Matt’s and my post Audi and the Infallibility of Religious Reasons is featured.

There are a number of other interesting reads also linked to so head on over and check them out.

The theme of the conference, as outlined on Notre Dame’s webpage,  is as follows;

Adherents of the Abrahamic religious traditions contend that human beings are made in the image of God and that modeling the character of God in one’s life represents the pinnacle of human flourishing and moral perfection. Defenders of this tradition commonly point to passages in the canonical texts of the Jewish and Christian faiths that portray God as loving, merciful, patient, etc. in support of such a position. Since the seventeenth century, however, numerous critics of these Abrahamic traditions have argued that God, especially in the Hebrew Bible, is often portrayed as anything but a moral role model.

On the one hand, historical narratives in these texts describe God apparently committing, ordering, or commending genocide, slavery, and rape among other moral atrocities. On the other hand, a number of commands purportedly issued by God seem to commend bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia. In recent days, similar criticisms of the Abrahamic traditions have been raised by philosophers (Daniel Dennett), scientists (Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris), social commentators (Christopher Hitchens), and others.

Are these apparent commendations and commands of the Hebrew Bible consistent with the claim that the Abrahamic God is perfectly good and loving? Those defending this tradition have two avenues of response open to them. The first response would be to argue that the aforementioned troubling narratives or commands should simply be rejected. Those taking this approach would have to explain how they think such passages could be rejected without placing in peril the Abrahamic religions, which have traditionally claimed that the Hebrew Bible is, represents, or contains the inspired word of God. The second response would offer explanations aiming to show that the apparently untoward consequences can be avoided without rejecting the narratives or commands. Those taking this approach must explain either why the untoward consequences do not follow, or why they are not, in the end untoward.

However, while defenders of this tradition have both routes available to them, few of these defenders seem to have taken the challenge to heart. Despite these recent, forthright criticisms, only a handful of theologians or philosophers in these traditions have sought to respond to the criticisms.

The present conference aims to remedy this deficiency, taking as its focus the charge that the Abrahamic tradition should be rejected because of its foundation in the Hebrew Bible, which portrays God as immoral and vicious.  The presenters and commentators include philosophers—both theistic and nontheistic—as well as Biblical scholars.

For those who are interested, Michael Rea from Notre Dame has put the entire conference online (including the Q & A).

Enjoy :-)

A secular reason is, roughly, one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God (for example, through appeals to divine command) or on theological considerations (such as interpretations of a sacred text), or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.[4]

Audi supplants this principle of secular reason with two others, a principle of “secular motivation” and something he calls “theo-ethical equilibrium.”[5] His principle of secular motivation goes further; “one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question.”[6] Theo-ethical equilibrium is “a rational integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical considerations … a mature, conscientious theist who cannot reach it [theo-ethical equilibrium] should be reluctant or unwilling to support coercive laws or public policies on a religious basis that cannot be placed in that equilibrium.”[7]

So construed there is an obvious asymmetry in Audi’s position. In a review of a book which defends Audi’s position, Philip Quinn observes;

These principles impose burdens on religious people that Audi nowhere suggests imposing on nonreligious people. … Audi does not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or politicise. The lack of symmetry is striking. [8]

The fact that Audi’s position singles religious reasons out for exclusion from public discourse in a manner which he does not apply to secular reasons, raises the obvious question of why? What’s so special or objectionable about theological reasons being used in public?

Elsewhere in his article Audi offers some reasons for this; he notes, “[religious reasons] are special in relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with [secular reasons] … that are not accessible to any normal adult.”[9] He gives five “salient points” to support his case, all based on the idea that religious reasons are dangerous to society.[10]

In this post we want to focus on the first of these. Audi thinks any appeal to God’s commands in public debate is dangerously divisive because “religious reasons … are directly or indirectly taken to represent an infallible authority.”[11] This line of thought strikes a chord with many, concern about the infallible nature of divine will is often the basis for criticism of appeals to theology in public discourse.

However, as Audi defines the term ‘infallible’ any reason a person offers for their position would be infallible; according to Audi, propositions are infallible if it is “impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false”.[12] God, as Audi understands him, is omniscient. God only believes true propositions. It follows then that any proposition one can imagine, regardless of its content, will be such that it is impossible for both God to believe it and that the proposition be false. Given this it is hard to see how “religious reasons” are especially objectionable on Audi’s contention.

Perhaps, however, this is a technical point based on a mistaken definition of infallibility. Audi’s main concern is that a person, who believes that an action is commanded by God, believes that an omniscient, infallible being has endorsed that action. Appeals to purported divine commands are therefore problematic because the authority appealed to cannot err.

