First, here is how Judge Wood describes the facts:

The misconduct was of a personal nature: Judge Ross was engaged in a sexual relationship with a law-enforcement officer whose department regularly appeared before that judge.

If a student at the University of Chicago offered that summary of the case, she would be failed. Judge Ross's sexual activity was appalling, but the most severe transgression was lying to the Chief Judge of the Circuit and the Chief Judge of the District. The closest Judge Wood got to acknowledging the dishonesty was this sentence:

Because Ross ultimately confessed everything and expressed what the committee regarded as genuine remorse…

This is a very roundabout way of saying she confessed to the sex and confessed to lying.

Second, Judge Wood offers no comment about the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council's decision to issue a private reprimand. The most she will say is that the Judicial Conduct & Disability Committee did not err in affirming that decision.

The JC&D Committee had to decide what would most likely produce the desired result—permanent cessation of that kind of behavior. It also had to decide whether it believed that the judge's remorse and willingness to mend her ways were genuine. Others may have decided differently, but I see nothing here that casts doubt on the genuineness or integrity of the decisions the JC&D Committee made.

Why wouldn't the decision be genuine or have integrity? The relevant question is whether it is correct as a matter of law. But even this question is constrained, as the JC&D Committee's review was limited to a deferential standard. Here is the entirety of the analysis:

In light of our review for errors of law, clear errors of fact, or abuse of discretion, and in deference to the Circuit Judicial Council's consideration of the special committee's review of the evidence, we affirm the Circuit Judicial Council's unanimous decision concluding that the subject judge's actions constituted judicial misconduct. The special committee conducted a thorough investigation and afforded the subject judge all the process that was due under the JC&D Act and the Rules. Accordingly, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the special committee's investigatory process. And we conclude that the remedial measures ordered by the Judicial Council under 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A) are appropriate and proportionate to the Judicial Council's findings in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct, balanced against the subject judge's correction of the prior false statements and subsequent candor with the special committee, the special committee's assessment that the subject judge is unlikely to engage in similar misconduct in the future, and the subject judge's otherwise exemplary service to the court.

The finding was affirmed based on no "abuse of discretion" or "error of law." This is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, which I'll note had no noted dissents--the only name on the document was Chief Judge Pryor. Does Judge Wood think the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council made the right decision in the first instance? We don't know.

Third, Judge Wood suggested that there are limits on how judges can be reprimanded. She suggests that taking away cases from a judge amounts may be unconstitutional:

Some have argued that this system is unduly solicitous of judges who engage in behavior so obviously unbecoming a federal judge. They contend that, at a minimum, this kind of misbehavior should always be made public. But there is only so far that the Conduct Act can go before it bumps into the constitutional protections for a judge's tenure in office.

Indeed, some think that depriving the judge of her caseload is a de facto temporary removal from office and thus beyond the power of the judiciary. Critically, however, the judge is actually not removed and continues to receive her salary.

Where has Diane Wood been on the Pauline Newman case? Has she published any op-eds criticizing Chief Judge Kimberly Moore? Why did she not join former-Judge Paul Cassell's amicus brief in support of Judge Newman's cert petition?

Fourth, Judge Wood makes it seem like no other punishments were possible. She doesn't state the obvious: the reprimand should have been made public. Judge Ross could have kept her cases, but she would have faced litigants who perceive a plausible conflict of interest. That act would have been punishment by itself.

Fifth, Judge Wood reflects on her own tenure:

As chief judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for nearly seven years, I well appreciate the constitutional tight-rope that these cases present.

Chief Judge Wood helmed the Seventh Circuit during the final years of Richard Posner's decline. I think an entire book could be written about how Judge Posner flouted the rules of judicial conduct, yet his colleagues took no actions against him. Maybe he should have been given the Pauline Newman treatment so he could spend all of his efforts on writing books. Indeed, Judge Posner's final act before resigning was to publish a bizarre book that attacked his colleagues based on confidential information. I do not think Judge Wood was the right person to comment on failing to take adequate action against a misbehaving judge.

