[ comment ] For Iran, 2013 could be one of the most challenging years--both at home and in relations with the outside world--since the 1979 revolution. The Islamic Republic faces the potential of stronger economic sanctions and even an Israeli and/or U.S. military strike because of its intransigence in complying with U.N. resolutions on its nuclear program.

But the world's only modern theocracy also must deal with twin domestic challenges-- deepening malaise among the young and increasing tensions among the political elite. Both could be important factors in the presidential election scheduled for June 14, which will feature a new slate of candidates since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will have served the two-term limit. Home-grown problems could outweigh the regime's foreign policy woes.

The Nuclear Controversy

Iran and the world's major powers have all indicated an interest in a new round of diplomatic talks in 2013 to end the long standoff over Tehran's controversial nuclear program. The gap is still enormous, however, after three rounds in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow in 2012. The big question is whether Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is truly interested in making a deal--and on terms that will also satisfy the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia.

Khamenei is not easily swayed by pressure. He has survived imprisonment and lived through the revolution, assassination attempts, the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, popular uprisings, and decades of sanctions. He views Iran's uranium enrichment program not only as a natural and legal right, but also a measure of Tehran's success against the United States. In 2012, he often publicly talked about the U.S. "decline" in the Middle East, reflected in part by the fall of three pro-American rulers with other U.S. allies wobbling. Tehran also spins the so-called Arab Spring as an "Islamic awakening" modeled on its own Islamic revolution.

Despite what he says publicly, however, Khamenei is also savvy enough to know that the same political changes represent new challenges for his regime as well. Syrian President Bashar Assad, Tehran's most important Arab ally, is under siege from a protest movement that turned into a surprisingly powerful military campaign. The spillover impacts Lebanon's Hezbollah, which also faces its own unique problems. And other regional powers, most notably Turkey, are increasingly questioning Iran's geopolitical aspirations.

The Economy

Iran begins 2013 with growing economic woes that may be an important calculation in Khamenei's decision. He needs tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues to maintain a vast and often loyal network that has maintained his rule as Iran's ultimate leader for the past 23 years. But the world's toughest sanctions, soaring inflation, and the plummeting value of Iran's currency produced the perfect economic storm in 2012. And Tehran's economic crisis will not end any time soon.

Iran's oil exports declined by as much as one-half in 2012, a factor that could produce additional pressure from key Khamenei constituents, including the Bazaar merchant class and the powerful Revolutionary Guards.

But chronic mismanagement is the chief cause of Iran's economic problems. After his 2005 election, President Ahmadinejad eliminated economic planning agencies such as the Management and Planning Organization. He also sidelined skilled technocrats who were not politically loyal to him. He fueled inflation by injecting massive cash into the economy and reducing subsidies. During his presidency, imports of goods from Asia and Europe skyrocketed, contributing to the closure or bankruptcy of hundreds of Iranian factories. The list goes on and on.

Corruption across the regime has contributed to the economic crisis. In 2012, the Islamic Republic was perceived as one of the most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. It ranked 133rd--tied with Russia, Kazakhstan, Honduras and Guyana--out of the 176 countries and territories that were ranked.

The Revolutionary Guards, which control large parts of the economy, are also reportedly corrupt. The most powerful military organization in Iran has charitable foundations (bonyads) that are tax-exempt and largely free of government scrutiny. The Guards have also been linked to illicit smuggling and narcotics trafficking. Some veteran officers have reportedly amassed significant wealth.

The economy is now the Islamic Republic's Achilles Heel. Iran has been successful in educating millions of Iranians and rebuilding its infrastructure after the Iran-Iraq War. But it has not reached the potential of a country with one of the world's largest reserves of oil and natural gas and a well-educated and resourceful population.

Presidential Election

The Islamic Republic begins 2013 with anxiety among both the public and the government over the impending presidential election. The 2009 election produced the deepest political schism since the revolution, with millions turning out in massive popular protests across the country to challenge the official outcome. It gave birth to the opposition Green Movement and created an enduring crisis of legitimacy for the Supreme Leader.

The 2013 election may be more tightly scripted than any earlier presidential race to prevent serious debates or competition. Candidates are technically vetted by the Guardian Council, but they must also have the Supreme Leader's unspoken approval. As the regime becomes increasingly militarized, candidates may also need to either have ties to the Revolutionary Guards or be amenable to its interests.

In December 2012, the Iranian parliament passed legislation requiring all candidates to have the endorsement of more than 100 of the regime's "experts" and to be between the ages of 40 and 75. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who has long been Khamenei's main political rival and a focus of hardline ire, is now 78 years old. He ran again in 2005 against Ahmadinejad, but lost. He is now excluded from running again.

Other potential challengers also appear to be sidelined--at least for now. Among them is Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is Ahmadinejad's ally and in-law. (Their children are married.) Khamenei loyalists have called him a "deviant" threat to the clergy and the Supreme Leader.

The spectrum of rivals reflects the unprecedented divisions. All were among the early revolutionaries who ousted the shah and hung together for more than a decade. Ahmadinejad, a hardliner who had Khamenei's full endorsement just four years ago, is now perceived as a threat to the Supreme Leader's hold on power.

But the most important challenge to the regime may still come from the Green Movement. Its symbolic leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are under house arrest but they remain a potent threat to Khamenei's rule, perhaps even more than an Israeli military strike or U.S. sanctions.

This article is presented by Tehran Bureau, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as part of the Iran project at iranprimer.usip.org.

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The United States is enforcing two types of sanctions on Iran: congressionally mandated ones enacted via legislation, and executive-branch-driven ones instituted via executive order. The repeal or amendment of the congressionally enacted ones must follow the same legislative process all bills must undergo to be passed and signed into law. According to the Treasury Department, there are currently nine acts of Congress that provide the statutory framework for the U.S. sanctions regimen imposed on Tehran.

To repeal or amend any of these statutes, a member of Congress would have to sponsor an entirely new bill. An amendment can be designed to remove sections of and/or add to an existing statute. As with all pieces of legislation, a move to repeal previous acts of Congress must be voted out of committee before reaching the full House of Representatives and Senate.

Given the influence exerted on members of Congress by lobbying entities such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Iranian opposition groups such as the Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organization (MKO) -- whose State Department designation as a foreign terrorist organization was recently lifted, thus enabling it to raise funds and make donations in the United States -- there may be a lack of will on Capitol Hill to soften the sanctions regimen, even in the event of a grand bargain between the Obama administration and Iran. Executive orders cannot alter statutes, so should such an impasse transpire, the president may have to resort to rousing public opinion by lambasting Congress for failing to act in the interests of national security.

With regards to those sanctions instituted by means of executive order, the process of repeal or amendment is much simpler. The president need simply sign an order that takes precedence over any relevant previous ones. There are at present 25 executive orders that provide legal justification for sanctioning Iran. President Barack Obama could provide significant sanctions relief unilaterally by releasing Iranian assets frozen in the aftermath of the hostage crisis in 1979, or by allowing certain business transactions between the two countries that are explicitly blocked only by executive order, such as the sale of spare aircraft parts for Iran's aging fleet of U.S.-built airliners.

While the sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 would seem to bar the Islamic Republic from actually paying for such goods, the president arguably could instruct the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control and the State Department's Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation to provide exemptions and waivers to companies and countries who wish to do business with Iran in certain defined fields. Alternatively, the administration could simply not enforce the law in particular instances, as with Obama's decision that the government would curtail the deportation of undocumented immigrants. The constitutionality of this tactic is a matter of debate.

