Editor’s Note: Please welcome Harold Cheetham, one of a number of new amateur Civil War bloggers here at TOCWOC.  Harold and the rest of the group are here to bring some fresh new perspectives to TOCWOC, a blog I founded back in late 2006.  My goal is to bring you the reader fresh content from a variety of perspectives five days a week.  I look forward to what Harold and the others will bring to the table.

The Civil War has always been a subject I have enjoyed and studied since high school. My interest comes from both my great grandfather and great,great grandfather,as both were in the 97th NY Infantry and we had at home just about everything they had brought home from the war. A lot of the items are displayed on the website I developed to commemorate the 97th. It is 97thnyinfantry.com.

In the past few years I have started to add to my book collection and my e-book collection as i enjoy reading everything I can get my hands on that has to do with the war.My collection is small compared to others but I keep adding to it every chance I get.

A lot of the items we have at one time were displayed by The Grange at the local county fair and the New York State Fair and they won many awards for the display.

Growing up I heard from my grandfather and my father many stories of the Civil War as told by my great grandfather and great,great granfather. These stories got me interested and on the road to discovery and research to learn more about the war.I still am learning every day.

When my kids were in school I got to finally visit Gettysburg two years in a row as a class chaperone and will never forget the site of that huge battlefield and all the other interesting things at Gettysburg. Hopefully some day in the future I can return and stay longer and visit other things I know I missed.

To me the Civil War is a part of history that never should be forgotten.The history of both the north and the south is fascinating and something that shouldn’t be taken lightly.

I could go on and on about what I like about the Civil War but  that would take up pages and pages.

If you are new to studying the Civil War there is a lot of information out there and you can start today your learning experience by just searching the internet or visiting your public library.You won’t regret starting your search for knowledge about the war once you get started.

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The Civil War and You: Memories From The Past

The Relief Column

At Brown’s Ferry the sound of the battle to the south alerted Hooker that his rear may be in trouble. MG Oliver Howard, commanding XI Corps, was ordered to double quick his nearest division to Geary’s aid. MG Carl Shurz got his two divisions ready for the rescue mission. The division of BG Aldolphus von Steinwehr led to the way with the brigade of COL Orlando Smith (33rd Massachusetts, 136th New York, and 73rd Ohio) out front. After a mile of double quicking down the Brown’s Ferry Road they ran into Evander Law’s pickets stationed at the base of a hill. All thoughts of the rescue mission stopped as the 73rd Ohio was scattered by the heavy volley from the trees. Smith had no choice but to turn and face the threat. He got the Ohioans in line and put the 33rd Massachusetts on their left. The 136th New York remained on the road in reserve. Orders arrived for Smith to clear the hill. The two regiments (approximately 450 men) inched their way into the tress and started up the hill. The advance quickly got disoriented but the men pushed up the slope. As they neared the top the intertwined units began to call out to each other for identification purposes. Suddenly there was a challenge

“What regiment is that?”

The answer rang out.

“Thirty-third Massachusetts.”

Once they had identified themselves they received a tremendous volley from Law’s main force at the crest of the hill. Nearly a quarter of the 33rd fell as a result. The volley fired at the Massachusetts men served as a warning and many of the 73rd Ohio fell to the ground expecting the same treatment. The volley passed over them, but they were ordered to push on and advanced into ever increasing fire. The momentarily staggered 33rd fell back to the bottom of the hill where they regrouped and were pushed forward again. Andrew Boies recalled the second trip up the hill this way in his journal of the war:

“…and at it they went charging with the bayonet, dealing each other blows over the head with the musket, slashing and cutting with swords…this was too much for them…and finally gave way…leaving the 33d in possession of the hill.”

The bold effort cost the regiment 86 casualties from 238 that fought the fight. The 73rd Ohio, their partner in this affair lost a third of its strength. What they didn’t know was that it could have been much worse. Law, reacting to a faulty intelligence report had decided to cede the position. The Confederates were in the act of realigning when the second assault came. The movement of troops had created gaps in the line that allowed the Federals to get in close. Had Law determined to fight for control of the hill its doubtful that the two Union regiments could have taken it at any cost. Law understood that his departure would leave Bratton uncovered from the north and that relief columns were headed to assist Geary. He issued a recall order.

