A.J. Price

6-2 : Height
181 lbs. : Weight
26 : Age
4 : Years NBA Experience
2 : NBA Teams

Signed by the Wizards as a free agent for the one-year minimum on July 23, 2012.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

57 : Games
22 : Starts
1,278 : Minutes

1.47 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Price evaluated over 19 games} 

12.4 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Jon Barry for the 2000-01 Sacramento Kings (12.4)
maybe Jeff McInnis for the 2004-05 Cleveland Cavaliers (12.4),
maybe Kevin Porter for the 1972-72 Baltimore Bullets (12.4)

.084 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Jameer Nelson for the 2006-07 Orlando Magic (.082),
maybe Travis Best for the 2004-05 New Jersey Nets (.084),
maybe Derek Fisher for the 2006-07 Utah Jazz (.083)

With A.J. Price on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 0.4 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 1.0 point less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-2.4

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

12.4 : Points
3.2 : Rebounds
0.1 : Blocks
0.9 : Steals
5.8 : Assists
1.8 : Turnovers
2.1 : Fouls

0.86 PPP

Price had 501 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.86 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 298th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.83 PPP over 477 possessions, ranked 108th.

Shooting

39% Field Goals (161-413)
35% 3-Pointers (70-200)
79% Free Throws (49-62)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#12

AJ Price in 2012-13 with the Wizards:

A Perfectly Imperfect Solution

by Kyle Weidie (@Truth_About_It)

A.J. Price was imperfectly perfect … Bare with me.

Ideally, Price is the right point guard behind John Wall. Well, wait a minute. Who, or what, is the ideal type of player playing behind Wall?

That player can keep the pace up, run with the other guys added to the team with Wall in mind, but knows how to maneuver in the half court. He can knock down long-distance shots to keep the floor open (especially if he has to play next to Wall). He’s not going to kill you on defense, in fact, he should be a net-positive on D, even if minor. He can keep the ball moving, and he’s not going to cause a coach to fret with carelessness.

There are, as always, a couple catches: Wall’s backup likely won’t play many minutes, at least as long as Wall and Bradley Beal are healthy. That said, the Crash Brothers might not always be healthy (unless they tone down the physical gambles on the court). The other catch: this player must cheap.

Sounds like the perfect backup PG for a lot of teams. So where does Price fit in?

The Wizards got their money’s worth, that’s for sure. Price came at the very affordable rate of the veteran’s minimum, $854,389 for a single season of basketball. His numbers this past season, his fourth in the NBA at age 26, compare very closely to the numbers Steve Blake put up in his fifth NBA season with the Portland Trail Blazers at age 27. That season, 2007-08, was the first of a three-year, $12-plus million contract for Blake—not sure Price is worth that kind of money now, as it’s a different market.

Still, this season was the best of Price’s career, and he was a strong part of the Washington’s locker room culture, often serving as the pre-game and sideline hype-man, constantly trying to uplift his teammates (and providing them with phrases like ‘Watergate‘). Price probably wants constancy (so, not a third NBA team in year five), but the man from Amityville, NY, also wants to get paid.

Ernie Grunfeld’s got some decisions to make. The blind horse headed to the water is led by the fact that the Wizards need John Wall injury insurance. The team’s woes without Wall this past season do not solely rest on his backup, Price, but there were times where Price could have done better, especially with his shot selection.

Price’s season in D.C.  had three acts.

Act 1: He started 15 of the season’s first 17 games and the Wizards went 2-15. Shaun Livingston was an attempt to change things up with starts in games 9 and 10. The Wizards struggled as a team, and it’s hard to put that on any one player. The reality is that they all fought hard but couldn’t get over a mental hump. Eight of the losses in Washington’s 0-12 start were by seven points or less; two losses came in overtime and one in double overtime—the Wizards were the most competitive 0-12 team ever.

Against the Golden State Warriors in game 17, Price broke his hand, compounding team problems. He missed just under four weeks and 15 games, during which the Wizards went 2-13.

Price Act 1: 17 games, 27.8 minutes

8.5 points, 36.6% FG, 34.2% 3P, 4.9 assists, 1.5 turnovers, 2.8 rebounds

45.5 eFG%, 30.4 AST%, 3.36 AST/TO, 93.38 Pace

Act 2: In Price’s return game, the Wizards upset the Oklahoma City Thunder at home. John Wall came back the next game and a lot of things changed. The Wizards improved, going 16-14 over Price’s 30-game Act 2 stretch (he missed one game with a bruised quad, a loss to the Knicks). Price’s numbers stayed relatively the same, but the Wizards were plus-6.9 per 48 minutes when Price was paired with Bradley Beal; Beal and Wall were plus-7.3 together. Price and Wall were paired together for 41 minutes during Act 2 and the Wizards finished plus-4.6 points per 48 minutes during this time.

Then Price injured his groin and missed two weeks and nine games.

Price Act 2: 29 games, 19.4 minutes

6.2 points, 38.9% FG, 32.9% 3P, 3.4 assists, 1.0 turnovers, 1.8 rebounds

46.3 eFG%, 28.2 AST%, 3.27 AST/TO, 92.70 Pace

Act 3: With Bradley Beal out, the focus of Price’s game changed when he returned from his groin injury. As the numbers reflect, he had to put up more points. The Wizards were desperate for scoring, and Price filled in nicely, making 1.6 3-pointers per game and shooting 40 percent from that range. The downside is that the Wizards lost interest in their goal (the chase to finish ninth in the East), played the more inexperienced players, and closed out the season 3-8. (Also, Beal is a really, really valuable player.)

Price Act 3: 11 games, 22.3 minutes

10.5 points, 43.0% FG, 40.0% 3P, 2.1 assists, 0.8 turnovers, 1.4 rebounds

52.7 eFG%, 18.0 AST%, 2.56 AST/TO, 92.72 Pace

Over Price’s 111 total minutes (across 11 games over the entire season) playing alongside Beal, Martell Webster, Nene and Emeka Okafor, the Wizards shot 49.5 percent from the field, averaged 102.9 points per 48 minutes, and finished a total plus-41.

Price played well with both Wall and Beal, so he could be a positive near-term solution, but he’s clearly not the only answer. (And as Jordan Crawford apparently guided himself out of the question.) So Grunfeld needs two answers at guard: Wall’s primary backup and a combo off the bench. Actually, he needs several.

The Wizards have nine players under contract for next season, and only three of them are guards or wings—Wall, Beal and Trevor Ariza (Chris Singleton doesn’t count as a ‘wing’ on offense). Re-signing Webster is the obvious priority, but then the lingering question becomes if Price is worth a contract along the lines of the bi-annual exception—two years and $4 million. And then what does Grunfeld next do to get much-needed scoring? Or does he simply let Garrett Temple, Shelvin Mack and Tomas Satoransky battle it out in training camp?

Price wasn’t perfect, but he’s probably as close to what the Wizards need … within reason. He’s not a finisher, but at 6-foot-2, that’s understood. Price provides a change of pace from Wall, i.e., he’s slower (the Wizards averaged about 3.5 possessions less per 48 minutes with Price on the court instead of Wall), but that doesn’t mean speed and pushing the ball aren’t part of his game. An essential part is Price’s overall contribution to 3-point shooting (though he doesn’t shoot it particularly well from anywhere). Perfectly imperfect.

Price gets this writer’s endorsement, but the Wizards need a lot more than that.

Martell Webster

6-7 : Height
210 lbs. : Weight
26 : Age
8 : Years NBA Experience
3 : NBA Teams

Signed by the Wizards as a free agent Aug. 29, 2012.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

76 : Games
62 : Starts
2,200 : Minutes

1.45 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Webster evaluated over 66 games} 

13.9 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Nick Anderson for the 1996-97 Orlando Magic (13.8)
maybe Ronnie Brewer for the 2010-11 Chicago Bulls (13.8),
maybe Willie Anderson for the 1991-92 San Antonio Spurs (13.8)

.138 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Scottie Pippen for the 1999-00 Portland Trailblazers (.137),
maybe Peja Stojakovic for the 2004-05 Sacramento Kings (.137),
maybe Bob Dandridge for the 1972-73 Milwaukee Bucks (.136)

With Martell Webster on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 4.7 points more per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 1.5 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-0.7

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

14.2 : Points
4.8 : Rebounds
0.3 : Blocks
0.8 : Steals
2.3 : Assists
1.5 : Turnovers
2.7 : Fouls

1.06 PPP

Webster had 806 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 1.06 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 21st in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.87 PPP over 668 possessions, ranked 196th.

Shooting

44.2% Field Goals (281-636)
42.2% 3-Pointers (139-329)
84.8% Free Throws (168-198)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#9

Martell Webster in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
A Freak Occurrence in an Unsettled Atmosphere

by Sean Fagan (@McCarrick)

Martell Webster is the type of player Ernie Grunfeld has spent years attempting to acquire, but never with much success. When signed by the Wizards, Webster appeared to be a traditional Grunfeld “value pickup,” a guy who came out in a slightly glutted free agent market and had been too dinged up in the recent past to take more than a flyer on. These types of moves had worked before to some degree (see: Stevenson, DeShawn) or had been semi-spectacular failures (see: Yi Jianlian—traded for, not a FA, but you get the point). At most, the Wizards were hoping to get a guy who could sop up the minutes that Trevor Ariza wasn’t taking and provide a safety valve in case Chris Singleton didn’t work out.

However, a funny thing happened on the way to the lottery. Webster not only blew up during the season, setting career-highs in just about every category, but he also displaced the incumbent starter, Ariza, when it became painfully aware that effort from Ariza would only come in fits and starts. Webster also became the go-to quote in the locker room in the early season after excruciating losses and the rare victory. However, there was a difference between Webster’s “on the record” exhortations and those of former Wizards spokesmen, such as Josh Howard or the “Captain” Andray Blatche. Webster, for one, was more in tune with the dynamic of his team and spoke of each situation in a realistic manner that provided ballast, unlike the ridiculous proclamations of players like Blatche, who would still be talking about playoffs after a fifth straight regular season-loss. Unlike Howard, Webster could get better effort out of his teammates because he was actually on the court playing. Thus, if he called out a poor effort, he was putting the blame squarely on himself and the team rather than deflecting it. He became both a media and fan-favorite, all through the strength of playing within himself and within Randy Wittman’s system.

The return of John Wall only reinforced Webster’s value to the team. Webster, in only one season, was everything that Nick Young wasn’t during his entire time with the Wizards. Webster, like Young, could hit the corner spot up 3-pointer that John Wall loves to initiate, but he could also keep the ball moving and help facilitate the offense. For a player essentially playing for a huge payday, Webster never became the black hole that he had every opportunity to morph into, and he rarely complained when he was lifted for defensive purposes for the more frenetic Ariza.

Now comes the difficult question, what are the above contributions worth to the Washington Wizards? Webster is somewhere between a stopgap solution at the wing and the long-term solution that the Wizards desperately need. However, to not resign him would be be another shot across the bow of Wizards fans. For Wizards diehards, not re-signing Webster would be a crime akin to not re-signing James Singleton or other hardworking players—only magnified by a multiple of a thousand. Of course, there is also the distinct possibility that Webster could become another Stevenson, great for one year before returning to the norm. The problem with having a breakout year after quite a few years in the league is that the term “outlier” begins to get thrown around a lot. (Even if Webster has seemingly overcome back issues in Washington.) The Wizards may have already mined all the gold from Webster and to re-sign him would be to expect lighting to strike twice.

At the end of the day, Webster serves as a potent example of how poor the Wizards’ player development system has been and how much of a desperate situation they have put themselves in by only signing him for one year (even if they didn’t really have a choice otherwise). Webster himself suggested that the Wizards trade their upcoming pick for another veteran, knowing full well his value to the team and that the only positional depth in the draft is a strong forward. Without any young Wizards ready to step up, and with Washington’s recent draft history, one has to hope that Grunfeld goes out into a thunderstorm with a kite.

Unveiling the Wizard

[Pre-Feast: Okafor, Webster & Nene - via instagram/martellwebster]

Trevor Ariza

6-8 : Height
210 lbs. : Weight
27 : Age
9 : Years NBA Experience
6 : NBA Teams

Traded by the New Orleans Hornets along with Emeka Okafor to the Washington Wizards
in exchange for Rashard Lewis and a second round pick on June 20, 2012.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

56 : Games
15 : Starts
1,471 : Minutes

1.41 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Ariza evaluated over 35 games} 

14.04 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Doug Christie for the 2003-04 Sacramento Kings (14.0)
maybe Reggie Miller for the 1987-88 Indiana Pacers (14.0),
maybe Kevin Grevey for the 1978-79 Washington Bullets (14.0)

.102 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Lamar Odom for the 2006-07 Los Angeles Lakers (.102),
maybe Mike Miller for the 2001-02 Orlando Magic (.101),
maybe Shawn Marion for the 2008-09 Toronto Raptors—after being traded by the Miami Heat (.101)

With Trevor Ariza on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 0.7 points more per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 3.0 points less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-1.5

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

13.0 : Points
6.5 : Rebounds
0.5 : Blocks
1.8: Steals
2.8 : Assists
2.1 : Turnovers
1.8 : Fouls

0.93 PPP

Ariza had 563 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.93 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 174th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.76 PPP over 394 possessions, ranked 29th.

Shooting

41.7% Field Goals (188-451)
36.4% 3-Pointers (76-209)
82.1% Free Throws (78-95)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#1

Trevor Ariza in 2012-13 with the Wizards:

Highs, Lows and Oh Nos!

by John Converse Townsend (@JohnCTownsend)

Hey, Trevor…

What’s up, brother? You gonna exercise that $7.7 million player option? You, uh, gonna stick around D.C. for the 2013-14 WASHINGTON WIZARDS PLAYOFF SEASON?!?

“I don’t know many people who are going to leave money on the table and I’m not one of the people to do that, so most likely.”

Alright. Great. Love the enthusiasm.

And I loved the way you played, for the most part. That 25-point performance against your old team, the Lakers of Los Angeles, on March 22… You pretty much won that game for the Wizards. A career-high seven 3-pointers! Martell Webster was the only other Wizards player to hit that many 3s this year.

Let’s watch the highlights:

Wow. What a weird show. And nice work, you really pissed off Kobe—that alone was more impressive than the season-high 26 points you dropped on the Charlotte Bobcats (for Charlotte Bobcats reasons).

What else… You dumped 20 points on the Knicks in a 106-96 win, and were red-hot from beyond the arc (5-for-7). You scored 14, and nabbed five boards, against the Nuggets in a 112-108 win. You had another good game against the Milwaukee Bucks on November 9. What had happened? Oh, just 15 points, eight rebounds and four assists. The Wizards lost, 91-101, but it wasn’t your fault. Basketball is a team sport and stuff.

You shot 55 percent in the restricted area. While you only made 15.4 percent of your takes in the paint, you fared better the further you got from the rim. You shot a somewhat respectable 37 percent from mid-range and sank a rock solid 36.4 percent of your 3-pointers—47.1 percent from the corner and … 29 percent above the break (cool it from there, kid).

OK, not to sour the mood here, but you probably air-balled more attempts this year than anyone else on the team because you turned down free shots like a teetotaler. And early in the season you would travel like a management consultant—all the time, frequent flyer. You also had a terrible record as a starer (2-13). (Only two Wizards had .500 records or better as starters: Shelvin Mack (1-1) and Jason Collins (2-0).)

In February, just before the All-Star break, David Falk called you a “broken-down Yugo.” Harsh. Now, I dunno much about Yugos—aside from the fact they don’t make ‘em anymore—but perhaps he was right about the broken down part. You missed 17 games between December and January with a left calf strain. Then you came down with “the flu” in March, which was a shame. But you were kind enough to wear a mask so as to not get any of your Wizards friends sick. Good on ya, Shredder! 

All in all, including the five games you sat out at the end of the season with a sore knee, you missed 26 games. Only Trevor Booker (29) and John Wall (33) missed more.

Anyway, Mr. Arizona, glad to hear you’ll be back next season, even if you’re ho-hum, whatever, who cares about it.

You ended the season on a high (but not glass-shattering high) note.

In 34 games before the All-Star break, you averaged 8.0 PPG, 4.5 RPG, 1.7 APG and shot .395 from the field (.311 from 3). In 22 games after the festivities in Houston, which no Wizard besides Bradley Beal was invited to because the team was downright turrible, you upped your averages to 11.7 PPG, 5.2 RPG, 2.5 APG and shot .446 from the field (.415 from 3).

That is what’s up. Like your contract at the end of the year!

DAGGER!!!

…

Kind of. Not really. Sorry.

“And I’m smokin’ on them flowers, catch the bouquet.” —Lil’ Wayne, song: God Bless Amerika

Emeka Okafor

6-10 : Height
252 lbs. : Weight
30 : Age
9 : Years NBA Experience
3 : NBA Teams

Traded by the New Orleans Hornets along with Trevor Ariza to the Washington Wizards
in exchange for Rashard Lewis and a second round pick on June 20, 2012.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

79 : Games
77 : Starts
2,052 : Minutes

1.43 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Okafor evaluated over 76 games} 

15.8 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Tyson Chandler for the 2002-03 Chicago Bulls (15.8)
maybe Erick Dampier for the 2002-03 Golden State Warriors (15.8),
maybe Bison Dele for the 1998-99 Detroit Pistons (15.7)

.104 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Samuel Dalembert for the 2004-05 Philadelphia 76ers (.104),
maybe Bendan Haywood for the 2010-11 Dallas Mavericks (.104),
maybe Brad Daugherty for the 1989-90 Cleveland Cavaliers (.104)

With Emeka Okafor on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 1.0 point more per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 1.0 point less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-1.1

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

13.4 : Points
12.1 : Rebounds
1.4 : Blocks
0.8: Steals
1.6 : Assists
1.9 : Turnovers
2.5 : Fouls

0.88 PPP

Okafor had 872 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.88 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 261st in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.81 PPP over 423 possessions, ranked 73rd.

Shooting

47.7% Field Goals (328-687)
58.4% Free Throws (109-191)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#50

Emeka Okafor in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
A Three-Sided Coin

by Adam Rubin (@LedellsPlace)

The many faces of Chukwuemeka Noubuisi Okafor: Emeka the Professional, Emeka the Player and Emeka the Contract.

