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Privacy and cookies

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Thu, 13 Feb 2020 00:00:00 UTC

Privacy and cookies

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O autorze

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Sun, 29 Jul 2018 00:00:00 UTC

O autorze

Jestem prawnikiem, wykładowcą na Uniwersytecie Surrey (University of Surrey) oraz research associate na Uniwersytecie Oksfordzkim. Specjalizuję się w teorii prawa, prawie publicznym (konstytucyjnym i administracyjnym) i w problemach styku prawa i technologii.

Ukończyłem studia doktoranckie na Uniwersytecie Oksfordzkim (obecnie oczekuję na ceremonialne przyznanie tytułu). Na Oksfordzie zdobyłem także tytuły M.Jur. oraz M.Phil. in Law. Wcześniej ukończyłem studia magisterskie na kierunku prawo na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim w ramach Międzywydziałowych Indywidualnych Studiów Humanistycznych.

Więcej informacji

Lista publikacji prasowych i wypowiedzi medialnych
@MBarczentewicz na Twitterze (po angielsku)
@BarczentewiczPL na Twitterze (po polsku)
SSRN
LinkedIn
Profil na stronie University of Oxford Law Faculty
Profil na stronie University of Surrey School of Law

Publications

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Sun, 29 Jul 2018 00:00:00 UTC

Publicystyka i wystąpienia w mediach

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Sun, 29 Jul 2018 00:00:00 UTC

Publicystyka i wystąpienia w mediach

Poniżej znajduje się lista moich publikacji, udzielonych komentarzy i wywiadów w prasie drukowanej i portalach internetowych (innych niż moje blogi barczentewicz.com i natemat.pl). Lista ta nie jest pełna, szczególnie w zakresie cytowanych wypowiedzi oraz wystąpień w radiu i telewizji. Lista obejmuje tylko media polskojęzyczne.

Teksty autorskie

‘Na Oksfordzie o polskim Trybunale Konstytucyjnym’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 16 lutego 2017 (www)
‘Jak się sądziłem z prezydentem’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 21 marca 2014
‘Udany zamach stanu w prawie’, Rzeczpospolita, 19 marca 2014
‘Państwo Tuska tajne przez poufne’, Gazeta Polska Codziennie, 30 grudnia 2011
‘Państwo zamyka dostęp do informacji. I to w tajemnicy’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 20 września 2011
‘Dlaczego idę do sądu z prezydentem?’, Wyborcza.biz, 14 lipca 2011
L. Kalina, ‘Niepotrzebne porady dla Balcerowicza’, Wyborcza.biz, 27 kwietnia 2011
‘Czy urzędnicy prezydenta łamią prawo ws. OFE?’, Wyborcza.biz, 18 kwietnia 2011

Wywiady udzielone przeze mnie

Polski prawnik z Oxfordu dla Gazeta.pl: Żeby do Brexitu nie doszło, wystarczy, że… nikt nic nie zrobi, Gazeta.pl, 25 czerwca 2016
Polska Agencja Prasowa, 3 lipca 2012
T. Walczak, ‘Kaplerowi trzeba zapłacić’, Super Express, 15 lutego 2012
T. Walczak, ‘Twórcom prawa brak kultury politycznej’, Super Express, 28 stycznia 2012
M. Skowron, ‘Kancelaria Prezydenta Komorowskiego kłamała?’, Super Express, 29-30 października 2011