Peacefully resolving the nuclear issue with Iran will be difficult in its own right, but removing sanctions could prove to be just as difficult, due not only to the aforementioned factors of congressional process and lobbying influence, but also to the wording of the sanctions legislation. For instance, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 states that sanctions can be lifted only once the Islamic Republic has released all political prisoners; ceased all violence against and maltreatment of Iranian citizens engaged in peaceful political activity; conducted a transparent investigation into the killings and abuse of peaceful political activists and prosecuted those responsible; and made progress toward the establishment of an independent judiciary. Furthermore, the president must also certify that the Iranian government has ended its support for acts of terrorism and that it no longer meets the standard for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism; and that it has halted the pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic weapons. In other words, even if Washington and Tehran were to resolve their differences over the Iranian nuclear program, that would be far from sufficient statutorily to permit the lifting of sanctions. The Obama administration may have no choice but to ignore these provisions of the law; there may never be a peaceful resolution otherwise.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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[ dispatch ] The sun has set on Tehran. It is Yalda now.

It is Thursday, December 20, the last day of the month of Azar in the Persian calendar. The winter solstice has begun -- the longest night of the year, the night of Yalda. The history of the seasonal celebration dates back to pre-Islamic Iran and the Mithraists, for whom Yalda was the night when Mithra, the angel of light and truth, was born. The tradition was adopted in turn by the Zoroastrians. With the arrival of Islam on the Iranian Plateau, Yalda became a purely social occasion without religious or official standing. For centuries, it was quietly observed by many Iranians with family gatherings and readings from the classical masters such as Hafez. That has largely changed.

Cars choke the streets of Tehran and the capital's notorious traffic jams are even worse than usual. People are heading to their Yalda parties after lining up outside shops since early afternoon. The shelves of pastry stores are empty. The prices for pistachios and the dried fruit-and-nut mix known as ajil have been rising for the past week, although the bakery and candy shop syndicate has announced that there is no shortage of Yalda treats. Coffee shops across the city have hung signs inviting people to come celebrate Yalda. To a foreign observer, it would seem self-evident that a national holiday is being observed.

Is this the norm in modern Iran? Morteza, a cab driver who works out of an agency on Sattar Khan Street in west Tehran, does not think so. "Yalda became important in the last few years; it was just a tradition and not a very important one." Nooshin, a psychologist from south Tehran, agrees. "Yalda was an occasion for people to get together, to meet their elders and to recite poetry and have fresh fruits and snacks." Now, "Yalda is a really big deal for many," she says. "From a night of family reunions and poetry readings, Yalda has evolved into a night of dancing and parties." She has seen many Yalda fêtes where alcohol -- entirely illegal in the Islamic Republic -- flowed freely.

For Bahareh, a 36-year-old physician, Yalda is a time to mix old traditions with new habits. "In our family, we usually get together at my grandparents' house. All my uncles and aunts are there with their children." She used to find such gatherings fun, but as Bahareh grew older her tastes changed. "I like my family, but hanging out with the older generation can be a bit boring," she says.

Tonight she will drop by her grandparents' place, but then head elsewhere for most of the evening. "My brother and I will hit a few parties in the north of Tehran." She even plans a costume change: a fashionable, yet modest outfit for the family will be followed by an evening dress for the party rounds. "It's a younger crowd and you need to look good," she explains. As for alcohol, she is looking forward to having some wine after hearing her grandfather read from Hafez. "A party without alcohol is not a party!" she proclaims. She is rushing home as her itinerary requires careful preparation.

The shift in how Yalda is celebrated has had economic consequences, as evidenced by those retail queues. In the Yousef Abad neighborhood, at one point there were at least 80 people lined up outside Bibi, a popular pastry shop. The cost of watermelon, a Yalda delicacy, has risen to new heights. Many from north Tehran have headed to farmers' markets on the south side to try to find it at a reasonable price. Javid, a grocery store owner in his mid-50s, is not happy. "Damn truck drivers halt by the roadside to sell their load to the passersby. I cannot find what my customers need and am losing clients to these pirates!" There is a heavy trade in alcoholic beverages as well. Kasra, a 26-year-old salesman, has already received his order of beer and Cognac for the night.

Kashani, who runs a pastry shop close to Vali Asr Square, says the celebration is good for his business. "People start to shop for Yalda a day or two before.... They come early to place orders so they can pick up fresh pastries in the afternoon." His cakes and cream puffs disappear as soon as they emerge from the kitchen. Kashani compares the increase in his sales to the one that precedes Nowruz, the Persian New Year's holiday. "It is not quite as much as Nowruz, but it is similar, maybe one of the biggest nights after that for us." The spike in pistachio and pastry prices tends to presage the level of temporary inflation around New Year's.

"What makes people happy is good for business and right now Yalda makes them happy," says Kashani. Last year, he ran out of baked goods on Yalda. This year, he believes, he is fully prepared to meet the increased demand.

Why has Yalda grown into such a major festival? According to Morteza, "People have no real entertainment, they are not happy anymore. They use any excuse to celebrate." Almost everyone I ask replies with some variation on that theme. Nooshin, for instance: "Yalda has become important because our people are looking for new ways of entertainment, trying to be happy." Mr. Hosseini, a retired teacher in his 60s, says, "People are celebrating their heritage. They want to tell the government that they are Iranians and they have Iranian heritage too."

Celebrating Yalda as a way of underscoring a distinctly Iranian identity is not new, says Nooshin. "However, people have become adamant about their cultural identity recently," she asserts. Mr. Hosseini concurs completely. "Our government wants to change us into something we are not. People do not want that and use every opportunity to keep their traditions." Riding Morteza's cab, he noticed how much more visible the celebration is around the capital compared to years past. "The government does not like Yalda, but now they have to acknowledge it because of the people."

It does seems that the authorities are taking notice. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) 1 is airing the American blockbuster comedy Meet the Parents. Dubbed into Persian, it has been rigorously censored according to IRIB rules. No one has any doubt, however, that it is a special screening for Yalda. Other TV and radio channels are broadcasting Persian music and poetry readings. A national photography competition dedicated to capturing Yalda moments is being held.

Still, the regime is hardly joining the party wholesale. A group of high-ranking clerics just announced that Friday, the day after Yalda, is the anniversary of the Second Imam, Hassan Mojtaba, whose martyrdom has traditionally been mourned three weeks later. The pious are advised to mark the occasion with prayer and mourning ceremonies. Morteza believes the sudden change of calendar is intended to dampen the public mood on Yalda itself. If indeed that was the intent, it has evidently failed.

It is getting late and the streets are still jammed. Yalda has just begun. Tehran, under the veil of darkness, celebrates its own unconquerable spirit.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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[ overview ] The Islamic Republic of Iran learned the importance of unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, technology in its defense against Saddam Hussein's armed forces during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. Among the various forms of support the United States lent the Iraqi regime, American intelligence was providing satellite imagery of Iran's military positions. To partially redress the imbalance in surveillance capabilities, in 1983 Iran began to develop its own drone technology through two firms, Quds Air Industries and Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company. The drones they produced, dubbed Talash and Mohajer, were used extensively during the final years of the war with Iraq.

Since the war, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had led further Iranian pursuits in the field of drone technology. The past 12 months have seen a series of confrontations and technological developments involving both Iranian and U.S. drones.

In early December 2011, the Revolutionary Guards managed to capture an RQ-170 Sentinel -- an advanced American drone, nicknamed the "Beast of Kandahar" after its extensive deployment in Afghanistan. Iran declared that it had brought down the Lockheed Martin-produced drone almost entirely intact.

