All three River Class patrol vessels of the Fishery Protection Squadron, HMS Severn, HMS Tyne and HMS Mersey are pictured exercising off the coast of Cornwall. The Fishery Protection Squadron (FPS) enforces UK and EU fisheries legislation in order to ensure the long term sustainability of the UK fishing grounds. In addition, the three UK based Ships are the only warships on permanent patrol around the UK, contributing to the policing of UK waters and delivering an intrinsic element of the UK’s Maritime Security

HMS Tyne Makes a Sharp Turn on Exercise with Fishery Protection Squadron

HMS Severn on Exercise with the Fishery Protection Squadron

The Fisheries protection Squadron gets bugger all attention so its great to see the MoD releasing these great photographs.

A good overview from Wikipedia here and the official page from the Royal Navy, here.

The images are from a recent exercise;

I want to make this another short article that asks some questions in order to peruse the conversations started in the comment threads of various other posts; hence the contentious title to grab your attention!

Let me be clear, I am not singing the “MBT is dead” refrain, far from it in fact, I think the heavy weight behemoth is still a necessary part of a nations armoury. However, I would like to examine our ‘need’ for the Challenger II as our MBT platform in the context of operational requirements, reform or regoranisation of the army towards a a Future Force 2020 and of course, in the context of budget.

The Main Battle Tank

The title gives it away eh ? The MBT is an evolution of a vehicle which started of as very much an “infantry support” vehicle. I am not going to do a history of the tank section – you can all go hit Wikipedia, or watch episodes of Greatest Tank Battles on YouTube, with the glorious interwebs we have no excuse for coming to the debate from a position of ignorance any more !

However let us just very brief revise the iron triangle – mobility, protection and fire power.

1. Mobility – well with modern engines, running gear and drive train’s the 60 tonne plus behemoth can have considerable tactical mobility, and also don’t forget the ability to “wade through fire” is in fact a tight linkage between mobility and protection.

2. Protection – largely what drives up the weight to where we are now, and where we might be in the near future

3. Firepower – also drives up the weight to some extent, you need a reasonably beefy vehicle to take the stress of firing a modern high pressure / high velocity 120mm tank gun.

As I said I would like to build on the conversations we have had recently on various threads, so time for a few links:

TD’s marvellous series on mobility: http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/02/vehicle-mobility-considerations/

TD’s recent piece on protection:  http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/02/vehicle-protection/

TD on multi-role brigades: http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/01/multi-role-brigades/

Jed on MRB’s and wheels: http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/02/a-balanced-force-with-a-balanced-budget/

Jed on “Medium Armour” : http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/06/medium-armour-%E2%80%93-what-is-it-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-post-2020-force-structure/

What is it for ?

Remember I am a champion in many respects of the MBT, so please try to see through my bias when I play devils advocate ! A quick visit to the Challenger 2 page on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Challenger_2#Operational_usage) will show us ample evidence of the utility of a big, heavy, well protected armoured vehicle to soak up fire directed at it by infantry type forces – the Chally hit by a Milan and 14 RPG’s that only lost it’s optics (well “only” is relative here, but we can come back to that), another one which was apparently hit by as many as 70 RPG’s !  Of course we have the driver who lost his toes to a more modern RPG29 and the other one who lost his leg to a big IED – but as we all know, no weapon system is completely invulnerable to all others.

Then of course we have the only Chally completed destroyed in action – hit by another Chally  in a “blue on blue” fratricide. The U.S. M1A1 had a pretty good record in the urban scenarios encountered after the invasion of Iraq, and we could talk all day about the to-and-fro of advantage between well armed Hizbollah irregulars and the IDF’s Merkeva.

BUT , let’s get to the crux of the matter – what do we want our MBT to do ? What is it for ? What can it do for us ?

1. Manoeuvre warfare – the armoured queen of the manoeuvre battlefield, able to destroy enemy MBT and lessor vehicles, to take on sangars and strongpoints, wade through fire and cope with varying terrain and obstacles – nothing controversial here, except perhaps the evolution of the MBT as the main weapon system to combating the enemies MBT.

2. Urban warfare – the U.S. experience in Iraq showed that the Russian experience in Chechnya was as much to do with doctrine, tactics, training and procedures as it was to do with the concept of a heavy MBT being squeezed into city streets.

3. COIN – just because we have not deployed, the Canadian, Danish, German and now USMC use of Leopard II and M1 as “120mm snipers”  has shown that even in some counter insurgency scenarios the MBT is worth it’s weight in – well, worth it’s weight in something (depleted Uranium ?)

That said, let us now put this in the context of the British Army. We have run down tank numbers, with the majority in storage (?). We made the mistake of binning 120mm rifled ammo production, and have run into form and fit issues with upgrading to the NATO standard smoothbore weapon (even if we could afford it).  So the same questions in our specific context:

1. What do we want the MBT to do for us ? Is it a niche we can deploy to provide heavy back up in urban combat scenarios

2. What CAN it do for us ? Well it is a very versatile platform, but penny packets of anything have to have their utility / validity questioned

3. What is if for really ? Killing other MBT’s,  infantry support, shock and awe assault weapon ? Where does it sit in our future doctrine ?

In the recent MRB discussion threads, many have picked up on the lack of strategic mobility and the need to deploy heavy armour by sea, rail, low mobility low loader etc as an issue for an army that according to SDSR political requirements is to be structured and postured for expeditionary warfare, of either a short duration or a of a more enduring nature. Many have also suggested that I was off my rocker by suggesting a reserve function could manage heavy armour.

Suggestions from others have ranged from 8 x 8 wheeled AIFV’s with big guns, to “medium” tanks built on FRES etc. So while we acknowledge that a FRES SV based ‘medium tank’ is no match for a Chally 2 / Leopard II / M1A1 – the question remains, what would we want to use it for, and would it be GOOD ENOUGH ?

Tank Destroyer versus Infantry Support Tank

Much of the discussion in the comment threads has been on how we could use a less well armoured, but more mobile (well strategically mobile at least) medium tracked or 8 x 8 wheeled AFV with a 120mm smoothbore as a ‘tank destroyer’. I get the concept just fine, 120mm smooth bore APFSDS being cheaper than ATGM for “plinking” the bad guys armour. Add this to allied air superiority, Tornado or Typhoon delivered Brimstone, Apache delivered Hellfire etc plus infantry or MICV / AIFV delivered ATGM and the actual “anti-tank” role of the MBT is one that can probably be most easily done by other platforms.

With modern active protection systems does the medium weight platform stand up to the multiple RPG battering that close support of friendly infantry against enemy infantry might entail ? Again, maybe not as well as a 60 tonne plus behemoth, but maybe just good enough ?

My main issue with dropping down into the medium weight category is actually also the main issue with a heavy MBT when used in an infantry support role – the main armament is not a good choice for this role.  The blast wave and over pressure produced by firing a modern high pressure / high velocity 120mm tank gun can actually be fatal to friendly infantry who are in the wrong place at the wrong time !

I will take this further by saying those who suggest a FRES SV medium tank using the Belgian 105mm gun with it’s Falarick ATGM are progressing the same approach, a high velocity gun, with a long barrel which can present it’s own issues in urban environments, in other words a weapon which is first and foremost designed for taking out enemy armour – not strong points, sangars, houses and factories etc.

So do we go back in time and split the MBT into tank destroyers and infantry support tanks ? Do we need a modern Sherman, with a smaller number of Sherman FireFly equivalents ? You know where I am going to go ref main armament of an infantry support tank – yes the 120mm smooth bore breach loading mortar – for I am nothing if not predictable…….

So I would suggest that all commentators open their response by answering these questions (if we had the money):

1. If keeping MBT capability and given the well advertised problem with “re-gunning” the Chally 2 would you retire it and buy surplus Leopard II – yes/no

2. If no to #1 above, would you consider fitting the Jordanian designed Falcon turret to the Chally 2 in order to get a smoothbore gun capable of handling NATO standard Ammo ? – yes / no

3. Would you like to see gun armed medium weight tank destroyers as part of the MRB ? (e.g. 105mm armed FRES SV or wheeled vehicle like Centauro) – yes / no

4. If we had above tank destroyers, or all 40mm CTA armed FRES carrying a pair of Javelin on the side of the turret (e.g. ample anti-tank provisions) would you consider turning the Challenger II into a specialist heavy infantry support tank with either a 40mm CTA or 120mm smooth bore mortar ? (could we even fit both ?) – yes / no

5. Do you think we should conceptually move back to less of multi-purpose heavyweight MBT to more specialist variants ? – Yes / no

There you go, 5 questions to frame your thoughts; as we say in the fencing salon, lets have at it ………

Plan A, politics

Plan B, deterrence

Plan C, defence

Plan D, recapture

We are going to have to be monumentally incompetent to get to a point where Plan C is needed and Plan D, most unlikely but extreme low probability/high impact events do happen, just as BP or the shareholders of RBS.