The Professional

As the Washington Post’s Michael Lee tells it, it’s not a stretch to say that Emeka Okafor earned his entire $13.5 million salary on February 27. That was the night of John Wall’s horrific meltdown against the Detroit Pistons which resulted in a fourth quarter benching, followed by a tense post-game interview where Wall blamed his teammates for mishandling his passes, followed by awkward post-game interviews with his teammates where they downplayed his struggles.

It was obvious something was wrong with Wall, but no one wanted to talk about it. Asked whether any veteran said something to Wall during the game, Martell Webster responded, “It’s all about motivation at that point. You’re not gonna brow beat anybody, just going to continue to encourage them and motivate them to lift them out of their slump. … So, it’s not a matter of brow beating ‘cause why would you do that, I mean we need him to be at his calmest.”

Enter Emeka Okafor. Professional brow beater. Michael Lee reported there was a heated confrontation between Wall and Okafor during which Okafor pretty much told Wall to get his head out of his ass and act like a leader.

Looks like Wall needed the tough love and nobody—other than Okafor—was willing to give it to him. You can’t put a price tag on that type of leadership, although $13.5 million probably comes close. The words “leadership” and “professionalism” get thrown around a lot in sports but rarely do you get such a clear example of its impact in the locker room. It’s scary to think what might have happened to Wall (and the team) if Emeka had not, as it were, encouraged him to remove his head from his ass.

The Player 

Emeka’s up and down performance on the court has been well chronicled. In short, he was awful to start the season, then morphed into a double-double machine once Wall returned. He also led the league in a peculiar and surprising stat—FG% on hook shots. (No. 2 on the list was Washington’s very own Kevin Seraphin.)

But his biggest contribution may have been on the defensive end. As a team, Washington emerged this season as a defensive force, ending the year as the eighth stingiest unit. While the credit does not lie with one player, it’s hard to deny Okafor’s impact as the defensive anchor. For a team only one year removed from an Andray Blatche/JaVale McGee front court,Okafor was a huge step in the right direction.

Which brings us to the final side of the coin…

The Contract

Last June it was no secret that New Orleans Hornets general manager Dell Demps was looking to cut payroll. Rumor was he might be willing to give up the No. 10 pick if a team took on Okafor or Ariza’s contract. Ernie did him one better. Washington took on BOTH contracts and let New Orleans keep the No. 10 pick, inexplicably sending New Orleans a second round pick in addition to Rashard Lewis’ partially guaranteed expiring contract, which saved New Orleans roughly $10 million up front and $22 million the following year. You can imagine Demps’ reaction when he hung up the phone. Needless to say, the trade was met with mixed emotions. The criticism was not so much an indictment of Okafor and Ariza as much as a lament of opportunities lost. But that’s a story for another time….

Let’s move on to opportunities gained. Emeka enters next season with a $14.5 million expiring contract. All options are on the table—from trading him at the deadline to a contender for young assets to re-signing him to a more palatable multi-year deal as our defensive anchor/mentor.

The decision is essentially a referendum on the rebuild. If you are happy with the direction of the team and are excited to battle for the 8th seed after an almost .500 record with John Wall, then Okafor is an essential piece of the puzzle. If you think “win now” does not apply to a team coming off five straight sub-30 win seasons and that our young assets outside of Wall and Beal are lacking, then Okafor is a nice trade chip to acquire another building block. If history is any indication, Ernie is firmly in the first camp.

Garrett Temple

6-6 : Height
190 lbs. : Weight
27 : Age
3 : Years NBA Experience
6 : NBA Teams

Signed by the Wizards as a free agent Dec. 25, 2012.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

51 : Games
36 : Starts
1,156 : Minutes

1.20 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Temple evaluated over 40 games} 

8.8 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Bimbo Coles for the 2001-02 Cleveland Cavaliers (8.8)
maybe Hubert Davis for the 2002-03 Detroit Pistons (8.8),
maybe Morris Almond for the 2011-12 Washington Wizards (8.7)

.049 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Mike D’Antoni for the 1974-75 Kansas City-Omaha Kings (.049),
maybe Kenny Smith for the 1987-88 Sacramento Kings (.049),
maybe Nick Van Exel for the 2004-05 Portland Trailblazers (.049)

With Garrett Temple on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 1.0 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 0.5 points less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-0.9

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

8.2 : Points
3.8 : Rebounds
0.5 : Blocks
1.6 : Steals
3.6 : Assists
1.9 : Turnovers
2.9 : Fouls

0.78 PPP

Temple had 334 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.78 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 393rd in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.90 PPP over 405 possessions, ranked 277th.

Shooting

40.7% Field Goals (105-258)
32.5% 3-Pointers (26-80)
70.3% Free Throws (26-37)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#17

Garrett Temple in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
Unsung Warrior, Blogger Mea Culpa

by Adam McGinnis (@AdamMcGinnis)

Since mea culpas have been elevated to high praise these days, I need to come correct and admit error. I was wrong about Garrett Temple.

When Temple and Shelvin Mack were called up from the D-League to replace Shaun Livingston and Earl Barron on the day after Christmas, the Wizards sat with a 3-23 record. Temple made an immediate impact in his second game with 13 points, six assists and six rebounds in a home win over Orlando. He soon started six straight games due to an injury to Bradley Beal, but his production tapered off. Temple was mostly buried at end of bench upon Beal’s return, but, as luck would have it (for Temple, at least), Beal got injured again, which provided Temple with another opportunity to start on January 30 in Philadelphia.

My initial skepticism of Temple’s game had merit. He put up a paltry field goal percentage and struggled finishing at the rim. He was signed to be the second- or third-string point guard and now here he was starting at the 2. Washington had a shooting guard that could not shoot. Just great. The past few years had seen the Wizards make several D-League call-ups, and I’d grown weary of the annual plug-and-play gambit.

Randy Wittman’s decision to start Temple over Jordan Crawford during Beal’s time out with injury triggered the abrupt downfall of Crawford. Sure, the team started to play better with Temple in the lineup, perhaps primarily due to other players (John Wall, ahem), but Temple’s stats were still terrible. It was more coincidence than causation, and doubters of Crawford used this new-found team success to justify Jordan’s hasty departure. That left a bitter taste in my mouth and I unfairly took this out on Temple.

Instead of giving Temple the benefit of doubt in being a versatile guy who played hard, I scrutinized his mistakes and downplayed his contributions. It was not his fault that Wizards coaching staff was playing him out of position, yet he never backed down from any challenge, especially on defense. In fact, the ability to defend played a major role in Wittman’s preference of Temple over Crawford.

After Crawford was traded, it took yet another Beal injury in early-March for Temple to get an additional shot at regular minutes, and he took advantage. His shooting percentages noticeably improved, and he was no longer a glaring liability on offense. Temple’s high basketball I.Q. also meant that he was usually in the right position. Quite impressive for a player who had only been with the team a few short months.

A few developments permanently flipped my opinion of the former LSU standout. Real chemistry started to develop between him and Wall. Temple was also able to defend an opposing team’s best guard, allowing Wall some vital rest on defense, and sometimes filled in as another ball handler, which alleviated some pressure off Wall in the half court.

Perhaps the main accolade was that Temple became an on-the-court warrior, as Wittman relied on him for heavy minutes with several of his guards hit with the injury bug down the stretch. Over a 10-game span in March, Temple averaged 36 minutes per game. His Wizards teammates were dropping like flies, but Temple answered the call serviceably and his production actually increased. When the Wizards won five of six in mid-March, Temple scored in double-figures in all but one of those games. Temple ended up starting in Washington’s final 22 contests.

Temple’s future with the Wizards remains unclear. He likely earned himself a legitimate shot at competing for roster spot in training camp, but I doubt the team will offer him a fully guaranteed financial commitment. Depending on how other moves play out, the Wizards could easily go in another direction.

Regardless, Temple made me eat crow in 2013, and other Wizards can feel free to make me do the same in the future.

Trevor Booker

6-7 : Height
240 lbs. : Weight
25 : Age
3 : Years NBA Experience
1 : NBA Team

Drafted by the Timberwolves 23rd overall in 2010,
traded to the Wizards on draft night. 

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

48 : Games
14 : Starts
887 : Minutes

1.20 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Booker evaluated over 25 games} 

13.9 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Xavier McDaniel for the 1991-92 New York Knicks (13.9)
maybe Darius Songaila for the 2008-09 Washington Wizards (13.9),
maybe Mike Sweetney for the 2005-06 Chicago Bulls (13.9)

.126 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Shane Barrier for the 2002-03 Memphis Grizzlies (.126),
maybe Tim Thomas for the 2000-01 Milwaukee Bucks (.126),
maybe Jon Brockman for the 2009-10 Sacramento Kings (.125)

With Trevor Booker on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 3.3 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 5.3 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-8.2

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

10.4 : Points
9.7 : Rebounds
0.6 : Blocks
1.3 : Steals
1.6 : Assists
1.3 : Turnovers
3.9 : Fouls

0.90 PPP

Booker had 278 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.90 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 230th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.77 PPP over 213 possessions, ranked 37th in the NBA.

Shooting

49.1% Field Goals (108-220)
0% 3-Pointers (0-5)
55.6% Free Throws (40-72)

#35

Trevor Booker in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
Cook Book Lacks Sizzle

by Rashad Mobley (@Rashad20)

Trevor Booker showed hustle, aggressiveness in the paint, and the ability to score in bunches during his first two years in a Washington Wizards uniform. However, he also struggled against taller post players, he lacked a real go-to post move, and he seemed to be injury prone—particularly at the end of the 2011-2012 season. But during Wizards Media Day last fall, Booker spoke with confidence about the evolution of his game and his health. He claimed the injuries were behind him (a bout with plantar fasciitis being one of them) and he mentioned that he made a concerted effort to improve his jumper (his specific words: “I just shot until I got tired.”)

Indicating that his health was “pretty good” heading into training camp, Booker was eager to step back on the court and seize an opportunity to be in the rotation. He then proceeded to miss time, and the first four preseason games, with a “grade one” hamstring pull. Two of the longest-tenured Wizards, John Wall being the other, were starting the (pre)season on the bench.

But Booker eschewed any notion that his third NBA season was going to be riddled with injury by returning to the court just before opening day. With Nene unable to play due to his own bout of plantar fasciitis, Booker became Randy Wittman’s starting power forward.

The third-year player suddenly had the opportunity to showcase his new jumper, the ability to run the floor, and make the hustle plays that caused Wizards fans and coaches to have so much faith in his potential. But over his first seven starts, Booker did not quite seem himself, and the Wizards began the season with seven straight losses.

Booker’s jumper seemed more effective, but he shot just 47 percent, well-below his 53.5 percent average. He didn’t fare much better from a rebounding perspective, either, averaging just five a game. Booker’s Total Rebound Percentage (percentage of available rebounds grabbed while on the floor) as a power forward was a paltry 10.7 percent. That’s the same percentage Mike Miller put up this season.

By the eighth game against the Utah Jazz, Booker lost his starting job to Jan Vesely, of all people. The next night against the Indiana Pacers, he tweaked his knee and proceeded to miss the next 22 games. And that is what the Cook Book’s 2012-13 season was all about. No steak, no sizzle, no significant third-year growth, just lots of speculation as to what was wrong.

The good Booker of year’s past came in flashes. Against Milwaukee in mid-March,  he scored 13 points and grabbed 12 rebounds in just 22 minutes, which led Trevor Ariza to say, “That’s what the NBA is about—always being ready when your number’s called. He did a great job tonight. He came off the bench and gave us a huge lift, did everything he could tonight.” The next night against the New Orleans Hornets, Booker didn’t score much (two points), but he grabbed 13 rebounds and did an excellent defensive job on Ryan Anderson (11 points on 6-for-18 shooting). On other nights, Booker would flash a brilliant up-and-under move or a perfect jump hook, but then often follow it up with a turnover, an indecisive move in the post, or the inability to be effective defensively against a taller opponent.

Booker never distinguished himself amongst the Wizards’ big man rotation of Nene, Emeka Okafor and Kevin Seraphin. Nene scored, rebounded and distributed the ball; Okafor was a double-double machine; and Seraphin, although wildly inconsistent,  provided much-needed offensive spark in spurts. Booker was none of those things on a consistent basis, and it is difficult to determine whether injuries or just an overall lack of growth hampered his game more this past season.

After scoring 16 points with 13 rebounds in the second-to-last game against the Brooklyn Nets, Booker was convinced injuries were the cause of his subpar season, “Individually, I got injured again, but when I came back, when I got in games, I felt like I did a good job producing. My biggest thing is just staying healthy.”

Booker has had three years to demonstrate he belonged in the Wizards rotation of big men, but injuries, new personnel and a lack of consistency caused him to fall short. But he realizes what he needs to do, and the consequences of his profession.

“Right now they’ve got me as a role player. I accept that role, but I can score more. I know my capabilities,” Booker told CSN Washington’s Ben Standig before the Wizards’ last home game.

“Next year I’m sure they’ll see it, whether I’m here or with another team.”

If  the talented, yet inconsistent former Wizards big men, Andray Blatche (Brooklyn) and JaVale McGee (Denver), were able to find success in their respective post-Wizards careers, there’s no reason to think that Booker can’t pack up his cook book and regain his sizzle elsewhere, too. It would certainly be “#SoWizards” of him.

Thumbs up?

Even Trevor Booker found #WittmanFace funny.

[Be quiet!]

In brief, a history of the Washington Wizards in the so-called “John Wall era.” At length, an exposition of the team’s front office and why the time for change is now.

“Point guards are not made, they’re delivered from heaven—and I believe he was delivered from heaven,” Flip Saunders said on “John Wall Day.” That’s what then-Washington, D.C. mayor Adrian Fenty dubbed the day after the NBA Draft when Wall was chosen first overall—June 25, 2010. Team brass wasted no time in welcoming highly-touted rookie to the city. Wall, who one day earlier signed a shoe deal with Reebok, was treated to door-to-Verizon Center limo service, red carpets, and had his mug posted on a billboard outside the arena. He even received an officially endorsed nickname, “The Game Changer.”

The Rebuild, Year One

“This is a very important and special day for this organization,” Team President Ernie Grunfeld said. “This is a new era … and what better way to start a new era than by having a No. 1 pick.”

“We found out that he has outstanding character, obviously his physical attributes are off the charts. … He has a real competitive nature. Winning and losing is very important to him, and those are the kind of players we want to build this team with, players that care about winning and losing, and have pride, and have great character and a great work ethic.

“[John Wall] is gonna be here for 10, 12 years … and he’s gonna bring a lot of electricity to this building.”

—Ernie Grunfeld

Wall’s stock couldn’t have been valued much higher (even while advanced statisticians like Dave Berri pegged DeMarcus Cousins as the top player in the draft, and others preferred the rangy Evan Turner). In November, six games into his rookie season, Wall became the fourth-youngest player in NBA history to record a triple-double with 19 points, 10 rebounds and 13 assists. He was 65 days into his 20th year.

He did it in a 98-91 win against Yao Ming, Kevin Martin, Luis Scola and the rest of Rick Adelman’s Houston Rockets. Andray Blatche, fighting fatigue from signing his three-year, $35 million extension, double-doubled with 20 points and 11 boards; “Cowboy” Al Thornton (as he was known around these parts) contributed 20 points; and Yi Jianlian broke out with 13 points.

“I knew after the first couple of games I could play in the league. I think I did good for my year,” said Wall after the season. However… “I wasn’t fully healthy and being myself, but I can’t hold nobody accountable for that. Things just happened. I just fought through it and helped my team out as much as possible.” Wall, an opening-day starter, appeared in 69 games (64 starts) but missed time in November, December and January. A sprained left foot slowed the rookie, then he was sidelined by a bone bruise in his right knee, which he picked up in his first game back in action. Wall admittedly played injured over the final four months of the year because he “didn’t want to disappoint anybody.”

“I want to be known as a player that’s very talented but also willing to work,” Wall said. “Like Derrick [Rose], he got better every year. Like [Russell] Westbrook, he got better every year. Those type of guys, I want to be in a category with those types of guys in the next two or three years, and I think if I just sit back and study the game like those guys did and work as hard as they did, as I should, and I am, I think I can be up there.”

Even with Wall’s impressive contributions to both the team culture (he wants to win, bad) and the player talent pool (pundits named him the second-best rookie, behind Blake Griffin), the losing continued. Flip Saunders, taking the fall for Grunfeld, was fired in January 2012 after a 2-15 start. The Wizards won just 23 games by the end of the season.

The Rebuild, Year Two

Wizards team management has traditionally found a way to advertise high expectations before, during and after disastrous regular season campaigns. Arguably more impressive, they’re able to find buyers. While the Wizards embarked on their worst start in franchise history during Wall’s sophomore season, winning just one game out of their first 10, Leonsis expressed optimism for the on-court product: “Our season ticket sales are up over 70 percent year over year.”

So, money was being made. That’s something for every franchise to celebrate. Arguably more important, the franchise player, Wall, stayed healthy during his sophomore campaign, playing all 66 games in a lockout-shortened season. Things were on the upswing, right? Not quite. Wall’s game regressed—he showed incremental improvement from his rookie season, at best, and he confessed as much to the media: “I think I’m kind of the same,” Wall said. “A little better, but not too much.” By the numbers, Wall shot worse from every distance (though he improved at the rim by 2 percent). His assist rate was down, slightly, and his turnover rate was up.

More salesmanship was in order: See, Despite Wall’s star power being noticeably tarnished in April 2012 after a 20-44 season, by summer there was talk of a postseason run in 2013. Blatche, McGee and Young: gone. Nene and Brian Cook: game. All the tough talk was surprising, especially for a team that hadn’t sniffed the playoffs since 2007-08. But it didn’t last long. Dreams of the roundball promised land were interrupted, and the Wizards’ chances at a playoff berth were again derailed when Wall suffered a stress-related injury to his kneecap in late September 2012.

“We’re all disappointed for John after how hard he worked this summer and how excited he was to begin training camp, but we feel fortunate that we caught the injury early and that he will be able to return with the vast majority of the season still in front of us,” Grunfeld said in a statement at the time. “In the meantime, we’re confident that the versatility and depth of our team will help us move forward and continue the positive momentum that we’ve seen over the past several months.”