This November, Iran announced that one of its planes had shot at an American Predator drone flying over the Persian Gulf, allegedly in Iranian airspace. According to Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the Guards' aerospace division, those were warning shots: "Americans should be aware of our red lines and observe them." Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammad Khazaei, wrote to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to complain about what he described as repeated U.S. violations of Iranian airspace near the Bushehr power station, which he called "illegal and provocative acts."

Earlier this month, on the eve of the anniversary of the Beast's capture, Hajizadeh told reporters that Iranian technicians had succeeded in cracking its encrypted software.

He claimed that Washington had made a show of using the drone to mollify Israel, which was demanding that it do something about the Iranian nuclear program. "All of the RQ-170's data was downloaded and it did not have even one single nuclear mission over Iran," Hajizadeh declared.

This odd assertion could well indicate that Iranian experts had in fact failed to extract the drone's secrets, perhaps because its computer systems had erased their contents, a safeguard employed by software designers for highly sensitive information.

Hajizadeh also boasted about his department's successes in manufacturing highly sophisticated drones. Referring to a drone that Iran's Hezbollah allies in Lebanon used to infiltrate Israeli airspace recently, he said, "Ayob was our product from the last decade." In September, the Guards unveiled a new drone with capabilities far surpassing those of the Ayob, the Shahed 129.

It was an unusual move for Hezbollah to publicly announce that the drone used against Israel was manufactured in Iran and assembled in Lebanon, and even more unusual when Iran publicly backed Hezbollah's claim.

In early December, as well, the Guards' naval chief, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, announced that his forces had captured a ScanEagle drone, one of the many operated by the U.S. Navy.

Fadavi told the Fars News Agency that the drone -- a low-cost long-range surveillance model -- had conducted several reconnaissance flights over the Persian Gulf in recent days, while the American navy asserted that none of its ScanEagles were missing.

Iranian state TV showed a ScanEagle that appeared virtually brand-new and hardly like one that had been brought down in the Persian Gulf, as had been suggested.

Since the American use of drones has increased exponentially since President Barack Obama took office, notably over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, it is hardly far-fetched to believe it is employing drones over Iran for intelligence gathering.

Based on the available evidence, though Iran's ScanEagle claim must be treated with suspicion given its routine exaggerations and fabrications about its military prowess, it seems increasingly likely that this drone war will turn even hotter, with Tehran giving the green light to its armed forces to shoot down an American drone over the Persian Gulf or its Iranian coast.

The Islamic Republic clearly saw strategic benefit in delivering indirect blows to U.S. military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, arming and otherwise backing anti-American forces. As those operations have wound down, the most hardline Guard commanders have been looking for a new theater in which to make a show of force against the United States.

Iran cannot go toe-to-toe with the American military machine, but there is a strong sense among Guard commanders that Washington has no stomach for another war, a conviction that is encouraging them to make not only extravagant claims, but bold choices as well. There is little question as to where they will look to flex their muscles: the Persian Gulf.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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How viral video can make a difference for Iranians.

[ opinion ] Despite the Iranian government's well-documented lack of respect for its citizens' civil and political rights, it readily bemoans and condemns any perceived violation of such rights by states beyond the shrinking orbit of its allies and business partners. From prison abuses to crackdowns on political and economic protestors -- the sorts of events that are often completely invisible when they take place here within Iran -- are sensationalized when they take place abroad, receiving extensive coverage in the state and state-aligned press and on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting's array of domestic and international channels.

The protests that followed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's June 2009 reelection, widely believed to have been rigged, were labeled "sedition," facilitating authorities' claims that they were justified in using brutal means to stop "foreign-sponsored saboteurs" and "rioters." By contrast, American and British police crackdowns on Occupy protesters and London rioters were reported as unjustified, criminal state aggression.

In fact, the Islamic Republic professes such deep care about the human rights of other states' citizens that, a few months back, it adopted the cause of Canada's First Nations people. At a time when the Iranian economic system has been devastated by sanctions and ordinary Iranians are suffering, the regime flew two former First Nations chiefs to Tehran and offered financial and other assistance. Iranians took to social media websites like Facebook, where some level of anonymity is still possible, to voice their often dark-humored objections. One netizen, for example, congratulated Canada's aboriginal peoples tribe becoming the Islamic Republic's new wards.

Through such applications of double standards, the Islamic Republic attempts to obscure the perniciousness of its own actions, for audiences both at home and abroad, by widening the circle of perpetrators. It also seeks to excuse its behavior internally by convincing Iranians that what happens here happens as well in so-called democratic states, and that they thus have little choice but to resign themselves to their fate with little fuss.

In cases of police brutality in the West, the people are free to take their attackers to court and seek justice. While it is theoretically possible to file suit against government authorities in the Islamic Republic, it is almost impossible in actual practice. An example is the 2009 killings in the Kahrizak detention center in which three young protesters lost their lives in custody. Despite officially expressed state outrage at the "gross negligence that led to this tragedy" and even an investigation by a specially appointed Majles commission, nearly four years later, the evidently culpable parties -- judges, intelligence operatives, police officers, prison guards -- have yet to be held accountable. Not a single person involved in the murders has been put behind bars.

Recently lawmaker Souroush Farhadian brazenly made light of the crimes. "How many people died in Kahrizak?" he asked. "Three people. Is the blood of three people more important or all of Iran and Islam and the world? It happens! No one hands out sweets in a fight."

Relatives of dissident blogger Sattar Beheshti, who was killed in custody last month, have been threatened simply for demanding answers about the circumstances surrounding his death.

Indeed, even when the average Iranian goes to the police station to report a theft or mugging, the customary response is "What do you want us to do about it?" What much of the rest of the world considers normal police duty, the Islamic Republic's functionaries treat as an exceptional favor.

So what do we do about it?

Some have adopted a deeply warped (and resigned) outlook. "They have every right to mug others," said one person I spoke to recently about the rising rate of street crime. "When they see they are being robbed blind by this regime, and they can't make ends meet, of course they turn to mugging."

Perhaps it's because our officials have such a full docket. Since they rarely feel the need to establish probable cause to arrest or beat a "confession" out of someone, since the way you dress or walk down the street is sufficient provocation for an officer to haul you in, it's easy to comprehend that their resources are stretched thin.

Neither publishing open letters nor lodging formal complaints about acts of terror and negligence by state functionaries yields much in the way of results. However, a notorious gang of muggers was recently arrested, apparently only because a citizen filmed one of their assaults and the video went viral online.

And so we are left to a few brave souls like the one who captured this video to make a difference in how the Islamic Republic respects its own nominal system of justice.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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[ idē ] From archaeological excavations that suggest northwest Iran was one of the earliest places where wine was produced -- more than 6,000 years ago -- to the tale of medieval French knights bringing grapes from the city of Shiraz, where the great Persian poet Hafez lived and wrote about his love of drink, there are many historical associations between wine and the land of Iran. In more recent times, Chateau Sardasht is still remembered by those who lived in Iran before the 1979 Revolution. Nowadays, visitors to Napa Valley can view the Persopolitan-looking Darioush Winery, one of California's leading vintners.

But there are other, more fanciful observations that inform the Western notion that Iranian culture was veritably drowning itself in wine in antiquity. Athenaeus, a Greek author who wrote about all things related to food, mentions that the Achaemenid king Darius the Great had the following inscription on his tomb: "I was able to drink a great deal of wine and to bear it well." Such an inscription is nowhere to be found. A similar picture is painted of Xerxes the Great in the biblical Book of Esther (1:10), where we read that the "heart of the king was merry with wine." Some commentators have suggested that the Achaemenid ruler was drunk when he ordered the beautiful young girls brought before him, so he could choose a new queen.