Cytowania moich wypowiedzi

PAP (K. Krupa), ‘Sąd Najwyższy wyda 24 stycznia wyrok w sprawie Brexitu’, 18 stycznia 2017
PAP (K. Krupa), ‘Zakończyła się rozprawa w Sądzie Najwyższym ws. Brexitu’, 8 grudnia 2017
S. Sękowski, ‘Dzień oksfordczyka’, Gość Niedzielny, 23 lutego 2014
Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa, ‘TK: Prezydent może udostępniać dokumenty dotyczące ustaw’, 13 listopada 2013
P. Pieńkosz, ‘Szkoły nie prowadzą BIP-ów, bo nie wiedzą, że muszą to robić’, Gazeta Prawna, 29 sierpnia 2012
P. Pieńkosz, ‘Samorządy lekceważą BIP’, Gazeta Prawna, 13 lipca 2012
A. Popiołek, ‘Agenci walczą o dodatkowe ulgi podatkowe przy oszczędzaniu na emeryturę’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 marca 2012
‘Za reklamę kosmetyków aptekarz zapłaci do 50 tys. zł’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 11 stycznia 2012
A. Prusińska, ‘W Polsce gorzej niż na Białorusi. Kto jest winny?’, Onet Biznes, 27 grudnia 2011
Ł. Kuligowski, ‘Proces tworzenia prawa wciąż mało przejrzysty’, Dziennik Gazeta Pawna, 29 listopada 2011
Ł. Kuligowski, ‘Łagodniejszego podejścia do reklamy leków chce UE’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 23 listopada 2011
Ł. Kuligowski, ‘Nie można narzucać kanałów dystrybucji kosmetyków’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 9 listopada 2011
S. Szymański, ‘Wygrał z prezydentem?’, Wprost, 10 października 2011
Ł. Kuligowski, ‘Ekspertyzy są informacją publiczną’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 7 października 2011
D. Frey, ‘Prezydent RP przegrał w sądzie w sprawie ekspertyz dotyczących OFE’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 października 2011
Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘WSA: zlecone przez prezydenta opinie dot. OFE są informacją publiczną’, 6 października 2011
E. Siedlecka, ‘Prezydent przegrał po raz trzeci’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 października 2011
Ł. Kuligowski, ‘Reklama leków nie może wprowadzać w błąd’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 24 sierpnia 2011
E. Ivanova, ‘Prezydent przegrał sprawę o dostęp do informacji publicznej: poznamy treść i autorów ekspertyz w sprawie OFE’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 4 sierpnia 2011
E. Ivanova, ‘Urzędnicy nie zablokują dostępu do opinii i analiz prywatyzacyjnych’, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 3 sierpnia 2011
Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘Współpracownik FOR złożył skargę na bezczynność prezydenta’, 15 lipca 2011

Wywiady telewizyjne i radiowe

TVN (‘Fakty’), komentarz nt. Brexit, 25 czerwca 2016
Tok FM, komentarz nt. Brexit, 24 czerwca 2016
TVP Polonia (‘Polonia 24’), ‘Polacy na Oksfordzie, 19 czerwca 2013
Polsat News (‘Informacje’), wywiad z M. Barczentewiczem, 19 marca 2012, 17:33
TVN (‘Fakty’), ‘Afera solna’, 9 marca 2012
Polsat News (‘Biznes Informacje’), wywiad z M. Barczentewiczem, 1 marca 2012, 18:38
Polsat (‘Wydarzenia’), 25 lutego 2012
TVN24 (‘Reporterzy’), ‘Umowy w ratuszu i ekspertyzy OFE’, grudzień 2011
TVN (‘Fakty’), ‘Tajne miliony warszawskiego ratusza’, 10 listopada 2011
Polsat News (‘Giełda Komentarzy’), ‘Prezydent musi ujawnić ekspertyzy ws. OFE – rozmowa z Mikołajem Barczentewiczem’, 6 października 2011
TVN24 (‘Fakty Ludzie Pieniądze’), ‘WSA: zlecone przez prezydenta opinie dot. OFE są informacją publiczną’, 6 października 2011
TOK FM (rozmowa nt. wyroku WSA w mojej sprawie z Prezydentem RP), 6 października 2011
TVN24 (‘Czarno na białym’), ‘Informacja nie całkiem publiczna’, 26 września 2011
TVN CNBC (konferencja prasowa L. Balcerowicz, M. Barczentewicz, P. Dobrowolski w siedzibie Fundacji FOR), 15 lipca 2011
TOK FM (‘Komentarze Radia TOK FM’), ‘Opinie przygotowane dla organów państwa mają być jawne’, 8 kwietnia 2011

Speaking

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Sun, 29 Jul 2018 00:00:00 UTC

Videography

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Sun, 29 Jul 2018 00:00:00 UTC

Univ Rowing Promo 2013 from Mikołaj Barczentewicz on Vimeo.

Oxford Poland constitutional crisis symposium, 9 May 2017

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Thu, 11 May 2017 11:16:20 UTC

Pomysł konferencji zatytułowanej The Polish constitutional crisis and institutional self-defence (kryzys konstytucyjny w Polsce i samoobrona dla instytucji) był, by zebrać w Oksfordzie czołowych polskich teoretyków prawa zaangażowanych w debatę publiczną na temat obecnych wydarzeń konstytucyjnych w Polsce i pozwolić im na przedstawienie tej debaty angielskim teoretykom prawa.

