Prachatai English

Thai student movement forms ‘Hope Theatre,’ making the stage its new battleground

eng editor 1 — Mon, 07 Sep 2026 07:53:28 +0000

Thai student movement forms ‘Hope Theatre,’ making the stage its new battleground

This past year, Thailand’s ‘Bad Student Organisation’ developed a new mechanism to question seemingly unbreakable cultural and educational taboos: theatre.

In 2025, the organisation formed Hope Theatre in order to create a dialogue around long-held Thai cultural norms and practices, particularly those involving education and students’ rights. Such practices include corporal punishment, never questioning teachers, wearing school uniforms and compliance with haircut regulations.

In September 2025, Hope Theatre delivered its first performance, a musical called Ribbon Club, which centred around four students who seek to uncover the truth behind a classmate’s mysterious death at an academy for magic similar to Harry Potter’s Hogwarts. At the behest of the character Jinny, a top ่student at the school, students gather to discuss the institution, its rigid rules, how teachers employ violence against them, and the identities they are forced to adopt.

(Photo from Hope Theatre)

As explained by Thamjuthi Thiangtham, 18, who recently completed his freshman year at Chulalongkorn University and works as an editor for Bad Student Organisation, “we started with the question of violence in the context of Thai schools … authoritarianism and violence directed against the lives and freedoms of students.”

He was referring to Thailand’s long-standing use of corporal punishment in schools. It was officially banned in March 2025 but the law has not been strictly enforced. Thamjuthi said that over the past year, his organisation received over 200 reports of student rights violations, including corporal punishment, mental abuse, and discrimination against LGBTQ+ students.

Thai teachers still frequently make headlines by imposing physical punishments on students. In June 2025, three months after the ban was implemented, a Bangkok teacher made a student do 200 squats as punishment for late homework. In February 2026, another student was hospitalised after his teacher ordered him to perform 800 squats for failing to submit an assignment.

Raising the issue on stage allowed student actors to address the violence directed again their peers. It also let them magically defend themselves from violent teachers.

Another topic raised in Ribbon Club the Musical is the suppression of classroom questions and debate. In the play, the characters have a special room where they can go for open conversations, similar to the room Harry Potter and his friends secretly gathered in to train against dark magic after a corrupt teacher refused to teach them. It provides a safe space for the students to break free from strict school rules. Inside, they can talk about anything, questioning, challenging, and debating with friends.” According to Thamjuthi, it frees them “to openly question the school power structure.”

The room is a plot device which serves to challenge cultural notions of what makes a “good student.” In Thai society, Thamjuthi said, “ideal” students don’t just have academic ability; they obey their teachers and don’t ask questions. “Conversely, a student who is brave enough to ask questions and disagree is considered arrogant … and labeled bad.” In the play, when students deemed ‘good’ and ‘bad’ by teachers meet each other and talk in the secret room, they discover there are no differences between them, however.

In the world of Ribbon Club, it is magic which serves as an indicator of who is a good student. Anything unrelated is deemed useless. Students are expected to use magic every day or - according to an ancient belief - some sort of major disaster will happen. The idea of using magic as a symbol, Thamjuthi said, was meant to help non-Thai audience members who might be less familiar with the context of the Thai education system understand the themes of the play. The audience included members of the Swedish Embassy, as well as some Chinese and American nationals.

According to Thamjuthi, around 80 percent of the audience were young people who already agreed with Hope Theatre’s message and protests. The rest were elderly people, who agreed with the play’s message but didn’t necessarily agree with direct protest. Younger audience members thanked the theatre group for making them more optimistic and hopeful about change in Thai schools. As for the elderly, although the play “wasn’t polite enough for them,” Hope Theatre’s advocacy drew praise from some, including a very conservative high school principal. Thamjuthi found it impressive that “art has this power to bring people, even those who might not stand on our side, to have more faith in us.”

(Photo from Hope Theatre)

Hope Theatre’s next performance will likely be staged in late 2026 or early 2027. It doesn’t have a script yet but Thamjuthi said it will explore the intense competition to be admitted to Thailand’s top schools. An idea in the works is for the plot to feature a reality or game show in which students must fiercely compete to demonstrate their ability. According to Thamjuthi, “contestants can do anything, no matter if it’s right or wrong, to compete for the prize. “

From the height of Thailand’s youth protests in 2020-22, the student movement has quieted down. In 2020, Bad Student led numerous protests for students’ rights and protections from strict uniform policies, haircut rules, and abusive teachers. Their protests often included costumes and creative expression, such as songs from the Japanese cartoon “Hamtaro.” These protests came amidst a larger protest movement demanding reforms of Thailand’s Article 112, which prohibits criticism of the country’s monarchy. Thamjuthi noted that Bad Student doesn’t engage in political issues at the national level, such as parties, the constitution or the justice system. However, regarding the larger protest movement, he remarked that as a result of the government’s ensuing crackdown, “most of our protest leaders had to go overseas … with negative consequences for the movement,” Thamjuthi said.

Thamjuthi remains hopeful for change, despite the election results earlier this year. He notes that ‘Bad Student’ has become a household name locally and no longer carries a negative connotation. “If you’re a bad student in your school, maybe it’s because you’re rebellious. Maybe it’s because you’re brave enough to question your teacher or challenge their power,“ he said.

Hope Theatre’s primary challenge, Thamjuthi said, is funding. Last year, the initiative was lucky enough to receive funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Now, however, it must find a new source of funding. It is not easy. “To work with students in this society, to work with youth to promote democracy… few funders or businesses are confident enough.”

Hope Theatre is a continuation of the student movement’s focus on art and culture. In the beginning, the organisation used dinosaurs to portray conservatives, promoting the slogan “goodbye dinosaurs.” Bad Student has also provided students with cartoon guidebooks to help students understand their rights. Another of their past artistic endeavours involved translating songs from Matilda the Musical into Thai in order to explain learners’ rights.

eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-07 - 14:53

Interview

Detention of Chinese dissidents draw continued pressure, attention to treatment of refugees

eng editor 1 — Sat, 05 Sep 2026 16:05:17 +0000

Detention of Chinese dissidents draw continued pressure, attention to treatment of refugees

Human rights organizations have urged Thailand to immediately halt the possible deportation of Chinese dissidents currently detained in Bangkok, warning that returning them to China would violate the international principle of non-refoulement and expose them to a serious risk of persecution, arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance.