As Bratton was about to begin his attack the messenger from Law arrived. There would be no final struggle just a retreat. The relatively unscathed 6th SC took up a position at the railroad and fired the last volleys to cover the retreat of the battered remnants of his other regiments. The Union relief troops from the north finally arrived hours after the battle had ended.

Conclusion and Assessment

Given the technology of the day night engagements were frowned upon. Difficulties with command and control in the darkness usually precluded such operations. Nevertheless, given the opportunity Colonel Bratton conducted a credible effort. He stealth fully avoided detection, maneuvered into close proximity of the enemy, achieved surprise, and inflicted serious damage to the enemy. His ability to remain in control of the operation despite the limitations speaks highly for the design of the attack, his ability to impart that design to his subordinate commanders, their execution of the plan, and the discipline of their troops. Had the attack been properly sized and supported it may have created an excellent opportunity for the Confederates to pin Hooker between them and the river. In Viet Nam terminology this might have become a “Hammer and Anvil” operation. The river helping to form the anvil and Longstreet’s corps providing the hammer. Trapped between the river and the Confederates and only a single means of escape (the pontoon bridge) or reinforcement the Union forces could have been in serious trouble. Unfortunately, Longstreet had not dedicated his entire force to the plan and the chance to contain the Union breakout went by the board.

The short fight at Wauhatchie was costly for both sides. Geary suffered 216 casualties, including his son who died at the guns. Bratton paid the more expensive attackers butchers bill, losing 356 men. The fight at Smith’s Hill nearly destroyed the 33rd Massachusetts and the 73rd Ohio.

Hooker attempted to find a scapegoat for his poor deployment that left Geary so vulnerable. He accused MG Carl Schurz of failing to aid Geary in a timely fashion. Schurz got a Court of Inquiry and was exonerated. Longstreet’s failure here led to the inevitable split with Bragg. He was sent off to Knoxville and Bragg, desperately short of troops, was glad to be rid of him.

• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 1
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 2
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 3
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Conclusion

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Night Fight at Wauhatchie Conclusion

The selection of Confederate reports for the battle of Chattanooga that made it into the Official Records is skimpy.  There is a report from Bragg, the army commander, but not from either of his corps commanders, Hardee or Breckenridge, and there are no reports from several of the division commanders or their subordinates.  Consider the division of William Walker: 3 brigades, 15 regiments, a couple of batteries – yet not a single report contained in the Official Records. So what did they do during the battle?

Modern battle studies (ie: books by Cozzens or Sword) don’t offer much in the way of answers.  We learn of the division moving from Lookout Mountain to Missionary ridge on November 23^rd, a few mentions of it relative to the position of General Cleburne, and that Maney’s brigade was sent to aid Cleburne late on the 25^th.  Not much else.

I believe that it is possible to determine the role the division played by piecing together references that involved the division even if it is not mentioned by name. For example, as Sherman’s men established a bridgehead on the south bank of the Tennessee River on the morning of November 24^th, they were subject to enemy artillery fire. Wiley Sword, in Mountains Touched with Fire, wrote “there was a swirling sound from afar, the rush of heavy air, and a close, jarring explosion”.  Where were these shells coming from? Sword doesn’t say but the only Confederate batteries at that time that had the range and trajectory to shell Sherman’s staging area were those with Walker’s division.

While watching Sherman’s progress  that day, Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana reported that “the rebels have men behind the railroad bank to the right of the tunnel,” a reference to Walker’s division.  The next day, as Loomis’ brigade advanced it found the enemy occupying the farm and roadway along the base of the ridge beyond Cleburne’s left. Cleburne wrote in his report that this was  “a brigade sent by General Hardee to the foot of the ridge.”  Again this would have been from Walker’s division.

