According to the complaint in this case, Plaintiffs Doug and Nicole Turpin sent their children to a private school called Charlotte Latin School. Beginning in the summer of 2020, the school began to change its curriculum to focus on politicized issues of race and gender identity. At some point, the Turpins learned that the school was teaching their sixth-grade child various polarizing concepts such as "Republicans are white supremacists." The school also required young students to read books on sexuality and gender identity that were not age appropriate.

The Turpins started organizing with other parents to voice their concerns about the school curriculum in 2021. Eventually, the Turpins scheduled a meeting with school leadership. At the meeting, the school was not interested in discussing the Turpins' concerns. Instead, the school terminated the Turpins' enrollment contracts and expelled their children with no advance warning.

Among other things, the Turpins sued the school for defamation, and the court allowed the case to go forward:

The Turpins allege that Charlotte Latin and Baldecchi made false statements [to third parties] about the contents of the [Turpins'] PowerPoint presentation [that the Turpins delivered at the meeting]—specifically, that the PowerPoint contained the racist assertion that minority students and faculty at the school "have not earned their positions and honors" and that those minority students and faculty were "not up to the merit of the school" like the white students and faculty ….

The defamatory statements by Charlotte Latin do not accurately characterize the "gist" or "sting" of the PowerPoint discussion. First, the only portion of the presentation referencing how the school's approach "erodes the quality of student" and the "quality of teacher" expressly addresses all students and faculty, regardless of color. That section of the presentation asserted that the excessive focus on "DEI and Critical Theory" was shifting the school away from a classical education teaching "objectivity," "science," "canonical reading," and so on, to instead embrace a "political and ideological agenda."

When a school that was long focused on the importance of a classical education instead shifts toward a partisan, politicized curriculum, as the PowerPoint claimed, that shift impacts every student and every teacher equally. Nothing in these statements suggests the school's changed curriculum or ideological agenda negatively impacted minority students and faculty but not their white counterparts.

The remaining portions of the PowerPoint examined by the Court of Appeals are critiques of non-merit-based hiring or admissions practices and a pitch to return to a "meritocracy." Importantly, none of these statements refer to the quality or merit of particular students or groups of students. The statements simply assert that the school should commit to a meritocracy where the driving goal is "academic excellence."

Were we to adopt the Court of Appeals' reasoning with respect to these statements, it would mean any statement criticizing non-merit-based hiring or admissions practices is, as a matter of law, a statement that people who benefited from those practices would not otherwise qualify based on merit. This is a fallacy. Someone who benefits from a non-merit-based factor can still be qualified based on merit alone. The presence of that additional factor says nothing about the merit-based qualifications of the candidate.

Simply put, criticizing so-called "DEI goals" or other race-conscious criteria in hiring and admissions, and urging a return to a "meritocracy," is not the equivalent of claiming that minority students and faculty have not earned their positions and honors or are not up to the merit of other students. We do not agree that "the gist" or "the sting" of these two categories of comments are the same as a matter of law. The latter—statements focused on the purported inferiority of minority students or faculty—are pernicious and racist. They are the sort of offensive statements that, if heard by others, can damage one's reputation and good name. Accordingly, in appropriate contexts, claiming that someone made this kind of offensive statement when they did not can be defamatory. Taking as true all the allegations in the complaint, this is one of those cases….

The school did not make a subjective statement of opinion such as "the Turpins are racists." The school told its entire community of students, parents, and faculty that the Turpins said a specific racist thing. That claim has an objective answer: the Turpins either said it or they didn't. The correct analogy is not claiming someone is a racist, as in the cases the dissent cites, but claiming someone used a racial epithet. If that is a lie, it is defamatory.

As we have done with respect to other factual allegations in this divisive case, we again point out that there may be more going on factually than what is alleged in the complaint. For example, we do not yet know what the presenters said as they displayed the PowerPoint document. At this stage of the case, we can look only at the document itself. Both the school's email and Baldecchi's statements may, in full context, have been addressing matters beyond the PowerPoint document.

Courts cannot seek out this sort of full context at the pleadings stage. That is the purpose of fact discovery. At this early stage of the case, we take the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Turpins. Doing so here, the Turpins have sufficiently alleged that defendants made materially false statements. We therefore reject the reasoning of the Court of Appeals with respect to falsity….

