moreover, Haren Pandya and Sreekumar were not present in the meeting also. Bhatt’s presence in the CM meeting is also questioned after refusal by his subordinate officer Pant to support Bhatt. (B) Secondly, allegations about bringing dead bodies of Godhra train fire victims to Ahmedabad city, VHP leaders accompanying the bodies and so on would not be deemed to be incriminating as these actions were taken on the request of the relatives of deceased persons by the CM. (C) SIT would also be reluctant to draw any adverse inference on facts like, (1) the Govt. not keeping minutes of meetings chaired by the CM and other senior officers, (2) positioning of Ministers in DGP and CP, Ahmedabad officers on VHP sponsored Bandh day on 28th February, 2002, (3) transfer of officers who took effective actions against the rioters in the thick of riots, i.e. Rahul Sharma, Vivek Shrivastava, M D Antani etc., despite DGP’s objection, (4) rewarding those who collaborated in riots, (5) CM characterizing the riots as operation of the Newton’s Law, (6) failure of the Govt. to take action on media making communally inciting reports and (7) non-implementation on regulations on riot control in Gujarat Police Manual, other Govt. documents, which facilitated riots. These are to be deemed as mere administrative omissions without any malicious motive.

The evidence supporting the charge of subversion of the Administration are, (1) failure to take follow up action on reports from State Intelligence Branch (SIB) for countering the anti-muslim bias of Govt. officials, i.e. police and public prosecutors not performing duties properly and this resulting in damage to cases of riot victims. Pertinently, the prejudice of Modi administration was adversely commented upon by the Apex Court in the orders, (a) transfer of cases to Maharastra for trial, (b) entrusting investigation to CBI, (c) reopening 2000 odd closed cases by Gujarat Police and their reinvestigation, (d) constitution of SIT in March, 2008 for reinvestigation of major carnage cases like Gulbarg Society, Naroda-Patia, Sardarpura etc. and Mrs. Zafri complaint against Modi and 62 others, (e) use of the instruments of reward and punishment to coerce officials to support the hidden anti-minority agenda of government, (f) appointment of pro-VHP advocates as Public Prosecutors, (g) giving false report to the Central Election Commission about Gujarat situation for holding of early Assembly elections, as revealed in the Commission’s Report dated 16th August, 2002, and so on. Significantly the Apex Court observed that Gujarat Administration acted like Nero during riots, while innocents were killed in the streets. Recently, Gujarat High Court also found fault with (on 9th February, 2002) Modi Government for its failure to protect the socio-religious institutions of the minorities. These intentional actions would be viewed by SIT as trivial and not as part of subversion of the Criminal Justice System (C.J.S.), calling for prosecution of those responsible u/s 166, 186 and 187 IPC.

The unchallengeable material evidence, including audio cassette, about intimidation of a senior police officer by Home Department officials and a Government pleader would be bypassed by SIT. The illegal move of the officials for forcing an officer to commit perjury before the Judicial Commission would be misjudged by SIT as part of duties of Home Department officials. Can a witness deposing before a Judicial Commission be tutored and pressurized to suppress facts and speak in favour of the Government, by the officials from his supervisory department ? Public Prosecutors can legally brief prosecution witnesses in a criminal case and not a witness who is free to present any truthful data to the Judicial Commission. Such a witness can be charged only for telling lies on oath. Here is a strange case of Government officials pressurizing a witness to commit perjury. What could be the quality and evidential merit of statements by a witness to a Commission, probing into the culpable role of Government officials in riots, if they are tutored by those in the Administration responsible for genocidal crimes ?

Recommendation by Amicus Curiae, appointed by the Apex Court, Shri Raju Ramachandran could be ignored by the SIT as the Apex Court itself had in his order dt. 12th September, 2011 observed that “It will be open to SIT to obtain from Amicus Curiae copies of his reports submitted to this court.” Thus it is not a binding order. So SIT could appoint its own Legal Advisor and get his stamp of approval on any decision of its choice, on the processing of evidence. Reportedly this was exactly done by SIT.

SIT could also ignore the reported Amicus Curiae’s recommendation to prosecute Modi u/s 153-A IPC for his statement about operation of the Newton’s Law because this was done by the CM after the incident of killing Mr. Ahsan Zafri on 28th February, 2002. Further, the evidence of SIT is exclusively for the case of Gulbarg Society registered by Gujarat Police on 28th February, 2002 and not on Mrs. Zafri’s petition to the Apex Court, which, the court did not treat as a separate FIR.

