Michael Yon - Online Magazine

Moonshine on Ama Dablam

inquiries@michaelyon-online.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 22 Nov 2010 02:56:58 +0000

First Published: 22 November 2010

Recently, I published an image that became popular. While perusing the photos from that night in the Himalaya in Nepal, a similar but better image popped up. The moon shining off the mountain grabbed and held my eye, and I thought some people might like to share this moment.

“Moonshine on Ama Dablam” can be downloaded for a single personal use.

My Facebook page stays plenty busy.

new donation

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (admin) — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 14:43:36 +0000

Reader support is crucial to this mission. Weekly or monthly recurring ‘subscription’ based support is the best, though all are greatly appreciated. Recurring and one-time donations are available through PayPal or Authorize.net.

Recurring Paypal Support	One Time Paypal Support	For recurring or one-time donations through Authorize.net


(Recurring subscriptions require additional information. Please be sure to check the recurring option.)

To send a check or money order:

Michael Yon
P O Box 5553
Winter Haven, FL 33880-5553

I will continue to do my part in telling the stories that are not being told. Readers must also do their part by keeping the cash flowing. Cash is essential .

Thank you!
Michael

The Battle For Mosul

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sat, 14 May 2005 14:57:31 +0000

First Published: May 14, 2005

The Deuce Four Fighting for Mosul

Mosul, Northern Iraq

As the new map of Iraq unfolds, a picture of progress emerges. The Iraqis who want freedom and democracy are gaining ground. From what I hear about the news back home, this might sound unreal. Nightly tallies of roadside IEDs and suicide car bombers driving headlong into crowds, like the Vietnam body counts on the Huntley-Brinkley Report, are the main summary of events, while most of this country is peaceful.

There are seventeen provinces in Iraq, and more than ten are quiet. They are busy rebuilding the infrastructure; building a new democracy, but mostly just getting on with life.

Unfortunately, the “Sunni triangle” is a region churning with an insurgency that shows no sign of letup. But by focusing on the flames, the media does not give the world a fair or accurate representation of what’s happening for most Iraqi people, or for most of the Coalition forces. I, too, have spent most of my time in Iraq in these dangerous provinces, so even these dispatches might indicate that Iraq has more problems than is actually the case.

Yet even here in the warring provinces, progress is clear. I have endured many tedious meetings with agendas focused on roadside trash, local business development, or Iraqi police training. These normalities do not make good news.

Though “the media” zooms in on the flames, viewers are equally complicit. After all, who among us is more likely to tune in or read about another successful Iraqi adopt-a-highway initiative, when the other option is dramatic footage of the fighting that our people face every day inside these jagged borders?

And so it is. I am with the 1-24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division, whose soldiers are fighting some of the most serious insurgency battles in Iraq.

To understand the situation in Mosul today, it helps to recap events beginning last March. Just one year ago, Mosul was largely peaceful. It hardly made the news. Then, far away in Falluja, insurgents ambushed and murdered four American contractors. In a scene as savage as any captured on film, a crowd morphed into a frenzied mob, dancing and mugging for the cameras as they beat smoldering corpses. With a depravity that even in retrospect retains its power to stun any person with a soul, they stampeded through the streets, dragging the dead behind them, until finally hanging what was left of the bodies from a bridge; pausing only to pose for souvenir photos.

The Coalition responded by clearing out the entire city, killing more than one thousand enemy fighters, and dispersing thousands of others “like roaches” throughout Iraq. Displaced fighters streamed from their nests in Falluja, scuttled into hiding throughout Iraq, and began spreading the disease of violence. Many landed in Mosul.

The 25th Infantry Division assumed control of Mosul in mid-October 2004, just when those enemy fighters started arriving from Falluja, soon to be reinforced by fundamentalists streaming in from the border countries. While the Americans happened to be in the middle of reducing troops in Mosul, the enemy happened to be rushing in. This irony didn’t escape the enemy, who responded to the changing odds by stepping up the violence against Americans.

According to Captain John Jodway, an intelligence officer of the 1-24th Infantry Regiment, the 1-24th tour began with American units taking hundreds of mortar rounds. When the Coalition responded by targeting mortar cells, the volleys sharply decreased. Out-gunned, the insurgents shifted from large mortar attacks on a well-defended military targets, to hacking off the heads of unarmed civilians.

This crescendo of cruel and capricious violence lasted two months. Iraqis who resisted the murderers were murdered. American soldiers found about 250 corpses in Mosul. The city had become an open-air prison, with the streets largely under the control of ruthless gangs. They attacked police, killing or scattering nearly all of the fledgling force, and looted their stations.

Days rolled on. Showing evidence of training, the terrorists began seizing and trying to hold entire neighborhoods in Mosul. They carefully selected terrain that would be defensible, stationed fighters with rockets and machine guns on rooftops. They lined streets with explosives, apparently believing they could keep out the Americans. The 25th Infantry would roll into the strongholds and kill dozens of fighters at a clip. One linear ambush was more than a mile long. The 1-24th was caught by surprise. But after they managed to fight through to the end of the ambush, the commander, who was in the thick of the fight, ordered his men to turn around and head back into the ambush, then led his men into the kill zone to kill more enemy. The insurgents stopped using this tactic.

On December 21st, with the Iraqi national elections just over a month away, the enemy managed to get a suicide bomber into the dining facility on an American base in Mosul, where the 1-24th and other units live. Twenty-two Coalition members were killed in the attack. Despite the pain of that loss, there was little time to mourn. They call it “soldiering on.” The soldiers had a job to do and so they continued to hunt down and kill insurgents in large street battles that occurred nearly every day from mid-October through late December.

New Year’s Day, 2005: Iraqi elections were looming. Every day brought the insurgents one step closer to their ultimate enemy: democracy. Every ballot cast would be a shot in the heart of despotism. The enemy showed the depth of their fear of freedom by stepping up intimidation aimed directly at election workers. Wave after wave of brutality washed away the thin veneer of courage that had barely had time to dry a first coat. The election workers quit.

With no election staff, and no police force, the insurgents resorted to attacking firefighters. Their apparent relentlessness made the possibility of Iraqi elections seem remote. After a solid month of increasing attacks, most observers had written off the idea, while cries to postpone voting began to drown out even the guns of the insurgents.

But then January 30–now one of the more remarkable days in recent world history–dawned to a scene of courageous Iraqis–men, women, old and young, whole families, taking tentative but nonetheless determined steps to freedom. The success of the elections in Mosul and throughout Iraq stunned naysayers across the continents. Millions of Iraqis voted, leaving little room for dispute about their intent to embrace democracy. Iraqis risked their lives to vote, simultaneously shaming and inspiring many who watched.

It wasn’t over. Ever anxious for effect, but increasingly pressed to scale down their activities, the enemy again shifted tactics. Through most of February, the insurgency was characterized by drive-by shootings and sniper attacks. The Coalition countered in Mosul, and began killing snipers. Those attacks remarkably decreased.

This brings us to now. The latest weapon in vogue in Mosul is the car bomb or, as it is often called in Iraq, VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device). When VBIEDs are piloted by suicidal men, they are called SVBIEDs. In Mosul, the enemy tries to ram SVBIEDs into the American Stryker vehicles. There have been more than twenty such attacks in Mosul recently.

The attacks sometimes fail, or are detected just before they happen. The 1-24th saw one car that was weighted down and driving erratically, so they shot the tires. The Saudi driver refused to leave the car but tried to persuade the Americans to come to him. While the Americans used an interpreter with a bullhorn to coax him out, the bomber stayed in the car. The Americans shot the car. It caught fire and exploded.

There are about seven hundred soldiers in the 1-24th, and they have been in some of the fiercest fighting in Iraq. As they complete the first half of their tour, the statistics tell the story–about one man in every six has been wounded or killed.

Lieutenant Colonel Erik Kurilla commands the 1-24th (Deuce Four). Kurilla’s men describe him as a ferocious fighter, afraid of nothing, a man who leads from the front. I would soon witness this with my own eyes.

LTC Erik Kurilla and SFC Robert Bowman in Mosul

At FOB Marez, home of the Deuce Four, the morale crackles in the air like gunfire. The heavy losses have not dampened the fight in these men. One young soldier told me, “This is my family. Colonel Kurilla is like my dad. He would die for me.” These are not the youthful proclamations of inexperienced troops who haven’t seen enough combat to know what bullets and bombs mean.

At midnight on my first day at Marez, I go to the gym. The place is packed. At seven the next morning, I go back to the gym. It’s packed again, this time with many of the officers and senior NCOs I met the day before. Some are just coming in from missions, others will soon be going out. Without saying a word, every move telegraphs that these are serious soldiers.

On my first mission with the Deuce Four, I rode with LTC Kurilla in his Stryker vehicle. Several officers and men told me it’s the most dangerous vehicle in Mosul because anytime Kurilla’s soldiers get into trouble, he comes to help. We rolled off the base and into the streets of Mosul. The mission was simple: the soldiers make rounds to the Iraqi Police and Army, checking on how things are going.

Various elements of the Deuce Four patrol around Mosul in Strykers, searching for suicide attackers, looking to spot them before they strap themselves into their moving bombs and take aim at a Stryker. The plan is extremely dangerous. The enemy has major advantages in this scenario. Strykers can be positively identified at a glance from a mile away. Traffic can be heavy in Mosul, another sign of the gradual improvement in security. Car bombs can be tough to spot at any range. Every soldier knows the consequences of every call. Shoot the wrong car, kill innocent people. Let the wrong car slip through, everybody in the Stryker might die. In some ways, life is simple here. Simple, not easy. Simple, but mined with danger. Seven days a week, in addition to conducting raids, and a full spectrum of offensive military operations, the Deuce Four rolls out the gate.

It was afternoon when LTC Kurilla started his rounds in Mosul. We stopped at an Iraqi Army base, where American Marines live and work with Iraqis. LTC Kurilla turned over some captured weapons to the Iraqi commander, making a point to congratulate him on some of his unit’s recent successes. Among the weapons is a Russian sniper rifle that had been used to shoot an American Marine Captain in the head. Luckily, the Marine’s helmet stopped the bullet. When I met that Marine Captain, still on duty at the same station, he politely recounted the story of getting shot in the head. He was not hurt, although the impact had knocked him cold, but one of his friends was seriously wounded in the same attack.

The Deuce Four departed the Iraqi garrison and headed to a police station where only a few months back the insurgents owned the real estate. The area around the station is pocked with bullet holes and scarred from explosions. Dozens of policemen armed with AKs stand about, waiting for something to happen, while LTC Kurilla discusses administrative matters with their chief.

As I started shooting video of the police, two deep thuds came from the distance. Deep enough for Air Force Staff Sergeant Will Shockley to remark, “Holy shit.” I’ve heard many car bombs since coming to Iraq. “That sounded like a VBIED,” I said, “Or a big IED.” The sounds hadn’t fully registered when LTC Kurilla walked out and asked “Where was that at?” Several Americans pointed in the direction where a mushroom cloud was rolling into the sky. We ran for the Strykers a couple hundred yards away.

Americans came onto the radio saying that a car bomb hit a Deuce Four Stryker. We loaded the four Strykers, closed the ramps, and rolled. The attack site was three minutes away. The radio chattered that American helicopters and jets were inbound to provide cover, but the ground situation was tenuous; the initial blast might be the enemy’s first move, but not the main attack. There might be follow-on suicide attacks, or IEDs planted on target, or perhaps dozens of insurgents with machine guns and rockets might be waiting to ambush us.

SVBIED attack on 23 April

When a soldier on the radio announced that the Stryker was burning with men trapped inside, the troops inside our Stryker began un-strapping fire extinguishers. We stopped and the ramp opened. The soldiers burst out running. Fires burned in several locations. Most of the tires were blown off the Stryker, while smoke poured from the hatches. The Stryker was filled with ammunition, but the back ramp had been jammed shut in the initial explosion. Four injured soldiers had gotten out, while two were trapped inside.

LTC Kurilla ran to the burning Stryker, threw off his protective gear and helmet, leading a swarm of soldiers atop and over the burning hulk, in a determined push to get their buddies out. Kurilla dropped himself down a top hatch, to get into the burning Stryker, while men passed up fire extinguishers and even bottles of water. Major Mark Bieger and others were also atop the vehicle, alongside one gutsy Private First Class that everyone calls “Q.”

“Get them out!”

The taste of toxic smoke combined with heat of the fires were overwhelming sensations. Rescuers and the men trapped inside were choking to death on that smoke. Attention was split between the urgent rescue at hand and the threat of follow-on attacks. Within minutes of our arrival, the men had wrestled out their severely injured friends and were climbing off the burning Stryker, separating into teams that shored up defensive positions while others scoured the area searching for other IEDs.

The officers worked alongside the men, collecting every large piece of the damaged Stryker; nothing would be left behind for the enemy. Here in the heat of mid-day, with burning debris spread up and down the road, the men carried heavy twisted chunks of metal, tossing them atop the mangled hulk. A recovery vehicle was on the way.

Meanwhile, American sniper teams had found perches around the blast site, and Army attack helicopters circled low overhead, at times so close that I could practically see the patches on the pilots’ uniforms, while fast-moving jets roared low to the ground in a show of force. In just minutes, Deuce Four had extracted their friends while preparing to unleash a devastating response if the enemy came out in force.

As the road cleared, someone made out the blackened hand and foot of the suicide attacker, smoke still curling off them. A lieutenant muted from smoke inhalation grabbed me, motioning for water; but he never stopped picking up debris. The men managing defenses continually assessed battlefield conditions, improving their posture. When the Iraqi translator heatedly ran off with no backup to question some Iraqis, I thought he might be shot down, but he came back to the road angrily cursing the attackers.

Once the recovery vehicle arrived and dragged the smoldering Stryker away, we needed to roll. But the Deuce Four all know what comes next. The gloating posse descends, camera crews at the ready, to shoot video that gets posted to the web and beamed around the world, of them in full celebratory dance, as if they had scored a major victory against “infidels.”

Just a few weeks earlier, when another of Kurilla’s Strykers was hit by an SVBIED, a camera crew arrived on scene. As a man pumped an AK, an American sniper killed him, wounding the cameraman in the process. When it was later learned that the cameraman was a stringer for CBS who had close ties with the enemy, CBS apologized on the air.

Just as we pulled out, people arrived with cameras and began shooting footage of the scene. One of the men, whom we later learned was an Associated Press correspondent with known ties to the enemy, is dead now. The associate scavenging with him was seriously wounded.

Deuce Four drove back to base, heading straight for the hospital, where they waited for word of their friends. Six had been wounded, all were serious. I was certain that the presence of all their buddies in the waiting room was helping those men somehow. On some levels, at least, it was. When a medical person came out to say they were short of A-Negative blood, a soldier was found with the right type in his veins. The battle had shifted to an operating room, but these men were still in the fight together.

After some hours, LTC Kurilla knew there was nothing more his men could do at the hospital–this was going to be a long night. So, as much for the good of his men as for the demands of the clock, he ordered them back to duty. But Kurilla didn’t leave. He stayed at the hospital with his wounded men. Sometime that night, Sergeant Anthony Davis, one of the men who had been trapped in the Stryker, died from his injuries. He was 22.

The news brought a fog of sadness to the men that rolled with them on their missions back into Mosul that night. And the next day, when Kurilla was back with his men, they rolled out again, this time talking with shop owners and others who might have information about attacks, past or pending.

A mission or two later, riding along with B Company on a raid, we picked up a couple of prisoners at the first target location. One of the prisoners started spilling information, so they took him along to ID another target house when, Blam! A Stryker in front of us hit an IED. It was a large explosion, but only one of the eight tires blew out, so we drove on, hitting another house, getting another prisoner, and coming back home to FOB Marez.

Since that day, six days ago, four more Americans and an interpreter have died from suicide strikes in the AO. Yesterday there were multiple large IED attacks here, two SVBIEDs downtown, and the men of Deuce Four keep soldiering on.

Statement From Taliban

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 22 May 2012 02:22:38 +0000

The Taliban sent this statement. There is a great deal of false information here but good to know what they are saying:

Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding the NATO summit in Chicago

According to news reports, NATO is going to hold a diplomatic summit in the city of Chicago from May 20-21 where Afghanistan will be the most important agenda on the table. Therefore the Islamic Emirate, in order to fulfill its historical obligation, wants to declare the below points to the participants of this conference:

1. The invasion of Afghanistan by America and its allies under the banner of ‘war of terror’ was an unjustified and tyrannical action which was only carried out for political and economical gains. Terrorism and ground realities had nothing in common. No Afghan had a hand in military operations in other countries and neither are there any proofs hence the occupation of Afghanistan by America is neither sound legally or logically.

2. As a result of this occupation, the invasive America imposed upon the Afghan Muslim nation a few war criminals that were cast offs, whose hands were red with the blood of innocent humans and who were involved in transgressing against the life, wealth and honor of the ordinary people. The Afghans have been facing torment from their brutality and crimes for the past decade while the invaders have just turn a blind eye to them.

3. The American intelligence networks including the CIA state that members of Al-Qaida have all left Afghanistan and that there are not more than fifty left therefore the military presence of America is not for its own security but a long term strategy for turning our country and the region into its colony. The declaration of the new president of France, Francois Hollande, that all its troops will be removed from Afghanistan at the end of this year is a decision based on realities and a reflection of the opinion of its nation. We call upon all the other NATO member countries to avoid working for the political interests of American officials and answer the call of your own people by immediately removing all your troops from Afghanistan.

4. The invading soldiers in Afghanistan martyr the defenseless children, women, elderly and other people of Afghanistan in their night raids and blind bombardments without having to worry about the consequences. The perpetrators of these violations are all criminals. The claimants of Human Rights must not condone them. Similarly, the occupying forces have created local militias under the title of ‘Arbakis’ who transgress against the life, wealth and honor of ordinary people and martyr innocent Afghans even though they cannot confront the Mujahideen physically. If the invaders want to fund and equip such groups and continue their blind bombardments then the responsibility of civilian losses caused in Afghanistan will rest squarely upon the shoulders of these forces.

5. We want to declare to the whole world the stooge Kabul administration tortures innocent prisoners, extracts false confessions and hands out long term prison sentences. The security apparatus of Kabul regime discriminates and treats them with prejudice. Ending this oppression is the obligation of every human being.

6. The invading forces have destroyed whole villages along with their inhabitants (Tarako Kalacha as example) in Afghanistan with twenty five ton bombs. They have razed entire bazaars with hundreds of shops in Helmand and Uruzgan. They have also uprooted the greenery and orchards in Panjwai and Zhari districts of Kandahar and similarly in Band-e-Sarda of Ghazni province. All this savagery is committed under the slogans of war on terror. Today’s international community which touts tolerance, justice and human rights, how can it justify this savagery in Afghanistan at the hands of these self proclaimed civilized men?

7. In order to brainwash the public and to vilify the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate, various networks in Afghanistan headed by the invading forces commit some acts such as the destruction and burning of bridges and schools, carrying out explosions amongst civilians, targeting of specific people for vile purposes and others, the Islamic Emirate declares its complete disavowal from them.

8. The occupying American forces have created secret prisons inside all of their airbases in Afghanistan where they keep innocent Afghans and carry out various forms of torture on them which has resulted in the martyrdom of many. Besides this, thousands of innocent Afghans are being held prisoners in Kandahar and Bagram airbases without any charges. These are all people who have no knowledge of the New York incident but are been held captives under its pretext for years and are languishing in unbearable conditions.

9. A survey conducted in April by CBS news and New York Times showed that 69 percent of Americans oppose the war in Afghanistan and want their troops out of Afghanistan. Similarly, the people of nations allied with America have also shown their opposition to the occupation of Afghanistan. So the NATO member countries who claim to be the elected representatives of its people and consider their government the peoples government, by the people, for the people; how will they answer the call of their people in this summit?

10. The Islamic Emirate once again declares that it holds no agenda of harming anyone nor will it let anyone harm other countries from the soil of Afghanistan hence there is no reason for the occupying countries including America to continue the occupation of Afghanistan under the pretext of safeguarding its own security.

11. The occupation of Afghanistan by America through the use of force is a clear violation of a sovereign state which is not justified under any international law. Those Afghans that are fighting against this violation are independence seeking Mujahideen who demand their due rights and putting up resistance to this occupation is their legal right. This armed struggle will only come to an end when the Afghans acquire their independence and a government of their choice. Imposed agreements and international conferences are not the solution to the Afghan quandary. The solution lies in giving the Muslim Afghan nation their complete legitimate and natural right.

12. The Islamic Emirate has left all military and political doors open. It wants to obtain the rights of the Muslim Afghan nation through all possible ways and as a responsible force, is prepared to accept all it announces however the invaders are utilizing a one step forward, two steps backwards tactic. They are conjuring artificial excuses to prolong the occupation of Afghanistan, are wavering in their stance and do not seem to have a clear strategy for a political solution. The Islamic Emirate considers the claims of the invaders of finding a political solution as meaningless until they come out of their fluctuating unstable state.

13. The occupation of Afghanistan by America and its allies is the fundamental problem. If this matter is solved, the Afghans understand each others language and share a common culture therefore they can reach a resolution regarding the country. The foreigners should forgo prolonging and complicating the Afghan issue for their colonialist objectives.

To end, we must reiterate that the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate will keep proceeding with their ongoing Jihad until it attains its goal. The terrorism and savagery of the invaders and their stooges will not be able to stop it. We call upon the leaders of the NATO member countries to realize the ground realities of Afghanistan and acknowledge the natural rights of the Afghans which are an independent nation and establishment of a government of its own choice. Similarly, they should stop the gross human right violations ongoing in Afghanistan and the desecration of the sanctities of Afghans committed by their troops. But if they still refuse to pay attention to the consequences of their criminal actions, then they will also be erased along with their oppression and terror on this blessed soil just like the previous imperialists and only their stories shall remain.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

Smoking Gun Army Documents

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 21 May 2012 12:42:23 +0000

Removing Red Crosses might help troops, but hurt Propaganda Campaign

Photo Credit: DVIDS

21 May 2012

We are making tremendous progress on the MEDEVAC issue. Much of the progress has come from people scattered around America who contacted their Senators and Representatives. Our “MEDEVAC Militia” was mostly ignored, or they received form letters that regurgitated Army propaganda. Nonetheless, our persistent efforts are paying off.

At least 17 lawmakers took the issue seriously. Congressman Todd Akin from Missouri gathered a posse and took it to the House Armed Services Committee. There the posse confronted Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Serious pressure has begun and we are not going to let up.

We have tremendous support from key military people. This support is hidden and must remain so.

Our powerful opponents are the top military leadership, including SecDef Panetta and General Dempsey. Needless to say, if a 1-Star General bucks Dempsey or Panetta, he will be sent home. That is the way our system works. Which is great. But then there is a hidden reality. The hidden reality means that Panetta and Dempsey cannot rule by fiat.

On the MEDEVAC issue, Panetta and Dempsey have undermined their standing within the Army Dustoff and Air Force Pedro communities. If they have any support remaining with Air Force Pedros, I have not found it. Pedros are red country for them. They do have some support within the Dustoff side, but that support is eroding month by month as more smoking guns are put on the table.

Importantly, the Dustoff community is only a subset of the affected parties. There are also ground forces and medical constituencies. Dustoff is the small but important go-between that carries wounded via helicopter. This is by no means “all about Dustoff.” It is about everybody who might be wounded, everyone who may have to transport and treat them, and their families and friends back in America, and about taxpayers who pay for wasteful Dustoff operations that use far more helicopters than are needed.

The steady stream of insider information that I continue to publish evidences growing support for change. This stuff does not just blow in, carried by the wind.

Today’s document proves that Army top brass have misled lawmakers and the public about the MEDEVAC issue.

Specifically, the Army’s leadership has repeatedly told Senators, Representatives, and the general public that Red Crosses must be displayed on “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters in order to comply with the Geneva Conventions. This is false. They know it. So do we. The Army’s leadership has also stated that no commanders have asked to remove the Red Crosses, or arm MEDEVAC helicopters. This is false.

Officers have told me that some units wanted to remove the Red Crosses, but we had no smoking gun documents to prove their statements. Thanks to hidden hands, we now have those documents.

Commanders asked for the Red Crosses to be removed, and their higher echelons of command denied their requests for purposes of IO/STRATCOM. (Information Operations/Strategic Communications: meaning propaganda.) A more complete definition of Information Operations can be found in the joint publication 3-13-4: Military Deception.

And so, distilling to the essence of this aspect of the controversy, we have documents proving that General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta are sending troops into great danger simply for propaganda purposes. One document is reprinted below.

Let us begin with an Army statement on MEDEVAC. The most salient parts of both documents are in red:

“Finally, it's important to remember that the Army would change its policy if battlefield commanders wanted a change. We take our obligation to perform the MEDEVAC mission very seriously. We're a learning organization and periodically we review our policies to make sure they remain relevant. We looked at the MEDEVAC policy in 2008, but after a review, we determined no change was necessary.”

The SMOKING GUN

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION PAPER

DASG-HCF
19 November 2008

SUBJECT: C/2-227 General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB) Proposal for Deployment of Armed Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Helicopters and Painting over Red Crosses

1. Purpose. Provide the Director of Health Care Operations, Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG) an update on the status of the C/2-227th GSAB proposal for deployment of armed MEDEVAC helicopters and painting over the red crosses.

2. Facts.

a. OTSG Aeromedical Evacuation Officer was notified 02 OCT 08 that Charlie Company (Air Ambulance Company) C/2-227th GSAB of the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) of the 1st Cavalry Division proposed to paint "over" three (3) MEDEVAC Aircraft (A/C) red crosses IOT employ them as MEDEVAC chase A/C during their upcoming deployment to OIF. The CAB’s intent is to keep the MEDEVAC carousels installed, Medical Equipment Sets (MES) and Flight Medics on board during all missions and install M240s (crew-serve weapon) in the doors gunner windows (total two per A/C). The CAB has evaluated and completed the first iteration of aerial gunnery for C/2-227th GSAB utilizing C/2-227th GSAB organic MEDEVAC A/C with Red Crosses and organic flight crews. Their proposal once deployed, utilize the A/C in an escort role/support and utilize an "extra" set of cargo doors with red crosses if utilized for actual missions if required after the removal of the M240s (A/C would not be marked IAW FM 4-02.2 & TM 55-1500-345-23).

b. HQDA G3/5/7 Aviation, FORSCOM G3 Aviation and Medical Evacuation Proponency Directorate at Ft Rucker were all notified of the proposal. OTSG Aeromedical Evacuation Officer requested & received a complete legal review by OTSG SJA and HQDA Office of the Judge Advocate General in order to assess the legal/policy considerations as they apply to the following: HQDA General Order # 3 (Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army), Geneva Convention, DoD Directive 2311.01E (DoD Law of War Program”, U.S. Code Title 10 Section 164 (Duties of the Combatant Commanders), U.S. Code Title 10 Section 3013 (Duties of the Secretary of the Army), AR 40-3 (Medical, Dental & Veterinary Care), AR 71-32 (Force Development and Documentation), AR 350-1 (Army Training and Leader Development), FM 4-02.2 (Medical Evacuation), FM 4-02.10 (Theater Hospitalization), FM 27-10 (Law of Land Warfare), TM 55-1500-345-23 (Painting & Marking of Army Aircraft), Information Paper Crew Served Weapons Training (OTSG SJA Legal Opinion 2007), MNC-I FRAGO 129 (M249 Mounting MRAP), FORSCOM SJA Paper (M249 Mounting MEV), TSG Memo dated 05 JAN 04 (Avn Task Force), MEDEVAC Charter between AMEDDC&S & USAAVNC dated 14 MAY 04 and Maintaining the proper strategic communication plan.

c. Initial assessment / findings by the OTSG Aeromedical Evacuation Officer were sent to HQDA G3 Avn, FORSCOM Surgeon Office & FORSCOM G3 Avn 30 OCT 08. FORSCOM G3 Avn engaged III Corps Avn 05 NOV 08 and addressed that FORSCOM G3 Avn does NOT support 2-227th GSAB plan for MEDEVAC Aircraft. Additionally, HQDA G3/5/7 Avn and FORSCOM Surgeon Office do NOT support 2-227th GSAB plan as well.

3. Key points.

a. Initial assessment / findings by OTSG.

1) The Surgeon General, delegated the responsibility to establish Law of War doctrine for medical personnel for the Secretary of the Army (DA General Order # 3, dated 09 JUL 02), can dictate policy and doctrine which he has done through AR 40-3, FM 4-02.2, and FM 4-02.10. He has the authority, responsibility and capability to provide operational oversight of medical capabilities to include the medical evacuation component IAW the Air Ambulance Charter dated 14 MAY 04. He must be able to retain visibility / oversight over these units as the absolute critical linkage in the healthcare continuum since the AMEDD has the retention of these MTO&Es (SRC08 vs SRC01).

2) AR 40-3, FM 4-02.2 and FM 4-02.10 prohibit the use of MEDEVAC aircraft other than for their intended purpose and installation of crew-served weapons.

3) Though not a technical violation of the Law of War and International Law, the painting over of red crosses and installing M240 crew-serve weapons will not only have potential negative IO implications in the ITO but has the very real potential to reflect negatively on the national strategic communication plan.

4) Will most likely create significant legal issues, increases the potential of Law of War violations, potential outright violations of the Geneva Convention, and require a substantial change in Army doctrine.

5) MEDEVAC asset sourcing is contentious (low density, high demand). CENTCOM will expect the Force Providers to produce what has been requested. When C/2-227th GSAB arrives in the ITO, it is expected as a 12 ship MEDEVAC company IAW the FTNs. Arriving with 9 or 10 "dedicated" MEDEVAC aircraft will raise flags and send what kind of strategic message.

6) The Surgeon General authorized M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) (NOT M240 crew-serve weapon) use on the Stryker Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV) and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Ambulances IAW TSG Memo dated 21 FEB 07. However, due to negative IO implications in the ITO and very real potential to reflect negatively on the national strategic communication plan, FORSCOM & MNC-I decided NOT to authorize the employment of these weapons for the reasons listed above (FORSCOM SJA Paper M249 Mounting MEV and MNC-I FRAGO 129 M249 MRAP).

7) Longstanding Army policy and doctrine, outlined in chapter 16 of AR 40-3, Appendix A of FM 4-02.2 and P-3 of FM 4-02.2.10 prohibit the mounting of crew-served weapons on MEDEVAC aircraft and provide detailed guidance on the utilization of the MEDEVAC aircraft, lest the platform lose its protected status under the Geneva Convention.

8) The Hague Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and on Land, Article 23f, specifically prohibits the misuse of the red cross symbol. A misuse would include using an aircraft marked or partially marked with red crosses for offensive operations (M240 crew-serve weapon viewed as offensive) or in self-defense beyond that allowed by Geneva Convention, article 22. The arrangement proposed by 2-227th GSAB invites the possibility of a potential Law of War Violation. If a M240 mounted in a MEDEVAC aircraft (if some or all red crosses showing) is used to commit a hostile action against an enemy, it would clearly be considered a violation of the Law of War or in other words a war crime.

4. OTSG Recommendation.

a. OTSG / MEDCOM Legal position dated 10 AUG 07, "The AMEDD prefers to maintain a standard for doctrine and training clearly consistent with the Geneva Convention and "NOT" arm MEDEVAC helicopters with crew-serve weapons".

b. 1st CAV CAB does NOT paint over the red crosses and install M240 crew-serve weapons. Though not a technical violation of the Law of War and International Law, the painting over of red crosses and installing M240 crew-serve weapons will not only have potential negative IO implication in the ITO but has the very real potential to reflect negatively on the national strategic communication plan. This will create significant legal issues, increases the potential of Law of War violations, potential outright violations of the Geneva Convention, and require a substantial change in Army doctrine.