Putting Walker’s division in context leads to better understanding of decisions and actions during the battle. With Walker’s division on his right front, Sherman had more to contend with than is commonly stated.  As they took the heights at the end of the ridge on the 24^th, Sherman’s three-division force encountered troops from three different Confederate divisions. Sherman didn’t know that Wright’s brigade of Cheatham’s division was all by itself on Chickamauga creek or that Cleburne was still getting into position but the extent of enemy contact makes Sherman’s decision to consolidate his position more understandable. In addition, acknowledging the place of Walker’s division in stopping Sherman’s attacks on the 25^th shows that Cleburne’s stout defense, while the brunt of the action, was not a solo operation.

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What were they doing over there?: Walker’s Div. at Chattanooga

Battle Joined

Bratton’s efforts to get into position continued for two hours after the appointed attack time. The nearly full moon was obscured by clouds and the darkness made it impossible, according to Geary, “to see a body of men only 100 yards distant.” Bratton’s skirmishers finally made contact with the Federal pickets about 0030 and the resulting fire drove them back into the main camp. The retreating pickets of companies C and G of the 29th Pennsylvania reformed at the battery in the rear of the Union line. The sudden eruption of fire and retreating men caused confusion in the Federal camp. Bratton reported that there was
“…considerable commotion in their camp. Whether it was of preparation to receive or leave us I could not tell, but the hurrying hither and tither could be seen by the light of their camp fires, which they were then extinguishing.”

One thing was certain, despite all Geary had done to avoid surprise he was caught completely off guard. Writing many years later CPT George Collins of the 149th New York recorded that “the men were thoroughly surprised and unprepared for an enemy whose presence they could not divine.” Bratton sensed the time was right to initiate the main attack. He sent three regiments (1st SC, 2nd SC and 5th SC) into the heart of the Union position. The Palmetto Sharpshooters were dispatched to the rail line to seek out the right flank of the enemy. Hampton’s Legion formed a reserve and the 6th SC guarded the Brown’s Ferry road to prevent the main body from being taken in the rear by any Union forces moving down from that direction.

The Federal commanders overcame the early confusion and assembled a line that included the 137th NY on the far left, the 111th PA and 109th PA formed the center, the 78th NY and 149th NY turned a 90 degree corner at the railroad embankment to form the right. The four guns of Knap’s battery lay badly exposed about 50 yards behind the main line. The infantry met the Confederate assault with volleys fired from a prone position. Knap’s pieces joined in, firing at maximum depression over the “prostrate forms and within a few feet of our infantry line.” With the engagement this close, limited visibility, and short fuses the inevitable happened. LT Pettit of Company B the 111th PA was decapitated by a round fired from the artillery. A fellow officer, LT Black of Company K, had both his legs destroyed by a short round. Nevertheless, the combined weight of fire from the four pieces and the infantry line stopped Bratton’s attack on the center.

The Fight Continues

The inability to force the center of the Federal line caused Bratton to adopt new tactics. He recalled the 6th SC from duty on the Brown’s Ferry Road to serve as a reserve and threw the Hampton Legion out to test the Union left. Combat in the center remained static as the Hampton Legion trudged off into the swampy area to the west. The devastating effect of the fire from the four artillery pieces singled them out for special attention. The word was passed down the Confederate line to target the gunners. Fire from the railroad embankment was particularly effective. With the flash of the rounds illuminating the scene for the Confederate marksmen the gunners were reduced at a terrifying rate. Eventually one gun had to be retired for want of crew to man it. It soon became apparent that action would have to be taken against this portion of the line to reduce the “very severe fire on us.” A recommendation was made to move a gun across the rail line to enfilade the Confederate position. At first the chief of artillery MAJ John Reynolds was reluctant to make the effort fearing the gun would be captured by the Palmetto Sharpshooters but Colonel Rickards offered up the returned men from the 29th PA’s picket force (C and G) that had been assembled there at the beginning of the engagement for the task. A gun was manhandled into position by the Pennsylvanians . The newly repositioned gunners exacted their revenge.

“After two or three rounds we got the range and swept the enemy from the bank.”

To retard any further Confederate efforts to get into their rear Companies A and F of the 29th were deployed into the woods and the situation on the Federal right stabilized.