SIT could freely use its inherent power of discretion on gauging the value of any evidence, material, input or suggestion received by it from anybody as valid and relevant or otherwise. Expectedly, SIT would undermine the credibility of evidence from those who provided data incriminating Narendra Modi and his collaborators, figuring in Zafri’s complaint, like R B Sreekumar, Rahul Sharma and Sanjeev Bhatt – all police officers – on technical and flimsy grounds. Rahul Sharma’s electronic data linking the accused, BJP leaders and police officers could be declared invalid, for want of original material and report to the higher officers. Similarly further investigation on Government documents provided by Sreekumar and Bhatt could be avoided on the grounds of non availability of original papers, generic nature of intelligence reports (though SIB has no accessibility to or authority over case papers for unearthing officer-wise defaults), legality of using classified and privileged documents for investigation and so on – all these actions for the advantage of the accused.

The unconditional offer by Sreekumar and Sanjeev Bhatt to undergo narco and brain finger-print tests could be ignored. These would avoid possibility of getting collateral and corroborative evidence in support of Sreekumar’s semi-official register, containing information on numerous illegal orders by the CM and other higher officers and also on Sanjeev Bhatt’s several legal instruments.

Brilliance of Judges evaluating materials and evidence collected with a pro-accused orientation would not be adequate to bring out the truth behind crimes. Investigation is a skillful art that can be successful only through deep penetrating drive and acumen of seasoned and honest police officers. Strictures from Judiciary also would not nullify pit falls in the collection of evidence and would not be purposeful for prosecuting an accused. In fact, plenty of adverse comments from the Apex Court and Gujarat High Court are available against the Modi Government, but this could evoke only media discussion and has no evidential value. If the criminals responsible for multiple crimes during the riots, are declared innocent, the blame should fall on the investigating agencies, viz. Gujarat Police and SIT and not the Judiciary which had given unambiguous indications about the line and thrust of investigation to be pursued by the police. Presumptions and inferences from Judicial censor had to be probed with insightful competence and material should be collected to confirm the letter and spirit of the Court’s observations. SIT would heedlessly avoid taking recourse to this straight and narrow path, for reasons best known to the SIT officials.

Without any dilution of reverence to the Judiciary, one can assert that even great authors of world renowned detective story literature, like Arthur Conan Doyal, Ian Flaming and Agatha Christy had not created any character of a Judge, astutely driving cops to catch offenders lost in the layers of mystery.

Riot victims feel that SIT had used tools of skill, discernment and caution, available to them for collection, collation, analysis and submission of evidence to the Court in favour of the perpetrators of various crimes in 2002 riots. Will Judiciary be able to sift through the materials before it and adjudicate to deliver long-delayed justice to “the wretched of the earth”, who bore the brunt of 2002 man-made communal holocaust? World at large is waiting for the D day.
(R B Sreekumar is Former Director General of Police, Gujarat )

Today, even as he was installing the Cooker, I was standing next to him, offering a hand whenever required and shooting questions at him at periodic intervals. He was explaining the difference between electric and gas Cookers and the advantages of the old wood burning range Cookers when he suddenly noticed a wire slightly protruding out and asked me to pull the Cooker to one side. He had connected the wires and turned all the hobs on. Even as I replied, ‘sure, will do’, I was leaning over him, to put off the main Cooker switch. Derek turned to me with incredulity in his eyes, ‘you don’t have to turn it off’, he exclaimed. ‘But if I am going to move the Cooker, won’t it be safer to first turn it off?’ I questioned back. He looked at me bewildered, and asked bluntly, ‘are you superstitious?’ ‘These things go through rigorous safety checks and they are completely safe’, he explained and I, ‘non-superstitious’ that I was, reluctantly pulled the Cooker to one side leaving the switch on. Job done, pleasantries exchanged, Derek was on his way out. But his question ‘are you superstitious?’ stayed with me, even as he left. What action or disposition of mine was superstitious? What does he mean by the word ‘superstitious’? And am I really superstitious?

