Prachatai English

More deadly shootings expose gaps in Thailand’s gun control

eng editor 3 — Tue, 18 Aug 2026 05:18:58 +0000

More deadly shootings expose gaps in Thailand’s gun control

Thailand’s gun-control measures have been under scrutiny following two deadly shootings within a week. As the government has moved to tighten control measures, the incidents highlight how the country with the highest number of privately owned firearms in Southeast Asia regulates access to guns.

On 7 August, Thailand witnessed a deadly mass shooting at a school in Nonthaburi which killed nine people, including a 12-year-old student. Three days later, former MP Chalong Riewrang opened fire in front of a government building in Nonthaburi, killing Pol Col Thongchai Yenprasert, the President of the Nonthaburi Provincial Administrative Organisation.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul swiftly responded to the incidents by announcing a halt to new gun permits and a ‘welfare gun’ scheme. The PM also ordered tighter gun controls, while the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is preparing to revise the law within 60 days.

The highest number of privately owned firearms in Southeast Asia

The Small Arms Survey estimates that civilians in Thailand possess around 10.3 million firearms, the highest estimated gun stock in Southeast Asia and the 13th-highest in the world. However, only 6 million are registered, leaving an estimated 4 million unregistered.

A study by Ramkhamhaeng University’s Faculty of Law stated that between 2016 and 2019, around 91,000 criminal cases were recorded involving unregistered firearms. The figure was significantly higher than the 25,000 cases with registered firearms. This highlights another key issue concerning access to firearms in Thailand.

Meanwhile, the World Population Review revealed that at least 2,400 people in Thailand were killed by gun violence each year between 2020 and 2023.

The welfare gun scheme is also seen as a key issue in gun access in Thailand.

It is open to government officials in Thailand, such as law enforcement officers, allowing them to purchase guns at a discounted price. A welfare gun, unlike government-issued firearms, becomes privately owned once purchased. However no regulation requires these firearms to be returned to the state once gun owners cease to be government officials.

Ownership of a welfare gun cannot be transferred until 5 years after the licence is granted. After that, it can be resold. Some officials have reportedly taken advantage of the scheme by purchasing firearms and later reselling them at higher prices on the black market.

Analayo Korsakul, a security, military and weapons expert, wrote on his Facebook page that the welfare gun scheme has effectively operated like a ‘gun convenience store’ which creates opportunities for making profit through resale. He argued that the scheme significantly contributed to the number of illegal firearms.

It is also common for Thai politicians and influential figures to own guns. Many cabinet members and politicians have included guns in their asset declarations. Suchart Chomklin, the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment , owns 12. One female MP from the ruling party has 48 guns, while another MP has declared 40.

Gaps in Thailand’s gun control

Thailand’s major law concerning gun control is the Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Fireworks and Imitation Firearms Act 1947. There are three main licences governing gun ownership in Thailand: a licence to buy, a licence to use, and a licence to carry firearms.

According to the law, no one can make, purchase, have, use, order or import firearms or ammunition unless a licence to purchase is granted by the local registrar. Meanwhile, to use a firearm, one has to be granted a licence to use. With only a licence to use a firearm, carrying a firearm in public remains illegal unless a separate licence to carry is granted.

A licence to purchase is valid for six months after it is issued, so the purchase must be completed within that period. A licence to use has no expiration date, while a licence to carry has to be renewed every year.

Government agencies under the Interior Ministry are assigned to handle gun ownership. In order to request a licence to purchase a gun in Thailand, an individual must be at least 20 years old and demonstrate that the firearm is intended for purposes such as self-defence or sport.

However, Thailand lacks effective measures to track guns and reassess the qualifications and psychological fitness of gun owners.

Deputy Prime Minister Pakorn Nilprapunt revealed that licensing approval is still handled through a paper-based system. Information on the import, distribution, possession and transfer of guns has not been systematically linked. As a result, when a problem arises, the officials will have to check the relevant information manually.

Do gun-control measures in Thailand really work?

At the 11 August cabinet meeting in response to the latest incidents, PM Anutin immediately halted the issuance of the three main gun permits and suspended the welfare gun scheme.

A nationwide review of licences to purchase firearms will be conducted. Officials are to verify the number of outstanding licences that have not yet been used to purchase firearms.

In the long term, the government is considering a requirement that the licence to carry a gun be renewed every three years in order to reassess the qualifications of those who have a licence to use.

The government will move to revise the current law, linking real-time data with the Customs and Revenue departments, strengthening firearm identification and dealer oversight, and increasing penalties for those who violate the law.

The government is also considering a possible amnesty to encourage people who have unlicensed guns to return them to the state.