Finally, I mention one last point, with some hesitation. Arthur, Gabe, and I pitched our essay to Bloomberg Law. The editor promptly got back to us and wrote "I don't think this fits into our coverage." Apparently, Judge Wood's non-defense of the courts does fit into the coverage. Go figure.

This entire piece feels forced. I think someone in the judicial apparatus asked a well-regarded, retired judge to defend the handiwork of the Eleventh Circuit. But she couldn't quite do that. She said very little, and reinforced how indefensible the Eleventh Circuit's private reprimand was. I'm not buying it. I've yet to talk to an actual judge who thinks the Eleventh Circuit got it right. If someone wants to defend what the Eleventh Circuit did here, they will actually have to discuss in detail.

I would hope that one of the law clerks who initially blew the whistle opts to appeal this matter to the full Judicial Conference. Chief Justice Roberts cannot simply turn this matter over like a couch cushion.

Update: A colleague wrote, "I just read Judge Wood's op-ed again, and I realized what it reads like: the hostage statement of someone who has been kidnapped." Yes, I agree. Also, how can Judge Wood say with certainty the subject judge was Eleanor Ross, and not even mention the reprimand was private. This situation seems like a fix.

The post What Judge Wood Did Not Say About Judge Ross's Misconduct appeared first on Reason.com.

Trump Keeps Immunity from I.R.S., a Victory in a Long-Running Feud

Subhead: "Even as they rebelled against a $1.8 billion fund for President Trump's allies, Republicans looked the other way as his administration granted him potentially lucrative tax protections."

The article notes that plans for the Trump-Blanche $1.776 billion Slush Fund were abandoned due to "Republican anger," but:

"Not so for the sweeping protections from I.R.S. audits that Mr. Blanche also ordered up for Mr. Trump and his family. On that front, Republican reaction has been much more muted, and Mr. Blanche said the audit shield would stay in place. . . .  The result is that an apparently unprecedented and enormously valuable public benefit for the president has, so far, flown under the radar in Congress and passed into Mr. Trump's hands without much protest from members of his own party."

It is indeed a shame that the Republicans have not spoken out against this part of the Trump-Blanche deal.

But we should not fall into the trap of talking as though Blanche has already conferred some kind of "immunity" – or an "audit shield" – on Trump. He has not. He's certainly been trying to do so, but because he is not authorized to do so, his attempt is of no force and effect.

Take a close look at the document that purports to give Trump and his family a shield against IRS actions.  It is dated (and was publicly posted) on May 19th – the day after the parties in Trump v IRS executed their so-called "Settlement Agreement," which contains no mention of any waiver of IRS claims, or immunity, or "audit shield," or anything remotely similar.

The May 19th document, signed by Todd Blanche, the Acting A.G., states two facts in the first paragraph: that the May 18th Settlement Agreement (1) "has created the Anti-Weaponization Fund," and (2) has "directed the Attorney General to issue an order establishing funding and any other relevant requirements for the Fund."

Both are correct; the May 18th Settlement Agreement, by its express terms, did both of those things.

Then, after declaring that capitalized terms in the May 19th order have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement, the entirety of the document reads as follows (I have broken up the single sentence of the waiver provision into its component parts, just for ease of comprehension; any omitted text is marked by ellipses):

The United States

RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES each of the Plaintiffs [i.e., President Trump, his sons, and the Trump Organization] from,

and is hereby FOREVER BARRED AND PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing,

any and all claims . . . or requests for any relief . . . whether presently known or unknown, that . . . have been or could have been asserted by [the IRS] against any of the plaintiffs . . . by reason of, in connection with, or which arise out of …

any matters currently pending or that could be pending (including tax returns filed before the Effective Date) before [the I.R.S.] or other agencies or departments. [Emphases added]

Well!

Where does Todd Blanche get the authorization to grant a waiver like this?! To anyone, let alone to his boss, the President of the United States?

The May 19th document itself is strangely silent about the answer to that question – unusually so, for an AG Order. It implies – though, oddly, and rather suspiciously, it does not come out and actually say – that it represents the "order" contemplated in the May 18 Settlement Agreement.  You remember – the one that the AG is directed to issue in order to "establish funding and any other relevant requirements" of the Anti-Weaponization Fund.