Derek’s question got me thinking, and led me to inquire into what ‘superstition’ meant. Of course, I am aware of the common usage of this term and what it means in contemporary parlance. Any online dictionary would give you a definition similar to this: ‘A belief, practice, or rite irrationally maintained by ignorance of the laws of nature or by faith in magic or chance’. According to this definition the main ideas behind ‘superstition’ are ‘irrationality’ and a belief in ‘supernatural causation’ – in other words, superstition is anything that on one hand went against the demands of ‘reason’ and ‘natural law’ and on the other positively a belief in the ‘supernatural’. Therefore, the modern understanding of ‘superstition’ can said to be defined by two other categories – ‘rationality’ and ‘religion’, in that it has a negative relationship with the former and a positive relationship with the latter – the absence of rationality and the presence of religion (qualified by irrationality) is superstition.

But what has this got to do with my leaning over Derek to turn off the Cooker mains? How is that ‘irrational’ or a ‘belief in supernatural causation’? A clue immediately comes to our cognitive visibility, and we can attempt to infer an answer to this question, but rushing into that answer would only be at the expense of missing out on the deep structures of the imaginaire out of which Derek’s question flowed. So you will have to bear with me for a very brief detour into the history of this fascinating term, which I promise, will not only give us a richer answer to our interrogation of Derek, but also provide some fodder for thought about our own worldview.

An important point to keep in mind is that words change meaning, even drastically, over time. A good example is found in an article by Megan Lane of BBC News Magazine titled ‘Disgust: How did the word change so completely?’ which held the number one position in the ‘most popular read’ story in BBC News today (15^th November 2011). Here she investigates how the term ‘disgust’  which was used to ‘express distaste for rotten food or filth’ at the time of its inclusion into the English language in early seventeenth century, is presently deployed to express a negative sentiment ‘against looters, phone hackers and others whose actions many find morally murky.’ Thus, words change meaning over time and they therefore have to be understood in the historical context in which they are used. This insight is important for our modern times when we work under a paradigm that presupposes that meanings are essential and universal in nature, transcending cultural and historical situatedness. Maybe my obliviousness to Derek’s context was responsible for my inability to understand his usage of the term ‘superstition’ for my action. Thus our investigation must lead us to explore Derek’s contextually-defined usage of the term.

Mary R. O’Neil in her article Superstition in the 2005 Encyclopaedia of Religion recognises that the term ‘superstition’ too has changed its meaning over time and argues that ‘its specific meanings vary widely in different periods and contexts, so that a survey of its historical application rather than an abstract definition is the best approach to the concept of superstition’. However, in spite of her cautioning, her own historical trace of this term appears to be dominated by the idea of ‘rationality’ informed by the modern understanding of ‘superstition’  resonating with the online definition we considered above rather than reveal the self-understanding of the earlier historical periods. For example describing the classical usage of ‘superstition’ she writes that the ‘classical world criticized certain religious behaviours as irrational, or as reflecting an incorrect understanding of both nature and divinity’ and this was ‘superstition’ in Antiquity for O’Neil. However the Classical understanding of superstition can she shown to be different during different periods even within the classical epoch and there are understandings of ‘superstition’ within the Classical period that have nothing to do with ‘rationality’.

Although her use of ‘rationality’ to interpret ‘superstition’ does not do justice to her own observation that the term needs to be studied in its historical location, she however makes an explicit connection between ‘superstition’ and ‘religion’. For O’Neil irrational religion is equivalent to superstition, an idea which we have already seen contained in our online definition. William Pitt in 1800 in his tract Superstition takes this argument to its logical conclusion. He makes a distinction between ‘religion of reason’ which focuses on the ‘eternal moral law of God’ and ordinary religion which for him emphasised on ‘holy romances, sacred fables, and traditionary tales’. His definition of ‘ordinary religion’ which he declares as ‘superstition’ practically encompasses all religious beliefs and practices. Thus, for Pitt, religion is superstition. To sum up, superstition is defined both (a) in opposition to rationality, and (b) as identical to irrational religion. Thus the modern view of superstition as religion is largely defined in opposition to what is seen as rational.

