Last month, Iran named its new defense minister, Mehrdad Akhlaghi-Ketabchi, to replace the interim minister, Majid Ebn al-Reza, and succeed the former defense minister, Aziz Nasirzadeh, who was killed in February 2026 by Israeli air attacks. Iranian defense ministers have been either senior officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Artesh (Regular Military), or have been Defense Ministry technocrats—Akhlaghi is an example of the latter, with 42 years of experience in Iran’s aerospace and defense industries.

Recent Iranian and Western reports have highlighted Akhlaghi’s past positions and experience in Iran’s aerospace and defense industries, including his role in Iran’s advancing Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. For instance, these sources have noted that Akhlaghi was director of the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG)—which runs the Defense Ministry’s solid-propellant ballistic missile programs—and the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees SBIG and all of the ministry’s missile programs. More recently, Akhlaghi headed the Defense Ministry’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which develops and produces a wide range of conventional weapons, munitions, equipment, and technologies. The Wall Street Journal even referred to Akhlaghi as “one of the fathers of the country’s ballistic missile program.” One Iranian press report noted his close ties to the late IRGC missile official and “father” of Iran’s ballistic missile efforts, Hassan Tehrani Moghadam, and also to Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the late commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force. Another Iranian press report stated that Akhlaghi is one of the key architects of Iran’s aerospace industry, and an Iranian Majles (parliament) member noted that Akhlaghi has been “hands-on” in Iran’s missile industry, with his hands in the “mixing pot” of missile programs. For 20 years, Akhlaghi has been identified by Western governments as an important figure in Iran’s aerospace and defense industries, and has been sanctioned by the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and other Western countries.

Although these reports provide a useful general view of Akhlaghi, they only scratch the surface of Akhlaghi’s extensive role in the origins and evolution of Iran’s ballistic missile programs and industries. Other sources, especially the three-volume book Eternal Man (mard-e abadi)—based on extensive interviews with Iranian missile and military officials—as well as other Persian-language information provide many other important datapoints about Akhlaghi’s missile background and experience. (The author of Eternal Man, who interviewed Akhlaghi extensively, referred to Akhlaghi by the pseudonym “Mohammad Ali Ahmadi” throughout the book.) This information provides a valuable picture of how well-positioned Akhlaghi is to help Iran rebuild and improve its missile capabilities moving forward.

The following is a summary of Akhlaghi’s missile background and experience, based mainly on Eternal Man, but also on other Persian-language sources.

Akhlaghi’s Background

Akhlaghi was born in 1958 in Rasht and earned a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering at the Amir Kabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic) in 1984/1985. According to Eternal Man, he also obtained a master’s degree in electrical engineering (with a specialization in control) at the Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. Probably many years later, he obtained a master’s degree in strategic management from the Defense Ministry’s Malek Ashtar University of Technology. Although he did not serve in the IRGC military forces, Akhlaghi holds the rank of IRGC general, according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). (If true, this is likely due to his service in the IRGC Ministry and IRGC Self-Sufficiency Jahad Organization, as described below.)

Akhlaghi Starts Work on Scud B Ballistic Missile

According to Eternal Man, Akhlaghi first entered Iran’s missile industry in the mid-1980s by joining the IRGC Ministry’s project to reverse engineer the Scud B ballistic missile at the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG). Akhlaghi worked for SHIG director Ali Ghiamtiun, guidance and control (G&C) official (and future SHIG director) Abbas Farivar, and Iran’s leading G&C expert, Mohammad Ali Masumnia. Akhlaghi became head of SHIG’s G&C group and worked with North Korea on the technology transfer of the Scud B guidance system to Iran. Later, Akhlaghi led SHIG’s Shahid Ghazi Project, whose aim was to improve the original Scud B guidance system.

(In the 1990s, Iran used the Shahid Ghazi guidance system in its domestically produced versions of the North Korean Scud B (Shahab-1), Scud C (Shahab-2), and No Dong (Shahab-3) missiles. Iran also used the Shahid Ghazi guidance system in its effort to develop an extended range version of the Tondar-69 (Chinese B610) ballistic missile, under the Zolfaghar-73 Project. Of note, in an undated visit to China, Akhlaghi and others were surprised at the similarity between the B610 and Shahid Ghazi guidance systems.)