Even Blanche must recognize how ridiculous that argument is.  A waiver of claims against Trump has absolutely nothing to do with establishing or funding or operating the Anti-Weaponization Fund. And besides -- isn't the Fund being abandoned?  So the May 19th document is an Order establishing a Fund that we're not establishing?  That's absurd and confusing.

So the May 19 document isn't that order.  What is it, then?

It could be part of the settlement terms, which falls within Blanche's inherent authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States, and to settle claims where it is in the interest of the United States to do so. The waiver, then, is part of the "settlement terms."

Blanche himself seems confused about that. He is adamant in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee: the May 19th document is not an "Addendum" to the Settlement Agreement. "It is a separate Attorney General Order." [see the video starting at around 44:30].  But a minute or so later he describes the May 19th document this way:

"There's a settlement. Part of the Settlement includes the [May 19th ] Order. … There's a Settlement the IRS entered into with President Trump and others, his family and his companies.  As part of that Settlement, as is customary in IRS Settlements, there's a separate AG Order."

Damned if I can figure out what he is talking about.

If the May 19 waiver order is not part of the Settlement, what is it?  If he's not issuing that in order to settle Trump's claims, where does he get the power to waive, forever, claims the United States may possess?  It's like the power to issue pardons – except, of course, the Attorney General doesn't have the power to issue pardons.  He can say "The United States waives . . ."; he can even put it on DOJ stationery and post it on the DOJ website, and he can sign it as the Acting AG – none of that gives it any legal effect whatsoever unless he has been authorized to take such action on behalf of the United States. If he has not been authorized to take such action, the "order" has the same legal effect as an entry in his private diary.

And if it is part of the "Settlement"?  That deal doesn't pass the hoo-haw test. Trump gives up his time-barred claims worth $0.00, in exchange for a $1.776 billion fund under his control PLUS a waiver of all tax or other claims against him, his sons, and his companies?

My guess is that Acting AG Blanche doesn't want to have to defend that deal when he comes before the Senate. Nor does he relish the opportunity to explain to a waiting world why the very significant waiver clause was omitted from the actual Settlement Agreement signed by the parties. Had the parties - and their lawyers, including the DOJ lawyers - just forgotten about it? Slipped their collective mind?

That's laughingstock stuff.

Trump v. IRS wasn't an actual case, because an actual case requires parties who are adverse to one another. There's a docket entry somewhere labeled "Trump v. IRS," of course, but that doesn't make it a valid or viable case.  The case can't be "settled," because it never actually existed as a case. Whatever legal effect the document labeled "Settlement Agreement" may have, it doesn't "settle" any case because there was never any case to settle.

So what about this thing that Todd Blanche posted on May 19th?  What is it? and What legal effect does it have?

I don't know. It's not part of a case settlement, and if it's not part of a case settlement Blanche has no authority to issue it.  So it's nothing.  A nullity.  It's not an immunity, or a waiver of the IRS's rights, or an audit shield.  It is just a figment of Todd Blanche's imagination, and we should treat it and speak of it accordingly.

The post Stop Calling it an Immunity! There's No Immunity! appeared first on Reason.com.

Suspecting him of involvement in a shooting in New Orleans, police secured a warrant to search the home of Curtis Squire, where they found a handgun.  While the handgun was not found to have been used in the shooting, Squire was charged with felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), based on his prior convictions of conspiracy and substantive counts of possession with the intent to distribute heroin, possession of a firearm with a controlled dangerous substance, and obstruction of justice.  In the same case, he had been convicted of a conspiracy count to possess stolen things, and in another case, burglary and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

Fifth Circuit precedent recognized § 922(g)(1) to be unconstitutional as applied to some felons, as "[s]imply classifying a crime as a felony does not meet the level of historical rigor required by Bruen and its progeny."  Non-violent felonies such as marijuana possession without evidence of present intoxication were subject to as-applied challenges.  As the court wisely wrote, "If Congress could escape Bruen's reach by simply classifying a crime as a felony, we would be confined to uncritically rubber-stamping class-based determinations, subjecting disarmament laws to a form of rational-basis, government-always-wins, type of review."  Those words are worth their weight in gold.