Meanwhile on the Union left the men of the Hampton Legion emerged from the swamp and found themselves in the Federal rear and amongst the wagon train. A few shots scattered the teamsters and guards and set some of the teams screaming off in every direction in a terrified attempt to get out of the way of the carnage. This “Charge of the Mule Brigade” has been widely overplayed and caused as much disruption to the Union attempts to counter the Confederate move as it did to the attackers. The most that can be said is that the momentary confusion created by these animals and the Confederate soldiers pausing to loot some of the wagons allowed just enough time for the Union troops to meet the attack from an unexpected direction. A sharp eyed adjutant, LT Mix, correctly evaluated the situation and refused two companies of the 137th NY (B and G) to meet the challenge. As the Confederates maneuvered for position they were raked across their flank by the fire of these two companies. The movement evaporated under the barrage. The Union left was saved and the field slowly quieted as the Confederates regrouped and considered their options.

The fierce two and a half hour struggle in the October darkness had exhausted the men on both sides and their ammunition supplies as well. The flanking attempts although defeated had used up nearly all the Federal ammunition. Colonel Ireland, leading the XII Corps contingent of Geary’s column, reported that by “sending to the hospital and cutting the cartridge boxes from the dead and wounded they has a supply until the close of the action.” At the conclusion of the action “there were not 200 cartridges in the regiment.” BG Geary was aware of the growing ammunition crisis but wrote in his report that there was no thought of retreat. He was going to hold his ground, determined to “depend on the bayonet should our ammunition fail.”

Across the field the Confederate commander, COL Bratton remained confident. Despite being rebuffed on his first two efforts he believed that “the position of things were entirely favorable to a grand charge.” The 6th SC was still available and he brought them forward to reinforce his new effort on the Union right. His troops were arranged in a “wide spread V”. The Palmetto Sharpshooters were reorganized on the left and with the 2nd SC and newly arrived 6th SC formed the left arm of the V. The 1st SC formed the base and the 5th SC and Hampton’s Legion extended southwest to form the right. The combatants set their teeth for what was sure to be a desperate struggle to the end.

• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 1
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 2
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 3
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Conclusion

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Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 3

Those that can’t write, Review!

May 2012

James W. Durney

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Battle Hymns by Christian McWhirter looks at the uses and impact music had during the Civil War. This is not another listing of popular songs but a look at what people said and remembered about these songs.

Corinth 1862: Siege, Battle, Occupation by Timothy B. Smith will fill the void between Shiloh and Vicksburg. Corinth, critical to the Confederacy’s survival, was a major objective in the West. Smith brings considerable knowledge and writing skill to this important campaign.

With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North by Carol Reardon looks at the problems associated with development of an overall plan for victory.

Richard Taylor and the Red River Campaign of 1864 by Samuel Mitcham Jr. look at this campaign from the Confederate point of view.

Joshua Chamberlain: The Life in Letters of a Great Leader of the American Civil War by Thomas Desjardin brings to public light 300 never-before-seen letters.

DIVIDED LOYALTIES: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War by James Finck provides An in-depth study of the twelve months that decided Kentucky’s fate (November 1860 – November 1861). This book could be a June item.

Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg (U.S. Army War College Guide to Civil War Battles) edited by Jay Luvaas, Harold W. Nelson and Leonard J. Fullenkamp. This was the first book in this respected series of guides and is ready for a new edition. Changes in the park, the Cavalry battles on the Third coupled with rewritten and expanded background chapters make a new book not a reprint.

The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2 – 20, 1862 by Bradley Gottfried is the newest full color entry into the fine Savas Beatie Military Atlas Series, is scheduled for the last week of May or the first week in June.

June 2012

The Petersburg Campaign: The Eastern Front Battles, June – August 1864, Volume 1 by Edwin Bearss and Bryce Suderow is a “must have” book. This is 488 pages with original maps by Civil War cartographer Steven Stanley.

Mightier than the Sword: Uncle Tom’s Cabin and the Battle for America by David S. Reynolds is being released as a Paperback.

By the Noble Daring of Her Sons: The Florida Brigade of the Army of Tennessee by Jonathan C. Sheppard. It is almost impossible to find books about Floridians fighting in the war. This book should help fill the gap for the Army of Tennessee.