Justice Allison Riggs, joined by Justice Anita Earls, dissented with regard to this; an excerpt:

[A]llegations of racism, like many subjective viewpoints, are in the eye of the beholder and do not squarely fit into the falsity test. How could a plaintiff prove that a statement alleging he expressed a particular viewpoint is false? How can a defendant prove that it is true? … "… [M]any courts in other jurisdictions that have faced the issue of defamation claims based on accusations of bigotry or racism have held the statements to be nonactionable statements of opinion." …

The majority fails to analyze whether the alleged defamatory statement is a fact, which can be false, or an opinion, which cannot. Charlotte Latin's email, about which the Turpins complain and that they infer is made in reference to them, states that parents complained "that diverse students and faculty have not earned their positions and honors at Latin and that diversity comes at the expense of excellence."

It is a faulty equivalence to suggest this actual statement, a reflection of values and opinion that the school rejected, is more like "claiming someone used a racial epithet" than "claiming someone is a racist." Instead, the crux of the Turpins' defamation claim is that Charlotte Latin, in characterizing the Refocus Latin presentation, portrayed them in a negative light. This is an entirely subjective inference, which does not lend itself to the falsity analysis. Even with the low notice pleading standard, the Turpins must state a legally cognizable claim—which they cannot do if the alleged defamatory statement is an opinion incapable of falsity.

As a matter of law, allegations of racism should be treated as unprovable opinion, not fact, as they are in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tilman (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that an allegation of racism "is not actionable unless it implies the existence of undisclosed, defamatory facts"); Murphy v. Rosen (Conn. 2025) (joining "numerous other jurisdictions" to hold that an allegation a person was a "white supremacist" was "not objectively verifiable" so was a non-actionable opinion); Cousins v. Goodier (Del. 2022) (holding that an allegation of racism was not "provably false" and that "the First Amendment is clear that [determining what it means to be racist] would be the opposite of our role")…. I fear this superficial treatment of the limitations on the use of state defamation law to constrain free speech will have significant chilling effects on important public discourse and will fling open the courthouse doors to disputes that should be settled in open, public conversations, not by judges….

The court also allowed parents' separate breach of contract and fraud claims to go forward.

The post Dissenting Parents' Defamation Claim Over School's Allegations of Racism Can Go Forward appeared first on Reason.com.

(1) unlikely to foster a culture of free inquiry, free expression, and intellectual diversity within the institution;

(2) unlikely to expose students to scholarly works from a variety of political or ideological frameworks that may exist within and are applicable to the faculty member's academic discipline; or

(3) likely, while performing teaching duties within the scope of the faculty member's employment, to subject students to political or ideological views and opinions that are unrelated to the faculty member's academic discipline or assigned course of instruction….

Because the professors lacked standing, the court didn't consider their substantive First Amendment challenges to that law. (For more on the law, and the standing issues, see this post.) But Judge Frank Easterbrook also added a concurrence that opined on the underlying First Amendment issue; I've emphasized the key passages:

I do not see how the plaintiffs have advanced a plausible argument under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs suppose that professors hold rights against universities about what shall be taught. Yet academic freedom belongs to the university. "It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedoms of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."

A university has the right to insist that professors provide the sort of education that the school promises to students but can deliver only through agents. Contra, Pernell v. Florida State University System (11th Cir. 2026). (Obviously, I agree with the dissent in Pernell and need not repeat what Judge Lagoa explains at length.)

Indiana University is not complaining—nor could it. The University is a part of the State of Indiana, which like other governments has a right to convey its own message. To enjoy this right the University must have teachers who will present the course of instruction it specifies. Professors' speech in class has not been regulated; it has been hired.

Many students want to receive educations in which professors "foster a culture of free inquiry, free expression, and intellectual diversity" and "refrain[] from subjecting students to views and opinions concerning matters not related to the faculty member's academic discipline or assigned course of instruction." But, if plaintiffs are right, colleges that make such promises to students (and their paying parents) are powerless to deliver on them. Faculty may choose to provide tendentious screeds instead, denying their institutions the ability to provide students with a particular kind of educational experience.