However, some of these measures are not new. Following the Nong Bua Lamphu mass shooting in 2022, in which an ex-policeman opened fire at a daycare centre and killed at least 37 people, most of them children, , the government tightened measures on firearms licences.

In 2023, a 14-year-old boy opened fire at Siam Paragon shopping mall, leaving three people dead. The government, with PM Anutin as the then Interior Minister, suspended issuing new licences to carry a gun for one year.

Earlier this year, the government once again suspended the issuance of licences to carry a gun in an effort to maintain public order.

These repeated incidents suggest that Thailand’s gun-control problem may not lie solely in the absence of strict regulations but in what happens once firearms are in circulation.

eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-08-18 - 12:18

Feature

Former Australian diplomat Katrina Cooper chairs Thailand-Cambodia maritime conciliation under UNCLOS

eng editor 3 — Fri, 14 Aug 2026 16:30:29 +0000

Former Australian diplomat Katrina Cooper chairs Thailand-Cambodia maritime conciliation under UNCLOS

Australian diplomat Katrina Cooper has been appointed as the Chair of the Compulsory Commission to resolve the Thailand-Cambodia maritime dispute. The first meeting is expected to be held in September 2026.

Katrina Cooper, Australia's Deputy Secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, has been appointed as the Chair of the Commission in conciliation proceedings between Thailand and Cambodia, according to a 14 August press release by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The PCA will also act as the Registry in the proceedings for this case.

Cooper has also been a Deputy Secretary at the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, responsible for national security and international relations.

Cooper has represented Australia in a wide range of roles, including as G20 Sherpa to Prime Minister Albanese (2021-22) and as Ambassador to Mexico (2008-12). She was Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Washington during President Trump’s first term (2017-21).

According to the Thai Foreign Ministry, Cooper is a well-regarded international lawyer with extensive knowledge, expertise, and experience in international law and negotiation.

She previously served as Co-Agent of the Australian Government in the world's first compulsory conciliation proceedings over the maritime boundary dispute between Australia and Timor-Leste, which reflected her direct and relevant experience for the discharge of these duties.

Cooper is also currently serving as Australia's special envoy for the Greater Sunrise Project, facilitating high-level bilateral talks between Australia and Timor-Leste regarding the development of the Timor Sea gas fields.

Compulsory conciliation is one of the maritime dispute resolution processes under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The conciliation was initiated by Cambodia on 2 June to resolve the long-standing Thailand-Cambodia maritime dispute. On 19 June, Thailand submitted its response to the notification of conciliation.

The process involves a third party called a Conciliation Committee, consisting of four conciliators appointed by the two countries and a chairperson who is selected by these four.

Cambodia named French academic Jean-Marc Thouvenin and Danish diplomat Peter Taksøe-Jensen as its conciliators, and appointed Foreign Affairs Minister Prak Sokhonn and Lam Chea, Minister in charge of the State Secretariat of Border Affairs, as its Agent and Deputy Agent.

Taksøe-Jensen was also the chair of the Conciliation Commission to resolve a long-running maritime border dispute between Australia and Timor-Leste from 2016 to 2018.

Meanwhile, Thailand named Judge Albert J. Hoffmann of South Africa and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of Germany as its conciliators. Both are former Presidents of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and are highly respected in international law.

Thailand also appointed Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, and Songchai Chaipatiyut, Ambassador to Kuwait, as Agent and Deputy Agent for the conciliation proceedings.

With the appointment of the Chair, the Commission will schedule the first meeting, expected to be in September 2026.

The key agenda for the first meeting will include consideration of the Rules of Procedure, which will establish framework for the Commission’s work and serve as guidance for subsequent meetings and related proceedings.

Typically, the Commission will take approximately 12 months to complete the report and recommendations, but this could be extended depending on the relevant parties.

Notably, the Commission’s recommendations will not legally binding, and the outcome will not result in either a loser or a winner. Both Thailand and Cambodia will have to enter into bilateral talks based on the recommendations in order to reach an amicable solution.

eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-08-14 - 23:30

News

Activists protest Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Thailand

eng editor 1 — Sun, 09 Aug 2026 04:44:59 +0000

Activists protest Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Thailand

Photos by Ginger Cat
On 6 August, activists and civil society groups staged a protest near Government House against the visit of Myanmar president and junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Thailand.

In the evening of 6 August, activists attempted to display protest banners in front of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), opposite Government House. However, they were blocked by police officers from leaving the OPDC. The police also displayed banners claiming that Phitsanulok Road is within the 50-metre radius around Government House where protest is prohibited.

