The (Ex) Washington Realist

More on the President's Afghan Address

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 15:08:00 +0000

Some initial reaction to President Obama's speech.

Some further concerns about the roadblocks the president's strategy will have to overcome.

Time Slipping Away ...

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Fri, 27 Nov 2009 14:50:00 +0000

Honeymoons end, grace periods run out, deadlines emerge ... my concerns about the administration's scheduling.

The Next Fall of the Berlin Wall

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 21:09:00 +0000

I took part in the forum over at World Politics Review on the question of the next "Berlin Wall moment." Other participants include Thomas P.M. Barnett, Ian Bremmer and Alexander Kliment, Walter Russell Mead, and Jacqueline Newmyer.

My individual contribution looks at the "fall" of the Korean DMZ as removing the basis for the U.S. security architecture in East Asia the way that the Berlin Wall impacted the Soviet one.

Aftermath of the President's China Trip

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Sat, 21 Nov 2009 00:36:00 +0000

Some of my reaction to the presidential visit to China over at World Politics Review. Beijing is becoming much more confident in how it handles the bilateral relationship and this will certainly have an impact on the fifth generation of leadership.

Speaking of which, I came across an interesting report on the matter by Cheng Li; I am struck by some of the similarities one might draw with the Kremlin leadership, at least the younger members, in terms of diversity on one hand but the "we are all in the same boat" on the other in terms of preserving the system.

Query for TWR readers: any good Chinese studies of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine?

Thoughts on the Craig Resignation

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 16:30:00 +0000

Just some thoughts on the resignation of White House counsel Greg Craig. Perhaps I'm overestimating the impact, but one of the undercurrents I have started to detect from other countries regarding the Obama administration is that talk is not followed by action ... something I am monitoring.

Comments welcomed.

The Reality of Eurasia

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Sun, 08 Nov 2009 15:45:00 +0000

Chris Marsh and I just published this essay over at Policy Innovations, about the enduring nature of the Eurasian cultural and economic space nearly two decades after the collapse of the USSR. Moscow remains the air travel hub, the business hub, the communications hub and this trend doesn't appear to be changing anytime soon.

Quotes of the Day

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 14:37:00 +0000

From my colleague Dr. Andrew Stigler, a professor of national security studies here at the Naval War College:

"If peace were manufactured in factories, there would be a lot more Senators in favor of it." (A timely quote given the leak from the Hill about the Congressional probe into members of the defense appropriations committee.)

"There is no such thing as a diplomatic-industrial complex." (Although given the first steps of private military companies to offer humanitarian and development services, might one develop in the future?) And Parag Khanna might have a different view about a future diplomatic-industrial complex (via Diplopundit)

Focus on Central-east Europe Today ....

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 18:03:00 +0000

The Vice President reassures, but also wants central-east European states to move the relationship forward with the United States.

But is economics the real determining factor for the future of the region, and the roles of Russia and the West?

Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 18:56:00 +0000

An interesting post by Edward Luttwak over at Foreign Policy, the Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.

Several years back, I asked What Would the Byzantines Do?" in addressing contemporary foreign policy challenges. Glad to see the subject interests others. I haven't yet read Luttwak's book, but I certainly hope that Obolensky's and Ostrogorksy's contributions to the field are cited.

Don't Understand the Logic

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 16:53:00 +0000

Jeffrey Goldberg and Marty Peretz are both angry with the administration that cancelling missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic didn't win Russian support for greater pressure on Iran.

Why would it? We said missile defense wouldn't work, the technology wasn't there, the plan was a boondogle. We were pretty public about these comments. Why did we think they wouldn't be heard in Moscow? (Psst ... the new administration doesn't want to spend money on a system they don't think works). So why should any rational actor say, You stopped work on something you said wouldn't work, now we are supposed to give you something substantial in return? A working, deployed system is another thing--but that's not what we had in place. And no one should be surprised at the reaction.

Lavrov's Answer ... (And Clinton's Hope)

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 16:04:00 +0000

Over the past several weeks, I've asked whether there might be a change in the Russian position on Iran. Foreign Minister Lavrov gave a pretty clear answer: no. No support for new sanctions on Iran at this juncture. The Russians were unwilling to discuss with Secretary Clinton any specific new measures that might be used to pressure Iran--if the comments from "State Department sources" are accurate. Sure, down the line, if Iran doesn't change its behavior, maybe we'll talk again. But when the Geneva talks resume later this month, the United States doesn't have a credible threat to wield against Iran.