Government need not specify all details in order to be a speaker. Whether to teach ethnomusicology at all, and if so how, is a question for a state university to answer, rather than for judges and juries to prescribe in the name of the First Amendment. Likewise with whether a person hired to teach economics must offer that subject rather than musicology.

Indiana has chosen to specify, through [the law being challenged], only a segment of the University's educational approach, but this restraint does not prevent the University from standing on its prerogative to decide what to teach. Indiana could not compel a private university to follow the approach laid out in this statute, but Indiana may choose to offer it for itself and see how it fares in the marketplace of ideas.

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In response to questions at oral argument and a later directive from the court, counsel for petitioners and the government revealed that the government has removed the three original named petitioners in this case. As there are currently no named petitioners in this appeal who are still in the United States, petitioners have moved to add five new class representatives on appeal—a motion that we deny today.

Petitioners have also moved for these five proposed class representatives to proceed pseudonymously on appeal, as well as for the sealing of their unredacted motion to add class representatives. The government does not oppose either motion.

But "the parties' consent does not end the analysis when determining whether pseudonymization is appropriate. Instead, the court must conduct its own balancing of the public and private interests at stake." We DENY these motions without prejudice to any future determination by the district court regarding whether to allow any new class representatives to proceed under pseudonyms or whether to seal a motion adding class representatives.

"What transpires in the court room is public property." Indeed, disclosure is generally favored. And "[p]ublic naming of litigants is one aspect of the broader 'presumption, long supported by courts, that the public has a common-law right of access to judicial records.'" Thus, "[a] strong presumption against party pseudonymity is generally well settled."

Of course, this presumption can give way in appropriate circumstances… [O]ur court has articulated "three factors common to anonymous-party suits that … 'deserve considerable weight'" in determining whether to allow parties to use pseudonyms: "(1) whether the plaintiff is 'challeng[ing] governmental activity'; (2) whether the plaintiff will be required to disclose information 'of the utmost intimacy'; and (3) whether the plaintiff will be 'compelled to admit [his] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.'" … We have also considered, among other things, "the showing of possible threatened harm."

These considerations do not weigh in favor of allowing the proposed new representatives to proceed pseudonymously here. First, while the petitioners certainly challenge governmental activity, "in only a very few cases challenging governmental activity can anonymity be justified." Where "plaintiffs [a]re suing private individuals rather than a government agency," a court may find "more reason not to grant the plaintiffs' request for anonymity." But that a plaintiff sues the government "does not stand … for the proposition that there is more reason to grant [that] plaintiff's request for anonymity."

Second, the proposed representatives have not shown that proceeding under their real identities would require them to disclose "information 'of the utmost intimacy.'" … "'[W]here the issues involved are matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature,' such as birth control, abortion, homosexuality[,] or the welfare rights of illegitimate children or abandoned families, the normal practice of disclosing the parties' identities yields 'to a policy of protecting privacy in a very private matter.'" Religious beliefs may also qualify, depending on the circumstances. Courts have also "permitted plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in cases involving mental illness."

Here, the proposed class representatives have not shown that disclosure of their names would "require[]" them "to disclose information 'of the utmost intimacy.'" They insist that we should treat "immigration matters, like the ones here, that disclose personal information," as intimate information warranting pseudonymity. But this argument fails. To begin, one of the proposed representatives says nothing about his immigration status at all, and another has temporary protected status. Neither explains how revelation of "immigration matters" related to him would "disclose [any] personal information," let alone information that makes pseudonyms appropriate.

Of the other three proposed class representatives, one has an approved asylum application, and two represent that they are currently seeking asylum. But this, without more, does not demand pseudonymity. The proposed class representatives point out cases in which district courts allowed asylum applicants to proceed pseudonymously in asylum proceedings. But they do not argue that they have used pseudonyms in their own asylum proceedings. Nor have they shown that Venezuela penalizes asylum seekers. Without more, the asylum-seeker status of three of the five proposed class representatives does not counsel against the "strong presumption against party pseudonymity."

The proposed representatives also fear that proceeding under their true names will cause the revelation of their physical characteristics. But it is difficult to see how physical characteristics that one exposes to the public count as intimate information—and the proposed representatives have not argued that they conceal the characteristics that they mention from the public. Even in the criminal context, one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's visible physical characteristics. Absent more evidence than the proposed class representatives have presented here, we will not deem physical characteristics intimate information in the civil context….