Two activists wore masks of Min Aung Hlaing and Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and staged a performance in which they ate cake and spoke about the splitting of benefit between the two leaders and the water pollution in the Kok River from rare earths mining in Myanmar. Around them, other activists scattered pictures of the river, people, and internally displaced persons to show the effects of the 2021 Myanmar coup.

The two activists said that inviting Min Aung Hlaing to visit Thailand does not solve problems in Myanmar or the effects felt in Thailand. By inviting Min Aung Hlaing, the Thai government disregarded the problem facing the people, from water contamination to airstrike in Myanmar and Thai investment in business relating to the Myanmar military. If leaders do not listen to the people, it is difficult to achieve peace and normalcy.

At around 18.40, activists put up a banner saying “We don’t welcome the criminal Min Aung Hlaing” on the side of Phitsanulok Road, opposite Government House where Thai and Myanmar leaders were reportedly meeting. The police then made a warning through a megaphone, ordering the activists to move out of the area. After the activists put the banner away, the police warned them to stay inside the OPDC or they will be charged.

eng editor 1 Sun, 2026-08-09 - 11:44

News

Civil society demand safety for political prisoners

eng editor 1 — Sun, 09 Aug 2026 02:23:40 +0000

Civil society demand safety for political prisoners

Civil society groups gathered at the Ministry of Justice on Friday (7 August) to call on the authorities to protect political prisoners.

The groups delivered a letter from human rights lawyer Anon Nampa, who is detained pending appeal on several counts of royal defamation and is facing around 31 years in prison.

The letter, dated to 5 August and published on Anon’s Facebook page, stated that, in late July, the Bangkok Remand Prison decided to separate royal defamation detainees and hold them in different blocks.

Anon wrote that this led to safety concerns. He alleged that, in 2021, unknown officials tried to abduct activists detained at the time. He also wrote that, since 18 May 2025, political prisoners were being pressured into petitioning for a royal pardon by officials claiming to represent “a higher-up”, but the detainees refused. After the Bhumjaithai government came into power, prison executives were replaced. Attempts to separate the detainees then began.

He alleged that a royal defamation detainee held in another block was attacked by other prisoners for not standing for the Royal Anthem, which is played twice a day in the Bangkok Remand Prison. The attacked detainee was later moved to the Bang Kwang Central Prison, a maximum security prison that is the site of the men’s death row.

Anon wrote that, although being held together does not guarantee safety for political prisoners, it means that if anyone is assaulted or murdered, the rest would tell the world about it.

At the Ministry of Justice, participants began arriving in the morning. At around 10.20, participants wore a mask of Anon’s face and placed a blue bird cafe as a symbol. They read out a statement and submitted a petition to the Ministry of Justice, demanding that political prisoners must be held together unless there is a legis safety reason. Representatives of human rights organizations, lawmakers, detainees’ family members, and other relevant agencies must be allowed to visit prisons to check the detainees’ wellbeing to ensure transparency and trust. They also called for a concrete safety measures for detainees.

eng editor 1 Sun, 2026-08-09 - 09:23

News

How Thailand’s Refugee Detention System Evades Accountability Ahead of UN Human Rights Review

eng editor 1 — Wed, 05 Aug 2026 09:09:14 +0000

How Thailand’s Refugee Detention System Evades Accountability Ahead of UN Human Rights Review

As Thailand prepares for its next Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the United Nations Human Rights Council in November 2026, human rights advocates warn that the country continues to rely on legal ambiguities and weak enforcement mechanisms that leave refugees vulnerable to arbitrary detention, torture, and forced return despite existing legal safeguards.

On 11 June, Fortify Rights called on the Thai government to immediately end the arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and forced return of refugees, arguing that Thailand’s upcoming UPR review will test whether authorities have genuinely implemented commitments made during previous review cycles.

Thailand is serving as a member of the UN Human Rights Council for the 2025 – 2027 term. Meanwhile, it faces growing international criticism over its treatment of asylum seekers, including refugees from Myanmar and Uyghurs deported to China despite warnings from UN experts that they could face torture upon return. Concerns have also been raised over the deportation of activists, among them UN-recognised refugees.

Anti-Torture Law Meets Immigration Detention Reality

Thailand's Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act, which entered into force in 2023, was widely praised as a landmark reform intended to strengthen protections against torture and refoulement—the forced return of individuals to countries where they face serious harm. However, legal experts and rights groups argue that implementation remains weak, and accountability mechanisms are ineffective.

While the law formally prohibits state officials from returning individuals to places where they risk torture or enforced disappearance, immigration detention practices continue to operate within a largely separate administrative framework. Refugees and asylum seekers are routinely detained under immigration laws because Thailand still lacks a comprehensive refugee protection system and has not acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

This legal gap creates what advocates describe as a "gray zone" in which immigration detainees remain outside many of the oversight mechanisms envisioned under the anti-torture legislation. Human rights organizations have repeatedly argued that immigration authorities exercise broad discretion with limited judicial scrutiny, making accountability difficult when allegations of abuse emerge.