Work on Zelzal Rockets

The timing is unclear, but at some point in the late 1980s or early 1990s, Akhlaghi switched from liquid-propellant missiles to solid-propellant rockets. According to Eternal Man and the diaries of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akhlaghi directed the Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2 rocket projects as an official of the Defense Industries Research and Development Group (RDG) of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and later as director of the Missile Research Center of the Defense Ministry’s Defense Science and Technology Research Center (DSTRC). (In 1989, the RDG became the DSTRC.)

According to Iranian sources, the Zelzal was based on the wartime Sejjil rocket project run by the IRGC and directed by Asghar Eslami who later worked on the Zelzal. (During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran ran several programs to develop long-range rockets—such as the Sejjil, Oghab, Nazeat, and Mojteme—to create a retaliatory capability against Iraq’s air and missile attacks.) Eslami’s photo (see below) was displayed in 2014 alongside that of Tehrani Moghadam, showing his important role in establishing Iran’s solid-propellant missile industry. The Shahid Eslami Research Center—SBIG’s research and development entity—was probably named after Eslami.

The Defense Ministry merged its two long-range rocket projects (Zelzal and Nazeat) into the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which oversaw the Defense Ministry’s solid-propellant missile efforts. In 1994, Akhlaghi received a national Iranian scientific award (Kharazmi award) for his leadership of the Zelzal-2 rocket project.

Fateh-110 Missile, Khojir Infrastructure, Sejjil Missile, IRGC SSJO

According to Eternal Man, during the 1990s and early 2000s, Akhlaghi moved to SBIG and shifted from unguided rockets to solid-propellant ballistic missiles. In an effort driven by IRGC missile official Hassan Tehrani Moghadam, Akhlaghi became both the project manager and industrial director of the Mersad Project at SBIG. The project’s aim was to develop Iran’s first solid-propellant ballistic missile, the Fateh-110, through the conversion of the unguided Zelzal-2 rocket into a guided missile by replacing its spin stabilization motor with a guidance system. According to Sayyed Majid Musavi—today’s commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force—Akhlaghi and his group conducted the design, research, and production of the Fateh-110 missile “from zero to 100.” As the project’s industrial director, Akhlaghi also oversaw the establishment of SBIG’s initial facilities at Khojir—a large missile R&D and production complex east of Tehran—to produce composite solid-propellant rocket motors and guidance systems, probably based in large part on Chinese assistance. This effort required about a hundred blasting operations to shape the terrain and clear away debris. Akhlaghi can be seen (see photo below) along with other important Iranian defense officials at the 2003 inauguration of SBIG’s facilities in Khojir for the production and testing of solid rocket motors. During this time, Akhlaghi became director of SBIG’s new Shahid Kharrazi Industries, which was created to produce guidance systems for SBIG missiles.

Consistent with Akhlaghi’s tenure noted above, SPOT imagery from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s shows the origins and construction of the SBIG facilities in Khojir for the production and testing of solid rocket motors. It also shows the construction of a missile assembly building and the Shahid Kharrazi Industries site for the production of guidance systems.

According to Eternal Man, during the mid-2000s, Akhlaghi, who was now the director of SBIG, oversaw the Ashura Project, which resulted in the Sejjil, Iran’s first solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). SBIG conducted the first successful flight test of the Sejjil in 2008.

Thus, one might view Akhlaghi as the “father” of the Defense Ministry’s solid-propellant SRBM and MRBM programs—through his direct involvement in developing the Zelzal rocket, Fateh-110 SRBM, and Sejjil MRBM, his role in constructing SBIG’s initial development and production infrastructure at Khojir, and his leadership of SBIG and SBIG’s Shahid Kharrazi Industries.

Of note, as SBIG director—and as the previous head of development of the Zelzal rocket and Fateh-110 missile—Akhlaghi probably played a role in Iran’s reported assistance to Syria during the 1990s and 2000s to produce its own versions of the Zelzal and Fateh-110.

According to Eternal Man, sometime in the mid-to-late 2000s, Tehrani Moghadam tapped Akhlaghi to help him establish the IRGC’s parallel solid-propellant missile program under the IRGC Self-Sufficiency Jahad Organization (SSJO) located at the Shahid Modares Base west of Tehran. Akhlaghi supported the SSJO’s work on its Ghaem and Ghadir projects, including his role as a lead designer and his involvement in motor and flight testing. Akhlaghi also constructed a small G&C complex in a building in northern Tehran to support the SSJO’s work. It is unclear if Akhlaghi did this while still working at SBIG, or whether he departed SBIG to work full-time for the IRGC SSJO. In any case, this role highlights the close relationship between Akhlaghi and Tehrani Moghadam, who called him “Dear Mehrdad” (Mehrdad-jun) and referred to him as the best missile designer in the Islamic world.