Eric Wittenberg’s Protecting the Flanks: The Battles for Brinkerhoff’s Ridge and East Cavalry Field, Battle of Gettysburg, July 2-3, 1863 is a new edition with a new map, additional illustrations, two new appendices, and other material.

IRON BRIGADE IN THE CIVIL WAR, THE: Bull Run to Appomattox, 1861-1865 by Lance Herdgen, is his fourth book on the Iron Brigade. His well received Those Damned Black Hats! The Iron Brigade in the Gettysburg Campaign published in 2008, is still in print.

The Civil War in Missouri: A Military History by Louis S. Gerteis explores the state’s conventional warfare and its effects on the unfolding of national history. Missouri controlled both the lower Mississippi valley and the Missouri River. St. Louis and mid-Missouri were vital for controlling the West, and rail lines leading across the state offered an important connection between eastern states and the communities out west. This combination makes the state a vital area for both sides.

The Union Forever Lincoln, Grant and the Civil War by John Y. Simon looks at their relationship, how they influenced each other and their individual struggles.

LAST BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, THE: Phil Sheridan, Jubal Early, and the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, August 7 – September 19, 1864 by Scott Patchan looks at the third Battle of Winchester the largest, longest, and bloodiest battle fought in the Shenandoah Valley.

The Petersburg Campaign: The Western Front Battles, June – August 1864, Volume 2 by Edwin Bearss and Bryce Suderow is a “must have” book. This is 488 pages with original maps by Civil War cartographer Steven Stanley.

July 2012

Remembering The Battle of the Crater: War as Murder by Kevin M. Levin looks at how we chose to remember or forget, using this one battle, the role of the USCT in the Civil War. This could be an important book in the development of the USCT’s role in the war.

The Long Road To Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution by Richard Slotkin looks at the changes the Emancipation Proclamation had the public’s view of the war by re-creating the showdown between Lincoln and McClellan.

The Hammer and the Anvil: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and the End of Slavery in America by Dwight Jon Zimmerman

August 2012

The Chattanooga Campaign edited by Steven E. Woodworth and Charles D. Grear has a very impressive list of contributors. This is an excellent series on the Western Campaigns and there is every indication this book will maintain that standard. Contributors include Sam Davis Elliott, Alex Mendoza, Timothy B. Smith and Ethan S. Rafuse.

Daniel E. Sutherland continues his excellent work on Civil War Guerrillas with American Civil War Guerrillas: Changing the Rules of Warfare. His prior books A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War; Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front; and Seasons of War: The Ordeal of a Confederate Community, 1861-1865 all deal with this subject.

By 1865, thousands of men were minus arms and legs. Guy R. Hasegawa details how society responded with support and government services in Mending Broken Soldiers: The Union and Confederate Programs to Supply Artificial Limbs. Medicine and veteran’s services have never received the ink they deserve. This is Mr. Hasegawa first independent book. He worked with James M. Schmidt on Years of Change and Suffering: Modern Perspectives on Civil War Medicine.

The Best Station of Them All: The Savannah Squadron, 1861-1865 by Maurice Melton.

More Than Freedom: Fighting for Black Citizenship in a White Republic, 1829-1889 by Stephen Kantrowitz looks at the epic struggle to establish African Americans as free citizens in Boston.

I always enjoy books about the development of the National Military Parks, Conflicting Memories on the “River of Death”: The Chickamauga Battlefield and the Spanish-American War, 1863-1933 by Bradley S. Keefer should extend our knowledge on this subject.

September 2012

Shiloh: Confederate High Tide in the Heartland by Steven E. Woodworth looks at the problems and impact of this battle.

We Have the War Upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War, November 1860-April 1861 by William J. Cooper

The Northern Home Front during the Civil War edited by Randall M. Miller & Paul A. Cimbala is a look at a nation under the strain of war.

Brady’s Civil War Journal: Photographing the War, 1861-65 text by Theodore P. Savas, photographs by Mathew Brady.

October 2012

This Wicked Rebellion: Wisconsin Civil War Soldiers Write Home by John Zimm looks at Wisconsin’s participation through letters drawn from the Wisconsin Historical Society’s archives.

Clash at Kennesaw: June and July 1864 by Russell W. Blount, Jr., looks at this important part of the Atlanta Campaign.