Finally, by revealing their identities, the proposed class representatives will not "be 'compelled to admit [their] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.'" Of course, a party need not necessarily "admit criminal conduct or criminal intent in order to proceed under a fictitious name." A court could also allow a party to proceed pseudonymously if that party "had to admit that [he] either had violated state laws or government regulations or wished to engage in prohibited conduct." … Here, the disclosure of their identities would not require the proposed class representatives to "express a desire to participate in proscribed activities." Indeed, all of the proposed class representatives maintain that they want to contest their purportedly "false designation as a member of Tren de Aragua and the application of the Alien Enemies Act to" them. Moreover, the government, which knows their true identities, has already served them with notices of removal under the President's Proclamation.

We have also considered "the showing of possible threatened harm" in determining whether to allow parties to use pseudonyms. Here, all five of the proposed class representatives express fear of retaliation "in the form of physical violence in Venezuela or third countries if their identities were to be revealed and if they were to be removed for being erroneously identified as members of TdA." True, "[c]ourts generally allow pseudonymity if there is 'reasonable[]' 'fear[]' of 'retaliatory physical … harm to the requesting party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties,' which may be considered in light of 'the anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation.'" But "[l]ack of such express threats or incidents—or at least lack of highly plausible predictions of possible future violence—will usually count against pseudonymity." And "this court does not usually allow parties to proceed anonymously based on generalized concerns."

Here, the petitioners express only "generalized concerns" about potential retaliation, directed toward either them or their families, in Venezuela or other countries as a result of the U.S. government identifying them with TdA. They present zero "plausible predictions of possible future violence," let alone evidence of "express threats or incidents" to anyone, including them or their families, arising out of identification with TdA. These evidence-less, generalized fears do not permit the proposed class representatives to overcome the presumption against pseudonymity….

The post Plaintiffs Contesting Tren de Aragua Membership Claims / Alien Enemies Act Application Can't Sue Pseudonymously appeared first on Reason.com.

A grand jury indicted Kyle Wagner for cyberstalking and transmitting interstate threats. The conduct giving rise to the indictment followed a series of escalating communications in which Wagner threatened federal law-enforcement officers and their supporters, solicited resources to evade detection by the authorities, and entertained an inquiry about killing a former government official. A magistrate judge ordered Wagner detained pretrial. But the district court changed course and permitted Wagner's release. Though acknowledging that the record exhibited some risk of Wagner's danger, the district court reasoned that certain release conditions—like requiring Wagner's assurances that he will limit his internet access and avoid making additional threats—would adequately ensure public safety. The Government appealed and sought an emergency stay of the release order, which we granted. We now reverse the district court's decision….

Kyle Wagner is a self-professed member of Antifa—short for anti-fascist—based in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Wagner has stated that he's willing to die in what "he view[s] as" an "ideological battle" against "violent fascist government actions and its supporters." Around January 2026, Wagner undertook a series of escalating steps to oppose Immigration and Customs Enforcement's actions in Minneapolis and broadcast his efforts to a social-media following. As the month progressed, Wagner's social-media posts transitioned into direct calls for violence against federal agents and their supporters.

A few examples paint the picture. Wagner proclaimed that the situation in Minneapolis was "kill or be killed." In that same post, Wagner encouraged his online followers to "hunt" ICE by "sacrific[ing]" their "vehicles." In other posts, Wagner declared that he and his followers were "f**king coming for" ICE and were "coming for [ICE's supporters] too." Wagner urged his followers to "f**king fight" ICE and "put[ ] hands" on law-enforcement agents and "take their f**king guns." He suggested that he and his followers should "have a little f**king fun" by "identify[ing] every single" ICE agent, "at the barrel of a gun" if necessary.  Wagner also lamented that protestors had yet to "march on f**king Whipple"—the federal building in Minneapolis—"with guns."  He therefore directed his followers to "[g]et your f**king guns and stop these f**king people." Wagner prefaced that directive by exclaiming that he was "not talking about peaceful protests anymore." Other videos of Wagner's stressed that Minneapolis was "where ICE has come to die."