The case has drawn renewed international attention to Thailand's treatment of refugees and political asylum seekers at a time when the country's diplomatic and economic relations with China continue to deepen. Rights advocates argue that the detention of the four dissidents illustrates a broader trend in which geopolitical considerations increasingly outweigh humanitarian obligations, raising concerns that Thailand is becoming an increasingly unsafe transit country for individuals fleeing political persecution in China.

A number of Chinese dissidents were detained at the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center in Bangkok between July and August. At least four were known: former investigative journalist Bai Zhaodong, activist Zhou Junyi, Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Zhang Xinyan, and human rights advocate Tan Yixiang. All four are recognised as refugees by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

On 13 July 2026, Human Rights Watch publicly urged Thai authorities not to deport the detainees, stating that the Chinese government had intensified pressure on Bangkok ahead of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul's official visit to China from 16–20 July. HRW warned that any forced return would constitute a violation of Thailand's international legal obligations and would further damage the country's human rights reputation.

Sunai Phasuk, Senior Thailand Adviser at Human Rights Watch, criticized Thailand's repeated willingness to comply with requests from Beijing concerning Chinese political dissidents. He argued that successive Thai governments have repeatedly ignored international human rights obligations in order to maintain favorable relations with China. According to Sunai, Thailand should instead permit the dissidents to travel safely to third countries where they have already been accepted for resettlement.

Among this group, Zhang has since been released and resettled in Canada. A Falun Gong practitioner, journalist, and member of the “Hong Kong Parliament” exiled activist group, Zhang is wanted by the Hong Kong authorities along with 14 other members of the group for alleged “subversion” under Hong Kong’s draconian National Security law.

Zhang had been approved for resettlement in Canada and was scheduled to leave Thailand on 8 July. However, Thai immigration authorities prevented her from departing shortly before her flight and transferred her to immigration detention.

Human rights organizations issued statements calling for her release. Fortify Rights submitted a petition on 15 July to Thailand’s Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, Justice and Human Rights requesting an investigation into Zhang’s detention and urging authorities to facilitate her departure to Canada. The organisation argued that preventing a UN-recognised refugee from reaching a country willing to provide asylum raised serious concerns regarding due process and Thailand’s human rights obligations.

Zhang’s legal representatives were unable to contact her during the first few days of her detention and were not allowed to visit her. They filed for a court hearing under Thailand’s Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act, requesting that all relevant agencies be summoned to testity on why Zhang was not allowed to board her flight and why her representatives were not informed of her whereabouts.

During the hearing on 16 July, a representative of the Immigration Bureau confirmed that the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok had requested that her resettlement be delayed, while Canadian authorities had already accepted her for resettlement and issued the necessary visa. The Thai Immigration Bureau subsequently prevented her departure while the case was considered by Thai authorities.

Hong Kong Free Press reported on 6 August that Zhang has arrived in Canada. Her arrival ended weeks of uncertainty over her fate and concern over potential deportation to China.

The case of Bai Zhaodong has also received particular international attention. Bai is formerly an investigative journalist for the investigative magazine Caijin. He has reported on high-level corruption in rural China and the social consequences of President Xi Jinping’s poverty alleviation initiatives on vulnerable populations, and fled China after facing pressure for his reporting.

Bai told Reporters Without Border (RSF) that at least five charges were brought against him between 2011 and 2022 by various public security departments due to his reporting on fraud and corruption. He was also accused of “inciting subversion of state power,” which carries up to five years in prison. If a court classify it as a “major crime,” five year is the minimum sentence.

Reuters reported that China has requested Bai’s extradition from Thailand, claiming that Bai is wanted on charges of extortion and bribery.

Bai remains in detention. His lawyers have filed a petition with the South Bangkok Criminal Court for his release on the grounds that he is being unlawfully detained. A hearing will take place on 18 September.

Nadthasiri Bergman, one of Bai‘s lawyers, said that Bai has a visa for a third country. He was initially scheduled to leave Thailand on 5 February, but the trip was cancelled after Thai authorities claimed that the exit clearance process was not completed. His re-scheduled trip on 22 June was also cancelled.

Nadthasiri said that exit clearance must not take more than 3 weeks and should be completed. She noted Bai has no criminal charge in Thailand and a third country has already agreed to his resettlement, and that it is unclear why he is not allowed to leave the country.

Another detainee, Tan Yixiang, has reportedly been deported. A Catholic activist and vocal advocate for the rights of Tibetans and Uyghurs, Tan came to Thailand in 2022. According to Human Rights Watch, he was then arrested and later released on bail in mid-2023. The police arrested him again in February 2024 and placed in immigration detention.

Thai Enquirer reported that Tan was deported around 11 - 12 July, days before Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s official visit to Beijing. Sunai told Thai Enquirer that Tan was deported, but there was no confirmation from the Thai or Chinese governments.

It is unclear whether Zhou Junyi, a member of the banned China Democracy Party who fled China in 2015 and was arrested in Bangkok in 2025 after organising a memorial event for the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, is still held in immigration detention.

The case of the detained dissidents follows a broader pattern of controversial deportations and forced returns by Thailand that have drawn international concern. Thailand has previously returned refugees and dissidents to countries like China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where they are likely to be prosecuted or face other abuses. Many of those forcibly returned were UN-recognised refugees.

Two Chinese activists and UN-recognised refugees, Dong Guangping and Jiang Yifei, were deported to China in 2015, despite being approved for resettlement in Canada. Both were subsequently detained upon their return.

In February 2025, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur men to China despite repeated warnings from the UN and international human rights organizations that they could face human rights violations upon their return. Earlier, in 2015, Thai authorities also deported more than 100 Uyghur asylum seekers to China, triggering widespread condemnation from the international community.

In November 2021, Thai authorities deported at least three Cambodian refugees despite UNHCR having notified the government of their refugee status and concerns about their safety if returned. UNHCR condemned the deportations, saying that it contravenes the principle of non-refoulement. Freedom House has also documented the case of four Cambodian dissidents who were deported from Thailand that same month despite being registered as refugees with UNHCR; all four were reportedly arrested immediately after their return to Cambodia.