The Man Who Saved the Union: Ulysses Grant in War and Peace by H. W. Brands is a 700+ page biography by this respected author.

The Enemy Never Came: The Civil War in the Pacific Northwest by Scott McArthur looks at people “deeply affected by the war yet unable to do much about it”.

November 2012

Americans Remember Their Civil War by Lesley J. Gordon looks at remembrances from the immediate postwar era to the early 21st century. The conflicting tensions as people sought to commemorate “their” war. The epilogue examines current memories of the war, debates and controversies.

December 2012

Edifice of Freedom: The Civil War Amendments in Historical Perspective by James S. Hunphreys looks at the 13th, 14th & 15th Amendments in detail. The book looks at both the historical and contemporary significance of the Civil War Amendments.

38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and The Beginning of the Frontier’s End by Scott W. Berg looks at the “Big Picture” of the 1862 Sioux war.

Unavailable Dates

Steve Stanley and J. David Petruzzi are hard at work on The Complete Antietam Campaign Guide. Antietam Chief Historian Ted Alexander is doing the Forward. This is a full color book styled on The Complete Gettysburg Guide. The book will feature Harpers Ferry, South Mountain, Antietam, and Shepherdstown plus many points in between.

The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses: Synopses, Orders of Battle, Strengths, Casualties, and Maps, June 9 – July 14, 1863 by J. David Petruzzi and Steven Stanley looks at more than three dozen engagements both large and small waged during the five weeks of the Gettysburg Campaign. A synopsis of each engagement, over three dozen, includes photos of the commanders, an original full page map of the fighting, an order of battle with numbers and losses (including killed, wounded, captured, and missing), charts and graphs of relative strengths and losses, a conclusion of how the fighting affected each side and the course of the campaign. The author’s The Complete Gettysburg Guide: Walking and Driving Tours of the Battlefield, Town, Cemeteries, Field Hospital Sites, and other Topics of Historical Interest published by Savas Beatie in 2009 won the U.S. Army Historical Foundation’s 2009 Distinguished Writing Award, Reference Category.

The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Volume 2: Antietam edited by Thomas G. Clemens is the second part of the Ezra Carman manuscript, covering the battle is on the Savas-Beatie Fall 2012 schedule.

Another book on that schedule from this publisher is The Battle of Big Bethel: Crucial Clash in Early Civil War Virginia by J. Michael Cobb, Ed Hicks, and Wythe Holt. The first full-length treatment of this small but consequential June 1861 battle.

In the Fall look for SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG, THE: The Attack and Defense of the Union Center on Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863 by David Shultz and David Wieck. This expands on the critically acclaimed The Battle Between the Farm Lanes. The book is a completely revised and expanded study, with new photographs, original maps, and a self-guided tour of the fighting.

Eric Wittenberg is working on a project is for The History Press entitled The Battle of Yellow Tavern: Jeb Stuart’s Last Battle. This will be a study of Phil Sheridan’s May 1864 raid on Richmond, with particular focus on the May 11, 1864 Battle of Yellow Tavern, where Jeb Stuart is mortally wounded.

James M. Schmidt is doing a book for The History Press, tentatively titled Galveston and the Civil War: An Island People in the Maelstrom scheduled for mid- to late 2012.

Savas Beatie has an option to publish Scott L. Mingus, Sr.’s next book titled Gettysburg’s Controversial Old Confederate General: Gov. William “Extra Billy” Smith of Virginia.

Nancy Dane reports she is waiting for An Enduring Union from her publisher, it seems to be “in the mail”. This book four of The Tattered Glory series looking at families caught in the war.

Yankee Dutchmen under Fire by Joseph Reinhart should be in stores in 2013.

From talking to Dave Powell, during his Chickamauga weekend, his history of this battle is growing. Savas Beatie publishing is talking about a multi-volume history of the Chickamauga Campaign. No publication date is available but Dave has the manuscript well in hand. Dave Powell is the author of The Maps of Chickamauga: An Atlas of the Chickamauga Campaign, Including the Tullahoma Operations, June 22 – September 23, 1863 and Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joe Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign.