By contrast, predicate offenses involving a dangerous or violent crime justified disarmament.  For that proposition, the court saw no need to make out an empirical case for the fact that heroin trafficking while armed is dangerous and involves violence.  Drug gangs wage war with each other and with law enforcement.  Drug traffickers use threats of violence and violence to enforce their illegal dealings as well as to protect their turf.  And heroin is a type of poison on which users often overdose and die.  One who traffics in heroin poses a physical danger to others.

Instead, the Squire court conducted the usual Bruen analysis of looking at historical analogues, having already concluded that Mr. Squire's ability to have a firearm in his home was covered by the Second Amendment's plain text.  The English Militia Act of 1662 directed the disarming of "dangerous and disaffected persons," even though, as Rahimi notes, the Glorious Revolution reduced the Crown's power to do so.  Catholics were disarmed as not having loyalty to the government.  In the American Revolution, persons refusing to swear an oath of allegiance were disarmed.

Native Americans and African Americans were also disarmed.  While use of these analogues is problematic, the court explains: "Granted, these repugnant laws classifying people as dangerous simply on the basis of their race or religion are wrong and unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment…. Nevertheless, these laws give us a glimpse into how early Americans understood their right to bear arms, how the legislature could determine classes of people to be dangerous, and the scope of their disarmament."

The Supreme Court should use the opportunity in Wolford, which concerns Hawaii's "vampire rule" banning exercise of Second Amendment rights in most public places, to disown the use of racist historical analogues.  My amicus brief in Wolford on behalf of the African American Gun Association makes that point in detail about an 1865 Louisiana black code provision.  And as Justice Kavanaugh wrote in his Rahimi concurrence: "Ratified in 1868, [the Equal Protection] Clause sought to reject the Nation's history of racial discrimination, not to backdoor incorporate racially discriminatory and oppressive historical practices and laws into the Constitution."

Squire sought to distinguish his situation by the fact that he possessed the handgun at home, but the court found that argument to be "mugged by the reality that our historical laws support his disarmament, even in the special confines of his home."  (I guess "mugged" is a term Squire would readily understand.)  As the court concluded, "§ 922(g)(1) as applied to drug traffickers permits arms dispossession based on dangerousness, not location."  That is a narrow holding, as "We do not decide whether the Second Amendment allows Congress to disarm individuals in the home based on convictions lacking a relevantly similar historical analogue to dangerousness, violence, or threats to public order."

The panel distinguished other courts that have refused to recognize any as-applied challenge to the felon-in-possession ban by postulating the basic difference between dangerous and violent crimes from mala prohibita, victimless crimes such as mere possession of marijuana.  We'll see what the Supreme Court says about that when it decides Hemani, which presents the question, "Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who 'is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,' violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent."  See my post here.

* * *

In footnote 1 of Squire, Judge Clement rejected the argument that the ban exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as foreclosed by circuit precedent.  Unsuccessful attempts to rein in Congress on the issue included U.S. v. McFarland (2002), in which the evenly-divided, en banc Fifth Circuit left a district court decision in place upholding the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, to a defendant who robbed local convenience stores with utterly no interstate-commerce nexus.  Based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, Judge Clement joined with half of the other judges in dissent.  Query whether the Supreme Court will ever return to the premise that local crime is not interstate commerce.

The post Second Amendment Roundup: No Protection for Heroin Trafficker appeared first on Reason.com.

Over the weekend, Bloomberg Law reported that Judge Ryan D. Nelson of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been charged with misdemeanor battery for his actions in an April 2 altercation with a man in a parking lot in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Judge Nelson has also been charged with malicious injury to property – the "property" being the glasses of the other man, which Judge Nelson allegedly knocked off and stomped on. The altercation apparently began when the other man said (twice) to Judge Nelson: "Learn how to park."

The Idaho State Journal published video of the incident and also a more detailed account of the episode. A pretrial conference is scheduled for June 18.