After the death of Tehrani Moghadam and dozens of other SSJO personnel in 2011 in a massive explosion at the Shahid Modares Base, Akhlaghi was named as the director of the IRGC SSJO, and planned to continue the IRGC’s work on the Ghaem project, according to Eternal Man. (Days after Tehrani Moghadam’s death, then-IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari appointed an unnamed “brother” as the new head of the SSJO—we now know this was Akhlaghi.) It is unclear, however, how long he held that position (possibly until 2014—see below), and it appears that he never returned to the SSJO.

During his time with the IRGC SSJO, Akhlaghi applied his ideas about outsourcing. According to Eternal Man, Akhlaghi briefed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about the SSJO’s use of outsourcing and “factoryless production” (tolid bedun-e karkhaneh) in the Ghaem project. Akhlaghi explained how during his 20 years in the Defense Ministry, the traditional approach was to locate all critical activities at a single complex. (It is worth noting that this was the approach by both SHIG and SBIG in their construction of the massive Khojir complex.) According to Akhlaghi, the IRGC SSJO relied on suppliers across the country to support its work, which was less costly and less vulnerable to potential U.S. air attacks. Elsewhere, Akhlaghi noted his support for the related approach of creating “small centers” (hasteh-ha-ye kuchek) and “large networks” (shabakeh-ha-ye bozorg) as a model of weapons programs and defense industries.

Of note, the Defense Ministry since the late 2000s has emphasized the approach—perhaps in part due to Akhlaghi’s influence—of small centers and large networks. (Iranian officials have also referred to this approach as “small knowledgeable centers” and “large capable networks” or simply as “core and network.”). In this model, the “centers”—that is, the core organizations such as the AIO—develop and produce weapon systems and then outsource the supply of key inputs to the “networks” of Iranian industries, research centers, universities, and knowledge-based companies. This outsourcing allows the core organizations to focus on the most critical and sensitive work, expands Iran’s domestic supplier base, and also disperses the industry to prevent its easy destruction from enemy attack. To operationalize this framework, the Defense Ministry established a center called “SAMTA” to oversee what it calls the “network of collaborators” (shabakeh-ye hamkaran), and to identify and license thousands of Iranian companies to supply the required components, materials, and equipment to weapons programs.

AIO Director

In 2014, Akhlaghi was appointed as the director of the Defense Ministry’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), where he now oversaw all AIO ballistic missile programs as well as its cruise missile and other missile and rocket programs. During his tenure as director, the AIO’s SHIG and SBIG significantly expanded their development and production of liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles—both short- and medium-range—including new families of systems derived from the Fateh-110 whose development he led more than a decade earlier. Also, SBIG expanded its facilities at Khojir to develop and produce solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

DIO Director

By 2020, Akhlaghi became director of the Defense Ministry’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a sister organization to the AIO and the producer of a range of conventional weapons, munitions, equipment, and technologies. Importantly, the DIO’s Chemical Industries Group supplies important inputs to the AIO’s ballistic missile programs, including solid propellant ingredients used in solid rocket motors and explosives used in warheads. Also, in 2021, the DIO inaugurated a solid rocket motor production facility in its Parchin complex that probably supplies motors to SBIG for its solid-propellant ballistic missile programs. It is possible that Akhlaghi—a longtime proponent of outsourcing—had a major role in establishing that facility as director of the AIO and DIO.

Akhlaghi’s Qualifications and Plans as Defense Minister

Akhlaghi clearly brings a wealth of experience and expertise to the position of defense minister—especially in areas important to rebuilding and improving Iran’s missile programs and industries. Based on his positions and experiences across numerous missile and defense organizations to date, Akhlaghi has clear expertise in areas such as:

• Managing close cooperation with missile end-users—especially commanders of the IRGC Air Force, and later Aerospace Force—to meet their technical and operational requirements for missile systems.
• Working across diverse organizations, including SHIG and SBIG, the Defense Ministry and the IRGC, and the AIO and DIO.
• Directing missile technology research and development. For instance, Akhlaghi has emphasized that he spent a decade focused on research before moving into the production sector, and established many research centers and design bureaus throughout the Defense Ministry.
• Implementing missile system development and production programs, and managing their difficult transition from development to production.
• Planning and supervising the construction of missile development and production facilities.
• Supervising the outsourcing of key activities to Iran’s domestic network of suppliers, and establishing and managing domestic and foreign supply chains.