The obvious rejoinder is that many secular ethical theories face precisely the same problem. One of the most influential secular theories is the ideal observer theory, which is endorsed by ethicists as diverse as David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hare, Roderick Firth, John Stuart Mill, Tom Regan, Richard Brandt, Immanuel Kant and others. On this theory, an action is wrong, if and only if, it would be proscribed by an ideal observer, by a person who is perfectly impartial and perfectly informed on all the relevant facts. A hypothetical ideal observer is no less infallible than religious believers take God to be. It is hard to see how invoking religious reasons is not acceptable but invoking the secular reasons is.

This is probably enough to address Audi’s concerns but there are several other points worth noting.

Firstly, the fact that the law of God is infallible does not entail that there is or cannot be debate over what the law of God in fact is. Claiming that God’s law is infallible is not to claim that any human never errs in his or her discernment of what this law is, his or her interpretation of it or his or her application of it to particular cases. Claiming that there is debate over the interpretation of divine law and debate over how to apply various precepts of divine law to specific cases, is compatible with affirming that divine law is infallible.

In this, the law of God is analogous to deductive reasoning. By definition, a sound argument can never have a false conclusion. It is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the argument is sound, hence sound arguments are infallible. It does not follow from this that people never err in constructing arguments that they mistakenly believe are sound or that there is no debate over which arguments are sound. Reason is authoritative; however, human reasoners are not. It is hard to see why the infallibility of the law of God means that appeals to this law are any more problematic than appeals to logic.

A similar response is available on the immutability of divine law. The fact that God’s law is immutable does not mean that any person’s understanding of this law cannot change. He or she may find his or her particular beliefs about God’s law were mistaken or that he or she had applied it incorrectly.

In this respect, the law of God is analogous to numerous things that it is unobjectionable to appeal to. Consider an appeal to facts and reason; these too are immutable. If it is a fact that the world was round at the time of Columbus then this is something we cannot change. It cannot be true 100 years from now that the world was not round when Columbus sailed. Moreover, whether an argument is sound is also immutable; we cannot repeal the laws of logic. Therefore, both facts and reason are as immutable as God’s law is.

Moreover, consider a precept such as it is wrong to torture children for entertainment. Is this mutable so that society could repeal it tomorrow? Is the claim that rape and genocide of Jews is wrong something that is mutable, that human beings can change and repeal these things? Obviously not. Immutability is a feature of any serious, ethical viewpoint. If you cannot base civil law on immutable things, then you cannot base it on facts, reason or secular values.

[1] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66.
[2] Robert Audi “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 259, 279.
[3] Ibid 284.
[4] Ibid 278.
[5] Audi, above n 1, 25-37.
[6] Ibid 284.
[7] Audi, above n 1, 21.
[8] Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review).
[9] Audi, above n 1, 31.
[10] Ibid 31-32.
[11] Audi, above n 1, 31.
[12] Audi, above n 1, 62.

This post was jointly authored. It is largely a mash of extracts from Madeleine’s  paper “Religious Restraint and Public Policy” and from Matt’s “Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century.”

What: Wellington Bloggers Drinks
When: Friday 27 November from 7:00pm
Where: Backbencher Pub, 34 Molesworth Street, Thorndon, Wellington

Open to anyone who happens to be in Wellington. You can RSVP via facebook, leave a comment below, post this on your own blog or just turn up.

From here on simply claiming to be Christian will not mean your blog automatically makes the top 10 New Zealand Christian blog rankings. In addition to being openly Christian in its blog description on Tumeke and HalfDone’s New Zealand blog ranking lists, now an eligible blog must also demonstrate adherence to the historic Christian tradition in their blog content.

We are going to be fairly broad with this. No one is perfect in their interpretation of biblical text or in how they apply their beliefs to their actions (or the content of their blogs). We all get it wrong from time to time. We are not looking for adherence to fine points of doctrine on things like eschatology or baptism or political leaning, etc. However, we will draw a line and exclude blogs that fall outside what CS Lewis calls “mere christianity”. Lewis sums this up as “the belief that has been common to nearly all Christians at all times.” So, for example, we would exclude those who claim to be Christian but who promote atheism or deny the resurrection or believe that Jesus was a magic mushroom and so on.

1. MandM 3
2. NZ Conservative 4
3. Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta) 8
4. Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 10
5. MacDoctor Moments 18
6. Liturgy Worship Spirituality 34
7. Being Frank 36
8. The Humanitarian Chronicle 42
9. Manawatu Christian Apologetics Society 43
10. Brad Heap 46

Top 10. name of blog HalfDone Rank

Of Note:

• A little change in position; newcomer The Dunedin School made the top 10.
• The following Christian blogs all made the top 100 but were outside the top 10 Contra Celsum 53, Semper Vita 67, True Paradigm 71, Christian News 73, The Briefing Room 81, Paul Gardner 90, Star Studded Super Step 95, I am Jonny King 99.
• An additional 30 Christian blogs were included in the list of 427 New Zealand blogs..
• Another 8 were unfortunately not able to be calculated due to their not resolving in Alexa and Technorati.