Doctors said Wall would be sidelined for eight weeks, but the timetable for his return kept stretching. It wasn’t until mid-January 2013 that Wall was back on the floor for the Wiz … 15 weeks later.

The Rebuild: Year Three

Meanwhile, the “versatility and depth” Grunfeld endorsed produced just five wins to 28 losses—taking the accolade for the worst start in franchise history from the 2011-12 team. While Grufeld’s supposed playoff caliber supporting cast didn’t hold up its end of the bargain, Wall’s return helped—significantly. He powered the Wizards to a 10-point win in his debut and averaged 14.1 points, 6.5 assists and 2.5 rebounds in 26 minutes over 11 games (four starts) during the month of January to start the new year.

The Wizards put together a 6-5 run with Wall, winning more games in 11 tries than they had in the 33 before his return. Despite Wall’s heroics—and heroics they were—Wall’s impact was more or less forgotten by the mainstream media. Perhaps it wasn’t enough to catch their attention. People like big point totals—sizzle, hot sauce, highlights.

On January 22, 2013 Washington, D.C. had officially become a basketball dead zone.

ESPN.com ran a story ranking the top 25 players under the age of 25. To be eligible, players had to be born after January 22, 1988.

Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, Blake Griffin, and James Harden made the cut. So did role players Ryan Anderson, Larry Sanders and DeAndre Jordan. The list also included flashy young potential in Brandon Jennings, Steph Curry, Eric Bledsoe, Nic Batum, Kyrie Irving, Paul George, and Brook Lopez. Damian Lillard, Anthony Davis, and Kenneth Faried, even younger but making almost as much noise, represented the rookie class. Injured stars Kevin Love and Derrick Rose made the top 10.

“To be clear,” explained authors David Thorpe and Kevin Pelton in their disclaimer, “this is a ranking of how we would order these players if we were starting a franchise and would have them for the next several years, not just this season.”

But John Wall? Despite meeting the age qualifier by more than two years, Wall, born September 6, 1990, was left off the list. Forgotten.

Some supporters began to miss the slapstick humor that had been reliably present in the team’s rotations over the years—the self-centered talent, if nothing else, made the losing more palatable. Brooklyn’s Deron Williams, in April 2012, described Wall’s help on the court as a “tough cast.”

“I don’t want to put anybody down but he’s not playing with the smartest guys in the world. That’s tough, man. That’s tough. They’re not smart. I’ve been watching. JaVale McGee was on the Not So Top 10, like, 50 times this year.”

But Wall, ignoring both his numerous, outspoken critics and indifference from others, continued to be a steadying presence for the franchise. The Wizards went 7-5 in February and finished 9-8 in March.

Slowly, pundits began to change their tune.

“John Wall might be the best player in the NBA right now not named Kevin or LeBron,” Grantland’s Chris Ryan wrote after Wall’s career-high 47-point explosion against the Memphis Grizzlies on March 25. “That should actually be an award: The M.V.P.N.N.K.L. Give that award to John Wall. Also, Ted Leonsis, fellow blogger, here’s a note: Pay John Wall. As someone who cheers for a team that just paid Jrue Holiday, that might pay a one-legged bowling enthusiast, that might pay Evan Turner, let me repeat: Pay John Wall.”

OK, cool. Wall found his jumper, and his legs, lost the weight (slowly got in game shape), and, yes, won a handful of games. Things were looking up! They were! At a guided flick of a wrist, the Wizards were somehow relevant, finally.

Days later, on March 28, 2013, Ted Leonsis offered some perspective, blogging about his team’s shot at a postseason berth without ever mentioning the “P” word (the P, of course, stands for playoffs):

“Since our exciting victory at home over Oklahoma City on January 7th, we have performed especially well over the ensuing 39-game stretch. During that two and half month run, we emerged with a 22-17 record including an impressive 16-4 mark at home.

“Prior to last night’s game, we sustained an average margin of victory of 2.9 points per game in a 38-game span, which would translate to roughly 49 wins if maintained over a full season. We are one of only 12 teams this season to hold a margin of victory of 2.9 points per game or better during a 38-game stretch. Every other team on that list is currently in a playoff position, and we have defeated each of those teams except for San Antonio and Indiana. (Teams with at least a 2.9 point-per-game margin of victory over [the previous] 38 games this season: Brooklyn, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Indiana, Los Angeles Clippers, Memphis, Miami, New York, Oklahoma City, San Antonio and Washington.)

“I realize we have to exhibit this type of play throughout an entire season, but this is a sample size that is worth noting.”

The Wizards finished the season 24-25 with Wall—29-53 overall—which was good enough to tie the Detroit Pistons (who swept the Wizards 4-0 this season) for the 10th seed in the East. Wall agreed with his employer, Leonsis, as he cleaned out his locker at the end of the season: “We’re healthy, we’re easily a playoff team—that’s the main thing, we’re healthy,” he said, confident that his worst days were behind him.

“If you’re realistic and see what happened and when we had our team, we had a team that could compete with anyone if had our pieces for the whole year—which we didn’t,” said Grunfeld during his season-ending media session.

“I think that the number one thing is that we need to get our players’ health right. We have to rest up this summer, get our health right, and come back next year with all our players.”

Grunfeld, the man Wall’s fate has been tied to, parroting a broken record, then said that his goal for next season is to “put a team out there that can make the playoffs.”

No excuses this time.

***

Like Wall, Grunfeld’s stock was sky-high when he became the head honcho in D.C. in 2003—he had led the Milwaukee Bucks to three playoff appearances in four years. His stock stayed afloat after acquiring talent like Gilbert Arenas through free agency and Antawn Jamison and Caron Butler after a series of trades—trades made in true Grunfeld fashion. His stock, however, took a dip after kneecapping the franchise by collecting $100 million contracts and erudite knuckleheads (what beautiful irony).

Now, with Wall commanding attention around the league, Grunfeld’s stock is back up again, boosted by talks of max-contract extensions for former lottery picks and pipe-dream playoff projections based on the hope that the team’s starting five can actually start 82 games … or at least 70. 65 even. 60?

Despite finishing with fewer than 30 wins for the fifth straight season, the Wizards’ most recent 29-53 campaign was seen by some as “a big win” for Grunfeld. So it seems that both Wall and Grunfeld’s time in D.C. tell boomerang stories.

What’s a boomerang story? I’ll let Stephen J. Dubner of Freaknomics take it away.

“So, back in the 19th century, when cities around the world began to grow like crazy, they were mostly powered by horse, more than 200,000 horses in New York City alone. Now, all those horses produced about five million pounds of manure a day. When the cities were smaller, there had been a healthy market for manure, because farmers from the surrounding area would buy it as fertilizer. But as cities grew, and took on more and more horses, there came to be a manure glut. The price of manure fell from strong positive to zero and then to negative—you actually had to pay somebody to get rid of the manure. Now, not surprisingly, most people weren’t willing to pay to have their manure taken away, so it piled up on the streets. It was a nightmare, in every way: it was a health hazard, it stank, it made it hard to get around. Thankfully, the automobile and the electric streetcar came along and replaced the horse as the engine of cities. Decades passed. The horse population declined. So therefore did the supply of horse manure. What rose, however, was a boom in home gardening, and, among a certain type of connoisseur, a demand for primo fertilizer. Like horse manure. So, today, a twenty-five-pound bag of manure mulch can sell for about fifteen dollars. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is a boomerang story. Something that starts out in one place, and then goes far away, and then ends up right back where it began.”

***

Evaluating the player is relatively easy. Most would agree that the Wizards have, indeed, struck it rich with Wall. He’s less the straight-line burner he once was and is now more of a creative, pacey floor general who somehow manages to turn the limited talent around him into serious producers. The Wizards with Wall on the floor, for example, transformed themselves from brickmasons into one of the best 3-point shooting teams in the NBA. From Wall’s return on January 12 till the end of the season, only Golden State (41.5%) and Miami (39.9%) shot better than the Wiz did (39.7%) from beyond the arc. Peak John Wall is still years away.

As for the general manager … well, that’s not so easy. But perhaps Grunfeld should no longer be given the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps Leonsis should be more critical. Grunfeld’s winning percentage in Washington (.390) would be enough to dissuade many from re-upping after a decade of mediocrity, but he continues to rule as if by divine authority.

“I’m just surprised that when everybody acknowledges it’s a player’s league—everybody would agree with that,” said former NBA head coach and current ESPN broadcaster Jeff Van Gundy in a radio interview in April, defending Lawrence Frank who’d been fired as coach of the Pistons.

“Then the most important player or person in any organization is the person that picks the players,” Van Gundy continued. “But we don’t, as organizations, examine them. We just take the easy way out time and time again. You lose, the G.M. convinces the owner, ‘We got good players. It’s the coach’s fault.’ We fire the coach; we bring a new coach in; we continue to lose. We fire that coach, saying that ‘We have better players.’ It just goes on and on.”

It’s Grunfeld’s responsibility, as the skipper of the ship, to make sure the crew can handle heavy seas. That involves drafting—and developing—the right players outside of the lottery, signing role players for depth, and acquiring veteran talent for positive team culture. With the exception of Wall and Beal, two players who fell into the team’s lap, Grunfeld has struck out in the draft.

It has taken the better part of a decade for the team to field mature, professional ball players, which is in part why the raw young talent never got cooking. At least the team has some blue-collar attitudes on it—fulfilling Leonsis’ vision of “a culture and a locker room and a style of play that is hard-working and effort matters and coach-ability matters”—but it’s still short of NBA experience. The draft picks still around are often chained to Wittman’s doghouse, hoping to be thrown a bone.

“Grunfeld sticks to ‘plans’ so diligently that he doesn’t fulfill his other duties as a general manager,” SB Nation’s Mike Prada wrote in a ranking of the NBA’s GMs. Those other duties include finding talent in the draft and getting good return value on trades. “In the end,” Prada continued, “Grunfeld certainly knows what he’s doing, but loses a lot of points for his shaky execution of his boss’ visions.”

That means Grunfeld moves parts around, tries to make tweaks, but has rarely succeeded in building much. That’s the principal indictment of the Wizards team president. It’s true, Grunfeld has remodeled the team to suit Leonsis’ vision, turning the roster over completely, and appeased the “star” talent in the process—Wall, reserved when speaking to the media, said that the Wizards “have enough young players” and that “management knows what’s best for us and the organization.” The reality is that team’s top rotation continues to be as thin as a coffee filter and as unfamiliar as the smell of a neighbor’s refrigerator.

Injuries are the easy excuse this past year, as they have been in the past, but an excuse nonetheless. It’s a cop out. Just about every team in the NBA was hurt by injuries. The Lakers, for example, seemed to go under the knife more often than the real housewives of Orange County, but they finished with a winning record and entered the playoffs as the seventh seed—in the Western Conference! Unfair? Fine. Other teams—including the Spurs, Clippers, Pacers, Warriors, Celtics, Nets, and, of course, the Chicago Bulls—found ways to persevere. The Wizards, on the contrary, just rolled over.

The other looming failure with Grunfeld is that his M.O. is to trade veteran talent for other veteran talent. But that is no longer possible with this squad. He could trade youth, but what would be the return on investment? Jan Vesely, Chris Singleton and Trevor Booker’s combined PERs (29.3) was lower than LeBron’s (31.67). Only Kevin Seraphin has a ceiling higher than that of a role player off the bench. Grunfeld dealt Jordan Crawford to the Celtics and all he got back was Leandro Barbosa, sans ACL, and Jason Collins. Put that on a T-shirt.

Shoot, suppose the stars align and the team makes the playoffs next season, history won’t be on their side. Grunfeld managed to carve his way into the postseason with near .500 records in four straight seasons in the mid-2000s, but the Wizards were swept in two series and thrice K.O.’d out in the first round. Problem is, .500 records may get you into the fight (on the East Coast anyway), but they don’t make you a contender for anything worthwhile, unless your goal is to get run off the big stage with a broom.

Let’s not forget that Leonsis in his pre-draft press conference called another appearance to the NBA Draft Lottery “unacceptable.” If that were so, where are the repercussions?  The 2013 Draft Lottery is next Tuesday, May 21; the Wizards will be in attendance, their fourth appearance in as many years.

So, is Leonsis’ plan really working? What’s the strategy to right the ship? And why the unwavering trust in Grunfeld to lead the way? Progress … has been … painfully slow. And John Wall’s emergence likely covered up a lot of the team’s shortcomings, including personnel mismanagement.

What we do know for sure is that the front office continues to overpromise and underdeliver. Another certainty: The Wizards haven’t won the executive of the year award since Bob Ferry last did it more than 30 years ago in 1981-82.

All that said, here’s what former ESPN analyst and current CSN Bay Area NBA insider Ric Bucher reported during a Warriors broadcast in late March:

“Everything that I’m hearing is that because of what they have shown down the stretch here now once healthy, that Ernie Grunfeld, Tommy Sheppard and that whole front office will be back next year and get a chance to show that they’ve put together a team that can be a playoff team in the postseason.”

[Note: Both Wittman and Grunfeld are in the last year of their contracts (both signed extensions last summer). Ted Leonsis has never hired—or fired—a general manager, excluding the Washington Mystics.]

The Wizards will run it back like they always do. A 29-53 season was good enough. It’s playoffs or bust, again. Boomerang. That same pile of horse shit that’s been piling up is now labeled “primo fertilizer” and being sold at a premium.

We’re expected to believe that things will be different.

Chris Singleton

6-8 : Height
230 lbs. : Weight
23 : Age
2 : Years NBA Experience
1 : NBA Team

Drafted by the Wizards 18th overall in 2011. 

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

57 : Games
11 : Starts
924 : Minutes

1.06 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Singleton evaluated over 27 games} 

7.8 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Fennis Dembo for the 1988-89 Detroit Pistons (7.8)
maybe Perry Jones for the 2012-13 Oklahoma City Thunder (7.8),
maybe Joey Graham for the 2010-11 Cleveland Cavaliers (7.7)

.028 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Danny Ferry with the 1990-91 Cleveland Cavaliers (.028),
maybe Danny Ferry with the 2002-03 San Antonio Spurs (.028),
maybe Wah Wah Jones with the 1951-52 Indianapolis Olympians (.028),
maybe Earl Clark with the 2011-12 Orlando Magic (.027),
maybe Tom Hammonds with the 1991-92 Washington Bullets (.027)

With Chris Singleton on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 1.0 point less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 1.5 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-4.7

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

9.0 : Points
7.2 : Rebounds
0.9 : Blocks
1.5 : Steals
1.4 : Assists
1.8 : Turnovers
4.8 : Fouls

0.73 PPP

Singleton had 313 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.73 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 416th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.85 PPP over 248 possessions.

Shooting

38.2% Field Goals (92-241)
19.4% 3-Pointers (7-36)
57.1% Free Throws (40-70)

#31

Chris Singleton in 2012-13 with the Wizards: Someone Give This Man Appropriately Heated Porridge

by Conor Dirks (@ConorDDirks)

When Chris Singleton was drafted 18th overall by the Wizards in 2011, praise was almost universal; many writers thought the Wizards had themselves a bona fide draft day steal.

In adorning the Grunfeld administration with an A+ (not a Scarlet Letter reference, even), Yahoo! writer Kelly Dwyer had this to say about Singleton: “Singleton is a needed lockdown defender who might allow Flip Saunders to bust out his zone defense once again…”

Commentary from SI’s Sam Amick (who also gave the Wizards an A+) was almost identical: “In Singleton, they get a lockdown defender player who claims he can guard all five positions.”

NBADraft.net’s Mike Misek said this about Singleton after the draft: “He has a tremendous ability to defend, but needs to stay out of foul trouble and work on his offense.”

Because the Wizards started the 2011-12 season with one of the most questionable lineups in team history (John Wall, Jordan Crawford, Rashard Lewis, Andray Blatche, and JaVale McGee—in limited action, Ronny Turiaf played 22 minutes off the bench), Singleton was put in a position to showcase the oft-noted “lockdown defense” that was expected of him. It turns out that “lockdown” may have been a bit hyperbolic; opposing small forwards averaged an above-average 16.2 PER against Singleton.

As noted by TAI’s Kyle Weidie around this time last year, Singleton started more games than all but two rookies in 2011-12, good for 77-percent of the games played in the lockout season. But quantity doesn’t equal quality in this case, and although Singleton got plenty of run (he was on the court for 45.2 percent of Washington’s available game minutes in his rookie year), he didn’t impress his coach, or his team’s general manager, enough to secure the organization’s confidence going forward. A subpar summer league performance, and a regressing jump shot, did nothing to assuage the unease. So, what was Plan B for an organization when their “A+” draft pick earned an “incomplete” on his rookie transcript? In the 2012 offseason, the Wizards traded for Trevor Ariza and signed Martell Webster, both of whom play Singleton’s “natural” position of small forward.

In 2012-13, Singleton managed to be on the court for 924 total minutes, or 23.5 percent of Washington’s total available game minutes. The drop in time can be partially explained away with the aforementioned significant roster upgrades, and partially by Randy Wittman’s tendency to rotate players into long-term doghouse accommodations. But mostly, the reason Chris Singleton didn’t play is because he didn’t perform particularly well when given a chance. There was, however, an anomalous stretch in February when Singleton stepped up.

Between a February 2 game against the Spurs and a February 8 game against the Nets, Singleton scored 7.8 points per contest and his shooting percentages were massive outliers compared to his cumulative season stats. In fact, over all of February, Singleton played 15.7 minutes per game, shot 47 percent from the floor, and showed some signs of being able to develop a consistent 3-point shot (33 percent from the 3-point line for the month). He also averaged 1.2 steals per game during February, far more success than he found in that category in any other month during the season.

Still, you have to wonder whether the development of a player like Singleton (defense-oriented, capable of guarding both forward positions) was poorly served by the learning cliff he was asked to navigate as a rookie on a 20-win team after a summer of non-contact with the team and coaches because of the lockout. Because of his position and because he started so many games so early, Singleton was regularly asked to contain confidence-killers like Carmelo Anthony, Paul Pierce, and LeBron James (in other words, the best player on the opposing squad). While NBA players are often judged by the leap they do or don’t make between their rookie and sophomore seasons, it would be unfair to do so in this case because of how Goldilocks-ish Singleton’s career has been thus far: first the porridge was too hot, now the porridge is too cold. Coach Wittman has yet to find a “just right” role for Singleton (if he’s even looking) and it’s difficult to think of Singleton’s meager contributions this season as anything short of a disappointment.