The fifth century BCE historian Herodotus claimed not only that the Persians were very fond of wine, but that they routinely made important decisions while drunk on it. According to Herodotus, the day after such a drunken deliberation, the Persians would reconsider their decision and if they still approved, adopt it. This is, to put it mildly, a highly unlikely image of a group of people who were able to carve out one of the largest empires in antiquity and sustain it for two centuries. Are we to think that they just got lucky over and over again when they were drunk out of their minds? This is certainly the view that the Greeks promoted and Iranian irrationality remains a topos in Western culture. A striking recent example comes in the 2009 movie by Bill Maher, Religulous, in which as soon as Iranians are mentioned, there is a scene of a party and people drinking alcohol out of the bottle in a frenzy.

But if one looks at the internal Iranian evidence, for example Zoroastrian texts, a new image of the importance of wine in classical Iran emerges. The most interesting of these texts is one called The Spirit of Wisdom from the sixth century CE. One chapter discusses how wine can bring one's good and bad dispositions, and argues that those who drink it in moderation benefit in enhanced awareness and intellectual facility: "this that is forgotten will be remembered and goodness will take place in thought and it will increase the sight of the eye and hearing of the ear and the speech of the tongue, and doing work and managing will proceed faster." Relative temperance, however, is emphasized. "But anyone who drinks wine must be conscious to drink in moderation, since through moderate drinking of wine this much goodness will come to him, because food will be digested and kindle fire [of the body], and increase intelligence and the mind and seed and blood, and reject torment."

The key here appears to be the Iranian notion of "moderation," a concept that existed among the Greeks as well, but which they somehow overlooked when they turned their gaze on Iran. As the classical Iranians saw it, drinking wine in moderation made one more attentive and mentally keen. This idea is not so alien to us in the modern world, but it was simply not associated with the Iranians when they were being observed from outside. So it appears quite plausible that the classical Iranians made important decisions while drinking wine, and then just to make sure that they had not exceeded moderation, weighed their decisions again the next day. This is a picture drastically different from the familiar one that was painted from afar. Ethnic stereotyping has a long history, not least when it comes to Iran.

IDÉ is where ideas are discussed in the magazine. Dr. Touraj Daryaee is a history professor at the University of California, Irvine.

related reading | That Sweet Iranian Spirit | Breaking the Stereotypes of Persia and Iran

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[ media watch ] Young Iranians start learning English in school by the sixth grade. And many begin even younger.

"Iranians are obsessed with having their kids speak English," one journalist working in Iran tells Tehran Bureau. "So many families put their children in kindergartens that teach English.... English classes are an inseparable part of the children's lives."

But officials of the Islamic Republic have never been known for their mastery of the lingua franca.

"Most Iranians consider their ignorance and incompetence as representatives of the nation and an embarrassment to the country," the journalist adds.

"Mind you, in order to earn a Ph.D. in Iran you need to pass the TOEFL" -- Test of English as a Foreign Language -- "and many of these officials allegedly have a Ph.D. So the question is how did they become doctors when they can't even speak or read basic English?"

In Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became as infamous for his English deficiency as for other, more internationally notorious matters. "Yes, happy new year," he responded to a simple "How are you?" from Russian Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev.

On June 9, 2011, then acting Iranian Oil Minister Mohammad Aliabadi's English accent as he read his opening statement from a sheet of paper at the OPEC summit in Vienna prompted many to joke about it having been transliterated in Persian.

In the video posted above, a reporter from Iranian state television's Channel 6 "News Network" (IRINN) asks participants in a meeting where a U.N. representative is delivering a speech in English whether they understand any of it.

No, they say, with a shrug. Many look like they may be members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The second half of the video features the head of the Iranian Football Federation, Ali Kafashian, struggling to deliver a speech in English at the Asian Sports Awards in Kuala Lumpur on November 29.

Kafashian previously served as secretary-general of Iran's National Olympic Committee, a job that also requires fluency in English.

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I arrived around noon and rented a scooter to tour round the island. This trip was to deeply influence my subsequent experience of Iran. I discovered a set of very suggestive forms and colors: crusts of brilliant white salt, iron-rich red soil, dark volcanic rocks, springs and ponds with transparent water colored by minerals, some bushes, isolated trees, jagged hills, at times rising up sharply, and an intense blue sky.

My initial impression was that I had been plunged into a world of unreal landscapes. Now, so many years later, I understand the reason for this better. Those landscapes rich in forms and colors were as if stripped of that third dimension which usually characterizes our everyday world. Perhaps it was the strong, very clear light, the incredibly bright hues, the limpidness and almost complete absence of shadows, the deep silence and the total solitude, but those scenes seemed to be contrived. They appeared to have been portrayed on a canvas, but with no perspective, in a style reminiscent of miniature painting.

Since then that type of landscape has stuck in my mind as a kind of ideal model that I have always sought to find again and to photograph on my many trips to Iran. At that time, however, photography had not yet become a predominant part of my education, a part that eventually coincided with my way of observing the world. So I took only a few shots and was more interested in admiring and trying to understand rather than record my feelings for aesthetic purposes. I am particularly fond of some of those photographs (shot in Bandar-e Abbas and Hormuz), which are now included in an exhibition that opens this week on Hormuz itself.

I returned to the area twice: in 1980 (the photographs of the island of Qeshm and some photographs of Bandar-e Abbas are from that time) and 1995 (when I visited and photographed the area of Chah Bahar). In those circumstances, too, I only made brief trips, characterized more by the pleasure of the experience than by my efforts to take photographs. Inspired by the idea of the current exhibition, I searched my archives of these two last journeys for some images to set beside those of Hormuz. The aim was to construct a small collection that, apart from being my own personal travelogue of those three distant journeys, would also convey an idea of the places in a blend of memory and documentation. At that time I was still working with slides which, because of the many years that have elapsed, now inevitably show signs of aging (especially the grain and the colors). But overall the material is in a satisfactory condition.

They are photographs of a past that I have come to reconsider today and, as often happens in such situations, I find some things with which I still identify and others that now feel more remote. Almost half the photos are of people: women with brightly colored clothes and the famous "masks" walking (but never on the seafront) with a jar or can on their heads; more soberly dressed fishermen who idly and melancholically wander along the seashore looking at their own boats or directly at the camera; children and adolescents walking, playing, working, thinking, or observing you, all on the seafront.

The remaining images are of landscapes, mainly from the interior of Hormuz, but there are also some seascapes (two at sunset) near the island of Qeshm. Some typical vessels also feature: they have been shot both in deep water or stranded at low tide, while a couple of close-ups satisfy my innate tendency to abstract representation. Photographs of architecture portray two types of buildings found in the area -- Portuguese castles and mosques.

The overall picture is of an area outside the current conflicts -- a beautiful, fascinating, and peaceful realm. Moreover, in this region Iranians and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis live together in keeping with the cosmopolitan spirit of the past, offering a great opportunity for fraternity and progress. The hope is that with the help of science, culture, and art the day will soon come when local natural resources will be secured from any threat, and military helicopters and aircraft carriers will leave the sea forever to dolphins and seagulls.