In the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (JCDA), Congress established a process for dealing with complaints that a federal judge "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability." Judge Nelson's alleged conduct would arguably support a finding of misconduct under the JCDA; it may also implicate the provision dealing with disability. How should the judiciary respond to this report?

Under the Act, complaints against judges may be filed by "any person" and thereafter reviewed by the Chief Judge of the Circuit. But the Chief Judge need not wait for the filing of a complaint before initiating the process. She may "identify" a complaint with the same effect. I have argued that "when reports of possible misconduct have become public, the chief judge should be required to identify a complaint." This will reassure the public that the judiciary is truly committed to policing misconduct within its ranks. And if the judge is exonerated, the process will help to remove the cloud that would otherwise hang over the judge's reputation.

So the first step is for Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Mary Murguia to identify a complaint. What next? The law allows Judge Murguia to conduct a "limited inquiry," but not to "make findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute." If there are disputed facts relevant to the complaint, she must appoint a Special Committee similar to the one that recently investigated the allegations against Judge Eleanor Ross of Atlanta.

I'll skip now to the question: does Judge Nelson's conduct fall within the statutory definition of misconduct quoted above? After all, in contrast to Judge Ross, all of Judge Nelson's conduct took place outside the court and was unrelated to his judicial role.

The most extensive discussion of that question in the decisions under the Act is found in a misconduct order issued by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs of the Second Circuit almost 20 years ago. The proceeding involved an altercation at a campfire on a beach. The principal allegation of the complaint was that the subject judge engaged in misconduct by intentionally striking the complainant without justification and, as a result, was charged with a criminal offense. The similarity to the allegations against Judge Nelson is striking.

Chief Judge Jacobs assumed that extrajudicial conduct could fall within the Act, but after careful analysis (which should be read in full), he concluded that the alleged assault at the beach did not. He summed up by saying that "this was a one-time private dispute between private citizens, one of whom happens to be a judge. At worst, the Judge used physical force to terminate a private confrontation in which the Complainant was using obscenities in the presence of the Judge's small children."

As the second quoted sentence indicates, there were mitigating circumstances in the case before Judge Jacobs that appear to have no close counterpart in the episode involving Judge Nelson. But there may be other mitigating circumstances here. Josh Blackman has ascertained that the parking lot adjoins a hospice center; it is possible that something was going on in Judge Nelson's life that caused him to "snap."

If this was an isolated episode related to a serious medical concern, that might be reason to conclude that the conduct was not misconduct under the Act. Indeed, if Judge Nelson apologizes to the individual involved (which I hope he will do in any event), the Chief Judge or the Judicial Council might "conclude the proceeding" (as the Act authorizes) upon finding that "appropriate corrective action has been taken." That would avoid the need to determine whether Judge Nelson's actions constituted misconduct.

The hospice center setting also raises the possibility that Judge Nelson's conduct reflects a disability or the effect of medications. That too is something that the Chief Judge and the Judicial Council should investigate and take into account.

On the other side of the ledger, shortly after Judge Nelson's confirmation in 2018, the Wall Street Journal reported that in the two decades before his appointment, he had compiled an extensive record of traffic citations. "He's gotten tickets for speeding, disobeying traffic lights and signs, illegal turns, seat-belt violations, not carrying proof of insurance, skipping an auto inspection and not registering his vehicle. He's been cited on his boat as well."

If that behavior stopped after his appointment as a judge, it should not preclude a finding that the parking lot altercation was an isolated event in his life. But if it has continued, that would raise questions about whether the altercation reflects a temperament inconsistent with the judicial temperament. And that might even raise questions about his fitness for judicial office, parallel to those that have been raised with respect to Judge Ross. (My own view is that the most serious finding of misconduct by Judge Ross is the one that involves false statements to the judges who were investigating her misconduct. That finding corresponds closely to conduct that was one basis for impeaching District Judge Samuel B. Kent in 2009. No such conduct has been alleged here.)

But it is far too early to condemn Judge Nelson. The criminal proceeding should take its course; so should the processes under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act and the rules that the judiciary has promulgated to implement it. When all of those investigations have concluded, there will be time enough to make judgments about Judge Nelson's future as a federal judge.