Thailand has also faced criticism over the forced return of Vietnamese dissidents. In November 2024, Thai authorities extradited Y Quynh Bdap, a Montagnard human rights and religious activist who had been recognised as a refugee by UNHCR, to Vietnam. Human Rights Watch said his return placed him at risk of torture and other serious abuses, while Bdap had previously been sentenced in absentia by a Vietnamese court to 10 years in prison on terrorism-related charges that he denied. The case prompted renewed concerns that Thailand may prioritise immigration enforcement and bilateral relations over the protection of people fleeing political persecution.

Even refugees and asylum seekers who are not dissidents are not safe. Thailand has hosted displaced persons from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam for decades, and UNHCR reported that Thailand was hosting more than 80,000 refugees from Myanmar in nine border shelters and around 6,500 urban refugees and asylum seekers from more than 46 countries as of February 2026. In 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Thai authorities continued to carry out mass deportations of Myanmar nationals, including children, despite the grave risks they could face if returned given continuing conflict and repression in Myanmar. More recently, in August 2026, rights groups warned that 26 ethnic Karen villagers detained in Phetchaburi province faced possible deportation to Myanmar after Thai authorities raided their community and arrested 28 people, including children and pregnant women.

Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has no national refugee law. However, its 2023 Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Dispparance Act prohibit the transfer of individuals to a countries where they may face torture or inhumane treatment. Human rights organizations have argued that deporting the dissidents would be in conflict not only with international human rights laws but also with Thailand’s own legislation. Meanwhile, the absence of secure legal status leaves many refugees and asylum seekers vulnerable to immigration detention, forced return and pressure from the governments they fled.

Human rights advocates believe that these cases reflect a broader pattern of transnational repression, whereby governments are cooperating with each other to monitor, intimidate, detain, abduct, or forcibly return political oppositions and human rights defenders. In Southeast Asia, dissidents who fled to neighbouring countries continue to face surveillance, legal pressure, extradition requests, and diplomatic efforts aimed at securing their return.

The pressure also operates in the opposite direction. Thai activists who fled to Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam have disappeared or been killed, such as Chatchan Buppawan and Kraidej Leulert, whose body was found in the Mekong River in December 2018 after they disappeared in Laos along with fellow dissident Surachai Danwattananusorn.

Siam Theerawut and Chucheap Chewasut, both Thai dissidents living in exile in Vietnam, were reportedly extradited back to Thailand but were never heard from again.

Taken together, these cases illustrate how transnational repression can function through a combination of formal and informal mechanisms: extradition requests, immigration detention, diplomatic pressure, surveillance, cross-border policing and, in the most serious cases, alleged abduction or enforced disappearance. Freedom House has described Southeast Asia as a major centre of such cooperation, noting that authoritarian governments increasingly collaborate to pursue dissidents beyond their own borders. The result is a regional environment in which exile does not necessarily guarantee safety. For refugees and political activists, crossing into a neighbouring country may provide temporary physical distance from persecution without providing durable protection from the governments they fled.

Observers also argue that Thailand's expanding strategic partnership with China has contributed to growing concerns regarding refugee protection. China has become one of Thailand's largest trading partners and a major investor in infrastructure, tourism, and transportation projects. While neither government has publicly acknowledged any connection between bilateral relations and the treatment of Chinese dissidents, Human Rights Watch warned that Beijing's increasing pressure ahead of Prime Minister Anutin's official visit has heightened fears that political considerations may influence decisions concerning refugee protection.

Thailand’s handling of the case may also affect its international standing ahead of its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) later this year. As a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Thailand has repeatedly committed to strengthening human rights protections, including for refugees and asylum seekers. Yet the detention, threatened deportation and forced-return cases involving people from China, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar have raised broader questions about whether Thailand can provide a safe and reliable place of refuge for people fleeing persecution. For refugee advocates, the cases of Bai Zhaodong, Zhou Junyi and Tan Yixiang therefore extend beyond the fate of three individuals: they are a test of whether Thailand will uphold the principle of non-refoulement when doing so may conflict with diplomatic or security interests. Human Rights Watch and Fortify Rights have urged Thai authorities to allow the remaining dissidents to travel to countries willing to receive them, arguing that Thailand's response will demonstrate whether its international human rights commitments are being implemented in practice.

eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-05 - 23:05

Round Up

Between fighting and talking: horse-trading in Thailand’s far South

eng editor 3 — Thu, 03 Sep 2026 10:25:28 +0000

Between fighting and talking: horse-trading in Thailand’s far South

Throughout the night of August 22–23, separatist combatants carried out attacks on 51 targets across the restive far South, in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.

A week later, the final count stood at 79 attacks, with Songkhla appearing in the revised tally. All fingers pointed to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), the long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.

As in previous cases, the BRN has neither confirmed nor denied its activities. The group does not have an explicit political branch to communicate with the public—not due to a lack of effort, but because Thailand deliberately avoids recognizing the political aspects of the conflict, fearing that doing so would further legitimize the BRN. Foreign parties who attempt, formally or informally, to engage the BRN have faced stern warnings from Bangkok. Despite this, since 2013, Thailand has sent officials to meet with BRN representatives not for official “negotiations,” but rather for “discussions.”

Because the BRN lacks a visible political wing to speak to the public, the Thai state largely controls the narrative. This might seem like it would make the government’s counterinsurgency messaging straightforward, but that has not been the case. Security officials have struggled to persuade both the local people in the far South and international observers of their perspective, mainly due to limited sophistication and communication abilities within Thailand’s security agencies and policy circles.

On the evening of August 22, amid the coordinated wave of arson and bombing attacks by separatist insurgents, an army helicopter was flying around Narathiwat’s Chanae District, allegedly firing at 2 young men, one of whom, Solae Doloh, 21, took a bullet to the stomach. An eyewitness provided the same account to local and foreign media. The Army denied shooting at the two young men but would not release the helicopter’s gun-camera footage, despite repeated calls from Parliament.

But this isn’t really a story about ballistics or one contested night. It’s a story about a trust account that’s been overdrawn for more than two decades, and a government that keeps making withdrawals from it in the same clumsy way. The net effect is a government that keeps choosing the posture of a party defending its institution over the posture of a party trying to be believed by a sceptical public — which, twenty years and one Tak Bai massacre later, is exactly the wrong instinct if the goal is actually to move the peace process forward.