In his testimony to Iran’s Majles and in other statements in October, Akhlaghi highlighted several elements of his priorities and plans for the Defense Ministry, based on the four-year plan of his predecessor, Aziz Nasirzadeh, and driven by the assessed needs from the 2025 12-day war and the 2026 Ramadan War (40-day war). Notable examples include:

• Create teams to address the enemy threat of “full-scale hybrid war” (jang-e tamam-ayar-e tarkibi) against Iran, including its blend of military attacks, economic sanctions and restrictions, cyber warfare, supply chain disruptions, information warfare, and the restriction of access to technology.

• Revitalize and restructure the Defense Ministry, to better align its structure with its goals, missions, and requirements.

• Rebuild and improve production facilities, with a focus on passive defense—that is, to improve the protection, dispersion, and concealment of facilities against attack. According to Akhlaghi, Iran will not limit itself to the same locations where production sites were previously situated, but will also select new sites for production centers based on criteria such as the existence of mountainous terrain for constructing secure facilities.

• Improve defense production, including by maintaining supply chain stability and increasing the share of production outsourced to companies outside the Defense Ministry to 85 percent by 2028. Reflecting the Defense Ministry’s longtime approach of “core and network” described above, Akhlaghi has noted that highly classified weapons production will remain within the ministry’s secure facilities, and less sensitive items will be outsourced to the country’s broader “production network” (shabakeh-ye tolidi).

• Expand weapons production, including a significant surge in the production and procurement of weapons and equipment tailored to future warfare.

• Ensure the Defense Ministry’s activities align with and meet the requirements of Iran’s armed forces, and increase cooperation with the IRGC and Artesh in the development, production, delivery, and support of weapons and equipment.

• Emphasize the fields of research, innovation, and technology development, including by leveraging the capabilities of universities and knowledge-based companies. According to Akhlaghi, the goal is to shorten the development cycle for new defense technologies to a maximum of six months.

• Upgrade weapons and equipment as well as integrate novel and emerging technologies into weapon systems to achieve “leapfrog innovation” (noavari-e jaheshi).

• Improve ballistic and cruise missiles, including enhancing their accuracy, range, and destructive power to strengthen deterrence. This includes improving these capabilities to such an extent that the enemy is compelled to maintain a greater distance from Iran’s borders. For example, according to Akhlaghi, enemy warships previously operated 300-400 kilometers away from Iranian territory, but now this distance has increased to 700-800 kilometers, and the goal is to force the enemy to remain at a distance of 4,000-5,000 kilometers.

• Continue advancements in the development of various types of drones, including stealth, long-range, suicide, reconnaissance, and air defense drones, as well as counter-drone systems.

• Strengthen Iran’s air defenses and combat aircraft capabilities, and develop and launch military satellites.

• Strengthen defense cooperation with target nations—likely a reference to Iran’s ongoing official defense relationships with countries such as Russia, China, and possibly North Korea.

• Continue sustained and effective support to Iran’s Axis of Resistance partners, and expand defense exports.

Akhlaghi is clearly a strong choice to undertake these efforts to rebuild and improve Iran’s missile and other weapons programs, industries, and supply chains. These highly ambitious plans—combined with the severe damage caused by Israeli and U.S. military attacks—will definitely put his 40-plus years of skills and experiences to the test in the coming months and years. And as Iranian officials have noted, Akhlaghi may be on the assassination lists of Iran’s adversaries, so he will also have to avoid getting killed while pursuing these priorities and plans.

Jim Lamson, based in Maine, is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and is a Visiting Research Fellow (non-resident) with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

After wreckage from a DF-15A appeared in Yemen last week, we decided to survey known Saudi missile-related sites and we noticed the construction. The Saudi missile program has flown somewhat under the radar this year, despite war raging in the Gulf. In fact, the debris in Yemen was the first indication the Saudis have used any of the missiles they have spent decades importing from China. In the meantime, the Saudis have been producing ballistic missiles at al-Duwadimi since late 2021 while expanding existing missile bases and building new ones.