The post The Criminal Charges Against Judge Ryan Nelson: How Should the Judiciary Respond? appeared first on Reason.com.

Eugene blogged about the incident last night. Bloomberg Law had additional coverage. (As an aside, Bloomberg Law has some of the most thorough coverage of the lower courts today; they consistently outperform other outlets.)

Here, I'll offer a few preliminary thoughts.

First, while I have never met Judge Ross, I do know Judge Nelson. All of my interactions with him over the years have been very cordial. The person I saw in that video was not the person I have come to know and like. As a general rule, we should not be judged at our worst moment, though in life and law, sometimes we are.

Second, I was able to figure out where the incident happened. The surveillance footage was labeled "Front Parking F Street." And the State Journal article referenced the location was on Memorial Drive. Google Maps quickly allowed me to find the intersection in Idaho Falls, Idaho. That parking lot belongs to a Home & Hospice Center. You can see the same blue column that appears in the video.

Third, this location may be relevant. One can imagine that attending to a loved one in hospice may be an emotional experience that could have put Judge Nelson, and the other person, in difficult emotional stages. Also, rushing to a hospice center may explain the judge's failure to pull into a single spot, though the lot was wide open.

Fourth, both Judge Nelson and the other person behaved poorly. Again, the lot had many empty spots. Why did the guy in the white truck pull up right next to Judge Nelson's car? And it wasn't necessary to say anything about the parking job. But then Judge Nelson lost his temper and behaved in an awful fashion. The situation escalated so quickly, it might seem there was history between these two men.

Fifth, Judge Nelson, like all criminal defendants, is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Yet, his attorney does not seem to dispute the underlying conduct--how could he, it is on camera. Here, unlike Judge Ross, Judge Nelson seems to have been truthful during the investigation.

The ethical issues here are complex. I have asked Professor Arthur Hellman to share a guest post on this matter, which I will post after mine.

This video just seems relevant.

Update: David Lat offers this update at Original Jurisdiction:

On the subject of a bad day, the first clerk shared with me that Judge Nelson has been going through a difficult time personally right now: "His father recently had a heart attack (which he thankfully survived), and other family members have been dealing with cancer. I haven't spoken to him about the incident, so I don't know if any of this played into it, but I can certainly imagine it."

Josh Blackman did some sleuthing, and based on the surveillance footage and Google Maps, he concluded that the parking lot where the incident transpired belongs to a Home and Hospice Center. So it certainly seems at least possible that Judge Nelson wasn't in a good state of mind when he had the parking argument.

The post A Few Preliminary Thoughts About Judge Ryan Nelson's Parking Lot Incident appeared first on Reason.com.

President Trump is succeeding where Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden all failed. The blockade of Iran will likely produce real regime change if it is left in place for another six to eight weeks, and the new Government of Iran will surrender its nuclear stockpile and will reopen the Strait of Hormuz unconditionally.

Iran is losing $500 million a day and 90% of its trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the blockade. No government can continue to govern and escape a revolution on the streets in this situation. Tellingly, no U.S. soldiers are dying, and President Trump is on track to win the United States' biggest foreign policy victory since the peaceful collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union because of the policies of President Ronald Reagan.

President Trump has very wisely let two conditions shape his negotiations with Iran over the last two months. First, he has insisted that Iran surrender its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium and end its efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. Second, he has rebuffed Iranian demands that Iran be allowed to charge a toll on any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Both demands are eminently reasonable. Yet the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is now the effective de facto government of Iran, is flatly rejecting both demands.

The IRGC is in a position of extreme weakness right now. It has been unable to pay its soldiers for weeks, and they are defecting in droves. The IRGC has filled all the storage tanks with oil, which it can store, and Iran may soon have to permanently shut down some oil wells, which will permanently damage them. Inflation is at record highs, especially for food; the currency has plunged to the point of being worthless; and even before the war, a super-majority of the Iranian public was furious with the regime. In six to eight weeks, the Iranian people will likely revolt in the streets, and the IRGC will have no troops to put down the popular uprising.