The obsession with ‘rationality’ and ‘superstition as the lack of it’ is uniquely characteristic of us moderns. The philosopher Alexander Lesser in 1931 has astutely observed that we moderns uncritically impose our view of superstition on our construction of knowledge of both other cultures and of different times. He argues that ‘a vague  differentiation  of  the  superstitious  from  the  rational  has  for the  most  part  availed,  because  all  issues  have  been  drawn  in  the universe  of  discourse  of  our  own  culture,  and  between  credulous, ignorant  belief  and  the  reasoned  thinking  of  the  logically  trained. In  so  far  as  the  intellectual  life  of  other  cultures,  particularly  the primitive,  have  been  drawn  into  discussion,  there  has  been  tacit agreement  that  unless  rationalism  can  be  shown  to  dominate  them, these  alien  realms  of  discourse  are  superstition.  Ethnologists  as well  as philosophers  have  assumed  this  attitude,  partly,  I  think,  because  the  ethnologists  have  uncritically  carried  the  distinction,  or lack of distinction,  over into  their  subject-matter.’ Similar to our critique of Mary R. O’Neil, Lesser’s critique is directed against Alice Gardner’s account of superstition in Hastings’ Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Gardner defines superstition as ‘ a  number  of  beliefs,  habits  and fancies,  tribal  and  individual,  which we regard  as not  being  founded on reasonable conceptions  of the world and of human life,  necessities and obligations.’ Lesser considers this as an ‘undiscriminating use’ of the term and questions back ‘what is such a “reasonable conception”?’ and ‘who is to judge its reasonableness and by what standard?’ Lesser’s critique is followed by a proposal which is equally exciting as his critique but before we get into that, we need to respond to the critique. The critique is that we are using our ‘modern’ understanding of ‘rationality’ to define ‘superstition’ pejoratively as ‘irrationality’ either in our description of other cultures, or even in tracing the historical development of this term. So the question is – was superstition understood in any other way, especially in the history of this term and was it defined in ways that have nothing to do with (ir)rationality?

The term ‘superstition’ etymologically comes from the Latin superstitio (noun) which is traced back to the first century AD and superstitiosus (adjective) which can be traced back to early antiquity for example going all the way back to Plautus in the fourth century BC. The first interesting insight we get from Ross is that the term superstition is non-pejorative in its usage in both Plautus’ usage of superstitiosus as well as Statius’ usage of superstitio in Thebaid in the first century AD where it is positively used analogous to the Roman religio signifying the rite and method of worship of the Roman goddess of forgiveness and mercy, Clementia. This brings the second insight that superstitio refers to a rite or a method of worship. Thirdly, Ross argues that while the Ennian usage in the second century BC is similarly non-pejorative as Plautus, its usage of superstitiosi  vates (superstitious seers) however contains a hint of sneer thus leading to a ‘extraordinary controversy about the meaning and development of superstitio’ in classical literature. So what was the controversy? Finally, Ross shows that in Seneca, in the first century BC, there is a divide between religio and superstitio, where religio is taken as the worship of the gods and supersitio as the violation of that worship, thus it appears that superstitio is beginning to get a pejorative nuance. But what is the basis of this pejoration? Here also originates the dichotomy between religion and superstition, but the dichotomy unlike our modern usage is not based on rationality, rather on other factors. Ross shows how the Ciceronian view gives a clue into the basis of this distinction which also reveals the source of pejoration – for Cicero a religio becomes superstitiosa if it is infected with ‘new or strange rites’. Therefore it was not religio becoming irrational, but it being supplemented or supplanted with rites different from those of religio that made it superstition.

Janssen in his article on ‘Superstitio’ and the Persecution of the Christians brings to light the distinction between superstitio and religio by investigating why the Romans considered Christianity as superstitio and worthy of persecution.

Janssen offers a fascinating historical trace of superstitio basing on the works of Otto, Linkomies and Benveniste on this term: first, in Plautus comedies superstitio refers to a clairvoyant who ‘in a supernatural  way have a clear knowledge about events that happened in the past and who are aware of things present which are beyond ordinary  human perception.’ However secondly, Janssen argues that in the first century BC the meaning of ‘superstitiosus and its derivative superstitio had shifted from clairvoyant to prophesying, foretelling future events’. Thirdly, Superstitio in this sense of prophesy introduced ‘un-Roman rites’ many of which came to the Roman republics from cults of foreign origin. If religio was seen as Roman rites to their gods then superstitio was seen as competing rites with allegiances to strange deities which were considered as ‘a serious offence to the Roman gods and a direct attack on the Roman state’. Fourthly, superstitio in Cicero has to do with people’s practicing of these new rites to ensure that their children survived them. Thus the emphasis was on individual welfare as opposed to the welfare of the Roman state – fostering one’s own interest before that of the res publica. Finally, if religio was seen as rites and rituals that kept the Roman republic together with its pietas and virtus then superstitio as strange and foreign rites with a focus on the individual and disregard for the community of the Roman republic (nomen Romanum) had to be destroyed. In short, superstitio was seen as a competing cult with rites that drew people, away from religio which were Roman rites exalting the Roman Empire, to a way of life consisting of foreign practices that even sought the end of Rome. Thus, in classical times, religion and superstition were opposed to each other not on the basis of reason or rationality but on the basis of political allegiance to the Roman state.