Jak pisałem w Dzienniku Gazecie Prawnej kilka miesięcy temu:

Być może rozczaruje to niektórych polskich obserwatorów, ale nie podchodzimy do problemu z tezą, że któraś ze stron ma rację. Mając świadomość jak gorący jest spór toczący się w Polsce i jakie są ograniczenia polskiej debaty, wychodzimy z propozycją rozmowy na innym poziomie. Niektórych rozczaruje też prawdopodobnie, że o ile ocena legalności działań różnych postaci toczącego się dramatu będzie niewątpliwie dla naszej dyskusji istotna, nie będzie ona głównym tematem. Świadomie zapraszamy do dyskusji wyłącznie akademików zainteresowanych teorią i filozofią prawa. Pytanie, które im zadamy brzmi następująco: czy i do jakiego stopnia działania różnych zainteresowanych stron były i są usprawiedliwione jako podjęte w obronie ważnych wartości takich jak równowaga i podział władz ? Wśród ‘zainteresowanych stron’ mamy na myśli przede wszystkim Prezydenta RP, Rząd, Sejm (nie tylko obecnej kadencji), a także sam Trybunał i poszczególnych jego sędziów (kolejność alfabetyczna). (...) Celem oksfordzkiej konferencji o polskim Trybunale Konstytucyjnym nie będzie ani obrona, ani atak na obóz rządzący w Polsce. Z jednej strony, pomysł konferencji zrodził się z dużego zainteresowania wydarzeniami w Polsce i chęci ich zrozumienia, wychodząc poza nagłówki prasowe. Z drugiej strony, mamy ambicję zapewnić miejsce i czas na wyważoną, głęboką, lecz nie mniej przez to krytyczną, dyskusję na temat wydarzeń wokół Trybunału.

Moim zdaniem w istotnej mierze udało się ten cel osiągnąć. Jeśli chcą się Państwo o tym przekonać sami, polecam obejrzenie nagrań.

‘The Polish constitutional crisis and institutional self-defence’

The Programme for the Foundations of Law and Constitutional Government Faculty of Law, University of Oxford Date: 9 May 2017 Venue: Danson Room, Trinity College, University of Oxford

The first panel (Chair: Nick Barber, University of Oxford)

Adam Czarnota
Associate Professor, University of New South Wales Law
Marcin Matczak
Associate Professor of Legal Philosophy, University of Warsaw
Q&A;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mm1ky1oepgA

The second panel (Chair: Timothy Endicott, University of Oxford)

Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
Professor of Legal Theory, Jagiellonian University
Hon. Lech Morawski
Judge of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland
Q&A;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3p5egncsjm4

Comments (Chair: Mikołaj Barczentewicz, University of Oxford)

Nick Barber
Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Oxford
Richard Ekins
Associate Professor of Law, University of Oxford
Alison Young
Professor of Public Law, University of Oxford
Q&A; (With the panellists from the previous two panels)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42gVcNp266Q

The Core Issue in Miller: The Relevance of Section 1 of the 1972 Act

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Sat, 07 Jan 2017 17:53:38 UTC

The legal controversy in the Miller case may now be distilled in the following way. The government argues that it has a general power to withdraw from treaties, which it certainly does. The claimants argue that the executive does not have a power to frustrate a statute, which it certainly does not. The government argues that Parliament legislated in 1972 (and afterwards) against the background of a settled practice that the power of the Crown to withdraw from treaties is untrammelled. The claimants respond that there was never such a treaty as the set of EU Treaties and hence the previous practice is irrelevant.

This paper suggests that the correct interpretation of s. 1 of the European Communities Act 1972 [‘ECA’] strengthens the government position in Miller. The paper does so by explaining the legislative choice expressed in s. 1 ECA with the aid of the clear interpretative statements made in Parliament by government representatives during the legislative work on what became the ECA.

Both the scheme of the ECA 1972 and the debates on it assumed that the Crown has an inherent constitutional power (not conferred by the ECA or any other statute) conclusively to enter (under international law) into treaties constituting important amendments to the Community Treaties. That power both to sign and to ratify was neither conferred by nor restricted in the ECA. Parliament only sought to influence – as distinct from authorise – its exercise by giving to each House of Parliament (not to Parliament, the Queen-in-Parliament, itself) the opportunity to approve or withhold approval of the government’s incorporating such future amending treaties into internal UK law simply by Order in Council declaring them (with conclusive effect) to be Community Treaties. ECA s. 1(3) confers that remarkable incorporation power of the government, subject only to resolutions in each House. The fact that it has scarcely been exercised in relation to treaties amending EEC/EU Treaties does not affect Parliament’s intent in 1972.