The result will be real regime change in Iran, one of the United States' most dangerous enemies, with an end to the IRGC's existence and to its funding of Hezbollah in Lebanon, of Hamas in the Gaza strip, and of the Houthis in Yemen. If we win the peace in Iran, the way President Truman won the peace after the end of World War II in Germany, Japan, and Italy, Iran will emerge as a potential U.S. ally, or at least as a likely peaceful regional partner.

This means that we will be able to end sanctions in Iran and help restore its full oil and gas production. That production, plus the resumption of oil and gas production in Venezuela, thanks again to President Trump, seems likely to cause oil prices to drop to about $40 a barrel, which will in turn likely bankrupt Vladimir Putin and end the Ukraine War on terms favorable to Ukraine. President Putin may even be overthrown as a result, eliminating another longtime U.S. enemy. The message sent to China not to invade Taiwan will be clear and unmistakable.

President Trump has the chance if he keeps the Iran blockade in place to emerge as the United States greatest foreign policy president since Ronald Reagan, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman. All that is required for this to happen is for him to have the patience to leave the U.S. blockade on Iran in place for another 6 to 8 weeks.

The post Keep the Blockade of Iran in Place appeared first on Reason.com.

California is notoriously slow at counting its ballots. In 2024, it took California until November 8 (three days after Election Day) to get just 70 percent of its ballots counted. Across all 50 states, the average share of the vote counted by that date was more than 95 percent, putting California squarely in last place. Rest assured, The Golden State did eventually hit that 95 percent mark … a full 10 days later….

Florida now manages to count 99 percent of its ballots within a few hours of polls closing, in part because election officials can process ballots before the polls close. And they are able to accomplish this feat of incredible speed with a sizable proportion of mail votes — about 27 percent in 2024…. Colombia held a presidential election on Sunday, and 99.98 percent of the result was in on Monday morning. Japan also counts most of its votes overnight. And in the UK (not exactly a poster child for state capacity), you can generally expect to have calls for all 650 parliamentary seats the morning after the election….

Nor is the problem inherent in California's choice to promote mail voting:

Mail-voting states such as Oregon, Washington, and Colorado count slowly relative to the US average, but they're all faster than California…. [And y]ou can make voting accessible without bending over backward to accommodate the tiny share of people affected by extending the mail ballot receipt deadline [to one week after the election, as California has]….

And slowness doesn't seem to be the price one needs to pay for accuracy:

There's no evidence that voter fraud or other election administration issues are any less prevalent in California than in faster counting states. Based on the Elections Performance Index — a project that compares election administration quality across states — California ranked 41st in 2024. So the state isn't slower and better: it's slower and (often) worse….

If you want people to be confident in your electoral system, a good first step is to build one that works properly instead of adding yet another example to the "California is a failed state" pile.

The post "Why Can't California Count?" appeared first on Reason.com.

Judges will not accept applications or recommendations before 12:00 pm EDT on Monday, June 8, 2026. (That's today — recommendations became permissible at noon Eastern today.) uscourts

For those reading this post later, note that I wrote this and asked Claude this on Sunday, June 7, 2026 (shortly after 12 noon Eastern). AI is indeed the future.

The post AI Remember Doing the Time Warp appeared first on Reason.com.

Idaho State Journal (Jimmy Hancock) reports (including video):

U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Ryan Douglas Nelson faces two criminal charges [for] {misdemeanor battery and malicious injury to property} after police say he battered a man by swiping the glasses from his face, tossing them across an asphalt lot and stomping on them during an April confrontation over a parking space in Idaho Falls….

The alleged victim says Nelson's truck was angled into a parking space — the bulk of his truck in one spot with the right front tire and bumper hanging over the right line and into the spot to the right and the left rear part of the truck hanging over the left line and into the parking space to the left, effectively blocking three parking spots in the lot directly in front of the nearby businesses.

As the alleged victim was exiting his white pickup truck, Nelson started his truck to leave the parking space. That's when the alleged victim spoke.