Saudi efforts to build out their missile infrastructure take place in the context of a worsening regional security environment for the Kingdom and an agreement with the United States which may allow them to enrich uranium domestically. The larger missiles with longer ranges and heavier payloads that the new casting facilities at al-Duwadimi would enable the Saudis to build compound existing concerns about Saudi proliferation that stretch back decades.

This is a crosspost from Michael and I’s new home at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. You can see the write up there as well.

The write-up follows:

Saudi Arabia Expands Missile Production at al-Duwadimi

Sam Lair and Michael Duitsman

October 23, 2026

Commercial satellite images taken by Planet Labs PBC and analyzed by researchers at the Foreign Policy Research Institute show that Saudi Arabia is expanding the solid-propellant missile production plant near al-Duwadimi.

Researchers first publicly identified construction of the plant in 2019 and confirmed in 2021 that Saudi Arabia was operating the plant with Chinese assistance.

New satellite imagery suggests Saudi Arabia is expanding the infrastructure at the missile production complex, likely to produce larger missiles that could deliver heavier payloads or reach longer ranges.

Solid propellant ballistic missiles are made much in the same way as a bundt cake. Dry components are mixed together with an epoxy binder using large, planetary mixers. The mixture is then poured into a casing in a casting pit where it is allowed to set and cure, usually at an elevated temperature. The size of the casting pit is a major constraint on the diameter of the ballistic missiles a plant can produce. The motor must be slim enough to fit into the casting pit.

Two new buildings are being constructed at the site. We assess one to be for casting solid-propellant rocket motors, and the other to be for storing either solid propellant precursor materials, such as ammonium perchlorate, or finished missile components.

Ground clearing and excavation for the possible storage site began in April 2025 while work began on the probable casting building in late April or early May of that year. However, little progress on the project was made until the fall of 2025.

That fall, concrete footprints were poured at the two construction sites. The footprint at the possible storage site only covered the perimeter of the site while the footprint at the probable casting building was more extensive. A trench was also dug to connect support equipment and cables from the probable casting building to a bunker, which may house a control room.

In December 2025, the footprint at the possible storage site had been covered in dirt, and construction on top of the footprint had started. The casting pits were visible at the probable casting building, measuring about 5-6 meters on each side.

A Planet image from September 18 shows the two buildings are nearly complete. Both are missing part of their roof, and two heavy-duty blast diverting walls are being installed on the north and south sides of the probable casting building. The walls are somewhat similar to those seen at the Bacchus West plant (for example the mixing building that was destroyed in a 1989 accident at 40.667° N 112.108° W) in the United States, and those at a propellant or explosives plant at Parchin in Iran (35.564173° N, 51.780052° E). Beyond the large, deep pits, the walls are further evidence that the building is to be used for casting solid propellant motors, as they would shield nearby buildings from any accidental explosions.

We assess the possible storage building to house precursor materials or finished components for two reasons. One is that it is slightly removed from the site, suggesting it is not directly involved in production operations. Second, it has poles around it that we think are lightning arrestors. Such arrestors can be seen throughout the facility, and indicate the materials stored inside the building are sensitive, like ammonium perchlorate or completed motors. However, we are less confident in the purpose of this building than the probable casting building. It could be a manufacturing building, such as for motor ignitors, but this is unlikely. The facility likely already has an ignitor fabrication building; storage would make more sense, as increasing motor production (or producing larger motors) will require more precursor materials to be stored on site.

The new casting building is larger than any other possible existing casting buildings on site. This suggests the new facility could support a new, larger missile than those already being produced at al-Duwadimi, but that cannot be confirmed without additional evidence. It could also support an expansion in throughput, as the building adds new pits to the facility, and the pits are large enough that it might be possible to cast multiple, smaller motors in one pit at the same time.