In relation to Miller, this strongly supports the view that withdrawal from the Community (now EU) Treaties was not, in law, subjected by the ECA 1972, even implicitly, to the requirement alleged by the claimants and the Divisional Court, that it be pre-authorised by the Queen-in-Parliament. Moreover, if that power of the government was confirmed and not curtailed by the ECA 1972, the most comprehensive incorporation of – and apparatus for incorporating – EU law into UK law, why would anyone think that Parliament impliedly intended later statutes, like the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 or the Communications Act 2003, to be protected from the normal effect of withdrawing from a treaty, namely that statutes presupposing events, processes etc. predicated on treaties may be left high and dry by the cessation of the UK’s involvement in such events and processes? The claimants’ assertion that those statutes created, as a strange side-effect, a kind of incorporation into UK law of EU rights existing under non-incorporated EU rules (about the European Parliament, for example) remains quite without support.

On the main issue, as well as the side issue just mentioned, the government has the stronger case. The claimants have to make a bold argument rejecting established constitutional practice and attributing to Parliament in 1972 and to subsequent Parliaments a very robust intent to change the law in unprecedented ways, an intent of which there is no sign in the ECA or the debates on its enactment. How many Justices of the Supreme Court will recognise this remains to be seen.

Download paper

Originally published by Policy Exchange / Judicial Power Project, January 4, 2017

Consequences of the High Court’s Reasoning in the Article 50 Judgment: EU Law-making Unlawful

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Fri, 18 Nov 2016 17:46:55 UTC

Introduction

In its judgment in Miller (the Article 50 litigation), the High Court had no doubts that it was defending constitutional orthodoxy. The issue at stake was that of the limits of executive action in the international sphere when this has consequences in UK law. The Court relied on the principle that the crown cannot change law without statutory authority. John Finnis, David Feldman, as well as Mark Elliott and Hayley Hooper argued that the Court erred by an over-broad reading of the principle and in its application. Finnis framed his argument using an analogy between withdrawing from a double-taxation treaty and withdrawing from the EU Treaties. However, some may have a worry that the analogy fails because EU law has a sufficiently special status in UK law or for some more technical reason.

I show here that even if that is the case, there is another class of executive actions rendered unlawful if one accepts the High Court’s reasoning in Miller. I am referring to voting by UK ministers in the EU Council in favour of EU secondary legislation that diminishes any individual rights derived from UK or EU law. It is difficult to assess exactly how many times, on this argument, UK ministers broke UK constitutional law since the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. What is not difficult to see is how staggeringly surprising is the conclusion that such law-breaking has been taking place. I neither criticise nor defend this conclusion here. My ambition is merely to develop the argument for it, applying faithfully the logic adopted by the High Court.

In her recent comment, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott noticed and dismissed this possibility saying:

… in cases outside of treaty amendment (where an EU Regulation is repealed for example) where rights are eliminated, the House of Commons European Scrutiny committee has the possibility of assessing the relevant EU measure, which should be deposited in Parliament by the Government. > >

She uses scrutiny by parliamentary committees as an argument for lawfulness of UK involvement in diminishing rights via the EU. However, on Miller terms this is insufficient: what is needed is express authority given in an Act of Parliament. No ‘green light’ from a Commons or Lords committee, no ‘special role’ for MPs to ‘have a say’ granted in a mere resolution of the Commons or of the Lords come close to providing proper legal authority. If we are serious about Miller, then such half-measures will not do.

The argument is straightforward. Voting in the EU Council on proposals of EU secondary legislation constitutes executive action that as such requires legal authority. The authority, in principle, could be (1) that of the royal prerogative to conduct international relations or (2) of s. 2(1) of the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972. In the first case, application of Miller is very simple: the executive cannot use the prerogative in such a way as to diminish individual rights. In the second case, I need to say a bit more about the proper construction of s. 2(1) ECA 1972. The point is that, if one interprets the ECA the way the High Court did in Miller, s. 2(1) ECA cannot provide sufficient authority for voting for measures that would have a consequence of diminishing rights. And we should remember how liberal the High Court was in admitting what kinds of rights are so protected. I hope it begins to become apparent to careful readers of the Miller judgment that there is some plausibility to this analogy. It is now time to fill in the details.