The team wants Singleton to develop as a defensive stopper who can play, and guard, both forward positions and knock down 3-point shots when there is an open look. He’s not there, but don’t label him as a bust just yet. Singleton is a player who has looked lost from time to time, outmatched every once in a while, but rarely incapable. A key question moving forward will be whether his handle of the ball can improve enough to take advantage of his significant physical gifts on offense. At the small forward position (and not in the small lineup power forward spot he’s been asked to play on a fairly consistent basis), he’s long enough to make defenders uncomfortable, but that will only go as far as his ability to drive and post up with confidence. Another concern for coaches is whether Singleton’s lateral movement is adequate to keep up with opposing small forwards. If the answer is “no,” a “small-ball 4″ could be the niche Singleton finds himself being coached into by the Wizards staff.  “Coached into a niche role” doesn’t quite have the ring of “lockdown defender” though, does it?

Flip Saunders once compared Chris Singleton to retired Spur, and notoriously capable defender, Bruce Bowen. The eye test produces erratic results, so bend a knee to your cruel defensive possession statistics overlord and let’s see how Chris Singleton compares defensively with some of his contemporaries:

Chris Singleton: 248 total defensive possessions, 0.85 points allowed per defensive possession, opponents shot 35 percent, opponents scored 38.7 percent of the time (including free throws), most vulnerable on post-up possessions, where opponents scored 42.4 percent of the time.

Martell Webster: 668 total defensive possessions, 0.87 points allowed per defensive possession, opponents shot 38.2 percent, opponents score 38.2 percent of the time, most vulnerable on post-up possessions, where opponents scored 53.5 percent of the time.

Trevor Ariza: 394 total defensive possessions, 0.76 points allowed per defensive possession, opponents shot 34.5 percent, opponents scored 35 percent of the time, most vulnerable on isolation possessions, where opponents scored 42.3 percent of the time.

Josh Smith: 778 total defensive possessions, 0.81 points allowed per defensive possession, opponents shot 37.8 percent, opponents scored 37.3 percent of the time, most vulnerable on pick and rolls featuring the roll man, where opponents scored 40.8 percent of the time.

Shane Battier: 649 total defensive possessions, 0.86 points allowed per defensive possession, opponents shot 38%, opponents scored 38.4 percent of the time, most vulnerable on isolation plays, where opponents scored 42.3 percent of the time.

Paul George: 1255 total defensive possessions, 0.82 points allowed per defensive possession, opponents shot 36.8 percent, opponents scored 37.5 percent of the time, most vulnerable on post-ups, where opponents scored 45.8 percent of the time.

(all statistics via Synergy Sports Technology)

Of these six players, Singleton is fourth in points allowed per defensive possession, second in opponent field goal percentage, and sixth in opponent scoring percentage (indicative of his fouling issues). Singleton is also sixth in total defensive possessions, which hearkens to his limited role. When considering these comparisons, remember that all five of the other players listed play more frequently against NBA starters than Singleton does. In some cases this distinction is more striking (Paul George) than others (Trevor Ariza).

Singleton may not have made the “jump” from rookie to sophomore year (unless we’re talking hopscotch), but players who improve significantly in their third year are far from rare. The organization will have to make a few important decisions over the summer, and those decisions could shape Singleton’s future development in D.C. If the Wizards re-sign Martell Webster, don’t trade away Trevor Ariza, and draft a forward, Chris could be traded or, worse, forgotten. But if Webster signs elsewhere and the Wizards draft Maryland center Alex Len, we might be able to see more consistent playing time, and hopefully more consistent development, from the young Washington forward.

A GIF

The highlight of Singleton’s season came in game three:
a big dunk late in a loss against Kevin Garnett and the Celtics in Boston.

On the first go-around with Jan Vesely, the aim was to disassociate him with the fact that he was the sixth overall pick (at least that’s how I coped). Vesely was already on the team, and he was drafted exactly with John Wall in mind.

The Wizards went with an athletic, defensive-minded, running, dunking role player with their high pick one year after making Wall the face of the franchise. Vesely was a project for sure, but one that promised to be part of the equation.

Then Klay Thompson happened.

The tall, rangy guard was one of the best shooters in the 2011 draft, and at over 6-foot-7 in shoes with a 6-foot-9 wingspan, what was not to like? (OK, so Nick Young was 6-foot-7 with a 7-foot wingspan… Who cares? So what?) Son of an ex-NBAer, Mychal Thompson, Klay also spent three years at Washington State—very in-tune with Ted Leonsis’ rebuilding M.O. of drafting more mature players. Would it have been better to put a more offensively skilled player next to Wall?

Problem is, this:

At the time, the Wizards weren’t looking for a shooting guard because the team was still developing Jordan Crawford and Nick Young was about to become a restricted free agent. Crawford and Young are both already gone.

That’s from a recent article on the ‘what if’ connection between the Washington Wizards and Thompson’s Golden State Warriors by the Washington Post’s Michael Lee.

But—there’s always a ‘but’—most knew that Nick Young was a dead-man walking and likely only to receive a qualifying offer, and no one will honestly claim that the remaining laurels rested on Jordan Crawford. Bad by design, huh?

Some have recently asked if you’d rather have Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson, or John Wall and Bradley Beal. Tough call. Some might ask if you’d rather have Wall, Thompson and Harrison Barnes, or Wall, Beal and Vesely—that’s the more legitimate possibility, and perhaps not so tough of a call.

But all the ‘what ifs’ aren’t appeasing Wizards fans, and they for damn sure ain’t improving Jan Vesely’s confidence.

Confidence is all that matters for Vesely at this point, and you wonder what the Wizards did to evaluate Vesely’s beforehand and what they are doing about it now. Vesely seemed to arrive in the U.S. chock-full of confidence, kissing his girl under the bright lights of national television and referring to Blake Griffin as the “American Jan Vesely.” What had happened? Vesely is still best known for that kiss.

After the M.V.M. (Most Valuable Mention) of overall team health by each Ernie Grunfeld and Randy Wittman in their season-ending media sessions was the word “confidence” when it came to Jan Vesely.

Certainly prompted by the media, certainly prompted by Vesely’s self-realization, certainly prompted by A.J Price saying this:

“I’ve heard him out of his own mouth, he doesn’t like to go to the free throw line. Just because everybody is watching. It’s just a confidence thing. So you know exactly what the issue is with him. It’s just up to him to find that peace or that confidence.”

Price went on to express his belief that confidence would come for Jan, but he didn’t make any promises. Vesely shot 53.2 percent from the free throw line as a rookie, 30.8 percent last season. It was truly a misadventure, every time.

Jan Vesely will never be Klay Thompson—you’d rather have Bradley Beal, anyway. In the long-run, it’s a relatively airtight case. Vesely might never live up to the generalist’s expectations of a sixth overall pick, either. Continue to indict Ernie Grunfeld if it helps you cope, but it’s still in the best interest of the Wizards for Vesely to excel.

That confidence is a revisionist property. Price probably knows from where he got his own confidence, but he can’t help Vesely find his. If boy-Honza ever does find confidence, forget about his forgettable history, because Vesely’s still got the athletic ability, love for the game, team mentality, and beyond scratch-of-the-surface skills to be the darling of dunking role players.

Then again, confidence separates men from boys, haves from have-nots, contributors from disappointments. And so far, Vesely has been nothing but the latter.

-Kyle Weidie (@Truth_About_It)

Jan Vesely

6-11 : Height
240 lbs. : Weight
23 : Age
2 : Years NBA Experience
1 : NBA Team

Drafted by the Wizards 6th overall in 2011. 

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

51 : Games
4 : Starts
601 : Minutes

0.89 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Vesely evaluated over 23 games} 

7.6 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Andris Biedrins for the 2012-13 Golden State Warriors (7.7)
maybe Chris Mihm for the 2007-08 Los Angeles Lakers (7.7),

.059 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Todd Fuller for the 1998-99 Utah Jazz (.059),
maybe Greg Dreiling for the 1994-95 Cleveland Cavaliers (.059)

With Jan Vesely on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 3.8 points more per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 4.3 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-3.4

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

7.5 : Points
7.3 : Rebounds
1.0 : Blocks
0.9 : Steals
1.7 : Assists
1.6 : Turnovers
6.4 : Fouls

0.82 PPP

Vesely had 155 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.82 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 346th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.92 PPP over 25 possessions.

Shooting

50% Field Goals (57-114)
30.8% Free Throws (12-39)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#24

Jan Vesely in 2012-13 with the Wizards: Confidence at Sea, Searching for Dry Land

by Lukas Kuba (@Luke_Mellow)

In late March, I emailed several bloggers in the ESPN TrueHoop Network (18 to be exact), asking them an array of questions pertaining to Jan Vesely.

“Honestly haven’t seen enough of him to have much of an opinion. Anything I could offer would be fairly misinformed, unfortunately,” wrote Jared Wade of the Indiana Pacers blog, 8 Points, 9 Seconds. That was a common response. Most haven’t seen enough of Vesely to have much to say about him.

If you look at the 29 other players taken in the 2011 first round, it’s hard to have a neutral option of at least 85 percent of them. Yet here we are with Jan Vesely, the sixth overall pick.

No one from the group of emailed NBA watchers had anything positive to say about Vesely. The most critical opinion came from Kalen Deremo of the Denver Nuggets blog, Roundball Mining Company:

“He was clearly a bust even before the draft. I remember all the hype about him and all everyone said was how athletic he was and how good he ran the floor, etc., but nobody said anything about his skills or one aspect of the game he could do extremely well. I haven’t seen enough of him to make definitive statements but from what I have seen he just looks raw and unskilled. You’d think after this long in the NBA he’d have improved. I think there’s a spot for him if he wants to put his mind to becoming a better player. Otherwise, there’s always Europe.”

If Vesely has one thing going for him, he’s an honest young man who doesn’t make excuses. Right after the last game in Chicago, a CzechSport.cz reporter asked Jan about feelings about the just-concluded season.

“It was a difficult season, we had a bad start to the season and lots of injured players,” said Vesely. “But we gradually improved and we managed to win several games in a row, too. So, by and large, there’s some contentment in the [Wizards] organization.

“In my rookie season, I got used to playing with John Wall, so it was definitely one of the factors [why I struggled]. But I can’t excuse my poor play on the absence of a point guard. In basketball, injuries happen every so often. If I want to play on this level I gotta be able to cope with it. I wanted to break-through in my second season but unfortunately, it didn’t happen.

“I should’ve shown something, shown my skills off a bit, and I did not do that. It’s not the same as in Belgrade, where I still was a young boy. The third season with the Wizards is going to be crucial. I gotta give everything into it.”

Vesely has been candid about his struggles, saying, “they are mainly in my head. I was lacking self-confidence. This is what I have to work on. It’s all about the head. I have to work on my individual skills and mainly on my psyche.”

Still, the proverbial black clouds are rollin’ up the valley for Vesely’s NBA career. Last month, the Czech national team coach dubbed Vesely as “still an unfinished product.” A Czech publication even ran this headline: “Vesely’s Second Season Was a Severe Disappointment.”

But there were beams of light, if you will. Vesely’s minus-3.4 per 48 minutes was better than Chris Singleton (-4.7), Kevin Seraphin (-6.1), Jordan Crawford (-7.4), and Trevor Booker (-8.2). He was the only Wizard to shoot 50 percent from the field. And if you’re looking at which young big was best paired with Wall, the order would go like this: Wall/Seraphin: 492 minutes, +2.1; Wall/Vesely: 117 mins, +0.8; Wall/Singleton: 287 minus, -0.2; Wall/Booker: 393 mins., -3.8.

Poor play ultimately falls on Vesely’s shoulders, but he’s also been put into an unenviable situation. The Wizards have a less-than-stellar track record when it comes to player development. Nor do they seem to turn to the D-League for developmental help—only Andray Blatche, Peter John Ramos, and Hamady N’diaye have been sent down while still on the official roster (Shelvin Mack only found the D-League once the Wizards had cut him). Leonsis has shown interest in owning his own D-League team, but Washington has clearly not advanced to that point as a franchise. The San Antonio Spurs, Los Angeles Lakers, Oklahoma City Thunder, Golden State Warriors, Cleveland Cavaliers, and, as of April 2013, the Philadelphia 76ers each own a D-League team. Several NBA franchises have a single-team affiliation with a D-League team, the Wizards currently do not.

That said, Vesely’s camp was granted assurance by the Wizards that he would not be sent down to the D-League, where, one could argue, it would be tougher for Vesely to develop via language barriers and the inability for Washington leadership to take a more hands-on approach. Sure, pride and the hope that Vesely would somehow crack Randy Wittman’s rotation also fueled desires from Vesely’s handlers to keep him at the top level. But persistent injuries to other Wizards became the prevailing factor to why he wasn’t sent down. Again, without owning a team, the Wizards have less control over minor league development, and in July 2011, their affiliate was located all the way in Iowa. (The 76ers purchased a franchise, the Utah Flash, on hiatus for the past two seasons, and relocated them closer to Delaware.)

Still, could Vesely have used game experience on a lower lever to build his confidence? The start of the season was a disaster for the team, and as time progressed, Jan found himself in a role of the fifth big in a four-man frontcourt rotation. Nene and Emeka Okafor are both proven, quality veterans, and most times it seems that both Kevin Seraphin and Trevor Booker are better players than Vesely. Jan desperately needed playing time to develop his skills against live NBA competition, but all he got was a bouquet of DNP-CDs, losing confidence along the way. He played 601 total (mostly semi-garbage-time) minutes, which is just not enough for a kid who needs time.

Vesely played 25 or more minutes twice this season. Bismack freaking Biyombo had 48 such games. (#IfVeselyWasOnTheBobcats) The sophomore Honza appeared in 51 total games. Only six players from the first round of the 2011 draft played in less games than him: Iman Shumpert (45, but played way more minutes than Vesely), Donatas Motiejunas (44), Nolan Smith (40), Jordan Hamilton (40), Cory Joseph (28), and JaJuan Johnson (0 – he’s not in the NBA anymore).

Six players from the 2011 second round played in more games than Vesely: Kyle Singler (82), Chandler Parsons (76), Isaiah Thomas (79), Lavoy Allen (79), E’Twaun Moore (75), and Charles Jenkins (59).

Not many prime-time producers have emerged from playing within a 500-to-650-minute window during their sophomore season. Gerald Wallace, Jayson Williams, Antonio Daniels, Dennis Scott, and Spud Webb are some of the better examples who have. Will Vesely’s game elevate like Larry Sanders, or will it go the way of Luke Babbitt? Could he turn into a Kris Humphries-like contributor, or is he another Yinka Dare? Maybe Vesely is best suited as a future Bill Wennington or Greg Foster.

“It definitely could’ve been better but I don’t think about it now, it’s already [in the rearview mirror]. There’s a summer [of basketball] ahead of me and I have to prepare for next season in order to play better,” said Vesely on the lack of playing time, ever-ready to move forward.

The day after the season ended, Jan revealed his summer plans to Czech Television. “On Saturday [April 20], I will fly to visit my family in the Czech Republic, and once I’m there at home, I‘ll unwind. During June and July I’ll be in Los Angeles working out and preparing for my third NBA season, and in August I’ll join the [Czech] national team before the EuroBasket tournament. But first we have to get the insurance of my contract thing resolved.”

While spending time in L.A., Vesely plans to work out with a Slovenian coach who first got him as a 16-year-old kid. “He’s crazy into basketball. He’ll instill confidence in my head,” says Vesely. And it’s no secret that he’ll be looking to boost himself at EuroBasket. “I’m immensely looking forward to playing for the [Czech] national team, it’s a long time since I played [for my country]. It’s going to be a nice change for me.”

Vesely’s teammates still seem to believe in him, or at least see through the youth to potential, particularly A.J. Price.

“Jan’s a great, great young talent, I think he‘s gonna be a phenomenal player, when he comes into his own,” said Price toward the end of the season. “You know, right now, he’s still trying to find himself, his game in the NBA. But he’s got all the skills to do everything, and I think next year’s gonna be a big year for him.”

With the biggest summer of his sporting life ahead of the once-celebrated “Airwolf,” Wizards fans can only hope for the best. Hope that Vesely gets stronger, hope that he takes thousands of mid-range jumpers, hope he excels out west at summer league and overseas at EuroBasket 2013, hope his ship finds the shore. Because hope, at least, is always the last one to die, but two feet on dry land means the journey can continue.

A.J. Price on Jan Vesely

{via 2012-13 exit interviews}

Vesely, Pre-Game Warm-up Action

{video via Adam McGinnis}

Earl Barron

7-0 : Height
245 lbs. : Weight
31 : Age
7 : Years NBA Experience
7 : NBA Teams

Signed by the Wizards as a free agent on Sept. 19, 2012,
waived by the Wizards on Dec. 22, 2012,
signed by the Knicks for the rest of the season on Apr. 17, 2013. 

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

11 : Games
1 : Start
122 : Minutes

1.75 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Barron evaluated over 4 games} 

6.9 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Frank Brickowski for the 1996-97 Boston Celtics (6.9)
maybe Herb Williams for the 1996-97 New York Knicks (7.0),
maybe Chris Dudley for the 1993-94 Portland Trailblazers (6.8)

-0.025 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Stanley Roberts for the 1999-00 Philadelphia 76ers (-0.025),
maybe Ike Austin for the 2000-01 Vancouver Grizzlies (-0.026),
maybe Uwe Blab for the 1986-87 Dallas Mavericks (-0.027)

With Earl Barron on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 5.5 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 3.2 points less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-7.9

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

8.3 : Points
12.7 : Rebounds
1.5 : Blocks
1.5 : Steals
0.9 : Assists
3.0 : Turnovers
6.8 : Fouls

0.57 PPP

Barron had 49 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.57 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 465th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.68 PPP over 25 possessions.

Shooting

35.1% Field Goals (13-37)
40% Free Throws (2-5)

#30

Earl Barron in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
Have Ring, Will Play Basketball

by Kyle Weidie (@Truth_About_It)

When bad franchises, such as the Washington Wizards, add someone who ‘once upon a time’ won a championship, they get all giddy. A ring is a ring, right? Yea, go ask Ernie Grunfeld or Flip Saunders how much Mike James’ ring (2004, Pistons) meant to them and the locker room.