The exhibition will be held in Paradise Art Centre, Hormuz Island, from December 17, 2012, to April 17, 2013. Another exhibition of the photographs on show in Hormuz will be staged in the Cinema Belas Artes, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, from January 31 to March 3, 2013. The photographs will also be published in the first issue of the magazine Âyiné (January 2013), dedicated to the region of Hormuz.

see also | Down Persian Roads

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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Reversal of the Day

Parliament does a 180 on presidential eligibility legislation

It is standard procedure in the Majles for legislators to vote on a multipart bill in its entirety and only subsequently to debate and vote on its individual articles. But what occurred over the past week concerning legislation that would have imposed a sweeping new set of qualifications for potential presidential candidates was anything but standard. The new election law, which passed by a wide margin in its overall form, was effectively gutted when its crucial article was found by the same legislature to be unconstitutional by a far wider margin.

According to Article 115 of the Iranian Constitution, a presidential candidate must have significant religious or political standing and be a "citizen of Iran, of Iranian parents, wise and able, of good reputation and background, and a true believer in the official religion of the country and the founding pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran." The Guardian Council -- a 12-member constitutional body, half hand-picked by the Supreme Leader and half named by the chief of the judiciary, with parliamentary approval -- exercises vetting power over all those who register as candidates, determining who passes muster under Article 115 and who does not.

At the beginning of the week, the Majles voted 144 to 91 in favor of legislation that would have added stringent new eligibility requirements to the constitutional roster: minimum and maximum age; a master's or doctoral degree (interpretations of the bill's language have varied); and the attestation of dozens or even hundreds of government officials, academics, or clerics that a potential candidate meets the religious/political significance and "wise and able" standards.

Those provisions stirred controversy among widely divergent camps. They were opposed both by defenders of the Guardian Council, who saw them as undermining its vetting authority, and pro-democracy commentators, who saw them as further limiting Iranians' already constricted choice in possible leaders. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke out vehemently against the legislation; it is widely assumed that he is maneuvering to have a member of his inner circle succeed him in next June's presidential election and that he saw the law as a means of eliminating any chance that his favored candidate would be approved. And those who hope to see 78-year-old former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani make another run for the office surely noted that the maximum age requirement would have barred that possibility.

Just days later, when the Majles took up debate on the legislation's individual articles, deputy Ali Reza Salimi moved that Article 7, encompassing all of the controversial new eligibility requirements, violated the Constitution. Speaker Ali Larijani (pictured above), who had personally pitched the virtues of the legislation to the Guardian Council -- half of whose members were chosen by his brother, judiciary chief Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani -- observed that the council also maintained that it was unconstitutional and thus seconded Salimi's objection. With Larijani, the parliament's top officer and the legislation's most prominent advocate, having turned against it, the Majles rejected Article 7 as unconstitutional by a vote of 162 to 19.

The reversal of the new election law is seen as an unambiguous victory for the Guardian Council, a bastion of hardline conservatism within the Islamic Republic's ruling system. While the requirement for a would-be candidate to obtain the support of scores of respected figures could readily be seen as a de jure limitation on democratic liberties, in actual practice, it might well have given non-hardline candidates the opportunity to amass and demonstrate both popular and institutional support before council vetting. Article 7's swift demise leaves the Guardian Council with a free hand to reject any nominee whom it finds politically incorrect.

First Nuclear-Themed Video of the Day

Voice of America interview with former chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian. According to Mousavian, the global community has failed to comprehend and thus effectively deal with the Islamic Republic's political judgments about its nuclear program and the international economic sanctions that have targeted it. "Iranian political behavior is completely different under threats and pressures," he says. "If they want Iran to be more flexible and cooperative, they should understand Iran cannot show flexibility and cooperation under threats and sanctions. This is what the world powers -- especially the Western powers -- they do not understand about the realities inside Iran. They believe if they increase sanctions and pressures, they would get Iran to agree to change its nuclear policy. It's not gonna happen."

Second Nuclear-Themed Video of the Day

Columbia University professor Gary Sick describes to Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose how little Iran's geopolitical interests have actually changed from the monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to the Islamic Republic that Ayatalloh Ruhollah Khomeini installed in 1979. "Iran's nuclear policy today is really scarcely different at all from the Shah's nuclear policy," he says. "When the Shah was doing it, we [the United States] were giving him nuclear reactors. We were assisting him in every way we could. We were competing for his business. And we thought this was just dandy, although there were people around saying, 'Hey, he's really going for a bomb.' We were prepared to just ignore that, close our eyes to it and help, because he was a friend of ours. The mullahs are doing exactly the same thing."

Photos of the Day

Antiquities in the National Museum of Iran, visited this week by a delegation from the Republic of Moldova.

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]]> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/news-majles-backflips-in-election-law-folly-whats-new-is-old-in-nuke-policy.html /wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/news-majles-backflips-in-election-law-folly-whats-new-is-old-in-nuke-policy.html Press Roundup slider Thu, 13 Dec 2012 09:30:06 +0330 A lesson in the utility of an unpopular chief executive.

[ news analysis ] Two major events recently took place within the recondite realm of Iranian power politics that on initial view may appear to stand in contradiction. First, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced that while the Majles was justified in passing a motion to question President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the floor of the parliament, "It is enough. Any further insistence on this motion will encourage the enemies of the nezaam," or ruling system. Less than 24 hours after the Supreme Leader's announcement, the motion's sponsors declared that they were retracting it. The much debated effort to bring the president to the Majles and hold him to account seemed to have come to nothing.

Soon after, the Majles approved major changes to the laws governing presidential elections, changes that Ahmadinejad denounced as fundamental violations of the Iranian Constitution, "the most important achievement of our Revolution." According to the Constitution, after the Supreme Leader, the president of the Islamic Republic is the state's highest officer, in charge of the executive branch and chief executor of the Constitution except in affairs "directly concerned" with the Supreme Leader (Article 113). Elected by direct popular vote for a period of four years, the president may stand for reelection to a second consecutive term, but not a third (Article 114).

As stated in Article 115, those eligible to run for president are "religious and political personages¹ who have the following qualifications: citizen of Iran, of Iranian parents, wise and able, of good reputation and background, and a true believer in the official religion of the country and the founding pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran." No other qualifications are constitutionally mandated, so scores and, in recent cycles, hundreds of Iranians have nominated themselves for the office every four years. With the exception of the first presidential election in 1980, however, only a few have ever actually been approved to run by the Guardian Council, to which articles 99 and 118 grant oversight of the election process.

The quadrennial parade of prospective candidates, among them some very colorful characters, lined up in front of the Interior Ministry to register their nominations, always attracts media attention and no small amount of public ridicule. Marjan, a 38-year-old bank clerk, recalls laughing at videos of the queued nominees before the last election. "Many of them were clueless; they did not seem to be in the real world. It was all so funny and pathetic."

Ahmad Reza, a 34-year-old businessman, has a different perspective. "Well a few nutcases always showed up, but you cannot think the whole process was ridiculous. It actually was one of the few moments that we could exercise our right to be part of political process, even if only to see the doors shut down in our face," he explains. Indeed, some who knew they had little hope of winning the Guardian Council's approval have nonetheless registered as a pointed political gesture, including opposition leaders Ezatollah Sahabi and Ebrahim Yazdi for the 1997 election; and Yazdi again, along with famous soccer player Naser Hejazi, who decried the corruption he saw endemic in Iran, for the 2005 vote.

Beside the constitutional qualifications for those who seek the presidency, the new legislation sets a minimum age of 40 and a maximum of 75, which disqualifies former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from seeking the office again. It demands a candidate have at least a doctoral degree or its seminary equivalent, which eliminates many midranking clerics. It restricts the definition of "political personage" -- someone who seeks nomination under that rubric must now attain recognition as such by either 150 individuals who have served as a minister, deputy minister, or governor since the Revolution or a majority of the Majles. For most nominees, it requires at least eight years of service as a minister, or a Majles deputy, or at an "equivalent rank" in the judiciary or military. A nominee can also register with the approval of 400 individuals with experience as a minister, deputy minister, or governor; or two thirds of the Majles; or 30 faculty members from across the country; or 30 high-ranking members of the clergy; or 20 members of the Assembly of Experts.