Detention Without Recognition

According to Fortify Rights, Thailand's National Screening Mechanism (NSM), introduced as a protection framework for people fleeing persecution, has produced limited results. Although Thai authorities highlighted the mechanism during previous international reviews, only a handful of individuals reportedly obtained protected status during the first year after implementation.

The organization further noted that several vulnerable groups remain excluded from the process, including many Rohingya refugees and Myanmar nationals holding migrant-worker documentation. As a result, thousands of people fleeing armed conflict and persecution continue to face the possibility of arrest and detention as undocumented migrants despite seeking protection.

For refugees from Myanmar, the situation has become increasingly urgent as violence continues following the 2021 military coup. More than three million people have been displaced inside Myanmar, while tens of thousands have sought refuge across the Thai border.

Forced Returns Raise Questions of Accountability

Concerns over Thailand's treatment of refugees have intensified following a series of high-profile deportation and detention cases that human rights organisations say illustrate persistent failures to uphold the principle of non-refoulement. Despite adopting new legal safeguards against torture and enforced disappearance, authorities have continued to detain and, in some cases, return individuals to countries where they face credible risks of persecution, torture, or other serious human rights violations.

The most widely criticised case occurred in February 2025, when Thai authorities deported 40 Uyghur asylum seekers to China after more than a decade in immigration detention. The deportation prompted condemnation from the UN Human Rights Chief, human rights organisations, and several foreign governments, all of which warned that the individuals faced a substantial risk of arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance, and other forms of ill-treatment upon their return. Human Rights Watch described the removals as a clear violation of Thailand's obligations under both international law and its own Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act, which prohibits returning individuals to places where they are likely to face torture or enforced disappearance (Human Rights Watch, 2025).

Concerns have also centred on the treatment of Y Quynh Bdap, a Montagnard human rights activist and UN-recognised refugee. Thai authorities arrested him in Bangkok in 2024 following an extradition request from Vietnam, despite repeated warnings from UN experts and rights organisations that returning him would expose him to politically motivated prosecution and possible ill-treatment. In late 2025, Thai authorities deported Bdap to Vietnam, where he had previously been sentenced in absentia on terrorism-related charges that supporters argue were politically motivated.

Human rights organisations have also documented the prolonged immigration detention of several Chinese dissidents and asylum seekers in Thailand while authorities considered deportation requests from Beijing. Rights groups argue that these cases demonstrate how immigration detention can function as a mechanism of prolonged pressure and uncertainty, leaving refugees vulnerable to forced return despite international protection concerns.

Taken together, these cases have reinforced broader concerns ahead of Thailand's 2026 Universal Periodic Review. Rights organisations argue that allegations of unlawful deportation and refoulement rarely result in independent investigations or meaningful accountability for officials involved in detention and transfer decisions, raising questions about whether Thailand's legal safeguards are being effectively implemented in practice.

International Pressure Builds Before November Review

For refugees from Myanmar, the situation has become increasingly urgent as violence continues following the 2021 military coup. According to the United Nations, more than three million people have been internally displaced by armed conflict, airstrikes, and widespread human rights violations, while many others have fled to neighbouring countries, including Thailand, in search of safety. Despite these protection needs, many Myanmar nationals who cross into Thailand remain classified as irregular migrants rather than refugees because the country lacks a comprehensive asylum system. Consequently, they face arrest, prolonged immigration detention, and the risk of deportation, even when they are fleeing persecution or armed conflict. For advocates, the key question is no longer whether Thailand possesses the necessary legal tools to prevent torture and unlawful returns. Instead, they argue, the issue is whether authorities are willing to apply those protections consistently within immigration detention systems that continue to operate with limited transparency.

As international scrutiny intensifies ahead of November's review, the experiences of refugees held in Bangkok's immigration detention facilities may become a critical measure of whether Thailand's human rights commitments extend beyond diplomatic statements and into everyday practice.

eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-08-05 - 16:09

Round Up

Thailand in damage-control mode after deadly attacks threaten to derail the peace process

eng editor 3 — Tue, 04 Aug 2026 07:40:16 +0000

Thailand in damage-control mode after deadly attacks threaten to derail the peace process

Royal Thai Army Chief of Staff Gen Chaiyapruek Duangprapat, did not mince words. Visiting Narathiwat the day after six Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) combatants gunned down five Paramilitary Rangers at close range, he warned: “Those who provide hiding places, and any country that provides hiding places, should know that we will pursue them to the ends of the earth.” He told the perpetrators to watch their backs when they eat, sleep, or walk. “The time has come for you to become the hunted.”