It is received as the latest instance of a script the community has seen before: Royal Thai Army (RTA) dismisses allegations, official inquiry goes nowhere, nobody is ever held accountable. One doesn’t need to believe this specific denial is a lie to understand why residents assume it is. The prior is doing the work, not the evidence.

The BRN, in the absence of a political wing and a sound communication strategy, lets their violence speak for it. As Assoc Prof Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Director of Deep South Watch, puts it, insurgency violence is a form of communicative action. Even BRN officials on the negotiating team acknowledge that the absence of a platform for negotiation creates an atmosphere in which combatants feel freer to act on their own initiative. They were referring to the absence of the terms of reference (TOR) for the Temporary Reduction of Violence — an issue that has been on the table since former Thailand spy chief Thanut Suvarnananda took over the position as the government’s chief negotiator. The meetings also touched upon a number of progressive items — amnesty for detainees, greater space for Patani Malay cultural identity and historical narrative, and power-sharing between the region and Bangkok. The two sides were hoping the TOR would be completed in time for the September 2026 high level official meeting.

But RTA generals, humiliated by the July 22 shooting deaths of five paramilitary rangers, threw a monkey wrench into the process: they halted the TOR process until the BRN could explain why, just as negotiations were moving along, combatants had carried out an attack like the July 22 incident.

Reading the demand as a face-saving move, the BRN never offered an explanation. Instead, its combatants launched the coordinated attacks of August 22–23, jolting the security apparatus even more. The movement has also insisted that any reduction of violence — and any eventual ceasefire — must involve an international monitoring team working alongside local civil society organizations on the ground.

The dilemma this creates is nerve-wracking: delaying the talks to “punish” the BRN only means more attacks, since there is nothing left to restrain the combatants. At a minimum, a signed TOR on the reduction of violence would give the conflict some degree of predictability.

Deputy Prime Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who chairs the Special Representatives Committee on the Southern Border Provinces, conceded that the assessment and the response fell short despite the warning from intelligence. That admission, however candid, turned a security incident into a political liability; it became a specific failure to point to, rather than the usual generalized complaint about an intractable conflict.

A long and bloody road ahead

Part of the face-saving narrative includes a sexed-up claim that there is some serious infighting within the BRN, that its military wing is hitting Thailand hard to discredit its own political leaders and negotiators. A BRN officer dismissed this, saying the attacks have more to do with the fact that the BRN marks August as the month of “merdeka,” when countries across the Malay Archipelago -- Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia -- commemorate their independence.

This is not to say the combatants are indifferent to what is being discussed at the negotiating table. BRN combatants effectively operate on autopilot: the political wing does not order attacks; militant cells decide among themselves what to hit and when. There have been times when combatants went beyond the unwritten ground rules and struck soft targets — as in the aftermath of the assassination of a key militant leader, Abdulroning Lateh, in April 2025, although the RTA denied responsibility for his death.

Artef Sohko, President of The Patani, a political action group that frequently serves as an intermediary between Thai state agencies and the rebel movements, said BRN combatants were angered by tough talk from RTA generals, including incoming National Security Council Secretary-General Gen. Chaiyapruek Duangprapat, who vowed to hunt down BRN insurgents wherever they are hiding.

Artef said the attacks were not aimed at running up a body count; rather, the sheer size and scope of the operation was meant to discredit the Thai security agencies.

Trying to get back on track

In recent interviews, Thanut indicated that discussions may resume in October. Others are pushing for talks to move up to September — though this depends on Malaysia appointing a new facilitator in time. Informed sources say the next facilitator could well be another army general.

Observers of the conflict say Thanut is banking on two pieces of legislation — the Local Government Act and the Minority Rights Act — to form the basis for satisfying BRN’s demand for greater recognition of its people and historical narrative.

Progressive ideas, such as making Malay a “working” language alongside “official” Thai, and implementing bilingual education for children in the far South whose mother tongue is Malay, were floated back in 2005 by the now-defunct National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). None of the NRC’s suggestions were taken up by the Thaksin Shinawatra government of the time; his all-or-nothing approach only dug a deeper hole for efforts to resolve the conflict.

But resuming talks with the BRN is not the only challenge facing Thanut. The spy chief will also have to manage Thai generals who have never liked the idea of negotiating with the BRN, believing it unnecessarily legitimizes the separatist movement.

These generals believe that if they could talk to the BRN’s military leaders directly, they could bring the conflict to an end. No one knows what concessions, if any, the RTA is willing to make. For now, the RTA is working a secret track with Indonesia’s Jusuf Kalla, hoping the former Indonesian Vice President can open a channel of communication with the BRN’s military wing. The RTA also sought help from a Malaysian think tank as they tried to conjure up a separate track to reach BRN military leaders.

The RTA doesn’t seem to grasp that, in line with international best practice, it cannot pick and choose who it wants to talk to — it has to talk to whoever the BRN sends.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far South.

eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-09-03 - 17:25

Opinion

The Red Shirts through Gen Z eyes

eng editor 3 — Thu, 03 Sep 2026 08:07:32 +0000

The Red Shirts through Gen Z eyes

Prachatai explores the memories of young people whose parents or relatives were part of the “Red Shirt” and “Yellow Shirt” camps. We ask what they were told about the Red Shirts as children, whether their understandings changed over time, and what, if any, place the Red Shirts occupied in the youth protests of 2020.

It was only 16 years ago that the crackdown and killings of Red Shirt protesters took place in central Bangkok, but young people generally know very little about the incident. They have a much better understanding of older events such as the 1932 revolution, the 14 October 1973 student uprising, and the 6 October 1976 Thammasat massacre. To understand why, Prachatai interviewed academics, political researchers, and Gen Z informants.

Childhood memories of Red Shirts

Kong, a 25-year-old former Chulalongkorn University student, grew up in Bangkok. He is the first person in his family to earn a bachelor’s degree. His mother is from Sri Sa Ket. She told him that their family directly benefited from Thai Rak Thai government policies like the Village Fund and the 30-baht universal healthcare scheme. She felt that their lives improved significantly because of such policies. The question of whether Thaksin was corrupt didn’t bother her; she liked him because “he made sure we had enough to eat”.