Prepared by: LTC HOWARD (703) 681-8195
William.howard2@amedd.army.mil

Approved by: COL Stewart

UNCLASSIFIED

US Congress and MEDEVAC

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 17 May 2012 14:21:15 +0000

17 May 2012

The US MEDEVAC issue is picking up speed and mass. There is so much progress that it is difficult to track. A separate and excellent website dedicated to the issue has popped up at http://medevacmatters.org/

Also, the highly respected writer and war correspondent Yochi Dreazen picked up the ball. Yochi has spent years in the wars and so he was able to quickly dial into the importance of the issue and the authorities involved. On 10 May, Yochi published an article in the National Journal, which was reprinted on the website of Congressman Todd Akin:

“After writing about the issue, Yon recruited an array of congressional lawmakers who agreed with his point of view. Seventeen members, led by Rep. Todd Akin, R-Mo., wrote to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta earlier this year. “This policy may contribute to unnecessary delays in transporting our most critically wounded soldiers and Marines to appropriate medical care,” the letter said. “Our concern is … that Pentagon policy decisions are needlessly restricting this medical care or are limiting the ability of commanders to evacuate the wounded.”

Please read the entire article. (By the way, I strongly think that the military’s position on the 92% survival rate is smoke and mirrors.)

Thursday in Mosul

inquiries@michaelyon-online.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 12 May 2005 14:47:02 +0000

12 May 2005

It was noisier than usual last night on Marez; our soldiers were firing 120mm mortars. When large cannons or mortars are fired around you daily, like they were in Baquba, it’s easy to start sleeping through the racket. But since outgoing fire is not common on this FOB, the booms kept some people awake. Then, shortly after sunrise, two rockets flew into base and exploded nearby, causing more sudden noise and injuring a few civilians.

Surrounded by IEDs

Deuce Four headed downtown this morning with several items on their to-do list. One task was to recon a gasoline station that was attacked and destroyed a couple of weeks ago. While we walked around the rubble of the abandoned station, the commander noticed two artillery rounds on the ground. A minute or so later, someone spotted a radio command switch for a very large booby trap.

We were surrounded by nine bombs (large artillery shells) all rigged to explode by radio control.

While I ran away as fast as I could, the soldiers “pulled back quickly” and called EOD, who arrived and removed the bombs without incident.

EOD

As the day progressed, the Deuce Four visited local police stations, checking security, and extending congratulations to chiefs on some recent successes they’ve had in battles with terrorists this past week.

The news back home is showing large increases in violence in certain parts of Iraq. But the soldiers here continue to comment that Mosul, at least, seems to come under better control with every passing month.

MEDEVAC Madness

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 10 May 2012 01:06:43 +0000

10 May 2012

Many people have contacted lawmakers around the country about MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan. Most of the lawmakers blew it off, or seemed intimidated by the Pentagon. But one serious man over in Missouri has not backed down. Congressman Todd Akin is demanding answers. This week, Congressman Akin brought it to Congress:

Lawmaker seeks report on medevac flights

“In a continuing battle between a key lawmaker and the Army over whether to use armed or unarmed medical evacuation helicopters in combat zones, the House Armed Services Committee voted Wednesday to require detailed comparisons of survival rates, speed and costs of the two methods.

“Rep. Todd Akin, R-Mo., is the chief sponsor of legislation demanding a report from the Defense Department that looks at medical evacuation capabilities of all of the services and allies in combat zones. The data will be used, specifically, for Akin’s challenge to the Army’s policy of using unarmed helicopters that in some cases have to wait for armed escorts to enter hot zones.

“By voice vote and with no debate, the armed services committee approved an Akin amendment that orders the Defense Department to provide Congress details that can be evaluated by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. The DoD report and GAO review would come in time for consideration as part of the 2014 defense budget.”

Please click for rest of story.

Red Air: America’s Medevac Failure

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 12 Oct 2011 02:20:40 +0000

4-4 Cav waiting to board helicopters for an air assault.

12 October 2011
Afghanistan

Most of our troops in Afghanistan never see combat. The closest they get might be the occasional rocket attacks on bases. A relatively small number will be in so many fights that the war becomes a jumble. For those who see fighting daily, their mental time markers are often when they or their buddies were hurt or died, or when some other serious event occurred.

The troops in 4-4 Cav have seen a great deal of fighting. Their courage seems bottomless and for two-and-a-half months I was an eyewitness to their professionalism and courage.

This mission would be dangerous. The Female Engagement Team was left behind and the only female Soldier to come was a medic because, as she would tell me, “I’m the badass medic.”

We sat in the morning darkness behind the helicopters waiting for them to start. A few Soldiers were sleeping on the rocks, while others murmured about this or that. A bomb dog looked at me, then plopped her head on the stomach of her handler, leaving her nose pointing to the sky due to the bulk of the handler’s body armor. The air was still and cool at about 0230 when the helicopters cranked engines under the waning gibbous moon. Illumination was enough for an RPG shot on the landing which could take us all down in a ball of fire.

The helium-filled aerostat balloon tugged at its tether in the background, and light years farther in the background was Orion, pointing north. Remarkably, all of the fighting done by 4-4 Cav has occurred within just a few miles of this base.

CH-47 lifting off on a 4-4 Cav air assault. This image was made from a previous mission. All other images in this dispatch are from the mission described herein.

The CH-47 engines were roaring under the spinning rotors as crew members inspected the aircraft with flashlights looking for any signs of trouble. Thick, hot fumes washed over us as we boarded. Troops filled every seat and all the space on the floor. The helicopters lifted off and soon the wheels touched down on the landing zone in tilled fields. We rushed away from the back ramp and the helicopters flew off into morning darkness leaving us among marijuana fields and the Taliban. The mission into the deadly village of Leyadira had begun.

Through night vision, the Operations Sergeant Major Gregg Larson--a fine NCO--could be seen flipping open his Army compass and checking the azimuth.

On the landing zone.

Soldiers ahead of us searched for bombs using special gear such as metal detectors and other more secret stuff, but that only works to a point. And it only covers the area where a trooper has used the gear. I don’t trust it. The dogs are okay, but they get blown up, too. Often the first person to find a bomb is far back down the line and he finds it by getting killed. Keeping your distance from the person in front is crucial. Being too close to any other man doubles the chance of both getting hit.

The village of Leyadira was full of booby-traps waiting for us--trip wires, pressure plates, and who knows what else--but we didn’t know that yet. As best I can tell, Specialist Chazray Clark was at least number eighteen down the line. The village was vacant other than the enemy. The commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Katona, expected a big fight. The moon was so bright that it cast shadows. We were maybe two hundred meters into Leyadira when the first explosion happened.

BOOM!!! Off to front right there was a tremendous blast. Seconds later, debris began raining down and could be heard coming through the trees on the right. The ANA Soldier looked at me startled (image above) and started to run for cover, but there was none to be found. I just stood still, waiting to be hit because it was better to be still in a place now known to have bombs. We were not in small arms contact. He saw me stand still and he did the same.

4-4 Cav Soldier working

Specialist Chazray Clark had stepped on a bomb. Some Afghan Soldiers had strayed off the cleared path and Chazray was following them because they were in front of his section. Sergeant Edward Wooden had been close to Chazray but not wounded. Wooden was proving yet again to be solid under pressure. He had been wounded during a previous mission but now was good to go. Sergeant Carroll was so close to this explosion that he was stone deaf. Chazray was terribly wounded and had been thrown and landed on his face. The platoon was staggered by the blast yet kept their bearing. They were amazingly calm.

Minutes after the blast, Lieutenant Flores is working the situation by making a “9-line” communication.

In my location, the air was clear, but closer to the blast area the dust was thick. The night vision devices were useless for those in the immediate area of the blast. Sergeant Wooden called out the names of his men in the darkness, taking head count. Near the detonation, nobody could see each other.

A Soldier moves toward the scene of the blast while clearing his steps. No visible lights are being used.

Sergeant Wooden called, “Clark!” Chazray was facedown. One arm and both his legs were gone, and yet this man had the strength and presence to call out from the dust and darkness. Chazray answered, “I’m okay. ” Sergeant Wooden said Chazray’s voice sounded completely normal. Chazray was carrying a good deal of explosives when he stepped on the bomb, including det-cord and caps. Luckily, they didn’t detonate.

Although Chazray had answered that he was okay, everyone here knows that when someone calls out “I’m okay,” the sound of their voice only means they are still alive. Fellow Soldiers located Chazray in the dark, and quickly put on tourniquets and unfolded a stretcher. I was not in the dust-filled area, but I could see brave men come out of it, carrying Chazray back over dangerous ground. I heard Chazray say his arm tourniquet was too tight. He was in great pain. Through night vision I saw an Afghan Soldier rush in to help carry Chazray.

Specialist Chazray was fully conscious and talking the entire time while being medically treated and moved.

The Soldiers took Chazray back to the landing zone where we had just come in.

We waited.

And waited. Some Afghans slipped off to pray in the dark despite that the surrounding areas were not “cleared.” (The next day during this mission, an ANA Soldier stepped into an uncleared area and was killed instantly.)

Sergeant Carroll taking a knee and surveying the surround area.

Sergeant Carroll was so deaf from the bomb blast that he didn’t seem to hear anything, but he stayed alert and on his job pulling security. At one point, an officer tried to talk with him, and a buddy of his said something like, “Sir, he can’t hear. He’s deaf.” And that’s how it went. When someone wanted to communicate with Sergeant Carroll, they had to grab him and speak loudly in his face.

Signaling the helicopter

The medevac was very late. It took us about 20 minutes to get back to the Landing Zone (LZ). Based on my significant experience down here in southern Afghanistan, I know that the helicopter could and should have already been on orbit waiting for us. Chazray was dying but fully conscious and talking the entire time. We waited, and waited. Finally a radio call came that the medevac was “wheels up” from KAF. It was unbelievable to us that the medevac was just taking off from Kandahar Airfield, twenty-five miles away.

The problem was that this was an Army Dustoff medevac, and Army medevacs don’t carry machine guns because they have red crosses emblazoned on the sides and front. When our helicopters sport the red crosses, they can’t carry offensive weapons. This is meaningless anyway because they are accompanied by an Apache attack helicopter, which is fully loaded with a cannon and missiles.

And so while Chazray was dying, his Dustoff medevac was sitting idly on the runway down at Kandahar Airfield. Since there was no available Apache, the Dustoff was not cleared to depart. The Air Force Pedros have no red crosses marking their helicopters. Instead, they have .50-caliber machine guns. The Pedro helicopter teams are parked right there on the same runway and they could have been dispatched, but for some extremely sorry reason the Pedros are not allowed to come into 4-4 Cav battlespace unless there is “red air.” Red air means the weather is too bad for Army helicopters to come. From my experience Dustoffs are not averse to extreme danger, but there are conditions during which they are not allowed to fly during which Pedros will go.

And so the armed Pedros, which could have flown to us in about 13 minutes, sat on the runaway twenty-five miles away, doing nothing. I know first-hand the skill of the Pedros having flown with them in 2009.

Specialist Chazray Clark was dying due to politics, and the Army and Air Force pilots are very angry about this. Chazray’s is not the only such case. Army medevac helicopters fall under the Medical Services Corps, who mark medevacs with red crosses. Officers will tell you face-to-face that the Medical Corps does not want to give up its helicopters because senior officers want their own helicopters to shuttle them from here to there.

It is important to be absolutely clear--this is not about the Dustoff pilots and crews, who are incredibly courageous. They have earned enormous respect. They’ll fly into hell to get one of our wounded troopers. This is about politics getting in the way of saving lives.

Yet despite everyone here knowing we are perpetually short on helicopters in Afghanistan, and while Pedros would have had Chazray to the hospital less than 35 minutes after the blast, Chazray lay dying. There is no doubt in my mind—after seeing Pedros in action many times—that Chazray would have been at the trauma center in less than 35 minutes if the Pedros team had been scrambled. Instead, it took 65 minutes for Chazray to get to the hospital. Chazray was fully conscious when he was finally put on the bird. But he died at Kandahar Airfield. The General in charge of this fiasco needs to be fired.

Unarmed Army medevac helicopters are not even allowed to go into certain combat areas because they may get shot up and have no way of defending themselves. And so if the air is too dangerous due to bullets or bad weather, Air Force Pedros are sent because they fly in all weather and they shoot back with .50-caliber machine guns.

I asked Colonel Patrick Frank, the 4-4 Cav brigade commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Mike Katona, the squadron commander, if they have any discretion about which birds are called. Can we request Pedros instead of Army Dustoff? No. The answer is simple, clear and ultimately disastrous: There is no discretion.

Marking the landing zone. Chazray is fully conscious and talking in the darkness waiting for an Apache escort.

Finally a courageous Army Dustoff crew lands.

Because of his proximity to the bomb blast, Sergeant Carroll was stone deaf. He was put on the bird with Chazray.

The Apache is orbiting in the darkness.

Chazray is loaded.

Now loaded with the two casualties, the Dustoff medevac heads to Kandahar Airfield. The Dustoff is wheels down at the hospital approximately 65 minutes after the blast. Specialist Chazray Clark died at the hospital while we continued the mission.

This is not the only time that medevacs have been delayed in responding to 4-4 Cav requests, or had to switch landing zones due to heavy enemy fire. If the Pedros were dispatched they would come right in because they can shoot back.

After ten years of war, the Army has had every opportunity to fix this problem. If the Army intended to right this wrong it would have been improved years ago. Clearly, the Army lacks the will to address this issue. We need courageous leadership. This issue should be elevated to the level of the Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who needs to shake the Army’s political tree and fix our medevac issue before more troops die.

We continued the mission. There was another KIA the next day from another IED. No helicopter was called this time because the Afghan Soldier was killed instantly. He was zipped up in a body bag and carried out that night.

Golden Seconds

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 24 Oct 2011 02:47:36 +0000

Golden Seconds

Open Letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
and President Barack Obama

US Air Force "Pedro" helicopter

24 October 2011

Gentlemen,

For the last seven years I have written about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I have covered the US Army, Marines, Air Force and Navy. I’ve also covered the British, Lithuanian, Afghan and Iraqi forces, among others, in places ranging from Iraq to the Philippines and beyond. My most recent embed in Afghanistan was at personal invitation from then-General David Petraeus. It is said that I have spent more time with American combat forces than any writer in US history. I do not know if this is true, but it’s got to be close. I’ve written three books and probably a thousand articles. My work is known worldwide.

On 12 October, I published a dispatch called “Red Air,” detailing policy shortcomings with US Army Dustoff MEDEVAC procedures. The kernel of the matter is that under the Geneva Conventions, when our Army “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters wear red crosses, they are forbidden to be armed. If they do not wear red crosses, they can be armed.

The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan regularly fire upon and hit our helicopters. In Afghanistan, a red cross means “Shoot me; I’m defenseless.” We’d have a better chance warding off vampires with crucifixes.

This battlefield reality causes commanders to send Apache attack helicopters as top cover for the Army Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. Yet with perpetual shortages of helicopters in Afghanistan, this leads to delays in evacuating terribly wounded troopers. Importantly, US Air Force, Marines, and the British flying in the same areas do not wear red crosses and are armed. Only the US Army, not the Geneva Conventions, is preventing Dustoffs from using machine guns. Meanwhile, we require yet more helicopters to perform top cover, adding to helicopter stresses, causing delays, and pulling the Apaches away from other fights.

When I exposed this travesty in “Red Air,” military HQ in Kabul responded with a statement addressing alleged discrepancies in my work, requesting that I publish their letter. Sadly for them, they must not have realized that I made high-resolution video/audio of a recent MEDEVAC failure. The reply from HQ was anonymous, and so I responded to the ISAF HQ Press Office: “Put a General's name on this and I'll publish ASAP.”

If the Army, in particular, believes in the veracity of its position, a high-ranking person should stand behind the assertions and allegations. Otherwise, as one Air Force Pedro pilot with 420 missions in Afghanistan would write to me a few days ago, it’s just “chaff.”

With nobody supporting the statement, let’s forget about the bulk of the orphaned missive and go straight to the salient points:

“Yon's point that the Army should arm and remove the red cross from its MEDEVAC aircraft fails to acknowledge larger issues. Doing so would place the US outside its commitment to conducting MEDEVACs under the guidelines of the Geneva Conventions and moral norm for how Western nations identify their aircraft dedicated to medical evacuation.”

The so-called “moral norm” has nothing to do with the realities of our decade-long war in Afghanistan. This statement is prima facie asinine and demonstrates a complete break with realities in Afghanistan.

Key point: Army medics do not wear red crosses. They carry rifles. Separately, we have military medical staff in Kabul who are wearing weapons while in the operating rooms. None wear crosses. Down in Kandahar Province, I recently sat alone on guard duty with a medic in an excellent unit known as 4-4 Cav. There were several machine guns in front of him. This inconsistency alone is enough to unravel the Army argument.

Army policy makers are not upholding the Geneva Conventions, but hiding behind them. There is a power struggle within the Army about who controls those helicopters. The red crosses are being used as crucifixes to ward off change.

As mentioned, the US Air Force, Marines, and British all fly without the red crosses, and nothing precludes the US Army—in this helicopter-deprived war—from removing its crosses. In the event that we go to war with a more reasonable country, such as Canada, we can repaint the crosses, though there is no obligation. In Afghanistan, the Marines perform helicopter evacuations with assets available. Guaranteed they will have machine guns. Likewise, Air Force helicopters come in with hot guns. Nothing is stopping the Army but the Army itself, and the internal politics of who controls the Dustoff helicopters. Secondarily, those who sell or control Apache helicopters have a vested interest in keeping Dustoffs unarmed.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told me personally that he instituted a 60-minute time limit to get wounded troopers from the battlefield to a hospital. It is noteworthy that the military required a directive from Secretary Gates before meeting these standards. One might erroneously assume that the US military would act in the best interest of its own troops without being ordered. This was not the case.

Remember Walter Reed

Major cover-ups are too numerous to track. Earlier in the war, gross negligence at Army medical facilities was revealed by the press, leading to a purge of leadership, including the resignation of Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey.

Many people will remember the cover-ups revolving around Pat Tillman, Jessica Lynch, and Abu Ghraib. We should not expect a more honest Army when it comes to Dustoffs. To admit the mistake now would be to admit the mistake was not corrected for ten years.

On the whole, the military has met Secretary Gates’ MEDEVAC directive with exemplary performance, yet a small number of informed observers can sense hocus pocus with the numbers.

For instance, after an attack requiring medical evacuation, the unit in combat must transmit a “9-line” report to HQ. Only then does the clock start running for the 60-minute directive. If fire departments waited for specific details for every call, their response times would look more impressive, but many people would die.

In combat, actions on the ground can be stressful, causing a delay in the 9-line even though the unit in contact may have immediately radioed that there is a triple amputation. We also have extreme issues with communications at times. I’ve watched people attempt for hours to establish comms with elements just a few miles away. But that’s another story. There should be no need to wait for paperwork to launch distant helicopters when it’s already confirmed that a 9-line is forthcoming. During the attack described herein, to which I was witness, the 9-line went up quickly due to the calm and quick actions of men of 4-4 Cav, and in particular one Lieutenant Jonathan Flores who did an excellent job. Flores transmitted the 9-line in about six minutes. In reality, the helicopters could have been dispatched immediately upon confirmation of the nature of the wounds. Our location was known. Other times, 9-lines can take much longer due to firefights or other distractions, and so the helicopters will sit on the runway “hot cocked” and ready to spin up. The clock is not yet ticking because the 9-line has not arrived.

Golden Seconds

The enemies in Afghanistan often conduct “complex attacks” with multiple, simultaneous raids or ambushes. When the enemy senses they have created Coalition casualties—often easy to observe with IED strikes—they try to predict where our helicopters will land. For years now, they have tried to predict and prepare the landing zones before the attack unfolds.

During the IED ambush in which Chazray Clark was wounded (see Red Air), the enemy could easily have predicted and then positively ascertained our LZ by simple observation. We had arrived under darkness via helicopters, then moved into the village where Chazray triggered the first bomb. The loud explosion would have been audible for miles.

The enemy is courageous, tactically nimble, and skilled at developing and exploiting advantages. They understand our tactics and we understand theirs. After our helicopter insertion and the bomb strike on Chazray, the enemy would be operating in a heightened state of alert.

The Golden Hour is crucial to survival of the seriously wounded. There also are Golden Minutes. The already-bleeding wounded are not the only ones in danger. The casualties provide a golden opportunity for the enemy to shoot down a helicopter and attack the preoccupied ground force. For the incoming helicopters, and ground forces in combat, minutes are crucial. Delay provides opportunity for the enemy to prepare to attack the helicopter, or in the case of Chazray Clark, ground forces waited on an open LZ for close to half an hour believing the helicopter would arrive quickly.

In that area, known as Zhari District, the enemy employs numerous weapons that can take down a helicopter. The powerful 82mm recoilless rifles regularly destroy our heavily armored vehicles. One shot from an 82 and the helicopter is finished. The far-less-powerful RPG will also do the job.

The failure I videotaped occurred in September 2011. The month before, 38 people including a SEAL team died when an RPG downed their helicopter. The investigation led by Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt would conclude, “The shoot down was not the result of a baited ambush, but rather the result of the enemy being at a heightened state of alert…”

In regard to MEDEVAC, the Army contends that top cover from Apache attack helicopters can replace, or are superior to, machine guns on Dustoffs. Veterans of ground combat will scoff at the notion. Furthermore, putting machine guns on Dustoffs does not exclude piling on Apache top cover. But waiting for that top cover can prove lethal to the patients, Dustoff crews, and ground forces in contact.

Apache helicopters and other assets were providing top cover when the shoot down occurred that killed 38 people. The enemy can fire from cover or concealment that an Apache, UAV, AC-130, or jets cannot see or even hit. Even when the enemy is visible to the Apache, there will be endless tactical variants when the pilot cannot possibly react quickly enough to provide preemptive or interruptive covering fire. Other times, the enemy may be too close (or at a bad angle) to the landing helicopter for response from top cover. Dustoffs have landed in towns, cities, or in depressed areas such as valleys where the enemy can fire down or peer-to-peer in such a way that Apache cover can be mitigated or irrelevant. The enemy often comes from holes, such as a karez entrance, or from under foliage where they are invisible even to our superior optics until the moment they use hot weapons. When they fire machine guns or grenades from inside of buildings, they may remain invisible from above even while firing. The helicopter roaring in for a landing will often be in a dueling situation with a hidden enemy wherein the result may bear true the maxim: “There are the quick, and the dead.”

When a helicopter is coming into a hot LZ, the idea of Golden Hours or Golden Minutes as measurement would be like using miles and hours to measure the distance and duration of a cobra strike. The strike will be close with sudden results. A man in the bush would not wear a crucifix to fend off cobras, and he would not use Apache helicopters to defend against the fangs; he would carry a shotgun. The cobra is drawn to the red cross. He knows that if he can stay hidden, he will get at least one strike – probably more – before the Apache can fire.

As the helicopter lands on a hot LZ, it’s literally down to the speed of the trigger fingers, the skills of the fighters, and luck. The enemy often uses PKM machine guns—every wasted second can mean roughly ten enemy bullets from a single machine gun.

According to the investigation into the August shoot down,

“…as [the helicopter] neared the landing zone from the northwest. A previously undetected group of suspected Taliban fired two or three RPGs in rapid succession from the tower of a two story mud-brick building approximately 220 meters south of the CH-47D. The first RPG missed the helicopter, but the second RPG struck one of the blades of the aft rotor assembly and exploded…” The report continues: “The destruction of the CH-47D rotor system from the rocket propelled grenade until the helicopter crash into the creek bed, likely lasted less than 5 seconds.”

And that was it: Mission failure. 38 people dead. Helicopter destroyed.

Neither the AC-130, the surveillance aircraft, the Apaches, or machine guns on the destroyed aircraft were able to prevent the RPG shots. The enemy got off at least two rocket shots, possibly three, and the Apache did not fire until everyone was down in flames. With burning wreckage on the deck, an Apache comes into action. According to the investigation:

“Fire support and surveillance assets immediately shifted focus to the crash site, and one AH-64 Apache helicopter fired 30mm rounds just west of the suspected RPG point of origin to suppress any potential enemy activity in the vicinity of the crash site.”

The idea that crosses and Apaches can protect Dustoffs is a US Army-manufactured fallacy. This policy grinds down our battle tempo and creates a need for more helicopters. Of course, those people who sell helicopters and helicopter parts, or who get to command all those extra forces and assets, will be tempted to proselytize the need for crosses. Purists who only want to win battles will be called heretics.

Combat troops vociferously complain about the delay between the casualty, the 9-line, and wheels-down at the LZ. Meanwhile, the Army haggles over accounting, and advertises 60 minutes as a success. Any minute longer than the minimum required to land and get out is one minute tempting fate with an enemy who moves fast, and in Zhari District the enemy also shoots straight. During one ambush on 4-4 Cav, the enemy took out three armored vehicles in about thirty seconds using recoilless rifles.

While waiting on a Dustoff to pick up Chazray Clark, an officer can be heard on my video asking about the bird, saying it’s been 45 minutes since the first call. A lieutenant next to me said this is the second time this has happened.

In Zhari, the enemy often fires grenades, and after they know the LZ, every minute we waited there was an invitation for grenades to begin falling. In addition to the reality that Chazray was wide awake and dying, and that the enemy could be preparing to attack the helicopter, they were using the time to prepare to attack us as we left the LZ. Later in the morning, I would photograph what was almost certainly an IED position that the enemy did not quite get into place in time. Our EOD and other troops found myriad bombs in the abandoned village. Chazray died at Kandahar Airfield, landing approximately 65 minutes after the attack. Pedros or armed Dustoffs could have had Chazray to the hospital in about 35 minutes, which also would have unlocked the unit from the LZ to wrestle initiative back from the enemy.

The Army’s next fallback will be that arming the Dustoffs reduces their load capacity. This is true. But again, experienced pilots with hundreds of combat missions will say—and I know from being there—that loads are not the problem. Speed and machine guns are the problem.

After the Dustoff picked up Chazray, we headed into the village. It was rigged so fully with bombs that we didn’t get far. There were minor small-arms fights. Though we never made it far from the LZ due to all the bombs, the next afternoon there was another BOOM. An Afghan Soldier tripped another bomb that took off an arm and his head. No helicopter was needed and so he was taken out in a body bag that night when other helicopters picked us up.

The points made by the Army that Geneva Conventions obligations exist for the Army—but not for the Air Force and Marines or British—are so silly that they do not need to be explained, merely exposed. One must wonder if we’ve lost Dustoff helicopters or crewmembers because Golden Minutes were wasted, or when they came under direct fire they were defenseless.

An accurate appraisal of the situation can be obtained by bypassing the Army Generals. Better to anonymously poll the pilots and crews who collectively have flown thousands of evacuation missions in Afghanistan.

The Army has demonstrated a lack of institutional will and common sense. After ten years they have not fixed the problem.

The Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States should intervene. I will provide my unedited video of the MEDEVAC failure to the Pentagon and White House upon request. I prefer to keep the unedited video “in house” due to the graphic nature. I kindly request that this video be safeguarded from release.

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

MEDEVAC Links

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 14:05:07 +0000

27 January 2012

The MEDEVAC issue continues to grow. There have been many articles and it's becoming difficult to keep up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is preparing something for Congress. My guess based on conversations is that JCS will try deflection and will not solve the issue. SecDef has done nothing, to my knowledge. And so this is set to become an election issue.

This list below is not comprehensive but can be a helpful resource.

Please listen to my interview with Dennis Miller.

LINKS
Op-eds by James Simpson

American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/01/incomprehensibly_stupid_army_regulation_killing_americans_in_afghanistan.html

http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/02/no_sex_many_lies_one_videotape_and_a_soldiers_unnecessary_death.html

Breitbart Big Peace
http://bigpeace.com/jmsimpson/2012/01/09/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-in-afghanistan/

Examiner.com—D.C. Examiner
http://www.examiner.com/independent-in-washington-dc/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-afghanistan?cid=PROD-redesign-right-next

Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/bureaucracy-killing-us-troops-in-afghanistan/

http://times247.com/articles/army-s-medevac-chopper-policy-in-need-of-revision

----------
Army Times
Article in the Army Times about Congressman Todd Akin's (R-MI) letter to Sec Def Panetta:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/01/military-lawmaker-arm-medevac-helos-to-save-more-lives-011712/

Navy Times
Article in the Navy Times about Congressman Todd Akin's (R-MI) letter to Sec Def Panetta
http://www.navytimes.com/mobile/index.php?storyUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.navytimes.com%2Fnews%2F2012%2F01%2Fmilitary-lawmaker-arm-medevac-helos-to-save-more-lives-011712%2F

------
Dispatches by Michael Yon
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/

17 May 2012
US Congress and MEDEVAC
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/us-congress-and-medevac.htm

09 May 2012
MEDEVAC Madness
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/medevac-madness.htm

23 April 2012
Dark Night
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/dark-night.htm

22 April 2012
Did Green Berets and MEDEVAC Violate Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan?
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/did-green-berets-and-medevac-violate-geneva-conventions-in-afghanistan.htm

13 April 2012
America’s Angry Troops
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/americas-angry-troops.htm

07 Mar 2012
Senator Levin on MEDEVAC
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/senator-levin-on-medevac.htm

01 Mar 2012
MEDEVAC Momentum: Senate Armed Services Committee to Raise the Issue
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/medevac-momentum-senate-armed-services-committee-to-raise-the-issue.htm

25 Feb 2012
White Birds in a Red War
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/white-birds-in-a-red-war.htm

23 Feb 2012
Army Dustoff Medics Unprepared
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/army-dustoff-medics-unprepared.htm

18 Feb 2012
A Hypothetical Interview General Martin Dempsey: (Fiction)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/a-hypothetical-interview-general-martin-dempsey-fiction.htm

15 Feb 2012
Department of Army Monitoring MEDEVAC Articles
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/department-of-army-monitoring-medevac-articles.htm

14 Feb 2012
Tippity Top General Lies to Congressman (in writing)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/tippity-top-general-lies-to-congressman-in-writing.htm

11 Feb 2012
A Matter of Trust
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/a-matter-of-trust.htm

05 Feb 2012
Contempt of and for Congress?
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/contempt-of-and-for-congress.htm

03 Feb 2012
17 Members of Congress Want Answers on MEDEVAC
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/17-members-of-congress-want-answers-on-medevac.htm

03 Feb 2012
Crucifixion of Common Sense
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/crucifixion-of-common-sense.htm

02 Feb 2012
The Army MEDEVAC Scandal: Report of Conspiracy
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-army-medevac-scandal-report-of-conspiracy.htm

31 Jan 2012
Important Letter from Gold Star Mother
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/important-letter-from-gold-star-mother.htm

30 Jan 2012
13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/13-military-pilots-rebuke-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff.htm

28 Jan 2012
British Army Officer on US Army Medevac
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/british-army-officer-on-us-army-medevac.htm

27 Jan 2012
Another Dustoff Pilot says Delays Costing Lives
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/another-dustoff-pilot-says-delays-costing-lives.htm

26 Jan 2012
Comments by Dustoff pilots
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/thoughts-from-a-dustoff-pilot.htm

23 Jan 2012
E-mail exchange with JCS concerning document from Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/messages-from-joint-chiefs-of-staff.htm

20 Jan 2012
CBS interview with LTG John F. Campbell
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/cbs-video-of-medevac-issue.htm

19 Jan 2012
Contact with staffer at Congressman Todd Akin’s office
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/jcs-curiouser-and-curiouser.htm

19 Jan 2012
JCS letter to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/joint-chiefs-of-staff-bogus-report-to-congress.htm

17 Jan 2012
Congressman Todd Akin’s (R-MI) letter to SEC DEF Leon Panetta about the JCS document and RED AIR
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/congressman-akin-medevac-letter-to-secdef.htm

17 Jan 2012
Danger For Senators and Representatives Army Deceptions May Cause Embarrassment
Letter to Senator Jon Kyle (R-AZ) regarding RED AIR dispatch of 12 Oct 2011
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/danger-for-senators-and-representatives.htm

16 Jan 2012
Progress on Removing Dustoff Red Crosses
Posting of an Alaska Op-ed on RED AIR
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/progress-on-removing-dustoff-red-crosses.htm

10 Jan 2011 (sic)
MEDEVAC/CASEVAC links
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/medevac/casevac-links.htm

9 Jan 2012
Take me to your Leader (if you have one); CENTCOM passes buck back to Army
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/take-me-to-your-leader-if-you-have-one.htm

9 Jan 2012
Link to Breitbart Big Peace Blog, piece by Bill Tuttle: A Pilot’s Perspective on Michael Yon’s Medevac Debate
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/delta-force-commander-former-on-dustoff-medevac.htm