I think we all pretty much agree that before we even get to discussions about defending the islands we must first look at intent and ability on behalf of the government and military of Argentina. In this there is a significant disparity between rhetoric and reality but the Falkland Islands remain an extremely powerful and emotive issue in Argentina. Sometimes I think we might be in danger of underestimating the depth of this emotion. The ‘Malvinas’ issue can always be relied upon to draw the gaze of a restive Argentine population, it’s an easy way to distract public opinion so in light of the recent and growing controversy around the train accident we might reasonably expect that dial to be turned to 11.

The usual suspects will continue to wade in and let’s not be expecting much solidarity from Spain either as the issue of Gibraltar remains a sore point. So, politically, there seems a rising tide of opinion, activity and pressure from multiple sources to which we must decide how to react.

In the previous discussion there were some great points but I thought one of the most interesting ones was the difference in cost between a small increment in defence capabilities to plug one or two potential vulnerabilities and mounting a recapture operation should those potential vulnerabilities be exploited by an intelligent and cunning enemy.

We should not underestimate the military capability on and around the Falkland Islands or over-estimate what Argentina can bring to bear.

However, it’s the weekend and it’s either this or a post on ISO containers so as a bit of fun I thought it would be good to discuss how the defence capabilities on the Falkland Islands could be enhanced.

Rules of the Road

Why Bother

Let’s assume, for the purposes of this weekend post, the grown-ups at the MoD have decided that in the face of a perceived increase in intent and the potential for an improving Argentine capability in a number of areas ‘something discrete’ has to be done.

Funding

As we all know, whenever defence capabilities are discussed, costs are both high and almost impossible to track down so there are no hard and fast rules, however, the basic principle is that if we want to increase capabilities over the medium terms there is not a huge pot of cash from which to dip in, so be modest.

If you want to trade existing capabilities off against new ones then fair enough, robbing Peter to pay Paul is within the rules. Depending on how it is counted, the current bill is in the order of three to four hundred million pounds per year.

Using non MoD funding for dual use capabilities could be an interesting avenue to explore.

Visibility

There is a balancing act between improving military capabilities and inflaming the political situation but it should also be noted that playground rules are sometime the most effective. Big statements can be effective but might not always be the best long term solution.

Mix and Match

The idea is to create a balanced force with the appropriate communications, mobility, ISTAR, logistics and combat elements, building on what is already there in some cases or from scratch.

Other ideas are permissible, moving the balance between regular and reserve, sponsored reserves or other engagement models for example.

Although any suggestion has to be balanced and sustainable you might decide to invest a greater proportion in sensor networks than machine guns, explain the rationale.

Every single nut and bolt has to be shipped or flown into the islands, too much variety adds costs.

Finally, people are always the most expensive, using capital spending to replace personnel is always worth investigating.

Dual Use

Any ideas for capabilities that have a wider utility for the Falkland islanders will get top billing.

The islands existing GSM/WIMAX network for example, could be extended and used for a network of remote sensors at vulnerable areas.

Don’t forget, the Islands have a vehicle ferry/landing craft and Islander aircraft operated by FIGAS

Should you think a hovercraft could provide both something of civilian and military use (Jed) then that would be a fair use of limited funds.

So, in your own time…

PS

Don’t forget, this is only a bit of fun!

Click to read more

A tip of the hat to PaulR

Question

Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for RAF air shows in the UK in (a) 2012 and (b) 2013.

Answer

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

The programme for Royal Air Force air shows is decided on an annual basis.

The following shows have been scheduled in 2012:

RAF Cosford—17 June 2012

RAF Waddington—30 June to1 July 2012

RAF Leuchars—15 September 2012

The long-term future of RAF air shows in 2013 and beyond is under review and as yet no decisions have been made.

Question

Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the Report by Lord Levene on Defence Reform, when he expects the Service Chiefs to have responsibility for budgetary decisions.

Answer

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

The conclusions and recommendations of Lord Levene‘s Defence Reform report are being implemented on a rolling basis. We aim for the new operating model as a whole—and in particular the new capability and finance model, which will also be subject to agreement with HM Treasury—to be implemented from April 2013, including the transfer of responsibilities for equipment and support requirements setting and budgets to the Commands. Some functions and transfers are taking place in 2012. There is a significant amount of further design and implementation work to do between now and April 2013 (and beyond), and transition to these arrangements will be informed by testing of processes and information systems during FY 2012-13. Further adjustments to the model will be made beyond April 2013, including refinement of the new capability and finance model.

Question

Madeleine Moon (Bridgend, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 8 November 2011, Official Report, columns 230-1, on armed forces: Germany, what estimate he has made of the saving which will accrue to his Department annually on (a) allowances, (b) education and (c) medical support as a result of British troops returning to the UK from Germany.

Answer

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

Detailed work into the financial savings to be made from the move of personnel from Germany to the UK is still ongoing. Once the rebasing is complete the Department currently expects to make savings in the region of £79 million, £95 million and £46 million on allowances, education and medical support respectively.

Question

Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which newspapers his Department provides for service personnel overseas.

Answer

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)

The following newspapers are, wherever practicable, available free of charge for service personnel deployed on operations overseas and in receipt of the Deployed Welfare Package:

Daily papers

Daily Express

Daily Mail

Daily Mirror

Daily Record

Daily Star

The Daily Telegraph

The Guardian

The Independent

The Sun

The Times

Sunday papers

Daily Star Sunday

The Independent on Sunday

The Mail on Sunday

The Observer

The People

The Mail on Sunday

Sunday Express

The Sun on Sunday (from26 February 2012)

The Sunday Telegraph

The Sunday Times

Service personnel in non-operational areas overseas such as Germany and Cyprus will have access to NAAFI shops, which have a wide range of similar newspapers on sale.

Question

Angus Robertson (Moray, Scottish National Party)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the current procedure is to alert civil authorities to an incoming missile threat.

Answer

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

The Ministry of Defence would use its own and other nations’ technical means to identify an incoming missile threat. The threat would be interpreted by the Space Operations Coordination Centre at Air Command who would produce a warning. The warning would be passed through normal communication channels to the Cabinet Office, who in turn would organise any cross-Government response.

Question

Eilidh Whiteford (Banff and Buchan, Scottish National Party)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many times search and rescue helicopters from RAF bases in Scotland have been involved in operations to rescue individuals from the sea off the coast of Scotland in each of the last five years.

Answer

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

The number of rescues from the sea off the coast of Scotland using helicopters based at RAF Lossiemouth in each of the last five years is shown in the following table:

Maritime call-outs are those that occur more than three nautical miles from the coastline. Coastal figures include those incidents between the high tide line and a distance of three nautical miles from the coast and may occur in the sea, or on the land at the edge of the tide line. Maritime call-outs may occur several hundred miles out to sea and the information provided is for all call-outs at latitudes north of the border between England and Scotland.

Question

Michael Fallon (Sevenoaks, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence

(1) pursuant to the answer of 14 November 2011, Official Report, column 529W, on military bases: Chelsfield, what his Department’s normal procedures are for marketing and advertising;

(2) how many organisations expressed an interest in purchasing the Chelsfield Ammunition Depot prior to its sale; and what their names are;

(3) what fee GVA Grimley levied for its services in the sale of the Chelsfield Ammunition Depot;

(4) how many officials of each grade were involved in the sale of the Chelsfield Ammunition Depot;

(5) for what reason clawback conditions were not included in the sale of the Chelsfield Ammunition Depot;

Answer

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)

Marketing and advertising is undertaken by the Ministry of Defence‘s agents GVA Grimley. Advertising is completed on a site by site basis and may include periodicals, journals, direct mailing and for sale boards.

For Chelsfield, 70 companies expressed an interest in the site and were sent a sales pack. 10 companies eventually made a bid for the site. The names of those companies cannot be made available as they are commercial-in-confidence.

GVA Grimley’s fees were in accordance with their contracted rates, details of which are commercial in confidence.

Fewer than 10 officials were involved in the sale of the site.

Clawback is most beneficial where sites have significant development potential. At Chelsfield, this was not considered to be the case and as clawback can restrict the amount bid for a site upfront it was decided not to include conditions within the sale.

Question

Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence

(1) what estimate he has made of the cost of establishing new facilities for the arming of nuclear submarines due to (a) a change in Government policy after a referendum in Scotland and (b) a major incident which disables existing facilities;

(2) at how many sites nuclear submarines can be armed in addition to existing bases.

Answer

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)

holding answer19 January 2012

The Government are clear that Scotland benefits from being part of the UK and that the UK benefits from having Scotland within it. The Government are not making plans for independence as we are confident that the people of Scotland will continue to support the Union in any referendum.

No detailed work has therefore been undertaken to estimate the cost of setting up new facilities for the arming of nuclear submarines or for relocating the Royal Armaments Naval Depot at Coulport to another part of the UK. It is clear from first principles, however, that the cost of relocating such families from Scotland would be extremely high.