How voting in the Council may diminish individual rights

The Council of the European Union

It does not require special argument that EU secondary law sometimes modifies and diminishes rights that individuals have under EU law or directly under UK law (e.g. the Kadi saga). And some, if not most, of that secondary law is created with express assent of UK government, by a vote in the EU Council. Importantly, the members of the Council are not EU functionaries, unlike the members of the Commission. Article 16(2) the Treaty on European Union makes this clear (emphasis mine):

The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, **who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote**. > >

What is particularly important for the present argument is that it is governments (executive branches) of EU member states which are represented in the Council and which cast votes through ministers representing them.

The Proclamations principle

As the High Court said in Miller (at [25]):

The Crown has only those prerogative powers recognised by the common law and their exercise only produces legal effects within boundaries so recognised. Outside those boundaries the Crown has no power to alter the law of the land, whether it be common law or contained in legislation. > >

And later, agreeing with the claimants (at [95]):

… that the Crown could not change domestic law and nullify rights under the law unless Parliament had conferred upon the Crown authority to do so either expressly or by necessary implication by an Act of Parliament. > >

This principle was expressed in many authorities, notably in _The Case of Proclamations _(1610) and the in Bill of Rights 1688. The Court refers to its version as summarised in The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77. For brevity, in what follows I refer to this principle as ‘the Proclamations principle’.

What sort of causal link must the negative consequences for rights have with executive action?

The Council normally does not make EU law alone and even if it did, it is still the case that the representatives of the United Kingdom do not make decisions for the Council but merely participate in decision-making. Someone might say that this is a significant difference with notification of a decision to withdraw from the EU in accordance with Article 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which - whatever its consequences - is a unilateral act for the UK to undertake. And, if no one does anything, once Article 50 is triggered there is the automatic consequence of leaving the EU after two years. The High Court in Miller accepted that an Article 50 notification by the executive would constitute altering of UK law by the executive that could only be done with statutory authority. Would the situation be different had Article 50 required, for instance, assent of majority of member states (or even of one other state) for triggering the procedure of withdrawal?

This sounds like the sort of ‘highly formalistic’ (Miller at [66]) argument that the Court rejected as inappropriate. Yes, the Court does say that ‘[t]he effect of the giving of notice under Article 50 on relevant rights is direct’ (at [11]). But given the Court’s general, robust approach to defending rights from executive action, executive authority to diminish rights when acting with accomplices, so to speak, is surely also ruled out by the logic of the Court’s position.

Aiming to be faithful to the reasoning adopted by the High Court, I suggest that in international affairs the Proclamations principle is triggered whenever UK government acts, alone or in concert, and when the legal consequences of the act are to diminish some individual rights given effect to in UK law. Hence, for instance: enacting an EU regulation, together with other members of the Council and together with European Parliament, may trigger the Proclamations principle (if the regulation diminishes rights).

The High Court’s discussion of the ‘category II’ rights is instructive (at [60]: ’those enjoyed by British citizens and companies in relation to their activities in other Member States, as provided for by EU law’). The Court rejected the government’s argument that may be rephrased as a proposition that those EU-derived rights in foreign law (e.g. French law) that UK citizens enjoy are not direct effects of the European Communities Act 1972. In response, the Court concluded that Parliament, when enacting the ECA 1972, must have intended the indirect chain of events leading to UK citizens acquiring those rights in foreign law. The Court characterised those rights as ‘created by Parliament’ (at [66]). But if a right to enter and remain in France, ‘formalistically’ speaking enacted by French legislature, is ‘created by Parliament’ then clearly ‘direct effect on rights’ in the Miller framework does not mean a consequence of acting alone, without involvement of other institutions.

The Miller judgment accepted that any domestic effect of an Article 50 notification will be due to the ECA 1972 (and other statutes) and it included ‘category II’ rights among the rights ‘created by Parliament’ through UK statutes. Importantly, without those statutes, exiting the EU would have no effect on rights in UK law and hence no way to trigger the _Proclamations _principle. Leaving the EU would not, strictly speaking, mean rescinding rights in domestic law by executive action on international plane alone. EU Treaties are not self-executing in UK law. The final consequence of an Article 50 notification (leaving the EU) needs to be ‘translated’ into UK law through statutory domestic gateways to have any effect there. In a similar way to new EU regulations.