3 Jan 2012
Passing the MEDEVAC Buck to CENTCOM, response by SEC of the Army John McHugh to Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/passing-the-medevac-buck.htm

30 Dec 2011
DELTA Force Commander (Former) on DUSTOFF MEDEVAC
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/delta-force-commander-former-on-dustoff-medevac.htm

09 Dec 2011
Embarrassed Army
https://www.michaelyon-online.com/embarrassed-army.htm

23 Nov 2011
Crusader Copters
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/crusadercopters.htm

22 Nov 2011
Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/mark-of-the-beast-evil-symbols-in-afghanistan.htm

14 Nov 2011
Marked for Destruction
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/marked-for-destruction.htm

10 Nov 2011
Leadership: More than a Word
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/leadership-more-than-a-word.htm

8 Nov 2011
Question for Congressman Pompeo: What is your Position?
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/question-for-congressman-pompeo-what-is-your-position.htm

7 nov 2011
Report to Congress: Army called to Report on MEDEVAC Failure in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/congressional-report.htm

6 Nov 2011
Fool’s Gold & Troop’s Blood
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/fools-gold-troops-blood.htm

27 Oct 2011
Dustoff Traction
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/dustoff-traction.htm

26 Oct 2011
Machine Guns on Dustoffs
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/machine-guns-on-dustoffs.htm

24 Oct 2011
Golden Seconds: Open Letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and President Barack Obama
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/golden-seconds.htm

12 Oct 2011
RED AIR—America’s medevac Failure
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/red-air-americas-medevac-failure.htm

14 Sept 2009
Pedros, USAF SAR in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/pedros.htm

------

Medevacmatters.org

17 May 2012
Revamped Flight Medic Training
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/05/16/revamped_flight_medic_training/

12 May 2012
Word Games
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/05/11/word_games/

15 April 2012
Is the Red Cross a Neutral Symbol to Afghans?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/04/15/is-the-red-cross-a-neutral-symbol-to-afghans/

13 April 2012
Senator Harkin’s Disinformation Letter
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/04/13/senator-harkins-disinformation-letter/

5 April 2012
Aerial Camouflage – Why It’s Not Easy Being Green…with White Patches and Red Crosses
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/04/05/aerial-camouflage-why-its-not-easy-being-green-with-white-patches-and-red-crosses/

1 April 2012
How the Army is slow to meet MEDEVAC Challenges in the 21st Century
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/04/01/how-the-army-is-slow-to-meet-medevac-challenges-in-the-21st-century/

29 Febuary 2012
The real reason why Army MEDEVAC helicopters fly unarmed
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/28/the-politicization-of-medevac/

23 Febuary 2012
Army Medical Department (AMEDD) MEDEVAC Innovations 1991-2011
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/23/army-medical-department-amedd-medevac-innovations-1991-2011/

23 Febuary 2012
Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Innovations 1991-2011
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/23/amedd-innovations-1991-2003/

22 Febuary 2012
NATO Newsletter: NATO Medical Lessons Learned Newsletter, March 2011
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/22/nato-newsletter-nato-medical-lessons-learned-newsletter-march-2011/

22 Febuary 2012
NATO Training: PECC Training Course
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/22/nato-training-pecc-training-course/

22 Febuary 2012
NATO Report: ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/22/nato-report-allied-joint-doctrine-for-medical-evacuation/

22 Febuary 2012
NATO report: NATO – Medical Evacuation in Afghanistan MP-HFM-157-05
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/22/nato-report-nato-medical-evacuation-in-afghanistan-mp-hfm-157-05/

21 Febuary 2012
US Army Report: 2011 After action report blasts MEDEVAC shortcomings
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/21/us-army-report-after-action-report-for-medcom-tasker/

20 Febuary 2012
Point-Counterpoint: 92% Casualty Survival Rate in Afghanistan
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/20/point-counterpoint-casualty-survival-rate-in-afghanistan/

20 Febuary 2012
Point-Counterpoint: Geneva Convention Applicability to the U.S. in Afghanistan
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/20/point-counterpoint-geneva-convention-prohibitions/

17 Febuary 2012
Daily Mail Online (UK): ‘He’d still be here’: Mother’s agony
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/17/daily-mail-online-uk-hed-still-be-here-mothers-agony/

17 Febuary 2012
Yon: 66 minutes is not 59 minutes
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/17/yon-66-is-not-59/

17 Febuary 2012
Kevin Lehmann: Incomprehensibly Stupid Army Regulation Killing Americans in Afghanistan
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/17/kevin-lehmann-incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-in-afghanistan/

16 Febuary 2012
Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF)
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/16/medical-treatment-facilities-mtf/

16 Febuary 2012
NATO MEDEVAC Timelines
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/16/nato-medevac-timelines/

16 Febuary 2012
AP: Should U.S. Arm Medevacs in Afghanistan?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/16/ap-should-u-s-arm-medevacs-in-afghanistan/

15 Febuary 2012
Yon: Department of Army Monitoring MEDEVAC Articles
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/15/department-of-army-monitoring-medevac-articles/

14 Febuary 2012
Yon: Tippity Top General attempts to Deceive Congressman (in writing)
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/14/yon-tippity-top-general-attempts-to-deceive-congressman-in-writing/

8 Febuary 2012
Fox News: Debate over arming Army medevacs. Does current policy cause delays?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/08/fox-news-debate-over-arming-army-medevacs-does-current-policy-cause-delays/

7 Febuary 2012
American Thinker: No Sex, Many Lies, One Videotape, and a Soldier’s Unnecessary Death
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/07/american-thinker-no-sex-many-lies-one-videotape-and-a-soldiers-unnecessary-death-read-more/

7 Febuary 2012
New Letter from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Congress
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/07/new-letter-from-jcs-to-congress/

7 Febuary 2012
Fox News: Congressman Akin Discusses Medevac Issues in Afghanistan
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/07/fox-news-congressman-akin-discusses-medevac-issues-in-afghanistan/

6 Febuary 2012
Letter from Chazray Clark’s Mother
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/06/letter-from-chazray-clarks-mother/

3 Febuary 2012
Yon: 17 Members of Congress Want Answers on MEDEVAC
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/03/yon-17-members-of-congress-want-answers-on-medevac/

1 Febuary 2012
NY Post: Hurry, wait … and die. Army rules stalling Medevacs
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/01/ny-post-hurry-wait-and-die-army-rules-stalling-medevacs/

29 January 2012
Soldier of Fortune: BLEEDING OUT FOR POLITICS
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/29/soldier-of-fortune-bleeding-out-for-politics/

27 January 2012
Army Times: Rep. Todd Akin Tells DoD Savings Lives more important than Geneva Convention
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/27/media-coverage-january-2012/

26 January 2012
Stripes.com: Controversial debate brewing: Should Army medevacs be armed?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/26/stripes-com-controversial-debate-brewing-should-army-medevacs-be-armed/

25 January 2012
Politico.com: Should Army medevacs be armed?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/25/should-army-medevacs-be-armed/

24 January 2012
Examiner.com: Is Army medevac policy killing our wounded troops?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/24/examiner-com-is-army-medevac-policy-killing-our-wounded-troops/

21 January 2012
Gen. Dempsey talks about trust
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/21/333/

20 January 2012
U.S. Army Chief PAO: Army statement on MEDEVAC issue
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/20/u-s-army-chief-pao-army-statement-on-medevac-issue/

19 January 2012
CBS Evening News: Did a military rule cost a soldier’s life?
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/19/cbs-evening-news-did-a-military-rule-cost-a-soldiers-life/

18 January 2012
Military.com: Amid Criticism, Army Defends Medevac Mission
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/18/military-com-amid-criticism-army-defends-medevac-mission/

18 January 2012
Dennis Miller interview of Michael Yon 2012-01-18
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/18/dennis-miller-interview-of-michael-yon-2012-01-18/

16 January 2012
Washington Times: Bureaucracy killing U.S. troops in Afghanistan – Political correctness keeps Army medevac helicopters grounded
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/16/washington-times-bureaucracy-killing-u-s-troops-in-afghanistan-political-correctness-keeps-army-medevac-helicopters-grounded/

16 January 2012
“So That Others May Live”
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/16/so-that-others-may-live/

14 January 2012
Mat-Su Valley Frontiersmen: Medevac policy is costing lives
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/14/mat-su-valley-frontiersmen-medevac-policy-is-costing-lives/

9 January 2012
Big Peace: A Pilot’s Perspective on Michael Yon’s Medevac Debate
http://medevacmatters.org/2012/01/09/big-peace-a-pilots-perspective-on-michael-yons-medevac-debate/

20 December 2011
U.S. Army Chief of Staff letter to Senator Jon Kyl
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/12/20/u-s-army-chief-of-staff-letter-to-senator-john-kyle/

17 December 2011
American Thinker: Army MEDEVAC Choppers Travesty
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/12/17/american-thinker-army-medevac-choppers-travesty/

6 November 2011
Yon: Fool’s Gold – Video from SPC Chazray Clark’s MEDEVAC Wait
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/11/06/yon-fools-gold-video-from-spc-chazray-clarks-medevac-wait/

24 October 2011
YON: Golden Seconds
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/10/24/yon-golden-seconds/

12 October 2011
YON: Red Air – America’s Medevac Failure [the article that started it all]
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/10/12/yon-red-air-americas-medevac-failure-the-article-that-started-it-all/

6 September 2011
USA Today: Army to boost flight medics
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/09/06/usa-today-army-to-boost-flight-medics/

25 August 2011
Stripes.com: Calm in the midst of chaos is lifesaving protocol for medevac crew in southern Afghanistan
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/08/25/stripes-com-calm-in-the-midst-of-chaos-is-lifesaving-protocol-for-medevac-crew-in-southern-afghanistan/

22 June 2011
Army.mil: Excellent Report of How a MEDEVAC Mission Can Run
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/06/22/army-mil-excellent-report-of-how-a-medevac-mission-can-run/

24 May 2012
2011-05-24 Secretary Gates Blasts Pentagon’s Resistance to Change
http://medevacmatters.org/2011/05/24/2011-05-24-remarks-by-secretary-gates-to-the-american-enterprise-institute/

------

ICRC

Health care in danger: making the case
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p4072.htm
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4072.pdf

------
CBS NEWS
CBS News interview with LTG John F. Campbell regarding RED AIR and the Army's policy:
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57362374/did-military-rules-cost-a-soldier-his-life/?tag=mncol%3Blst%3B1

MEDEVAC Photo Essay by Nicole Sobreki
Photographs by Nicole Sobecki of an Army medevac unit in Afghanistan. Photo 3 shows the interior of a UH60A medevac helicopter. The gunners would sit in the two seats behind the sitting Marine that face outward toward the windows just behind the pilots. This configuration belies the Army's argument that he UH60 would suffer degraded performance and cause the removal of two litters from the helo were two .50 caliber machine guns to be mounted on the fuselage.
http://www.nicholesobecki.com/#/dustoff--us-army-medevac/NS_AF_113010_Medevac14_002

U.S. Army
The U.S. Army's Public Affairs Office response to the criticism of the Army's medevac policy:
http://www.army.mil/article/72250/Army_statement_on_MEDEVAC_issue/

Larry Wood
14 Jan 2012
Frontiersman (Wasilla, Alaska) Medevac policy is costing lives
http://www.frontiersman.com/opinions/columnists/medevac-policy-is-costing-lives/article_3bf39468-3f52-11e1-8999-0019bb2963f4.html

24 Jan 2012
Examiner.com, Is Army medevac policy killing our wounded troops?
http://www.examiner.com/alaska-gubernatorial-in-anchorage/is-army-medevac-policy-killing-our-wounded-troops

Stars and Stripes
26 Jan 2012
Controversial debate brewing: Should Army medevacs be armed?
http://www.stripes.com/news/army/controversial-debate-brewing-should-army-medevacs-be-armed-1.166840

New York Post
01 Feb 2012
Hurry, wait ... and die Army rules stalling Medevacs
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/hurry_wait_and_die_wyLvNsCxiZKASR4ePF3VyK

The Post and Courier
Use of armed medevac choppers debated
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2012/feb/14/use-of-armed-medevac-choppers-debated/

Right Truth
Should the U.S. arm medevac helicopters?
http://righttruth.typepad.com/right_truth/2012/02/should-the-us-arm-medevac-helicopters.html

News Day
Soldier's death sparks debate over arming medevacs
http://www.newsday.com/news/soldier-s-death-sparks-debate-over-arming-medevacs-1.3526254

Boston.com
Soldier’s death sparks debate over arming medevacs
http://articles.boston.com/2012-02-13/news/31055865_1_medevac-pilots-escort-aircraft

MailOnline
'He'd still be here': Mother's agony as soldier dies after unarmed rescue team was delayed an hour waiting for cover
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2102305/Chazray-Clark-death-Mothers-agony-soldier-dies-rescue-team-delayed-waiting-armed-cover.html

Associated Press
Should U.S. arm medevacs in Afghanistan?
http://news.yahoo.com/video/us-15749625/should-u-s-arm-medevacs-in-afghanistan-28327981.html

Drunken Monkeys, Milkooks, Military, and the Media

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 25 Apr 2012 15:35:40 +0000

US Army Master Sergeant and milblogger, CJ Grisham: known for spamming Wikipedia and other outlets with false information

(This dispatch is intended for investigative journalists who may be interested in military propaganda targeting US citizens. Much of the account is first person, the way that it unfolded.)

25 April 2012

USA TODAY journalists are experiencing something that I first began describing roughly two years ago. When a writer pens uncomfortable words about the military, the writer invites systematic defamation. This dispatch reveals fact-patterns and information that can reveal the tell-tale fingerprints of the propaganda machine.

USA TODAY reported last week:

"Misinformation campaign targets USA TODAY reporter, editor"

WASHINGTON – A USA TODAY reporter and editor investigating Pentagon propaganda contractors have themselves been subjected to a propaganda campaign of sorts, waged on the Internet through a series of bogus websites.

Fake Twitter and Facebook accounts have been created in their names, along with a Wikipedia entry and dozens of message board postings and blog comments. Websites were registered in their names.

The timeline of the activity tracks USA TODAY's reporting on the military's "information operations" program, which spent hundreds of millions of dollars on marketing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan — campaigns that have been criticized even within the Pentagon as ineffective and poorly monitored.

This also happened to me. After I wrote that two Generals should be sacked, certain milblogs began a military-sponsored attack against me. They alleged that I had PTSD and that I had been dis-embedded from US, UK and Canadian forces for security violations. They also claimed that my own service record was tattered. None of it was true. My time in the military was honorable, and in the wars as a writer, I had not embedded with Canadian forces, nor was I ever dis-embedded from other militaries for OPSEC violations.

I have been dis-embedded for writing things that they did not like. Generals often are sacked for doing or saying things that people do not like. McChrystal, for instance. The list is very long.

Milblogger Jim Hanson (“Uncle Jimbo”) of Blackfive, calls this his “backyard office.” Music, laptop, drinking and blogging. In this image, it appears that Jimbo is making a self-portrait by remote control. Jimbo never saw a day of combat, and he admits that he has never been to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Milbloggers such as Jim Hanson at Blackfive wrote that I was kicked out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Untrue. Of the approximately 65 countries that I have traveled in, only Burma ever denied me a visa. The bedroom and backyard milbloggers do not grasp that the US military has no control over travel to Iraq, Afghanistan, or to Canada. All are sovereign countries that control their own immigration and borders.

Master Sergeant CJ Grisham, a friend of Uncle Jimbo, Tweeted this image of a dismembered field mouse that he bragged about killing. (More context, later)

UNSTABLE SOLDIER

The US Army deployed an unstable milblogger, Master Sergeant CJ Grisham, to Afghanistan. The Army shipped Grisham back months early, in March 2012, after he complained of mental problems. Grisham, still a soldier, and a de facto spokesman for the US Army, has previously claimed that he hears “voices in his head,” and has expressed suicidal thoughts.

Even today this Army sanctioned milblogger’s accusations against me remain on Wikipedia.

The USA TODAY folks are experiencing normal misinformation operations. My own Wikipedia page has at times been largely fiction. A target can spend his waking hours guarding a Wikipedia page against sabotage. I myself have made no entries or deletions but I have asked others to make Wiki factual. They encountered difficulty making the changes stick.

Link to Michael's Wiki Page

The military media hit team creates spoof websites, fictitious Facebook pages, and in my case, somebody also registered a fake Skype account. It is conceivable that someone has used this Skype account to misrepresent me to media, or to others:

Milblogs, such as Blackfive, who are so often implicated in propaganda campaigns, are nominees in this year's annual milblogger awards, sponsored in part by the US Army, and hosted by milblogging.com.

Jim Hanson, sometimes called “Uncle Jimblow,” or “Jimbo,” is tightly and publicly associated with other questionable milbloggers such as Matt Burden and CJ Grisham.

Modus operandi

Blackfive, Mudville Gazette, or any of another dozen milblogs would write the initial propaganda, which associates, such as Grisham, then would cite on Wikipedia or send out to journalists or to other bloggers.

Key: By stroking milblog thought-leaders, the military can harness a pack response with little input. Their ink is attainable with simple favors and a little bit of attention.

General McChrystal Strokes Jim Hanson

In 2010, Uncle Jimbo was in direct communication with General Stanley McChrystal and staff.

Uncle Jimbo passed around and bragged about his communications with General McChrystal:

People like Hanson are key in the sense that prostitutes in Colombia are key. Guys in key places use their services, but would prefer to keep it in the dark.

Hanson directly stated, in writing, that he was sanctioned by high authority to discredit my work. I pushed back, saying that the above statement looked like “Sholtis” wrote it. Jimbo replied, “Mikey, C'mon do you think I would lead with the real shit. That was just to make sure you understood that this transcended just ISAF.”

Lieutenant Colonel Edward “Tadd” Sholtis was copied on the above email from McChrystal. Sholtis, a media operative for McChrystal, was also secretly running a blog called “The Quatto Zone,” but the website Mudville Gazette exposed him privately.

After I wrote that McChrystal should be fired, Sholtis secretly sabotaged me. Some of his backchannel communications made their way to me. (Sholtis later admitted unequivocally in writing to being part of a conspiracy.)

During 2010, General McChrystal had a ridiculous media fight after trying to close a few Burger Kings in Afghanistan. There must have been a thousand international stories about the Burger King onslaught. The distraction from the fight with the Taliban and building Afghanistan was a global story. This misplaced priority was symptomatic.

The war had turned into a bloody circus. On March 2, 2010 I published that Canadian Brigadier General Daniel Menard should be fired:

On 15 April 2010, I would be dis-embedded by ISAF for reasons I still do not fully understand. Those reasons probably were related to my writing that General Daniel Menard should be sent home. It didn’t help that Menard is Canadian, and I am American. Menard was the first military person I had ever said should be fired. The silliness of the war had become overwhelming.

Facebook post:

McChrystal was trying to control the message and he needed suckers. Experienced war correspondents were the last thing that the Generals wanted around. After dis-embedding me because there was “not enough space,” McChrystal’s public affairs crew embedded a 21-year-old “journalist” with zero experience. His name was Michael Enright.

Mr. Enright spent a few weeks in Afghanistan and he saw no combat. He went home to America, got drunk, and he slashed a taxi driver’s throat. Nearly killed the guy.

Enright’s lawyer, of course, started talking about PTSD.

McChrystal’s crew was on a roll. In addition to Enright, they embedded Michael Hastings from Rolling Stone, during a command trip to Europe. Some of the crew, including McChrystal, reportedly got stumbling drunk with Hastings on 16 April, staggering out of a Paris bar after midnight.

Hasting’s book has the chapter:

TOTALLY SHIT-FACED
APRIL 16, 2010, PARIS

Jake [McChrystal staffer] wobbled up the stairs in the lobby, a glass of beer he’d taken from the bar still in his hand. Charlie [a Colonel] collapsed in a chair in the lobby, checking his Blackberry.”

“That’s dangerous to do while drunk,” [Hastings] said to him.

On 15 April, the day before they got drunk in Paris, McChrystal’s bunch dis-embedded me in Kandahar. People were calling me crazy for saying that two Generals should be fired. I started to leave Kandahar Airfield to stay downtown in Kandahar City. I was late getting to the house, which was lucky: A truck bomb hit it that night, leaving many dead and injured.

The truck bomb left me stuck on base waiting for an airplane to Jalalabad. Thanks to McChrystal, I had nothing to do. So I revealed that Brigadier General Daniel Menard was having an affair with a staffer. That caused a huge scandal and Menard was later relieved of command. I revealed the case due to his military incompetence, and because I was stuck on base with an idle mind. Strangely, McChrystal accidentally helped Menard get relieved.

After McChrystal’s night of drinking in France, Hastings describes the Paris hangover of 17 April 2010:

The team woke up at seven A.M. the next day. McChrystal allegedly got his seven miles of running in. The staff went up the Eiffel Tower. The generals were worried that other tourists in the elevator car could smell beer on them.

Blackfive swung into action on 18 April, with a rant, and reposted my Facebook entry. I had called Senior Public Affairs people crazy monkeys, but had I known they were actually getting drunk with Rolling Stone when I wrote that, I would have said Crazy Drunken Monkeys:

Approximately a dozen milblogs (many of them current nominees for the 2012 milblog awards), defended McChrystal and attacked me at once. Some claimed to be my friends, but I had never met any of them, and I did not even know most of their names, other than Matt Burden. I had met Matt briefly in Chicago back in 2006.

As for the kinetic war, and the information war, McChrystal had no method. I didn’t see any method. They were monkeys in the cockpit of a war, pushing buttons and trying to sound confident. The war was just a thing that they were doing, and on 16 April, they were doing it in Paris.

But what did I do wrong? Photo DVIDS

For his antics, General McChrystal got called to the main office. The White House. I emailed to the public affairs office of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to please fire McChrystal and that I would support Petraeus. General Petraeus knows how to win.

Soon, Petraeus was standing there with President Obama. I was watching in rapt amazement, and I pulled out my BlackBerry and I emailed Petraeus right when he was standing there with Obama getting the job.

Hastings went on to write a book called The Operators. He should have titled it Crazy Monkeys.

Page 28 of The Operators:

So let’s review: I was kicked out and replaced by Michael Enright, who slashed a guy’s throat. Michael Hastings partied with McChrystal in Paris and got McChrystal fired. Menard was fired. The Burger King menace in Afghanistan was destroyed. The Taliban got stronger.

Innumerable stories of our men and women in combat will never be told, thanks to McChrystal’s staff. But Hastings got a killer book deal out of it.

Army sanctioned blogger CJ Grisham, the suicidal mouse killer, who “hears voices in his head,” shows off his gun collection on Twitter

UNSTABLE SOLDIER II

Milblogger CJ Grisham moonlights as a fulltime soldier in Army intelligence. He was sent home from Afghanistan in March 2012, after complaining again about mental problems, and that his superiors were stressing him out.

After I first exposed McChrystal in 2010, Grisham and other milkooks spent a huge amount of time spamming my website, Facebook, and Wikipedia.

Grisham captions, “Just being a redneck in the front yard shooting cans.” There is a famous “redneck joke” about “shooting cans.” Puerto Ri-Cans, Mexi-Cans, and Afri-Cans. This racist joke is as commonly known in the South as are grits.

That Commanding Generals allow a senior NCO to post racist jokes online speaks of ...something.

Grisham boasted about shooting this field mouse in half. After shooting it, he took the time to photograph, upload, and brag about it.

At least five people have told me that they felt threatened by Grisham (two Army officers and three women). Yet he goes on, shooting “cans,” and mice.

Complaining to his chain of command is useless. I’ve done it many times.

Grisham spends a great deal of time bashing President Obama—often while wearing his Army uniform.

As a military writer, Grisham has the “authority” to parrot the Army message. Here he stands with the excellent Hugh Hewitt, who probably has no idea about all of this.

Grisham with Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison.

Grisham with a band.

Matthew Burden is considered a major milbogger. Burden is close with Hanson and Grisham. Both Burden and Hanson have refused to step foot into combat in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

BAD SEED

A small number of milbloggers are often present when there is a stench of military misinformation. One of those mibloggers is Matthew Burden, the founder of Blackfive. Burden invited Hanson to write at Blackfive.

Burden has run for public office, and is also a board member at the very large charity Soldiers' Angels.

David Axe writes:

….Jimbo has plans that go beyond journalism and publishing. Jimbo, whose real name is Jim Hanson, has talked about turning Blackfive into an arm of a private military intelligence network, like a low-rent intel version of Blackwater.

I know this because Jimbo tried to recruit me last summer.

I had just returned from Chad. I had drinks with Jimbo and Blackfive boss Matt Burden. While Matt sat quietly, Jimbo told me how he was frustrated with professional reporters who only report facts, and don’t help use those facts to promote U.S. national security. He said he envisioned building a privately run intelligence network that would use freelance reporters, operating under Blackfive’s auspices and sponsored by corporations, to gather information for transmission to intel analysts in the U.S. He asked if I would be interested in joining up.

I said no, in no uncertain terms. In fact, I recall cursing and yelling.

David Axe writes of Matt Burden's Blackfive:

All this is to say, Blackfive is not just a tacky blog, it’s actually dangerous — the kind of forum that encourages violence and hatred. Don’t believe me? In a recent post discussing the U.S. national debt, Blackfive blogger “Crush” all but advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.

Aquarium worker Matthew Burden has political aspirations and uses his blogging, board membership on Soldiers’ Angels, and other high profile activities and people in a bid to extend his influence.

Burden ran for State Representative in Illinois. During an interview, Burden bragged, “Because of my distinguished military career…” There is nothing evident that distinguishes Burden’s service.

Despite being touted as a leading milblogger, Burden assiduously avoided going to the wars. Earlier in the wars, I invited Matt Burden to walk the walk. He would not do it. Much of his time has been spent working at the Shedd Aquarium in Chicago, just off Lake Michigan. There is nothing wrong with that, but playing up his military credentials is a bit much.

As a man, Matt Burden does not shine. The aspiring politician depends on reflected glory, and so he keeps as close to combat veterans as possible.

MILBLOG CONFERENCE

This year’s milblog conference will consist of a who’s who of milkooks. Not all of the bloggers there could be called kooks or propagandists, but the serious milkooks will be runners and many are listed on milblogging.com. Blackfive and Grisham are nominated, as are numerous others.

McChrystal’s leadership was so potently toxic, and his information campaign so underhanded, that it fomented damage that continues to unfold two years later. McChrystal’s 2010 information war got him fired and is directly responsible for my dis-embed in 2011. (Petraeus invited me back later in 2011. When Petraeus left later that year, the information war was still on and the rest is history).

Milblogging.com energetically supported milkooks in their disinformation attacks. This fact is indisputable. Milblogging.com is damaging to positive coverage of US forces in Afghanistan. Milblogging.com hosts the Milblog Conference.

I am not alleging that milblogging.com is involved in systematic or willful propaganda, but I am emphatically stating that milblogging.com publishes false information. This could be due to incompetence or laziness rather than conspiracy.

Milkooks play a bit part in the propaganda machine, while providing a manhole entrance down into something much larger. More interesting than the milkooks will be the military members and others who show up at the conference.

It is important to note that I previously allowed Military.com to publish my work on a free basis, but when they got word about my publishing on this milblogging.com issue, they severed ties the same day, earlier this week. Milblogging.com is a property of Military.com.

This dispatch could run on for hundreds of pages yet there is other work to do. For more information, researchers should go here:

Sergeant Godsmack vs. Nazar

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 27 Mar 2012 11:27:35 +0000

27 March 2012

PTSD is a serious problem. Suicides by veterans happen many times per day, every day. At best, PTSD can degrade the quality of life of veterans and their families. At worst, unmanaged, the human toll is incalculable.

Other problems with “military PTSD:”

1) PTSD for profit: Disability payments. Profiteers learn the symptoms, mimic, and then get paid, often for life. Most symptoms are self-reported, in response to interview questions by military or Veterans Administration (VA) professionals. Chaplains also serve as a resource. The PTSD mockingbirds, the fakes, often sing to chaplains, to establish a precedent for later favorable diagnosis.

2) Dueling Scar PTSD: Long before the recent wars, many people “suffered” from PTSD as if it were a dueling scar. “PTSD” was evidence that they had “been there.” Rambo had “PTSD,” and wannabes needed it, too.

Dueling scar

Dueling scars were fashionable early in the last century in places like Germany and Austria. Many were real, the result of genuine duels, or academic duels. The cult of the scar was so compelling that a market emerged for anti-cosmetic surgery to create them. Stuffing scars with horsehair made them even more disfiguring. Dueling scars were supposed to be seen. Everybody knows that chicks dig scars.

A psychologist at a VA facility who treats PTSD reviewed this dispatch and commented, “You can also see this in VA hospitals where some veterans seemingly embrace the PTSD diagnosis (legitimate or self-diagnosed…) like being part of an elite club. There is overlap with the service compensation seekers but there is an identity factor independent of secondary gain that seems to drive certain individuals.”

3) PTSD as justification/excuse/alibi: “Yes, your honor, I beat my wife. And I wrecked my car with a bottle of whiskey in my gut. I have PTSD.” “What did you do in the Army?” “I was a cook.” “Were you in combat?” “The sirens from the rocket attacks still ring in my head.”

4) PTSD as Negative Brand: Nobody wants this. True case: a war correspondent wrote that two generals needed to be fired. In order to squelch bad press, or to make sense of unpleasant assertions, many people said (accused, really) that the writer had “PTSD.” They said that he had “been in war zones for too long,” and that he was “crazy.” (But then both generals were fired). The false branding was a handy tool to discredit an unwelcome messenger. Unfortunately, there is a persistent negative bias against soldiers, or anyone, really, who has PTSD. This is the scar that chicks do not dig.

Veterans with authentic PTSD know about shunning. Those with legitimate diagnoses often display opposite behavior from the Dueling Scar crowd: they try to conceal their honorable wounds. Their symptoms are not what they wish to flaunt, but what many times they cannot hide. Their memories are not what they want to remember, but what they cannot forget.

Man in Bangladesh who was attacked by a tiger in late 2011. He never smiled during our conversation.

For some people, one serious bomb or firefight overfills their cup. They actually seem to crack. It is like they snap. One day they are fine, and the next, they are different. Maybe they will regroup. Maybe not.

Others who experience the same event, and sometimes dozens more, keep going. They draw current like a battery. Some are like rechargeable batteries, and they seem to lose chargeability over time. I saw an entire American platoon in Afghanistan that kept doing very dangerous missions, but you could tell that they were spent. I saw a British platoon with a similar feel.

Everybody has limits. Some crack like eggshells, and others seem hard like diamonds. All will splinter under sufficient instant pressure, or wear down over time with persistent mental abrasion.

PTSD is also a big business for “patients” on the scam, and for doctors, both honest and not. The disorder has become a “slip and fall” con for our generation, but with a hint of “Agent Orange.” One side can make a credible claim, then the swindlers pile on, and our government does not want to pay for any of it.

Troops have a motive to “get” PTSD, while the military is incentivized to diagnose a “pre-existing personality disorder.”

From our psychologist friend: “I often hear about individuals being med-boarded out for post-trauma psychiatric problems that are mislabeled Personality Disorder NOS, but I do not hear about this mislabeling as much in regards to denied service compensation claims for veterans. Usually, you see insufficient evidence for the diagnosis, the problems are better explained by a comorbid psychiatric condition or the examiner is unable to link the PTSD to a service-related incident if there are other significant traumatic events in the life of the claimant.”

Unfortunately, veterans with legitimate diagnoses of PTSD can end up excluded from treatment. There is vigorous debate in Washington on this matter. During a March 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the issue was specifically raised.

Aside from the political and economic dramas surrounding PTSD, authentic and fictional stress can have disquieting legal and social consequences. The effects of bona fide PTSD can echo through generations, when a parent is psychologically and emotionally damaged (often with substance abuse issues). Children suffer diminished parents, with adverse repercussions that can impact subsequent generations. Suicide is epidemic.

New road facing away from Panjwai to Kandahar City: Auto accidents are the primary cause of PTSD in America, yet we do not expect survivors to go shooting up the neighborhood.