One of the rationales offered for these sweeping changes is the mockery that the existing process has sometimes evoked. Deputy Kazem Jalali, head of the Majles Research Center, reminded the MPs that "last time, a 24-year-old lady came to register her candidacy. When she was asked why she wanted to be the president, she answered that it was because she was unemployed."

The legislation has sped through the system. Early in the fall, the bill was submitted for debate with the signatures of 120 deputies. This past week, it was approved by a vote of 144 to 91, with 11 abstentions.

As the Majles voted, Ahmadinejad was delivering the opening speech at the Symposium on Executive Branch Rights in the Constitution. He declared his belief that the Constitution alone set the qualifications for a presidential candidate and that laws passed by parliament may properly deal only with how the government conducts the electoral process. Addressing a group of reporters, he said, "They could just put the name of the person they want to be the president next year and be done with it" -- a thinly veiled reference to Majles Speaker Ali Larijani. His run for the chief executive office in 2005 attracted little support, but many think that he will make a bid for next June's ballot.

The debate over reforming the presidential qualification rules is not new. In the past, however, either or both the Majles and the Guardian Council, which wants to maintain its vetting authority, have opposed any change. This time around, the dominant faction of principlists -- conservatives who have sworn ardent fealty to the Supreme Leader -- is happy with alterations drafted entirely to its design. As for the Guardian Council, before the vote on the legislation Larijani held a meeting with its members to address their concerns. The Majles speaker already possessed significant influence with the council. Six out of its 12 members are nominated by the head of the judiciary -- his brother, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani -- and approved by parliament. (The other six members are clerics chosen by the Supreme Leader.)

Speaker Larijani has acknowledged the concerns that the new law will limit the Guardian Council's power. He told reporters that all potential candidates will still need the council's approval. What no one from the state and state-aligned media has publicly asked is if the legislation will further limit the choices given to the Iranian people and further constrain their democratic rights.

The principlist camp has successfully portrayed critics of the new legislation as supporters of Ahmadinejad. This has shifted the debate from one over citizen's rights and made it part of the one about Ahmadinejad and his camp's efforts to have one of their own succeed him.

It is doubtful whether the Majles would have been able to pass this legislation with such alacrity and ease had a truly popular chief executive been in office. With that observation in mind, the Supreme Leader's recent intervention to stop parliament from questioning the president does not seem to be motivated by any rejuvenation of his erstwhile favor for Ahmadinejad. It seems, rather, that the nezaam finds it useful to prop up a weakened Ahmadinejad precisely because he is now so widely disliked by the Iranian people.

Seyyed Solat Mortazavi, deputy interior minister for political affairs, whose office is in charge of election administration, called the new law "an effort to establish an incorporated company with a limited number of shareholders." Facing a revolutionary tribunal more than three decades ago, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, longtime prime minister to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, stated, "I was the director of a company whose president was the Shah." Many historians agree that all true executive power rested with Pahlavi, and that the nominal head of government was little more than his henchman. The Islamic Republic of Iran may just have taken a major step toward institutionalizing a very similar system.

***

1. The Farsi word here is rejal, which literally means "men," but is conventionally used to refer to "personages" (i.e., "persons of significance"). Many thus hold that this constitutional passage does not bar women from running for president. However, the Guardian Council has never approved of a female presidential candidate.

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]]> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/elections-defining-democracy-down-irans-new-presidential-election-law.html /wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/elections-defining-democracy-down-irans-new-presidential-election-law.html Features slider Mon, 10 Dec 2012 20:10:08 +0330 Reflections on ten years working for the Iranian American community.

Ramin Bajoghli is the President of the Board of Advisors of Iranian Alliances Across Borders (IAAB), a non-profit organization that seeks to strengthen the Iranian diaspora community through leadership and educational programming. All opinions are his own.

[ opinion ] The all too common Iranian American myth goes something like this: we are the wealthiest, smartest, most successful diaspora community in the United States.

Unfortunately, by perpetuating this myth, we ignore or refuse to acknowledge the very serious challenges facing the Iranian American community.

In the last decade, various national organizations and numerous individuals have worked tirelessly to combat the racist and misrepresentative images of Iranians in mainstream media. The 1979-81 Iran hostage crisis created a wave of anti-Iranian sentiment that in some measure continues to linger today. In response, many in the Iranian American community have sought to take control of its public image. However, the narrative we've created for ourselves is one of extreme levels of success: we are not the bearded and veiled religious fanatics of yesteryear, but instead, we demand recognition as the CEOs, bankers, scientists, doctors, lawyers, and engineers in the vanguard of 21st-century America.

Although our successes in the United States need to be celebrated, we are treading a treacherous slope with our narrow definition of success. As with any community, our socioeconomic conditions are diverse. The real difficulties faced by our community are not a matter of public relations and image; instead the complications emerge from exclusivity. We are marginalizing scores of our own who do not fit the golden image of success.

Socioeconomic issues are not the only barrier Iranian Americans need to recognize and address. Problems of mental illness, health and disability issues, domestic violence, racism, sexism, and homophobia are very real and occur daily in our community. Without an honest and open debate on these issues, Iranian Americans will never stand on a par with other successful diaspora communities. A serious study of said communities reveals a common characteristic sorely lacking among Iranian Americans: each diaspora community -- Jewish, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Armenian, Arab, etc. -- provides resources and social services to those in need.

Having spoken with leaders of these various communities over the past decade, three common elements in building a powerful and active diaspora community emerged: (1) take care of your own (the poor, the sick -- anyone in need); (2) be active and participate in domestic policy issues; and (3) once significant ground has been gained on the first two, enter and sway foreign policy debates.

A successful diaspora community is one that celebrates the triumphs of all its members, regardless of profession, and comes to the aid of those in need. We must learn that individual success does not equal community prosperity. At this critical juncture for our community, it's the only responsible way forward.

As Iranian Americans, we love to cite the oft-quoted Saadi poem that adorns the entrance of the United Nations.

Ironically, it seems, we never heed Saadi's words when it comes to our own.

Human beings are members of a whole,

In creation of one essence and soul.

If one member is afflicted with pain,

Other members uneasy will remain.

If you have no sympathy for human pain,

The name of human you cannot retain.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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]]> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/opinion-community-redefined-hailing-successes-recognizing-failures.html /wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/opinion-community-redefined-hailing-successes-recognizing-failures.html Commentary slider Mon, 10 Dec 2012 18:52:27 +0330 Despite the impression often given by the Western media, conservative opinion in Iran is far from monolithic. There is, in fact, an immense diversity of opinion among pro-government Iranians. This is the latest in a series of reports that analyze the disparity between conservative opinion blogs in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[ media watch ] There was a wave of reactions to the death in prison of Sattar Beheshti, a blogger critical of the Iranian government, from across the political spectrum; actors from both the Iranian establishment and the international community have called for an investigation into the causes of Beheshti's death. Less well documented, however, was the reaction of conservative bloggers to this incident. Along with critics of the Iranian government, conservative bloggers objected to what they called its "silence" about the death of Sattar Beheshti and have also called for an investigation.