"I say 'learn how to park,'" the alleged victim said. "I said it twice. That's when he went crazy." …

"When I spoke with Nelson he admitted to knocking his glasses from (the alleged victim's) head but stated he did not touch him. He also admitted to stomping on his glasses," [a police officer's] affidavit states.

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J. Whitfield Larrabee …. alleges that since taking office, President Donald J. Trump … has engaged in a course of unconstitutional conduct (collectively, "the Policy") by issuing executive orders that punish and threaten to punish lawyers and law firms that he dislikes. Larrabee asks the Court to declare the Policy unconstitutional and to enjoin President Trump and other named defendants … from taking any such action against him….

In March, 2025, President Trump issued a memorandum to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security titled "Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and Federal Court." That Memo directed the Attorney General to seek sanctions against attorneys and law firms who engage in "frivolous, unreasonable, and vexatious litigation against the United States." It also directed the Attorney General to review conduct of attorneys and their law firms in litigation against the Federal Government over the past eight years and, if any misconduct were to be identified, to recommend additional steps to be taken, including reassessment of security clearances and federal contracts.

Contemporaneously, President Trump began to issue Executive Orders ("EOs") that purported to address the conduct of and risks posed by specific law firms. Plaintiff alleges that such EOs targeted law firms based on their past representation of clients and causes disfavored by President Trump. The EOs restricted the access of those law firms to federal buildings and limited official interactions between federal government personnel and their attorneys. Several law firms agreed to provide substantial pro bono work favored by President Trump in order to avoid being subject to similar EOs….

Plaintiff, an attorney and self-described adversary of President Trump, alleges that he has a history of engaging in litigation against President Trump and has represented causes disfavored by him. He says:

[s]o long as Trump is President, [he] intend[s] to make additional legal complaints against Trump's businesses, family members and associates where there are good grounds to do so.

He contends that he faces "a credible threat that the policy will be enforced against [him]" if he follows his intended course of conduct. He further claims that he has been deterred from representing particular clients and has been "engaged in self-censorship" out of fear of such enforcement….

The government contends that plaintiff has not alleged actual or imminent injury traceable to the Policy [which is a requirement for having standing to sue -EV]. The Court agrees.

[A.] Actual Injury

Defendant submits that he is currently suffering actual and ongoing injuries resulting from the Policy. Specifically, he alleges that he has refrained from representing particular clients and causes that are adverse to or disfavored by President Trump. Such allegations are insufficient where plaintiff has failed to establish that any future harm is certainly impending. As discussed below, plaintiff has made no such showing and thus his attempt to establish standing is unavailing.

[B.] Imminent Injury

Plaintiff contends that he faces a credible threat of enforcement sufficient to confer standing because the Policy has been recently enforced against others and the government has not disclaimed enforcement against him…. [P]laintiff must show that the enforcement is certainly impending or that there is a substantial risk that harm will occur. He has not met that burden here. First, the Court must give weight to the fact that there is no history of enforcement of the Policy with respect to like facts. The Policy has thus far been enforced against large, international law firms associated with attorneys who led investigations into President Trump or previously represented his political opponents. Plaintiff is not similarly situated to those individuals and provides no indication that the Policy has been applied to similar facts.

Larrabee's reliance on Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) is unavailing. The three factors supporting imminent enforcement in that case are inapplicable here. See Driehaus (noting that the challenged policy had previously been enforced against plaintiff, conferred broad authority on private citizens to instigate enforcement proceedings and its enforcement was "not a rare occurrence").

Here, the Policy can only be enforced by President Trump and a select few members of his Cabinet and it has not previously been enforced against Larrabee or similarly situated individuals. Indeed, enforcement of the Policy has been a rare, headline-making occurrence, and more than one year has elapsed since the most recent enforcement action. Furthermore, in Driehaus the Court declined to determine whether the civil enforcement proceedings, without the additional threat of criminal prosecution, was sufficient to confer standing. Larrabee does not allege any threat of criminal prosecution connected with the Policy.

In sum, the Court finds that plaintiff does not face an imminent injury and thus lacks Article III standing. Having so decided, the Court declines to address the parties' other arguments….

Michael Fitzgerald (D. Mass. U.S. Attorney's Office) represents the government.

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