According to our psychologist: “Many people don’t seem to get that PTSD is not a ‘thing’; it is a constellation of symptoms that exists on a continuum and in certain combinations, intensities and frequencies, surpass an arbitrary threshold to meet diagnostic criteria. PTSD means one’s symptoms are severe enough to create impairment in function and warrant the diagnosis. Those who cross the line into the diagnostic zone vary incredibly from highly functional and dealing with significant, silent internal turmoil to total, dysfunctional train wrecks.

“The train wrecks often have a complex trauma history, legitimate personality disorders (not the kind the military dishes out on DD-214s), comorbid conditions or just really severely disabling genuine PTSD.

“It is not a synonym for crazy, unstable, etc. Not to say someone swerving off the road because the dead armadillo suddenly has a bomb stuffed in it and the terrified driver in a moment confuses past with present appears to be a dangerous lunatic to others…yes, these things happen sometimes but these moments are usually very brief. Even when I hear about reactive acts of violence when trauma triggers occur, it is almost always a spontaneous, immediate response to a (mis)perceived threat, not a sequence of calculated behaviors that result in a spree of violence.”

Outpost in Panjwai

Every sane person is a psychologist. Tuning into ourselves and to others is an essential survival skill, though many of us believe that we are better psychologists, or more informed, than we really are.

To whit, less than a day after the Panjwai 17 massacre, before the suspect was named, we began debating whether or not he suffers from PTSD. The public did not know, and still does not know, whether the accused even committed the murders, or if he acted alone. An individual with PTSD will almost always not engage in a “sequence of calculated behaviors that result in a spree of violence,” as our psychologist explains above. In general, the mass media has failed to divine this attribute of PTSD, much less explain it to anyone.

Of course, from our side we will drag in PTSD, Lariam, traumatic brain injury, and no telling what else, and there may be truth to it. The bottom line is that due to the circumstances, we have a predisposition to excuse mass murder. We must wait to see what comes to trial.

Panjwai

The lawyer of the accused said that there is no forensic evidence, but if his client committed these crimes his footwear and his clothes should tell a story. A forensics laboratory is 15 minutes from the crime scene at Kandahar Air Field (KAF).

Robert Bales: charged with committing 17 murders in Panjwai

We harbor scant empathy for Afghan children who breathe interminable war, and who in many cases will see much more combat than our own troops. There were two more “green on blue” incidents yesterday (26 March, 2012) in Afghanistan. Afghans in two different provinces wearing friendly uniforms shot a total of three ISAF members to death. We will probably not wonder whether the shooters had PTSD.

US Forces in Panjwai

Weeks before the Panjwai massacre, I warned that something was coming. This is not voodoo, prognostication, or mere chance. It is more like a forest ranger who sees a hundred thousand acres of trees (or 91,000 troops), and no rain for a year. No special skill is required to note the severe and growing fire hazard.

Most Afghan Security Forces do their jobs. It is incorrect to characterize them all as traitors, but it happened again, twice, yesterday.

Our troops are becoming disgusted and angry in what has gone from a promising start in Afghanistan, to something that many believe is a lost cause for an unthankful people who treacherously murder our own. President Karzai cannot be bothered to apologize.

The ingredients for hatred: take two fistfuls of steaming anger, slam that anger into a bucket filled with slimy, smelly disgust fetched from a roach-filled outhouse. Stir that hot anger and wretched disgust and the result is hatred.

Hatred is a compound emotion consisting of anger and disgust.

Hatred can be super-boosted by fear. Toss in a dash of injustice, a scoop of frustration, and two squirts of testosterone, then put an automatic weapon in the corner, and see what happens. (For instant effect, stir in alcohol or other accelerant.)

We hate al Qaeda because they are disgusting. We fear them. They make us very, very angry. So we chase them like roaches, and we blast them to smithereens, and we do not care what their mothers think.

When the Marines urinated on Taliban corpses, they demonstrated disgust and contempt for our enemy. Afghans were disgusted and angry. If Taliban defecated on the faces of dead Marines, then laughed about it, and published the video on the Internet, many Americans would call for genocide.

“Crazy” is not needed to commit mass murder. Anger will pull the trigger. Hate will take it to mutilation.

The overall professionalism of our forces remains strongly intact, yet it would not be surprising to see another massacre, especially in the immediate aftermath of an insider attack, or other stress incident. That such retaliation is historically uncommon is testimony to the discipline of our troops, not to mention indicative that their American character remains whole, with the exception of a very few.

Panjwai District: The majority of Afghan Soldiers are foreigners here.

Panjwai is a Pashtun area, while probably less than 2% of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are Pashtun. NATO published that Southern Pashtuns were “up to 3.6% of ANA new recruits in January 2011.” (What are the ethnicities of the Afghans committing insider attacks?)

Let’s talk about Panjwai.

I have been to Panjwai, and spent months in the general area of Kandahar City and Province, and the adjacent Arghandab River Valley. The area has been a thunder zone for a decade. Fighting occurs broadly and daily.

ANA outpost at Panjwai

Imagine a 15-year-old boy, born and raised in Panjwai. His name is Nazar. This war began when Nazar was about 4. His birth date is unknown, but he was born before the harvest. If Nazar reaches thirty, and you ask his age or birthday, he might look at you curiously, as if you asked a random man his shoe size. He might smile at the strangeness of the question, and tell you that his age is about 35, but that he does not know.

At 15, Nazar has no television and no idea what New York is. Is that a fruit, or a vegetable? He has never heard of 9/11, or of Osama bin Laden. He met some Navy SEALs when they killed his uncle. He heard that they were British or Russian. He knows that they were foreigners who shot his uncle—who was a Taliban commander.

Nazar’s family is illiterate, but they are not dumb. There are two cows inside his family courtyard, chickens, a rooster, and a big kuchi dog. Nazar bathes in the river. For cooking and drinking, the family has a well inside the family compound. They haul water up using a bucket attached to a radiator belt.

In the summer, his family sleeps on a raised wooden platform under the stars. At night he sees aircraft high above. Sometimes he can see and hear an AC-130 Spectre firing its cannon. The aircraft makes no flashes, but he can see the silhouette of the airplane against a million stars. The thumping of the cannon imitates the pounding of his heart, but much louder. First comes the boom of the cannon, there is a long pause, and then a karuummph from the explosion. The loudest are the bombs, and after that, the strafing runs.

Panjwai

At night, helicopters and jets and Predator drones can see the white or black heat signatures of his family, their cows, and even their dog, but not their chickens. Helicopters fly more when the moon is bright.

Nazar sees all sorts of helicopters. Sometimes they have Red Crosses on them, which his father says is a sign of the Crusaders. His father says that the helicopters with Red Crosses are good to see, because they cannot shoot down, and they come to retrieve the Crusaders killed by the Taliban. The Taliban love to see the Red Crosses, and they laugh and celebrate when they fly over.

Our symbol of failure: “Crusader Copter” at FARP in Afghanistan. The Army has a Doctor Jekyll and Mr. Hyde thing going with the Red Crosses. The crosses are big enough to underscore incompetent Army leadership, but small enough that anyone pretending to abide by the Geneva Conventions can make a strong case for not seeing them. Taliban love the Red Crosses: The crosses show that the helicopters have no machine guns, and also that they are coming to pick up dead Crusaders. After years of pretending to follow a “COIN” (counterinsurgency) strategy, the Army still uses a symbol associated with the Crusades by most Afghans.

Games in the sand

Nazar and his friends have never seen a computer. They play with sticks and rocks and drawings in the dirt. When the children get their hands on a mobile phone, they take it and play games until the battery dies.

Grape Rows: Russians, Canadians and US forces have taken many casualties in the vineyards. The squat building in the background is for drying grapes to raisins. The enemy uses these buildings, and so we often flatten them.

Nazar’s home has been raided and searched dozens of times, and there are bullet scars on its walls. In the winter, his family lives in Pakistan.

The boys play war in the grape rows. When the season is green, they can hide inside the grapevines, until the enemy is only a foot away. They know all the good ambush spots, and how to get to them and away. They are careful to avoid the bombs that the Taliban have buried. Sometimes when Taliban from other areas come, they accidentally step on the bombs. His father is proud to say that a Canadian was killed in his grapes, and his blood made the grapes sweeter.

When the Canadian was killed, the helicopter with the Red Cross landed. The villagers celebrated, because if not for the Red Cross, they would not know for certain that a Crusader was killed. The villagers heard the helicopter, and they rushed out in time to see the Red Cross. Calls went around, and they gathered in celebration. Every time that the Red Cross flies, hundreds or even thousands of Afghans see it, and the Taliban gets free advertisement for their success.

Afghans keep derelict fighting vehicles all over the country as monuments to defeated enemies. This one in Panjwai.

The boys play war using the same ambush spots that their grandfathers used to attack Russians. The same places where their fathers hid to kill the Canadians, and now, the Americans.

Panjwai, near the river. The vehicles were ours.

Nazar’s skin will never know air conditioning or electric heating. He has never heard of toilet paper or seen a flush toilet. His mothers cooks over a fire, and they have no electricity. His father wants revenge for the death of his brother, and he believes that he got it many times, with the bombs that he buries.

Panjwai: You know that you are a redneck when your house has horns.

Panjwai: Those two men on the roof have a machine gun and they are not with us.

Panjwai: Our movement is often channelized. Bombs are dug into the walls, or buried underground, and grenades are thrown from concealment. This way of warfare is cheap, it is easy, and it works. It is not readily negated.

Mobile phone advertisement in Kandahar City, about 14 miles from Panjwai.

It is unlikely that Taliban in Panjwai would put up with al Qaeda these days. For instance, graveyards are adorned in a way that al Qaeda would find intolerable. This has caused frictions in the past.

BlackBerrys and iPhones work, other than in areas where the Taliban coerces telecommunications companies to turn off the towers at night. The Taliban like cell phones, but they also know that we track them.

Cemetery in Panjwai: al Qaeda does not like flags on graves.

There are more cemeteries here than I have seen anywhere else in Afghanistan. Locals say that many of the graves hold dead Taliban.

Afghans keep cemeteries away from their villages to avoid being cursed at night by the dead. (Sounds like stories I heard growing up in America.) An Afghan friend said that 12 years ago, a woman in Nimruz Province buried her husband inside her home so that she could touch his soul. This spooked other Afghans, just as it would many Americans.

Derelict cemetery in Panjwai: Coalition forces killed off many people here.

Panjwai is the birthplace of the Taliban (1994). Kids born that year are today reaching fighting age.

The imaginary Nazar was born about 3 years after the Taliban was founded in Panjwai. He was 4 when the Twin Towers fell.

His home is near the Arghandab River, flowing down from the Arghandab Valley, and near the great fighting that has occurred for hundreds of years. Sometimes after the fighting, he has seen bodies floating through Panjwai and down into the Dasht-i-Margo (Desert of Death).

KAF is ten minutes away by helicopter.

On KAF there is 24-hour electricity, hot showers, pizza, ice cream, coffee joints, a French bakery, and a T.G.I. Friday’s with steaks, non-alcoholic beer, and fancy desserts. It houses possibly the only T.G.I. Friday’s ever to be hit by a missile. The warhead ripped a hole through the roof, but it did not explode. (Back left corner by the road.)

From T.G.I. Friday’s, you can see the helicopters with the Red Crosses taking off and landing, fetching our dead and wounded.

This spot is 10 minutes from T.G.I. Friday's.

There is WiFi on KAF. And a writer.

Between 2011 and March 2012, a senior Noncommissioned Officer (a “Master Sergeant” or MSG) in the US Army has been tweeting, blogging and bragging about his heroism and his breakdowns from PTSD.

The Master Sergeant briefly experienced combat in Iraq almost a decade ago. He received a Bronze Star for “actions” the same day that Jessica Lynch got hers in a different incident. (Jessica admitted that her award was fraudulent, for which she earned respect). The writer has been bragging about his decoration for years, and about his combat prowess based on his practically non-existent war experience, as a non-combat soldier.

Before going to Afghanistan in 2011, he alerted the press that he was available for interviews. The writer-soldier never stepped off KAF. He is just a guy stuffed into a uniform.

Master Sergeant Godsmack vs. Nazar

While Nazar labors in the fields and sleeps under the stars, the nearby Master Sergeant works, dines, showers, and blogs in air-conditioned or heated buildings, possibly munching a chocolate chip cookie while sipping a frappe, as he pecks away with greasy fingers about these terrible deployment hardships. (It can get mighty hot between the air-conditioned buildings.)

The senior soldier, leading by example, writes about the frightening rockets that sometimes land within a mile. He cannot sleep at night. He advertises his fears from deep inside the giant base, ten or twenty miles from the fighting that he never will see. America’s Twitter Hero broadcasts to the world, and to the Taliban:

The Taliban uses Twitter, and they monitor feeds from our troops:

Meanwhile, outside the wire, Afghan boys and men shoot rockets and frighten the American Master Sergeant whose fingers must twitch on the keyboard.

Master Sergeant C.J. Grisham is an intelligence NCO. The Taliban, those who live in Kandahar City, Kabul, and in Pakistan, have competent intelligence specialists who read blogs, Facebook and Twitter. Grisham publicizes his meltdown:

“Today, I listened to the advice of more than a few people and finally went to the TMC and Combat Stress hospital. My right hand hasn’t stopped twitching after nearly a month and it’s beyond irritating. I’m not sleeping, not eating, and highly irritable. I’ve been under a lot of stress and feel like many of those above me are just making things worse. So, for three hours today, I sat and got to revisit many issues related to my PTSD, depression, and anxiety as well as some new ones.”

The Taliban must be laughing at America’s public display of weakness and stupidity. There is no better way to describe one of our intelligence soldiers drawing so many family and friends out into the public, as they tweet along with him, all while encouraging the Taliban to keep on shooting rockets. Stupid is as stupid does.

Master Sergeant C.J. Grisham (next stop Sergeant Major) has become a de facto representative of the US Army. The Army permits him to promote his agendas while wearing a uniform purchased by American taxpayers. He uses his rank, his uniform, and the Army in his many public writings. He may be free to speak, but he is not free to invoke his employer without permission. That the Pentagon allows him to speak while using its name makes him a de facto spokesman. Grisham speaks on behalf of the US Army and its intelligence community, whether we like it or not.

The Taliban must be belly laughing while watching our intelligence people crumble:

“Faizullah! Have you seen this? Our rockets have frightened the Crusader who reports that his hand is shaking! The rockets are working. Give them more! Show this to Essa and beg to double our supply of rockets! May Allah grant this American a long life to continue to report his fears in Kandahar.”

Unfortunately for the Taliban, the soldier was sent home with mysterious problems. Grisham tweeted:

“I’m no longer in theater. I requested to come home early to deal with some issues.”

(That tweet disappeared: Grisham frequently removes posts that backfire.)

The Taliban must be disappointed. He was the best damned soldier that the Taliban ever saw.

January 2012: Grisham at Sick Call at KAF making his case to be sent home. He was sent home in March 2012 in time for a Godsmack concert.

Grisham tweeted:

“I love my wife. She got me tickets to the @Godsmack and @Staind concert for when I return from Afghanistan in Belton, TX!!””

Master Sergeant C.J. Grisham abandoned his subordinates, “his Joes,” for Godsmack. Now that he is home, he is tweeting about his “battle experiences,” and using “PTSD” as a pretext to raise money in Texas, even while his young subordinates are still at KAF.

Combat troops who have watched wounded buddies languish on landing zones while waiting for late helicopters, can thank Grisham, who tweeted about contacting Congressman Todd Akin, to make sure that the Red Crosses stay on.

Grisham has a lot of time to attack people and to chase down MEDEVAC Red Cross issues. He so damages the military media war that it is enough to wonder if he is taking instructions directly from Mullah Omar. Master Sergeant Grisham reports that Congressman Todd Akin pulled back:

Since that time, Congressman Akin, who had led the charge on MEDEVAC, has gone silent: Infantry Soldiers who have fought in Afghanistan might want to ask Grisham face-to-face, why he is ready to leave them to die.

Grisham has invested great energy attacking his commanders (who are too weak to confront him), gays (saying they are unfit for battle), the media (who will expose his actions), and President Obama.

The Army does not stop Grisham from dressing up in his uniform, posting photographs of himself, and bashing President Obama:

Master Sergeant C.J. Grisham, United States Army, abandoned his subordinates, and his unit. While talking smack, Grisham quit.

The Taliban consists of harder folk.

Nazar stays in the war. This spring, he is back in the fields. He watches artillery and airstrikes, GMLR rocket strikes, Predators launching Hellfire missiles night and day, Apache helicopters firing missiles and cannons, A-10 Warthogs and F-18 Hornets rolling in for strafing runs, or dropping bombs.

He has watched massive IEDs explode, killing Americans and allied forces, and he has helped place the bombs. He celebrated when the helicopters with the Red Crosses came.

He has been shot at, dozens of times. At night, he sees orange illumination flares floating down, and he glimpses black helicopters thundering through the darkness. The Canadians had Leopard tanks in Panjwai, and they fired their big guns.

Nazar has seen a lot. Back in 2006, the fighting had dragged on and left NATO frustrated. NATO decided to “clean up” the area.

Small Mosque

When Nazar was about 9, the first large Battle for Panjwai unfolded (Operation Zahara), and then there was another (Operation Medusa). The fighting was intense. During this timeframe of 2006, I published twelve dispatches that the Afghan war was being lost, but I soon headed back to Iraq, and I missed this Panjwai fighting.

During Operation Medusa, ground troops swarmed in. Jets, helicopters and artillery were hitting targets. On 3 and 4 September 2006, strafing runs and bombs had been striking day and night when the pilot of an American A-10 Warthog accidentally shot up Canadian Soldiers in Panjwai. No doubt the Taliban celebrated that.

Bottom of map is “Desert of Death.” KAF is on right. Zangabad, area of the crime, is lower left.

JOURNEY TO PANJWAY

Robert Bale is charged with murdering 17 Afghans. His attorney, Lance Rosen, says that he wants to visit Afghanistan. There is no value in going unless he goes to Panjwai.

If locals realize that Mr. Rosen aims to exonerate Robert Bale, he will surely face grave resistance. If Rosen survives, he will better understand the Afghan reality that his client experienced.

In the event that Mr. Rosen ventures to Panjwai, here is some free information. By following these instructions, Mr. Rosen should be able to get from any major airport in America, to Panjwai, in about 48 busy hours, or perhaps 72. I accept no responsibility for the outcome.

Murders occurred in general area of Zangabad, lower left. (Disregard the red traces; some of my old routes.)

Start

Fly to Dubai. Drive to Abu Dhabi, to the Afghan Embassy, and get a visa. It should take no more than a few hours. Find an Afghan tailor, have some native clothing made, and arrange for it to be delivered to your hotel. Sleep.

Next morning, fly to Kandahar.

KAF has one of the busiest runways in the world. As you descend, there will be A-10 Warthogs, Pedros, Dustoff MEDEVACs with their Red Crosses, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and dozens of other aircraft types parked on the aprons. There might be a CIA RQ-170 Sentinel stealth UAV taxiing, while your commercial jet rolls by and passengers whip out their iPhones to take photographs. CIA has a big building just by the tarmac.

USAF/CIA RQ-170 at KAF. The “Beast of Kandahar” used to take off and land at the Kandahar International Airport where commercial jets landed, filled with everything from Iranians to Chinese to Taliban. I made this image before bin Laden was killed. Our government disclosed that the RQ-170 observed bin Laden’s compound. Later, the Iranians seized one intact.

At KAF, Predators or Reapers frequently take off with Hellfire missiles hanging beneath their wings. There will be Apache and Kiowa helicopters, all variety of aircraft thundering and rumbling away. This is not an air show: those bombs and missiles are live.

The combat support hospital (CSH) is just at the runway so that Dustoff and Pedro can deliver the wounded and dead from the battlefields. The CSH is about 13 minutes’ flight away from where Chazray Clark was hit. If you get killed on this trip, a helicopter with a Red Cross might pick up your body, and the Taliban will rejoice as your remains are delivered back to the CSH.

While clearing immigration, if you hear loud sirens, it is probably due to inbound rockets. The enemy seems to shoot for the runway, and for the area around T.G.I. Friday’s. From the direction from which some rockets fly, the terminal can be in-between the apparent targets. Dive to the ground, or take your chances standing. Big boy rules apply.

From where you are standing, or from where you are lying flat on the ground, Panjwai district center is about ten minutes by helicopter. It is much faster to get there by A-10. The 17 murders happened about 15 minutes away by Blackhawk.

After formalities, grab a taxi. Head to the gate. Car bombs often explode around the gates. Do not loiter. Take a left on highway A-75 and head north toward Kandahar City. This road is reasonably secure, but suicide attacks and other assaults do occur. You are outside the wire. (Of course, you brought all sorts of tracking devices, and you have a kidnapping plan.)

Traffic Circle: are those guys looking at you?

Drive over the Tarnak River Bridge that General Daniel Menard allowed to be hit with a suicide bomb. That bomb tossed an American MRAP off the bridge, and killed a US Soldier. You can see scars from bombs here. Keep going to the traffic circle up in Kandahar, and tour the city a bit. Do not loiter. Stay alert.

That’s the Red Mosque. When President Karzai’s corrupt brother was assassinated, services were held here, and a suicide bomber got inside and filled more graves. People have been shot and blown up all around this neighborhood. Keep moving. Enjoy the tour. Stay alert.

Those who live and travel “outside the wire” stay in constant tune with breaking news. You never know when the Coalition will accidentally run over a family or bomb a wedding, or when some nut will burn a Koran. People at home in America will say, “Burn baby burn!” For you, however, this can translate into being shot in the head and your body hanged upside down from a light post. A Pulitzer winning photo can encapsulate the endgame.

Security firms use various feeds and chat rooms to keep their fingers on the spider’s web, alert for twitches that can ensnarl clients. Stay alert.

The Afghan police might shake you down. If you have body armor, they might steal it. The driver should know the way to the new road to Panjwai. Do not tell him that you are here to free the American.

Take the new road to Panjway, down past the road sign of the EOD technician disabling a bomb (it will be on your right). This road looks safe. It is not.

Nearly to Panjwai.

That might be a Special Forces detachment with their ANA counterparts.

Special Forces base from the opposite direction, heading away from Panjwai toward Kandahar City. (The guy on the motorbike might be Special Forces. The jackasses blocking the road are senior Public Affairs Officers.)

You will pass by a small Special Forces base on the right. The Special Forces guys will not bother you. There will be no sign, but the base is obvious. This means that you are in no-kidding Taliban country.

Stay away from the base. If you see US forces, stay away from them. If they approach you, there is a 99.9% chance that they will be friendly and professional. If they are Special Forces or other combat troops, you are good to go. They might say that you are a lunatic and ask if you are lost. If you want to go on, they will not stop you. They might hand you a bottle of cold water and ask that you reconsider. Ask them about the situation in the area, but remember that they are bullet magnets. When they get attacked, they shoot back, and then it is a mess. Just stay away. Believe me.

Afghan police wreck a truck near a small mosque. They constantly smash these trucks.

Afghan checkpoint. Notice the bullets wrapped around the barrel of the machine gun.

This is a few miles away from where Chazray Clark was hit with an IED, where we waited for his MEDEVAC last September.

Welcome to Panjwai

It is best to start at the District Center. There should be US troops there, and plenty of Afghans, including police and Army. The accused killer, Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, walked out of Camp Belamby. The murders occurred in nearby Balandi and Alkozai.

The chances of finding these villages without dying and without a local guide are not good. You will need to do some negotiating with the locals to have a shot at safe passage. Coming from the West coast of the United States to the Panjway District Center is only half the journey. The other half will be the few miles remaining to the target. People in the District Center will know people from the villages, and it is possible that you can meet them at the District Center. If you ask, the Afghans might let you stay overnight, which can give you a chance to figure out the situation.

(Note: I have difficulty believing that one soldier committed this act.)

Afghans use many bicycles and motorbikes.

Gas station: many IEDs are in similar yellow jugs

The river is just ahead. More yellow jugs.

This is the river near Nazar’s home. Nazar still works the fields and plants bombs and cheers for the Red Crosses. Master Sergeant "Godsmack" failed and went home. Today he is peacocking his invisible dueling scar.

This is not the truth that I want, but the truth that I found. There is no nice way to end this. Maybe that is why this story is so long. I was searching for a happy ending that I could not find.

Another day drags on, and ends jaggedly, like war.

Shot in the Dark: Blackhawk Down

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 02 May 2012 11:37:13 +0000

Afghan firing RPG in Urozgan

02 May 2012

On 19 April there was a suicide attack. Numerous Afghans were killed and others were dying.

The night was especially dark. The weather was bad, and there were no city lights bouncing off of the clouds. No stars. No nothing. Even if the skies had been clear, the moon phase would have revealed only a thin sliver at its brightest. The night was as black as the deep sea.

People living in or around a big city in America or Asia or Europe will never see a dark night like this one unless there is a blackout. In Western Europe, few people ever witness a truly black night unless there is heavy weather. The cultural lights are too bright. For darkness in Europe, there are a few special places, such as an edge near the sea in Scotland.

Afghanistan is different. Many Western city-dwellers have never seen the Milky Way, and some, when they go to Afghanistan, are taken by the stars, exclaiming that they did not realize that you could see so many without a telescope. Away from the bright bases, the night sky in Afghanistan is like a movie, complete with more shooting stars than you can remember.

There is no electricity in most places, and where there is, the current trickles, creating scant light that flows up to reflect off of dust or clouds. The Milky Way is so bright that it looks almost close enough to scoop out. But even on the major bases, the Milky Way fades, and it can be too bright to realize how dark it is just a short distance away. Flying over Afghanistan at night can be like flying over the Atlantic, with occasional discreet lights below, appearing like lone ships or oil platforms.

This leads to an awkward dynamic that I have failed to write about during the last six years. The brightest areas in Afghanistan are our bases, and you can see them glowing at night from many miles away. Afghans, who want electricity, do not understand why we have spaceships glowing in the desert while they never get a dribble of energy. That is another story.

To keep things simple, the military likes to color code. Flight safety depends on illumination, and so they classify illumination as Green, Amber, or Red. Since there are few cultural lights in Afghanistan (and where there are, they are subject to suddenly going black), the pilots cannot depend on the bright lights of Las Vegas to guide them through the desert trap. In Afghanistan, it is about the moon, the gear, and the team.

With "Green illum," the moon is higher than 30 degrees and 25% or more illuminated. Full moon is 100%. Amber is 0 – 30 degrees moon angle, and 25% or greater moon illumination. When the moon is below the horizon, it is always Red illum. If the moon is less than 25% illuminated, no matter the angle, it is Red illum.

Combat troops sometimes complain about the moon angle being a factor in Red illum (because many missions are limited during Red), but the flying team knows what they are doing. For instance, when the moon angle is low, there are shadows, and in the mountains the moon shadows can be deadly. The pilots might go from great flying conditions to a patch of Red illum, or they might start a mission with good illum, and as the moon sets, it drifts into Red illum. Or weather can roll in.

If they were flying like fighter jets from one big base to another, they could fly in just about any weather or light. The jets are high, and they are coming into bright airports, and there is radar, and there are smart people on the ground to guide them. But the helicopter pilots might have to land 20 miles from the nearest light. There is no radar. There is no air traffic control. There may be a firefight. The tracers are very bright. Through the night vision gear, when the tracers race low over the earth, they are bright enough to briefly illuminate the path they trace over the ground. Explosions start very brightly and then quickly become many sparks, and a second later just a glowing dust cloud.

And if matters could get worse, Afghanistan might have more moon dust than the moon. Moon dust is a problem in broad daylight. The particles are so fine that it literally splashes like water, and when you are driving and a pound hits your windshield it instantly blocks out the light, but then splashes off like water. The moon dust is a most curious thing and the helicopters stir it up like a volcano, night or day.

The difficulty of the pilots' job is hard to convey.

On the night of this MEDEVAC, it was below Red illum, and for any practical purpose of the human eye, it was utterly black. The pilots had no light. They have systems that can be used to fly in blackness, but those systems do not replace ambient light. Their night vision goggles would be useless unless they used their own infrared (IR) light source, which of course the enemy can see.

Some troops believe that the enemy does not have night vision capacity, but they definitely can spot our IR. For instance, the enemy has rigged cameras to weapons. The little video camera sitting beside me can resolve a helicopter from miles away. The enemy can tape a cheap video camera to a weapon and now they have a sophisticated night vision device (a cheap camera) mounted to an RPG or a machine gun.

The enemy uses this technique to spot IR lasers from our drones and other aircraft. I am not giving anything away. I learn these things by studying the enemy. Even if the IR spotlight is off, the IR strobes will be on, and the birds will be visible for miles. Flying low and slow is very dangerous, but then so is flying in Red illum. Or flying in Afghanistan, period.

The faster you go, the darker it is, and with bad weather, there is only so much that America’s great gear can do. It is just dangerous. Very, very dangerous. The job is not for everyone.

You likely will never see the enemy until he fires. The moment that he fires, his weapon will flash very brightly and you can rip him apart in a few seconds if you have a minigun or a .50 caliber machine gun in your hands. But the first shot belongs to him. In this particular situation, the enemy can own the night until he fires.

The suicide bomber had detonated his weapon leaving 4 dead and 7 wounded Afghans. There has been friction that we will launch MEDEVAC for our people under conditions where we will not launch for Afghan troops. This would not be such a case. The MEDEVAC launched into the darkness and the armed “Chase” bird followed into the night.

Both were Blackhawks. In current configurations, most of the “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters in Afghanistan can carry three litter patients. In a different configuration they can carry six. Depending on the state of the casualties, the armed Chase bird would also have to land, leaving Dustoff flying for cover. Since Dustoff does not have machine guns (due to wearing the Red Cross), the Chase bird would be especially vulnerable while loading casualties. The Chase helicopter can cover the Dustoff, but the Dustoff cannot cover the Chase.

Piecing together information from various sources, this is what seems to have come next: The unarmed MEDEVAC was in the lead with the armed Chase aircraft behind. They appear to have been flying low and slow over a river. They may have been flying using the IR spotlight but this is unknown to me. An RPG hit the Chase Blackhawk behind a fuel cell, causing it to spin and to crash at high speed. It burst into flames and the crew was probably lost immediately. Blackhawks are partly made of magnesium, which burns very hot and brightly. The bright fire washed out the MEDEVAC pilots’ goggles. There was tracer fire from the enemy on the ground but the unarmed MEDEVAC could not land or suppress enemy fire. They called for more help and circled low for about 20 minutes, but were never able to land.

We lost four Soldiers:

CW2 Nicolas Johnson
Sergeant Dean Shaffer
CW Don Viray
Sergeant Chris Workman

I do not know what happened to the seven wounded Afghans.

Little Girl Revisited

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 02 May 2012 02:32:17 +0000

02 May 2012

This image was made seven years ago today. There had been a great deal of combat. It’s been said that the “Deuce Four” was the most decorated unit in the Iraq war. I do not know if this is true, but if not, it is probably close.

There had been a suicide car bomb that attacked in a civilian neighborhood. The Soldiers did their best to help the people. Little Farah, seen here, cradled by Major Mark Bieger, would soon die of her wounds.

As the months unfolded, fighting remained intense and many Soldiers in the Deuce Four would be wounded or killed.

On the home front, some veterans went off to school and got degrees, or in some other way kept living their lives. Others took routes that we so often hear about. Substance abuse, trouble with the law, broken families.

The years unfolded, and many returned to Iraq for more combat tours. They kept fighting and more were killed and injured. Others went off to Afghanistan. I would meet many of them in combat in the following years in Iraq or Afghanistan, and there they always shined.

This image seems like it was made just yesterday, and like a million lifetimes ago. Without the photo, this day was just one of countless others that would rip across the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Bangkok. The day Farah died was average for Iraq. Terrible? Yes. Unique? Others were far worse. Only the camera made this day unique.

Please read: LITTLE GIRL

Taliban Denounce Poisoning of Girls

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 18 Apr 2012 12:59:29 +0000

18 April 2012

Yesterday, about 171 girls and women were poisoned at a school in Afghanistan. Whereas the blame immediately went to the Taliban, Afghanistan is far too complex for reflexive answers. Further, there are many groups of "Taliban," and other associated enemies, making it impossible to affix responsibility to a monolithic enemy that does not exist. The attack might also be the work of a lone wolf.

The Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik recently slaughtered 77 people in Norway. That was terror by a Norwegian against Norwegians. Back in Afghanistan, at least one American Soldier is accused of recently killing 17 Afghans. Many victims were women and children. Back in America, years before the war, a former American soldier killed 168, including many very young children, in Oklahoma City. Nearly 700 were wounded in that Oklahoma terrorist attack.

That's about 260 people killed in three attacks, apparently by only three white guys, none of whom were Taliban or Muslims. Some people are just bad, and many act alone or nearly alone.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid fully owned up to their terrorist attacks that unfolded just days ago in Kabul and elsewhere. He emailed to me, and contacted large media, and took credit for multiple suicide and other attacks. And so it was natural to ask Mujahid if the Taliban (there are many groups, and there are lone wolves) was behind this atrocity against the girls yesterday.

His answer today:

"we are respecting womens . taliban movement became in power againt those who kidnape womens and rap girls . we don,t know about these girls , who and for what reason they kidnape. we are not support this . Their arae a lot af those creminals who were involve in that kind of cases b4 , now they are in power . and I personly sure that in this case they will be involve"

And so I responded to Mujahid's answer with a question. Will the Taliban bring these criminal(s) who poisoned the girls to Islamic Justice? Mujahid answered minutes ago:

"As I wrote u in my last mail we are agaist this criminals activety , so of corse we will bring them to islamic justice."

Of course, not everything that happens out there is in accordance with the policies of the Afghanistan government, or our troops, or the Taliban. When a Soldier or Soldiers apparently murdered 17 Afghans, those murders were not sanctioned by our side, though it looks like we own it. Likewise, the Taliban did abolish opium and the use of boys for sex, and they did hang people for raping women. Meanwhile, the government of Afghanistan is more apt to make a woman marry someone who rapes her. This is a complex mess. There is no black and white in this. The more you learn the more your head spins.

If there is any good news out of this, it is that many girls are in school.

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012

nomadickirk@gmail.com (Admin) — Wed, 18 Apr 2012 12:38:22 +0000

Please click here to view the entire document.

RED CROSS: Symbol of Blood

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 17 Apr 2012 11:43:08 +0000

Photo Michael Yon

17 April 2012

Army Generals will have the public believe that the Red Cross is a morale booster for our troops. That load of bull is too heavy even for a Blackhawk helicopter sling load. During my about three years with combat troops downrange, I've never heard the slightest inkling of "morale boost" from troops who see a Red Cross.

The Red Cross boosts enemy morale. It alerts the Taliban that they have caused casualties.

For experienced American combat troops, the Red Cross symbol is associated with the sights and smells of your friend being blown to pieces and his shredded uniform draped high in the branches of a tree, or someone shot through the eye socket. A Red Cross on a helicopter evokes memories of dusty landings to pick up wounded, dying, or dead. Others will say that helicopters with Red Crosses and no machine guns leave wounded on battlefields due to ground fire. And this is sometimes true.

Recently, there was a blood drive in a shopping mall. The organizers displayed big Red Crosses, evoking memories of Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, the Army Generals pretend that troops cheer at the vision of the Red Cross, when the Red Cross, like raw ground beef in the market, means something else.

Watching the Army drag the Red Cross into battle reminds us of how backwards the Army mindset really is. We have gone through nearly a century of wars while the Army continues to display the Red Cross, and the symbol still draws enemy fire. How many more wars must we undergo before someone says enough?

The only time I've seen troops who practically cheered for medical evacuation helicopters was in Sangin, Afghanistan, with British forces. British Soldiers in Sangin were fighting well but taking terrible casualties. The landing zones were hot. Air Force Pedros would come in from Camp Bastion, miniguns on each side (they carry .50 caliber machine guns these days), with pararescue medics hanging with their legs out the doors and with their rifles in hand. They roared in no matter what. The Air Force had no distinctive crosses on their helicopters, and the British never mentioned the name "Pedro" without some level of reverence. Pedro meant hospital. “Red Cross” was tantamount to “can't land because the area was too dangerous.” Pedro meant miniguns. Red Cross meant delay.

To this day, the Red Cross symbol leads to unneeded delays and thus saps the morale of our troops, while bolstering Taliban morale and propaganda.

Some Army officers say that mounting machine guns provides a false sense of security on helicopters. Another fable. It doesn't even make sense. This Army claim is so bizarre that I'm left without a response, so let's keep moving.

Defenders of the Red Cross will say that Pedro also gets hit, and if anything, that armed Pedros get hit more frequently per capita than unarmed Dustoffs wearing Red Crosses. That's probably true considering that we send Pedro to the worst places, because Pedro has guns. There is no doubt that on average, Pedro is sent to the most dangerous pick up zones because they have two .50 caliber machine guns on each bird.

Our supposedly war-wise Generals say that we are implementing COIN, or counterinsurgency, in Afghanistan. Why, one might ask, if we are trying to win over Afghans with our COIN war, do we have helicopters wearing a symbol of the Crusades?

Protest in Afghanistan, 2012. (Photo credit unknown)

The Red Crosses do these three things:

Red Crosses alert the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed: If Army Generals insist on sending unarmed helicopters into combat, it makes no sense to telegraph that fact to the enemy. Army Generals will try to change the subject by saying that adding machine guns adds weight, and this is true. But if they insist on going unarmed, why then force our MEDEVAC crews to alert the enemy? This makes zero sense. A General who insists on alerting the enemy that our MEDEVACs are unarmed must think that we are stupid. He's saying, "You are so dumb that I can tell you this and you will actually believe me because I wear these stars. That's how dumb you are. And we are winning the war. Trust me."
Red Crosses alert the Taliban that they caused casualties: This is a terrible and free gift to the enemy. First, the Taliban wound or kill our people, and then our Army Generals insist on broadcasting this fact to every village that the helicopters fly over. We might as well paper the villages with leaflets saying, "That boom that you just heard killed our guys. The Taliban got us! We thought that you'd like to know. Friendly reminder: Every time that you see the Red Cross, the Taliban succeeded again."
Red Crosses are an EVIL SYMBOL to many Afghans: This is the “Counterinsurgency” that our Generals brag about.

The Crosses are to Pashtun Muslims as swastikas are to Jews. (For that matter, Israeli Jews and Muslims also don't want Red Cross crusaders flying overhead.) I have written about this before, and high-ranking officers have said my reports are incorrect. They say that Afghans are not bothered by the Red Cross. Let’s examine this:

From a book called Passing it On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan's Frontier. This book was written by the British General Sir Andrew Skeen, and published in 1932.

General Sir Skeen writes of the Red Cross:

And so at least one General agrees, and he agreed back in 1932. In places like Afghanistan, the difference between 1932 and today can be minimal. But just in case our Generals come back and say that I am wrong again, please note this photograph of a poster of evil symbols, tacked up on a wall in a village in Eastern Afghanistan:

Mark of the Beast: Evil symbols of Afghanistan.

The issue transcends this war. During World War I, the Germans sank plainly marked hospital ships, sending them to the bottom of the sea. During World War II, the Japanese, and the Germans (largely Christians themselves), were shooting at Red Crosses. The Koreans and the Viet Cong/NVA did the same. Those wars were not about religion.

Red Crosses did not ward off enemy fire during World War I

During the Vietnam War, a war that has some similarities to Afghanistan today, Red Crosses alerted the Viet Cong that they’d whacked some Americans, as opposed to unmarked helicopters that might have been landing to deliver more troops or ammo.

Helicopters with Red Crosses landing on hot pick up zones tell the Taliban with certainty that they are not reinforcing or resupplying, but are extracting dead or wounded. (Helicopters wearing Red Crosses are not permitted to deliver war supplies or combat troops. They also are not permitted to fly over the enemy, but we ignore that rule, which causes one to wonder if we also ignore the rules prohibiting resupply and reinforcement.)

The Red Cross:

Alerts the enemy that helicopters are unarmed.
Alerts the enemy that they have caused casualties.
Alerts the enemy that the helicopter is not carrying supplies or reinforcements.
Is an "evil" symbol in Afghanistan.
Reminds our forces of losses. (Every time you see MEDEVACs fly you think someone got hit.)
Boosts enemy morale.
Provides Taliban with propaganda tool. (“The Crusaders are back.”)
Provides Taliban with second propaganda. (“We killed Crusaders.”)
Is a glaring symbol of top leadership incompetence, hidebound bureaucratic parochialism, and the willingness of ranking officers to deceive the public and elected representatives while peddling BS to our own troops.
Doesn't work.

Some will blame the President for the Red Cross debacle, but if we are to blame this President, we'll have to reach back and blame Presidents who have been buried for decades. If we are to blame something on Presidents, let’s at least stick to what they are responsible for, and to what they should reasonably be expected to know about.

The Dustoff issue is huge if you are a wounded trooper, or a Taliban commander who wants to know if he caused casualties, or who wants free morale boosters and propaganda tools. But on the national scale, the deaths caused by helicopters wearing Red Crosses are mere angel dust, and will escape a President’s attention if we don’t bring it up, and point out how poorly the Army is managing its affairs, and how badly the Army is serving our troops, our sons and daughters. The Red Cross symbol is not the disease, but a symptom of something fundamental.

The Red Cross has become a symbol of intergenerational Army inanity, and our failure in Afghanistan.

Is the Red Cross a Neutral Symbol to Afghans?

nomadickirk@gmail.com (MEDEVACmatters.org) — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 11:06:52 +0000

16 April 2012
Wrtten by: MEDEVACmatters.org

[Writer] Michael Yon has written about the cultural importance of our MEDEVAC helicopters showing Red Cross symbols on them in a Muslim society. Here is a photo of a poster displaying banned symbols Mark of the Beast

Photo courtesy of Michael Yon

From Yon’s article:

An Afghan friend translates:

*Destroying the cross is an Islamic obligation*

1. Christians want to publish and spread their unholy and cursed religious logos and signs in different shapes and appearances in clean and holy Muslim society.

2. These Christianity signs (Crosses) have affected our Islamic society too

– even our mosques and our Menbers are not safe from those Christianity signs (Crosses).

(Further note from my Afghan friend explaining “menber”: When you enter a mosque, the menber is a chair in the most forward point. After the prayer is done, a mullah sits on that chair and enlightens people. Talking rubbish about how to be a good muslim or other nonsense. That chair is higher than the regular ones in terms of height. It’s higher in order to enable the mullah to see all the folks and the folks seeing mullah – even the ones sitting far away. Menber is the written name of it.)

3. The respected Ulemas agree over the fact that destroying these crosses is an Islamic obligation and on whatever object or surface where there is a cross, praying is a sin.

4. —– had a gold cross in his neck and prophet Mohammad told him to remove that ‘idol’ from himself and is narrated from Aisha that prophet Mohammad never allowed anything in his house with a cross on it and used to destroy or throw it away.

6. For further explanations, refer to …. / …. / …. (Names of references given)

*Some of the names on the crosses:*

1. Cross of George

2. Cross of Andrew

3. Cross of Lauren

4. Cross of Jerusalem

5. Cross of Anthony

6. Cross in shape of the Nazi logo

7. Catholic Cross

===End of Translation===

Predictably, naysayers immediately pummeled Yon as spinning a fantasy. But was he?

The Red Cross symbol is the inverse of the Swiss flag in honor of the lengthy neutrality of Switzerland and the home of the International Committee of the Red Cross which administers the Geneva Convention. The basis of the Swiss flag is somewhat uncertain but there are three leading explanations:

War flag of the Holy Roman Empire (Reichssturmfahne) during the 13th century

Triangular field ensign used by Swiss confederate forces from ca. the 1420s

Field ensign used from ca. 1470 and during the early 16th century
(Image source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_Switzerland)

In each case there was a history associated with the design that includes an element of the Christian religion.

In early 1863, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) adopted the red cross on a white background as the distinctive emblem to be used to mark medical vehicles, buildings and personnel granted protection under the provisions of the new Geneva Convention.

Only 13 years elapsed before the Red Cross symbol was embroiled in religiously based contention by a Muslim nation. During the war between Christian Russia and Islamic Turkey in 1876-1878, the Ottoman Empire used a white flag with a red crescent in lieu of the Red Cross symbol because it believed that the Red Cross was offensive to its Muslim troops.

In 1929 Egypt petitioned the ICRC to formally adopt the Red Crescent and a flag bearing a red lion and a red sun as alternatives to the Red Cross symbol. They were accepted.

In 1949 the Netherlands and Israel each petitioned for approval of new symbols, but were rejected, as was a request to revert to the Red Cross as the sole authorized symbol. Israel refused to sign the Geneva Convention based on the rejection of it proposal to use the Red Star of David (used within Israel) as an internationally authorized symbol. In 1980 Iran waived its right to continue using the red lion and red sun in favor of adopting the Red Crescent symbol.

In 1999 the ICRC established a working group to address comprehensively the question of which symbol or symbols should be authorized officially for future use. The goal was to avoid any symbol with any national, political or religious connotation. Member nations rejected the abandonment of the existing Red Cross and Red Crescent symbols in favor of new symbol.

So, a new religiously neutral symbol was designed consisting of a red square rotated 45 degrees (to stand on a corner) on a white background.

In 2005 – 2007 the ICRC took the steps necessary to formally adopt the Red Cross, the Red Crescent and the new Red Crystal as official symbols to be used by signatory nations. Muslim signatory nations fought the approval because it would pave the way for Israel to join the ICRC. Upon the approval of two signatory nations the symbol was officially adopted and Israel joined the ICRC. Israel reserved the right to display the new Red Crystal with a Red Star of David within it for use within its national borders.

Is it reasonable to believe that Muslims in Afghanistan are more culturally tolerant than those in other Muslim nations? Would the Taliban avoid exploiting a historical distrust of any group that displays a symbol that includes a cross?

To participate in the poll and for the original posting click here.

Senator Harkin’s Disinformation Letter

nomadickirk@gmail.com (MEDEVACmatters.org) — Sat, 14 Apr 2012 04:02:04 +0000

04 April 2012

Written by: MEDEVACmatters.org

A constituent of U.S. Senator Tom Harkin finally received a reply five months after her initial letter and fax to Senator Harkin about MEDEVAC operations in Afghanistan. Despite the date on the Senator’s letter, she just received it today.

The letter is another example of how the Army’s spin doctors have misled members of Congress and the American people about the truth about MEDEVAC operations.

Here We Go Again - The Geneva Convention Prevents Us from Doing the Right Things

In paragraph 2 we are informed that the rule regarding not arming medical evacuation vehicles is traced to German perfidy in World War I. Not true. The relevant provisions in the Geneva Convention come from the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field signed in Geneva on August 22, 1864:

Article 1. “Ambulances and military hospitals shall be recognized as neutral, and as such, protected and respected by the belligerents as long as they accommodate wounded and sick.”

“Neutrality shall end if the said ambulances or hospitals should be held by a military force.” [emphasis added]

Source: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/120-40001?OpenDocument

Article 7.” A distinctive and uniform flag shall be adopted for hospitals, ambulances and evacuation parties. It should in all circumstances be accompanied by the national flag.”

“An armlet may also be worn by personnel enjoying neutrality but its issue shall be left to the military authorities. Both flag and armlet shall bear a red cross on a white ground.”

Source: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/120-40007?OpenDocument

More importantly, the Senator argues that “clearly marked medical evacuation vehicles may not be targeted for attack and must not be armed.” As radio icon Paul Harvey used to say, “and now for the rest of the story.”

The Geneva Convention is a legal agreement signed by nation states. It includes rules about how medical evacuations shall be conducted in wars involving nations that signed the agreement.

•   The treaty does not require medical evacuations to be conducted only by vehicles dedicated exclusively to that purpose.
•   It does not require medical evacuations to be done only by unarmed vehicles
•   It does not require medical evacuations to be done only while showing Red Cross emblems on the vehicles.
•   It does state that if vehicles bear Red Cross emblems then

o they shall be used for medical purposes only (evacuating the wounded, transporting medical supplies, etc.) and
o they shall be unarmed

This is a point that confuses many people arguing that the Red Crosses cannot be removed from MEDEVAC helicopters. They have the argument backward, saying that because the helicopters are used for MEDEVAC purposes then they must bear the Red Cross emblems and thus must be unarmed. Armies are free to transport wounded in any vehicle they wish – armed or unarmed. It is only if they bear the Red Cross emblem that they are restricted to being unarmed in exchange for not being attacked by enemy forces of signatory countries.

The Geneva Convention clarified for signatory nations that in the event of a war with a non-signatory nation or other non-signatory armed forces, then another set of rules applies. The signatory nation (the U.S. in Afghanistan) is obliged to abide by Geneva Convention rules for a reasonable period of time upon commencement of hostilities. During this period the enemy nation or force must declare whether it will abide by all the provisions of the Geneva Convention. If it fails to make that declaration and/or fails to act fully in conformance of the terms of the Convention, then the signatory nation is relieved of its obligation to adhere to the terms of the Geneva Convention. Given the lack of a declaration of adherence from al Qaeda or the Taliban and their repeated violation of the terms of the Geneva Convention, the U.S. is free to choose which if any provisions of the Geneva Convention it wishes to follow.

Assuming the U.S. decided to abide by the Geneva Convention, it still is entitled to remove the Red Cross emblems from the MEDEVAC helicopters and arm the aircraft. In October, 2008 the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General – International and Operational Law Division gave an opinion to the Army Surgeon General that arming MEDEVAC helicopters with M240, 7.62 Medium Machine Guns (defined by the Army as crew served) may be done at the discretion of the Theater Commander in Afghanistan without violating the Geneva Convention or other international law – as long as the aircraft are not bearing Red Cross emblems. In the case of this specific request for an opinion, the helicopters would “keep the MEDEVAC carousels, medical equipment sets, and flight medics on board during all Missions.” The helicopters could then be employed for an escort/chase or general support role – and by extension medical evacuation (as long as the Red Cross emblems are not replaced). The sole consequence of doing so is the helicopter and crew will “lose its protected status under the [Geneva Convention].”

If We Armed Them Then We Would Reduce Care for the Wounded

In paragraph 3 of Senator Harkin’s letter we find several assertions needing rebuttal.

First, helicopters prior to the early 1960’s lacked the power to carry crew served weapons, but that did not prevent Marines during the Korean War from firing personal weapons from helicopter as they recovered the wounded. During the Vietnam War the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters were tasked with recovering downed airmen – not as supplements to the MEDEVAC forces. However, there were reports of several cases where U.S. Army divisions converted armed air assault helicopters into “division MEDEVAC” assets complete with Red Crosses that were unaffiliated with actual MEDEVAC units under the Army’s Medical Department control.

Next, in an attempt to dismiss the ability of a CSAR/CASEVAC helicopter crew to provide medical aid to the wounded, the Senator says CSAR/CASEVAC helicopters do not carry doctors. Left out is the truth that U.S. Army MEDEVAC helicopters do not carry doctors either. MEDEVAC crews include a single Army flight medic trained as an Emergency Medical Technician – Basic. (National Guard MEDEVAC crews typically have an experienced paramedic as the flight medic.) On the other hand, the regularly denigrated unmarked, armed CASEVAC aircraft are staffed like so:

• USAF CSAR/CASEVAC Pedro – a minimum of 2 of the more highly trained Emergency Medical Technician – Paramedic as crew members; some flights carry 3 paramedics
• UK Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) – carries a trauma/emergency medicine doctor, trauma/emergency nurses and paramedics who have extensive training and experience in all aspects of trauma management. MERT functions as a portable trauma room.

Harkin’s letter then says that MEDEVAC helicopters “maintain a full complement of emergency medical equipment for military doctors to use” and that “arming MEDEVACs may only displace necessary medical equipment in favor of weaponry.”

It is true that UH-60A/L MEDEVAC helicopters typically are outfitted with more medical equipment than a USAF Pedro helicopter, but that is changing, too. In 2011 the Army began phasing in the new HH-60M helicopters as replacements for legacy UH-60A/L models. In August, 2011 C Company, 3/82nd MEDEVAC Company became the first active duty MEDEVAC unit to deploy to Afghanistan with them. Immediately upon arrival in RC-East it was clear that the extra 2000 lbs weighed by the HH-60M over the older UH-60A/L prevented them from reaching locations previously serviced by the UH-60’s.

In an attempt to lighten the birds enough to fly to the necessary altitudes, orders were given to strip out the electric litter pans (much to the joy of the unit’s medics), the Aircraft Medical Oxygen Generation System and the Environmental Control System. When that proved inadequate, the command ordered the removal of the entire medical package.

In less mountainous regions, the UH-60A/L unused 600+ lb. litter carousel (which medics decry because it limits their ability to care for patients in flight) could be removed. Adding two machine guns, ammunition and gunners would be a virtual swap in weight. So, the change could be accomplished without interfering with patient care or “displac[ing] necessary medical equipment” while adding protection for the aircraft and crew.

Let's Not Make Our MEDEVAC Helicopters Targets

In a final statement which displays complete ignorance of the reality of every conflict the U.S. has been in since World War II, the Senator informs us that ”allowing medevacs to become military targets is simply a worse alternative.”

We do not “allow medevacs to be military targets”, our enemies make that decision. Consistently. In every conflict. Thousands of times in the past decade MEDEVAC helicopters with Red Cross emblems on all surfaces flying in Iraq and Afghanistan have been attacked with small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and shoulder launched missiles (Iraq only).

The Real Issue Is Delayed Launches

The real issue is delayed launches of some MEDEVAC flights under current policies in Afghanistan. Eliminating the delays can be achieved in a variety of ways:

•   Arm the MEDEVAC helicopters and let them fly under the same conditions as USAF Pedro aircraft
•   Dedicate an adequate number and type of armed helicopters to fly chase/escort for MEDEVAC missions so time isn't wasted waiting for an escort to be found
•   Change the rules determining launch requirements

Army leadership and Senators who can influence Army policies refuse to take any of these steps. They refuse to arm the MEDEVAC helicopters, insist that they be painted in highly visible colors, maintain the same launch rules, and refuse to dedicate enough armed escort helicopters to provide MEDEVAC helicopters airborne protection without delay.

We know that is not international law that prevents the problem from being solved. What else explains the failure to fix the problem? Money? Political power struggles within the Army? Weight? Tell the Gold Star families whose loved ones died due to delays in getting them to medical care that it was because of money or petty politics or weight.

So our wounded troops and MEDEVAC crews continue to be imperiled because no one in authority will take the simple steps necessary to provide adequate protection to the MEDEVAC helicopters.

When will members of Congress realize that Army managers are not telling them the whole truth about MEDEVAC and pre-hospital care in Afghanistan?

There are none so blind as those who will not see.

The original article can be found at www.medevacmatters.org

America’s Angry Troops: Message from a Marine

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 13 Apr 2012 01:21:55 +0000

Image: DVIDS

13 April 2012

Marine, Army and Air Force sources continue to provide information about MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan. Top Army Generals say there are no complaints from the MEDEVAC/CASEVAC community in Afghanistan, but if this were so how is it that I end up with stacks of internal documents from dozens of sources? In fact, top Army Generals have spent their credibility with the MEDEVAC/CASEVAC community.

In March, an Army Dustoff source revealed that a Marine died from electrocution in Helmand subsequent a slow MEDEVAC dispatch. (There may have been two separate electrocutions on separate dates.) Another Dustoff source brought up another Marine who died in Helmand within the last couple of weeks after a double amputation. Sources say that slow dispatch occurred in both cases.

The highest ranking officers in the US Army continue to deceive Senators and Representatives about the ongoing MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan. There are telltale signs that reveal deceptive Generals. If a General says or implies that Dustoff must wear Red Crosses due to Geneva Conventions, he is lying. Full stop.

There is no provision within the Geneva Conventions that states MEDEVAC helicopters must wear Red Crosses. It does not exist. Army lawyers have stated in writing that the Red Cross may be removed. The Generals are aware of this. More disturbing is that multi-star Army Generals will deceive about something so easily checkable as Geneva Conventions, and so simple as Red Crosses. What about the more complex aspects that are beyond our reach to check?

Many thousands of words have already been written about these MEDEVAC failures, including Red Air, Fool’s Gold and Troops’ Blood, Golden Seconds, Crusader Copters, and Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan. A more complete list is here.

The Red Crosses are symptomatic of a larger problem with MEDEVAC/CASEVAC and the war in general.

Take this email, from a Marine pilot:

(Published with permission)

“Notable fact, Marine aircrews are currently forbidden from performing any manner of casevac or medevac unless approval has come from the Wing commander (Brig Gen) himself. Having returned from a flying tour throughout Helmand last October, I can tell you they are very serious about this. In 2009, I saw two pilots get sent home along with the ground controller who allowed the injured (Marine in this case) to be put on board the helicopter.

“It’s one of the first things drilled into your head as a Marine pilot showing up at Bastion/Leatherneck for your inbriefs: ‘you will not transport injured personnel (US, ISAF, Afghan, or otherwise) in your aircraft without CG approval’. I've never heard of it being approved either. Only those few folks who risked it without approval and found out the brass wasn’t joking. Again in 2009, I actually watched a Captain tell Colonel to his face, ‘you’re wrong, Sir. I know I did the right thing’. He was sent home.

“This was a surprise to some who had flown in Al Anbar that were accustomed to Marine CH-46’s routinely flying casevac missions, for which they train as a fairly regular mission set/capability. The CH-46 is not, however, involved in Afghanistan due to power/lift limitations and it’s clear that the thought process from the USMC side is, ‘better to let the dedicated casevac/medevac platforms (Dustoff, Pedro, MERT) handle that job and we’ll stick to hauling ass ’n trash.’

“I will tell you in confidence that I have flown directly over the scene of IED strikes with badly injured personnel while listening to the radio and hearing Dustoff calling for takeoff at Bastion over 25 mins away...wondering if I could make a difference. Weird feeling.

“Most of the time we reassured ourselves that those aircraft had medics and life support equipment onboard while all we carry is a basic first aid kit for the crew and two litters. ‘The injured would fare better with them’...but still it caused one to wonder.

“I am not criticizing the USMC leadership for this decision-making process as it’s true that our aircraft are already overtasked, and the three Assault Support platforms in Afghanistan (CH-53D/E, MV-22 OSPREY) do not carry any medical equipment/personnel on board as I mentioned. It just makes the Army issue that much more intolerable to see it so poorly managed. Please forgive me if I’m bringing up points you’re already familiar with, but I’ve seen ‘USMC’ thrown out several times in the past months with regard to the casevac/medevac debacle and thought I would add my perspective.”

Bowe Bergdahl: Two messages from the Taliban

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 11:50:00 +0000

10 April 2012

Over the months I have communicated with the Taliban about US prisoner Bowe Bergdahl. Numerous times I have asked the Taliban to allow me to visit Bowe. In each case, the Taliban has declined citing security issues.

It has been said that I am negotiating with the Taliban for Bowe's release. This is untrue. I have asked only to visit. Nothing more.

This morning, I received two emails from the account of Zabihullah Mujahid, a high-level Taliban spokesman in regard to Bowe Bergdahl:

===Begin Taliban message===

dont worry , we are not like Americans who are doing to bad with their presnors in their preson , may be you remember or not the lady who was in our preson b4 and then she became muslim . it was because of good behaviour of our comanders . He is safe and have good health and sorry for this to say that we will invite you to see him becase of some security reasons .

But I asure you that he is happy and have good health . our holy prophet (Hazrat muhammad ) pbuh teach us how to deal with presnors .
so once again dont worry abut him , and my reqards and about his health to his family .
be safe.

===End Taliban message===

Also, on 29 March 2012, I had emailed a follow-up to the account of Zabihullah Mujahid:

===Begin my message===

Zabihullah,

Please ask the Taliban if I can come with a camera to record that Bowe is okay.

If you can send recent photos of Bowe, I would greatly appreciate this.

Thank you.

====End my message===

The second email today from the account of Zabihullah Mujahid:

===Begin Taliban message===

you have to wait for this, we know better that which time is best for his pic or vidio.
thanks.

===End Taliban message===

Taliban Sends Message about US Prisoner Bowe Bergdahl

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 29 Mar 2012 11:34:24 +0000

29 March 2012

Several years ago, the Taliban captured a US Soldier named Bowe Bergdahl. Yesterday was Bergdahl’s third birthday in captivity.

I’ve asked the Taliban several times to see Bergdahl. They have declined in the past citing security reasons. I recently asked the Taliban again about Bergdahl’s condition.

A message came from key Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid. More accurately, the email came from his account.

There is strong reason to believe that messages from this account are coming from from Zabihullah Mujahid, or someone deep within the “Big T” Taliban. (Upper leadership.)

In the past, this account has provided me with breaking information that could not have been derived from the news. For instance, Zabihullah, or whoever uses the account, messaged me last year just as the big hotel attack in Kabul unfolded. The account provided detailed information so early in the attack that the author must have had foreknowledge.

The actual messages might not be accurate, and they often exaggerate, but the account is real. This message came on 29 March 2012 in response to my inquiry about Bowe Bergdahl:

“He is healthy and with Taliban ,  we were in tuch with amerian to talk about exchange the prisoner but they not ecept this . and just wast the time . I personly issure u that he will be released , How , When , this is secret .”

I have requested again to visit Bowe Bergdahl.

Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 22 Nov 2011 12:25:27 +0000

22 November 2011

US Army MEDEVAC helicopters in Afghanistan are marked with Red Crosses. Helicopters sporting a Red Cross are not allowed to be armed. The enemy knows this. The enemy tries to shoot down these unarmed helicopters with the added advantage that our people cannot shoot back. And so, we push people into combat while advertising to the enemy that our people are unarmed. The best that can be said for this policy is that it’s wrong. The worst that can be said might be that it borders on criminal.

We like to think that after a decade of counterinsurgency, we have learned something. Have we? What does a cross on a helicopter mean? For some Afghans, it’s a mark of the beast. The poster above was hanging on a wall in eastern Afghanistan.

Of the approximate fifty evil symbols, most are crosses. Even the shape of an anchor is seen as unholy.

An Afghan friend translates:

*Destroying the cross is an Islamic obligation*

1. Christians want to publish and spread their unholy and cursed religious logos and signs in different shapes and appearances in clean and holy Muslim society.

2. These Christianity signs (Crosses) have affected our Islamic society too

– even our mosques and our Menbers are not safe from those Christianity signs (Crosses).

3. The respected Ulemas agree over the fact that destroying these crosses is an Islamic obligation and on whatever object or surface where there is a cross, praying is a sin.

6. For further explanations, refer to …. / …. / …. (Names of references given)

*Some of the names on the crosses:*

1. Cross of George

2. Cross of Andrew

3. Cross of Lauren

4. Cross of Jerusalem

5. Cross of Anthony

6. Cross in shape of the Nazi logo

7. Catholic Cross

===End of Translation===

The US Army will defend the Red Crosses on the helicopters by falsely bringing the Geneva Conventions into the conversation. They will say, “According to the Geneva Conventions…”

Nothing in the Geneva Conventions forces us to put Red Crosses on medics or helicopters. I’ve never seen a medic in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Philippines who was wearing a Red Cross. I don’t recall ever having seen an American service member wearing a Red Cross. Importantly, the US Air Force, Marines, and the British do not put Red Crosses on their helicopters.

This puts the Army’s argument about Geneva Conventions into an interesting light. By bringing the Geneva Conventions into the discussion, the US Army implies that the Marines, Air Force and the British all are violating the Geneva Conventions. They are not violating the Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile, the Army is shamelessly hiding behind those conventions to forward an internal political fight about who controls those helicopters.

The Army has not a single valid reason for sporting the Red Crosses. Army leadership should hang its head in shame for willfully endangering troops and the mission by sending unarmed troops into combat, signaling to the enemy that they are unarmed, all while elegantly marking our helicopter with what to many Afghans is a mark of the beast.

If the Army insists on sending unarmed troops into combat, it should at least remove the crosses that alert the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed, all while inflaming local passion to shoot it down.

Panjway, Afghanistan: Amphitheater of War

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 23 Mar 2012 11:29:09 +0000

For a larger view please click on image or one of the links below.

23 March 2012

This panorama was made in the general area where the Panjway 17 massacre unfolded. The view is over the Arghandab River Valley, a place that Canadian and many US forces know well. The Arghandab can be an interesting place to watch war; there are many vantage points such as this that allow you to witness much fighting. Sometimes you are in the middle. The area can be an interactive combat amphitheater.