At points, Wagner disavowed any intent to commit physical aggression. Still, Wagner's followers—spanning Minnesota and beyond—understood him to be calling for violence. In response to one of Wagner's posts, an Instagram user referenced firearms, commenting that it's "[t]ime for [ICE agents] to meet your friends. Namely AR15 and 9MM."  Others expressed interest in joining Wagner's "cause" from out of state.

Wagner also sought tangible resources from his followers to aid his efforts to "organize."  Wagner specifically requested funds to help him "evade" detection by law enforcement. And he provided the name of several financial-payment accounts for use in transferring him money. In all, Wagner's followers sent him between $10,000 and $15,000.

After Wagner posted calls for "[b]oots on the ground" to a local intersection near ICE agents and urged his followers to "[g]et your f**king guns and stop these f**king people," Instagram deleted Wagner's account. Yet he quickly resurfaced with a different account—employing the username "@antifa.kaos"—and a new series of online postings.  Among other things, Wagner used his updated account to publish a video of him distributing gas masks and riot shields at a protest.

Wagner's activities were not just public facing. In one private Signal chat, a user allegedly contacted Wagner with a request to help "kill" a man named J.P., a former high-ranking government official. Wagner responded in the chat that "we do stuff, me and my family of friends" and "[w]e like to know about people who deserve consequences." He then asked for "credible verifiable information" that he could pass onto his "team" so it could "assess the situation." In another chat, Wagner allegedly stated that he "may have found" the address and phone number of N.S., an individual "who did investigative work."

On January 29, 2026, Wagner allegedly "doxxed" J.S., "a pro-ICE individual," by publishing what he claimed was J.S.'s name, phone number, birth month and year, and address. Alongside that information, Wagner described J.S. as a "bb nazi boy" and said "we can all knock on strangers doors … See you soon kiddo – stay safe out here."  After the alleged doxxing, J.S. and Wagner apparently discussed fighting in a cage match. In a subsequent post, Wagner allegedly published what he thought was the address and phone number of J.S.'s parents….

Several days later, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging Wagner with one count of cyberstalking and one count of transmitting interstate threats for his alleged doxxing of J.S. Wagner was subsequently arrested in Minnesota. During his arrest, Wagner allegedly began "pushing" agents and "spitting on them" while stating that he would "beat" them. He also told the arresting agents "[d]on't let me out." During his booking photo, Wagner flashed two middle fingers at the camera. His message: "This is for the judge." …

The Government argues that Wagner is a danger to both J.S. and the broader community. It also argues that Wagner is a flight risk. We agree with the Government that it carried its burden on dangerousness. Because that conclusion is sufficient to support Wagner's detention, we need not address risk of flight….

Wagner … defends the district court's apparent attempt to draw equivalency between Wagner's threats and the actions of federal law enforcement. Specifically, the district court remarked during the detention hearing that "protection of the public" was "kind of like a two-way street" that "depends on what side of the street you're on whether or not an individual might feel they are protected or in need of protection." Both Wagner and the Government interpret that remark as a "compar[ison]" between "Wagner's actions in the community to those of ICE." In context, it thus appears that the district court may have discounted the dangerousness of Wagner's threats based on its view that ICE also threatened the public.

Any reasoning along those lines was error. The Bail Reform Act focuses on the danger the defendant poses to "any other person and the community." The district court's views on the Executive Branch's immigration policy have no bearing on that inquiry….

Judge Rachel Bloomekatz dissented:

In December 2025, the Department of Homeland Security launched Operation Metro Surge, a mass immigration enforcement effort that deployed thousands of federal agents to Minnesota and triggered widespread protests. Kyle Wagner, a Minneapolis native, was a vocal opponent of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents throughout the operation. He regularly posted on social media, sometimes multiple times a day, to denounce ICE agents and to call for his followers to resist ICE. Wagner also criticized ICE supporters, and, in one Instagram post, shared the purported personal information and address of a pro-ICE online influencer. Based on this single post, the government charged Wagner with cyberstalking and transmitting interstate threats, and then it moved for his pretrial detention. The district court found that it could reasonably protect against any risk of danger or nonappearance that Wagner posed by imposing numerous restrictive pretrial release conditions, so it ordered his release.