For example, in a post entitled "Someone Please Speak!" Omid Hosseini wrote,

It is apparent that Sattar Beheshti died either by natural causes or accidentally during the arrest. These are the only two possibilities. If he passed away due to natural causes, prove it; if torture is the reason for his death, take responsibility! Why the silence? This silence will result in the police and related authorities palming off responsibility to the regime.

Meysam Ramezanali also criticized the authorities' silence on the death of Beheshti in a post entitled "Does ignoring and not reacting [to Beheshti's death] benefit the Islamic Republic?" Ramezanali posits here that the authorities' silence will "destroy the public's trust in the national media" and "diminish trust in the regime."

However, it would be incorrect to conclude that this criticism arises out of a concern for freedom of speech and human rights; rather, it comes more out of a desire to protect the image of the Islamic Republic. For example, Seyyed Ali Pour Tabatabi expressed concern about Iran's image after such a death: "Instead of the individual who has committed this crime, the whole country is being held responsible.... Iran's image should not be ruined by the actions of one criminal."

Ali Hassanzadeh was also concerned about Iran's image internationally in light of the news about Behesti's death. He asked,

With such mistakes (assuming this news is true), will other countries imitate Iran?! To what extent was [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad's speech at the United Nations accepted by others?! Once the Supreme Leader gives his speech, will it have an impact on the people?! Who will benefit from the destruction of the image of the only Shia country in the world?!

Some bloggers even considered Beheshti's death to be a conspiracy against the Islamic Republic. Abuzar Montazer Ghaem, for example, compared the blogger's death to the civil war in Syria and ongoing troubles in Lebanon: "These kinds of actions remind me of Syria: constant killing in order to create a bad image of the Syrian state. In Lebanon, in order to destroy the image of the frontline resistance group (Hezbollah of Lebanon), [the enemies] bomb and terrorize repeatedly [and blame Hezbollah]."

Certainly, not all conservative bloggers have as radical a view as Montazer Ghaem. Omid Hosseini, for instance, believes that writing a blog against the government does not pose a threat to the Iranian authorities. It is also interesting to note that the conservative bloggers halted their discussion on Beheshti after Iranian officials "explained" that the police had violated Beheshti's file and he had been detained illegally.

***

The second term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency has been a costly and troubled period for the Islamic Republic, from the protests after the election in 2009 to the contentious disagreements over the economy between the Majles and Ahmadinejad's administration. The conflict between the legislative and executive branches reached a new peak last month, when some members of the Iranian parliament sought to question the president in front of the Majles for what would have been the second time this year. However, this summons was cancelled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

During the height of the recent controversy over Ahmadinejad's potential questioning, many conservative bloggers, as well as those from across the political spectrum, reacted to the plan. Meysam Ramezanali, author of the Habil blog, considered Ahmadinejad's possible questioning to be nothing but a political game in which people are jostling for position in the presidential election that will be held next June: "Questioning the president is similar to the game of 'taking part in a fight in order to be recognized.'"

Contrary to the views expressed on the Habil blog, Seyyed Hesam al din Zandavi stated his belief that questioning the president is a standard affair. What he focused on, by contrast, is how unpredictable the president is when giving speeches: "He has such a particular and unpredictable behavior, and his ability to conjure up unconventional answers is such that everyone will be anxious that the results [of his questioning] will have social implications."

The majority of conservative bloggers appeared to welcome the idea of questioning Ahmadinejad. However, as Hesam al din Zandavi suggests, in reality most would perhaps prefer for it not to happen.

Small Media is a London-based non-profit that aims to increase the flow of information in closed societies by conducting research, providing training, and supporting the development of technology solutions.

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]]> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/media-watch-conservative-bloggers-in-iran-beheshti-and-summoning-ahmadinejad.html /wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/media-watch-conservative-bloggers-in-iran-beheshti-and-summoning-ahmadinejad.html Press Roundup slider Sat, 08 Dec 2012 00:23:36 +0330

"A frank dialogue to address contentious issues and break longstanding taboos is a fundamental step to that end."

Loghman H. Ahmedi is the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan's head of foreign relations. All opinions are his own.

[ opinion ] On November 17 and 18, a delegation from our party, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, participated in an Iranian opposition meeting in the capital of the Czech Republic. Our party believes it is imperative to contribute to the formation of a democratic and united opposition to the Islamic Republic. The importance of the Iranian opposition to our party is twofold.

First, the various opposition groups need to engage each other in order to create a unified front in pursuit of ending dictatorship in Iran. A frank dialogue to address contentious issues and break longstanding taboos is a fundamental step to that end.

We believe the following issues need to be addressed in a climate unencumbered by emotions and in a rational manner: Is Iran a mononational or multinational country? Should there be only one official language or several official languages in the country? Should power be concentrated in Tehran or devolved to other regions of the country? Should the political and administrative structure of the state be preserved in its centralist form or reorganized on the basis of federalist principles?

Needless to say, these issues, which are the concerns of the non-Persian nations in Iran, cannot be raised publicly under the authoritarian rule of the sectarian theocracy in Tehran. The current regime, which has created an oversized and brutal surveillance and repressive structure, responds to any public or even private manifestation of such legitimate questions with violent means.

Unfortunately, some Persian-dominated opposition groups outside of the country are also reluctant to address these issues. There are groups who deny the multinational character of Iran, but they find it difficult to explain the fact that Arabs and Azeris in Iran, for example, are part of recognized nations in neighboring countries such as the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Since 1958, the Iraqi constitution recognizes the binational character of that country and that it consists of Arabs and Kurds as two constituent nations. Denying the existence of these nations inside the borders of Iran while recognizing their status as nations in neighboring countries is a deliberate distortion of reality. We in the Kurdish opposition are appalled by the fact that some Persian-dominated opposition groups, who describe themselves as being committed to democracy, are adopting a policy of denial.

Insofar as other Persian-dominated groups are willing to address and respond to the demands of the Kurdish, Arab, Azeri, and Baluchi nations, their response is accompanied by charges of separatism. Very often, whenever the opposition groups find an opportunity to convene, some groups create an emotionally charged atmosphere, which a priori entails a political closure that inhibits an open, frank, and rational debate. This, in turn, inhibits cooperation between the Persian and non-Persian opposition groups. As long as the Iranian opposition groups do not overcome such obstacles, there will be no progress toward recognition of the most fundamental problems, confidence building, reaching political consensus and, ultimately, achieving unity.

Nevertheless, we believe that the very fact that the opposition groups are willing to take part in such meetings with each other is a sign of progress. In spite of the obstacles toward rational dialogue, there is growing awareness on the part of all groups that contentious issues need to be addressed.

Second, working with the opposition to facilitate a democratic transition and, more important, consolidate such a system of government once it is in place is a strategic objective for our party and other significant organizations within the Kurdish opposition. The regime in Iran might implode. As the Arab Spring demonstrated, regimes that seem solid and unshakable can suddenly be overthrown. Iran's historical experience with the 1979 Revolution and social movements demanding change is instructive as well. To avoid the repetition of past mistakes, we need to reach a consensus on democracy, devolution of powers, and the constitutional recognition and protection of the national and religious diversity of the country.

We believe that more than three decades of sectarian theocracy has discredited theocracy as a system of government among the overpowering majority of the Iranian populace. In this regard, we always remind our friends and political opponents alike that the Kurdish people rejected the Islamic Republic in 1979. We believe that if the different nations in Iran were to be given the opportunity to freely choose the form and nature of government in this country, a majority of them would vote for democracy, federalism, and secularism.

The non-Persian nations have been subject to systematic and institutionalized oppression by the previous regime as well as the current one. Naturally, they yearn for freedom and demand their national rights. A federal and secular democracy would accommodate their demands. The political, moral, and economic failures of the sectarian theocracy in Tehran for the past three decades have also strengthened the universal quest for liberty and human dignity in Iran at large.