What has all this got to do with Derek and my leaning over him? Before we conclude with that answer, let’s summarise what we have learnt from this incursion into the study of superstition. We have looked at two periods – Classical and Modern – and their usage of the term superstition respectively. In the modern period ‘superstition’ has been used as opposed to reason and analogous to irrational religion. However, in the Classical period superstition is primarily used as opposed to religion but religion was defined by its allegiance to the Roman state rather than by rationality and hence, superstition was anything that opposed the Roman state. Thus in antiquity religio and superstitio were two ways of living lives, possessing two different allegiances and two separate kinds of rites and rituals, in short, two traditions. In modern times, in both religio and superstitio being bundled together as irrational, what is missed is that these terms are being defined against and in opposition to another tradition or cult, namely the cult of scientific material rationalism. In other words, religion and superstition being termed irrational has to taken as differently-rational, contrary to the rationality of scientific materialism. Scientific materialism too has its own rites, rationality, allegiance-demands, and therefore in short is a tradition. Just as in Classical times the competition was between two distinct traditions of superstitio and religio, similarly in our modern age the conflict is between the two distinct traditions of superstition/religion and scientific materialism. Each of these traditions have their own practices and texts and authorities and demand allegiance and punish disobedience.

It is against this background that Derek’s incredulity and admonishing gathers meaning. My failure to trust the safety of modern science made me an apostate, someone who did not believe in the reigning religio of our modern times and thus in that sense was acting superstitiously. The god of modern science was not given her due by my action. I was performing a strange rite of turning off the Cooker, which went against the established authority of science. The manufacturers of the Cooker rigorously following the dictates of Science, according to Derek, have produced a Cooker that guarantees my safety and my failing to recognise that and not trusting it, made me superstitious. My act, however insignificant, was going against the res publica of Science and therefore I had to be admonished and my disbelief destroyed, lest these tiny drops of dissent form a torrent that would threaten Rome. But Science is much more a dangerous religion than the Roman religio, because it does not define itself only by some specific rites or allegiances as the Roman religio, but it defines itself by the nature of what is rational. In that it has subsumed everything rational, as its own and in that it terms everything that is against its rationality as irrational and as religious superstition. But the crucial question upon which the ‘god of science’ stands or falls has to do the nature of rationality and particularly if it is universal?

But here is where we must return to Lesser’s proposal. With some clever work, Lesser establishes that rationalism can be seen in two senses – first, in the narrow sense of justification through formal logical statements and secondly, in the broader sense of the possession of reasoning powers in a systematic sense, however without regard to a defined logic. Therefore what is pre-logical while it goes against the narrow sense of rationalism, is however not ipso facto irrational as it is still within the purview of the broader sense of rationalism. In other words every religious or superstitious practice or rite has its own rationality within its own system of reference. It is only an isolated belief or practice that could appear irrational, however, when it is seen in its systematic interrelations with other beliefs and practices, its own rationality will emerge. This insight that every religio/superstitio possesses a competing rationality challenges the hegemony of the god of science just as Christian superstitio challenged the Roman religio. There is no single rationality, but a plurality of rationalities. Different religious traditions possessing differing rationalities are able to offer alternative beliefs and practices and visions of the good life, even if they are contrary to the claims of modern scientific rationality.

It appears that the central questions for us is – to whom do we give our allegiance, whom do we worship, whose texts and practices have supremacy in our lives, and which tradition do we follow? I am happy to have Derek follow his scientific religion and perform rites dictated by it even if they are different than mine, but probably what raised my curiosity was his incredulity in me not subscribing to his god and rites. It appeared as if suddenly the Roman Empire had reincarnated as modern science which taking on eagle’s wings was demanding my obeisance.