Information regarding the number of sites at which nuclear submarines can be armed, in addition to existing bases, is being withheld for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Question

Angus Robertson (Moray, Scottish National Party)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many armoured fighting vehicles by type will be returned to the UK from Afghanistan; and what the cost to the public purse will be.

Answer

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

No decision has yet been taken as to whether those armoured fighting vehicles (including medium and heavy protected patrol vehicles and tactical support vehicles such as Mastiff, Husky, Ridgback, Wolfhound, Warthog and Buffalo) procured under the urgent operational requirements process (to meet specific threats in Afghanistan) will be retained or disposed of. If retained, no decision has yet been taken on type or number of vehicles (with the detailed planning the subject of future departmental annual planning rounds) and, if to be disposed of, the method of the disposal (which can include sales and gifting to the host nation) is unknown at this time. The cost to the public purse cannot be estimated until these decisions are taken.

With regards to those armoured fighting vehicles deployed in Afghanistan from the Army’s core equipment fleet (including the Warrior Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Trojan Armoured Engineer Vehicle, Challenger Armoured Repair and Recovery Vehicle, Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) and the Multiple Launch Rocket System), these vehicles will be returned to the UK although the cost of returning them and their subsequent refurbishment is still to be determined.

Question

Bob Russell (Colchester, Liberal Democrat)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the number of personnel who have served on deployments to Afghanistan who will not qualify for the diamond jubilee medal.

Answer

Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)

holding answer20 February 2012

I have made no such assessment. Service personnel who deployed to Afghanistan are eligible to receive the operational service medal. The Queen’s diamond jubilee medal is a commemorative medal and is awarded to all members of the armed forces who have served for five years or more and were in service on6 February 2012, regardless of whether they have undertaken an operational deployment.

Question

Dan Byles (North Warwickshire, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) officers and (b) soldiers were discharged as being temperamentally unsuited to service life from each of three single services in each of the last 10 years.

Answer

Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)

The information is not held in the format requested and could be provided only at a disproportionate cost.

The term “temperamentally unsuited to service life” is applied to those service personnel who, despite considerable efforts to resolve difficulties, cannot adapt to the basic but unique demands of service life, such as toleration of discipline, both self and military, close quarter living, and separation from family. Personnel who are judged by a psychiatrist to be temperamentally unsuited will be administratively discharged.

Administrative discharge from the armed forces can take place for a wide variety of reasons, and it is not possible to determine the number of officers and soldiers who were discharged as being temperamentally unsuited without undertaking a manual review of all administrative discharge records for the last 10 years.

Question

Chris Ruane (Vale of Clwyd, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the use of mindfulness-based techniques in the US for returning veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Answer

Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)

Mindfulness-based cognitive techniques have a range of forms and applications, including educational (in developing effective thinking processes) and medical (in treating some mental health conditions). Specifically, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) is recognised by the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) as effective for the treatment of mental health disorders such as recurrent depression.

In assessing the possible effectiveness of MBCT for UK military patients, we would certainly take into account the experience of other nations. In this context, in 2011, a new collaborative UK/US taskforce was set up to share best medical and rehabilitation practice, with four working groups being established to take this work forward. The second of these has a specific focus on mental health care issues, and comparison between the different techniques employed by the two countries will form an important part of its work.

Question

Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many civil servants his Department employed in (a) May 2005, (b) May 2010 and (c) December 2010.

Answer

Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)

holding answer20 January 2012

The information requested is as follows:

The Government have announced a reduction of about 32,000 full-time equivalent civilian posts by 2020. This planned reduction is based on the April 2010 total of 85,850 full-time equivalent employees and equates to some 38% of the civilian workforce.

Question

Gemma Doyle (West Dunbartonshire, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the effect on the total number of officers of the proposal to reduce the Ministry of Defence police budget by up to 50 per cent.

Answer

Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)

Possible options to adjust our future requirement for Ministry of Defence police (MOD) services and capabilities are still being considered. Final decisions have not yet been taken about the future budget of the MOD police.

Question

Gemma Doyle (West Dunbartonshire, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what representations he has received on his decision to approve the PR11 options which resulted in a reduction in the budget of the Ministry of Defence Police; and what assessment he has made of these representations.

Answer

Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)

As part of the consultation process on the PR11 options that relate to the Ministry of Defence Police, I have met personally with the chairman of the Defence Police Federation on a number of occasions to discuss changes to the Department’s future requirement for civil policing services and capabilities. The views of the Defence Police Federation will be taken into account during the implementation of these changes.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click the image to visit the review site and obtain a copy of the review paper.

I will have a a more in depth look at this later but in the meantime, have a video

Click here to view the embedded video.

Four of the 200m tankers will be obtained in the £452m deal

This is a quick post to which I will probably add to later.

Some older links on the subject

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/02/fdr-maritime-at-sea-replenishment/

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/12/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-11-logistics-and-support/

Promised an update but although there is plenty of stuff around the web on the specifics I thought it would be more interesting to ask a few questions that didn’t seem obvious from the announcements and that had popped up in the first set of comments on this post…

ONE

The spec sheet from BMT states;

Future Fit of 1 stern fuel delivery reel

Which seems to be fitted for but not with.

The question is in three parts; is this a a capability that the current fleet has, how useful is it, how easy would it be to fit and/or transfer the equipment

TWO

Can this tanker deliver fuel over the beach?

THREE

Why is the Labour Party and various left wing politicians making such a big deal about the loss of the contract to South Korea when it was the Labour Party that approved the procurement strategy in the first place?

MARS tanker

Politicians will be politicians I guess!

FOUR

Is the relatively low speed a valid trade off against cost?

FIVE

Is four fleet tankers enough (the original tender documents mentioned) based on future plans for the task group and CEPP ideas?

SIX

What comes next in terms of the long overdue MARS project and its aspirations?

SEVEN

Why haven’t we seen a MARS a day headlines, I though this one and War of the Worlds references were bad enough :)

My name is Sir Humphrey, and I’m the author of a small blog called the Thin Pinstriped Line.

Some of you may know me from ARRSE, PPRUNE and Warships1, where I post (or posted) under a variety of different usernames. I originally set my blog up to write about some of the issues in Defence at the moment, and try to look in more depth at what was really going on in some issues which were being inaccurately reported by the media. It’s also served as a means of providing some more in depth analysis for other issues as well.

I was contacted by the owner of this site, and asked whether I’d be interested in occasionally writing some articles here too. I’m delighted to say that I’m now able to do so, and that from now on you’ll be seeing the odd longer analytical piece from me on a variety of issues. I won’t be posting here every week, but between this site and my own blog, you should see a fair amount of my work. My aims here remain the same as on my blog – to look a little deeper into the story, and try to present a more positive (dare I say balanced) perspective than may sometimes be seen in the media. My one philosophy though is that in the MOD decisions, no matter how odd they appear, are almost always taken for a reason that makes sense – the challenge is making sense of these reasons!

In terms of my professional background, I have a strong background to a lot of the issues described on this site, and have served in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Hopefully this will come through in some of the pieces that I do. As always with my pieces, I am happy to discuss via the comments page or on my blog.

For my first piece here, I’ve combined the three articles on my blog about the Falkland Islands, to try to turn them into a single article looking at the nature of the threat, and the challenges faced by an attacker to the islands. Enjoy!

[This is a more sensible post than my article about our pants, TD]

The reality of the Falkland Islands dispute – why quiet diplomacy matters more than willy waving and why the Falkland Islands are unlikely to be invaded again.

A perennial favourite headline of so many newspapers, particularly tabloids, is to proclaim that Argentina threatens the Falklands, that the Royal Navy couldn’t possibly mount a task force again, and that western civilisation as we know it is threatened by the fact that a  territorial dispute exists between Argentina and the UK. For this inaugural Think Defence article, I want to try and look beneath the dispute, to try and examine the real level of threat to the Falklands, and to also explain why it is highly unlikely that the Argentineans could repeat 1982 without some spectacular investment, planning and luck.

Argentine Bellicosity

The Falklands are an election issue, and an easy means of unifying the Argentine people against an external wrong that must be righted. At its most simple, the dispute has little to do with any geographic claim, but instead provides successive Argentinean leadership figures with an easy means to distract attention from any internal domestic woes, or political problems.

Almost without fail, the Falklands will be mentioned in any Argentinean political campaign, usually to much alarm from the UK media, but this is as much a reality of Argentine politics as an election campaign is in the UK when the parties roll out the tired old cliches of protecting the NHS, investing and whatever else is the mantra of the day. In other words, to talk of the Falkland’s in an Argentine election is normal – its when they don’t get brought up that we should start to worry.

In recent months, there has been much alarm in the UK over the fact that Argentina appears to be placing pressure on other South American countries to ban Falkland Islands registered vessels from ports, to increase pressure on the UK getting access for its military assets staging through South American countries, and to try to raise the issue at every opportunity in international fora.