The government appeals the district court's order denying pretrial detention and releasing Wagner subject to these comprehensive conditions. The government seldom appeals pretrial release orders, so why is it insistent here? Wagner, who identifies as "antifa" (anti-fascist) and has large tattoos on his face, neck, and chest, looks aggressive in his social media videos, so it is no surprise that the White House Press Secretary held up a photo from one of his videos while touting law enforcement efforts against "left-wing agitators."

But Wagner has never committed a violent crime. He does not own a gun and has disavowed owning one. And there is no evidence in the record that he has ever assaulted or otherwise physically harmed anyone, save for spitting towards agents during his arrest.

Instead, as the government admits, Wagner's purported dangerousness is based almost entirely on his online speech—namely, his anti-ICE posts. His commentary is no doubt fiery and aggressive, but it is also clearly full of bravado and rhetoric. And the government does not point to a single harmful action his speech has incited. Yet, because of his speech, the government says—and the majority agrees—Wagner poses a danger to the public that no conditions of release can address, so he must be incarcerated awaiting trial.

I disagree. On this record, the government has not provided "clear and convincing evidence" that Wagner is so dangerous, or proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he is at such a risk of absconding, that no set of release conditions "will reasonably assure" the community's safety and his appearance. Not only does the government overstate the evidence of dangerousness, but in my view, the government has not provided a convincing reason to overturn the district court's conclusion that the stringent conditions of Wagner's release—including no social media access, no communication with anti-ICE organizers, GPS monitoring, home confinement in the presence of a custodian, and electronic surveillance on all his devices—are sufficient to protect the public and assure his appearance….

Danielle Asher represents the government.

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The principal question presented is whether the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act applies to deceptive and unfair advertisements that appear on a Florida limited liability company's website. By its plain language, CUTPA only applies to unfair and deceptive acts and practices that occur in trade or commerce in Connecticut. See General Statutes § 42-110a (4) (defining trade and commerce as "the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property … in this state." (emphasis added]).

As set forth below, the court concludes that an out-of-state or foreign company that operates an interactive internet website is not, on that basis alone, engaged in trade or commerce in Connecticut. Consequently, the court lacks the statutory authority under CUTPA to impose civil penalties on such foreign companies based solely on allegedly false and deceptive advertisements on their websites. To hold otherwise would require the court to ignore the clear limits that the General Assembly placed on the geographic scope of CUTPA and would expose foreign companies across the country, if not the world, to CUTPA liability based solely on statements that appear, or allegedly should appear per Connecticut law, on their websites….

In 2019, the State of Connecticut enacted … "An Act Concerning Ghost Guns," to address the growing public safety threat posed by untraceable firearms. Ghost guns are privately made firearms that do not have serial numbers and cannot be traced back to the original owner or dealer. The act provides, in relevant part, "[n]o person shall purchase or receive or sell, deliver or otherwise transfer an unfinished frame or lower receiver, except as provided [herein]." The act does not proscribe advertising the sale of such components….

[T]he manufacture and sale of ghost guns and parts remain legal under state law throughout much of the United States, including in the State of Florida…. [T]he federal Gun Control … does not ban ghost gun parts outright. Nor does it ban advertising. Rather, it requires sellers to secure federal licenses, conduct background checks, keep sales records, and mark their products with serial numbers.

[The Act Concerning Ghost Guns] is a penal statute, the violation of which is a Class C felony. Although the Office of the Attorney General generally lacks the legal authority to enforce the state's criminal laws through criminal prosecutions, it has the authority to enforce CUTPA. In March 2023, the Office of the Attorney General announced that it had filed the present civil lawsuit against four out-of-state firearm companies. The lawsuit alleges that the companies violated CUTPA by advertising the sale, offering for sale, and selling products that are expressly prohibited under Connecticut law except in limited circumstances not relevant to this case….

Indie Guns LLC[] is a Florida limited liability corporation not registered in Connecticut as a foreign corporation. Indie Guns operated a website that advertised ghost gun parts for sale. After Indie Guns failed to file an appearance, the state moved for entry of a default, which the clerk granted in the normal course…. [At the damages hearing], the state introduced evidence of a single sale of ghost gun parts to an undercover agent in Connecticut…. [T]he state seeks the maximum civil penalty under CUTPA of $5000 for each day that Indie Guns' website operated between October 1, 2020 and the hearing in damages, i.e., 1539 days. Thus, the state seeks a total civil penalty of $7,695,000….