Nonetheless, the likes of Trevor Ariza (2009, Lakers) and Fabricio Oberto (2007, Spurs) have been paraded. Even Jason Collins’ two straight summers of NBA Finals experience (but not a ring) before Bradley Beal reached double-digits in age was seen as a significant plus, when the reality was that Collins was only a warm body in Washington who didn’t see the court unless absolutely necessary during his 54 total minutes.

[NOTE: the Wizards have, however, been pretty good about getting ex-players rings. The list currently includes Caron Butler, Brendan Haywood, DeShawn Stevenson and Mike Miller—cross your fingers, Rashard Lewis!]

None of this is to insinuate that such experience is meaningless—past input is always necessary—it’s just hard to imagine John Wall or any other Wiz Kid approaching Earl Barron about winning a championship ring with the Miami Heat in 2006. As an NBA rookie that season, three years removed from a four-year college career at Memphis, Barron didn’t see the court for one second during Miami’s run. Still, he was there.

Just as Barron was ‘there’ in the Wizards’ locker room this season—relatively quiet, relatively unassuming, and there to work. And work Barron did.

Washington signed Barron to their training camp roster in September, bringing the total to 18 players. With Nene’s ailing plantar fascia, Emeka Okafor and Kevin Seraphin were really the only other ‘bigs’ on the roster who could legitimately play center. Those next in line—Trevor Booker, Jan Vesely and even Chris Singleton—could be inserted at the 4 spot, but each, as Wizards fans continue to realize, leave a lot to be desired.

So along with Barron, Ernie Grunfeld elected to kick the tires on veteran bigs Brian Cook and Shavlik Randolph to help the Wizards hold down the paint. Randolph was ultimately one of the first to go and Cook was one of the last; Barron survived to make the final roster, mostly because his defense could be counted on much more than the other two vagabonds, and his offense wouldn’t totally hurt you.

In the season opener, Barron surprisingly tallied eight points and eight rebounds in 16 minutes and was part of a Wizards comeback attempt that ultimately fell short in Cleveland.

When Randy Wittman did play Barron (he was with Washington for 25 games but appeared in just 11), it was often because others simply weren’t hustling. On December 18, Barron came off the bench to grab 14 rebounds in 26 minutes in a loss against the Atlanta Hawks. When asked why he went with Barron—Chris Singleton started but only saw 11 minutes and Jan Vesely sported a “DNP-Coach’s Decision”—Wittman simply said:

“Activity. I mean, this guy—there wasn’t a play run for him, alright, and he gets 10 shots, 14 rebounds, and four blocks.”

Championship ring or not, usually the guy at the end of the bench fighting for his professional basketball life will give you some quality hustle minutes, while limiting the mistakes that young players tend to make.

Still struggling and searching, the Wizards waived Barron (and Shaun Livingston) on December 23 and brought in Shelvin Mack and Garrett Temple to help out what became areas of greater need: running the offense and perimeter defense.

Barron sat dormant until mid-April when he was signed by the New York Knicks, in light of the retirement of Rasheed Wallace and the fact that New York’s first replacement choice, former Wizard James Singleton, fell through.

When the 2013 NBA playoffs started, 12 ex-Wizards from the last four seasons were on playoff rosters. Now, with half the teams eliminated, only four remain: Rashard Lewis, Mike Miller, Kirk Hinrich, and Earl Barron.

Hey, maybe the Earl of Barron will get another championship with New York, even though he has yet to see any playoff action (or even a uniform; Barron is normally inactive and in a suit on New York’s bench). And maybe the NBA will never see Earl Barron again. But one thing we know is that he’ll always be a Wizard, just like the other 56 players who have populated Washington’s roster over the last four seasons.

Barron on Opportunity
Wizards vs. Hawks Post-Game, Dec. 18, 2012

Cartier Martin

6-7 : Height
220 lbs. : Weight
28 : Age
5 : Years NBA Experience
3 : NBA Teams

Signed by the Wizards as a free agent on Mar. 28, 2012.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

41 : Games
3 : Starts
694 : Minutes

1.71 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Martin evaluated over 12 games} 

9.7 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Mike Miller for the 2010-11 Miami Heat (9.7),
maybe James Jones for the 2011-12 Miami Heat (9.7)

.047 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Harvey Grant for the 1998-99 Philadelphia 76ers (.047),
maybe Fabulous Fabricio Oberto for the 2009-10 Washington Wizards  (.047)

With Cartier Martin on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 0.9 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 0.5 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-3.3

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

14.0 : Points
5.2 : Rebounds
0.3 : Blocks
1.0 : Steals
1.0 : Assists
1.7 : Turnovers
3.0 : Fouls

0.91 PPP

Martin had 297 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.91 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 210th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.94 PPP over 158 possessions, ranked 365th in the league.

Shooting

38.1% Field Goals (96-252)
39.7% 3-Pointers (58-146)
71.4% Free Throws (20-28)

#20

Cartier Martin in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
Last Gasp for the Good Guy

by Adam McGinnis (@AdamMcGinnis)

When the official announcement came last summer that Cartier Martin would be brought back for the 2012-13 campaign on a one year deal, it was universally well-received in the Wizards community. Martin is a likable player who can shoot the rock, and fans applauded the team for rewarding Martin’s solid contributions in 17 games at end of 2011-12. (The same couldn’t be said about the Wizards’ handling of James Singleton, who had a higher salary threshold than what the team was willing to offer.) Martin was on his second stint in Washington, bouncing from the D-League and China (during the lockout-shortened season) in the interim. The Wizards could always use more long-range specialists, and after Martin lost much of his money in a Ponzi scheme constructed by his AAU coach (who since committed suicide), it was easy to root for Martin. The hope was that the stability of a guaranteed deal would allow him to blossom. Unfortunately, his season never panned out that way. Martin’s season was defined by inconsistent minutes, streaky shooting, the inability to harness any midrange game, mental lapses, especially on defense, and an inopportune injury setback.

He started the season buried on bench until breaking out in Dallas on November 14, 2012. He caught fire during the fourth quarter and almost single-handedly brought the Wizards back with four 3-point field goals. But his playing time fluctuated along with his marksmanship, and he never seized a spot in the rotation. One of Martin’s better games before the end of 2012 came when he contributed 21 points and eight rebounds in a December home loss to the Los Angeles Lakers.

On the same day that Washington Redskins QB Robert Griffin III tore his ACL against the Seattle Seahawks, Martin hyper-extended his left knee against the Heat in Miami. The injury cost him two months. Upon his return, he mostly saw spot duty before starting the final three games of the season. The highlight of his season was a career-high 23 points at Golden State in late March, with 18 of those points coming on 3-pointers.

Martin appeared in 41 contests, averaging 6.6 points, 2.4 rebounds, 0.5 assists, and 16.9 minutes per game. He connected on 58 3-pointers out of 146 for a commendable average of 39.7 percent (41.9 percent from the corner, 38.8 percent above the break). Going deeper into his shooting numbers is where it gets uglier. His overall Field Goal Percentage was 38.1 percent but dips to 35.8 percent on 2-point field goals. On shots from 3-to-18 feet, Martin came in at 32 percent, and he missed half his attempts at the rim (11-22). His Offensive Rating finished at 95, down 14 points from his last two seasons with Wizards. His turnover percentage (10.8) also saw a significant bump. Metrics rating Martin’s defense, 104 Defensive Rating and 0.9 Defensive Win Shares, were career-highs, but they also might be more indicative of the team’s defensive success than his individual contributions. Martin was often in the wrong place on the court, and often to the audible disgust of Coach Randy Wittman.

Martin’s time with the Wizards is likely done. Wittman says he wants guys who can defend, and Martin does not necessarily qualify. He did not improve enough to capitalize on a fair chance, and that is just how the NBA shakes out sometimes. Not to say he can’t parlay shooting almost 40 percent from 3 into another NBA gig, but he’ll have to fight his way there.

Cartier is a good dude, always smiling, and has been a joy to be around. I wish him well and … hope that he can finally settle on a better hair style.

Shelvin Mack

6-3 : Height
215 lbs. : Weight
24 : Age
2 : Years NBA Experience
3 : NBA Teams

Drafted by the Wizards on June 23, 2011;
waived by the Wizards on Oct. 28, 2012;
signed by the Wizards on Dec. 25, 2012;
waived by the Wizards on Jan. 7, 2013.

Time as a Wizard in 2012-13

7 : Games
2 : Starts
141 : Minutes

1.25 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Mack evaluated over 4 games} 

10.4 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
Earl Boykins with the 2011-12 Houston Rockets (10.3)

.052 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
Jamison Brewer with the 2001-02 Indiana Pacers (.052)

With Shelvin Mack on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 5.5 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 7.5 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-12.6

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

9.4 : Points
4.1 : Rebounds
0.0 : Blocks
1.5 : Steals
5.9 : Assists
2.0 : Turnovers
2.6 : Fouls

0.73 PPP

Mack had 48 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.73 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 416th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.70 PPP over 54 possessions, ranked 9th in the league.

Shooting

40% Field Goals (16-40)
30.8% 3-Pointers (4-13)
50% Free Throws (1-2)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#22

Shelvin Mack in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
Lost in a Waive of Despair

by Adam Rubin (@LedellsPlace)

For all intents and purposes, Shelvin Mack’s Washington Wizards career ended on July 15, 2012. That was the date of Washington’s third game in the Las Vegas Summer League versus the NBA D-League All-Stars. While Mack’s poor play in the first two summer league games could be chalked up to offseason rust, it was impossible to ignore his struggles in Game 3 against the D-Leaguers. At times, Mack could not even get the ball over half court against pressure, and even when he did, he had trouble setting up the offense. Mack ended the game with five turnovers in 26 minutes.

Things got so bad in the second half that one young lady sitting behind Washington’s bench wearing a Bullets T-shirt screamed repeatedly (and loudly) for Sam Cassell to take out Mack and insert Earl Calloway, Stephen Gray, or any of the other guards who had outplayed Mack in Vegas. The gym was nearly empty, as is often the case for the late game on a Sunday night in Vegas, and the fan’s pleas could be heard in all corners of the otherwise silent gym. It’s never a good sign when one of your own fans goes Robin Ficker on you in a meaningless summer league game against non-NBA talent.

It’s no coincidence that A.J. Price was signed one week after summer league ended. Ernie Grunfeld had made it a priority to upgrade the backup point guard position. Mack stuck around through the preseason but never had a real chance of making the final roster. Shelvin was given a second chance in late December when both he and Garrett Temple were signed in the wake of A.J. Price’s injury and Shaun Livingston’s waiver. However, Mack only lasted two weeks while Temple parlayed his opportunity into a starting role.

The bottom line is that Mack is a marginal NBA talent, at best. After leaving Washington, he excelled in the D-League with the Maine Red Claws and signed a couple 10-day contracts with the Philadelphia 76ers before latching on with the Atlanta Hawks for the final 23 games of the season (and four games, 10 minutes, of sweet playoff action). Not a stellar resume, but, in fairness to Shelvin, most second-round picks don’t even make it that far.

Mack also has the unfortunate distinction of being the third member of perhaps the worst “what-if” draft class in recent NBA history. In 2011, one year after selecting John Wall as the franchise cornerstone, Ernie Grunfeld was blessed with three of the top 34 picks in the draft. Given the opportunity to grab Klay Thompson, Kenneth Faried and Chandler Parsons (or possibly Kawhi Leonard or Jimmy Butler), Grunfeld came home with Jan Vesely, Chris Singleton and Shelvin Mack. It’s not fair to expect a perfect draft, but one out of three would have been nice.

Copyright 2011 NBAE (Photo by Ned Dishman/NBAE via Getty Images)

[The haze of summer league & getting out-played by Earl Calloway - photo: Adam Rubin]

Shaun Livingston

6-7 : Height
182 lbs. : Weight
27 : Age
8 : Years NBA Experience
7 : NBA Teams

Waived by the Rockets on Oct. 29, 2012;
signed by the Wizards on Nov. 15, 2012;
waived by the Wizards on Dec. 22, 2012;
signed by the Cavaliers on Dec. 25, 2012.

Time as a Wizard

17 : Games
4 : Starts
320 : Minutes

1.0 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Livingston evaluated over 7 games.} 

7.4 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
Roger Mason with the 2002-03 Chicago Bulls (7.4),
or perhaps Rusty LaRue with the 1999-00 Chicago Bulls (7.4)

.028 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Monta Ellis with the 2005-06 Golden State Warriors (.028),
maybe World B. Free with the 1987-88 Houston Rockets (.028),
maybe Doug Overton with the 1992-93 Washington Wizards (.028),
probably Gabe Pruitt with the 2007-08 Boston Celtics (.028)

With Shaun Livingston on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 7.4 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 2.2 points more per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-15.3

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

7.1 : Points
4.2 : Rebounds
0.2 : Blocks
1.2 : Steals
4.3 : Assists
1.9 : Turnovers
2.5 : Fouls

0.68 PPP

Livingston had 93 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.68 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 441st in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.86 PPP over 126 possessions, ranked 168th in the league.

Shooting

36.4% Field Goals (24-66)
0% 3-Pointers (0-3)
100% Free Throws (15-15)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#14

Shaun Livingston in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
In Like A Lion, Out Like A Lamb

by Kyle Weidie (@Truth_About_It)

Shaun Livingston arrived in D.C. with a glimmer of hope. Hope that his career, which was mainly rekindled with the Wizards late in the 2009-10 season after a well-known disastrous derailment (“the injury” circa February 2007), would somehow take the next shining step.

Wasn’t even close.

When Livingston was signed in mid-November 2012, John Wall’s return was still unknown, A.J. Price was doing what he could, Shelvin Mack was long gone (via training camp cuts), and Jannero Pargo had been flat-out terrible.

Washington’s early-season offense was the worst in the NBA, by far. During Wall’s time from mid-January on, they jumped up to 23rd, but still finished dead-last on the season overall.

“I thought we needed to get another play-maker, a guy that can facilitate, maybe get us easier baskets,” said Head Coach Randy Wittman when Livingston was signed.

And Livingston was much better than Pargo’s offering, 7.2 PER points better in fact. But, as it turns out, Livingston’s total 7.4 PER during 17 games with the Wizards was worse than Chris Singleton’s 7.6 and Jan Vesely’s 7.8. Yes, Jannero Pargo put up a 0.2 PER in his seven games with Washington. TRBL!

A recent TAI post on lineup data revealed that Livingston, as point guard, led one of the worst Wizards 5-man units on the season, one featuring Livingston alongside Bradley Beal, Cartier Martin, Kevin Seraphin and Nene Hilario. It was a tough environment of new, fresh parts and guys trying to cope with injuries into which Livingston was suddenly inserted. Players were buying into Wittman’s defensive schemes, but the offense remained largely confused and not at all confident.

No other Wizard fielded a worse plus/minus per 48 minutes when on the court than Livingston—minus-15.3 in 320 minutes. Pargo was only minus-2.8 per 48 in his 102 total minutes. Washington finished last in the league in averaging just 92.4 points per 48 minutes on the season; with Livingston on the court, that point production dropped almost 10 points to 82.8.

Shooting just 36.4 from the field, Livingston couldn’t use his length to its normal advantage; many of his midrange shots were covered and fell short. His overall limited range, along with the lack of any dribble-drive creators next to him in Washington’s lineup, drastically limited floor spacing. The play-making Wittman was hoping for never surfaced.

Livingston was cut by Washington in late-December, along with Earl Barron (who is now a playoff participant with the Knicks), as the team electing to bring back Shelvin Mack (for a seven-game spell) and add Garrett Temple, who stuck for the rest of the season. Three days after being cut, the Cleveland Cavaliers signed Livingston and kept him for the remainder of the schedule. In Cleveland, Livingston’s PER improved to 14.6; his on-court plus/minus per 48 narrowed to just minus-0.8; and the offensive production of the Cavaliers picked up to 98.7 points per 48 minutes in his presence.

In mid-March, the Washington Post’s Michael Lee wrote a feature story on Livingston. In it, the player tossed some critique toward the NBA franchise he’s come to know on a couple occasions, citing, “a lack of structure from an organizational standpoint.”

“The structure, system wasn’t necessarily … it’s tough to elaborate without really going overboard,” Livingston told Lee. “It’s just sometimes I think I work a little better with more structure and the personnel, sometimes you play better with certain guys that put you in position to succeed and I wasn’t necessarily able do that for the team. I don’t think my skill set was being utilized to help guys. For whatever reason. I can’t put the blame on the coaches. Sometimes the players and chemistry didn’t fit as well.”

The plan drawn up by team brass showed minor successes later in the season with a healthy Wall, among others. But the underlying construct had major flaws, and Livingston was merely a fraction of what highlighted that—not even a smart player with a good head on his shoulders like Livingston could save the Wizards from their long-standing woes.

The only constant is that even though now separate, both Washington and the 27-year-old Livingston have several hills, perhaps mountains, to climb before a return to NBA relevancy.

Some Livingston Highlights,
for some reason:

Jason Collins

7-0 : Height
255 lbs. : Weight
34 : Age
12 : Years NBA Experience
6 : NBA Teams

Acquired by the Wizards on Feb. 21, 2013 from the Boston Celtics
along with Leandro Barbosa in exchange for Jordan Crawford.

Time as a Wizard

6 : Games
2 : Starts
54 : Minutes

0.63 out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Collins evaluated over 4 games} 

2.9 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
maybe Eddy Curry for the 2008-09 Knicks (2.8),
maybe Pervis Ellison for the 2000-01 Sonics (2.4)

.016 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
Jason Collins for the 2006-07 New Jersey Nets (.015)

With Jason Collins on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 4.4 points less per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 14.3 points less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: plus-13.3

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

2.7 : Points
5.3 : Rebounds
2.7 : Blocks
1.3 : Steals
1.3 : Assists
1.3 : Turnovers
7.3 : Fouls

0.44 PPP

Collins had 9 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.44 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.79 PPP over 14 possessions.