The reality is that these efforts have achieved very little – international initiatives are commonplace, and many countries sign up to them, not because they passionately care about the issues at stake, but because it is easier to go along with something in order to keep your neighbour sweet, so you can call in the favour when you need it. It is highly unlikely that Brazil or Uruguay particularly care about the Falkland Islands, but they do care that they share borders with a large nation with a reasonable economy, and that annoying them over something like the Falklands is more hassle than its worth.

So, even though the press would have us believe that the world as we know it is threatened by these statements, the truth is that nothing has really changed, and that the dispute remains primarily one between the UK and Argentina. What could change this? In reality, it is hard to see a situation emerging where Brazil or Uruguay would willingly close access to their ports permanently, or send vessels to side with an Argentine cause – it would cause immense economic damage, and the potential political fallout would be enormous. Is Brazil seriously willing to risk isolating itself for an attack on a foreign nation in support of Argentine goals?

The reality is that we’ll probably see Argentina continue to try to press the small advantages in local organisations, and see very verbose declarations which will then be seized on by the Argentines as evidence that others support them. Then, in reality, nothing will change and Argentina will continue as before. The moment that the UK should really begin to worry about wider South American support for the Argentines position is when they follow through on pledges, or begin to link wider diplomatic support or pledges of assistance to movement on the Falklands issue. Until this point, declarations are little more than worthless – great if you want to feel good about something, but in reality delivering nothing of tangible value.

UK Diplomatic Response

There are some who feel that the UK should be far more assertive over the Falkland’s, and take a tougher line with countries that support the Argentine position. The question is what would this achieve? Having worked in the diplomatic arena, it is clear that while in the short term highly emotive statements make the originating country feel good about itself, it quickly causes more harm than good. If the UK threatened to sever relations, or cut off trade to countries which supported Argentina’s stance, then what would actually be achieved? In reality such a move would isolate the UK in South America, do immense damage to our long term reputation in the region, and bring countries on the fence into the Argentine camp.

It is important to remember that diplomatic actions have very long term consequences – arguably the UK is still dealing with the aftermath of messy colonial incidents from the 19th century today as a result of its possession of the Falklands. If the UK sought to view its entire relationship with South America through the prism of the Falklands, then there is real danger that our longer term ability to influence, support and work with many countries would be harmed. Countries remember insults for far longer than compliments – in many ways diplomacy is like children at school arguing over who likes or hates one another the most. Flexing the UK muscle now would merely irritate and in the longer term, isolate us and do more harm than good to our position.

What can the UK do to counter the constant Argentine charm offensive? Well for starters it needs to be realistic about goals – the UK has to ensure it retains good relations with the continent to ensure that 8000 miles from home, 2000 people and 1500 plus service personnel remain safe, secure and with open lines of communication in perpetuity (or until the Falkland Islanders determine they want another way of life). Pissing off your neighbours, acting like the local bully and generally throwing your weight around won’t achieve this – it will achieve the opposite.

The UK has to try to secure a form of quiet diplomacy in South America – an accepting policy which realises that other south American countries have to live with Argentina, and that they will sign up for things, but equally one which applies discrete threats / carrots / sticks at a point where nations will not be publicly humiliated, nor in a way which merely fuels Argentina’s policy goals. This means not reacting in a manner which will make tabloid readers feel good about themselves, but which ensures continuity of access to ports, airports, logistical facilities and prevents South American nations from feeling isolated, humiliated and unwilling to make concessions to the UK.

The worst thing the UK can do now is to go on an aggressive diplomatic offensive – it would play straight into Argentine hands, and make our life much harder. Our primary goal is to keep the Falkland Islands secure and British for as long as they want to do so – this goal is much easier to achieve when other nations are unlikely to back Argentine actions.

In the next part of this article, we’ll look at why the Argentines lack the ability to invade the Falklands, and also why, despite the best efforts of the Daily Mail, it is unlikely that a small team of special forces soldiers (even if they had escaped from a military stockade to the LA underground), could take out the UK garrison in one night.

Part 2 – Planning Considerations to capture the Islands

Following on from the earlier piece about the diplomatic issues surrounding the Falklands, Humphrey now wants to take a look at the reality of the challenge facing any potential aggressor, and to show the planning considerations that any J5 planning shack is going to have to think about when looking at a successful attack on the islands.

Firstly, a mild disclaimer – unlike many Falkland Island commentators (FI), Humphrey has actually been to the Falklands, and has a very good understanding of the military structure and capability on the islands. Because of this, the author is not going to discuss some specifics, and may seem vague in other areas. This is because he is one of the few people left who think that PERSEC isn’t a dirty word.

Secondly, unlike some websites / publications, Humphrey has no time for the concept of ‘ORBAT Porn’, by which he means the lining up of two paper ORBATS between two countries, and deciding that as X is greater than Y, Y wins. It’s pointless, silly and as seen in countless wars over the years, almost always an inaccurate means of predicting the outcome of a crisis.

For the purposes of this article, Humphrey is looking at the current balance of power as it stands NOW. Not in 10 years, not if Argentina gets new LPDs, not if the UK gets CVF, and not if the Death Star parks in orbit and uses its super laser to wipe out all penguins.

The first part of this article looks at wider planning considerations that need to be taken into account when considering an invasion. The next part will look at specific considerations relating to the islands defences.

Situation

The first, and most critical question that must be asked when considering an invasion is ‘why’? The Falklands serve as a useful lightning conductor to Argentine leaders – whenever distracted by political problems at home, they can quickly rally support around the concept of the Falklands issue. Invasion not only removes this as a lightning conductor, but also opens up a range of longer term problems – a quick invasion without bloodshed followed by Argentine occupation is a good idea in theory, but a leader would have to be certain that this could be achieved. Failure would result in them losing office, power, and probably liberty as well.

Whenever considering the Falkland Islands, one has to ask ‘what does the President of Argentina personally gain from an invasion’? The reality is that unless they have the most successful invasion in history, it’s likely to be the end of their presidency. Few people willingly relinquish power until they have to – it is hard to envisage circumstances where an Argentine leader would do so over the Falklands.

Military Planning

But, assuming the go ahead was issued, then the first planning consideration when considering the invasion of the islands is what is the defined Argentinean end state? In other words, what is their view of campaign success? In 1982, the Argentines arguably defined their end state as the initial occupation of the islands militarily, and did not plan, nor assume any requirement to fight beyond this point. The author would argue that any future Argentine plan needs to define its end state as ‘the successful capture of the islands, followed by the mounting of a sufficiently robust defence as to prevent their recapture in perpetuity’.

One of the problems with looking at this potential conflict is that everyone assumes that if Argentina invades, then the UK will immediately turn around and launch ‘Task Force 2′, followed by a short bloody war in which the UK either kicks Argentina off the islands again, or is sent home humbled and never again enters the South Atlantic. Humphrey would suggest that this is unwise to consider – after all, UK planning is based on holding the islands for perpetuity (where perpetuity means ‘for as long as the Islanders want us to remain’), and that if Argentina seeks to capture the islands militarily, it needs to be ready to defend them in perpetuity as well.

So, the first thing to ask is whether Argentina has sufficient military capability to not only invade the islands now, but also defend them in the long term without a major increase in defence spending.

The next issue when planning such an invasion is the level of violence and casualties one is willing to inflict upon an enemy force to achieve mission success. In 1982, the Argentine attack was predicated on landing roughly battalion sized forces to take out a sub company (barely platoon) sized formation. Its often forgotten that Argentine SF made a deliberate attempt to destroy the marine barracks, presumably hoping to take out the marines in their beds, rather than have a fight.

The world has changed dramatically since 1982 and the arrival of 24/7 media coverage, global news and analysis and the internet & other social media means that any attack or use of force will be questioned. To force the UK defending forces to surrender will mean either denying them the ability to fight or to sustain, or inflicting sufficient casualties to make the ground commander decide further resistance is futile.

Let’s put this in context for a moment. The FI are garrisoned normally by up to 1500 military personnel, and supported by a range of logistics and infrastructure that will enable the garrison to continue fighting for a considerable period of time without requiring external support. For an Argentine attack to put the UK garrison in the position where it has to surrender due to an inability to sustain itself, we have to assume the loss of air and maritime resupply for a prolonged period of time, backed up by an aggressive land campaign which reduces stocks. This would seem to require a maritime and air presence beyond that which the Argentines currently possess.

Similarly, to put the defending force in a position where it has lost sufficient casualties that it feels it has not option but to surrender, one would need to inflict realistically more casualties than the UK has lost in Iraq & Afghanistan combined in over 10 years of fighting, and inflict them in a time scale probably measured in days. This would again require a very aggressive campaign, and one which would be quickly portrayed in global media as an exceptionally aggressive and brutal attack by Argentine forces.

The reality would be for Argentina that any attack has to be done in such a manner so as to force a surrender, without causing a massacre. Unless this occurs, then global opinion will swing firmly against Argentina, and it is likely that UNSCRs, or even possible military support from allies may be offered to the UK in any attack. Argentina has to be seen to be a liberating force in the manner of the Indians in Goa in 1961, and not the Iraqi ‘annexation’ of Kuwait in 1990.  In other words, a short military attack, limited resistance and then general global apathy, despite anguished pleas from the defending power (in this case Portugal, which the author understands still technically claims Goa is a part of its empire).