Derek had long gone, and it was a week later and the incident nearly forgotten. Keeping in line with my rigorous diet that had nothing to do with religio or superstitio or science, I was getting ready a tray of veggies to be grilled for my dinner. As l turned the Cooker on to pre-heat the grill – suddenly, lo and behold – flashing lights and a loud noise, and the Cooker went out with a big bang. I stood frozen next to it, glad to have my shoes on and I thought – even the scientific god cannot be completely trusted, and maybe my earlier act of defiance was not all too unwise.

Every Rome has its fall.

It has been fifty years since he has started playback singing. Half a century is a big span in any sphere, be it cinema or music. Lots of shifts occurred in our life styles, listening habits and technologies; radio, 78 rpm records, vinyl tapes, tape recorders, loud speakers, analogue recording, digital recording, cable TV, internet, mobile… Music composers who radically changed our aesthetic conventions like Salil Choudary, K J Joy, Shyam, Raghu Kumar, Ilayaraja, Raveendran, Rahman and more came and went. Yesudas stayed.

Is it the same yesudas we are having all these years? I feel he has evolved through the time which is not just the case of `aging’. His voice and singing style have played an important role in the making of Malayalam film songs and vice versa. But unfortunately there hasn’t a comprehensive study about him yet. I think his bass voice considered as a `model male voice’ is not just a biological factor but a technological and sociological construction. I don’t yet have clear evidence but I assume that the discovery of this bass voice happened later in his career while there was a shift in our listening equipments; for instance the sound boxes replacing the `kolambis’ and the simultaneous shift in recording and broadcasting technologies.

Most of us know about the difference in his speaking voice and singing voice. What is this difference? What could be the factors that bring about this great shift to his singing voice? This, I think, is an area to be explored in detail.

Yesudas has always been a site of many conflicts, anxieties and negotiations of the people called Malayalis. He is considered as an advocate of ‘pure music’ by many, as he too presents himself, but at the same time he is also attacked for `diluting the essence of classical music’. I think he has tactically dealt with film music and carnatic `classical’ music by blurring the borders cleverly and developing a peculiar style of singing.

Another important anxiety is over his secular image. I have always felt that the secular space of Malayalam film music is what forces him to be tactical about his secular image. He has always tried to build a secular public image/persona singing his first recorded lines `jaathi bedham matha dwesham’ in every public appearance, visiting hindu temples and singing devotional songs of all major religions.

Let me conclude by saying that like any other music composer I too have the desire that Yesudas would render one of my compositions some day.

I am genuinely annoyed at the news that the Director of Public Instructions, APM Mohammad Hanish, has ordered a ban on cinematic dance in Kerala schools. (Deccan Chronicle, August 1, 2011) Although my first reaction was a chuckle, it later developed into anger after reading the reason behind its censorship.  The director says: “It has come to our notice that certain private organizations and TV channels are promoting cinematic dance in schools all over the state. It has reached ridiculous levels with classrooms are being used for cinematic dance training.’’ The director has never learnt dance while he was at school, I am sure. But having grown with school youth festivals, and other competitions, I know that it was the only option left for students—to  convert class rooms into dance studios during rehearsals.  The second reason is all the more hilarious: “The so called cinematic dance experts and trainers were using the opportunity to exploit students”. What he means by “exploitation” is not clear. Anyhow, can anyone name that utopian dance teacher or art teacher who will never “exploit” a student?  I wonder why the director has not banned the state youth festivals; because during that time the participants never attend classes, the faculty would be busy preparing the students for the trophy, and classes are sometimes taken in makeshift rooms. Again, talking about exploitation, I would like to remind him of the news that appeared in Manorama News Channel, which exposed the fact that around 20,000 to 50,000 rupees was paid through middlemen to get an ‘A’ grade for a district level youth festival. Why didn’t he put a ban on youth festivals then?