Shooting

16.7% Field Goals (1-6)
100% Free Throws (2-2)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com; original image above via Sports Illustrated]

#98

Jason Collins in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
In Like A Lamb, Out Like A Lion

by Rashad Mobley (@Rashad20)

Jason Collins’ arrival to the Washington Wizards franchise was as quiet and unassuming as he is. After he and Leandro Barbosa were traded to the Wizards from the Boston Celtics for Jordan “Steez” Crawford, there was a general feeling of malaise—not necessarily toward the newly acquired players, but more so toward Ernie Grunfeld and yet another one of his perplexing moves. Crawford was a malcontent who had seemingly given up on the team, but before John Wall’s return from injury and Beal’s emergence, he was the go-to scorer.

Barbosa arrived already out for the season with a torn ACL, and Collins was averaging 10 minutes, 1.2 points and 1.6 points for a Celtics team that, while lacking physical interior defenders besides Kevin Garnett, was more desperate for scoring and ball handling with Rajon Rondo shelved due to injury. How could the arrival of Collins, 34, possibly help the rebuilding Wizards?

Collins didn’t exactly assuage the fears and concerns of Wizards’ fans once he finally put on a Wizards uniform on March 12 against the Cleveland Cavaliers, but he did show a willingness to do the dirty work, as was mentioned in the postgame DC Council:

For the first time since the Wizards acquired him from Boston, Jason Collins checked into the game  (during the second quarter) for some meaningful minutes. His first order of business was to communicate with Emeka Okafor about who was guarding whom, while Alonzo Gee shot his two free throws. Next, he blocked Dion Waiters’ shot as he drove to the lane—something Waiters did seemingly at will all night. After Collins blocked the shot, Okafor got the rebound, and John Wall hit a 15-foot jump shot to give the Wizards a 45-43 lead. He played a total of two minutes and 55 seconds, and that blocked shot was the only stat he accrued, but given that Washington’s bench scored just nine points (Cleveland’s bench scored 29 points) Collins’ small feat was one of the few bright spots.

He did start in two consecutive games against the Phoenix Suns and the Los Angeles Lakers with mixed results. Against the Suns, he once again demonstrated his knack for creative stat lines with zero points, four fouls, two blocks, two steals, two assists, and solid interior defense in the closing minutes of an 88-79 Wizards victory. Two nights later against the Lakers, Collins—who was once known as being the Kryptonite to Dwight Howard’s Superman act*—was whistled for four fouls in just 13:18 of play and was mainly a spectator as John Wall and Trevor Ariza led the Wizards to a win.

[*Collins' Atlanta Hawks were swept by Howard's Orlando Magic in the 2010 playoffs, but beat Orlando 4-2 in the first round of the 2011 playoffs. Collins' totals in that winning series: 103 minutes, 22 fouls, 8 points, and 11 rebounds.]

Collins played in just three more games after that start against the Lakers, and his final shot in a Wizards uniform went a little something like this:

#JasonCollinsAlert vine.co/v/bUWMi1v0bIW

— Kyle Weidie (@Truth_About_It) April 18, 2013

When Collins left the Verizon Center after his exit interview—after recording more fouls than points for the 10th season in 11 years—there was no reason to suspect his name would ever be mentioned again in the same sentence as the Washington Wizards. The team had no plans in retaining his services and an unnamed source told the Washington Post’s Michael Lee that Collins would return to the team, “only if it is in desperate need for interior defense.” Then just a week and a half after his exit interview, Collins announced to Sports Illustrated (and Emeka Okafor, among other teammates) that he was gay. Collins proceeded to appear on Good Morning America, the B.S. Report with Grantland’s  Bill Simmons and Oprah’s Next Chapter (where no clips of him in a Wizards uniform were shown throughout the entire interview).

We hardly knew Jason Collins. He arrived with little fanfare, did nothing of note as a member of the Wizards, and then became a media darling (Chris Broussard notwithstanding) once he left the franchise. That’s so Wizards.

Jason Collins: 1st NBA Dunk

Jannero Pargo

6-1 : Height
175 lbs. : Weight
33 : Age
9 : Years NBA Experience
7 : NBA Teams

Signed by the Wizards as a free agent on Oct. 1, 2012;
waived by the Wizards on Nov. 15, 2012.

Time as a Wizard

7 : Games
0 : Starts
102 : Minutes

N/A out of 3 stars

Average Truth About It.net DC Council Game Rating
{Pargo was never evaluated on a game-basis, wasn’t really warranted.} 

0.2 PER

NBA historical PER contribution equivalent:
Anthony Carter with the 2003-04 San Antonio Spurs (0.2),
certainly better than Lawrence Moten with the 1997-98 Washington Wizards (-0.2)

-0.129 Win Shares/48 Minutes

NBA historical WS/48 contribution equivalent:
maybe Andrew Toney with the 1985-86 Philadelphia 76ers (-.128),
maybe Mugsy Bogues with the 2000-01 Toronto Raptors (-.128)

With Jannero Pargo on the Court…

The Wizards offense scored 2.9 points more per 100 possessions (OffRtg)
The Wizards defense allowed 6.2 points less per 100 possessions (DefRtg)
Plus/Minus per 48 minutes: minus-2.8

Numbers : Per 36 Minutes

7.4 : Points
2.1 : Rebounds
0.4 : Blocks
0.0 : Steals
4.9 : Assists
2.8 : Turnovers
2.8 : Fouls

0.51 PPP

Pargo had 41 offensive possessions with the Wizards that ended with a FGA, TO or FTs, and he scored 0.51 Points Per Possession (PPP) on those, ranked 468th in the NBA (via Synergy Sports Technology). Defensively, he allowed 0.78 PPP over 37 possessions, ranked 47th in the league.

Shooting

25% Field Goals (8-32)
15% 3-Pointers (3-20)
100% Free Throws (2-2)

[stats via NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com]

#7

Jannero Pargo in 2012-13 with the Wizards:
A Trivial Pursuit for an Orange Wedge

by Sean Fagan (@McCarrick)

Must we remember Jannero Pargo? Is there a moment that stands out during the 2012-13 season that bears encapsulation? You could say that he was the worst of all the point guards that the Wizards trotted out to replace John Wall, but that would insult the contributions of Shelvin Mack. You could stand in amazement that the Wizards thought so little of a player that they actually cut him after seven games, considering the morass that existed at the position of floor general. One might marvel that a player who was so inconsequential for the Wizards could ERUPT on his first night of a 10-day contract with the Hawks, shooting 6-for-11 from the field and helping lead Atlanta to an early season victory over a injury-destroyed Minnesota team. Of course, that would be the sum total of Pargo’s contributions to Atlanta, as he was also cut by the the Hawks after seven games (before eventually winding up with the Charlotte Bobcats).

Jannero Pargo is going to be a Wizards trivia question in a few years. Who manned the point guard position when John Wall was out? Who entered through the revolving door? How could the situation have devolved so completely that the car keys were handed to Jordan Crawford of all people?

During his seven games with the Wizards, Pargo took 32 shots of which he made eight. He was a deadly 3-for-20 from 3-point range. He also recorded one block.

Pargo is an NBA lifer, one of those guys who is always on the shortlist of injury-ravaged teams to call when there are no other options. A stopgap measure at best. He must drive the people who make basketball cards (do these still exist?) crazy because he a vagabond of the pro basketball world. Have what one would call a 3-point shot, will travel.

Jannero Pargo is a player a team signs when they are uncomfortable with risk. He is the “Big Mac” of the NBA. It doesn’t taste particularly good, is probably bad for you, and you are going to feel awful after the experience. But you do know exactly what you are getting into.

If you are a Wizards fan who is looking forward to the next few years of the franchise’s evolution, you want less Jannero Pargo and more of anything else. Because the one thing the Wizards need to stop doing is eating Big Macs.

Pargo’d

When the Wizards got “Pargo’d” in the seventh game of the season:

[From the Metro Bus - K. Weidie]

“Come playoff time, what most coaches do, is they play eight,
they rely on seven, and they only trust five.”

—Reggie Miller, former NBA player, current television analyst

“I’d love to have an eight- or nine-man rotation.
That’s my dream. And I’m playing 12 and 13 every night.
You can’t do that in an NBA game.
You have to develop a [starting] group and a group that comes in.
I’m having a tough time doing that.”

—Randy Wittman, Wizards coach, Nov. 2012, after franchise-worst 0-9 start

The right guys, the right combination, the right unit—coaches are always searching for the lineup that works best. You gotta play five at the same time and which five is important. If early 2000s U.S. losses in men’s Olympic basketball and what is now known as the FIBA Basketball World Cup taught us anything (’02-’06 to be exact), it’s that it is not necessarily the most talented collection of individuals, but it’s the five who work best together (or, in reality, the four-to-five players who work best around two-to-three very, very talented individuals, who also work well together—a team, or more appropriately, a rotation).

Players on the outskirts are well-aware of the struggle—sometimes political but certainly not as much as they think—to be part of the in-crowd. Some understand the working-together part, some don’t.

Forty (40) different 5-man units saw 20 or more minutes of court action together for the Washington Wizards in 2012-13.

The 1,782 total minutes of those 40 units accounted for 40 percent of Wizards all 5-man unit minutes.

Seventeen (17) of the 40 lineups finished in the positive in plus/minus (per 48 minutes); one lineup finished with an even zero; and 22 lineups finished in the plus/minus negative per 48.

The best crew:

1. John Wall
2. Bradley Beal
3. Martell Webster
4. Trevor Ariza
5. Emeka Okafor

27 total minutes (over five games)
Plus-63.1 per 48 minutes

Situational? Nouveau small? Whatever it is, it’s a scary lineup for opponents to guard, and not a bad defensive unit, either—at least no one on this unit is a defensive liability. Okafor might not be the perfect center complement, but I’d wager that he’s one of the top 10 in the NBA in terms of solid, dependable (health-wise included) defense. Okafor was also one of just six NBA centers who averaged a double-double and shot 50 percent or better from the field since the return of John Wall in mid-January.

The worst crew:

1. Shaun Livingston
2. Bradley Beal
3. Cartier Martin
4. Kevin Seraphin
5. Nene Hilario

21 total minutes (over six games)
Minus-57.7 per 48 minutes

Should be better, on paper, but sadness all around otherwise. Early season woes and psychology probably also a factor. Beal is not a creator off the dribble in general but drastically improved since the start of the year. A major part of this squad’s issue is that neither Livingston nor Martin have a chance of breaking down a defender off the dribble; other considerations would be rebounding inefficiencies with the entire unit.

The most (in time):

1. John Wall
2. Garrett Temple
3. Martell Webster
4. Nene Hilario
5. Emeka Okafor

The above 5-man unit saw a team-high 283 minutes together, but those only happened over the course of 21 games, and the five only accounted for 7.1 percent of all minutes on the season.

Plus/Minus: minus-5.6 per 48 minutes.

Garrett Temple is great and all. The team really appreciates his defense and hustle, but his presence here represents an institutional failure in the existence of Jordan Crawford (or, simply, having the appropriately developed guards in the queue).

Speaking of, Crawford to the Washington Post’s Michael Lee about his time in Boston versus Washington:

“I’m around better people. People that, when they see talent, they appreciate it and they try to work you in. They accept real people around here.”

[...]

“Definitely in a great position. It ain’t people that hold you back and hate on you for no reason.”

Maybe Crawford was a brick wall. Clearly he played with headphones on in D.C.—in his own world. He didn’t even recall ever playing for the Wizards a month ago. But maybe the organization didn’t develop enough. Maybe the failure to connect is greatly upon them, shepherds of other presumed grown men (Crawford is 24).

And not to pick on Temple, but replace him with 19-year-old Bradley Beal in the same lineup, the second most-used lineup on the year (142 minutes over 18 games), and that 5-man crew is plus-27.1 per 48 minutes. A 32.7-point difference? Whut.

Thus, the immediate future:

1. John Wall
2. Bradley Beal
3. Martell Webster
4. Nene
5. Emeka Okafor

However, let’s note what’s worth nothing … this lineup:

1. Jordan Crawford
2. Bradley Beal
3. Martell Webster
4. Nene Hilario
5. Emeka Okafor

The above unit saw just 25 minutes of action over two games … and finished plus-5.7 per 48. Point Crawford?

But if you’re keeping track at home, the difference between Wall and Crawford is 21.4 points per 48 minutes in Wall’s favor. Also, the Wall-led unit shot 49.6 percent from the field in their 142 minutes; the Crawford-led five shot 10 percent worse from the field.

Was the issue between Wall and Crawford? Could they not play together? Stats say…

This lineup was afforded 16 total minutes of action over six games, finished minus-2.9 and shot 45.5 percent from the field:

1. John Wall
2. Jordan Crawford
3. Martell Webster
4. Nene Hilario
5. Emeka Okafor

Small sample sizes galore. Jordan Crawford is no Bradley Beal. Water is wet. Beal’s shots are Watergate, Crawford’s shots are water-boarding.

The best non-Wall (and non-Crawford) lineup that saw more than 30 minutes together:

1. A.J. Price
2. Bradley Beal
3. Trevor Ariza
4. Chris Singleton
5. Kevin Seraphin

31 minutes over eight games—and this is that aforementioned even zero lineup.

Two under-30-minute, non-Wall lineups also performed very strongly:

1. A.J. Price
2. Bradley Beal
3. Trevor Ariza
4. Jan Vesely
5. Emeka Okafor

22 minutes over eight games
Plus-38.6 per 48 minutes

1. A.J. Price
2. Martell Webster
3. Trevor Ariza
4. Emeka Okafor
5. Nene Hilario

21 minutes over six games
Plus-32.6 per 48 minutes

Lots can be inferred from lots of data. Good to remember.

Washington’s top three 3-man units (at least 100 minutes played, plus/minuses per 48 minutes):

Plus-20.2 (221 minutes over 14 games)

1. Bradley Beal
2. Martell Webster
3. Nene Hilario

Plus-18.6 (134 minutes over 13 games)

1. John Wall
2. Bradley Beal
3. Martell Webster

Plus-18.0 (224 minutes over 14 games)

1. Bradley Beal
2. Nene Hilario
3. Emeka Okafor

Minus-12.0 (112 minutes over 8 games)

1. John Wall
2. Garrett Temple
3. Emeka Okafor

Minus-11.1 (121 minutes over 8 games)

1. Garrett Temple
2. Nene Hilario
3. Emeka Okafor

Minus-8.0 (150 over 10 games)

1. Garrett Temple
2. Martell Webster
3. Emeka Okafor

More to infer…

The Wizards have five (or six) Randy Wittman can trust: Wall, Beal, Webster, Ariza, Nene, and Okafor.

A.J. Price is (could be) a solid part of the main eight, if not No. 8. I can envision the Wizards retaining him and Washington also being the situation in Price’s best interest (he has a foot in the door and likely does not want to be the guy going to his third team in three seasons).

But to take the next step, the Wizards need a No. 7, and this is working under the assumption that they can retain  Webster.

It’s probably safe to say that Kevin Seraphin is No. 9. Otherwise, these unknown entities are under contract: Chris Singleton, Jan Vesely and Trevor Booker.

The Wizards need a secondary guard, or a wing—someone who can be trusted to handle the ball, defend, and most importantly, score via shooting. If they do lose Webster this summer, the straights are even more dire for Wall’s fourth year in the league.

And guess what: the draft pick isn’t the answer. It is almost certain to be traded, even if it’s just to trade down. …Grunfeld will believe it’s time to do something mildly desperate get desperately needed complementary scoring.

Because even with Wall (since January 12), Washington’s Offensive Rating (OffRtg – points scored per 100 possessions) of 101.3 still ranks 23rd in the NBA (the Wizards ranked dead-last for the entire season). Only Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Minnesota, Orlando, Charlotte, and Phoenix were worse (ranked 24 to 30) during Wall’s 49 games of health.

This lineup data shows where the Wizards have been, but it also shows where they need to go. As with every summer with most team brain trusts, Ernie Grunfeld has his work cut out for him. When you add the need (and likelihood) to sign John Wall to a max extension on top of pressure to improve, the margin for error is little.

Grunfeld, and the Wizards, were lucky to land Wall, so the process of keeping Wall is not so much the factor. It’s the players surrounding Wall (and Beal) who are key for the next step. The lineup data reflects that the Wizards, and Grunfeld (and Ted Leonsis) are off to a decent start, but no one should patting themselves on the back for keeping the electricity running for only half a season. Because in less than three months, a new NBA champion will be crowned, last year’s pixels will fade, and 30 teams will be in a competition to get better. And the pressure will be shifted exclusively to the one year remaining on each of the contracts of one Ernest Grunfeld and one Randy Scott Wittman.

Can they find the right piece to add? Will the Wizards further develop the young players they already have to any degree of success? The uncertainty may only be answered when the coach (and team president) are certain about their lineup… their rotation.

As the data shows, the search continues.

[stats via NBA.com/stats]

[Jason Collins on the day he arrived in Washington after being traded to the Wizards from the Boston Celtics.]

The most ever written about him on this site, until today: 128 words, in a recap of game 82.

Yet Jason Collins is destined to be the most remarkable unremarkable Wizard of all-time.

(And for a star-crossed franchise that’s boasted a constellation of characters, from a rising Gilbert Arenas to a fading Michael Jordan to a…whatever-the-heck Ledell Eackles was… well, that’s saying something.)

Collins announced that he was gay in a self-authored Sports Illustrated piece on Monday morning, and within minutes, teammates from across his career were offering their support.

@jasoncillins34 you have made sports what it should be and that’s “OPEN” proud of you for being you. That’s jump shot is still weak lol.

— Martell Webster (@MartellWebster) April 29, 2013

Played NBA +college w/ @jasoncollins34 -tremendous human being and PHENOMENAL teammate, leader, friend.Look forward 2his continued success!

— Mark Madsen (@madsen_mark) April 29, 2013

“We are extremely proud of Jason,” said Wizards president Ernie Grunfeld, on behalf of the team. “He has been a leader on and off the court and an outstanding teammate throughout his NBA career.”

Winding path to Washington

Since graduating from Stanford in 2001, Collins has played for six NBA teams, counting the Wizards. That’s something I knew without a visit to Basketball-Reference.com; as a guy who was lucky enough to spend a little time on Stanford’s campus, I’ve followed Collins’ career a bit more closely than most.

Back in 2001, I arrived in Palo Alto a few days before Collins and his brother formally left. Watching that summer’s NBA draft in a Stanford dorm room, we pondered where the twins would fall on the league’s list of brother combos. (Accurate prediction: Below Horace and Harvey Grant, although well above Ed and Charles O’Bannon.)