So, even prior to the launching of an invasion, Argentina is faced with a series of high level policy & political challenges – these can be summarised below:

1. What is their justification for war?
2. What is their desired end state?
3. How do they recapture the islands using minimal force?
4. How do they hold onto the islands in perpetuity?
5. How do they manage international reaction to the invasion?
6. Can they afford an international crisis / incident on this scale?
7. Is it really worth it?

The next part of this article will look in more depth at how an Argentine commander would need to consider options, based partly on their ORBAT, but also partly on the defensive considerations

Part 3:  The reality of capturing the Falkland Islands.

In earlier posts, the author has looked at the threat posed by Argentina to the Falkland Islands, and has suggested that if you ignore bellicose public statements, then the reality is that the islands are unlikely to be attacked by Argentina anytime soon.

In this final post on the subject, the intent is to explore some of the challenges surrounding any potential aggressor who wishes to attack the islands, and the sort of planning considerations that they need to consider when factoring in an attack. This is perhaps more timely given that yet another senior general (Sir Mike Jackson) has now claimed that if the islands were lost, then the UK could not recover them.

The challenge

Any potential aggressor intending to occupy the Falklands needs to plan an assault around the following factors.

1. A remote airbase with good ground defences, and located a not inconsiderable distance from the nearest credible port is the centre of gravity.
2. The defending force is well equipped, and has considerable operational experience accrued over the last 30 years of occupying the terrain.
3. There are multiple defensive structures dispersed across the facility which would require potent munitions to deny.
4. The facility is located some distance from international airlanes, and is unlikely  to see significant commercial air traffic. There are multiple satellite facilities to provide radar coverage. There are air defences present, both air and ground based.
5. There is a not inconsiderable maritime force located in the region, which is self-sustaining and which may include an SSN.
6.  Any attack has to be conducted in a manner which denies the defending force the ability to reinforce, and must force a surrender of all occupying forces in under the  time it  would take to begin the reinforcement plans from the UK.
7. Any prolonged attack is going to lead to calls for talks, and be highly damaging to international opinion against the aggressor. A swift fait acompli is essential to secure victory.

What this means is that any Argentine commander has to consider some immensely challenging tactical problems which in turn build in time delay. No plan survives first contact with the enemy, and it is likely that any assault will encounter delays. Lets now examine these considerations in a little more depth.

When considering the defence of Mount Pleasant Airfield (MPA), commentators who have not been to the islands often make the mistake of assuming it is a small facility which could easily be overrun. The reality is somewhat different – it occupies a large area of ground, and has many highly dispersed facilities. While the main admin / life support hub is located in the near legendary ‘death star’ complex, the remainder of the facility is spread over a large geographically dispersed area. This means that any assault has to factor in the challenge of denying multiple facilities, many of which may be defendable, and in doing so while operating on unfamiliar terrain.

To even get close to the facility would require a significant march by troops. Not exhausting in itself, but it would probably require insertion of special forces by SSK – this limits the locations that landings can be conducted. The terrain of the islands is not particularly conducive to building shelters, and the islanders are exceptionally suspicious of outsiders. At best the Argentines could hope to land a small SF force (roughly 50 men), which then has to avoid detection while it marches to the airbase.

At this point, it then has to conduct an assault against a large, well defended facility which is designed for the purpose of being used to fight a defensive battle, and they have to do so against a garrison which outnumbers them 30-1. They have to complete this assault and force the British to a position where they wish to negotiate for surrender prior to the airfield commencing reinforcement flights.

The airfield was designed in the 1980s at the height of the cold war, and reflects much of the thinking at the time. It is likely that it could easily be repaired in the event of a denial attempt, and there is likely to be sufficient room to permit landings in the event of damage. It would take a very significant attack to deny the runway to the point where it could not be used further. Such an attack would require equipment and munitions accuracy beyond that currently possessed by Argentina.

Any air movements, either transports to land troops, or bomber attacks are going to be picked up by early warning radar stations. There will be significant warning of inbound air attacks, and there are plentiful defences in place to handle them. Any air attack has to conduct a long overwater transit, and then will only have seconds on station to deliver its munitions. It will be doing so against a force likely to be expecting it. Similarly, if transport aircraft were inbound, then if needs be, they need not even be shot down. The base could merely park sufficient vehicles across the runways at regular intervals so as to prevent the plane from landing. While some bad fiction writers postulate about the idea of an Entebbe style strike, the reality is that the planes have to land first to deliver this strike. Again, a failure to land first time and commence the assault will see the reinforcement plan kicking into action.  Also, given the lack of air traffic in the region, one would hope that it is unlikely that anyone would be fooled by an aircraft faking an SOS message and then landing to disgorge hundreds of armed troops.

The defensive structures of the base suggest that significant munitions would be required to deny some facilities. It is all very well landing 50 SF, but what happens when people deploy into trench and bunker complexes which require artillery or mortars to deny? This then requires the landing of further troops ashore with the ability to call in support fire – in turn this requires both the ability to find a beach where a surprise landing can be carried out and artillery moved into position to conduct fires missions, and to do so without being detected. Again, the author would suggest that the sighting of an Argentine battery digging in, would be enough to trigger the reinforcement plan activation.

The rule of thumb is that an assault against well dug in and defended troops, particularly well motivated ones, with reasonable supplies, is that it requires a ratio of 3-1 attackers to defenders to be certain of success. Assuming a garrison of 1500, this means that Argentina would need to move sufficient troops to land 4500 troops on the ground to conduct the attack. More troops would be needed to provide support, and logistical work. Let’s assume 5500 troops are needed to be certain of putting the attack force together.

Firstly, the Argentine navy doesn’t have the ability to conduct an amphibious operation carrying 5500 troops. In fact, very few navies do. Even the Royal Navy, arguably one of the worlds more potent amphibious forces, would struggle to deliver more than 1500 personnel in its current structure. To successfully land the troops, supplies and equipment needed to crack MPA in a conventional assault, Argentina would need to be build the world’s second largest amphibious force, develop the doctrine and training required to ensure that they could land successfully, and then ensure that their troops are capable of doing so without messing the plan up. These troops are then required to land, march a significant distance to the objective and conduct an assault against a well dug in force which is likely to expecting them. Significantly, this force will have got a reasonable amount of operational experience, compared to an Argentine force which hasn’t seen action for 30 years. The Argentines are expected to do this while maintaining complete surprise, as if the reinforcement plan starts, and more UK troops are flown in, then they go from 3-1 ratio, to likely 1-1, or worse. Oh, all the while, Argentina needs to maintain the element of complete surprise while building up, training and delivering this invasion force to the Islands.

The other key point – if Argentina has built an amphibious fleet, and then sails it with deliberate intent to the islands, it needs to be certain that the UK maritime assets have been denied. Otherwise, they will need to be prepared to encounter a range of maritime capabilities, potentially including nuclear submarines that will present a significant tactical challenge.

The final point – this attack has to be done in a manner which denies the defending forces the ability to operate, and for their commander to feel he has no option but to surrender, and this has to be done in less than 24 hours, or else reinforcements will arrive. This would require an untested force engaging a defensive force which has spent 30 years preparing the ground for this fight. The fight will have to occur on the defenders terms, and would pose an enormous tactical challenge to the aggressor.

There is some suggestion in some quarters of fantastical ideas of cruise liners disgorging SF into Stanley – which would be a challenge given the lack of adequate berths, or alternatively somehow capturing the town. While this would be challenging, it still comes back to the earlier issue of a lack of manpower to actually get on the ground, and also the fact that MPA is the centre of gravity. In extremis, the loss of Stanley would not lose the UK hold on the islands. MPA is the key, and it remains a well-defended installation.

While much remains uncertain, and while this author deeply hopes that such a situation is never tested for real, he would suggest that any potential attack against the islands using current Argentine ORBATS would result in a very bloody and humiliating defeat for Argentina, and one that is completely unnecessary.

UK policy is not to lose the islands in the first place – the author would suggest that the current force laydown ensures that this remains a realistic policy goal.

This photo was taken on January 21, 2012

Those ladders look like the plain old common or garden variety

British soldiers from the QRH (The Queen's Royal Hussars) Battle Group are pictured patrolling during Operation Zmaray Ibda (Lions' Discovery) in the district of Lashkar Gah, Helmand province. British soldiers from the QRH(The Queen's Royal Hussars) Battle Group, consisting of troops from Support Company(Coy) 1 Yorks alongside C Coy QRH took part in Operation Zmaray Ibda(Lions' discovery). Having deployed by Chinook helicopter into a rural outreach of Lashkar Gah, the mission was to apprehend an insurgent commander. The Operation was partnered with the ANP (Afghan National Police) throughout.