Also, in passing ... Secretary Clinton held out hope that Boeing will get a major Russia contract. I find it hard to believe that she "has hope" that Boeing will be
selected to provide planes for the new carrier Rosavia given that 51 percent
of the firm is owned by a Russian state company that includes the Russian
arms exporters and U.S. policy works against this companies sales (e.g. to
Iran) and that U.S. policy is working against Russian energy interests.
Unless she is compromising on other things that matter to Moscow ...

UPDATE: Press agencies are reporting that President Medvedev told Secretary Clinton that while he is pleased about the apparent success of the Geneva talks "he expects Iran to implement them and if they don't there should be sanctions," according to another "senior State Department official." It is being cited as proof of a breakthrough.

Again, I am not rushing to celebrate. "Should be" sanctions is not the same as "there will be". Define implementation of the Geneva agreements. As I said earlier, I don't see that the U.S. has gotten a firm commitment that strengthens its position when the talks resume.

The Vice President Heads East?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 12:09:00 +0000

Some thoughts on the vice president heading to central/eastern Europe, on another of his reassurance missions. What will be interesting to observe is what he's been authorized to offer ...

A greater conventional U.S. military presence in the region, including stationing forces and a Patriot missile battery in Poland, has been banded about. Will the administration decide that this is what it needs to proffer in order to reassure not only people in the region but its critics here that no new "Yalta" is in the offing?

Serving the Country?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Wed, 07 Oct 2009 14:28:00 +0000

James Joyner has an interesting essay over at the Atlantic Council, where he looks at the growing phenomenon of senior public servants who define their service in government as being "non-partisan" and the growing attempts to categorize their efforts as in fact being partisan--looking at recent coverage of both General Jones as the National Security Advisor and Bob Gates as Secretary of Defense and the implications that they are becoming partisan supporters of the president.

A James Baker Moment

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 13:12:00 +0000

David Billington raises a good point in his response to my earlier post about the Geneva talks. Doesn't the U.S. get what it wants if the Geneva agreement is actually implemented?

Yes and no. Yes in that the immediate danger of Iranian nuclear proflieration is ended. No in that the infrastructure and know-how remains intact, giving Iran a possible hedge down the road. The U.S. principal intent has always been to deproliferate Iran--with all equipment and facilities dismantled and removed--not to supervise an Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

I talk about the Obama administration facing a "James Baker moment" in this column. What I mean by the term is the extent to which the U.S. limits its own policy preferences in return for getting maximum international support on a key development [e.g. better to have a broad coalition supporting the explusion of Saddam Hussein from Iraq rather than go to Baghdad alone.]

Am I Too Pessimistic About the Iran Breakthrough?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 12:41:00 +0000

Some of my colleagues think I am underestimated the breakthrough that occurred in Geneva in the Iran talks. I acknowledge that Iran has made a seemingly major concession--sending uranium outside the country to be enriched--essentially a version of the Scowcroft plan proposed a few years back--and this could be the start toward ending the crisis. Where the deal easily could be hung up: Iran agrees to ship out the uranium but wants to keep all of its existing infrastructure with no dismantling as a hedge.

Why, if I have been stressing Russia's reluctance to sanction Iran, would they be instrumental in getting this deal through by being one of the parties involved in supplying Iran with the fuel? Well, to the extent that this "temporary" settlement only delays rather than resolves the Iran issue, then much of the status quo which benefits Russia stays in place--and Russia reaps benefits in Europe for its constructive role.

I assume that the U.S. perspective is one of eventual timing--delay works in our favor if we expect that time is against the current regime.

Just my thoughts--

An Answer to Takeyh's Question

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Thu, 01 Oct 2009 19:26:00 +0000

On the Newshour, September 24, 2009, Ray Takeyh, in responding to what to expect from the upcoming negotiations with Iran--"And the question is, can Iranians drag out that process in a rather inconclusive way by making slight modifications?"

Reuter's "Snap Analysis"concludes that Iran agreed to limited transparency measures and a promise of a future meeting but that no date has been set for the IAEA inspectors. Meanwhile, "the chances of making harsher sanctions work suffer from a lack of global will to enforce them."

Russia's Price?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Mon, 28 Sep 2009 20:42:00 +0000

Some thoughts, over at GlobalSecurity.org, on what game-changing events might need to occur to change Moscow's calculus on Iran. For your discussion.

So Does Obama-Medvedev Meeting Prove Me Wrong?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 23:09:00 +0000

Readers of TWR know that I am not particularly sanguine about getting major Russian help on Iran. Does tonight's Obama-Medvedev meeting prove me wrong? Medvedev acknowledged that sometimes sanctions are needed and that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. We also have the draft resolution for the UN Security Council on countries that seek to use civilian nuclear programs as the basis for weapons development.