The July 22 ambush, in which gunmen riding in the back of a pickup truck opened fire, also wounded six civilian bystanders, including a three-year-old girl and a ten-year-old boy. It came just 24 hours after a car bomb tore through the Khao Tanyong police station in Narathiwat’s Muang district; the driver jumped clear before it detonated.

Footage of the Rangers being shot spread rapidly on social media, triggering both public outrage and renewed criticism of the armed forces’ enormous budget, which critics say has done little to change the course of the conflict.

Chaiyapruek, already known for his hard line on the Cambodia border dispute, stopped short of naming Malaysia as a possible haven for the gunmen. But given the scale of media attention, his remarks read as much as a soundbite for public consumption as a statement of policy.

For a military establishment more accustomed to being at the receiving end of guerrilla-style, hit-and-run tactics, the July 22 killings were a humiliation.

“This was not your average hit-and-run incident. The insurgents took the fight to us and took out our troops,” said one Thai military intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In response, the government paused high-level official talks and demanded that BRN explain the spike in violence just as the peace process appeared to be gaining momentum.

Long-time observers say the demand was less a genuine search for answers than a face-saving measure for a military caught off guard; whatever BRN says in their reply will almost be beside the point. Bangkok is buying time and managing optics while the public calls for revenge, even as talks at the technical level between BRN and Thai officials continue. BRN supporters say there is no need for the movement to “overreact or get bent out of shape” over the demands from the Thai side.

Instead, a counter demand from BRN includes opening up the cultural space in Patani to accommodate Malay identity and language and scrapping the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) project, in exchange for a temporary cessation of violence (TCOV) — the centrepiece of the current horse-trading. This message was also passed through the Chair of the Prime Minister’s advisory board, Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, during a recent meeting in Jakarta.

BRN has for years consistently signalled openness to a reduction in violence provided certain conditions are met, including international and local monitors on the ground.

Complicating matters today, a BRN negotiation-team official said, is the fact that Malaysia’s current facilitator is on his way out, with a replacement, expected to be a retired general, yet to be named. For Bangkok, the transition came in handy as it provides a convenient excuse as to why a pause is needed.

In response to the July 22 daring attack, the Army abruptly reversed its recent posture of security relaxation, invoking the Martial Law Act across Narathiwat and granting security forces the authority to search vehicles and homes linked to separatist elements without a warrant.

A monkey wrench from within

If the Army’s response was aimed outward, the peace process had already been damaged from within even for the July 21 car bomb and the July 22 killing of the five Rangers. Three days before Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s two-day official visit to Malaysia on July 9-10, Defence Minister Lt Gen Adul Boonthamcharoen was quoted by Isra News questioning whether the government needed to talk to BRN at all.

“The government has no business talking to the BRN,” Adul said, before appearing to contradict himself in the same breath: “And we will not elevate the status of the dialogue any more than necessary” — suggesting he is aware of the process but unhappy with it.

The timing could hardly have been worse. Anutin was due in Kuala Lumpur to meet his counterpart Anwar Ibrahim and discuss, among other things, conflict resolution in Patani. Adul’s comments were, by several accounts, humiliating for the prime minister, and indirectly gave BRN a measure of justification for the violence that followed.

It remains unclear whether Adul’s scepticism was connected to a mystery caller who separately telephoned Isra News claiming to be a BRN commander in Narathiwat, offering to surrender more than 100 combatants in exchange for an Army withdrawal from the “area.” One veteran observer suspects the call was a ploy by the old guard of the Fourth Army Area, resentful at being replaced by commanders from the Second Army Area, and was meant to provoke their replacements — who, the observer said, kept their cool.

Adul’s own rebuttal of Chaiyapruek — noting that BRN combatants are also Thai nationals and that dialogue remains the best option — drew a harsh reaction on social media, forcing a teary-eyed defence minister to clarify he had been misunderstood.

“Thai officials tend to contradict one another when it comes to the conflict in Patani. This is because the government doesn’t have a comprehensive strategy that unites all the key agencies and ministries,” said Artef Sohko, President of the political action group, The Patani.

Thailand’s domestic politics has long held the peace process hostage, and official talks — which began back in 2013 — have proceeded in fits and starts ever since. But observers agree the biggest spoiler has always been the military, many of whose generals believe that talking to the rebels unnecessarily legitimizes them.

“It was the army who refused to accept that the conflict is political in nature and insisted all along on using military means to crush the insurgents,” Artef said.