Tom Desjardin’s biography of Joshua L. Chamberlain is due out in 2013.

Ethan Rafuse and Charles R. Bowery Jr. are working on a War College guide for Richmond-Petersburg expected in 2012.

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Reading the War

The idea is to suggest books on events as they unfold which will give us a more detail understanding of the war.

For the Battle of Williamsburg look for A Pitiless Rain: the battle of Williamsburg, 1862 by Earl C., Jr. Hastings and David S. Hastings.

Jackson’s Valley Campaign is under way. You can fill a library with books about it. I would like to suggest some books on the battles and locations.

Three Days in the Shenandoah: Stonewall Jackson at Front Royal and Winchester (Campaigns and Commanders) and We Are in for It!: The First Battle of Kernstown by Gary L. Ecelbarger covers some of the early battles.

Peter Cozzens has the most current book on the campaign in Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign.

While Russel Beatie’s Army of the Potomac: McClellan’s First Campaign, March – May 1862 covers much more than this month, it is an excellent and Detailed account.

Corinth 1862: Siege, Battle, Occupation by Timothy B. Smith, due this month, is a look at Halleck’s “advance” after Shiloh and the capture of this vital railroad crossing.

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Civil War Sesquicentennial Publications

In an effort to support, sesquicentennial publishing this will be part of this column through 2015. If you know of a book, please contact me so it can be included.

New Jersey

New Jersey Goes to War part of the New Jersey Civil War Sesquicentennial is in its’ second printing. It is so popular that New Jersey’s Odyssey using the same format is available. This book is “An Anthology of Civil War Tales from 1850 to 1961”; Joseph G. Bilby edits both books.

Discover Your Community’s Civil War Heritage, by Steven D. Glazer, is a comprehensive and up-to-date manual for those wishing to research the stories of their own community’s Civil War veterans.

Only available from www.njcivilwar150.org 100% of the purchase price goes to support the New Jersey Civil War Sesquicentennial. All those involved contributed their time and contributions paid for printing.

York County, Pennsylvania

Civil War Voices from York County, Pennsylvania: Remembering the Rebellion and the Gettysburg Campaign by Scott L. Mingus Sr. and James McClure contains the rich oral tradition coupled with letters, diaries, photographs and newspaper accounts to tell the stories of York in those bleak days 150 years ago. They give a vibrant voice to those living, serving and dying in this most tumultuous period in America’s history.

Adams County-based Colecraft Industries is the publisher.

The authors coordinated the project with the Pennsylvania Civil War 150, the York County Heritage Trust and the York Daily Record/Sunday News.

Contact: Scott Mingus, scottmingus@yahoo.com.

Virginia

Lists the book America on the Eve of the Civil War edited by Edward L. Ayers and Carolyn R. Martin, as 160-page book with four black & white photos.

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Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

May 2012 Civil War Book Notes

Editor’s Note: Please welcome Mark Lally, one of a number of new amateur Civil War bloggers here at TOCWOC.  Mark and the rest of the group are here to bring some fresh new perspectives to TOCWOC, a blog I founded back in late 2006.  My goal is to bring you the reader fresh content from a variety of perspectives five days a week.  I look forward to what Mark and the others will bring to the table.

I have always been a huge military history fan. From the time a was a boy studying everything I could find on the second world war until the birth of my son 9 years ago, my passion for the civil war slowly blossomed. Ten years ago I looked at my newborn son and asked myself for the first time what it meant to be a man. I knew of the horrors and deprivations suffered during the civil war. I was especially struck by the rows of neatly stacked men that were marched into a hail of soft lead balls up that hill toward Marye’s heights in Fredericksburg. It was beyond my 20^th century mind to accept that this was how rational thinking men behaved. I delved into the study of the civil war. Some might say I’m a bit obsessive compulsive about it. It has given me a wonderful look at a time now past when men held traits of character like chivalry, loyalty and courage above ones own comfort or even ones own life. My favorite battle areas of study are Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and Vicksburg. I especially find the stories of individual soldiers during these battles extremely thought provoking and poignant. I am the father of three grown women and one overactive nine-year-old boy who is the light of my life. I am an avid reader with seldom less than three books going at once. Born and raised in the Boston area I am a lifelong red sox fan and now reside near the beach in sunny southern California. I am currently researching my Irish ancestors and have found that while my grandparents did not arrive in the United States until 1896, my clan surname, Lally, served on both sides and is listed 130 times. I am looking forward to learning along with all of you of the sacrifices, the bravery and the valor of the men who wore the blue and the grey.