Kong’s father used to watch the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protests on television. However, parental political differences did not make the atmosphere at home particularly tense. Kong barely understood what was happening during the 2006 coup. It was not until 2009, when he began seeing the distinctive red plastic foot clappers (ตีนตบ) in his house, that he became aware of the Red Shirt movement. He later learned that some of his aunts and uncles were Red Shirt protesters and that some had had to flee military gunfire.

The events of 2010 made him question why society responded so differently to the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts - as though one group was good and the other bad. He believes that some Abhisit government policies adversely affected his family, including restrictions on the purchase of palm oil. He also thinks that a first-car scheme implemented under the Yingluck government helped his family become more financially secure.

Khemmoot, a 25-year-old former Thammasat University student, recalls that her father watched Yellow Shirt demonstrations. He told her that Red Shirt protesters were “paid to go to demonstrations”, which gave her a negative impression of them early on. However, she felt conflicted because neighbours he described this way were kind people that she knew.

Her senior year in high school, she began reading the work of Somsak Jeamteerasakul, at a time when political satire about the junta was becoming increasingly common. A private tutor criticised her for sharing his writings, even calling her family and demanding an apology. A major turning point came when she entered Thammasat University. There, she met friends who took her to academic discussions and political demonstrations, and she started to understand the country’s structural problems and economic inequality.

She only came to fully understand the Red Shirt movement in 2020, when she visited relatives in Uthai Thani and an uncle who had been a Red Shirt told her about his experiences. He had gone to Bangkok for work and joined the protests because he saw injustice. He still kept a blood-stained shirt belonging to a friend, as well as a piece of a tank’s indicator light as a memento. Another aunt, however, had burned her Red Shirt clothes, cards and other belongings because she feared being targeted after the crackdown.

Limited knowledge of the Red Shirt movement

Dr Anusorn Unno says that university students today generally know little about the Red Shirts. Much depends on how interested they are in politics. Those with some interest tend to see the Red Shirts as lower-income people who were treated unjustly. Those with a strong interest see them as people who fought against unjust power before their own generation did.

Teerapon Anmai, a lecturer at Ubon Ratchathani University, says many students know little more than that the Red Shirts opposed the Yellow Shirts. He thinks that those with a deeper understanding come from Red Shirt families, have relatives who took part in the movement, or are particularly interested in politics and critical analysis. He says that in 2020, young people and student protesters could be divided into two broad categories: those with Red Shirt parents who had a good understanding of the movement, and those who knew of the Red Shirts but had little detailed knowledge.

After the 2023 election, most students leaned towards the ‘orange’ Move Forward Party camp rather than the ‘red’ one. A smaller group of students who supported the red camp had a deeper understanding of politics and electoral principles. Their numbers increased in the last election, but they remain a minority.

The Red Shirts’ ‘place’ in the 2020 protests

After the 2014 coup, the Red Shirt movement broke up. Its leaders were arrested or forced into exile and its supporters dispersed. When youth opposition to authoritarianism emerged in 2020, Red Shirts became part of the movement and a source of support but did not take leadership roles.

They provided support through their participation, financial contributions and bail funds. In 2021, they also joined the car protests, where symbols of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) appeared alongside those of the Ratsadon movement. Again, however, they did not lead the protests.

A significant event took place on 14 August 2020, when Chulalongkorn students publicly read an excerpt from Red Shirt leader Nattawut Saikua’s speech “Voice from the Earth to the Sky”. According to Teerapon, the reading was a way of honouring the Red Shirts’ struggle and it triggered a public apology to the movement from members of the younger generation, including some former supporters of the PAD and PDRC. He thinks that students protested when Abhisit spoke at Chulalongkorn because they remembered his role as prime minister during the 2010 crackdown.

Anusorn views the students’ decision to read “Voice from the Earth to the Sky” as a “link” between different generations, reflecting a continuation of questions about the role and authority that began to emerge within the Red Shirt movement in 2008, even though criticism of the monarchy was not yet part of the movement at the time. Nalinrat says that the Red Shirts she interviewed were deeply moved to see the younger generation recognise the value of their struggle, as itconfirmed that what they had done was not in vain.

A thesis examining the event concluded that students were not specifically speaking about the Red Shirts, however, but rather were comparing their own experience of being “small people without a voice” to that of Red Shirt citizens in the past.

Kong believes that the 2020 protests helped reduce some of the stigma surrounding the Red Shirts, but agrees that their history remained marginalised. Some people worried that associating the youth movement with the Red Shirts would “taint” it, and some Red Shirts did not want young protesters to face the same kind of crackdown they experienced.

Why young people are not ‘into’ the Red Shirts

“Class consciousness and perceptions of politicians” are clearly factors. Young people may feel more connected to the People’s Party movement and the October 1973 protests because they associate both with a new generation and a sense of “hope”. In contrast, the Red Shirts are linked in the popular imagination to workers, rural people and Thaksin.

Teerapon argues that among members of the middle class, academia, the media and NGOs, the Red Shirts are often treated as “a mass movement serving politicians” that did not really address contemporary demands, despite the fact that a key demand in 2010, one that got many people injured and killed, was simply for Abhisit to dissolve parliament and hold a new election.

Another issue is the negative media narratives surrounding the Red Shirt movement. As noted by Teerapon, the movement was never really “romanticised” during the Yellow Shirt-Red Shirt conflict because the media was largely a tool of the state. Although online media began presenting alternative perspectives after 2020, coverage of the Red Shirts was fairly limited, never becoming a part of popular culture. At the same time, negative portrayals of Red Shirts as “men in black” who tried to burned down the country shaped public perceptions, even though criminal cases supporting this interpretation were later dismissed.

“Nang Baek” perceptions of Thaksin

According to researcher Nalinrat Lertleelawiram, young female supporters of Pheu Thai, so-called “Nang Baek”, include both descendants of Red Shirts and people from conservative families. As a result of interacting, some formerconservatives now understand that Thaksin was not “a bad person” but rather “a capable leader who was a victim of political circumstances”. They remain less enthusiastic than an earlier generation of supporters, however.

The 2020 protests also changed how they viewed the Red Shirts, with many coming to see them as victims who suffered injustice. This did not necessarily mean that young Pheu Thai supporters identified with Red Shirts, however. Instead, defence of Thaksin and Pheu Thai became associated with this newer “Nang Baek” identity. This reportedly contributed to tensions between the red and orange camps, causing some of those who respected the Red Shirts’ past struggle to strongly dislike their “Nang Baek” counterparts. Despited shared political sympathies, they remained separate groups.