The court noted that, even when a defendant has defaulted, the court must still consider whether the plaintiff's allegations "are sufficient on their face to make out a valid claim for the relief requested." It concluded that the allegations were sufficient as to the one sale in Connecticut as to which the state introduced evidence (and which would lead to a $5000 penalty). But the court stressed that "the state does not seek a civil penalty on [the] basis of that sale."

Rather, the state's penalty argument focused solely on the Indie Guns' website, and the court held that this argument was legally unfounded:

CUTPA only applies to unfair or deceptive conduct that occurs in trade or commerce in Connecticut. The court determines that a website owned and operated by an out-of-state person or business entity does not, alone, constitute the conduct of trade or commerce in Connecticut.

To hold otherwise would mean that every website owner or operator throughout the entire country, indeed the world, is potentially subject to CUTPA liability, including for advertisements that may be lawful in the owner's jurisdiction but potentially unfair or deceptive under Connecticut law. As discussed below, the state not only is untroubled by this position, but instead embraces it and describes a contrary position as dangerous and bizarre….

As previously noted, Indie Guns' advertising of ghost gun parts is not forbidden under Florida law or federal law. Nor does Connecticut's ghost gun act forbid the advertising of such parts…. [I]n the court's view, a view an appellate tribunal may not share, CUTPA does not authorize a court to impose civil penalties on foreign companies based solely on the contents of their websites.

The government also noted that Indie Guns and its owner, Lawrence DeStefano, had posted various things on its Instagram account:

One Instagram post shows DeStefano sitting in front of a sign that says: "TO ALL YOU GOVT ANTI-GUN ASS CLOWNS, YES! THESE ARE UNTRACEABLE UNSERIALIZED UNREGISTERED GHOST GUNNERS! AND YOU CAN'T DO SHIT ABOUT IT!!!"

Another post shows DeStefano putting packages into a large white mail bag. He says, "I am at an undisclosed location shipping out packages … they are trying to disarm us, I want you to understand that … this is about disarmament, this is about tyranny … they want all these ghost guns … serialized because … they want to know who's got 'em so they can take them away." He repeatedly professes his mission, to help people build guns in their homes even when in violation of state law, and to avoid oversight of gun purchases and ownership by law enforcement.

In another post, a video opens by thanking "Willie" Tong. Next is a clip from the [Connecticut] Attorney General's press conference. Attorney General Tong, with advocates for gun violence prevention by his side, displays the lower receiver … purchased from Indie Guns … and explains that a person could build a fully functioning AR-15 from the part. The words "In Stock: Ghost Gunner" are superimposed on the clip. Indie Guns then plays footage showing how a machine that Indie Guns advertises, sells, and offers for sale, called the "Ghost Gunner," can be used to easily turn [the displayed lower receiver] into a functional gun part. The video end with a clip of a scene from the film Scarface, during which Al Pacino uses an automatic assault weapon to spray people with gunfire. The "Ghost Gunner" was offered for sale on Indie Guns' website up until the date of the hearing….

DeStefano complains about the cooperation of other illegal gun parts dealers with Attorney General investigations, specifically, AR Industries, an original defendant in this matter. DeStefano explains that "the DIY gun movement … culture … has always been a secret society … we didn't care what government regulations were out there, what the laws were, or where it was illegal to ship. We just didn't care." …

DeStefano states: "I supply people from all walks of life … different age groups, whether you're young …. I don't care…. I specialize … I offer a service, which is extreme discretion …. I don't take credit cards, I make personal contact with you … and I make sure I get the product to them, regardless where they live at …. Typically the customers that call me, they can't get their products from somewhere else … and that's why they deal with me, so that's my customer base." …

But the court held that these statements didn't matter:

[T]he obvious contempt that Indie Guns' owner showed for this lawsuit and the Attorney General [does not] support an award of CUTPA civil penalties. The first amendment to the United States constitution protects Indie Guns' right to make those statements through social media. They may be relevant to showing willfulness, but they do not constitute CUTPA violations. And they do not transform the Indie Guns' website—which is separate from India Guns' Instagram account—into trade or commerce in Connecticut….

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