Panjway Panorama Link: http://gigapan.org/gigapans/101311

I made the 27 photos in this pano in a handheld mode while tagging along with members of the Central Asia Development Group (CADG) who were implementing a water project. We were without troops. CADG operates freely in some of the most hostile areas of Afghanistan where troops would not go without significant force. This is one of those places.

Much serious fighting has happened within ear and eye-shot of this panorama. This is, quite literally, the birthplace of the Taliban. There is little doubt that Mullah Omar once bathed in this water.

This image is interactive. By searching, you can see security barriers and cell phone towers. The Taliban forces many cell towers to shut down at night. Taliban likes cell phones, but we use them for targeting. Of course the enemy knows this and want them off at night. Blackberries and iPhones work here.

If our goal were simply to wipe out the enemy without regard for human costs, US forces could do that in an hour or two. But we've tried counterinsurgency (COIN), which remains a work in progress a decade later. Today we are negotiating with the Taliban.

The Taliban will inherit this land. Panjway, where these images were made, is the birthplace of the Taliban and it's still theirs. As you can see, the terrain is not rough. We simply never applied enough pressure to break their will, and they didn’t quit.

Progress has definitely been made: COIN is working, but we waited too long. The Afghan war is a classic case of too little, too late. This area of Afghanistan will remain Taliban country, but we will have made roads and other projects to help get crops such as opium to market. After aid dries up, they’ll probably let the roads fall into disrepair and keep plodding along.

Again, this image is interactive. If you see something of interest, please make a "snapshot" with a description. Snapshot button is on lower left.

(The GoogleEarth geolocation is approximate. The "two" motorcycles on the right are actually one guy. He moved between images.)

Panjway Panorama Link: http://gigapan.org/gigapans/101311

https://www.facebook.com/MichaelYonFanPage

Tigers, Crocodiles, Korans and Superstitions

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 28 Feb 2012 12:30:14 +0000

Tiger eyes of man with fresh scars

“The Sundarbans lies in the massive delta between India and Bangladesh. This is one of the most beautiful but most dangerous places in the world, a place of tigers and crocodiles and dangerous seas and canals. Mamata is just one of about 3,000 ‘tiger widows’ in the Sundarbans.”

28 February 2012

When a man says, “It’s a jungle out there,” he means, “It’s the Sundarbans.” Among the many wild and unforgiving places in the approximately 65 countries I’ve traveled, most are fairly safe when approached with good judgment and aforethought. The Sundarbans is not one of those places. Few jungles are this dangerous.

The natives here rub shoulders with mortality on a daily basis. And so before venturing into the labyrinth waterways, one should acquire a guide, which in my case was a government employee with a powerful FN-FAL rifle to ward off man and beast. Competent, local guides are always your best insurance, and if I had a choice of any rifle in the world to bring here, the FN-FAL would be high on the list. And so those boxes were checked.

Within about a week previous my arrival, eight people had been killed and more than a dozen wounded in personal combat with tigers. Nobody knows why the tigers kill so many people here. None of the eight people recently killed were eaten. The tigers often devour their prey, but sometimes they just murder, and of course there is always a market for tiger parts. It’s a bloody mess.

Add to that the giant saltwater crocodiles, sharks, incredibly venomous snakes, mosquitoes and so on and so forth, and the Sundarbans is a mysterious place that remains off of the backpacker beat. I’ve wanted to come here for years but was rudely interrupted by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The vast jungle and mangrove swamps cover about 10,000 square kilometers. Many sights and smells can nearly mirror places in Florida, and so at times it felt like home and could have made me homesick it weren’t so fun and interesting. Anglers who tool around the estuarine river areas of Florida, and who cast for snook near the mangroves, would find reminders in the form of beautiful white egrets, kingfishers and relentless sun. The mostly compliant alligators we see basking in Florida are replaced here by extraordinarily ferocious crocodiles.

Noticeably missing are the turtles. Whereas in Florida it would be normal to see a hundred turtles per day sunning themselves on white-worn branches elbowing out of the waters of the Peace River, it can be rare to see even a single turtle after spending long days on many Asian rivers. This is true ranging from the mighty Mekong, to the Mae Ping, the Salween, over to the Ganges or up at the Bramaputra in Nepal. I rarely if ever see turtles in Asia, though there were land turtles in Afghanistan. There has been a program to introduce thousands of snapping turtles into the Indian Ganges to eat the thousands of human corpses, but apparently the turtles could not keep up. My guess is that the people ate the turtles.

Numerous substantial rivers including the Ganges feed the Sundarbans. About one third of the Sundarbans drains from India and the rest from Bangladesh. Due mostly to Hindu funerary traditions, the Indians dump countless tons of human flesh into “Mother Ganges” (Ganga Ma) each year, which flows and fans to the delta by the crocodiles, the crabs, and the tigers. Some people believe that the Royal Bengal Tigers of the Sundarbans may have gotten their taste for man from the stream of corpses flowing into their abode.

The Ganges is tremendous. I’ve been lucky enough to see many faces of Ganga Ma, and spend many a day and night along her banks, and on boats in India. In a world with many rivers unnamed, Ganga is eclipsed only by the Amazon and Congo rivers in sheer volume. In full flood only the Amazon is larger. Fittingly, headwaters for Ganga Ma include snowmelt from the very distant Mt. Everest. And so water flows from Mt. Everest, through the mysteries of Nepal and India, through the wonders of the Sundarbans finally into the Bay of Bengal where it mixes with the seas.

In the United States, to see people petrified of snakes is almost comical. Practically nobody dies from snakebites in America. The chances are far higher of being hit by lightning. The most deadly snakes in the US are still second-chance serpents, like rattlers or moccasins. If a diamondback hits you, you’ll almost certainly live because you’ll probably get to a hospital and suffer through. But if a cobra or other super-snake hits a villager, he’s likely finished.

There are about 216 types of snakes just in India, of which about 52 are venomous. Nearly all the deaths are caused by “The Big Four”: Indian Cobra; Common Krait (the bed snake); Russell’s Viper (which Indians call “Daboia”—the lurker); and the Saw Scaled Viper, a vicious little snake that some people consider the most deadly in the world.

There are many lists for the “most dangerous” or “most venomous” snakes in the world. The snakes that count most are not the ones with the most toxic juices, or the most dangerous bites, but the ones who actually fill the most graves.

The deadly Krait likes to come inside homes where it often slithers in bed with people. Its bite is so painless that many victims do not realize they have been envenomated. Some Indians believe the Krait just licks people. Victims are found dead in their beds, or wake up and die.

Cobras are not much better; they also like to move into people’s homes to chase rats. Getting bitten by a cobra is like being blasted by a shotgun. There was once a practice of putting cobra venom inside musket balls and arrowheads, though I have no idea if this still occurs.

In India alone, it is believed that snakes kill up to 50,000 people per year.

Man with tiger eyes removes shirt to show new scars.

The lure of the Sundarbans is strong. Moreover, this general area of the world is increasingly important to the United States and so it’s good to understand something of the neighborhood. Bangladesh was formerly known as East Pakistan. It’s about 90% Muslim and the balance mostly Hindu. Bangladesh is a young country in the old world with history as complex as the mangroves. In 1971, East Pakistan split from West Pakistan (our current headache for Afghanistan, etc.), and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. The divorce was bloody and Bangladeshis have little love for current-day Pakistan.

We have military cooperation with Bangladesh. As an American I was well received and felt welcome. Our Special Forces have worked with the Bangladeshi military. Though Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on Earth—and is ravaged every year with floods that would be significant historical events in the United States—the people seem remarkably happy and were extraordinarily friendly without the commensurate rip-offs that one finds in north and central India, and to a lesser degree in Sri Lanka, and far lesser still in nearby Nepal.

Some people believe that radical elements wish to impose a Taliban-esque state onto Bangladesh, making it an even more interesting place to become familiar with, though compared with places like Afghanistan, terrorism is negligible and the greater threats for a man on journey are from common sources, such as mosquitoes, bad water, and the same sort of crime that can be found in Mexico or Los Angeles.

Bangladesh is the most crowded country on Earth. The lowland bordering the Bay of Bengal makes it acutely vulnerable to tsunami. Much of the country is so low that a minor sloshing from the sea can be catastrophic. The earthquake threat is of cataclysmic proportion. Powerful shifting can change the course of the major rivers and erase huge numbers of people in a single moonless night, sweeping them wholesale through the darkness toward the Bay of Bengal.

Mr. Tiger prepares to show wounds.

And so there we were. Deep, deep in the Sundarbans on a boat. We got out occasionally and found in dried mud the tracks of a tiger cub and momma. For every tiger print there were hundreds of deer prints. Monkeys and spotted deer were a common sight. Monkeys more so than the deer. Locals say the monkeys and deer cooperate and warn each other of tigers.

The crocodiles can be huge, and I’ve heard stories from the India side of people sacrificing babies to crocodiles, though I doubt the Indian authorities would permit that these days. Various human sacrifice is still a problem in India but authorities seem to be making progress tamping it down. There are frequent credible stories, such as that in Bangladesh of the bricklayer whose head was burned in a kiln after a fortune teller said the sacrifice would redden the bricks, and therefore fetch a higher price. Some Bangladeshis believe that sacrificing human heads will strengthen bridges. It is unlikely that the vast majority of these events are reported.

This week yet another report of a cannibal monkey man in India:

“The Mumbai police have rubbished rumors doing rounds at several suburban pockets in the city where people are living in fear of a gang or a ‘monkey man’ that is kidnapping children and raping women before consuming them.”

Some Indians believe the monkey men smear themselves with grease, such as the “grease devils” in nearby Sri Lanka, who slippery themselves up to avoid being caught. Grease devils and rumors of grease devils have led to considerable violence when the gossip causes panic. Strange social panic attacks based on fact, fiction, or both, unfold so frequently in South Asia that I cannot keep track.

Along for security was the man with the clean rifle. The FN-FAL was smooth from wear and he kept it at my feet. I asked if it was loaded, and he pulled out the magazine and ejected a cartridge and handed it to me, saying he had twenty. He handled the rifle safely at all times. He wasn’t just some guy to whom they issued a brown uniform and powerful military weapon. He was accustomed to holding the rifle. Maybe he had been a soldier.

He didn’t need 20 bullets for a tiger. One or two from that powerful rifle would take care of anything a cat could do. He said that if you fire one shot into the air, the tiger bolts.

But there are pirates and poachers. There are even boats with prostitutes in some areas. Human smugglers are said to kidnap or buy children from various countries, and they live in the wilds and on boats in the Sundarbans. Global human trafficking is immense and complex. My grandmother used to warn that gypsies would kidnap children. Interestingly, up near Dhaka, the capital, I went to a river gypsy village. The men had no problem with my photographing everyone, including the children, but there was one young girl they did not want photographed, which during the melee of gypsy kids, I photographed anyway.

I don’t know what the going price for kids is, but some tigers are said to go for up to $70,000. A tiger might as well be on the FBI’s Top Ten to command such a bounty. Every villager from here to Chitwan knows that one tiger is worth more than his entire family will ever make in a lifetime, but children are far easier to find and market.

During honey-collecting season, villagers leave the boats and push deeper onto land, and the tigers hang out by the bees and kill the honey collectors. The Royal Bengal Tigers attack the neck from behind, so the honey collectors wear masks facing backwards to confuse the tigers. They say the tigers have caught onto that trick. Tigers will swim out to small boats to take fishermen at night.

On the second day, I asked Mr. Rifle to take us to a village where a man had recently been attacked.

The villagers were Hindus and had never met an American. My photographs did not always catch them smiling despite that the people seemed very happy for the guest.

Mr. Tiger never smiled. He was stiff from the attack and had difficulty turning his head. Sometimes the tigers come into the huts at night but if a tiger holes up in a hut, the villagers are apt to surround the hut with fishing nets and trap it.

When the cyclones come, villagers must escape to cyclone shelters or risk being washed away. It’s nothing for a cyclone to sweep up from the Bay of Bengal and kill thousands of people.

Powerful storms in the Bay of Bengal can gather quickly. With little warning, unfavorable geography and weak preparations, the people are smashed with world-class hurricanes. The 1970 Bhola cyclone killed up to 500,000 people and was one of the worst natural disasters known to man. For every human lost in Hurricane Katrina, approximately 250 were lost in Bhola.

The only things this place is missing are man-eating plants and an angry volcano. If a man can live here and not pray to God, he’s a true atheist. The Sundarbans is a perfect breeding ground for extreme superstition.

Tiger Man had been out in the nearby jungle collecting wood and other materials to make these huts. He had no warning before the cat hit him.

His eyes never changed expression. Some troops get this look when they’ve seen too much combat. He was friendly but never laughed when the others laughed, nor did he crack any hint of a smile.

Tigers attack the base of the neck from the back.

Superstition is king of many deserts and jungles. If you come into a village, and someone falls from a tree and dies, it might be best for you to move out. Many a traveler no doubt has met his tragic end for some superstitious therapy, to set villagers’ minds at ease that the rip in the universal fabric has been mended.

In the Sundarbans, when a man is killed by a tiger, his wife is believed to have brought bad luck and she and the children are vanquished:

“[T]he tiger widows…viewed as harbingers of bad luck among the superstitious local population…are avoided, expelled and, after the dramatic deaths of their husbands, thrown out by their husband's families, with which they have often been living since their weddings. Already poor, they have no choice but to provide for their families themselves.” Spiegel: Bangladesh's Tiger Widows Fight Exclusion

Man is always looking for ways to make himself right by the Gods. Today in Afghanistan, over the Koran burnings, that cleansing appeasement takes the form of bullets and car bombs.

In Africa and other places, babies often are sacrificed:

“His top teeth came in before his bottom teeth. That is how elders of the Kara tribe determined that a healthy baby boy needed to be killed. The child was ‘mingi’—cursed, according to their ancient superstitions. With every breath, they believed, the boy was beckoning an evil spirit into their village.

“…[T]he decision to kill the boy was the easy part. It was the sacrifice of one infant for the good of the entire tribe—a rite that some of the elders had witnessed hundreds of times...the tribe’s leaders were less certain of what they should do about the boy’s twin brother, who had died of sickness shortly after birth. After some debate, including a pensive examination of a goat’s intestines, they decided the dead child must have been mingi…they dug up the corpse, bound it to the living boy, paddled a canoe into the center of the Omo River and threw them both into the murky brown water.” CNN: Is the tide turning against the killing of 'cursed' infants in Ethiopia?

Mr. Tiger had a Bengal tiger on his back. He struggled to survive but the cat was strong and was winning. He said five or six other men attacked the tiger with sticks, but the cat fought back.

Tiger teeth marks.

One can only imagine the suddenness of a tiger weighing hundreds of pounds sinking its teeth into your neck, pinning your head to the ground. The sound of its panting in your ears, the smell of its meat-eating breath in your nose and mouth. Those who have smelled tiger’s breath say it’s horrible.

If the cyclones, serpents, mosquitoes and tigers aren’t enough, there’s the Sundarban crocodiles. We saw many, and the largest was bigger than most of the fishermen’s boats. These are Estuarine Crocs and keeping in context with the Sundarbans, they are man-eaters. They snatch people off the banks and boats.

Crocodile just near Tiger Man’s village.

There are stories around the world about sacrifices to crocodiles. Along the Ganges, Hindu women of yestertimes were said to hold a baby by the arm until a crocodile came to take it, and then she would toss the baby to the croc and watch it devoured.

Tiger scar.

Tiger Man could try kitty therapy. This cat would be perfect; it sleeps with its claws extended and it can warn of Kraits.

Mankind uses therapy to assuage its fears. Sometimes the therapy comes in the form of drowning babies, feeding them to the crocodiles, or in casting out the tiger widows.

Laws against human sacrifice are enforced only when those making the laws are more powerful than those who continue with human sacrifice.

There is no significant difference between this and what we see today in Afghanistan with the fanatical reaction to the Koran burnings. Dozens of people have already died. There was a large car bomb yesterday morning in Jalalabad, for which the Taliban claimed credit for killing at least nine more people. Most of the killing is by Afghans of Afghans.

If those committing this human sacrifice were a small tribe in Africa warding off “mingi,” we would instantly recognize that their behavior is unacceptable. If someone burned some papers, no matter how much offense it caused, and a tribe in Africa started a bonfire for babies, it would not be appropriate to apologize.

There is little difference in blasting off suicide bombs than in feeding babies to crocodiles. Anthropological details vary but the essentials remain unchanged.

Hindu shrine along a canal near Mr. Tiger's village and the crocodile.

Those committing the human sacrifices in Afghanistan hold sufficient power that they caused the President of the United States, and our Commanding General in Afghanistan, to buckle and supplicate themselves with apologies for offending the sensibilities of superstition. Granted, it is unwise to gratuitously offend the beliefs of others, but when murder is being committed the apologies should cease. We are not responsible for atrocities they commit.

I have repeatedly spoken up against the burning of the Koran, yet there comes a time to acknowledge that something is wrong for which we are mistaken to apologize.

Libya Spot Report

nomadickirk@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:43:45 +0000

16 March 2012

An experienced friend is currently in Tripoli and writes:

I’m telling you, you should get your butt over here to Libya - it’s a really interesting place. I know everyone’s mind is on Afghanistan these days, but there’s really no comparison. The two countries could not be more different – at least from what I can see here in Tripoli.

I haven’t had an opportunity to get far out of Tripoli, so my observations are limited to the capital area, but still, I can’t help feeling optimistic about Libya. Everyone may be in the honeymoon phase a bit, post-Ghadaffi, but from what I have observed, most Libyans here in Tripoli have laid down their weapons and cheerfully gone back to work. You do see the militias, but they are no longer running checkpoints around the city and seem to confine themselves mostly to milling around their compounds or hanging out on a street corner. You still see the odd technical – like the DShK I saw mounted in the back of a pickup in the city center yesterday – but very few armed men in the streets.

Tripoli itself does not appear to have taken much damage in the NATO bombing raids. The only major damage I’ve seen is to the military installations just outside the city and of course on Ghadaffi’s compounds, which were basically leveled. I’m kicking myself for not taking a photo of the billboard I saw near one of Ghadaffi’s ruined compounds that said “Thank You, NATO!” The only major destruction I’ve seen inside the city was to one of Saif Gaddafi’s houses, where all the windows were shot out and the walls appeared to have been peppered with RPG and small arms fire. You still hear occasional gunshots, usually at night, but it sounds to me like people just letting off the odd burst for the hell of it. I’ve heard nothing that sounded like an actual gunfight – despite what some of the journalists around here might be reporting. In fact, you might want to check that out, because I’m really starting to feel that some of the journalists over here may be sensationalizing their reports a bit. But then, I haven’t been here that long, so maybe there are things I’ve missed.

As for the city itself, Tripoli has much to offer. It’s right on the water, has access to many historical sites, including many Greek and Roman ruins, and seems to have pretty good infrastructure. Since the end of the revolution, there have been efforts to clean things up in the city, but they do have a ways to go. Although there is still a lot of trash in the streets in some areas, they have done things like re-painting historic buildings in order to spruce up the place. I’ve been consistently impressed with the quality of the buildings and infrastructure here. The roads are quite good, with a modern highway system that looks very similar to what you would see in the States. Other than the trash problem, municipal services are up and running, with power, water, and sewer systems all functioning as they would in any developed country.

I think the thing that strikes me the most is the people’s ability to hold things together, even without much government presence. The locals I’ve met here all say there has not been a huge increase in crime, despite relatively few police on the streets.

I don’t know if this is true, but one of our favorite taxi drivers told us yesterday that when the rebels started closing in on him, Ghadaffi released several thousand prisoners from jail (why? Our interlocutor just shrugged and said, “because Ghadaffi was CRAZY”), but instead of running off, most of the prisoners actually gave themselves up again and went back to prison. This sense of order seems to prevail around here. For example, despite a complete lack of traffic police, I would say that about 80% of the drivers here obey traffic lights and road signs.

As for the people, they are all quite friendly. Of the locals I’ve found who speak English, they all say the same thing: Libyan people love life. I can’t know what things look like in rural areas, but here in the city that does seem to be the case. That’s not to say that they aren’t concerned about the future, because they are. But so far, I’ve seen no evidence that there are any hard-core Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists hanging around the city. Most women do wear headscarves, but you see them driving everywhere and there is free mixing of the sexes, so that’s an encouraging sign that people don’t seem to be outwardly too conservative. Here’s a good example: there’s a statue of a naked woman in the middle of one of the fountains in town.

Apparently, there have been a few people making a stink about it, but most of the locals could care less. You also see naked people on some of the Roman ruins in town and no one seems too bothered by that either. I know these things can change quite rapidly, but for the moment, logical minds seem to be prevailing. I guess that’s what happens when you have a pretty educated and literate population. The ethnic composition of the city is mixed, with about 10-15% of the residents being black Africans. Many of them are 2nd or 3rd generation Libyans though and are not refugees or guest workers from sub-Saharan Africa. There are also a number of Turks, Tunisians, and many Egyptians here. The latter appear to dominate the service industry – for example, at all the hotels I’ve been to, the staff are all Egyptian.

Overall, everyone seems to be holding their breath a bit until the elections in June. Although the East, dominated by Benghazi, is pushing for a semi-autonomous state, which some people fear could lead to a civil war, I can’t help feeling that they’ll work things out somehow. All I know is that it would be a shame for things to devolve into chaos here. I think there’s opportunity in Libya for the development of a modern, somewhat secular state, friendly to both Europe and the U.S., but I think we in the west need to help guide things a bit – mostly through foreign investment. Personally, I think we should stay out of their business when it comes to politics. I have to agree with a local friend I met here a couple of days ago – Libya might not be ready for full-blown democracy just yet, and we might screw things up if we insist they try to go down that road. Just look at Afghanistan and how well “democracy” is working out there!

Anyway, I still think you should come check it out. There’s not much American involvement here at the moment – I’ve only met two others since I’ve been here and they’ve been working and living in Morocco for several years, so they’re not exactly new arrivals. I think the American people might like to know what’s going on over here since we bankrolled most of the revolution. And after being jaded by Afghanistan for so long, this place is something of a palate cleanser.

Sir Petraeus

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 16 Mar 2012 14:26:01 +0000

16 March 2012

This has been secret until a few minutes ago. The Dutch Minister of Defense just knighted General (ret.) Petraeus in the Hague. I was invited to go but could not make it, unfortunately.

More Mass Murders in Afghanistan

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 15 Mar 2012 14:39:07 +0000

15 March 2012

Got this message from former Marine Tim Lynch, in Afghanistan. Tim's not always polite, but he's a former infantry officer and I listen to him very closely:

"The Taliban killed 13 women and children today with an IED in Uruzgan and I think they got 8 yesterday - but that's all cool here because they're the Taliban and we're the big fat retarded kid on the block who gets bullied everyday but still shows up to fork over even more lunch money while assuming at some point everyone will like us because we're so xxxxx generous."

The Panjway 16

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 15 Mar 2012 12:26:19 +0000

15 March 2012

The New York Daily News asked for an op-ed on the mass murder in Afghanistan. I invested several hours writing and they took it as is. As per normal, they changed the title. Practically every publication does this to suit their specific readership, and that’s fine. But on my website we can stick with the original title,

“The Panjway 16.”

Are some in the American forces buckling under the pressure of war?

The mass murder in Afghanistan was predictable. Twice in the past three weeks, I published that it was coming. Why was I able to write this with sad confidence? I’ve spent more time with combat troops in these wars than any other writer: about four years in total in country, and three with combat troops.

About 200 coalition members have been killed or wounded from insider attacks. Afghan President Hamid Karzai is tantamount to being Taliban and has not bothered to apologize. Instead, Karzai whips up anti-U.S. fervor at every opportunity. Twice, Karzai has threatened to leave politics and join the Taliban.

Even our most disciplined troops — not the few problem troops — have lost all idealism. They have not lost heart for the fight. Mostly, they just don’t care. They fight because they are ordered to fight, but they have eyes wide open. The halfhearted surge and sudden drawdown leave little room for success.

We face a discipline collapse. The bulk of our force is solid — then there’s a small fraction, probably a sliver of a percent, who might be crushed by the pressure.

On Feb. 24, I published:

“As the prevalence of insider attacks rises, and we lose more troops to Afghan troops going berserk and murdering our people, it’s likely just a matter of time before a U.S. troop or troops turn the table and intentionally slaughter Afghan forces.

“That could lead to a meltdown. We are at risk of losing control of more than some people might imagine. There is only so much that U.S. forces will put up with before fringe U.S. combat troops start taking matters into their own hands. Believe me.”

The next day, I published, “If things keep going this way, my expectation is that it’s a matter of time before discipline breaks and the gun turns.”

I’ve seen a few men on our side precariously close to the edge. In fact, my official embed status was ended by the Army in August 2011 after I wrote about issues with three soldiers.

I was accused of saying there were issues because I was disembedded. Yet the written trail and chronology is clear: I publicized discipline problems, then the Army circled the wagons and I was shown the door.

I published that a master sergeant stationed in Kandahar was homicidal after he strongly hinted at murder on his website. For years, he had been writing about his mental issues — yet the Army sent him to Afghanistan. Between hate-filled rants about gays and so on, he would write about his mental illness. In January of this year, he turned himself in to a clinic in Kandahar for mental issues.

Why was this guy armed and in Afghanistan in the first place? (He had nothing to do with the 16 murders.)

The 16 murder victims, including women and small children, are Pashtun. Pashtuns live by a code called Pashtunwali, which they take as seriously as the Koran. Pashtunwali includes “nanawatai” (asylum), “badal” (justice/revenge), “tureh” (bravery, specifically protecting women, children and property) and “namus” (honor of women).

Pashtunwali commitment to “badal” makes the Hatfields and McCoys look like a schoolyard fight. Nor is this just a Pashtun thing. There is an annual bloodfest between the Hazaras and Kuchis. That feud should be cranking up again with spring.

Afghan feuds are famously persistent. Badal carries through the generations like DNA. A grandson not born today might take revenge for events decades before his birth. He may kill someone who also was not born at that time.

Panjwai district, the scene of the crime, had been one of the most dangerous districts in Afghanistan. Panjwai saw major battles involving Canadian, U.S., U.K., Dutch and Afghan forces. Many hundreds of enemy were estimated killed, and we took substantial casualties.

Progress was happening there. In early 2011, I drove there from Kandahar city without the military. The mood of the locals was tense. The journey was unsafe, but the fact that we entered what had previously been a Taliban-owned district, and returned safely, was demonstrative.

Yet in one furious night of murder, a single U.S. soldier (apparently) has wiped Panjwai progress off the map.

Karzai is Pashtun. He said, “This is an assassination, an intentional killing of innocent civilians, and cannot be forgiven.”

Afghans will seek revenge and they will have it. This will lead to yet greater possibilities of another mass murder from our side. We are considering holding the trial in Afghanistan. Pashtuns don’t care about our justice system. They don’t even care about the Afghan government; they want blood for blood. We are being drawn into a feud.

Senator Levin on MEDEVAC

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 07 Mar 2012 13:41:19 +0000

07 March 2012

Senator Carl Levin has been sending a form letter to his constituents. Key parts of the letter seem to be have been written by the Army. At minimum, Senator Levin’s responses are a rewrite of Army releases. His statement perpetuates numerous myths and outright falsehoods. Carl Levin is Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Oversight is his duty. If Senator Levin independently researched the Army statements, he would know that they contain falsehoods.

The letter [along with my comments in brackets]:

Dear [Deleted]:

Thank you for contacting me about the U.S. Army’s medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) policy. I appreciate hearing your views on this matter.

Following the September 18, 2011, death of Army Specialist Chazray Clark in Afghanistan, concerns were raised about the Army’s MEDEVAC helicopter policy. The specific circumstances of Specialist Clark’s death are the subject of an ongoing investigation. For force protection reasons, all helicopters in Afghanistan fly in pairs, and the responsible in-theater commander makes the decision to use an armed escort for the MEDEVAC helicopter based on an appropriate tactical and risk assessment of each situation.

The Red Cross markings common to MEDEVAC vehicles of all types, ground or air ambulances, are consistent with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions. [False: there is zero requirement to wear the Red Cross. The Air Force, Marines, British and Dutch do not use the Red Cross in Afghanistan. Nor do Army Special Operations Forces. Only Army Dustoff MEDEVAC are ordered to wear the Red Cross, and the manner in which they fly in Afghanistan actually violates the Geneva Conventions. The violations occur in numerous ways. For instance, aircraft marked with the Red Cross are not permitted to fly over the enemy. Marked MEDEVAC also must fly over pre-agreed routes at pre-agreed times, and must land for inspection when summoned by the enemy. We violate or do not adhere to these and other GC provisions in Afghanistan. Most bizarre in this MEDEVAC debacle is that with his letter, Senator Levin is suborning violating Geneva Conventions, and may be encouraging the Pentagon to break the law. Of course the normal reply to this is, “The Taliban are not signatory to the GC.” And in rebuttal, “Agreed. The Taliban are not signatory. And so why did Senator Levin bring up requirements of the GC, implying that the Air Force, British, and Dutch are in violation? If GC does not apply, why bring GC into the discussion, and why alert the enemy to unarmed helicopters by wearing the Red Cross? If GC does apply, as Senator Levin suggests, we are in clear violation and Levin is encouraging violation.”] Even if the enemy targets all aircraft regardless of marking, as is the case in Afghanistan, the Red Cross ensures these helicopters will not be used for any other purpose than protecting their availability for their lifesaving mission. [Air Force Pedro are used in MEDEVAC/CASEVAC/CSAR rolls in Afghanistan. They do not wear Red Crosses and they are used for nothing but rescue. Levin’s sentence implies that Army generals admit that they lack the command horsepower to dedicate birds to MEDEVAC missions unless the generals use the excuse of the Red Cross.] MEDEVAC is distinguished from casualty evacuation, in which any available vehicle or aircraft is used to carry the wounded, as well as the well-known combat search and rescue operations of the Air Force and Navy. [This sentence is meaningless, and untrue; Air Force Pedro are dedicated assets with more medics aboard who on average are more highly trained than Dustoff flight medics.]

Arming MEDEVAC helicopters would require significant changes to the interior configuration of these helicopters and would reduce the space otherwise available to carry and treat wounded troops. [This is untrue on one level, and irrelevant on another; a primary argument is that Dustoff MEDEVAC should not wear Red Crosses to alert the enemy they are unarmed. Taking off the Red Crosses adds no weight, and might even save a few ounces in paint. The secondary argument is about arming the helicopters. Why not just remove the Red Cross so as not to alert the Taliban that you are unarmed?] Improvised explosive devices detonated against a military vehicle are the most common casualty producing attack in Afghanistan. These attacks typically injure more than one vehicle passenger, requiring evacuation of several victims. Arming MEDEVAC helicopters reduces the number of wounded carried and therefore increases the number of helicopters required and trips into and out of the area of an attack. [This is a statistical falsehood and also sidesteps the argument that two armed Air Force Pedros can carry more patients than one unarmed Dustoff with an Apache escort. This answer is a herring and assumes an uneducated reader.]

According to the Army [Does Levin trust the Army to say otherwise?], there is consensus within the Department of Defense and among commanders in Afghanistan that the policies and employment practices for Army MEDEVAC are appropriate. [False: most pilots I speak with say the system is replete with flaws far beyond those mentioned here.] It is important to note that the 92 percent survival rate for the wounded in Afghanistan is the highest in history, an accomplishment built on sound policy and the brave work of the Army’s medical crews. [The military is unable to substantiate this 92% claim. I have looked into this and found it demonstrably specious. The Pentagon should publish the study that supports the 92% figure. The Pentagon should be called before the Senate to defend its position.] As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I will keep your thoughts in mind as the Committee performs its oversight role of military operations in Afghanistan.

Thank you again for contacting me.

Sincerely,
Carl Levin
levin.senate.gov

MEDEVAC Momentum: Senate Armed Services Committee to Raise the Issue

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 01 Mar 2012 13:09:35 +0000

01 March 2012

The MEDEVAC issue continues with increasing seriousness. Numerous Generals, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense (through General Dempsey, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs) have all weighed into the fight. Seventeen members of Congress have joined, and more expressed interest in the past 48 hours in correspondence to me. I’ve just spent several hours personally answering many correspondences from offices of Members of Congress.