Back in February 2010 I bemoaned the lack of engineering technical expertise within DE&S, not that it isn’t there but what is there is obviously in short supply which results in the MoD having to buy in technical consultants or contract specific projects. In years gone by, when the MoD was technical skills rich the kinds of projects we are now outsourcing would have been handled in house.

With state sanctioned vandalism that saw the rundown of the government research establishments and the ultimate sale of DERA/QinetiQ the reduction in technical skills, in favour of management skills, resulted in the the MoD becoming a commissioning entity rather than a systems developer or integrator, the costs of this are only starting to become clear now.

There has been much in the papers over the last few days about how much the MoD spends on consultants, it is always an emotive subject.

The arguments for moving to technical consultants and contractors is based on the simple premise that a non MoD employee does not attract pension contributions and are therefore much cheaper, even accounting for the significantly greater day rate. A secondary argument, to the cynic, is that reducing the number of so called ‘fat arsed civil servants’ plays well with the House of Parliament and tabloids.

I hold no truck whatsoever with argument because we should be measuring value in other ways and it is pretty shameless for this government and others, the MoD and even the media to portray MoD civil servants in such a bad light. They should know better and stand on for their people.

Anyway, back to the ladder.

The example I used in the previous post was the humble ladder, much used in Afghanistan for small gap crossing and getting onto a compound roof.

Defense News ran with a story describing how when faced with a requirement from Afghanistan for a portable short gap crossing system (thats a ladder  to you and me) instead of calling on the resources of its 22,500 employees it outsourced the job to BMT.

Responding to an urgent operational request from the frontline to come up with a better method of crossing ditches and scaling walls than a conventional ladder the Ministry of Defence turned to BMT Defence Services to provide an answer.

In the space of five weeks this summer the Bath, England-based consultancy conducted a survey of possible solutions and completed a competition involving more than a dozen bidders from the U.K. and overseas.

Eugene Morgan, the director of systems at BMT Defence Services, says the consultancy team running the project spoke to designers ranging from a supplier of ship gangways to a Formula 1 racing team in order to find the best possible solutions.

Morgan said recommendations on the top three or four designs for the 3 metre bridge requirement was submitted to the MoD last month.

I suppose it’s a good thing that the requirement was met in double quick time.

Is this another indicator of something we covered earlier, it’s not the numbers of civil servants that count but the types.

If DE&S doesn’t have the bandwidth to run an acquisition exercise for what is more or less an upgraded ladder, then we need to be concerned.

A year after BMT submitted their recommendations the MoD has released details of the resulting product.

Sorry for the crap pictures…

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Roger Pidgeon, the DE&S team’s project manager for the short gap crossing, said:

“We received an urgent request for an ultra-lightweight and man-portable short gap crossing capability.

“In the first instance we looked to deliver a commercial off-the-shelf solution, but none was immediately available on the market.

“BMT’s engineering knowledge helped us to reach specialist suppliers in the motorsport and aerospace sectors who have extensive experience in lightweight aluminium, carbon fibre or composite structures.

“Our requirement was turned into a bespoke design solution by BMT in just four weeks.”

The bridges designed by Alpha Composites can be carried by each member of a patrol. Troops can also use the system as a lightweight assault ladder, replacing the bulkier, heavier in-service equipment. Alpha Composites are a market leading company in hi technology materials and I wonder if any of the trials team or IPT managed to blag themselves a gucci briefcase !!

What does this tell us?

First, there is valuable and cutting edge capabilities within the UK manufacturing sector that we absolutely need to exploit so the MoD/Automotive sector partnership that was started a few years ago has to be nurtured and expanded.

Second, whilst BMT are no doubt an excellent organisation, this kind of facilitated access to manufacturers and technical evaluation role should be a core MoD function. If the MoD and DE&S is going to improve its variable record on buying equipment for the armed forces it needs to bring back in house the expertise it hastily discarded and continues to discard.

Finally, here is an excellent example of not buying off the shelf, not going with the 80% or ‘good enough’ solution. However, given the quite staggering loads being carried by infantry soldiers in Afghanistan it is equally an example where insisting on something other than good enough and developing a bespoke solution was absolutely the right thing to do.

Those advocating more of the former might perhaps like to carry those extra kilograms in 40 degree heat.

Of course we don’t know if it is any good or substantially lighter than the traditional alternatives.

Maybe it really is a Short Gap Crossing and definitely not a ladder!

Which brings me back to the question posed in the title of this post.

If they are so fantastic why does the first image above, the one taken last month, not have the Short Gap Crossing system on view.

Is it because they are in short supply?

Is it because they are not needed?

Or

Is it something else?

Perhaps this comment from a TD contributor might have something to do with it.

Ah that ladder. Awesome for crossing ditches. But heavier than a normal ladder and extremely uncomfortable to carry. Know what the SF guys did? Wrapped some hesco frame around the old normal ladder! Voila! Works better too. Oh to answer your questions at the end. No it’s not lighter. And everyone hated it as with the old ladders you could carry them by putting your arm through the rungs. You can’t do that with these ladders which made them heavier and incredibly fatiguing to carry. Yeah it’s good for crossing ditches but as I said the SF just wrapped hesco framing and got the same result but lighter and more comfortable to carry. I emphasise this because it’s such a good example of over engineering and wasted money. Yes folks. They f*cked up a ladder. A ladder! Horrible bit of kit. I shudder.

I assume there is more to this than meets the eye (there usually is) but in our rush to strip the MoD of civil servants are we in danger of throwing the baby out with the bath water just to appease stupid politicians and journalists?

BAE have released a few images of their solution…

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

Click to enlarge

The honest answer is we don’t know. The Americans are not reducing the total numbers of JSF but changing the profile of those purchases. Other partner nations are indicating they are going to reduce their actual off take.  This is likely to have implications for JSF prices particularly in the early stages which is when this country intends to procure its (fighters).

Something else we don’t know is the cost and operational implications of the switch to CATOBAR beyond an estimate of just shy of a billion pounds.

Or

How we are going to turn a conventional carrier into the flexible Carrier Enabled Power Projection

Construction is going well and the training and cooperation agreements with the US and French navies seem to be equally on track but project CVF/JCA still has a great deal of risk and uncertainty that has still to be resolved.

Click here to read it.

This bit of news popped into the newsreader this afternoon

Click to visit

General Dynamics and BAE Systems have demonstrated a precision guided 81mm mortar round, or should that be bomb!

The question I think of when I see this (followed by the inevitable clamour to buy some) is this…

Does adding cost and complexity disrupt the fundamental characteristics of mortars,namely; simplicity, low cost, ease of use and immediacy?

Anyone care to answer?

Everyone seemed to agree there was a preponderance of the grown ups but the problem with perceptions is they are often just that. We all observe things and we are all subject to the underlying narrative that the senior ranks are proving harder to cull than those famous sacred cows that were despatched in the SDSR.

One of the first posts I ever wrote at Think Defence was on the subject, click here to see my early clumsy attempts.

I came to the conclusion that it was a reality but not as marked as the media would have us all believe.

Using data from the underused and thoroughly professional Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) I bashed together a few graphical representations of the underlying data.

To start with I looked at the decline in what we might means of measure, crude as they are but they illustrate a rate of decline in ships, aircraft and battalions/regiments.

One might expect the size of the forces to follow a similar glide path, accepting these are old graphics and not reflective of the slashing and burning of the SDSR.

This shows a fairly rapid increase in the ratio of officers to other ranks but from the mid nineties that ratio remained somewhat steady.

If we look at the x axis, the time period is quite wide but using the last 10 years data from DASA a little more detail is available .

Click to enlarge, rank and percentage of that rank compared to the total

The table above shows the totals and percentages of each rank from 2000 to 2011 (the last year the data was published in this form)  

Click to enlarge

Looking at the senior ranks as a group, the table above shows a similar display but the percentage figures are expressed as a percentage of that group, not the total personnel count.

Click to enlarge

Finally, the table above shows a simple comparison of officers and other ranks.

What this crude analysis does not do is look at do we actually need a certain rank to be doing a certain job, there is always several stories behind any number but it does show that things have remained largely consistent over the last decade. If that is as it should be is a completely different discussion, especially when we start asking, for example, how many Admirals a navy with a couple of dozen combat ships actually need or why do we have more Air Marshals than squadrons etc (just for clarity, I don’t know if that is true, am just having a tabloid/MP moment).

Despite the media’s inbuilt bias and talent for talking nonsense these are important questions that hopefully the defence reform unit is looking at, where does the narrative meet reality.

You can always do your own detective work.

One of the very little known transparency agenda commitments that everyone would seem to want to forget is the fantastic on-line organisation chart tool.

Click to visit

Click the image to visit or start from here

PUS and CDS, as of September 2011

Chief of the General Staff, as of September 2011

First Sea Lord (1SL) / Chief of Naval Staff, as of September 2011

Chief of the Air, as of September 2011

Chief of Joint Operations, as of September 2011

Chief of Defence Materiel, as of September 2011

Defence Infrastructure Organisation, as of September 2011

Hours of fun to be had because you can drill right down to junior level

Someone mentioned the The Royal National Lifeboat Institution as a good example.