Artef and The Patani have often acted as the go-between for the BRN, Thai government agencies, Malaysia and members of the international community working on conflict resolution. His group was instrumental in getting the BRN to declare a unilateral ceasefire during the COVID-19 pandemic in response to the request from the UN Sec-Gen António Guterres to halt violence on the ground to give safe passage to health workers. Today, Artef is facing legal charges for promoting separatism.

ISOC in hot water, left and right

Running parallel to the negotiating track is a long-running battle over the narrative. Two decades ago, when the current generation of separatist militants resurfaced, they were dismissed by officials as “sparrow bandits.”

Even after BRN combatants made off with roughly 400 pieces of military weaponry in the January 2004 Narathiwat arms heist, officials for years continued to portray them as drug-crazed youths following a distorted interpretation of Islam. Today, as Adul’s comments suggest, the same scepticism persists even as the government keeps sending officials to have what it insists on calling “conversations,” rather than negotiations.

Overseeing much of this narrative battle is the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), nominally a civilian-chaired body under the Prime Minister’s Office but reliant in practice on the armed forces’ logistics, intelligence networks and personnel; in the far South, the ISOC officer and the RTA officer in the same district are often the same man wearing two hats.

ISOC’s information operations have long targeted local activists and human rights defenders who press security agencies for accountability, and it denies wrongdoing. But on June 11, Thailand’s Court of Appeal ordered ISOC, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Army to pay a combined 210,000 baht to Senator Angkhana Neelapaijit and Anchana Heemmina, founder of the Duay Jai human rights organization, over online posts spreading false information about them.

During recent debate over the 3.788-trillion-baht Fiscal Year 2027 budget, lawmaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha called on the government to scrap ISOC as redundant, citing a failed assassination attempt on Narathiwat MP Kamonsak Leewamoh in which the weapon, personnel and vehicle involved reportedly belonged to ISOC — a charge that ISOC denies. Its campaigns, which began in the far South, have since expanded to target student-led reformist movements and, most recently, critics of the military’s Cambodia border policy.

Positive signs, fragile gains

For all the turbulence, the underlying negotiating architecture had, until recently, been moving in an encouraging direction under the National Intelligence Agency’s director, Thanut Suvarnananda. His team moved quickly to enlist an international NGO to facilitate discussions between Thai generals and their Indonesian and Philippine counterparts — officers experienced in the Aceh and Mindanao peace processes — while a second INGO has been facilitating talks between Thai officials and BRN negotiators, with Malaysian facilitators taking part.

Thailand is separately weighing a BRN request to release some detainees as a goodwill gesture, a TOR for public consultation is being drafted, and the negotiating team plans to bring Thai civil society organizations to Malaysia to meet BRN leaders, with talk of allowing some to observe the official negotiations.

The Army’s absence from the negotiating table has arguably made it easier for the two sides to reach agreements. But implementing any deal without the Army’s buy-in would be difficult. According to an informed source, the Army is considering opening a separate back channel through former Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla, reflecting a long-standing desire among Thai security agencies to speak directly with BRN’s military leadership. International best practice, however, does not allow Thailand to pick and choose its interlocutors; BRN selects its own representatives, and Thailand will have to learn to work with that.

Whether that lesson sticks may depend less on the negotiating table than on what happens next in Narathiwat. With the Army bristling over its most humiliating loss in recent memory, the coming weeks will test whether Thailand’s civilian and military tracks can speak with one voice — or whether, as Artef put it, they will simply keep contradicting each other.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far south.

eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-08-04 - 14:40

Opinion

Cartoon by Stephff: Thailand-Myanmar talks

eng editor 1 — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 07:40:06 +0000

Cartoon by Stephff: Thailand-Myanmar talks

eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-08-03 - 14:40

Multimedia

HRW demands investigation into threat against Deep South parliament members, activist

eng editor 1 — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 06:31:42 +0000

HRW demands investigation into threat against Deep South parliament members, activist

The Thai authorities should immediately take effective measures to protect the prominent members of parliament Angkhana Neelapaijit and Romadon Panjor and the human rights defender Anchana Heemmina, all of whom have been facing online death threats and attacks, Human Rights Watch said on Friday (31 July).

On July 31, 2026, Angkhana, a senator and former member of Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission, filed a complaint with the Bangkok police under the Computer-Related Crime Act that numerous posts on social media accused her of being unpatriotic and sympathetic to the separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front or BRN). Some posts said she should be killed or disappeared. Similar disinformation and hate campaigns were posted on social media against Anchana, founder of the Duay Jai human rights group, and Romadon, a member of parliament from the opposition People’s Party.

“The Thai authorities should urgently and impartially investigate online attacks, including death threats, against Angkhana, Anchana, and Romadon, who have been widely recognized for their work defending human rights in Thailand’s deep south,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Those responsible for serious threats should be brought to justice, regardless of their affiliation, to demonstrate Thailand’s commitment to protecting human rights defenders.”