But the crux of the matter for the U.S. is not when Tehran crosses the line and has a working bomb, it is trusting Iran to have a nuclear infrastructure like Japan's. I think that Russia will be far more supportive of "trusting" Iran with nuclear technology than a U.S. which would prefer a much higher degree of Iranian denuclearization. And I think it is here that we will still have daylight between the positions, unless something else changes the calculus.

The Passing of Irving Kristol

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Mon, 21 Sep 2009 12:09:00 +0000

Irving Kristol, who founded The National Interest in 1985--the magazine I had the honor of editing for several years--has passed away.

He created a forum for debate on foreign policy--particularly on first assumptions--and then let it take off from there.

I always found that first essay he did for TNI--"Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology"--to be a useful and even twenty-five years later prescient warning (minus the references to the USSR).

The conversation goes on ...

The Two Timetables

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 17:57:00 +0000

Thoughts on the two timetables that seem to guide American and Russian approaches to the Eurasian space. With the likely cancellation of the missile defense system for Poland and the Czech Republic, will this change the equation?

Iran Wants to Talk ... So What?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 15:43:00 +0000

The debate on Iran continues, and Geoff Kemp tells us why not to get any expectations up about the six-power talks (for Iran).

Meanwhile, two interesting pieces from David Rothkopf over at FP--on the "unused" reset button with Russia and the strange timing of the trade sanctions on China--both of which seem to prove the point that Iran is not at the center of U.S. foreign policy concerns (and that domestic concerns are still tops) ...

Well, I Knew It Was a Drill ...

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Fri, 11 Sep 2009 23:59:00 +0000

I am still receiving "Arlington Alert" messages even though I am now in Newport, and there was one this morning about a coast guard exercise taking place on the Potomac. Deleted it, moved on with my day. Then I check in late this afternoon to hear a whole media frenzy about terrorists on the river and gunfire and the president threatened at the Pentagon.

Guess the national news desks don't check with their Arlington affiliates?

What are We Prepared to Do (on Iran)?

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Tue, 01 Sep 2009 15:14:00 +0000

John Bolton lays out a persuasive case today in the Wall Street Journal as to why sanctions against Iran won't work to alter the behavior of the current government when it comes to acquiring a complete nuclear infrastructure. As long as Russia, China, Japan, India and some European countries do not fully commit to "strong sanctions", then enough loopholes remain for Iran to mitigate the full impact of sanctions.

So what to do? Is preventing Iran from completing its nuclear infrastructure the guiding point of American foreign policy--and are we going to put this at the center of our bilateral relationship with other powers? Are we credible when we suggest that we might act unilaterally (with potentially unpleasant consequences for the interests of others)?

Are we having the equivalent of the discussion between Officer Malone and Elliot Ness in the Untouchables?

- What are you prepared to do?
- Everything within the law.

- And then what are you prepared to do? If you open the ball on these people, you must be prepared to go all the way.

Or not--if you think that containment works and is feasible.

Afghan Elections

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Wed, 26 Aug 2009 19:57:00 +0000

With about 17 percent of the vote in, the electoral commission has released an unofficial tally--with Karzai leading at 45 percent (but not over the 50 percent barrier to avoid a run-off) and Abdullah at 31 percent.

Let's assume--and keeping in mind that it is a very fluid count plus there are thousands of fraud allegations--that this pattern holds.

Would voters who didn't vote for Karzai in round one cast ballots for him in the run-off, or is Abdullah the beneficiary?

If Abdullah wins, what does this do for U.S. strategy? Further stabilize the north but hinder efforts to gain support among Pashtuns against the Taliban?

Like Bosnia, Afghanistan is a country where one group forms a clear plurality but where this plurality cannot dominate the entire country. If you have a "minority" president and a northern dominated government, does this act as a shot in the arm for the Taliban revival in the guise of protecting the Pashtuns?

Just some speculation.

Claiming Success from the Weather

noreply@blogger.com (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) — Mon, 24 Aug 2009 12:54:00 +0000

Piracy was out of the news for while (until the Russian timber ship was hijacked), but as my colleague J. Peter Pham notes, let's not forget that piracy is a climate-driven enterprise. Attacks resume when the weather improves.

And piracy is increasingly a global criminal enterprise, not just a bunch of rag-tag fisherman. As he notes today over at Foreign Policy:

... modern piracy is a sophisticated enterprise; pirates have proven themselves to be highly adaptable. Turkish Rear Adm. Caner Bener, commander of CTF 151, acknowledged last month, "While our ability to deter and disrupt attacks has improved over time, we are constantly adapting the way we do our business as the pirates adapt and modify their tactics."