Nalinrat sees a generational difference between the “Nang Baek” and the Red Shirts. Members of the former group do not consider themselves Red Shirts. Their support for Pheu Thai and Thaksin does not stem from the same political experiences and attachments that shaped the original Red Shirt movement. Kong also argues that treating the “Nang Baek” as part of a single group denies them their own agency. In his view, they have their own reasons for making political choices and should be allowed to express those views.

Gender, sexuality and Gen Z politics

Anusorn observes that gender and sexuality influence the political preferences of young people as well. Some students have begun distancing themselves from the orange party because of internal problems and sexual-harassment allegations. Meanwhile, at least some of the students who protested against Abhisit’s speech at Chulalongkorn were members of the LGBTQ+ community.

Khemmoot herself supported the orange party in 2023, but switched to the red party in the most recent election because she liked its approach to labour issues and felt that the orange party’s positions on certain matters did not align with her values concerning human rights and economic justice.

The new generation of “Nang Baek” can also be said to communicate differently from earlier Red Shirts. They use queer-influenced language, humour, satire and pop culture, making politics something that can be experienced as part of everyday life.

The #genzforpheuthai phenomenon during the most recent election showed that some Gen Z and first-time voters have begun openly supporting Pheu Thai, despite being mocked and accused by orange supporters of being “paid to do it”. Pheu Thai itself also adopted the communication style of the “Nang Baek” in its campaign in a bid to speak directly to Gen Z.

eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-09-03 - 15:07

Feature

Thai court to hear challenge to detention of Chinese journalist Bai Zhaodong

eng editor 3 — Thu, 03 Sep 2026 06:10:57 +0000

Thai court to hear challenge to detention of Chinese journalist Bai Zhaodong

The South Bangkok Criminal Court will hear a challenge to the detention of a Chinese investigative journalist and UN-recognised refugee Bai Zhaodong, who has been in detention for approximately six months and was twice barred from traveling to a third country.

It was reported on 31 August that the 56-year-old Chinese journalist and UN-recognised refugee submitted a petition with the South Bangkok Criminal Court, requesting his release due to allegedly unlawful detention. The Court accepted the petition and the hearing is scheduled for 18 September.

Who is Bai Zhaodong?

According to his interview with Reporters without Borders (RSF), Bai Zhaodong has worked as an investigative journalist in China for over 20 years, most recently with the renowned Beijing Caijing Magazine. His work exposed large-scale corruption and a financial fraud network involving money laundering and other illicit financial activities. The investigation implicated both local government officials and high-ranking officials within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

One of his most outstanding investigations, published in 2017, examined China’s poverty alleviation campaign in Shaanxi Province, revealing the pressure local officials faced from the central government to meet poverty-reduction targets.

Between 2011 and 2022, at least five charges were brought against him by various public departments across the country due to his reporting on fraud and corruption scandals.

He was also accused of inciting subversion of state power, a charge that can carry up to five years' imprisonment unless the Chinese courts classify it as a major crime, in which case, five years is the minimum sentence.

Bai fled China in 2023 and arrived in Thailand in 2024. On 30 September 2024, the Public Security Bureau of Yulin City issued an arrest warrant for Bai on trumped-up charges of extortion.

At the end of October 2024, Chiang Mai immigration police were seen twice at the hotel where Bai was staying, looking for the journalist. In January 2026, he was placed in a detention facility pending relocation to a third country, but Thai authorities have barred him from leaving Thailand on scheduled flights twice in February and June.

On 16 July, Reuters reported that the Chinese authorities have asked Thailand to promptly extradite Bai. He is currently in detention at the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre(IDC).

According to RSF, China ranks 178th out of 180 countries and territories in the 2026 RSF World Press Freedom Index, and currently holds 124 journalists behind bars.

Bai’s detention is considered unlawful

Nadthasiri Bergman, one of Bai’s legal representatives who filed the request with the Criminal Court, revealed that the request was filed to oppose the unlawful detention of Bai. According to the Immigration Act, the authorities can detain a person as long as necessary pending departure to another country.

The fact is that Bai had been granted a visa and his departure from the the country wasarranged twice on 5 February and 22 June. However, the authorities claimed that the “Exit Clearance” has yet to be completed, resulting in both flights being cancelled.

Nadthasiri observed that the Exit Clearance typically has a 3-week timeframe, and that it should now be completed for Bai’s case. It was also found that Bai did not face any charges in Thailand, and the third country has already agreed to receive him. She noted that there was no reason for the National Security Council to prevent him from travelling to the third country.

The lawyer asserted that holding Bai in detention is considered unlawful, noting that the Thai authorities are obliged to allow Bai to go to the third country.

Montana Duangprapa, Bai’s legal representative who recently visited him at the IDC, revealed that Bai was still in good physical health and able to eat normally, despite losing a significant amount of weight, possibly resulting from stress.

Bai has underlying health conditions, requiring him to take medication regularly. When the medications are running low, his legal team takes supplies to him in the IDC.

She added that the Chinese journalist has recently appeared to be anxious, observing that this could be because there has been no progress on his departure for the third country.

Bai is not the first person facing such a situation. In July, the Thai authorities refused to allow Chinese refugee Zhang Xinyan to travel to a third country, claiming that the Exit Clearance had yet to be completed. Zhang was stopped by the Thai authorities before boarding a flight to Canada and was taken back to the Suan Phlu IDC. However, international news outlets later reported on 4 August that she finally arrived in Canada.

Thailand also held in detention Tan Yixiang, a Catholic and vocal advocate for Tibetan and Uyghur rights. He was detained for two years at the Suan Phlu IDC. A source reported that he had a plan to depart to a third country on 12 July, but he disappeared from the IDC. It was later found that Tan was deported to China on 11 June.

eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-09-03 - 13:10

Feature

Hunger striking activist begins dry fasting after bail denial

eng editor 1 — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 09:22:22 +0000

Hunger striking activist begins dry fasting after bail denial

Activist Promsorn Veerathamjaree has begun dry fasting after over 60 days of hunger strike and being repeatedly denied bail, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said yesterday (1 September).

Promsorn is currently detained pending appeal on six counts of royal defamation, two of which are now before the Supreme Court and two in the Appeal Court. He has been on a hunger strike since 1 July to demand the right to bail.