Two Senators, McCain and Manchin (both members of SASC) are stepping into the ring. Major media from CBS to FOX to AP and many others have done major pieces and more attention is on the way.

Rick Clay emails:

“I have some good news. I spoke to Senator Manchin and Senator McCain today. They are going to bring our issue up in an Armed Services Committee hearing March 5th during the Army Posturing Hearing and request a follow-up during the Afghanistan Hearing on March 25th. They are going to send me the link so we can watch the hearing.”

http://armed-services.senate.gov/members.htm

Our Weak Government Must Stop Apologizing for Criminal Behavior of Others

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 26 Feb 2012 18:19:35 +0000

27 February 2012

The recent Koran-burning in Afghanistan has again inspired lunacy and murder. And while the US civilian and military leadership burdened by their oleaginous apologies tumbles down a moral stairwell, Afghan security forces continue to murder American and Coalition troops. Insider violence persists at an increasing rate. Approximately 200 Coalition members have been killed or wounded in nearly fifty documented “green on blue” attacks.

Noticeably absent from the airwaves is a definitive apology from Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and a vow to fight this treachery committed by his troops. Instead, we are likely to hear Karzai whining about night raids that his own troops help conduct every night.

We should immediately cut off all aid to Afghanistan until we hear a public apology from Karzai, and a denouncement from Karzai of Coalition murders by Afghan troops. We should end all unnecessarily joint operations, training, and support of Afghan forces until we have public assurances from Karzai that the Afghan government strongly condemns the increasing murders of Coalition members. Armed Afghans should not be allowed onto US aircraft. Our people do missions every night with armed Afghans on our helicopters. It would be nothing to take down a CH-47 from the inside.

It is time that we redeploy our main battle force home and disentangle ourselves from AfPak.

Army Dustoff Medics Unprepared

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 23 Feb 2012 12:22:22 +0000

“After more than 9 years of conflict and more than 40 AAR’s recommending the evolution of MEDEVAC to current civilian standards, no institutional change has been made. Continuing the legacy model has resulted and continues to result in documented sub-optimal outcomes and increased deaths among patients transported by helicopter in the current conflict.”

Robert L. Mabry, FS, EMT-P
Lieutenant Colonel, MC
JTTS Medical Director, Enroute Care

23 February 2012

The United States Army has failed with extraordinary dexterity while executing the helicopter MEDEVAC plan in Afghanistan. On the surface, the Army advertisement campaign sells a story that their performance is exemplary and unprecedented in the history of war. The press machine churns out sound bites, which are picked up in major media without the barest pretense of auditing. For instance, senior Army officers saying and committing to writing that the Army has achieved a 92% success rate on MEDEVAC. The Army peddles this message, and yet nobody says, “Show me the money. Where do you get these figures?” There is growing evidence that the 92% figure is hollow and fraudulent.

For instance, in an internal memorandum, the issue of poor or nonexistent tracking is repeatedly hammered:

“Further, no systems exist that capture adverse outcomes, protocol violations or sub-standard care outside of the individual MEDEVAC unit or GSAB. Lack of patient care documentation in the medical record and trauma databases is the greatest hindrance to developing data needed to drive improvements in MEDEVAC care.”

Just how the Army derives a “92% success rate” (whatever that is) with data that it fails to track is unknown.

Another Army talking point is that the Dustoff MEDEVAC community is “purpose built” for MEDEVAC, and are the crème de la crème providers in Afghanistan. Yet this same memorandum states in clear terms that of the three principal MEDEVAC/CASEVAC providers in Afghanistan (Dustoff, Air Force Pedro, British MERT), the Army comes in last place with substandard, archaic procedures and woefully undertrained flight medics.

Excerpted highlights:

**US Army flight medics, credentialed at the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technician-Basic (EMT-B) level, are not trained to perform critical care transport or aggressive advanced resuscitation at the point of injury like their civilian flight paramedic counterparts operating in CONUS [Continental United States].

**Current MEDEVAC staffing model is outdated and based on Cold War / Vietnam [era] doctrine.

**The current capability gap has been documented in more than 40 AAR’s [After Action Reports] since 2002 in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Lack of advanced flight medic capability has directly resulted in poor outcomes in multiple cases and was the impetus for the deployment of critical care nurses to fill this capability gap as well as the deployment of a physician medical director. A recent study that compared critical care trained flight paramedics from a US Army National Guard air ambulance unit versus the conventional MEDEVAC systems operating in OEF [Afghan War] showed a 66% reduction in death at 48 hours post-injury in severely injured patients. Several recent cases illustrate the complexity and acuity of patients currently being managed by a single EMT-B flight medic. [Dustoff flies with a single medic. Air Force Pedro flies with a minimum of two medics per bird (often three) who are on average more highly trained.]

** Discussion: Significant variability in unit capability performing MEDVAC exits in the AO [Area of Operations]. The operational units have attempted to fill the capability gaps of our current MEDEVAC model with ad hoc methods that are not standardized and often have significant operational limitations. This creates a situation where different units/personnel have to be used for different missions. Further, no US Army standard treatment protocols exist, as these are significantly variable across different units. This variable capability degrades the MEDEVAC commander’s flexibility to respond appropriately across the full spectrum of missions.

**National Guard flight medics are often credentialed paramedics with extensive training/experience in critical care transport able to operate across the entire mission profile.

**Regular Army flight medics with EMT-Basic credentials and are not trained to transport post-op or intubated patients, nor are they able to perform advanced airway or resuscitative interventions from the point of injury.

**Medics in RC-S [Regional Command South; based in Kandahar] (101st ABN Div) attended an abridged paramedic program before this most recent deployment. Only 15% of the medics passed this accelerated program and while the remainder are “paramedic trained” they not credentialed as EMT-P’s. They have an expanded Advanced Life Support scope that #2 lacks, but still are not trained in advanced airway management / critical care transport skills.

**Air Force PJ’s (PEDRO) are credentialed paramedics that operate in pairs but lack critical care transport skills and cannot transport ventilator patients. They are allowed to perform Rapid Sequence Intubation and administer blood products but these skills are rarely used or sustained.

**Enroute Critical Care Nurses are able to transport intubated patients from Role II but are not allowed to go to a Battalion Aid-Station or a Shock Trauma Platoon to pick up an intubated patient as these are considered Point of Injury.

**British MERT (Medical Emergency Response Team) is able to bring a full resuscitation team to the Point of Injury and provide aggressive treatment to severely wounded casualties but their response time is sometimes longer than Army MEDEVAC or PEDRO.

**Unit flight surgeons lack the clinical skills, experience and credentials to supervise and train flight medics.

**Discussion: Every GSAB flight surgeon currently deployed to Afghanistan is a PGY1 general medical officer with no additional training in out-of-hospital care, trauma management, medic training, in-flight critical care, or medical oversight of a helicopter EMS system. In most cases, the experienced flight medics have more knowledge of enroute care than the physician supervising them.

**Further, no systems exist that capture adverse outcomes, protocol violations or sub-standard care outside of the individual MEDEVAC unit or GSAB. Lack of patient care documentation in the medical record and trauma databases is the greatest hindrance to developing data needed to drive improvements in MEDEVAC care.

**Conclusions: After more than 9 years of conflict and more than 40 AAR’s recommending the evolution of MEDEVAC to current civilian standards, no institutional change has been made. Continuing the legacy model has resulted and continues to result in documented sub-optimal outcomes and increased deaths among patients transported by helicopter in the current conflict.

Entire document

66 is not 59

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:43:50 +0000

17 February 2012

The Army campaign around the MEDEVAC continues to unravel. They’ve tried just about everything short of assassination and witchcraft to freeze the growing stampede. In the beginning, they claimed that my accounts of the failed MEDEVAC were completely wrong. And then I produced the inconvenient high definition video and audio.

Undeterred, the Army has continued with a pattern of repetitive deception, knowing that if they repeat something enough it becomes “true.” For instance, media accounts continue to parrot that Chazray Clark made it to the hospital one minute under the “Golden Hour” standard. They say he reached the hospital in 59 minutes. My video shows that it took about 66 minutes.

But the Army doesn’t let simple proof get in the way of the command narrative.

My unedited video of the attack and aftermath has been offered to the Pentagon and to the White House. Neither accepted. CBS and the Associated Press took it and produced stories. Neither questioned my timeline. FOX, nor any other media source, has questioned my timeline.

Yet outlets continue to parrot 59 minutes. All reports that accept this narrative in the face of video are faulty.

Importantly, the unit in question, 4-4 Cav, has never dissented with the timeline I provided, and was highly supportive of these efforts. A story about a fine Soldier in 4-4 Cav was published just yesterday, with these kind and generous words:

“Penton said if you really want to know what’s going on in Afghanistan, go to Michael Yon’s “Online Magazine.” He said all the American troops in Afghanistan trust and read Yon. Yon is what is called a combat journalist and the “New York Times” said he has spent more time imbedded with U.S. troops than any other living journalist. ”

Picayune Item

Department of Army Monitoring MEDEVAC Articles

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 15 Feb 2012 16:37:25 +0000

15 February 2012

The following message was issued behind closed doors by the Department of Army (DA). It pertains to media coverage of the MEDEVAC debacle. There is no foul in monitoring the articles, but the inside glimpse is interesting.

TAMPA TRIBUNE COVERS MEDEVAC STORY WITH LOCAL ANGLE:

Howard Altman, Tampa Tribune, is doing a story about one local woman's interest in the MEDEVAC issue and how it got her connected with Michael Yon, also a Florida resident. MRD OIL Team provided context and quotes as available in current

RTQs. Referred questions on the reporter's questions on catastrophic injuries to MEDCOM.

---END DA email---

Acronyms:
DA = Department of the Army
MRD = Media Relations Division
OIL Team = Operations, Intelligence, Logistics (a department in MRD)

Tippity Top General attempts to Deceive Congressman (in writing)

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 14 Feb 2012 15:24:42 +0000

14 February 2012

Happy Valentine’s Day. It isn’t Valentine’s for those who will get hit with bullets or bombs today. And it will happen. So let’s get down to business.

The top officer in the US Military is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to President Obama.

Recently, Congressman Todd Akin from Missouri has taken up the cause of repairing the Army MEDEVAC failures.

Previously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided Congressman Akin with a deceptive, error-filled letter whose content could have been written by Baghdad Bob for Ripley’s Believe it or Not! You have to see it to believe it.

Congressman Akin continued to push, but he was stonewalled. Mr. Akin was undeterred and responded by redoubling his efforts. For example, he marshaled other concerned Members of Congress, and altogether 17 Members sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.

The response by Mr. Akin and other Members of Congress is heartening. This is how a democracy should work. We citizens raised valid, important points. It took some time to get their attention, but once we got beyond those hurdles, Members of Congress have taken on the cause by first searching for the truth.

On two occasions, Mr. Panetta did not respond to Mr. Akin. On the second occasion, Mr. Panetta passed the buck back to General Dempsey, the Chairman of the JCS. General Dempsey’s response to Mr. Akin avoided the most important questions. General Dempsey’s response was also demonstrably deceptive. General Dempsey clearly states that he is responding on behalf of Secretary Panetta, meaning that Mr. Panetta endorses the deception.

With that realization, we have exhausted the military chain of command. And so this has finally become a matter for the Commander in Chief: President Obama.

If General Dempsey has provided a briefing to President Obama that parallels what we see below, General Martin Dempsey should be fired. If in good faith President Obama should make the mistake of repeating this from General Dempsey, at best he will look clueless to most combat veterans.

Despite those who wish to politicize this, the MEDEVAC problems did not arise under the watch of President Obama. They’ve been going on for years. I believe that if President Obama is properly informed, he will intervene.

President Obama: Please speak with Congressman Todd Akin in private, and with experienced Army Dustoff and Air Force Pedro pilots, before saying anything on this subject publicly. If you speak to Mr. Akin and to those pilots, you will know the truth.

The duplicitous letter from General Dempsey:

17 Members of Congress Want Answers on MEDEVAC

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 17:27:38 +0000

Contempt of and for Congress?

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 05 Feb 2012 02:30:22 +0000

US Military Forges Ahead with Deadly Deceptions

Dhaka, Bangladesh
05 February 2012

The US military is toying with American lawmakers.

Based on two key documents submitted to individual Members of Congress and the House Armed Services Committee, by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Army, it’s clear that a concerted, organized attempt to deceive Congress is coming from DoD brass. Repeated deceptions regarding MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan continue to be perpetrated in writing by certain leadership elements within DoD. Rebuttal to an egregious JCS letter is published here.

Subsequent the JCS missive to Congress, the Army also began circulating a statement to Senators and Representatives after CBS aired a story revealing some of the MEDEVAC shortcomings.

As with the JCS missive, the Army statement is a conspicuous attempt to mislead Congress. It really is that bad. The deceptions from both JCS and the Army are so egregious, so obvious, and so demonstrable, that the Congress should consider identifying the flag officers responsible to hold them accountable. The absurdity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army submitting unsigned communiqués packed with sleight-of-hand and outright falsehoods, in response to direct, official inquiry, is stunning. Not only does this demonstrate terrible judgment and dangerous “leadership,” they treat Members of Congress as fools to be played.

Members of Congress have requested truthful information from the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in return have received contempt. A minor error can be overlooked, but the calculation involved in repeatedly putting forth the same misleading arguments and falsehoods cannot be seen as a minor mistake. It’s strategic.

Some top officers do not take seriously the ability of elected officials to see through their clumsy smokescreen. Senior military officials are testing the will of Congress, doubting the determination of many offices on the Hill to drive forward with investigation—and to uncover the ground-truth we all know is hampering our Dustoff crews in doing the jobs they’re demanding to do.

The anonymous Army statement below is an orphan of unfit parents. We should hope that Members of Congress are not duped into embarrassing situations by responding to their constituents on-the-record with this issue by relying on unsigned spin like the document below, and the earlier JCS document. As the issue unfolds at an accelerating pace, and media inquiries to me increase, this fiasco has the potential to damage the credibility of any office defending or avoiding it.

The continuing, unacceptable MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan are of pressing consequence for troops in harm’s way. These policies, too, will leave more orphans of war, if not changed.

Yet this demonstrated contempt of and for Congress is a separate matter. Flag officers should be called before the Congress to explain these communiqués, and their roles in disseminating false information to Senators Kyl, Grassley, Hutchison, and Webb. These Senators and others have been deceived.

Please read this Army statement:

The orphaned Army statement above is refuted along with the JCS statement.

It's time to lay down the law.

The Army MEDEVAC Scandal: Report of Conspiracy

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 13:32:56 +0000

02 February 2012

An Army officer writes:

The Army is not resisting Dustoff policy change because our leadership honestly believes the current policy is superior, but rather because of AMEDD's [Army Medical Department] protectionist attitude toward "their" Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. I'm an active duty infantry officer, and I've been following the Dustoff issue since you first brought attention to it. More importantly, I have a lot of contacts within the Medical Service branch. While we have discussed this issue "around the watercooler" at work, Medical Service officers have been receiving briefings from senior members of their branch about a selectively edited account of SPC Clark's MEDEVAC mission, and what their message should be if anyone asks about it.

My contacts have highlighted that AMEDD's number one priority is protecting their "ownership" of the helicopters in question. They are concerned that removing the Red Cross from AMEDD's birds will result in those helicopters being assigned general purpose tasks, outside of the Medical Service Corp's control. In other words, their top priority is NOT providing the best possible care for our Soldiers and partners, but rather protecting their own fiefdoms. AMEDD is choosing to put Soldiers' lives in danger rather than chance losing "their" birds. Never mind that our sister services, special operations forces and allies are all able to field armed, dedicated CASEVAC/MEDEVAC helicopters! Somehow, despite all the evidence to the contrary, this is still the irrational argument AMEDD is sticking to, and directing its officers to spread. I'm concerned that in the dust-up over policy recommendations, comparisons with Pedro, and rebutting the JCS letter that we may be losing sight of the real obstacle in our path to reform. Sincere thanks for all you do, and keep up the fire!

13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 29 Jan 2012 19:48:07 +0000

An overview of harmful Army medical evacuation practices not endorsed by other service branches, and a response to official arguments defending this policy provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).

30 January 2012

Introduction

Michael Yon is a combat writer, and a former member of the US Army Special Forces. The New York Times noted in 2008 that he’d spent more time embedded with combat units than any other journalist in Iraq, and the reporting on his blog won the Weblog Award in 2005, 2007, and 2008. It is probable that he has also spent more time with combat troops in Afghanistan than any writer, photographer, or journalist of any sort. He is widely respected inside the military and beyond for the quality of his journalism, and his pursuit of the truth alongside US and allied combat personnel in the most dangerous theaters of operation.

On 18 September 2011, Mr. Yon accompanied an element of the US Army’s 1st Infantry Division, the 4-4 Cav, on a nighttime combat operation in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. During this mission the unit was attacked with an Improvised Explosive Device, deafening one soldier, and amputating both legs and one arm of a second—Specialist Chazray Clark. Specialist Clark was conscious and communicating up until the time he was evacuated.

US and allied forces have two primary helicopter medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets in Kandahar: US Army “Dustoff” flights, and US Air Force “Pedro” flights. Unlike Army Dustoff flights, the Pedro flights—as well as British, Dutch, US Marines, Navy, and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) medical flights—do not bear the Red Cross. The core reasons for this difference involve rapid reaction and maximum flexibility with limited air assets.

While Pedro, SOCOM, and Marine rescue flights can launch and insert quickly due to being armed, US Army Dustoff flights—following Geneva Conventions requirements for bearing the Red Cross—are unarmed, with Army policy requiring armed escort before they are allowed to launch their rescue missions. Consequently, unlike other MEDEVAC/CASEVAC flights, Army Dustoff flights are regularly delayed while they await escort gunships, often from other areas. There is no obligation under the Geneva Conventions to wear the Red Cross.

Specialist Clark and others probably died because of this delay.

During the incident in question, a Dustoff helicopter was approximately three minutes away, parked at Forward Operating Base Pasab. Both Dustoff and Pedro aircrews report being able to be airborne within roughly six minutes of receipt of orders.

However, because there were no Apache gunships available, the Dustoff flight for Specialist Clark was delayed. Official records state that he was delivered to hospital facilities 59 minutes after the MEDEVAC flight was requested by his unit—one minute from falling outside DoD standards, and within the “Golden Hour” from the moment of injury. But the military deceives here. Their fictitious Golden Hour does not begin at the moment of injury, but from the time the 9-line casualty report is received. This deadly deception was revealed in Golden Seconds.

Pedro helicopters also sitting at Kandahar Airfield could have completed this mission in less than 35 minutes. If Pedro or armed Dustoff had been stationed at Pasab, Chazray Clark could have been delivered to the trauma center in roughly 24 minutes.

The official record states that it took 59 minutes to deliver Chazray Clark to the combat support hospital. Video shot by Michael Yon provides conclusive proof that the military has deceived the Congress. Patient delivery took about 66 minutes from the time of injury, and about 65 minutes from the time of first report. There is no argument on this point. This clear deception brings in question all other military statements on this issue.

The death of Specialist Clark attributed to these delays is not an isolated incident.

The purpose of the Red Cross on Dustoff aircraft is to officially designate non-combatant status, granting immunity from hostile fire. Like many 20th Century rules of war, they are simply not recognized by any hostile elements the US is currently in conflict with. Even if they were recognized, the Red Cross is hard to see at night or during limited visibility. Helicopters do get hit with fire at night. For instance, a CH-47 was shot down at night last August, killing all 38 aboard.

According to the Geneva Conventions, "If there is no agreement, belligerents will only be able to use medical aircraft at their own risk and peril."

The reality is that helicopters bearing the Red Cross receive no protections, they are banned from participating in other high-need combat missions, and they have been delayed in their official duties to the point of permitting the deaths of US personnel.

It is also worth noting that because Geneva protections were not being afforded to clearly designated US Army Medics, they were ordered to cease wearing the Red Cross-marked armbands and helmets and to start carrying weapons—back in Vietnam. They have not worn them since.

Air Force, SOCOM, Marines, Navy, British and Dutch aircraft have foregone the Red Cross and its legal restrictions, resulting in vastly more flexible MEDEVAC capacity. In addition to being better positioned to save lives, it is notable that these units also maximize the dollar-value to DoD and the US taxpayer by maximizing the utility of the airframes and aircrews involved.

The senseless additional trauma inflicted upon Specialist Clark after the IED by faulty Army MEDEVAC policy was witnessed by Mr. Yon, and in further researching and reporting on the incident, the full scope of the poor judgment involved in these MEDEVAC policies came forth. Many seasoned professionals of all walks, including dozens of aircrew members of different service branches, reached out to him to provide further insight. Dustoff crews, in particular, expressed deep frustration with these policies.

Of additional tremendous concern coming to light is that current Army Dustoff policies actually violate Chapter VI of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which the US is a signatory:

“Article 36. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerents concerned.

They shall bear, clearly marked, the distinctive emblem prescribed in Article 38, together with their national colours on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. They shall be provided with any other markings or means of identification that may be agreed upon between the belligerents upon the outbreak or during the course of hostilities”

Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.

Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.” (Underscore emphasis added)

The reporting of this incident and calls for a change in Army MEDEVAC policy resulted in significant pushback from Army authorities in-theater. Congressional interest and inquiry resulted only in further resistance from military authorities, including at CENTCOM, all the way to the highest levels of Pentagon military leadership—the Secretary of the Army and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is the opinion of Mr. Yon and many of his readers who are subject matter experts, that documentation provided to Members of Congress and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) regarding Army MEDEVAC policy contains falsehoods and is obfuscatory in nature.

In particular, the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided HASC an unsigned document with neither title page nor date, which was riddled with egregious errors and deceptions. With this document, JCS deceived Congress. While the author is unknown, and may have come from lower commands, the document was provided to HASC by JCS under the color of their authority, without caveat.

The remaining portion of this article addresses this document, and sheds light on the reality on the ground as our troops experience it. Of particular note, thirteen active duty helicopter pilots contributed to this analysis of the JCS document—five Army Dustoff, five Air Force Pedro, and three additional non-Dustoff Army. All have completed at least one tour in Afghanistan, or are there now. Many have also completed combat tours in Iraq. In total, these 13 pilots have roughly 25 combat tours between them, and thousands of missions. More than twenty subject matter experts contributed to this analysis.

A copy of the JCS document is published here. JCS Bogus report to Congress

Commentary and Analysis

The JCS document begins:

“The information below details the circumstances surrounding the event in question as first reported by Michael Yon in his blog titled ‘Red Air’ and followed up by an open letter to Secretary Panetta and President Obama.

After examining the facts and circumstances of this particular incident and compiling data regarding all MEDEVAC/CASEVAC missions in theater, we have found no merit to Mr. Yon's claims that any change in MEDEVAC policy or procedures would provide any improvement in current casualty survival rates.”

Mr. Yon: Both the White House and Pentagon were offered copies of the original, unedited video of the attack in which Specialist Chazray Clark was wounded, described in “RED AIR”, which extended over an hour and included the long delay of the Dustoff arrival. Neither the Pentagon nor the White House accepted the video, nor have they accepted argument from MEDEVAC crews, and aircrews from other services regarding the speed and effectiveness with which they can conduct rescue operations without the Red Cross designation. The edited, public version of the video may be found here.

According to JCS:

“Below are definitions that are useful and commonly used when discussing MEDEVAC procedures:

MEDEVAC- Unarmed, specifically designated (Red Cross), US Army UH-60s
CASEVAC- Any evacuation asset other than MEDEVAC (CH-47, UH-1, UH-60, etc.), may be armed or unarmed.
PEDRO- Air Force HH-60 armed with.50 caliber guns on both doors; primary mission is personnel recovery/CSAR; in RC-South, only located at KAF”

Mr. Yon: Pedro units are stationed not only at KAF (Kandahar Airfield), but at Bastion and Bagram as well. (In other Regional Commands.) More importantly, however, while their primary mission might be stated as “personnel recovery/CSAR”, the reality is that they are doing MEDEVAC/CASEVAC daily, and even patient transfers in other areas. Argument has been made that Pedro assets are limited strictly to special operations-types of rescues. This is not the reality of their employment in-theater.

JCS:

“THUNDER- Unit designation for the Army MEDEVACs in RC-South
CHASE- accompanying helicopter, generally "slick" Blackhawk (.240 caliber door weapons, no external tanks/rockets)”

Mr. Yon: No “.240 caliber” weapons exist in the US inventory. This is such a conspicuous error that the author simply cannot have had any experience with combat units. Within a combat unit, this is as glaring as saying, “The Houston Red Sox won the Super Bowl. It was a great soccer match.” Perhaps the author was interpreting this from the M240 machine gun, chambered for the 7.62mm cartridge. Further discrediting the author was a note I received from a Dustoff pilot currently in Afghanistan, stating that most Chase flights in Afghanistan are “MED on MED chase,” and are thus unarmed.

JCS:

“ESCORT- accompanying, full armed helicopter (Apache, Kiowa, Cobra, etc.); specifically not a PEDRO or lightly armed UH-60”

Mr. Yon: This is false—Pedro aircraft do perform escort. Pedros are well armed with two .50 caliber machine guns per aircraft. It is suspected that this duplicitous definition is an attempt to discredit or minimize the policy of other services to provide medical flights that are self-escorted, as Pedro flights are.

JCS:

“Category A (Cat A) - urgent case requiring evacuation within 60 minutes
Category B (Cat B) - evacuation required within 4 hours
Category C (Cat C) - evacuation required within 24 hours
First Up (1st up)- Primary flight asset with responsibility to be first to respond; generally assumed to have 15 minute "run up" time
Second up (2nd up)- Back up flight asset generally responding only after 1" 1 up is unavailable (on mission, mechanical failure, etc)
Run up -The time it takes to prepare an aircraft to fly; generally considered 15 minutes (some aircraft/crew take less time, some take more)”
9 line MEDEVAC Request- 9 lines of information requesting the evacuation (location, number and severity of injuries, condition of landing zone etc...)”

Mr. Yon: The assertion of 15-minute run-up times is inaccurate, and is likely being used to pad “acceptable” time into the delayed response in Specialist Clark’s MEDEVAC, and others. Pedro and Dustoff crews need about six minutes to be airborne. British MERT uses a larger helicopter and brings a surgical team and can take fifteen minutes during daytime, but up to thirty minutes at night.

JCS:

“Summary of events in response to ‘Red Air’.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 82 decision matrix on MEDEVAC asset allocation is similar to that of the previous battlespace owner, CJTF-10, in that a dividing line exists whereby those missions falling to the west would be assigned to the MEDEVAC assets based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Pasab and those falling to the east would be assigned to the assets based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF). While similar decision points exist for the MEDEVAC assets at FOB Sakari Karez, Tarin Kowt, and Wolverine, only the previously described line was relevant as the casualty of reference was between Pasab and KAF. The Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell (PECC) in RC-South has the decision lines plotted to assist with rapid evaluation in assigning the evacuation to the location with the most expedient route to the appropriate military treatment facility (MTF).

Based on run-up times and distance from the appropriate MTF's, CJTF-82 determined that the MEDEVAC is the only appropriate asset for any Category A casualty found west of the dividing line; Pedro, from KAF, will only be used for the much less urgent Category B (if PEDRO is first up) or Category C (if Thunder is first up). Those casualties to the east of the dividing line will be assigned to MEDEVAC or PEDRO based on which unit is first up and which is second up; the designation of which is alternated each Monday at 1300.”

Mr. Yon: The tone of this passage seems designed to appeal to authority and dazzle with vocabulary, but consistently, Pedro and Dustoff pilots report slow, weak, or poor decision-making processes coming from PECC. Reports indicate this is a major problem with the medical evacuation system in Afghanistan. A common complaint from pilots is that PECC will task aircrews in a way that makes little or no sense, including having a Dustoff or Pedro flight sitting “hot cocked” (ready to go), only to task a unit needing far longer to spin up, such as the excellent but slower British MERT (Medical Emergency Response Team).

Army and Air Force pilots insist the decision on who to send is often tactically senseless. The worst examples involve using Pedro units—possessing the highest and most advanced rescue capability—on routine Cat-B or Cat-C patient transfers. Mr. Yon accompanied such missions with Pedro. It is fairly mindboggling to witness a Pedro flight used for routine medical transfers—it’s the equivalent of using a SWAT team to write parking tickets, being taken out of availability along with the most advanced gear. Pedro HH-60G Pave Hawks are capable of entering very hot Landing Zones on the most dangerous or technically difficult of missions and terrain, on missions that may involve the most severe weather, heavy enemy forces, or require scuba (our vehicles are sometimes blown into rivers), or requirements where the medics may have to climb or parachute to patients. Dustoff cannot perform all Pedro missions, but Pedro can perform all Dustoff missions, and more. Pedro should be reserved for Cat A and very dangerous or technical work. Had this policy been in place for Specialist Clark, he may have lived.

As one Pedro pilot noted: “[This is a] serious problem—our aircraft were never intended to fly as much as they have had to. It is like owning a car with over 400,000 miles that you have to use as a daily driver. Our maintenance folks are killing themselves trying to keep them flying.”

A second Pedro pilot noted: “Pedro is limited in performance due to weight from mission equipment on high altitude missions in hot temps. We have HC-130s [Fixed-wing aircraft] in country and can still do a Jump Mission with the PJs to get medical care to them within the Golden Hour then call a Chinook for extraction. Which the PECC would probably never think of.

This is the critical problem with the entire system. ISAF PECC Qualifications are inadequate for the Medical Evacuation Personnel assigned. They make the recommendations on which asset to use to the officer in charge of the JOC [Joint Operations Center] who then authorizes it. The personnel who fill these positions try hard but are simply not qualified. Many are Non-U.S. Forces and come from other ISAF Nations. The only folks running Medical Evacuations in Afghanistan are American and British. Last time I was there and went to the PECC at Kandahar to see for myself who was making these decisions I was surprised to see for myself that it was a Medical NCO with clinical but no evacuation experience. Medical personnel run system not Personnel Recovery folks. They simply don’t know anything about tactical operations. They spend a lot of time thinking about what is the right thing to do rather than instinctively knowing what to do immediately.

This position should be filled by a Guardian Angel Combat Rescue Officer or Pararescueman, Pedro, Dustoff, or MERT pilot or crewmember that has completed at least one operational tour. We need someone making the recommendations to the officer in charge that actually knows what he is talking about.”

According to the JCS document:

“MEDEVAC's will require an ESCORT if the casualty is in a area designated high risk landing zone, "hot LZ" by the 9 line request. This is accomplished by the PECC alerting the supporting aviation brigade who then scans the airspace to locate the closest appropriate asset able to divert and provide coverage in to the high risk area. In most cases, an appropriate asset is already in the air and can quickly divert to cover the mission; however, if no flying asset is readily available due to mission necessity, an ESCORT will need to be requested from KAF. The latter is the least preferred as it will take more time to scramble the crew and "run up" the aircraft.”

Mr. Yon: This entire passage would be made largely irrelevant were Dustoff MEDEVACs armed. In all but the most extreme cases—where Pedro units would be best tasked—Dustoffs simply would not need escort if they had their own weapons. Pedro is armed and requires no additional escort. Escort requirements cause delays, and further stress already stretched rotary assets.

JCS:

“The incident in question involved a casualty at approximately 0450 on 18 September 2011 in the TF Spartan AOR in RC-South. Since the near entirety of TF Spartan's battlespace is west of the dividing line, the appropriate aircraft for any CAT A casualty in this AO is a MEDEVAC. In this case, because the western LZ was considered high-risk the MEDEVAC required an armed escort. Because none of the airborne assets were able to leave their mission to provide coverage an AH-64 was requested from KAF. The crew was scrambled and the aircraft was "run up" and launched toward Pasab; the MEDEVAC from Pasab then joined the ESCORT in the air as it approached the objective.

Timeline:

a. 04:50 – 9-line request placed by unit in field
b. 04:52 – Time of PECC authorization (and begin tasking for ESCORT)
c. 05:24 – Wheels up for MEDEVAC from Pasab
d. 05:37 – Wheels down for MEDEVAC at Casualty
e. 05:39 – Wheels up with Casualty
f. 05:49 – Wheels down at MTF (KAF)”

Mr. Yon: Had the Dustoff stationed at Pasab been armed, the seven-minute run-up time and roughly three minute flight time from Pasab to the Landing Zone (LZ), plus a combat-realistic 2 – 3 minute loading time, would have meant Specialist Clark would have been airborne to the Combat Support Hospital at Kandahar Airfield within fifteen minutes of his unit calling in the 9-line request.