What is the alternative? If we are to insist that diminishing of rights must be a ’necessary’ or ‘invariable’ consequence of an executive action, notification under Article 50 does not satisfy this test. Article 50 expressly presents as a default option not the automatic lapsing of membership after two years but a new agreement between the exiting state and the remaining member states to be reached before that deadline. It also expressly allows for extension of the period of negotiation. More importantly: outside of the express wording of Article 50, it would be possible for all the member states (including the UK) to decide that the UK is to remain a member of the EU. Note that I am not relying on unilateral revocability of an Article 50 notification (which is available according to many EU law experts) - but on revocability by unanimous consent of all member states. Even if that is not a likely scenario, it falsifies claims of ‘necessity’ and ‘invariability’ of the consequences of an Article 50 notification. Uncertainty is greater than Robert Craig allows while responding to Mark Elliott: notification of a decision to withdraw does not have exiting the EU as its ‘necessary’ consequence. Necessity-if-nothing-changes-and-no-one-does-anything is no necessity.

What would be an example of necessary consequences in a relevant sense? Take Acts of Parliament: they can change the law the very moment they are enacted. No one, except for Parliament, can stop them in such a situation. And if Parliament legislates to do so, then it is undoing a change already made. Not so with Article 50 notification and its revocation (or unanimous disregard by all EU member states): there would be no change in law to be undone (at least no rights-affecting change).

Maybe what is required is that an executive action is very likely to have as its consequence diminishing of rights, as an Article 50 notification arguably would. But participation in the EU legislative procedure may satisfy this condition and do so not only in cases where unanimity in the Council is required for a legislative measure to pass. Even in the more commonly used qualified majority voting procedure, both the UK’s vote and the UK’s participation in preparation of a proposal may be significant enough to increase appreciably the likelihood of passing an EU measure that happens to diminish rights. In other words, UK government does have a ‘strong voice’ in Europe (it just may be that we are only now finding out what are the domestic legal limits on exercising that voice).

_Can EU law-making really trigger the Proclamations principle?_

A possible objection may be that all EU rights are permanently at the mercy of the EU and as far as UK constitutional law is concerned: the EU giveth, the EU taketh away. In other words, because s. 2(1) ECA 1972 refers to rights, powers and so on ‘from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties’, UK law gives EU institutions - and UK government acting within them - a carte blanche on doing whatever with those rights, powers etc. There is perfect symmetry: as many rights the EU can create in UK law, as many it may expunge or diminish. The objection could be summarised in the following way: the rights-protecting mechanisms of UK constitutional law kick in only when EU law is to be removed wholesale.

This sounds somewhat ad hoc. It is also at odds with the approach to statutory interpretation adopted by the High Court in Miller. In my forthcoming paper, I made the argument on how the principle of legality and the principle of the rule of law may limit (but also expand) the scope of s. 2(1) ECA. Nevertheless, I admit that I did not expect the catalogue of rights protected by domestic constitutional principles to be as broad as the High Court said in Miller (especially the so-called ‘category II’ rights in foreign law, see Miller at [57]-[64]).

I suggest that a new picture on interpretation of s. 2(1) ECA emerges from Miller, one of rights-protecting asymmetry. On this view, Parliament that enacted the ECA 1972 ought to be taken to have intended a generous recognition of new rights coming from EU law, but not a (domestically) unlimited power to diminish rights once granted. Also, we should not forget that EU secondary law may not only diminish EU rights, but also rights coming directly from UK law (so more than ‘EU giveth’).

At the very least, it is arguable that s. 2(1) ECA does not constitute a statutory authorisation for UK ministers to commit UK government in the EU Council to any EU measure, no matter how rights-diminishing. If a rights-diminishing measure passes, then perhaps it may still be directly effective in UK law. But that would not change the fact that it would have been unlawful for UK ministers to assent to it. A stronger view would be that at least some rights-diminishing EU measures do not have effect in UK law because they do not fit in the domestic incorporating gateway from s. 2(1) ECA, but I leave this consideration aside (I argue for a version of it in my forthcoming paper).

What is the legal authority for representation of the UK in the Council?

It may be surprising to a contemporary reader, but the issue of the legal basis for representation of the UK in the Council’s legislative functions was a matter of some controversy around the time the UK joined the EEC. Non-legislative procedures aiming to provide some parliamentary scrutiny that Sionaidh Douglas-Scott mentioned were instituted as a response to this problem (‘little short of scandalous’ as Martin Howe QC put it). But are they legally sufficient? Some thought no and arguably Miller revives this concern. For instance, there was a position expressed by minority of the authors of the Second Report from the Select Committee on European Community Secondary Legislation (October 1973, 1972–73, HC 463-I, p. xxxviii):