RNLI (Click to see how you can help)

Get your wallets out!

RNLI Lifeboat Crew Reaching Out to Royal Navy Rescue Winchman

The common perception, if you read any of the mainstream media, seems to be that senior officer numbers have been outstripping junior officers and other ranks by quite some margin, especially over the last decade.

More Admirals than ships, Generals than Regiments, Air Marshalls than Squadrons and bumbling idiots all round is the general narrative.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Now I know the readership of Think Defence is a better informed group than the average MP or mainstream media defence journalist so before I spring forward with the actual numbers, it would be most interesting to see what such a well informed group thinks of the the issue.

Over to you…

The statement in full…

As part of the Team Complex Weapons construct the LMM was ‘reversed’ into an existing production and long term support contract, thought to be for Starstreak. Because the threat that Starstreak is designed to counter is considered lower than when it was placed in production this seems like a sensible and flexible approach. Thales have a support contract with the MoD for Starstreak out to 2020 but it is not known if the commercial arrangements have also been modified to account for fewer of those missiles and the introduction of LMM, one would imagine its all in the small print.

Fulfilling the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapon (Light) requirement it will be one of the primary weapons of the maritime variant of the Wildcat helicopter.

AgustaWestland AW159 Lynx Wildcat

Aboard the Wildcat it has been shown in a couple of configurations, 5 and 7 round launchers.

Lightweight Multirole Missile - AW Wildcat

Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile - Wildcat

The initial production variant (that will be obtained in a quantity of 1,000) is the laser beam riding version.

The LMM is derived from the innovative Starstreak High Velocity Missile

Click here to view the embedded video.

Designed to attack small targets like inflatables, fast attack craft and surfaced submarines for example, what marks the LMM as something rather special is its relatively low cost, the motor for example was value engineered by Roxel to a specific cost and the guidance and much of the control system has been taken from the Starstreak.

The second distinguishing feature is its small warhead when compared to the larger Hellfire or Brimstone missile. This precise and low collateral damage warhead will allow it to be used against a much wider variety of targets. The warhead is a blast/fragmentation type weighing 3kg; compare this with 9kg on a Hellfire and 8.4kg on a Javelin.

The missile weighs 13kg and range is given as 8km with only a small minimal range, 400m, unlike the precision guided 70mm rockets that need a considerable distance. The fuse uses a laser proximity system and the missile itself is only 76mm in diameter with a length of 1.3m. The use of a laser proximity fuse is designed to allow the missile to be used against non-metallic targets, inflatable boats being the obvious example.

Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile

Thales have stated that a semi active laser seeker and anti-armour warhead would be relatively easy to integrate, the SAL seeker being recently test fired.

The laser beam riding guidance system means that the firer must remain focussed on the target and whilst this makes countering it difficult the firing platform has to remain exposed. Only one target at a time can be attacked with this guidance method which might limit its use against multiple swarms, however, this is a reasonable cost trade off and because it has a high speed, depending on range, this focus time may not be all that great.

The upgrade path, specifically a low cost semi active laser (SAL) seeker would allow the missile launch and target designation platforms to be different.

What intrigues me the most about LMM is its flexibility, being helicopter launched is just one of the means in which it can be used.

Air Launched

The LMM could also potentially arm the Watchkeeper unmanned system and is nominally slated to do so as part of the development path, although the extra weight might impact on performance in other areas it might be a reasonable trade off in some circumstances. Watchkeeper is already quite heavy compared to the design it is based on although engine improvements might also mitigate this extra weight.

For fleeting targets of opportunity it would offer something quite interesting and improve the flexibility of Watchkeeper, even if there would be an additional training burden.

LMM has been fired from a Scheibel Camcopter and shown on a BAE Systems Fury UAV

Fury UAV

If it can be used on Wildcat and Watchkeeper, why not Apache or the King Air 300 based Sentinels or even an A400, Harvest Hawk style?

One might even imagine a pair being used on the Base-ISTAR aerostats to provide a snap shot capability against fleeting targets, it has zero recoil when fired.

Maritime

The LMM has also been shown on a naval mount, Seahawk Sigma, as below, combined with a 30mm Bushmaster automatic cannon for naval applications. MSI are one of those low profile UK defence manufacturers that deserves to be heard about a lot more.

MSI 30mm mount with 7 LMM

MSI 30mm mount with 7 LMM

The Turkish company Aselsan has shown the LMM on a naval mount with 4 LMM’s

Aselsan Thales LMM

Aselsan teamed up with the patrol vessel maker, Yonca Onuk, to develop the two axis gyrostabilised mount and off mount electro optical director.

Land

Because the LMM has been designed to fit within the existing physical and electrical footprint of the Starstreak HVM missile it is not inconceivable that it could be used on the numerous launchers that have been developed or in use.

One such example is the Thor system, which could carry a mix of LMM and Hellfire as needed.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Aselsan have also shown a remotely operated weapon system (RWS) fitted with a 2 round LMM 12.7mm HMG combination.

Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile and 12.7mm HMG

In a land environment LMM could provide a lower yield alternative to Javelin in complex environments where precision and a reduced blast radius would be useful.

Perhaps even a new lease of life for the Stormer HVM vehicles.

Stormer High Velocity Missile

We can exploit the LMM across multiple domains, not just maritime.

I think the LMM has a great deal of export potential and of great utility across multiple platforms and environments, anyone else agree?

TD has recently regailed us with posts on the Post Afghan vehicle lottery and on aspects of operational mobility (just to back up his veritable reference work on bridging!), including his awesome series of specialist mobility video postings.

In the comment threads, plus those on earlier articles there is countless discussion of wheels versus tracks, CVR(T) 2.0 versus FRES SV etc. Personally I have always thought that “wheels versus tracks” is a non-existing argument – in fact we very obviously need both and we should use the right tool for the right job wherever and whenever we can.

However my thoughts on Future Force 2020 and what the army might look like evolve every time I read another interesting article or re-read interesting comments in the various threads. The evolution of the “perfect” post Afghanistan force structure for the British Army is apparently a cause close to many of our hearts, even ex-Navy men like me ! However as none of us are endowed with the ability to read the tea leaves of the geo-political future, we can’t really do anything other than attempt to design a force structure that meets the requirements of the SDSR, with a balanced set of capabilities that has the ability to enable a flexible response by UK forces to a potentially very broad set of contingencies.

Following this train of thought, I constantly return of two of TD’s enduring themes:

1. Massive commonality of vehicle type – with the aim to reduce logistics burden and through lifecycle cost by maximising maintenance benefits and simplifying the spares holdings etc.

2. Providing niche capabilities – providing NATO and ad hoc coalitions, or other alliances with specific ‘niche’ capabilities that lever what we are good at, or what we are already equipped to do.

Using these lenses to view the expeditionary requirements of the SDSR, with HMG’s confirmed desire to meddle in other people’s backyards in order to safeguard our national security interests, my own thoughts on force structure and Tables Of Equipment (ToE) have swung back and forth as the debate rages in the comment threads.

For example, I have never been a ‘fan’ or proponent of the 8 x 8 wheeled AFV as a replacement for tracked medium weight vehicles. However a few vociferous commenters are great fans of the concept, and their arguments with respect to strategic self-deployment, and operational mobility in theatre are not completely without merit. On the other hand, although just about everyone admits that the day of the 60 tonne plus MBT are really not over, with even the COIN-istas admitting their utility, the questions remain as to how often we might require their capabilities in any great numbers, and what is the best way to retain their certain advantageous capabilities.

Questions, questions and more questions…..

I would like to examine a few of the questions that pop up in my mind before indulging in a little bit of “fantasy fleet” force structure design.

Question 1 – do operational requirements outweigh the cost benefits of massive standardisation ?

If we could standardize on 3 ‘fighting vehicle’ fleets (not including MBT) with:

• 1 tracked medium family (upgraded Warrior or FRES SV),
• 1 wheeled Medium family (FRES UV) and
• 1 light wheeled family (Foxhound);

plus some oddities like RM Viking, then would the cash benefits outweigh any potential operational flexibility costs ?

Question 2 – does filling a ‘niche’ mean going to extremes ?

Our NATO allies are divesting themselves of MBT’s and reducing their numbers of high end tracked, medium to heavy weight MICV / AIFV type vehicles, well most of them are – the U.S. and Turkey to a lesser extent. So should we aim for that niche, do a U-turn on MBR’s and go all heavy at one end and all light at the other ? Keep all our Chally 2′s and Warriors, upgrade them, get FRES SV into service, and build up the capabilities of our elite light infantry units at the other end of the capability spectrum ? After all we are no longer fighting the cold war, so do we need a the equivalent of TA infantry battalions in Saxon, able to zoom along the autobahn to re-enforce BAOR ?