If the new infrastructure is to support a larger missile, it would add reliability and readiness to the Saudi regional-range missile force. Reliant on about 40 DF-3s acquired from China in 1987, according to declassified CIA estimates, Saudi Arabia has few options to hit targets at regional-ranges, putting much of Iran out of its reach. It is unclear what missiles Saudi Arabia currently produces at the al-Duwadimi plant. In addition to the DF-3, wreckage from Yemen indicates the Saudis have also acquired or produced a domestic copy of the DF-15A from China. There were unconfirmed reports in the mid-2000s that Saudi Arabia bought DF-21s from China which may have been a misinterpretation of a DF-15 transfer. Nevertheless, a domestic production line for a regional-range capability would make the Kingdom more self-reliant, something they have already demonstrated an interest in given the existing missile plant. It would not be surprising if Saudi Arabia sought to produce longer-range missiles such as a copy of the DF-21 or something similar at al-Duwadimi.

A larger missile would also be able to deliver larger payloads. The recent war in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated the utility, albeit limited, of a larger throw-weight missile like Iran’s Khorramshahr-4 in overcoming defenses, as they can carry cluster munitions or more sophisticated re-entry vehicles. However, considering the lack of Houthi or Iranian missile defenses, this might not be as significant a motivating factor.

Whatever the purpose, the expansion to al-Duwadimi is not yet complete. While completing the roofs will not take long, installing the new casting equipment may take several months. The upgraded casting facility could, therefore, be ready as early as the end of the year.

While Iran’s missile program has absorbed the lion’s share of attention in the past several years given the several True Promise operations and Operation Epic Fury, the Saudis appear committed to growing their own missile force. The Middle East is rife with missile proliferation, and Iran is not the only contender in that competition. This facility expansion is only the most recent indicator that the Saudis are not interested in being left behind.

Long story short (tl;dr)

Welcome to the new Wonk. There’s a lot that changed and you should check it out:

— Article reading lists by topic
— New podcast landing page and player
— Podcast transcripts
— Guests of the pod pages
— Video pods
— Improved site-wide search 
— Day / Night theme

Actual long story

These posts become time capsules, so please allow me to luxuriate in prose for future nostalgia. This update shares a goal with the last one 10 years ago: finding ways to make a massive archive of articles and podcasts more accessible. How do you do that?

New “related” posts now sit at the end of every article. We embed the site’s content with a machine learning model and recommend the closest vectors, which means posts are matched on meaning, not keywords. Then we clustered those vectors to find common topic groups, which in turn became collections and reading lists. Pretty cool.

To apply the same system to podcasts, we first needed transcripts. I ran a local, open-source speech recognition model on all 325 episodes, then used a language model to identify and label speakers. Once we had good transcripts for each episode, the same embedding pipeline we used for articles could produce meaningful topic groupings here too. And what’s related to an article might now be a podcast episode, and vice versa. Crossover.

Full transcripts we can display on the site fell out of this process. So did the ability to connect podcast guests to every episode they appeared on. And since many podcast guests also write for the blog, their author and guest pages now link to both. Along the way, we recovered 105 episodes that had never been posted on the site, and we unearthed the inaugural episode, previously thought lost to time.

That feeds into the project’s second goal: giving the ACW podcast a first-class home of its own, which it very much deserves after a ten-year history and so much content. There’s now an on-site player that persists in the footer as you navigate the rest of the site. And the transcripts aren’t just readable. They’re also searchable across the whole site and each result jumps the player to that exact moment.

For the visual redesign, I leaned hard into the editorial minimalism we’ve been chasing since the beginning. I’m pretty proud that V4 held up visually for 10 years. I’d like to think the choices here are solid enough to go another 10.

Then there are the unglamorous parts, which were most of the work. The site moved from shared hosting to its own server and two decades of legacy were cleaned out of the database. Page loads are optimized. Bandwidth use is minimized: the heaviest image post went from 70 MB to 2 MB (looking at you, Pyongsan uranium mill).

***

In 2015, Version 4 of ACW took 120 hours of my time (and I had help). When Jeffrey asked me in 2025 if I’d consider another wonk refresh, I hesitated. I didn’t think I could do it. And I was right.

How quickly things changed in 12 months.

Enter Claude Code. No one I know writes code by hand anymore. It’s a weird time, and we’re all still working out what it means as a society. What does it mean for this website? It means I was free to focus on what I believe makes a website great no matter the code behind it: insane attention to detail at every level. I still have 50 hours of time in this, but what was built is something I couldn’t have done in 120 hours, or even 240 by myself.

Aaron and Jeffrey crossed paths in Philadelphia for a TTX about space nukes and escalation dynamics. The two caught up on the game, the recent news from USAF Secretary about US weapons in orbit, and what it all means for the new space race. 

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