Online attacks against Angkhana, Anchana, and Romadon have intensified since the insurgent attack in Ra Ngae district, Narathiwat province, on July 22 that killed five soldiers and injured six civilians. Some of the abusive social media posts come from accounts allegedly affiliated with the Thai government’s information operations. In June, the court of appeal ordered the Internal Security Operations Command to pay Angkhana and Anchana compensation for damages caused by smear campaigns.

People who speak out for human rights in Thailand’s deep south—the predominantly Muslim Malay provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, plus Songkhla—where the Thai government has fought the BRN insurgency since January 2004, face grave dangers, Human Rights Watch said. Online attacks appear to have led to real life violence.

In March 2004, Angkhana’s husband, human rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit, was abducted and his body has never been found. Substantial evidence implicated a group of police officers, who allegedly sought retaliation for Somchai’s involvement in lawsuits regarding widespread police torture of Muslim suspects in the deep south.

Over the past 22 years, there have been numerous attacks, including harassment, threats, assaults, enforced disappearances, killings, and unjust prosecutions targeting human rights defenders in the deep south. None of these cases have been successfully resolved by the Thai authorities, including the assassination attempt on Kamonsak Leewamoh, a Muslim member of parliament and prominent human rights lawyer in Narathiwat province in April 2026. The authorities issued arrest warrants for three former military personnel.

Human Rights Watch stated in its submission to the 53rd session of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review of Thailand’s human rights record, scheduled for November, that successive Thai governments have failed to uphold their obligations to ensure human rights defenders can carry out their work in a safe and enabling environment, in line with the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. In November 2025, UN human rights experts expressed concern about reports of death threats and online attacks against Angkhana and the Human Rights Watch Thailand senior adviser Sunai Phasuk as a result of their comments regarding possible international humanitarian law violations during the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict.

Thailand became a member of the UN Human Rights Council in 2025 and is expected to “uphold the highest standards in the protection and promotion of human rights.”

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul should commit to addressing attacks on human rights defenders and ensure that complaints of threats and harassment are swiftly and independently investigated. The Thai government should send a clear message that threats of violence will not be tolerated, Human Rights Watch said.

“Concerned governments and UN agencies should press Prime Minister Anutin to hold accountable those who threaten or attack human rights defenders,” Pearson said. “Thailand should show the world that it has earned its UN Human Rights Council membership.”

eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-08-03 - 13:31

Pick to Post

Election Commission put on the spot as Senate collusion case escalates

eng editor 3 — Fri, 31 Jul 2026 06:19:44 +0000

Election Commission put on the spot as Senate collusion case escalates

The crisis over Thailand’s Senate election collusion has entered a critical phase after Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and eight other high-profile figures have threatened to file defamation lawsuits against the iLaw director for linking them and the ruling Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) to the scheme. As the legal battle intensifies, the Election Commission (EC) faces public scrutiny over whether it will refer this high-profile case for prosecution.

It is widely believed that the ruling BJT party dominates the Thai parliament’s upper house. The incumbent Senate has been in office since 2024 after a controversial and complex self-selection process which vote-rigging has been alleged. Over one-third of Senators, known as Blue Senators after the BJT party colour, are believed to be closely tied to the ruling party.

The Senate election collusion scandal reached a tipping point after iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanont submitted information to the opposition People’s Party on 21 July, requesting an investigation into the issue. According to iLaw, the Senate election collusion allegedly involved at least nine high-profile individuals, most of them cabinet members.

The nine individuals included PM Anutin, Deputy PM Songsak Thongsri, Transport Minister and Deputy PM Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn, Ministers Attached to the PM office Paradon Prissananantakul, Napintorn Srisunpang and Suksomrauy Wantaneeyakul, Government Chief Whip Korrawee Prissananantakul (Paradon’s brother), BJT MP Phichai Chomphuphon, and former Deputy House Speaker Supachai Phosu, who is now banned from politics for life.

On the same day, PM Anutin and the ruling party announced that it will pursue full-scale defamation lawsuits against Yingcheep.

iLaw also spearheaded an online signature campaign calling for the elected Constitution Drafting Assembly, a proposal which requires at least 50,000 signatures. The campaign also calls for any new constitution drafted by the CDA to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the assembly itself, rather than by parliament.

This condition is part of attempt to prevent the BJT party from using the so-called Blue Senators to control the content of the new Constitution.

The BJT Party’s move seems to have backfired. Following the legal threat, the number of signatures doubled overnight and surpassed 100,000. This surge is also seen as placing pressure on the Election Commissioners’ decision whether to pursue legal proceedings against those involved in the Senate election collusion.