But as I suggest, with the SDSR requirements, this is hardly a likely niche to focus on, is it ?

So could we go the other way ?

Reduce heavy armour and tracks to a minimalist capability, relying on allies to bring the tanks if we end up in another GW1 / GW2 type scenario ? Does the French, Italian, and U.S. (Stryker brigade) all wheeled brigade type of force fulfill the requirements of a what is largely an expeditionary force ?

Question 3 – is there a middle ground, some heavy tracked, and some medium wheeled ?

Can we truly afford to keep the “full spectrum’ war fighting capability of Challenger 2 regiments, Warrior armoured infantry, FRES SV ‘Formation Recce’ and find a suitable FRES UV wheeled armoured vehicle to replace all those thousand plus FV432 and CVR(T) variants, Mastiff’s, Wolfhounds and Ridgebacks ?

Can we dismiss ‘massive commonality” in favour of operational flexibility in the shape of some big, weighty well protected 8 x 8 to replace some tracks (say Patria AMV or RG41), while buying a cheaper 6 x 6 or 4 x4 (say RG35) to take on all the supporting roles ?

Question 4 – what roles for the reserves ?

People keep noting in the comments that fast paced armoured manoeuvre warfare is no role for part-time soldiers. I am not sure I agree. The assertion might be true the way the TA is structured right now, but other nations don’t have a problem with reservist armour crews – perhaps taking a leaf from the Israeli training manual we would only allow ex-full time ‘professionals’ into such units ? I have seen the big halls full of Challenger and Warrior simulators in Germany; spending a whole weekend buttoned up in one of those has to be a solid training experience !

We recently discussed the tooth to tail ratio with respect to the reserves – should the focus be on CSS units rather than on infantry and armour ? Perhaps this is the wrong way of looking at things ? Perhaps we should be asking if we need to rely on reservists to augment full timers on long term enduring operations, or instead should we aim to only fall back on a large scale short-ish duration call out of large numbers reservists if we commit a full (large) division to a short term high intensity operation ?

I would like to suggest two straw man options for people to pull to bits. However first I would just like to digress to cover the two “intervention” brigades, the units that SDSR FF2020 state are “out of the rotation” for a long enduring operation – 3 Commando Brigade RM, and 16 Air Assault Brigade

For each of these brigades, with 4 infantry units, I would use the existing vehicles to provide an “armoured support group” such as that which already exists for 3 Cdo with it’s Vikings. For 16 AAB (which I would change role and title a bit, but we don’t need to go there right now) we could use the 100 plus Warthog’s plus some additions. For both vehicles we should purchase some dedicated 120mm mortar versions with the STK SRAMS for example. The Warthog group might get some recce variants based just on the front module as I suggested previously.

Straw man force structures

Of course we can mess with the structure of the MRB’s and other units as required to fit our own agendas J For both potential solutions there are sizing options we can consider too, however I don’t want to explore all the variables, just to really examine the vehicle fleet options:

#1: The high end – low end option – mixed MRB’s

So straw man number 1 is a high-low mix, with nothing in the middle, but with a mixed set of capabilities based on both tracked and wheeled vehicles within the MRB. So five identical MRB’s of:

• 1 x FRES SV family based Brigade Recce Regiment
• 1 x Armoured Infantry Regiment on upgraded Warrior
• 2 x Mechanised Infantry Regiment on FRES UV family based on RG35 variants
• 1 x Artillery Regiment – resurrected LIMAWS based on single pod of rockets, and M777 on RG35 or other wheeled chassis.
• CS – Combat Engineers with tracked as required (FRES SV family)
• CSS – mostly FRES UV based

A am sure a squadron of Chally 2, a TA regiment of AS90 and an extra infantry battalion could be attached as required ? Should there be 4 infantry battalions as the norm and if so, can 1 be “Light role” as they would in the peacekeeping / peace enforcing / COIN scenarios they would be guarding bases etc and could patrol in Foxhounds if required ? Or should the deployable Brigade be capable of putting all it’s infantry on the move under armour, for more “intensive” scenarios ?

The aim here is to keep the FRES SV and Warrior upgrade programmes as they are, already funded etc. but add a single large family of FRES UV to replace a lot of existing old vehicles and make as much as possible of the “massive commonality” them at the wheeled, lower weight end.  Of course we would add Foxhound family based vehicles as required.

If you think about it, this is not radical at all, we would just be looking for the money to buy a lot of RG35 series vehicles, built in the UK if required to replace lots of old, mostly tracked vehicles. You could still mess with whether or how much of the MBT capability sits in the reserves or main force etc.

#2: High – middle – low

I want to be deliberately more contentious with this one, so hang in there with me, and just follow it through:

Heavy end:

• 1 x Regular Armoured Brigade – 2 x MBT Regt. & 2 x Armoured Infantry (Warrior)
• 1 x Reserve Armoured Brigade – as above

The Reserve formation would actually be twice as big, but with whole fleet management of the vehicles the concept is 2 regiments or battalions would share 1 regiment or battalions worth of vehicles. This means of course in time of call up we should have no problem getting a full complement of warm bodies for the ‘war time establishment’ of the units, plus probably some additional as ‘battle casualty replacements’.

The regular armoured brigades units would operate their squadrons / company’s on the 1 in 4 rotation, so that at any one time there should be a 12 tank squadron and a company of Warrior carried infantry available to the deployed MRB, with another available to support the ‘intervention’ brigade(s).

Medium wheeled:

• 4 x MRB each with:
• 1 x Brigade Recce Regiment on 8 x 8 AFV (e.g. Patria AMV or RG41)
• 1 x Armoured Infantry on 8 x 8 AFV
• 2 x Mechanised Infantry on 6 x 6 or 4 x 4 (e.g. RG35)

Potentially some Combat Support units would need the more expensive 8 x 8 vehicles. Combat Service Support would be mainly on the 6 x 6 or 4 x 4 platforms.

Notice that I am not mixing tracked FRES SV for Brigade Recce with the rest of the MRB on wheels. So we could go the cheap and easy short term route and ditch FRES SV family and rely on upgraded Warriors OR do the exact opposite and lever the investment in FRES SV and replace Warrior with FRES SV Protected Mobility variants.

The heavy armour units have potential to cause some of you varying amounts of apoplexy too. I would suggest 4 squadrons of 12 Challenger 2’s (4 x 12 = 42 + 2 = 50), plus a Recce squadron of 16 Warrior Recce variants – so I guess that’s a Type 66 Regiment ?

Also as TD has described for us previously, the upgrade path for Chally 2’s main armament is not an easy one; not easy to fit a 120mm smooth bore, nor easy to start production of a top of the range kinetic energy round for the current rifled gun. Two suggestions to fan the flames; put the Jordanian Falcon turret on them, or sell them off or scrap em’ and buy some second hand Leopard 2 A5 / A6’s.

The fifth Brigade / Formation Recce Regiment should have a vehicle able to support the Vikings and Warthogs of the intervention brigades – I am not going to map this to TD’s weight categories / break points , I will let you do that.

So, how many infantry battalions would we have all together in this heavy, medium, light and wheeled plus tracked force structure:

• 5 battalions in the ‘intervention’ brigades (1 in 3 Cdo, 4 in 16 AAB)
• 2 Armoured Infantry (tracked) on Warrior
• 4 Armoured Infantry (wheeled) on 8 x 8
• 8 Mechanised Infantry (wheeled) on 6 x 6 or 4 x 4
• 2 Cyprus garrison battalions
• 1 School of Infantry / Warminster battalion
• 4 London Public Duties Guards battalions

Unfortunately I guess this would need us to bring back the “arms plot” and rotate units through specialisms in order to mix in the nice jollies to Cyprus and chicks sticking phone numbers into bearskins, with the rotation of MRB’s into the latest trouble spot.

In summary, my second straw man proposal provides an army with everything from elite light infantry for airmobile ops (Paras in 16 AAB), to specialist armoured infantry in tracked AIFV’s, through similar troops but in wheeled vehicles, to mechanised infantry delivered to the edge of the battle area in less tactically mobile 6 x 6 vehicles (and hopefully we could afford to buy some of these for a decent amount of the reserve infantry too !). However although it offers a “well balanced” force to take on a “full spectrum” of operations, it would introduce a whole raft of different vehicle types:

• MBT and associated engineer support vehicles
• Tracked medium weight AIFV – Warrior AND FRES SV, or maybe consolidated on just one type
• Wheeled medium weight AIFV – for example the Patria AMV family or the BAe RG41 or similar
• Wheeled medium weight APC / FRES Utility Vehicle family – for example the BAe RG35 family
• Lighter weight wheeled family – Foxhound family in various versions
• High Mobility Protected mobility vehicles – BVS10 Mk2 Vikings for 3 Cdo Brigade Armoured Support group and STK Warthog for 16 AAB Armoured Support Group
• Light weight specialist vehicles – Supacats, ATV’s etc etc…..

Is this model affordable and sustainable ?

Discuss…………