Unlike other countries in the region, where democratic elections have favored Islamic parties with illiberal agendas, we believe that the age of Islamic revival has come to an end in Iran. Therefore, we believe that the current regime contains within it the seeds of its own destruction. However, dictatorship in a different guise and shape is likely to reemerge once this regime collapses.

Therefore, we believe in undertaking proactive efforts to promote a consensus on democracy, devolution of powers, and federalism as the best way to avoid the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism, dictatorship, and continued oppression of the country's diverse national, ethnic and religious communities once the current sectarian theocracy is gone.

In fact, we believe that recognizing the multinational character of the country and accommodating the national rights of the non-Persian nations in the form of a federal system will be critical to democratize Iran. In such a scenario, there would be no trade-off between preserving the status quo and embracing democracy.

A federal democracy would create more, not less, solidarity between the various nations and religious communities in Iran. Millions of Iranians, who are constantly offended by being treated as second-class citizens and whose languages are under the threat of extinction and whose cultures are stigmatized as backward, would have a stake in the country and contribute to its development and success. A federal democracy would not only create equality and mutual respect between the different nations of Iran; it would also transform the Iranian state from a security threat to the non-Persian nations to an entity that protects their interests.

Similarly, these nations and the political organizations representing their interests would no longer be perceived as threats by future democratic governments in Tehran. In this vision, all nations in Iran would be stakeholders in the state's internal and external affairs on equal terms.

Iran would be able to realize its potential as a stable and prosperous country only if it is at peace with itself and plays a constructive role within the international community. Indeed, a future Iran thus envisaged may serve as a model to be emulated in a region tormented by dictatorship, aggressive and pathological forms of nationalism, linguistic and cultural discrimination, constant instability, and wars.

This is the message we are trying to convey to other opposition groups whenever we take part in meetings with them, including the most recent one in Prague. We will continue to do so because we believe such a message is based on a careful reading of historical and contemporary realities in Iran and it is the expression of a strategic outlook that serves the interests of all nations in Iran.

At the same time, we are realistic and acknowledge that recent meetings between the various opposition groups have encountered problems and that we have a long way to go. For example, in spite of devoting one panel to the legitimate concerns of the non-Persian nations in Iran, later some of the organizers of the meeting in Prague issued a statement describing Iran as a mononational country. The delegation from our party, for their part, issued a statement in which they rejected this notion and emphasized the strategic importance of acknowledging the multinational character of Iran in order to make progress toward achieving genuine liberty and democracy.

Ultimately, we see only two scenarios for the future of Iran. Either we come together and coordinate our efforts to bring about a democratic system of government that reflects and protects the rights and interests of all nations in Iran. Or some opposition groups continue to justify the status quo and strive to preserve current relations of domination and subordination between the Persian and non-Persian nations once the current sectarian theocracy is gone and is replaced by another regime. Such relations of domination and subordination, history teaches us, can only be maintained at the expense of liberty and democracy -- which, by necessity, will involve violations of the rights of the majority of the Persian nation -- since it will require the systematic use of coercive and violent means. We hope that an opposition that claims to be committed to genuine democracy chooses a different path.

All opinions are the author's own. Photo via Flickr.

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]]> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/debate-a-democratic-and-unified-opposition-is-a-strategic-imperative.html /wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/debate-a-democratic-and-unified-opposition-is-a-strategic-imperative.html Commentary slider Fri, 07 Dec 2012 00:43:40 +0330 Human rights champion halts perilous seven-week protest after primary demand is met.

[ in focus ] Jailed human rights lawyer and journalist Nasrin Sotoudeh ended a hunger strike of 49 days after Iranian authorities acceded to her demand that they no longer bar her 12-year-old daughter, Mehraveh, from traveling abroad. Sotoudeh is incarcerated in Tehran's Evin Prison, along with many other political prisoners; she has served 27 months of a six-year sentence on charges of disseminating "propaganda," violating mandatory hejab, and "acting against national security." Her blood pressure had reportedly fallen dangerously low toward the end of her hunger strike, in which she consumed only salted and sugared water.

According to the Kaleme website -- associated with Green Movement leader and former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, who has been under extralegal house arrest since February 2011 -- the authorities' concession came after Sotoudeh's husband, Reza Khandan, and a number of women's rights activists met with a group of Majles deputies who were about to undertake an investigation into the circumstances surrounding her detention. The legislators subsequently pursued the issue with Speaker Ali Larijani and his brother, judiciary chief Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani. On Tuesday evening, Khandan reported on his Facebook page that his wife had ended her hunger strike and that he had just returned from an "extraordinary meeting" with her.

Sotoudeh was protesting not only the travel ban placed on her daughter, but also repeated interference with her own family visitation and telephone call rights. In addition to Mehraveh, Sotoudeh and Khandan have a four-year-old son, Nima. This was the fourth hunger strike she has undertaken since she was imprisoned in September 2010. After her release, she will face decade-long bans on performing legal work and traveling outside the country.

Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, the United Nations special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, noted in his latest report -- presented to U.N. officials in September and publicly released the following month -- the many accounts that Iranian

human rights defenders in general are subjected to unfair trials and issued severe sentences, including flogging, long-term activity and travel bans, long-term exile, and prison terms ranging from six months to 20 years. Interviewees also reported the arrest, detention and interrogation of family members and friends, and maintained that family and friends were threatened, insulted and tortured for the purpose of placing pressure on detainees, or to discourage them from public discussions about the situation of their loved ones.

Reacting to news of the end of Sotoudeh's hunger strike, Peter Godwin, president of PEN American Center, which awarded her the PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award last year, declared,

Nasrin Sotoudeh embodies the bravery of the Iranian people's struggle for the rule of law and a vibrant civil society. That she was imprisoned at all is appalling. That she was forced to risk her own health to end the vindictive persecution of family members has shocked consciences in Iran and around the world. 
Now is the time for everyone who shares Nasrin's unbending commitment to protecting the rights of the Iranian people to stand with her and call for her freedom.

Sotoudeh defended a variety of clients as a member of the Center for the Defense of Human Rights -- her work for the group was the rationale for the "acting against national security" charge -- and the Society for the Protection of the Rights of Children. They included Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shirin Ebadi, opposition party leader Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, journalists such as Isa Saharkhiz, and student activists such as Atefeh Nabavi. Another client, Arash Rahmanipour, supposedly committed "anti-state" offenses as a minor; he was convicted and eventually killed by the state in violation of international law. A member of the Campaign for One Million Signatures, which fights for an end to laws that discriminate against Iranian women, Sotoudeh also defended several of her fellow members who faced prosecution, including Nahid Keshavarz and Nasim Khosravi.

First arrested in June 2008 while preparing to attend a national women's solidarity event, she faced trial the next February for disturbing the peace but was not sentenced. In August 2010, her home and office were raided and assets frozen. Summoned to Evin the following month, she was denied bail, effective legal representation, and family visitation. In response to her treatment, on October 6, 2010, she began her first hunger strike. Two more followed through January 2011. Each of the three lasted at least three weeks. Her most recent hunger strike is believed to have been her longest.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

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]]> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/in-focus-nasrin-sotoudeh-ends-hunger-strike-after-daughters-travel-ban-lifted.html /wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/in-focus-nasrin-sotoudeh-ends-hunger-strike-after-daughters-travel-ban-lifted.html Press Roundup slider Wed, 05 Dec 2012 13:36:05 +0330