For the United Kingdom this poses a constitutional and legal paradox. For legislation by the executive is expressly prohibited by law and constitutional practice in the United Kingdom. This power was rejected under the guise of prerogative legislation in the _Case of Proclamations _(1610) 12 Co. Rep. 74 and in the Bill of Rights 1688 (and Scottish Qaim of Right 1689). United Kingdom Ministers of the Crown participating in E.E.C. Council of Ministers business do so, even from an E.E.C. standpoint, only insofar as they are clothed with United Kingdom constitutional authority. But that very constitutional authority expressly forbids them from legislating without the consent of Parliament. No Act of Parliament has yet given them that authority nor do the Treaty of Accession or the Treaty of Rome touch upon it. > > > > It follows that United Kingdom Ministers cannot constitutionally consent to E.E.C. Council of Ministers secondary legislation having direct effect in this country without the consent of Parliament. > >

Similar concerns were raised in parliamentary debates (e.g. in 1974 and in 1977).

In principle, setting aside the issue of altering domestic law, it could be that UK ministers exercise prerogative powers when participating in the Council. As the High Court said in Miller (at [30]):

… as a general rule applicable in normal circumstances, the conduct of international relations and the making and unmaking of treaties on behalf of the United Kingdom are regarded as matters for the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative powers. > >

But the core point of Miller is that prerogative powers will not do when alteration of rights and duties given effect in domestic law is at stake. If there is no prerogative power to act in the EU Council with effect of diminishing rights, then the question remains whether government has sufficient statutory authority for that.

Here I come back to the point I already made on proper interpretation of s. 2(1) ECA 1972. As was noted in parliamentary debates from the 1970s I referred to earlier, s. 2(1) ECA does not contain an express provision giving UK ministers a legal power to participate in the Council’s legislative activity. A maiore ad minus, there is no express statutory authority for them to participate in enacting EU measures that diminish rights coming from EU law or directly from UK law. Why would the lack of such express language be a problem given the seemingly catch-all nature of s. 2(1) ECA? The High Court provided an answer (at [83]-[84]):

… Similarly, the stronger the constitutional principle, the more readily can it be inferred that words used by Parliament were intended to carry a meaning which reflects the principle. > > > > We emphasise this feature of the case because the Secretary of State’s submission, in our view, glossed over an important aspect of this starting point for the interpretation of the ECA 1972 and proceeded to a contention that the onus was on the claimants to point to express language in the statute removing the Crown’s prerogative in relation to the conduct of international relations on behalf of the United Kingdom. > >

Applied to the issue at hand, it would mean that to infer that s. 2(1) ECA confers on UK ministers a power to vote in the EU Council for rights-diminishing measures, we would expect more express language. In the absence of such language, the intention cannot be inferred from the general words that s. 2(1) ECA does contain. And that means that UK ministers have neither prerogative nor statutory authority in UK law to assent to rights-diminishing EU measures. When they do so, they act unlawfully in UK law.

Conclusion

In a surprising twist, the High Court brings us back to the view on the constitutional limits of UK government’s participation in European law-making abandoned shortly after the UK’s accession to the EEC. Perhaps that view is correct and the history of the UK’s membership in the EEC/EU has been fraught with executive law-breaking. My point is simple: once we accept the kind of robust legal limits on executive action in the international realm and the kind of interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972 that the High Court relied on in Miller, then it would be ad hoc and unprincipled to then contend that this reasoning applies only to withdrawing from the EU Treaties altogether. An interesting question is how much more of currently uncontroversial executive action is caught by Miller-like arguments. Given the established consensus on lawfulness of ministerial representation of the UK in the EU Council, this argument may perhaps further undermine the correctness of the High Court’s judgment in Miller.

The author thanks Mark Elliott, Tobias Lutzi, Alice Schneider, Ewan Smith, as well as Stephen Tierney and Jeff King for their comments on a draft of this text.

Originally published on the U.K. Const. L. Blog, November 18, 2016

The Supreme Court Should Not Refer to the EU Court of Justice on Article 50

Mikołaj Barczentewicz — Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:49:32 UTC

One of the most discussed aspects of the forthcoming appeal in the Article 50 litigation is the issue whether the Supreme Court should make a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union. George Peretz QC and professor Mike Wienbracke argued that it should not (or at least will not), whereas Richard Lang and professor Daniel Sarmiento argued that it should. There are, however, two arguments for why the Supreme Court should not make the reference that have not yet received adequate attention. First, establishing whether an Article 50 notification is revocable is not necessary for the Supreme Court to decide the case because the claimants ought to lose even if it is irrevocable (and not merely because both parties stipulated irrevocability). Second, even if the first argument is wrong and the case does turn on revocability, it is still the case that no UK court has a legal power to make a reference to the EU Court, because the European Communities Act 1972 does not incorporate EU law that purports to regulate withdrawal from the EU.