So once Collins joined the Wizards, I’d always meant to talk to him—I even wore my Stanford sweatshirt to the locker room at one point—but think we said all of three words to each other, mostly because Collins played so little and was never around.

Of course, a lot of folks who covered the team, much more closely than me, are wishing they’d talked just a bit more with Collins before this week.

It’s not uncommon to ask players why they wear certain numbers; I wonder if Collins would’ve been ready to tell us the reasons behind choosing #98. (Update: Via the Washington Post‘s Dan Steinberg, he wasn’t.) I remember being in the Wizards locker room when a reporter was quizzing players about whether they’d be OK with a gay teammate. Would Collins have felt OK answering that, or would it have come too close to the mask he felt he needed to wear?

Now there’s a whole new batch of questions facing Collins. The practical: The Wizards got him as a throw-in; will he stay in a Washington uniform–or any uniform–next year? The cynical: Will teams that are chasing a title welcome his leadership and courage, or want to avoid the potential media distraction?

And the inspirational: Did he ever, in his darkest days, think that a moment like this was in his future?

But those answers can wait a bit. Twenty-four hours after his announcement, the only conversation needs to be about the conversation that Collins wants to start.

Meanwhile, ESPN.com moved the Collins story out of front-and-center position to its sidebar by early Monday evening, returning to the business of covering the NBA playoffs.

So perhaps that was the most remarkable part of a memorable Monday: on a day when Jason Collins made history, we can relish just how unremarkable the news actually felt.

[...continued from Part One...]

>>Damage in the District

Scorched from the Michael Jordan era, Washington, unlike Milwaukee, was Grunfeld’s chance to somewhat build anew—no one really had any connection to the players leftover from Jordan and Doug Collins’ time. But his opening act wasn’t that much different from the stage in Wisconsin, just longer. Grunfeld was able to find entertaining scorers to thrive in Jordan’s pro-style Princeton-style offense, but defense could never get the attention it deserved.

Through the first five seasons of the Jordan-Grunfeld pairing, Washington finished with a 106.9 Offensive Rating (OffRtg), ranked eighth in the NBA. Their 108.0 Defensive Rating (DefRtg) from 2003 to 2008, however, ranked sixth worst. The Wizards made the playoffs in four of Grunfeld’s first five seasons, making quick work to get the into the postseason in year two after a 25-win debut. The duo ultimately fielded a combined postseason record of 8-18.

Prior to season two, Grunfeld traded the 2004 fifth overall pick (Devin Harris) and two busted veterans, Stackhouse and Laettner, to Dallas for Antawn Jamison. Jamison was 28, coming off winning the NBA’s 6th Man of the Year Award in his sixth season, and was going into year three of a six-year, $80 million contract. No one could much argue trading the high draft pick in this instance. The Wizards were getting a more talented player who was a perfect fit in Jordan’s system. The fate of the franchise was seemingly changed for good with a 2005 playoff appearance and an Arenas shot to beat the Chicago Bulls at the buzzer in Game 5 before the Wizards won the series in six. They were swept 4-0 by Dwyane Wade, Shaquille O’Neal and the rest of the Miami Heat in the second round, but still boasted the NBA’s highest-scoring trio with Arenas, Jamison and Larry Hughes.

[Grunfeld circa when shit was hitting the fan in 2010.]

The Wizards finished Grunfeld’s third season two games over .500 and fell 4-2 to LeBron James and the Cleveland Cavaliers (and Hughes) in the first round of the 2006 playoffs; the Cavs took Games 5 and 6 in hard-fought, controversial overtimes. Heading into his fourth season, Grunfeld added Oleksiy Pecherov (18th pick in the draft), DeShawn Stevenson and Roger Mason to the core. The team finished an even .500 on the court, but both Butler and Arenas experienced significant injuries over the final weeks of the season. Without two All-Stars, the Wizards were swept 4-0 by the Cavaliers in the first round of the 2007 playoffs.

Grunfeld could never assemble enough complementary parts around Arenas, Jamison and Butler to get over the LeBron hump, nor could they stay healthy. That core “Big 3” really only experienced a single playoffs together. Injuries robbed them of all other chances. For good measure, the Wizards were beaten one last time by the Cavaliers in the 2008 first round, 4-2, with Arenas either injured or relatively absent (in mind and in spirit) for most of the season. The Wizards haven’t sniffed the 30-win mark in the five seasons since. The lowest-lows during that time have been well-documented, so a rehashing isn’t completely necessary.

It was always posthumously lauded how the Wizards got off to such a great start in that 2006-07 season. Washington was 10 games over .500, 27-17, into late January, and Jordan coached the East All-Stars. But that half-season of accolades only worked to cloud the reality. The old writing on the wall couldn’t be read: NBA team builders simply could not afford to blindly throw their efforts into offense when defense was still championship king. It wasn’t always outspoken, but Coach Eddie Jordan did have his frustrations with certain primary players being less than willing and capable defenders–Brendan Haywood was a terribly robotic pick-and-roll defender, Jamison rarely paid defensive accountability so much as a courtesy, and Arenas often dedicated his defending to gambling and ball-watching.

Grunfeld’s best free agent signings over the Eddie Jordan years were Antonio Daniels, Darius Songaila and Deshawn Stevenson. Also worth noting that prior to the 2004-05 season, Grunfeld was forced to match a six-year, $36 million offer sheet that Etan Thomas signed with Milwaukee. Thomas, then coming off a strong third NBA season, was a highly sought-after big man in an otherwise thin free agent market at the position. The move was later highly scrutinized as Thomas’ play declined and as a rift developed between Thomas and Haywood, who were involved in multiple fights over the subsequent years. Grunfeld, normally more calculated in free agency than his NBA counterparts, got burnt again, even if rational hindsight continues to indicate that keeping Thomas was a necessity.

In tune with Grunfeld’s M.O., he was able to nab Butler from the Lakers in 2005 in exchange for Kwame Brown instead of playing the open market (Brown was a free agent, signed and traded to the Lakers in the deal). He left the gambling for the draft, opting for risky youth oozing with natural talent but little basketball wherewithal–perhaps Blatche, McGee and Young leave the most flagrant track marks on Grunfeld’s arm. As history has shown, that once-budding group had little in terms of locker room leadership from which they could learn, if they were even capable of absorbing knowledge in the first place.

“The most important player or person in any organization is the person that picks the players. But we don’t, as organizations, examine them.”

—Jeff Van Gundy, in general

The firing of Eddie Jordan and ultimate transition to Flip Saunders was another major, underrated mistake by Grunfeld. Not to say continuing with Jordan was the answer, but the offense fell off and the defense didn’t get much better under Saunders. And the oversimplified fact was that Saunders, even as an experienced coach inheriting a presumably veteran team, was not the right personality for the cast of characters in Ernie’s cupboard.

“I’m just surprised that when everybody acknowledges it’s a player’s league—everybody would agree with that—then the most important player or person in any organization is the person that picks the players. But we don’t, as organizations, examine them,” said former Grunfeld colleague Jeff Van Gundy in a recent radio interview pertaining to the Detroit Pistons firing head coach Lawrence Frank. “We just take the easy way out time and time again. You lose, the G.M. convinces the owner, ‘We got good players. It’s the coach’s fault.’ We fire the coach; we bring a new coach in; we continue to lose. We fire that coach, saying that ‘We have better players.’ It just goes on and on.”

Unlike in Milwaukee, Grunfeld overcooked his commitment to the “Big 3” in Washington (certainly at the behest of Pollin). Even in New York he was able to test the waters of foresight by trading Oakley and Starks at the right time. Perhaps a different ownership environment in D.C. would have taken a longer view. But an aging Pollin was finally interested in loosening his purse strings for one last championship chase. Arenas and Jamison were sons of Abe, so Grunfeld was forced to double-down on his marriage to offense, throwing boatloads of contract extension cash to both in the summer of 2008 (Arenas for six-years, $111 million and Jamison for four-years, $50 million). Similar to in Milwaukee, Grunfeld surrendered a draft pick to get veterans (and to dump the misspent contracts of Songaila and Pecherov). Although, it was much more valuable draft pick—the fifth overall in the draft (so long, Ricky Rubio; so long, Stephen Curry). Mike Miller and Randy Foye weren’t disruptive personalities like Anthony Mason, but the fact that they were one-and-done talents was disruptive enough to the franchise.

The idea was for Flip’s offensive mind to weld veteran parts into a well-oiled machine. The reality is that wasn’t who Flip Saunders was. Experienced, yes. Capable, yes. But given a handful of jokers with the rules changing on the fly, Flip was showing up at the card table shirtless already.

>>Demolition Man

The elephant in the room is that maybe Arenas was right. Turns out, Javaris Crittenton was the real bully, with real bullets, and is now indicted on a real murder charge in an obviously separate incident. The 2009 gun incident in the Wizards’ locker room between Arenas and Crittenton was the mystery card up Grunfeld’s sleeve that even he didn’t know he had. Whether the incident could have ultimately been swept under the rug will never be answered. But if there was ever an accelerant to the reset button, it was Grunfeld going public (starting with David Stern) regarding the disruptive, jumper-less, and drained-of-explosiveness Arenas. Simply put: Grunfeld hitched his wagon to Arenas, got fed up with his antics, and drew the line (which was made much easier after Pollin had passed away a month prior in November 2009). If you can’t blame Grunfeld, blame everyone.

But under new ownership, Grunfeld has done all that’s been asked of him. If you had a new boss, you’d want him to evaluate you just the same.

[Grunfeld did a little dance when he landed Wall.]

But it doesn’t work that way.

Grunfeld cleared bad contracts leftover from his days under Pollin with reckless abandon, barely concerned with getting assets back–he actually added cash to Mark Cuban’s pockets to take Butler, Stevenson and Brendan Haywood off his hands. It’s amazing to think that more contributions to today’s player rotation were a result of trading Gilbert Arenas (Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza, via Rashard Lewis) than from the combined, current returns of trading Jamison, Butler, Haywood and Stevenson (essentially, Trevor Booker). A forced hand made step two of Grunfeld’s demolition getting rid of his glaring mistakes: JaVale McGee, Nick Young and Andray Blatche.

Somehow, in the process of it all, Grunfeld and the Wizards got defensive.

Add some defensive-minded veterans.

Draft athletic, defensive-bodied players with more college or overseas experience–Trevor Booker, Kevin Seraphin, Jan Vesely, and Chris Singleton.

Get rid of bad investments in youth without a defensive willingness–McGee, Young, Blatche, and Jordan Crawford (the cumulative returns: two banged-up Brazilians, Nene and Leandro Barbosa … and 54 minutes of Jason Collins).

Is it a surprise the Wizards were quickly able to turn-around one of the worst defenses in the league with such simplicity? Not totally.

>>Defensive Much?

This season the Wizards fielded the fifth best DefRtg in the NBA, 103.0, the only season in Grunfeld’s last 14 running a team that his defense has been ranked better than 18th. The average DefRtg rank over his previous 13 seasons: 23rd. According to Synergy Sports Technology, the new Grunfeld assembly has allowed just 0.86 Points Per Possession this season, also ranked fifth in the league.

[OffRtg and DefRtg of Grunfeld's NBA teams; click to enlarge.]

Oh, there’s been a pattern alright.

But while Grunfeld watches games from his perch above the court, Randy Wittman is down in the trenches, as were Flip Saunders, Ed Tapscott, Eddie Jordan, George Karl, Jeff Van Gundy, Don Nelson, and Pat Riley, all past coaches under Grunfeld. Is Wittman the one responsible for Washington’s improved defense? Certainly he had a large hand. As opposed to the circumstance of his colleague, Saunders, Wittman has thus far brought a no-nonsense approach to the Wizards. He benched McGee and Young and embarrassed Blatche with a ‘DNP-Conditioning’ label over a large portion of last season. Wittman coaches Kevin Seraphin hard (and the player likes it), and he’s not afraid to send messages to John Wall when he’s pouting, nor keep Trevor Ariza on the bench when he claims he’s the “sixth starter.”

“That’s the good thing about our coaching staff, they don’t have anyone entitled or just feeling that they’re going to get a free pass.”

—Ted Leonsis on the current version of his Washington Wizards

Wittman’s demeanor has been key to the franchise, run by Grunfeld, reestablishing leverage in Leonsis’ rebuilding environment. Expectations and tainted veteran influence have been exponentially lower for the coach.

“That’s the good thing about our coaching staff, they don’t have anyone entitled or just feeling that they’re going to get a free pass. They all have to play really really hard they have to practice hard,” said Leonsis during the television broadcast of Washington’s final game of the 2012-13 season in Chicago. “Randy really looks at how they’re going to contribute defensively, besides what they’re going to contribute in points and assists.”

Begs the question: Why did the Wizards wait so long to rid themselves of the so-called entitled players? Or was that by design as well? No one in the organization will ever take responsibility for the so-called knuckleheads, rather they’ve simply moved on as if the problems were created out of thin air. Lesson learned? Good question.

“We want to make sure whoever we bring on board fits into what we’re trying to develop,” said Grunfeld on Tuesday. “We tried to change the culture, and we tried to bring a culture of hard work, of professionalism, and we wanted to get players who cared about winning and losing.”

It’s difficult to read through the generic lines if Grunfeld is now more cautious in his evaluation of additions which might affect team chemistry. It’s safe to assume that Leonsis is more analytically involved in the process—or at least more measured—than Pollin was.

“You gotta have the right personnel, no question.
I don’t care who you are.”

—Randy Wittman on defense

“Coach Witt,” answered John Wall point-blank when asked during his exit interview to what (or whom) he attributed Washington’s defensive improvements. “Coach Witt just installed it into us in practice a lot. That’s what we really focused on is doing the defensive concepts and just learning how to help side and those type of things, and just us willing to buy into it.”

When asked recently, Wittman wouldn’t really get into the specifics of why the defense under him has changed so much. He certainly credits new assistant coaches Don Newman and Jerry Sichting “a lot,” admitting that defense is “kind of their background” coming from top-notch programs in San Antonio and Boston* respectively—Grunfeld and Leonsis can share bite-sized credit for sponsoring those additions.

Otherwise, “We were just able from the start really implement a system defensively, and it started from Day 1. We weren’t able to do that, obviously taking over in the middle of the year [after Flip Saunders was fired],” said Wittman. “We pretty much laid down the foundation, this is how we’re going to play from a defensive standpoint and these guys have stuck with it.”

When asked what particular aspect has sparked such a change, Wittman had one answer: “Pick and roll. It’s just a big part of our game, and you have to be solid in that part of it night in and night out. And I think that’s where we really got solid and consistent in doing it basically one way … over and over in repetition, guys on the same page.”

Hard to filter through broad concepts such as “consistency,” but it’s clear Wittman is also referring to Grunfeld’s department: personnel. Wittman is, after all, the very same coach who claimed that rookie Jan Vesely was his best big man pick-and-roll defender just over a year ago. That’s not an over-inflation of Jan’s talents, but rather an indictment of the past on-court brains facilitated by Washington’s brain trust.

“You gotta have the right personnel, no question. I don’t care who you are,” says Wittman. “So that’s another step, and we’ll continue to do that, looking like this is how we want to play both from an offensive standpoint and now defensively, and try to continue to get players that fit that style. And I think that’s going to be important as we move forward and try to add to this group. Not just add a body but add a part that’s going to be conducive to playing the way we want to play.

Hint: Grunfeld’s work isn’t done. There are several on Wittman’s squad who clearly haven’t proven their defensive salt. And the coach doesn’t merely want bodies, he wants defenders. So what now? The can has been kicked back to the front office.

[We were all young, once upon a time.]

Can his track record be trusted? Is Grunfeld innovative enough? And when people talk about changing the culture of a franchise, why haven’t the Wizards started at the top of basketball operations? One measure of a first-rate franchise is the ability to endure injuries without being historically terrible, but the Wizards have shown little resiliency over recent times in that regard. Is it fair to measure management accordingly? Yes.

A recent Washington Post article titled, “For lottery-bound Wizards, the future starts now,” rubbed a bit of lost promise in the face of Washington pro basketball fans. Grunfeld has seemingly had so many futures that he doesn’t know which crystal ball to look into. The only real known is that he has one more season under contract to keep kicking the tires. But for Grunfeld and the Wizards, the future isn’t now. ‘Now’ is merely bargain-bin rhetoric. The future is ‘How,’ and from New York to Milwaukee to Washington, Grunfeld has been out to sea—Gone Fishin’—for so long, that a return to shore with the ultimate catch still seems like a fish story.

[I'm Ernie, charmed to meet you.]

[Stats/Research via Basketball-Reference.com]

• “BASKETBALL; Grunfeld Is a Candidate for Bucks’ Post,” New York Times, Clifton Brown, May 1992
• “PRO BASKETBALL; After a Fall, Grunfeld Rebounds in Milwaukee,” New York Times, Chris Broussard, August 1999
• “Grunfeld Returns to Milwaukee,” AP, August 1999
• “PRO BASKETBALL; With Mixed Emotions, Grunfeld Returns,” New York Times, Mike Wise, November 1999
• “Pre-draft deals have players on the move,” AP, July 2000
• “ON PRO BASKETBALL; After Being Fired in New York, a Playoff Reunion,” New York Times, Mike Wise, May 2001
• “Will Bucks risk investing in Anthony Mason?,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Michael Hunt, September 2001
• “Mason trying for best scenario,” AP, Chris Sheridan, September 2001
• “Bucks close to signing Mason after making three-team trade,” AP, Chris Sheridan, October 2001
• “Three-team trade clears way for Bucks to sign Mason,” AP, October 2001
• “Jury still out on Mason as plus/minus for Bucks,” Baltimore Sun, Don Markus, November 2001
• “PRO BASKETBALL; Timing Surprises Grunfeld,” New York Times, Abe Winter, December 2001
• “Blazers looking at Grunfeld,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Don Walker, May 2003
• “Sonics’ Payton traded for Bucks’ Allen at deadline,” AP, February 2003
• “Grunfeld named Wizards’ president,” AP, June 2003
• “Milwaukee Releases Grunfeld — Wizards Job May Follow; Bucks Owner Won’t Sell,” Washington Post, Steve Wyche, June 2003
• “Bucks owner ends talks about selling team to Jordan,” AP, June 2003
• “Grunfeld free to pursue other jobs (Wizards?),” ESPN News Services, June 2003
• “Grunfeld named Wizards’ president,” AP, June 2003
• “‘Detailed discussions’ with Jordan prove fruitless,” ESPN News Services, June 2003
• “PRO BASKETBALL; Wizards Fill Top Job By Hiring Grunfeld,” New York Times, Steve Popper, July 2003
• “Grunfeld sits at head of Wizards’ table,” Baltimore Sun, Milton Kent, July 2003
• “Bucks buying out Mason’s contract,” Racine Journal-Times, Gary Woelfel, October 2003
• “Hughes Will Sign With the Cavaliers,” Washington Post, Michael Lee, July 2005
• “Against Miami Heat, the Milwaukee Bucks will be long shots to end first-round frustration,” Palm Beach Post, Ethan J. Skolnick, April 2013

*Note: Sichting was not a coach with Boston, but rather a player on the 1986 Celtics championship team.