Instead, roughly half an hour was wasted in waiting for an escort, along with additional minutes in linking up with the AH-64 escort.

According to JCS:

“The only stated time goal for MEDEVAC is the 60 minute "golden hour" from time of 9- line request to wheels down at the MTF. This mission was documented at 59 minutes. The 60 minutes is derived from a combination of assuming it takes 15 minutes to "run up" the aircraft, 40 minutes to fly from the base-point of injury-MTF, and 5 minutes for casualty load time; however, this breakdown is only based on estimates and there is no rule that each specific subset must be met.”

Mr. Yon: This passage is a stunning argument for mediocrity, and shamelessly uses poor policy to provide cover for poor decision-making. Given the circumstances and available assets, Specialist Clark should have been at the hospital within half an hour, maximum. This letter argues a fictitious 59-minute timeline, in addition to ignoring the minutes it took Specialist Clark’s leadership to determine, in the dark in a combat environment, the nature of the blast and casualties, and to call in the proper information in the required 9-line format.

JCS:

“The extenuating circumstances in this case were the need for an ESCORT and the atypical situation where an ESCORT capable of diverting from its current mission could not be found. This circumstance delayed the MEDEVAC from departing Pasab and required an AH-64 ESCORT to be alerted from KAF. While it would appear that 32 minutes from the PECC notification to wheels up for the MEDEVAC is excessive, the delay was due to the need to confirm that none of the ESCORTs in the air were able to leave their present mission and then to notify an AH-64 crew to move out to their aircraft, run it up, and fly to meet the MEDEVAC.

Mr. Yon's allegation is that the PEDRO would have been more appropriate in this situation. There is no substantiating evidence for this claim. In hindsight, it might have been possible to transport this casualty to the MTF more quickly if the PEDRO would have been launched at the exact time of notification for this mission but that would only have been possible with the foreknowledge of no available local ESCORT.”

Mr. Yon: The mendacity (or ignorance) of this argument is made clear by this Pedro pilot: “Does not make sense. Why would there be no operational knowledge of which tactical assets were available for tasking? Pedro was either first up or second up. If Dustoff was first up but had no escort, immediately send the second up, Pedro. Pedro goes either way. [This is a] leadership failure— there is a system in place, and they should know which assets are available. I knew when I was in Command of the Pedros who else was available besides us; there is no excuse for this.”

JCS:

“However, once the time had been taken to ascertain no active local ESCORTs were available, turning to the KAF-based PEDROs would not have decreased the mission time as the AH-64 and PEDRO would have similar preparation and flight times due to distance from the casualty.”

Mr. Yon: Again, the entirety of this argument would be irrelevant were the Red Cross removed, and Army MEDEVAC flights made by armed helicopters. Mission time would have been less than half of what it was. Critically, changing this policy also keeps those AH-64 Apaches on-station, on the combat missions they’re intended for, and protecting ground units.

JCS:

“If it is alleged that waiting for an armed ESCORT is an excessive delay it must be considered that to date, there have been only five escorted MEDEVACs that have encountered surface to air fire resulting in degraded operations, two of which were PEDRO helicopters.”

Mr. Yon: In light of the many counterfactual statements above, these numbers should be looked at with suspicion, especially considering that medical flights are not all qualitatively equal. It should be kept in mind that in August 2011, an ESCORTED helicopter was shot down during a combat operation, with 38 people being lost, including 22 Navy SEALs. This JCS red herring is discussed in detail in “Golden Seconds” . Importantly, Pedro units are far more frequently sent into far more dangerous situations than are Dustoff. Per capita, Pedro takes more fire.

JCS:

“Based on all the facts regarding this incident it is ISAF's contention that the MEDEVAC assets were properly managed according to well established protocol. Based on the information provided, the timeline appears reasonable for the conditions on the ground. The well established PECC procedures appear to have been followed and the casualty arrived at the MTF within the established 60 minute goal in spite of being injured at a high risk location requiring an ESCORT aircraft.”

Mr. Yon: Medical professionals know that the Golden Hour starts ticking at the moment of injury, and adding in the requirements of assessment and reporting for Specialist Clark’s unit, the overall time was well over the “Golden Hour.” Importantly, we were taking no ground fire on the LZ. A more courageous and sensible decision by PECC would have been to launch Dustoff and let the pilot and ground commander decide on whether to complete extraction, or to wait for escort. Pedro and Dustoff pilots complain that PECC tends to be risk averse to the point that troops die.

A pilot with a tour in Iraq and a recent tour in Afghanistan was livid with the JCS document: “This ‘Golden Hour’ thing is, as you have pointed out, a flawed way of thinking about it. Why not make it a ‘Golden Half Hour,’ or a ‘Golden as soon as possible’? It is just a statistical construct. Each wounded American soldier must be looked at and cared for individually in terms of what is best for them. In most cases, that means getting them there fast. It makes a big difference. Believe me, if the leadership had their own sons in harm’s way as I have [his son is also a combat veteran], they would think much differently, and become totally committed as I have to fly as many as possible to the hospital as fast as possible.”

JCS:

“Theater-wide MEDEVAC Statistics

For the period May to Oct 11 there were 1209 Coalition Forces (ISAF and USFOR-A) CAT A missions of which 95 CAT A missions were Out of Standard (OOS), meaning they exceeded the 60 minute Golden Hour planning factor. This equates to 7.86% of CAT A MEDEVAC missions that were OOS. There are several factors that can cause a mission to become OOS, including weather, mechanical, distance, enemy situation and waiting for air weapons team (AWT). Of the 95 OOS CAT A missions from May-Oct 11, seven were categorized as being a result of waiting for an AWT and none of these seven OOS missions had a clinical impact on the casualty.”

Mr. Yon: Considering Specialist Clark was alert and talking up until the point of being evacuated, but succumbed shortly thereafter, it’s fairly outrageous to read a claim that says nobody experienced “clinical impact” from these delays. This short timeframe and the attempt at wielding statistics to cover poor policy and judgment only adds to this outrage. Essentially, this document argues for a Military Golden Hour to be treated as a “pass all.” By self-scoring, if no more than 59 minutes of the debatable Golden Hour are used, they get a 100%. How many more wounded veterans would have died if evacuations were delayed by an additional forty minutes? According to iCasualties.org, 46,542 US troops (not to mention contractors and allies) have been wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. If an additional 40 minutes were added to each before they reached a hospital, how many more would have died? One percent? Two percent? That’s anywhere from 465 – 931 additional dead.

“The overall trend line for OOS missions is decreasing over time. In 2010, 11.8% of the total CAT A missions were OOS compared to 7.86% OOS from year to date.

In the last six months, there have been a total of 57 surface to air fire events involving MEDEVAC aircraft. Of the 57, none resulted in aircraft being shot down. Five resulted in hits which degraded operations, including one British ‘Tricky’ CH-47, two US Army ‘Dustoff'HH-60s, and two US Air Force ‘Pedro’ HH-60s.”

Mr. Yon: Is this for the entirety of Afghanistan, or just Regional Command South? Importantly, the JCS admit here that the Red Crosses do not stop the enemy from shooting at Dustoff. We’ve seen too many faulty numbers and statements in the JCS document. None of the numbers can be trusted.

JCS:

“Summary

The MEDEVAC circumstances surrounding the specific incident highlighted in Michael Yon's ‘Red Air’ did not contribute to the untimely death of a brave Soldier who suffered a triple amputation due to an IED strike. Removing Red Cross from Army ‘Dustoff' helicopters will not improve the exceptional MEDEVAC capability already in place. Not only is there a policy implication with making such a decision but more importantly an operational impact which actually may degrade current MEDEVAC capability.”

Mr. Yon: This note from a former Ranger and Green Beret, who is also a combat veteran, clarifies the obfuscation: "Not one point that they have made in their letter supports the above contentions. They have written a letter and included arguments and made points, but not for the ‘conclusions’ above. It is as though the Chiefs wrote a different letter and then omitted all discussion of the Red Cross, not to mention ‘policy implications’ (and what does that mean?), not to mention their reference to ‘an operational impact.’ The Chiefs have not explained their nebulous ‘policy implications’ or their reference to potential ‘degraded capabilities’ or their reference to ‘operational impact,’ whatever that actually means. More artful public affairs sleight of hand. The Chiefs obviously think that we are stupid."

JCS:

“The primary mission of Pedro helicopters are for Personnel Recovery and Combat Search and Rescue. Pedro's in the Afghanistan theater are routinely integrated into the MEDEVAC rotation to maintain crew and medic proficiency. Because of advanced avionics and other organic armament and weaponry, the Pedro is rated as being able to only carry two litters at a time, compared to the Army Dustoff which is rated as being able to carry four litters at a time. The extreme altitude and often unpredictable weather conditions in Afghanistan make the weight of a helicopter a critical planning factor in being able to conduct flight operations.

Mr. Yon: A Dustoff pilot currently in Afghanistan disagrees. JCS states that four litters can go, but according to the Dustoff pilot, the Dustoff can carry four litters only “if carousel litter carriers are installed, in which case we would be power limited because the stupid things weigh over 500 pounds and make it impossible to work on any part of a casualty but their head or feet. We don’t use carousels in Afghanistan. We strap litters to the floor, and three will fit but two will be ignored.

The Dustoff pilot says two patients will be ignored. Experienced combat medics will say that no matter how great the medic, he or she cannot work on three Cat A patients simultaneously. Dustoff carries one medic and so more than a single Cat A will just be strapped down for the flight.

A flight of one Dustoff and one Apache can treat just one Cat A patient.

By comparison, Pedro escorts Pedro. Each of the two Pedro HH-60G Pave Hawks carries two or three pararescue “PJ”s. (Often a total of five PJs between the two birds.) And so a normal flight of two Pedro Pave Hawks can work five Cat A patients. (There is some nuance depending on types of wounds, etc.)

As medics, PJs are well trained. They also receive rigorous combat training and can parachute to patients, mountaineer, and scuba dive, all of which can be needed in Afghanistan. PJs are trained to fight. In the case that a Special Forces (Green Beret) team medic is wounded in Afghanistan, at least one Pedro unit planned to leave a PJ or two behind to cover for the team while another medic could be found. When patients are trapped in twisted wreckage of armored vehicles, PJs have gear and training to cut into the vehicles. PJs are something of mixture (for argument’s sake) between Rangers and highly trained medical personnel. And so with a Dustoff flight, you get one medic whose mission often must wait for launch authority. Pedro brings four .50 caliber machineguns with dedicated gunners, along with five commandos (PJs) who can get off the birds. Dustoff is an air ambulance: Pedro is more of a special operations force.

Pedro pilots dismiss the weight argument. As one highly experienced Pedro pilot noted: “…I've had three litters back there…and if the survivors can sit up (ambulatory) you can quite literally pile them in. I haven't limited the aircraft yet over there. The considerations are patient care, time en route, aircraft performance (do I have the power to take off) and the ground threat…if I don't take the survivor now does he have the time to wait for the next trip? As a Flight Lead, I'll weigh all available info, and lean on the Pararescue Team Lead to determine how many. If it’s a mass casualty event, we'll triage the survivors and take the Cat A’s first and return for the B’s and C’s and lastly the Heroes [KIA]. But yesterday here at [training] I put 9 people in the back of one aircraft, and 9 in another, total of 18 bodies in two aircraft. They were all ambulatory and the ground threat was high so comfort went out the window. It was about getting their asses out.”

JCS:

“Arming a Dustoff helicopter, whose primary mission is MEDEVAC, would require approximately an extra 600 lbs. This is based on two door gunners, 200 lbs each; two .50 cal machine guns, 841bs each; plus conservatively estimating 100 lbs of ammunition. This extra weight would have a severe impact on lift capability and also limit the ability to evacuate four litters vs. two. This trade-off of lift to armament is unacceptable and would result in severely degrading MEDEVAC operations.

Mr. Yon: Combat experienced Dustoff and Pedro pilots address this:

Dustoff pilot: “The weight argument is crap. My platoon flies UH-60A+ aircraft (Alpha slicks with Lima model engines) chased by UH-60L with [M-240 machine guns] mounted. Our chase birds outweigh us by about 1000lbs. The HH-60L and M models weigh significantly more but still much less than the Pedros' birds.”

Pedro pilot: “Remember that arming 2 x Dustoff helicopters means no chase aircraft and allows you to use both aircraft as evacuation platforms. You have a greater capability not less.”

Dustoff pilot: “…The notion that 600 extra pounds would exclude us from carrying 4 litter patients is wrong. We have a ‘PPC’ (performance planning card) that we use to tell us exactly how much we can carry…I can guarantee the Lima and Alpha+ models can handle that no problem...in RC S/SW. In east and north the altitude starts to get much higher so I can't speak for that region as we do not fly there. Second carrying 4 Cat A litter patients would most likely mean there was a mass casualty, of which my unit has responded to at least [stricken for anonymity] and to my knowledge they were all local nationals …Apart from that my medics generally put one Cat A on board because they can only efficiently work on ONE patient at a time, especially in the Clark case, with a triple amputation that medic has his hands full. That's not to say we leave anybody behind but the most critical are treated first. Which is why we spread the patient load. The example of 4 Cat A just sounds like deflection when the real point of all of this is not to increase patient capacity but to get the wounded off the battlefield in the quickest manner possible. If need be we can take as many patients as will fit inside, but as one of my medics told me, it comes down to who he thinks has a chance as to who gets treated on the flight as the majority of our flights are less than 30 min. Like I said above if one aircraft HAS to take 4 litters there have already been calls made and at least three more hawks will be en route.”

Pedro Pilot: “The DUSTOFF aircraft I escorted as a Pedro [were faster than] me; they were much lighter than I was and had a large power reserve that I did not possess because of my extra weight in armaments. That being said, the Pedros record on being able to still execute the CASEVAC goes without question.”

Mr. Yon: These pilots find no merit in the weight argument.

JCS:

“In conclusion, the MEDEVAC system currently in place is truly a success story. This level of capability has never been delivered before and demonstrates the degree of commitment that is expended in supporting our US, NATO, ISAF and Afghan forces. While it is not a perfect system it is truly unprecedented and we should ensure any changes to the system is carefully examined and only done after a thorough evaluation in order to ensure our service members receive only the best care available.”

Former Ranger and Green Beret: “I am really tired of the Chiefs [congratulating] themselves over a ‘level of capability that has never been delivered before.’ So what? [They] send the best men in the nation to war, who go willingly, who volunteer. They deserve the best. They are not receiving the best now, and worse, they are not receiving the best now due to bureaucracy and parochialism and the egotistical protection of fiefdoms. The JCS should be ashamed of themselves.”

Thoughts from a Dustoff Pilot

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Dustoff pilot) — Thu, 26 Jan 2012 05:21:12 +0000

26 January 2012

I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt. In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls. Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot. On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas. On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently. When we got the call, we went.

When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients. No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.

Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.

Some facts as I see it:

1. With only 1 medic on the helo, we will NEVER take more than 2 critical patients. More than that will overload the medic’s ability to treat the patients. So arming medevac will NOT lower the ability of the Blackhawk helicopter to carry patients due to weight. (Hawks in medevac configurations, typically launch at about 16K lbs, but have a max of 22k, so are they saying that guns and ammo weigh 5000+ pounds? Ridiculous.

2. Medevac can launch within 3-5 minutes of a call. Pedros always took at least 10 to get spooled up. [Note from Michael Yon: Pedro can go in about 6 mins.] Apaches and Kiowas must sight in their systems and take at least 15 minutes to get up, assuming they are fully armed, fueled and ready to go. So escorts always keep us waiting.

However, the biggest problem we face in combat today is not waiting for escort (though they are slow), it is not the Dustoff crews, it is the current command. Commanders and their representatives (usually battle Captains on duty) are so worried about their careers being effected by enemy action, they will take any Dustoff call and send it so high up the chain of command (cover your ass) that it takes 30-45 minutes to just get launch approval. This usually has little to do with our escorts. We sometimes are all (medevac and escorts) ready to fly, but sit for 20 minutes for launch approval, because someone has to wake the general, brief him or her and then get approval for the mission.

So taking off the red cross, arming the medevac bird is a great thing, but will only solve half the problem. We need commanders willing to allow the Dustoff crews to do their job, without multiple layers of approval for every mission. We need to solve the problem of every commander having to fear for his career (or worse) over making decisions on the battlefield. We need to empower the lower levels of command again instead of waiting for the generals to micromanage the entire war.

====END====

Separately, this comment was found under a dispatch:

RE: MEDEVAC Issue — Dustoffer

I'm a Dustoff pilot that returned from Afghanistan in April 2011. There is a launch criteria that we have to be off the ground within 15 minutes of the 9-line call. The problem is, we have to be approved by our battalion commander or the battle captain on duty to launch. There were several times we were sitting on the ground at REDCON 1 (100%) waiting to be told that we could launch. I actually launched my bird early once and proceeded to get an ass chewing once we returned via telephone. I honestly believe if I were closer to the flag pole, they would have relieved me of my position. I was about 6 hours away by air. Oh, and I launched at 15 minutes and some change.

To add injury to insult, approx. 70% of the missions I flew were MEDEVAC on MEDEVAC coverage. Meaning we had no gunship escort to the pickup site (one MEDEVAC aircraft covering another MEDEVAC aircraft).

There was more than one occasion that if we would have had mounted M249's or M240's we could have laid suppressive fire and/or engaged the threat. That is my personal and professional opinion. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't matter.

This comment was found here.

And I strongly disagree with “my opinion doesn’t matter.” The opinions of Dustoff and Pedro people are extremely important. Dustoff and Pedro opinions carry the overwhelming weight of this fight. The force behind all this is the Dustoff and Pedro communities. Every morning they crack the whip. I am only the public face. My website is your website. This is your microphone.

Time to Leave Afghanistan

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sat, 21 Jan 2012 14:42:18 +0000

21 January 2012

This war is going to turn out badly. We are wasting lives and resources while the United States decays and other threats emerge. We led the horse to water.

Importantly, there is no value in pretending that Pakistan is an ally. We should wish the best of luck to the Afghans, and the many peaceful Pakistanis, and accelerate our withdrawal of our main battle force. The US never has been serious about Afghanistan. Under General Petraeus we were starting to gain ground, but the current trajectory will land us in the mud.

The enemies will never beat us in Afghanistan. Force on force, the Taliban are weak by comparison. Yet this is their home. There is only so much we can do at this extreme cost for the many good Afghan people. We must reduce our main effort and concentrate on other matters. Time to come home.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

British Officer Slams US Army on Growing MEDEVAC Debacle

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sat, 28 Jan 2012 13:14:06 +0000

28 January 2012

While reading traffic in a closed forum between current and former military officers, I stumbled across this message from a British officer. I’ve known him since the Iraq days, and he’s also served in Afghanistan. He’s an honest and very smart officer, and so I pay close attention to him. With his permission, I reprint:

Message from British officer

I've been following Michael's work for years and I watched that painful video some while ago.

Michael makes a perfectly valid, arguably indisputable point that, in some circumstances, US Army MEDEVAC policy can delay the movement of casualties to hospital. The fact that the Golden Hour can still be met in most cases is immaterial. If we could make it work, we'd want a Platinum 30 Minutes as we all know that a few minutes can make the difference between life and death. Accordingly, there should be a continuous effort to shave extra minutes off of the time it takes to reach the wounded and what is proposed by Michael will often do just that.

The arguments presented by the US Army for why a change is not necessary are unconvincing, in fact in parts they seem somewhat fictive. I just hope there aren't people out there telling their boss what they think he wants to hear when they know differently in their hearts.

Therefore - and as a British Army officer I do think carefully about criticizing an organization I admire in many ways - my opinion is that there should be a quick meal of humble pie at the upper levels of the US Army and a change to match the USAF and RAF methods which do not mark MEDEVAC aircraft and do arm them. Saying "We were wrong" need bring no shame, it would be a fine example of leadership that would be respected within the Army itself and wider - and it'll likely save a few lives.

Congressman Akin MEDEVAC Letter to SecDef

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 03:42:08 +0000

You can download a pdf version here.

Fool’s Gold & Troops’ Blood

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 06 Nov 2011 12:50:40 +0000

America's Medevac Failure

06 November 2011

This combat video was made in September 2011 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. A bomb was planted in our path. A young, highly-liked Soldier named Chazray Clark triggered the blast. Chazray lost an arm and both legs. Despite great pain, Chazray was awake and lucid the entire time.

A tragedy was unfolding. The US military, at the direction of former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, strives to get our wounded to hospitals within the “Golden Hour.” The military mostly accomplishes this with incredible speed, often under direct enemy fire. They could do much better.

After casualties are sustained, the medical evacuation helicopters typically will not launch until a “9-line” report is transmitted from the field. During this mission, due to the calm discipline of the Soldiers of 4-4 Cav, the 9-line was transmitted in only six minutes. That’s fast.

Bold accounting magic has been used to redefine the Golden Hour. The true starting gun for the biological Golden Hour begins at the moment of injury. The military Golden Hour begins after the 9-line is received. If combat or other circumstance delays the 9-line by 20 minutes, the military Golden Hour becomes 80 minutes. But when we hear a military spokesmen saying that average MEDEVAC times are 50 minutes, what they are really saying is 50 minutes plus the 9-line time, and they won’t mention that 9-line buffer. This audacious deception angers many military people who know about it.

I reported that 65 minutes were used to get Chazray Clark to the hospital. The military rebuked my initial report, saying it took only 59. They took the Golden Hour tax deduction, deceived the public, and did so in writing.

It took 65 minutes. It should have taken 25. There are several reasons why Chazray suffered the additional 40 minutes.

The first reason is the 9-line. Pilots in Afghanistan say there is no need to wait. They should launch immediately upon notification of serious wounds. They can pick up the 9-line in flight.

The bigger reason is a longstanding Army policy to wear Red Crosses on their helicopters. The Army will say that in accordance with the Geneva Conventions they must wear the Red Crosses, and therefore cannot carry machine guns on the helicopters. This is false: neither the Air Force, nor the Marines, nor British wear the Red Crosses, and they go armed. The enemies in Afghanistan do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Is the Army saying that the Air Force, Marines and British are in violation of Geneva Conventions by not wearing the Red Crosses? Of course not. But the Army wears the Red Crosses as crucifixes to avoid uncomfortable change.

The helicopters are clearly visible on most nights while the Red Crosses are not. An Afghan said that Taliban would likely consider the Red Cross a sign of Christianity, not MEDEVAC. The enemy constantly tries to shoot down Army Dustoffs, Red Cross and all. By contrast, the Air Force and Marines play smarter games and will come in guns blazing and help kill enemy around the landing zones.

While Chazray lay dying, an unarmed Dustoff helicopter was parked about 2 – 3 minutes away at Forward Operating Base Pasab. After a call, it can take about 7 minutes to launch a Dustoff. And so, 7 minutes plus 3 minutes’ flight could have had Chazray on the bird in just over 10 minutes. The hospital was at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) about 13 minutes away. So 10 minutes to arrive to the LZ, 2 minutes to load Chazray and take off, then 13 minutes to the hospital. This would have put Chazray at the hospital in 25 minutes. Alternatively, armed Air Force Pedro rescue birds were parked farther away at KAF and could have flown the longer distance, picked up Chazray, and had him back in about 35 minutes. Had Pedros or armed Dustoffs been at FOB Pasab, they could have done the job in 25 minutes.

Instead, since the Dustoffs do not have machine guns, the Dustoff waited for the Apache helicopter top cover. Forty minutes were lost due to 9-line procedures and waiting for the Apache. This delay allowed the life to drain out of Chazray. It also allowed the enemy a great amount of time to prepare to attack the unarmed Dustoff helicopter on the open landing zone, along with the Soldiers who were there in the open working hard to save Chazray. (In this case, no attack occurred during LZ operations.)

The military spent much energy refuting my claims in RED AIR and GOLDEN SECONDS. They apparently did not realize I made video. For instance, they tried to undercut the credibility of my reports by saying the Dustoff did not come from Kandahar Airfield, but from FOB Pasab. The video clearly shows on numerous occasions that the Dustoff was coming from KAF. Nevertheless, allowing for battlefield errors, if the Dustoff actually came from Pasab, this does not help their case, but damages it outright. KAF is about 13 minutes away; Pasab only about 3, and so what they accidentally said by trying to undermine my reports was that Chazray could have been to the hospital 10 minutes faster. That is, if the Dustoffs were armed and could depart without gunship cover.

The 9-line procedure must be changed, and Dustoffs must be armed. The “Military Golden Hour” must become a thing of the past. There is only one Golden Hour. All else is Fool’s Gold. This Fool’s Gold is expensive; it’s costing lives of our service members in Afghanistan.

Please watch this important video of the attack and MEDEVAC of Chazray Clark.

CrusaderCopters

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 23 Nov 2011 12:57:59 +0000

Afghanistan: Army Medic helps to bag up an Afghan Soldier who was just blown up. Our medics do not wear Red Crosses. They carry rifles.

23 November 2011

Army Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopter crews have been performing stellar work in Afghanistan. When troops are wounded, the Dustoffs go into hostile territory often while taking ground fire. Most interesting: they go in unarmed.

The helicopters are emblazoned with the Red Cross, and so according to the Geneva Conventions they are not allowed to carry offensive weapons. Just what constitutes an offensive weapon is another line of discussion, but the bottom line is that Dustoffs do not carry machine guns.

More interesting is that the Red Cross is one of the symbols used in the Crusades. After years of throwing around the COIN acronym while pretending we have learned something about Counterinsurgency, we still fly around Afghanistan in CrusaderCopters.

The Air Force Pedro rescue helicopters are not burdened with the Red Cross, and so they carry two .50 caliber machine guns. The U.S. Marines and British Army also don’t burden themselves with the Red Cross, nor are there the World War II-type scenes with medics wearing crosses on their sleeves. The medics are armed. In fact, some medical crews working in Kabul are armed even while in the operating room.

The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan do not subscribe to the Geneva Conventions. They try to shoot down any and all helicopters, and sometimes they succeed. If you ask an Afghan what the Red Cross means, he’ll likely say it’s a symbol of Christianity — and in that regard, it might actually draw fire. This poster describing evil symbols was found hanging on a wall in an Afghan village. Most of the symbols are crosses.

There are numerous reasons why the Dustoffs should remove the Red Cross. We’ve been plagued with helicopter shortages in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war. When Dustoffs perform rescue missions, they must have armed top cover, often in the form of an Apache helicopter. By comparison, the Air Force Pedro rescue helicopters do not need top cover because they carry machine guns. And so in addition to adding more stresses to our helicopter fleet, the necessity to have top cover can lead to delays in MEDEVAC.

In September, I videotaped such a delay after an IED strike. The most wounded soldier was a triple amputee. Another soldier was deaf from the blast. A Dustoff crew was stationed probably two to three minutes away at Forward Operating Base Pasab. You can sometimes see the crews at Pasab running to start up a Dustoff helicopter. The Dustoff was parked about 200 meters from my tent. If it takes the Dustoff seven minutes to launch and three minutes to get to the LZ, they could have picked up the patients in about 10 minutes.

The hospital at Kandahar Airfield was about 13 minutes away, and so this means the patients could have been at the hospital in about 25 minutes. Instead, it took 65 minutes.

The Army claims it took 59 minutes, but they don’t start the clock until after a “9-line” casualty report has been called up. The Golden Hour doesn’t start when the 9-line goes up; it starts when the bomb explodes. In any case, 59 minutes is a lot longer than 25, and this delay was caused because the Dustoff needed Apache top cover.

The triple amputee was very much alive and talking, but you could hear him fading as the minutes ticked by. His buddies were saying he was going to live. The commander said to me that he was going to live, but as the minutes dragged by the soldiers became frustrated with the delay. We were sitting on a landing zone vulnerable to enemy fire, and there was little doubt the enemy knew where we were. In addition to endangering the wounded with delays, the delay also provided the enemy time to prepare to shoot down a rescue helicopter, or to attack troops who would be in the open on the LZ.

An Air Force Pedro pilot with 420 combat missions worth of experience read this article for accuracy and he responded:

“Pedros fly in a two ship formation for several reasons, mutual support, both with fires and mission management, and added capacity. In a dynamic and inaccurate threat environment we may launch on one Cat A, and arrive to discover additional survivors (or, God forbid, Heroes). This happened often, but as an example one of my missions in the “Cat Triangle” SE of Bastion, I was launched to rescue a Brit double amputee. 30 sec from the zone a second IED detonated and rendered a second Brit as a double amputee. Both Pedro’s effectively split and worked individual rescues while maintaining each others “back” — we minimized the time in the zone and got the survivors back as rapidly as possible. In my opinion two armed Dustoffs are better for the fight than one unarmed Dustoff and an Apache.”

If the Dustoffs were armed, there would have been no delay. So why does the Army hide behind Geneva Conventions when the Air Force, Marines, and British do not? It’s not about Geneva, but about who controls the Dustoff helicopters. It’s not about the “moral high ground.” The crosses have been used as a crucifix to ward off change within the military.

Some Army officers will attempt to confuse laymen by slapping the “Geneva Conventions” card on the table. There are two categories of people who will say we are legally or morally obligated to sport Red Crosses on our helicopters. The first category is the uninformed. This dispatch is written for the uninformed yet smart-minded people who, when presented with the evidence, will make a good decision. The second category consists mostly of a small number of Army officers who are lying. They have a political dog in this fight and they are willing to sacrifice combat readiness and troops’ lives to maintain the status quo. These people are disgraceful and I make no effort not to offend them. They should be discharged from the Army.

To be sure, it will be difficult to find senior NCOs or officers from the combat arms who will say that it’s a good idea to send unarmed troops into combat while marking them as defenseless.

Let’s number the problems, any one of which is enough to take off the crosses:

1)   Sending unarmed troops into combat is unwise
2)   Marking them as unarmed is tantamount criminal
3)   Delays in MEDEVAC leave wounded troops bleeding on battlefields
4)   Creates additional stresses on overstretched helicopters
5)   CrusaderCopters create a “COIN fail”

If the Army insists on sending defenseless CrusaderCopters into combat, it should use common sense by not alerting the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed.

Marked for Destruction

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 13:08:38 +0000

14 November 2011

Camouflage is a combat imperative. Instruction in the use of camouflage begins in basic training. The Red Cross on the bright white background is meant to break up camouflage and to be seen.

While there might seem little chance in hiding a roaring helicopter, the contrasting colors and sharp shapes of the Red Cross create a significant difference when aiming shots. Many or most of the enemies in Afghanistan are bad shots. Others are good. They make successful long shots onto FOB Pasab, for instance, with explosive weapons, such as recoilless rifles and rockets. They have no problems hitting moving armored vehicles with recoilless rifles. One shot can easily destroy a helicopter.

Combat Medic in 4-4 Cav: Not Wearing Red Cross

The Red Cross specifically means that the wearer is unarmed. Only non-combatants are to display the symbol. There is no security violation in saying that our helicopters sporting Red Crosses all are unarmed. That is exactly what we are trying to advertise.

The enemies in Afghanistan will shoot down any helicopter. And so, if the Army insists on using unarmed helicopters for MEDEVAC missions, it makes doubly no sense to advertise that the helicopter is defenseless, all while literally helping the enemy to aim.

4-4 Cav Soldiers firing mortar during minor firefight

It must border on criminal negligence to order our people to advertise that they are unarmed while knowing that the enemy will fire upon them. At minimum, the US Army is displaying incompetence and a lack of sense. The Marines, Air Force, and British do not so encumber their helicopters. After ten years of war we know that the enemy shoots at all helicopters. We know that forcing our warriors to advertise themselves as unarmed welcomes attack. We know that the Red Cross literally makes an easier target for aiming. After ten years of war, the Army has not adapted to this obvious reality.

If the Army insists on pushing unarmed Soldiers into combat, it should at minimum remove the advertisement that notifies the enemy of an easy target. With the Red Cross, our people cannot even bluff that they might have weapons. Pushing unarmed Soldiers into combat while forcing them to advertise they are defenseless is wrong.