On 29 August, his mother and lawyers filed a bail request for him. His mother petitioned the court to have him released so he can take care of his father, who has several medical conditions including Alzheimer's, noting that he is willing to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet and report to court once a month, and for the court to set other conditions including a curfew and prohibit him from leaving the country, or to appoint a guardian. The Supreme Court subsequently denied the request.

Promsorn told a lawyer who visited him yesterday (31 August) that, after 2 months of hunger strike, he has decided that he will start dry fasting. He said that a prison psychologist came to speak to him, but he did not feel pressured. He also noted that prison volunteers have been checking on him twice a day.

eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-09-02 - 16:22

News

Chiang Mai activists demand ECT prosecute Senate collusion suspects

eng editor 1 — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 08:53:23 +0000

Chiang Mai activists demand ECT prosecute Senate collusion suspects

Activists in Chiang Mai staged a protest today (2 September) in front of the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT)’s Chiang Mai office to demand that the ECT prosecute 229 suspects in the Senate collusion case.

Activist Chatchai Thammo told Lanner that questions have been raised about collusion during the 2024 Senate selection, which allows political groups to dominate the Senate. The protest was called because people have seen the evidence and want to demand prosecution of the suspects, he said, and because the people must hold independent bodies accountable. The activists are planning to hold another protest on 14 September if no progress is made in the case.

It was previously reported that the ECT would rule whether to refer the Senate collusion case to the Supreme Court by the end of August. However, in a press release issued on 28 August, the ECT said it will rule on the case on 14 September.

The legal watchdog NGO iLaw, which has been disclosing information about vote rigging and collusion during the Senate select, organised an event at the Chaeng Wattana Government Complex in Bangkok, where the ECT head office is located on Sunday (30 August). They call for the ECT to prosecute all suspects so the evidence can be heard in court. If the ECT does not prosecute any individual, they will release information about that individual‘s involvement to the public.

eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-09-02 - 15:53

News

Election Commission files complaint against iLaw over Senate collusion case

eng editor 3 — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 05:53:50 +0000

Election Commission files complaint against iLaw over Senate collusion case

The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has filed a complaint with Central Investigation Bureau’s Crime Suppression Division against the legal watchdog NGO iLaw for exposing documents containing its Deputy Secretary-General's opinions over the Senate collusion case.

On 28 August, ECT Deputy Secretary-General Kanchit Charoen-in immediately filed the complaint against iLaw after it disclosed documents containing his opinions given in September 2025, when he was acting on behalf of Secretary-General Sawaeng Boonmee. His opinions were based on the evidence from the ongoing investigation into collusion inthe Senate election.

According to the documents published by iaw, it was found that Kanchit recommended that the ECT file a petition to the Supreme Court, requesting the court to disqualify at least 136 senators, whose numbers were found listed in the same pattern in voting notes of otherindividuals, which revealed too many coincidences.

In addition, at least 17 cases indicated that the elected senators may have been involved in making payments to others in suspicious manner.

However, the Deputy Secretary-General recommended dismissing the cases involving financial transactions, claiming that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the transactions were made to influence the senate candidates.

There was also an allegation against 18 prominent members of the ruling Bhumjaithai Party, including Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and other cabinet members. Kanchit recommended dismissing the complaint, saying that the witness who exposed the scheme failed to provide supporting evidence, and reported merely hearsay.

It is widely believed that the ruling BJT dominates the Thai parliament’s upper house. The incumbent Senate has been in office since 2024 after a controversial and complex self-selection process in which vote-rigging has been alleged. Over one-third of Senators, known as Blue Senators after the BJT party colour, are believed to be closely tied to the ruling party. The Senate collusion case has been perceived as the biggest stain on the ruling party.

The collusion case has recently been in the spotlight as the opposition party and iLaw have periodically released evidence since July, exposing the scheme’s methods, those allegedly involved, and financial transactions, and demanding that the ECT prosecute all 229 suspects.

On 25 August, Justice Minister Pol Lt Gen Rutthaphon Naowarat admitted that the documents disclosed by iLaw were parts of the investigation file from the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), adding that the Minister was investigating how these documents were leaked.

On the same day, it was reported that officials from the DSI filed a complaint with the Crime Suppression Division against individuals who disclosed the investigation documents. The DIS noted that the documents can be disclosed only during a court trial, saying that the disclosure caused significant damage to the process.

Apart from a series of complaints initiated by the state bodies, defamation lawsuits from senators and cabinet members have also been filed. In July, PM Anutin Charnvirakul and eight other high-profile figures threatened to file defamation lawsuits against iLaw Director Yingcheep Atchanont for linking them and the ruling party to the scheme, with Suksomrauy actually filing a case against Yingcheep.

On 20 August, MP Parit Wacharasindhu from the opposition People’s Party revealed that he also faced defamation suits filed by those alleged to be involved in the collusion, on the same grounds.

He faced at least three lawsuits, filed by Deputy Prime Minister Songsak Thongsri, Minister Attached to the PM’s office Suksomrauy Wantaneeyakul, and Senator Sorachat Wish Suwanprom.

eng editor 3 Wed, 2026-09-02 - 12:53

News

Activist jailed for royal defamation over live streaming near royal motorcade route

eng editor 3 — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 04:01:15 +0000

Activist jailed for royal defamation over live streaming near royal motorcade route

Pro-democracy activist Tantawan Tuatulanon has been sentenced to two years in prison for royal defamation without suspension over live streaming near a royal motorcade route on 5 March 2022. She was later granted provisional bail pending appeal.

Tantawan was charged with royal defamation, violation of the Computer Crimes Act, and other charges for resisting officers and refusing to follow an official order over live streaming near the royal motorcade route on 5 March 2022, according to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights.

Her Facebook livestream showed her questioning the way the authorities cleared the road in preparation for the procession by removing protesting farmers who had been living in a makeshift shelter on the footpath for three months, demanding that the government solve the agricultural debt problem, as they had promised two decades ago.

In her live stream, Tantawan expressed her excitement at seeing real horses from the cavalry and questioning the perspective of the King and police in clearing the protesters away from the scene instead of coming to listen to the farmers’ grievances.