The first defamation lawsuit against the iLaw director was filed by Suksomrauy. It is believed that the other eight individuals will file separate cases as well, and causing Yingcheep to have to travel up and down the country to defend himself. Observers have warned that such lawsuits could be considered SLAPP suits.

The iLaw director revealed that he was prepared to enter the judicial system, adding that PM Anutin should explain the matter to the public, rather than file a lawsuit. He also asked the media and general public to keep an eye on the main case, rather than the retaliatory lawsuits, which he believed were intended to divert public attention from the bigger issue.

From unprecedented election process to alleged vote-rigging

The label ‘Blue Senators’ is not solely a matter of public perception but is based on several irregularities that have been detected.

The selection process involved elections by candidates only (not the general public). Candidates registered by social and professional groups and senators qualified through both intra- and inter-group elections through a multi-level voting system at the district, provincial, and national levels.

This unprecedented election process is viewed as the most complicated ever, potentially leading to rigging concerns. iLaw found that voting results were irregularly clustered and were linked to provincial-level political influence.

At the national level, dozens of candidates did not receive any votes, not even voting for themselves. Notably, these candidates were from the provinces dominated by the BJT party. In addition, identical voting patterns were observed in several cases. Small provinces known as BJT strongholds also have a disproportionately large number of successful senators.

It is obvious that since the senators assumed office, 120-130 of them have repeatedly voted in a bloc on multiple parliamentary motions, particularly the first motion to vote for the Senate president. The successful candidate, Mongkol Surasajja, a former Governor of Buriram Province with strong ties with the Bhumjaithai Party, received 140 more votes than the runner-up.

The saga of the Senate collusion case

The legal proceedings over the Senate election collusion began during the administration of former PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra from the Pheu Thai Party. The investigation was believed to be the underlying reason behind the BJT’s departure from the government coalition, although the party publicly cited the leaked "uncle clip" as the reason for its withdrawal.

Earlier, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) accepted the Senate election case as a special money laundering case.

The EC also formed its 26th investigative subcommittee, which recommended prosecution of 229 individuals, 138 of whom are now the incumbent senators.

The then Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong revealed that the DSI identified approximately 7,000 individuals, including unsuccessful and elected candidates .

In addition, several former Senate candidates sought witness protection from the DSI, claiming that they had been threatened not to testify in the case.

After Anutin became PM in September 2025, one of the witnesses reversed his testimony, asserting that no vote-rigging took place in the 2024 Senate election. He also said that he had been pressured to give false testimony against the BJT party. Later, several other witnesses reversed their testimonies.

In December 2025, the DSI decided to pursue prosecutions against only eight individuals from the original 229.

As the government changed, so did the direction of the investigation. Former Deputy PM and Chair of the DSI Board of Special Cases Phumtham Wechayachai and former Justice Minister Tawee became sitting ducks targeted by a group of senators who were accused of vote-rigging in the 2024 Senate election.

The group of senators filed a petition with the Constitutional Court, alleging that Phumtham and Tawee interfered with the DSI investigation. However, the Court ruled that they were not guilty as alleged, and both had already left office after the BJT became the ruling party.

The legal battle continues as the senators also filed a complaint with the National Anti-Corruption Commission, seeking an investigation into both former ministers and other members of the DSI Board of Special Cases for malfeasance.

Notably, the 26th subcommittee’s recommendation was overturned by the EC’s 36th subcommittee, which was formed to continue the case. This back-and-forth has stirred uproar over the EC’s handling of the case and its internal decision-making.

The EC is currently reviewing the case based on the information from both subcommittees, and it is expected that it will decide by the end of August whether to refer the case to the prosecution. It led to public concerns that the EC will decide not to pursue legal proceedings.

The iLaw Director reiterated that the vote-rigging scandal was not merely a series of allegations, noting that his information came from the witnesses who had testified to the DSI. Some of these witnesses also spoke publicly about how the collusion occurred. The financial transactions related to the scheme were also exposed.

Opposition People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu stated that there are three ways in which the EC may proceed with the case:

1. Endorse the findings of its 26th investigative subcommittee and refer all 229 individuals to the court.

2. Dismiss the case as recommended by the 36th subcommittee.

3. Refer only some of the accused to the court.

The MP said the third scenario is likely, and urged the public to closely monitor the EC’s decision to prevent the masterminds from escaping accountability.

The EC’s seven commissioners are now under intense public scrutiny as they hold the authority to decide whether the case should be referred to the court. Whether public sentiment will ultimately shape the outcome of this case remains to be seen.

eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-07-31 - 13:19

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