Let me call a spade a spade. This “anxiety of Keralianness” sprouts from the fear of “caste” and “gender” in cinematic dance. In my experience as a student, most of the cinematic dance teachers were not from upper castes, nor were they elite. And, the female dancers are most often not “tamed” and “subservient”. The popularity of cinematic dance accentuates a caste and gender formation where an under privileged caste/class dancer can also be a “guru” and a female dancer could be virile. This amplifies a fear among the dominant communities. My conviction would be evident when we look at what is going to replace cinematic dance. In the discussion thread on Deccan Chronicle’s profile in Facebook, a gentleman says: “Schools are promoting cinematic dances which are leaving traditional dances like Bharatnatyam, Kathakali, Kuchipudi etc in a sorry state. A school makes responsible citizens not a Badnaam Munni or a Jawaan Sheila who is too sexy for all of us.” I wish he knew that even little children dance to padams explicit with pedophilia in classical dance forms. It is not his fault, I understand. Most often neither the performer, nor the audience understands what a Bharatanatyam or a Mohiniyattam performer does on the stage. It was only last year that I  witnessed girls as young as five and ten performing highly viraha and sringara padams for a Mohiniyattam concert, which was quite disturbing. Nobody seems to take an objection to such practices. Similarly, what the director means by a utopian, non-exploitative environment or teacher for dance seems to echo the nostalgia for the gurukula system, studies of which now show that it was a breeding ground of child labour and sexual exploitation. Why is it then that we blindly accept anything “classical”, and downrightly reject anything “popular”? Who equates “classical” with spirituality and purity and “popular” with crass and vulgar?

Interestingly, the ban is considered as a manifestation of the literate Keralian’s intelligent decision. Dance histories time and again prove that the ideas on what should constitute “Indian classical dance” came from the western perception of it, which was later imbibed by the metropolitan English educated elite Hindus and incorporated into the existing dance forms in the name of “cultural revival”. How many would remember it was the much stigmatized Tevidichiyattam that is now called as Mohiniyattam, one among the youngest dance forms to get the entry into the “classical dance” league set by the Culture Ministry of India? How can the society that borrows any Eurocentric idea to add to their “intelligence quotient” shut their eyes towards the increasing popularity of Indian cinematic dance on the global stage?

If someone gives me the lame excuse that it is not in “our culture”, I would have to simply cite G.P.Deshpande. In his essay “Dialectics of Defeat: Some Reflections on Literature, Theatre and Music in Colonial India” (EPW, Vol-22, No.50. Dec. 12, 1987) he says that “culture” is a colonial import. Until then no Indian languages ever mentioned the word, not because Indians were never cultured, or that they never had a culture, but because it never existed as “an autonomous world of discourse”. He explains: “Everything was dharma. Going to a temple was a dharma, singing a raga or a ragini was also a dharma. Dharma does not in this context mean religion. It indicates a space which an individual creates or obtains in a given area of action, duty or creation. This space was a part of the total whole. It was a continuous space. Hence such diverse actions as singing or worshipping or procreating were all described as dharma. It was a secular concept.” Thus, the word “sanskriti”, which is the Indian equivalent for “culture”, used often in the modern cultural scenario should be understood as a colonial invention.

Along with accusations of being “base”, cinematic dance is also considered easy to do. Talk to a committed dancer and he or she will show you how difficult cinematic dancing could be. My effort is not to plead for a place for cinematic dance by placing it alongside “classical dances”, because whether the Director of Public Instructions bans it or not, cinematic dance is going to stay. During my stint as a dance teacher, taking classes for a few school goers, I understood that they came to learn Bharatanatyam, not because of their will but to appease their parent’s ambition. In one of our classes, all of them said in a chorus, “we don’t want Bharatanatyam, it is so boring, we want bollywood dance”. But one girl objected. She was afraid her mother would scold her. When the notion of aesthetic itself is a creation, and what constitutes it changes from time to time, one doesn’t have to necessarily inject it in “tomorrow’s citizen”, especially when it only helps creating condescending attitudes.

In my opinion, the government should promote cinematic dance, because it doesn’t have the entrenched casteist markings and trappings, nor does it train a girl child just to be a meek, humble and sweet human being. The necessity of equal opportunity will be evident if only we look at the names of famous classical dancers Kerala has produced. When news on excommunication of performers from minority communities like VP Rubiya are reported in the state on the grounds that they danced “Hindu dance forms”, government should take cautious steps which includes encouraging of other kinds of dance forms. The “need of the hour” is not banning an art form, but solving the problems of exploitation, or dressing up that “befits a child’s age” as actress Shwetha Menon reacts to the ban. And this applies to any art form, not just cinematic dance.