Note: This list only includes Christian blogs that are openly identified as Christian blogs on HalfDone’s ranking list and that that demonstrate adherence to the historic Christian tradition in their blog content.

When Tumeke’s September stats are out we will compare them with HalfDone’s and publish the overall MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for October 09.

1. [1.] MandM 12 (3 – 21)
2. [2.] NZ Conservative 16.5 (9 – 24 )
3. [3.] MacDoctor Moments 17 (16 – 18)
4. [4.] Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 20.5 (13 – 28)
5. [5.] Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta Blog) 22.5 (18 – 27)
6. [8.] Being Frank 38.5 (45 – 32)
7. [10.] Liturgy Worship Spirituality* 42 (39 – 45)
8. [N.] Brad Heap 48 (55 – 41)
9. [N.] Sustain:if:able kiwi 50 (51 – 49) [actual score 50.00]
10. [N.] Prodigal Kiwi* 50 (47 – 53) [actual score 50.08]

Rank. [previous top 10 rank] Blog MandM (Half Done – Tumeke)

To obtain our stats we run searches on Half Done’s September 09 NZ stats and Tumeke’s September 09 NZ stats for openly Christian blogs that demonstrate adherence to the historic Christian tradition in their blog content then we average those blogs scores to obtain their overall scores.

If you think your blog should make our rankings, make sure you are listed on both Tumeke and HalfDone’s rankings as an identifiably Christian blog and we’ll check you out.

* For blogs that only feature on one set of stats a score for the other set is estimated by factoring in the discrepancy between the two sets of stats given their different ranking methods; any blogs this effects are marked with an asterisk. We suggest that any blog not featuring on both should submit their blog to the ranking they are not currently on as it is not always possible for us to simply calculate the score that blog would have obtained.

1. MandM 21
2. NZ Conservative 24
3. Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta Blog) 27
4. Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 28
5. Being Frank 32
6. The Briefing Room 47
7. Sustain:If:Able Kiwi 49
8. Contra Celsum 57
9. Keeping Stock 65
10. True Paradigm 66

Top 10 Tumeke. name of blog Tumeke rank

Of Note:

• Change at the number 1 spot.
• Nice climbing Beretta and welcome to the top 10 True Paradigm.
• Paul Gardner 74, The Humanitarian Chronicle 79, Christian News New Zealand 87, Theology Geek 93 each made the top 100 despite being outside the top 10.

Now that Tumeke’s September stats are out we will compare them with the HalfDone September report and publish the overall MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for September 09 shortly.

Note:
This list only includes Christian blogs that both:
1. Demonstrate adherence to the historic Christian tradition in their blog content.
2. Appear on and openly identify as a Christian blog on Tumeke’s ranking descriptions.

I have written on the morality of warfare, whether it is sometimes permissible to lie, the morality of torture, capital punishment, the nature of our obligations to the poor, issues around abortion and homosexual conduct – topics, I think, that are unavoidable if one is a theologian writing from a relatively conservative evangelical perspective.

Some of my positions are controversial, I believe that homosexual conduct is contrary to divine law and I believe that feticide is homicide. The latter claim is not just a casual opinion; I spent some years writing a PhD thesis on the topic and over the last couple of years I have had academic articles published in this area.

Now an all too pervasive response to a Christian, like me, expressing a position on these issues is to be deemed a “fundamentalist bigot” (or variation to that effect). One would think that it would be fairly obvious that one cannot refute a position simply by calling the person who holds it names, and it is tempting to dismiss this response as simply a confused ad hominem, the problem is that people do not appear to find this obvious. In my experience, many people, even educated people, recoil from considering any argument against feticide or homosexual conduct or listening to theological concerns on these or other matters because they perceive such positions to be “fundamentalist” and “bigoted.”

It is worth fisking this objection a bit. A good place to start is to ask what this charge amounts to?

Take the term “fundamentalist,” what exactly does it mean? It is hard to find a consistent definition of the term. Originally the term referred to a particular protestant movement of Christianity in the early 20^th century who published a series of tracts entitled the “the fundamentals.” Clearly, when the term is used today, few who use it have this meaning in mind.

Muslim terrorists are regularly called “fundamentalist” yet they do not defend the fundamental Christian doctrines that this movement defended. In other contexts, fundamentalist is a term used to describe those with a strict dispensationalist pre-millennial and 6-day creationist reading of scripture. However, many of the authors of “The Fundamentals” were Darwinists and rejected pre-millennialism. To complicate things further, Islamic terrorists are not dispensational pre-millenial, though some are literal 6-day creationists and others are old earth creationists. Now, dispensationalists are committed to the State of Israel. I doubt Al Qaeda, Hamas, et al are terribly enthusiastic about the protection of the Israeli state.