“I told you I was going to get
the best brains in basketball.”

—Abe Pollin, former owner, upon hiring Ernie Grunfeld in July 2003

The direction of the Washington Wizards changed drastically and rapidly during the 2003 summer. Team owner Abe Pollin sent Michael Jordan and his cigars packing in a Mercedes and peeling out into the sunset. Meanwhile in Wisconsin, it was known that Senator Herb Kohl wanted to sell his Milwaukee Bucks, and it only took weeks for a group centered around Jordan to become the primary potential buyer. In an intriguing maneuver, Kohl, with his intentions to sell well-known, arranged to release Bucks GM Ernie Grunfeld from the last year of his contract so he could seek other options (after Grunfeld conducted the 2003 draft, Kohl stipulated). Other teams, such as the Portland Trailblazers, were rumored to be interested in Grunfeld, but Pollin and Kohl had several talks over the matter in the days after the draft, and Washington quickly developed as the likely destination. Within hours of Kohl officially releasing Grunfeld, it also became public that he was backing out of selling the Bucks to Jordan. Kohl did not provide much insight into the reasoning behind his decision, opting to take his team off the market altogether.

It was never clear if Kohl was afraid Michael Jordan would move the Bucks from Wisconsin. Or if Jordan’s people thought the asking price to be too high and the market too risky. Or if Pollin’s words to Kohl about his experience with Jordan had an influence. What’s clear is that Kohl still owns the Bucks today.

As the events unfolded in Washington, Pollin already had a new coach to replace Doug Collins. Eddie Jordan was one of the most sought-after assistants in the NBA. His offensive mind helped guide the New Jersey Nets to back-to-back conference championships in 2002 and 2003. Eddie Jordan’s coaching style implemented elements of the Princeton offense, such as back-cuts and reading and reacting to the defense, applied to the pace of the professional game. The coach’s offense also called for positionless personnel, an NBA trend at the time.

Similar to in Milwaukee, Grunfeld’s hand was waiting for him when he sat at the table in D.C. With Eddie Jordan in the fold, the new leader of basketball operations had an edict to build around offense.

He inherited a rookie class of Jarvis Hayes and Steve Blake; second-year players Jared Jeffries, Juan Dixon and Lonny Baxter; and third-year players Kwame Brown, Brendan Haywood and Etan Thomas (Thomas was drafted a year prior to Brown and Haywood all but missed his entire rookie season in Dallas with a broken toe). Grunfeld’s main veterans were Jerry Stackhouse, Larry Hughes and Christian Laettner. As landing the position coincided with the start of the free agency period that summer, Grunfeld immediately used his wits to steal the offensive-minded Gilbert Arenas away from the Golden State Warriors. The loophole Grunfeld used to get Golden State’s 2001 second round pick and the NBA’s Most Improved Player in 2003 was closed in the subsequent Collective Bargaining Agreement, now known as the “Gilbert Arenas Provision.”

“Those of you that have said that Mr. Pollin is over-the-hill,
incompetent and doesn’t know what he’s doing.
I think we proved that we still know what we’re doing.”

—Abe Pollin on getting Eddie Jordan, Hayes, Blake, and Grunfeld

Pollin was originally said to be courting Larry Brown or Jeff Van Gundy to coach his team, offering either one power when it came to personnel decisions, but ultimately seemed enthused about his summer catch.

“I’m 4-for-4. Those are the two guys [Grunfeld and Jordan] that I wanted to head the organization, and the day of the draft I met with Eddie and Wes [Unseld]. We spoke for hours. And those are the two guys [Hayes and Blake] we hoped to get, and we got them,” said Pollin.

“In any winning organization, the first thing you need is to create a positive environment,” Grunfeld told the media in Washington when hired. “We want to create a professional, hard-working environment, where players will work hard and be respected. In turn, they will be accountable for what they do. You have to have that.” Little did Grunfeld know what the future would bring.

While inheriting offensive environments in Milwaukee and Washington, Grunfeld’s New York Knicks teams were quite different. He spent 17 homegrown years in the Knicks organization and was provided with a defensive core of Patrick Ewing and Charles Oakley by the time he started making personnel decisions at the onset of the 1990s. The Knicks under Grunfeld’s direction never once finished outside of the NBA’s top four in defense (measured by Defensive Rating (DefRtg), the amount of points allowed per 100 possessions; New York’s average league rank during his time: 2.4). On the other side of the ball, Grunfeld’s Knicks averaged an 18th ranking in Offensive Rating (OffRtg – points scored per 100 possessions) in the NBA from 1991 to 1999.

After 1999, Grunfeld’s script was flipped. During the subsequent 13-year span, it was offense, locked and loaded, sometimes quite literally. Now, with Washington’s team complexion drastically changed in 2013, there’s a chance that the beleaguered team president can finally get back to building around what wins championships: Defense.

>>Sometimes the Big Apple Bites Back

“His fall from the organization was even more meteoric than his rise,” wrote columnist Mike Wise about Grunfeld for the New York Times in November 1999. Wise:

“Since he retired as a Knicks player in 1985, Grunfeld had been consistently promoted in the organization. From marginal forward to radio analyst, assistant coach, general manager and, finally, team president, Grunfeld ascended the ladder quickly.

“There were questionable signings and draft picks, and overpaid players, along the way. But he had also rebuilt the Knicks on the fly in 1996 — trading for Larry Johnson and signing Chris Childs and Allan Houston as free agents. Flaws aside, he had presided over a perennial playoff team that came within a game of winning the championship in 1994.”

On April 20, 1999, Madison Square Garden president Dave Checketts called Grunfeld to dinner in White Plains, N.Y. and fired him. Well, he didn’t exactly fire him, Checketts demoted Grunfeld to a “special consultant” for the Knicks, 21-21 at the time with eight games left in a lockout-shortened season. New York then won six of their last eight and advanced all the way to the NBA Finals, losing to the San Antonio Spurs.

[Grunfeld during his playing days with the Knicks before he was given keys to the bus.]

It came down to a Broadway-style feud between GM and coach, and Checketts later admitted that he sided with the coach. The rift died down over time, but Van Gundy, now having been a television analyst for several years, has long amplified his criticism of Grunfeld’s Wizards.

There was some speculation that the Knicks might bring Grunfeld back to run basketball operations for 1999-00, but Grunfeld didn’t want to be fed to the New York media wolves anymore. Plus, Van Gundy was going to continue being the coach, and bygones were not yet bygones.

“I don’t look at it like I was run out of town,” Grunfeld told the New York Times, although conceding that the situation was awkward. “I think we did a lot of good things in New York. After that, I just came to a very good and positive situation [in Milwaukee].”

“His fall from the organization was
even more meteoric than his rise.”

—New York Times columnist Mike Wise on Ernie Grunfeld’s time with the New York Knicks

The Knicks paid-out a portion of the three years remaining on Grunfeld’s contract and let him go to the Bucks, where he was drafted and spent the first two seasons of his playing career. He left New York 397-227 (.636) over eight seasons and 61-44 in the playoffs, losing in the conference semi-finals five times, losing in the conference finals once, and losing in the NBA Finals twice. Grunfeld was courted by the Bucks early in his Knicks decision-making tenure in 1992, but then New York did enough to retain him. The second time around was a different story.

>>Hot Shooting, Cold Milwaukee & Money Mase

When he joined the Bucks in 1999, Grunfeld inherited head coach George Karl, who was one season into his five-year tenure with Milwaukee (the ending of which ultimately coincided with Grunfeld’s departure). Grunfeld wasn’t granted decision-making autonomy, Karl was going to have his say. But according to the head coach, they were on the same page.

“I think we see the players the same way. He likes athletes, he likes speed, he likes defense,” said Karl upon Grunfeld’s arrival.

Karl was coming off a 28-22 record in a lockout-shortened 1998-99 season in which he guided the Bucks to their first playoff appearance in eight years (and a 3-0 sweep at the hands of the Indiana Pacers). Together, the duo had a veteran squad: Ray Allen was heading into his fourth season, Sam Cassell into his seventh, Glenn Robinson into his sixth, and Tim Thomas into his third. In Grunfeld’s first summer at the helm, he added 16-year vet Dale Ellis, 11-year vet Danny Manning, nine-year vet J.R. Reid, and of course, Darvin Ham. Those Bucks finished 42-40 and again lost to the Pacers in the first round, this time 3-2.

Grunfeld’s big moves heading into his second season were exchanging Vinny Del Negro, J.R. Reid and Robert Traylor for Jason Caffey and Billy Owens; Grunfeld then flipped Owens for Lindsey Hunter. “We don’t expect him to average 20 points a game. … We expect him to make us tougher,” said Grunfeld about Caffey.

“He’s a guy we think is as good as anybody on our team as a low-post player,” said Karl. Caffey had lost his job to Antawn Jamison in Golden State and went on to become a nice role player for Milwaukee, as did Hunter.

In the draft, Grunfeld took Michael Redd in the second round, 43rd overall (his best pick ever), and drafted Jason Collier 15th overall, later exchanging him and a future 2001 first rounder (No. 22) for ninth overall pick Joel Przybilla. Behind health—Allen played 82 games, and Robinson/Cassell/Thomas each played in 76 games—those 2000-01 Bucks made it all the way to the Eastern Conference Finals, finishing as the second seed with a 52-30 record. They took down Tracy McGrady’s Orlando Magic in four games, the Charlotte Hornets of Jamal Mashburn and Baron Davis in seven games, and ultimately lost to Allen Iverson’s Philadelphia 76ers in seven games, which lost to the Los Angeles Lakers in the Finals.

The Bucks were thought to be a piece away, but the kind of piece very key to winning a championship. “If you listed our top five weaknesses last season, toughness and rebounding would be in there,” said George Karl during the 2001 summer. The other Ervin Johnson, Scott Williams and Jason Caffey were nice, but the Bucks needed star presence in the paint.

So Grunfeld doubled-down on one combustible, familiar hand: Anthony Mason, a diamond-in-the-rough whom Grunfeld had uncovered in New York. Mason had just finished his 11th NBA season, one in which he made the All-Star team as a member of the Miami Heat (his only career All-Star appearance–in a free agent year, no less). In order to clear cap space to sign Mason, Grunfeld traded Scott Williams and a future 2004 first rounder (who turned out to be Josh Smith at 17) to Denver for a foreign guy who never suited up, Aleksandar Radojevic, and a 38-year old Kevin Willis. Willis was then flipped to Houston for a 2002 second rounder (who turned out to be Dan Gadzuric).

“He has done something that not many players have. He wanted to play in Milwaukee.”

—Bucks coach George Karl on Anthony Mason

Mason came with plenty of disclaimers, having once been suspended several games with the Knicks for a sideline shouting match with then-coach Pat Riley. About the move to get Mason, the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinal’s Michael Hunt wrote in September 2001:

“Yet Mason is the embodiment of a stone-sharpened double-edged sword. Though he can score, he doesn’t need to score to satisfy his fiery competitive nature. What he requires is to be constantly involved in the offense. Plays must run through him more than on an occasional basis to keep him happy, a real potential for conflict on a team already with three such egos.

“Then there is the matter of Mason’s considerable personal baggage. While playing for Charlotte, he was involved in three highly publicized incidents in his hometown of New York. An accusation of sexual assault by teenage girls was pleaded down, as were two nightclub brawls. The Bucks, at least under Herb Kohl’s watch, have been especially mindful of citizenship. Almost without exception, bad acts have been sent elsewhere.

“Presumably, the senator has more pressing matters on his mind at the moment than issuing a hiring approval for his diversionary enterprise. However, a team source indicated that Kohl is prepared to give his consent if the Bucks are able to get Mason.”

In his column, Hunt ultimately concluded that Mason was worth the risk.

“I like Mason with my three shooters and Tim Thomas as the sixth man. I think that’s a dynamite team,” Karl told the AP’s Chris Sheridan. It was both a crafty and desperate move by Grunfeld. Approaching training camp without a team, Mason was sticking to his demands of a five-year contract worth around $26 million, but the market was shrinking. Approaching the luxury threshold, the Heat didn’t even want their own All-Star back and were showing restraint from potential sign-and-trade moves. With players like Clarence Weatherspoon getting five-years, $28 million from the Knicks; Joe Smith six-years, $34 million from the Timberwolves; Corliss Williamson six-years, $33 million from the Pistons; and Antonio Davis six-years, $64 million from the Raptors already that summe—all out of Milwaukee’s price range—Grunfeld had little choice. With suitors for Mason coming down to his Bucks and the 76ers, Grunfeld had to pull the trigger. All GMs have to gamble at some point, it’s all in the game.

“Right now, he isn’t in shape. But he has done something that not many players have. He wanted to play in Milwaukee,” said Karl about Mason in late-November of that season, making a good point. Milwaukee is NBA Hell. Think of a worse destination; not even Charlotte, not even Sacramento. Jason Caffey had been vocal about not wanting to play in Milwaukee as a member of the Golden State Warriors, prior to being traded there. Gilbert Arenas once ripped Milwaukee as only Gilbert could, ‘LOL-ing’ via his NBA.com blog once because fellow Arizona alum Richard Jefferson got traded to the Bucks.

“That was probably personnel-wise one of our worst moves, because he wanted the ball all the time.”

—Ray Allen, in 2013, on Grunfeld’s Anthony Mason signing

Signing the 35-year old Mason to a four-year, $18-20 million contract understatedly didn’t work. Grunfeld failed to get a good read on Mason’s character. Karl called him out for showing up to training camp overweight and out of shape, while Mason vocalized his displeasure with his role in the offense. Mason did, however, play in all 82 games in 2001-02; while Allen missed 13, Robinson 16, and Cassell and Thomas eight each. Still, a small change in chemistry, and health, can throw an entire franchise off, as Wizards fans know.

“That was probably personnel-wise one of our worst moves, because he wanted the ball all the time. And we had a nice little flow going to what we were doing,” Ray Allen told the Palm Beach Post about Grunfeld’s Anthony Mason maneuver in April 2013.

“We were scoring fast, we were top two or three in scoring. And [Mason] came in and he just couldn’t understand the way we played. And there was just always friction. It made (coach) George Karl cater to what Mase was doing and what he wanted, and it took away from everything else we were doing.”

Milwaukee finished an even 41-41 and out of the 2002 playoffs. Mason wasn’t totally to blame, Tim Thomas had a disappointing year and a defense anchored by the aging Ervin Johnson became less dependable. Still, that effectively ended hope of winning with the Cassell-Allen-Robinson trio, at least in the eyes of Grunfeld; the head honcho stuck with his core a lot longer in D.C.

Barely a year after Milwaukee won 52 games and lost to the 76ers in the conference finals, Grunfeld tried to retool in the 2002 summer by trading Robinson, another traditionally cantankerous character himself, to the Atlanta Hawks for Tony Kukoc, the infamous Leon Smith (who was waived soon thereafter) and a 2003 first rounder. The Bucks middled at 42-40 and lost to the Nets, 4-2, in the first round of the 2003 playoffs—Milwaukee’s still-potent offense, ranked second in the league, was held in check by New Jersey.

Before the end of that 2002-03 season, the dismantling continued. With Redd developing amidst concerns about the luxury tax, Grunfeld traded Allen, Flip Murray, Kevin Ollie and a 2003 first round pick (14th overall, Luke Ridnour) to Seattle for Gary Payton and Desmond Mason at February ‘03 trade deadline. That summer, he selected a new point guard, T.J. Ford, using Atlanta’s 8th pick from the Robinson trade and sent Sam Cassell to the Timberwolves for Anthony Peeler and Joe Smith. The last two years and $9-10 million of the disruptive Mason’s contract were bought out. Mason’s NBA career, at that point, ended. To this day, his name remains on the Wisconsin Department of Revenue’s website for being delinquent on tax payments; Mason is listed as owing over $2.3 million.

[A younger, presumably less-wiser Grunfeld during his Milwaukee GM days.]

The Bucks of Grunfeld and Karl did field one of the NBA’s top offenses from 1999 to 2003; second best, in fact. It followed the pattern provided to Grunfeld in Milwaukee, mostly the result of Karl being coach. Milwaukee’s 108.2 Offensive Rating was second only to Dallas (109.1) over that four-year span. The Bucks were also the only team to shoot over 50 percent on Effective Field Goal Percentage (eFG%) during Grunfeld’s run. Defense? Not so much. Milwaukee gave up a DefRtg of 107 points per 100 possessions, tied with Memphis for second-worst in the league. Again, very much a product of Karl’s offensive nature. Karl’s Denver Nuggets have had the fourth-best OffRtg (109.2) in the NBA since he started with the franchise in 2004, but also the ninth-best DefRtg over that span.

>>Damage in the District

Scorched from the Michael Jordan era, Washington, unlike Milwaukee, was Grunfeld’s chance to somewhat build anew—no one really had any connection to the players leftover from Jordan and Doug Collins’ time. But his opening act wasn’t that much different from the stage in Wisconsin, just longer. Grunfeld was able to find entertaining scorers to thrive in Jordan’s pro-style Princeton-style offense, but defense could never get the attention it deserved…

[Part Two of this two-part post looking at Ernie Grunfeld's career running NBA teams can be read here.]

Offensively Defensive

Ernie Grunfeld’s NBA teams, their Offensive and Defensive Ratings each season, and the overall NBA rank of those respective statistics during those seasons. [stats via Basketball-Reference.com]

[click on image to enlarge]