The broadcast included phrases like “What route is this? Can I see the horses? Can I look at the horses? Can I come for a close look?”, “The farmers’ protest has to move … so you should know that the farmers’ protest must be moved because one person is coming”, and “Let’s remember that the farmers’ protest has to move. Instead of listening to their problems, the authorities have chased them off just because one person is coming. So let’s remember, between the people and the monarch, who is more important.”

According to the Criminal Court, her action was not considered questioning in good faith but carried defamatory implications toward the King.

The Court stated that if she intended to criticise officials, it can be done without referring to the King, but several of her actions were insulting to the King.

She was also found guilty of violating the Computer Crimes Act, as she imported false information which was related to national security into a computer system through her Facebook account.

The defendant was found guilty of refusing to follow an official order, as she refused to stop live streaming when told to do so three times by the officers. In addition, she kicked the officers during the arrest. However, she was found not guilty of resisting officers, as they did not inform her of the charges while arresting her. The Court concluded that she did not intend to hurt the officers but acted out of fright.

The Court sentenced her to three years in prison without suspension. Tantawan also received a 900-baht fine for refusing to follow an official order. Due to her guilty plea, the sentence was reduced to two years in prison with a 600-baht fine.

She was granted provisional bail pending appeal with 100,000 baht as security on the condition that she does not travel aboard.

On 5 March, Tantawan broadcast live on Ratchadamnoen Nok Road which the officers claimed was the route of King Vajiralongkorn’s royal motorcade. The arrest was made by about 60 police officers ahead of the motorcade's arrival.

She was initially charged with refusing to follow an official order and resisting officers. She was then taken to the Phaya Thai Police Station and was not allowed to meet a lawyer.

The activist was informed of a royal defamation charge and a charge related to the Computer Crimes Act on the following day (6 March 2022).

Tantawan was detained at the Narcotics Suppression Bureau located inside the Police Club from 5 March to 7 March 2022 when she was granted bail with 100,000 baht as security and on condition that she does not repeat the offense or participate in activities which damage the monarchy, and that she must wear an electronic monitoring bracelet.

During witness testimony, Tantawan argued that her live stream was to question the authorities, insisting that the point where she livestreamed was not the royal motorcade route, and she resisted the officers because they did not tell her where she would be taken.

This case led to her being detained twice, during which she went on two hunger strikes. The first hunger strike occurred after the Court denied bail on 20 April 2022 on the grounds that she posted on her Facebook and drove close to the royal motorcade.

Tantawan was detained at the Central Women’s Correctional Institution. This hunger strike lasted for 37 days until she was allowed bail on 26 May 2022.

In January 2023, she revoked her own bail in this case to protest the court’s alleged injustice and to demand the right to bail for political prisoners. Her second hunger strike lasted 53 days.

Tantawan also faced a royal defamation charge for conducting a poll on royal motorcades in February 2022. However, on 6 July this year, the South Bangkok Criminal Court dismissed the charge, ruling that the poll only raised questions about royal motorcades and did not mention specific members of the royal family.

eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-09-01 - 11:01

News

Civil society demands ECT prosecute senate collusion suspects

eng editor 1 — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 09:59:05 +0000

Civil society demands ECT prosecute senate collusion suspects

On Sunday (30 August), a gathering took place at the Chaeng Watthana Government Complex, where the office of the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) is located, to demand that the ECT prosecute all 229 individuals suspected of involvement in collusion during the 2024 Senate selection and refer the case to the Supreme Court.

Organised by the legal watchdog NGO iLaw, the event was designed as a sports day. Over a hundred runners joined the 2.29-KM run around the running track on the 4th floor of the Government Complex. Meanwhile, participants took part in games of badminton, using boxes with pictures of Bhumjaithai cabinet ministers accused of involvement in senate collusion to hold down the net. Others played “Blue into the group” - a game in which they throw balls into boxes with names of suspects in the Senate collusion case.

After the activities, representatives of the Human Rights Lawyers Association (HRLA) and other civil society organizations read out a statement demanding that the ECT prosecute all 229 suspects, noting that the ECT is required by law to refer a case to court if there is reasonable evidence that a candidate committed election fraud or that they know others had committed fraud.

The statement noted that the ECT‘s own investigation committee ruled that the case should be referred to court. However, instead of doing so, the ECT formed a sub-committee to rule on the issue. The sub-committee then ruled that the suspects were not guilty. This is in spite of evidence such as witness testimony, money transfer, phone call logs, and evidence of meetings between the suspects, which should have been seen as reasonable evidence of fraud. Some of this evidence has also been released to the public.

The organizations also said that there would not be a need for whistleblowers if the ECT is doing its job independently and as required by law. Meanwhile, citizens have a constitutional duty to protect the interest of the country. Citizens and political parties also have the right to hold the ECT accountable, as they have the right to seek, impart, and receive information and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs under Articles 19 and 29 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The government is also responsible for protecting citizens who express opinions or publish information that is within the public interest from lawsuits.

”The Human Rights Lawyers Association and other undersigned organizations call on the ECT to prosecute the senators and do its job as an independent body responsible for holding power in check without being dominated by political power. We also call on personnel and mechanism throughout the judicial process to protect the people’s rights and freedom, to keep in the mind the country’s interest, and to not yield to power and become a tool for silencing the people,” said the statement.

Before the end of the event, participants took photos together holding cardboard boxes with pictures of the 229 suspects, while a banner saying “Prosecute the senators” was dropped from the fourth floor balcony.

In a press release issued last Friday (28 August), the ECT said that it will rule whether to refer the Senate collusion case to court on 14 September.

iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanont said that the civil society’s only demand remains that the ECT prosecute all 229 suspects, so that the evidence can be heard in court. If the ECT decides not to prosecute any suspect, iLaw and its network will release information about that individual’s involvement to the public.

With two weeks to go before the ECT make its decision, Yingcheep said that interested citizens may help by collecting information about senators from their provinces, their connection to political parties, or if there is any accusation that they are involved in vote rigging during the Senate selection, and send the information to iLaw. Netizens can support the campaign by posting pictures, change their profile covers, or use the hashtag #สั่งฟ้องสว. (“Prosecute the senators”).

The civil society network is planning another event on 13 September, a day before the ECT‘s meeting. Yingcheep said that the format, time, and location of the event will be announced at a later date.

eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-08-31 - 16:59

News