When I was researching for my doctorate in theology I noted Roman Catholic apologists often use the term “fundamentalist” to designate evangelicals. Yet when I studied at Laidlaw College the term was used by evangelical professors to designate defenders of a strict understanding of biblical inerrancy, particularly those who emphasised a strict adherence to scripture in contrast to the experiential theology associated with Pentecostalism. However, the media often describes Pentecostal churches, like Destiny Church as fundamentalist.

In his book Warranted Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga noted that the term “fundamentalist” tends to expand or contract depending upon who uses it and we can definitely see that in the examples above. Plantinga’s conclusion was that,

Its cognitive content is given by the phrase ‘considerably to the right, theologically speaking, of me and my enlightened friends.’ The full meaning of the term, therefore (in this use), can be given by something like ‘stupid sumbitch whose theological opinions are considerably to the right of mine’.[1]

It is hard to resist his conclusion that “merely pointing out that they differ from the objector’s (even with the addition of that abusive emotive force) is not [a valid objection].”[2] The term fundamentalist in its contemporary use “is simply meant to denigrate and demonise, to label and conjure up stereotypes to avoid having to actually come up with anything concrete”[3] like an actual argument against their position.

The labeling of someone as a “bigot” fairs little better. The dictionary defines a bigot as “an obstinate or intolerant adherent of a point of view.”[4] Presumably, the objector claims that one who appeals to the law of God to condemn feticide or homosexual conduct (or some other practice celebrated by contemporary liberal secularists) displays or expresses these features; they are both obstinate and intolerant. The accusation clarified, an obvious question arises, why?

Turning first to the issue of obstinance, why assume that the fact that someone holds these beliefs automatically renders them obstinant? Could they not have come to these beliefs as a result of careful and considered reflection? Alternatively, could they hold to them because they are not convinced that the counter arguments are sound? What is needed here is some argument to preclude such options and none is forthcoming; names and labels won’t do the job.

I suspect that what lingers behind this accusation is the belief that theologically-based opposition to issues like abortion is obviously mistaken and the case against it so compelling that no rational, informed person could possibly think otherwise. If so, then this is not so much an argument against such appeals but an assumption that those who make them are mistaken on other grounds. The objector should come clean about what these other grounds are and put forward these compelling, unassailable arguments that everyone else should apparently already know about.

Regarding the charge of intolerance, let me here just say that the concern about intolerance implicit in this objection is mistaken. Even if the proponents of more conservative positions were intolerant, this would only constitute an objection to their behaviour if it were first assumed that people have a duty to refrain from intolerance but this assumption is problematic.

In many contexts intolerance is appropriate and contrary to popular slogans, is a virtue. Imagine a society that tolerated rape, child molestation or infant sacrifice? Moreover, if unqualified, the assertion that people have a duty to be tolerant entails that one is required to tolerate intolerance; a deeply paradoxical claim.

For this charge to have any substance, the objector needs to specify what sorts of action he or she thinks one should tolerate and which ones are such that intolerance is inappropriate. He or she needs to justify this distinction and then provide reasons for thinking that appeals to divine law on a subject like feticide fall into the latter category. Again, a label will not achieve this.

Here us the rub; if feticide is an action on a par with infanticide then intolerance towards it is justified. In asserting that it is not, the objector implicitly assumes that feticide is not homicide without offering an argument. Similarly, if homosexual conduct is a serious form of sexual immorality, on par with incest, bestiality, polygamy or adultery, then intolerance against it is not necessarily wrong. Our society, for example, has laws against incest and bestiality and few contend for their repeal (though the chipping away has begun). Once again, the objector here, in making their charge, assumes that homosexual conduct is not seriously immoral without providing an argument.

Now it is possible that these assumptions are correct but it is also possible they are not.

Anyone who appeals to divine law to condemn practices like feticide or homosexual conduct is denying these assumptions. You don’t provide a cogent objection to a position by assuming it is false at the outset and then using this assumption to prove that it is, arguing in this circular fashion proves nothing and is an error of logic. What is needed is an actual argument for the assumption in the first place. Until some actual argument is forthcoming that demonstrates the falsity of what has been defended, objections based on the notion of tolerance merely beg the question and have no impact on the thesis being advanced.

I think there is a kind of irony here; often when someone accuses Christians of “fundamentalist bigotry” they themselves are the ones obstinately assuming that their position is true and their assumption leads them to castigate and refuse to tolerate the opinions or persons who express dissent to their secular liberal orthodoxy. In using these labels they are dismissing a person’s opinion, not on the basis of reason but on the basis of a religious stereotype. Here, as elsewhere, the accusation of “fundamentalist bigotry” is a form of Orwellian double-speak.

[1] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 245.
[2] Ibid.
[3] I am grateful to my wife, Madeleine Flannagan, for these words.
[4] Oxford English Dictionary.

I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the October 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com