Before I turn to those arguments, I would like to direct reader’s attention to an interesting statement made in Parliament on 7 November by the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU. In response to a question why his lawyers stipulated that an Article 50 notification would be irrevocable, Mr Davis said: ‘The reason was not really a point of law so much as a point of constitutional and political reality. I did not see it as possible that we could reverse the decision of the British people.’ This answer may suggest that learned legal discussions on the true meaning of Article 50 will not influence the government’s strategy on appeal.

Revocability of an Article 50 notification not central to the case

Under EU law (Article 267 TFEU), a domestic final court of appeal is under a duty to make a reference to the Court of Justice only if a decision on an issue of the interpretation of the EU Treaties is necessary for the domestic court to give judgment. The commentators have already identified several reasons why interpretation of Article 50 TEU is not necessary for the Supreme Court to give a judgment:

Both parties to the present litigation have stipulated that an Article 50 notification of a decision to withdraw from the EU is not revocable (though it is clear that both High Court and the Supreme Court could disregard that).
Even if the notification is irrevocable, there is still a possibility that withdrawal negotiations will end in something other than withdrawal (e.g. that instead of losing UK as a member, all the member states will unanimously agree on a new EU reform treaty). (Peretz raises this point).
Aside from the issue of revocability, by the reference to a Member State’s ‘own constitutional requirements’, Article 50 TEU makes other considerations, of how the decision to withdraw and to notify that intention is to be made, either not issues of EU law at all or issues on which EU law somehow incorporates domestic constitutional law (with a consequence of non-justiciability on the EU level). (Wienbracke develops this argument.)

I suggest to take more seriously the government’s position expressed by the Attorney General on 17 October: ‘[w]e do not in any event accept that this question is central to the arguments before the court’ (page 64 of the transcript). He accepted that if the claimants are right about the limits of prerogative, then the government must lose even if Article 50 allows for revocation of a notification to withdraw. My point is simply that the claimants must lose even if notification is irrevocable. For reasons why this is the case, I refer the reader to powerful analyses by John Finnis and David Feldman. If they are right about the limits of prerogative powers, then even under EU law there is no duty for the Supreme Court to refer.

No UK court has a legal power to make references to the EU Court related to Brexit

What if the Supreme Court concludes that the case does turn on the issue of revocability of an Article 50 notification and if the judges do not see themselves bound by stipulations made by the parties? It would be difficult to argue that, as a matter of EU law, revocability of Article 50 notifications belongs to the set of issues on which EU law defers to national law. It would then seem that, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, the Supreme Court would be under a duty to make a reference to the Court of Justice. However, this is too quick.

The UK has a dualist approach to all international law and EU law, at least in principle, is not different (on the idiosyncrasies of the case of effect of EU law in the UK, see my forthcoming LQR article). What this means is that, in itself, the Article 267 duty to make references to the Court of Justice is not a duty UK courts can recognize. There is a need for a gateway in UK law to give that EU law any domestic effect. The general gateway for effects of EU law in UK law is to be found in the European Communities Act 1972. However, as I show in my paper, the ECA clearly does not provide for domestic effect of all EU law.

The question then is whether the ECA provides for domestic effect of a duty to make references on matters of withdrawal from the European Union? The Court of Appeal in the Brexit referendum case of Shindler (see my note published in this blog) suggested that the legislative choice made by Parliament in enacting the ECA 1972 was only to make provision for effect of EU law to the extent the UK remains a member of the club. As Elias LJ noted in his concurring majority judgment: ‘… I do not think it can have been intended to bind the UK to those rules when the very question is whether it should be bound by those rules.’ I leave aside the issue that the interpretation of the ECA 1972 in Shindler is much more plausible than (and hard to square with) the one adopted by the High Court in Miller.

What follows from this is that it is at the very least arguable that Parliament did not intend for EU rules, like the duty to make references to the EU Court, to have any effect in UK law in matters of withdrawal from the EU. This would mean that, in UK law, the Supreme Court would have neither duty, nor even a power to make the reference. The reference would not be an option. It would be for the Supreme Court to interpret Article 50 TEU alone and with final authority, just like domestic courts routinely interpret international law.

Originally published on the U.K. Const. L. Blog, November 11, 2016