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Color my thinking, Blue and grey

Geary Deploys

BG John Geary took his responsibility seriously although he felt he was operating under difficult circumstances. On the 25th he had reached Bridgeport with only one regiment and 2 sections of artillery because his command was stretched from “Tullahoma to Murfreesboro guarding the railroad.” By the 27th he had gathered four regiments ( 78th NY, 149th NY, 29th PA, and 109th PA) of his division for the move forward. Late on the 27th he sent out orders for three days rations and 60 rounds of ammunition to be issued to all available men. The march began at 0500 and reached Shellmound at 1400 where they were joined by three more regiments (111th PA, 60th NY, and 137th NY).

Geary ordered “heavy fatigue details to aid in constructing a pontoon bridge across the river at Shellmound”. The bridge was completed at 0100 on the 28th and the column moved on at 0500. At Whitesides Geary detached the 60th New York to guard an import pass into the area of operations. He was also well aware that his movements were being observed noting that;

“active signaling plainly discernible to the naked eye”

was being conducted from the Confederate signal stations. Understanding that they had been seen and the possibility of an attack on his vulnerable position as a result Geary ordered his exhausted troops to “bivouac upon their arms, with cartridge boxes on.” He also ordered his available artillery to “a knob about 30 yards to the left of the railroad.”

Geary also selected Colonel William Rickards of the 29th Pennsylvania to act as Officer of the Day and ordered him to post his regiment as pickets. Rickards immediately posted his men secure the camp “to the best advantage” with additional instructions to construct “such defenses as would protect them from the enemy’s shot.” Companies E, K, and B were posted at the Junction of the road network under CPT Rickards (related?). CPT Stork and companies I and H were sent 3/4 of a mile out on the Kelly’s Ferry Road. LT Cousault posted companies A and F between the main camp and Lookout Creek. Companies C and G took station 1/2 mile out on the Brown’s Ferry Road. Company D continued the line between Stork and Rickards commands and a small reserve was established under CPT Millison. Millison was instructed to have the men prepared to react “on the least alarm.” When information from local citizens that there was a bridge across the creek became available Rickards rushed men to the road from it. The picket line now formed “a continuous line around our camp” and seemingly covered all approaches. Behind this defense the remainder of the division formed a semi-circular line facing north with the right flank anchored on the rail line.

Confederate Reaction

As expected the Confederate leadership was watching the development of the Union plan. By October 25th reports from scouts had alerted Bragg to a possible move into the valley from Bridgeport. He ordered Longstreet to conduct a reconnaissance in that direction. In the evaporating command atmosphere that was the Army of Tennessee Longstreet chose to ignore the order. Colonel Oates, of the 15th Alabama, also noted the activity at the river and requested reinforcements. The request was ignored. Longstreet had formed his own opinion concerning the Union intentions in the valley and dismissed further warnings from Evander Law that a large Federal column (H ooker) was on the march up the valley. Oddly, Longstreet again chose to do nothing.

Eventually the evidence of Union operations in the valley and around Brown’s Ferry became so obvious that Bragg insisted that Longstreet take action against it. In a very contentious meeting on the 28th Bragg insisted that Longstreet attack the Federals. The order was tainted by their mutual dislike and mistrust and led to a serious misunderstanding about the number of troops to be used in the proposed attack. In a curious decision Longstreet dedicated only a single division (Jenkins’) to the take on the two Federal Corps operating in the valley and around Brown’s Ferry although Bragg reminded him that his entire Corps could be used.

As he was planning his attack Longstreet noted the presence of the Union rear guard (Geary) at Wauhatchie and requested permission to conduct a night attack to cut the Federal lines of communication there. Bragg, pleased that Longstreet was finally doing something about the Union operations in his sector, agreed. Longstreet, however, sent only the one division forward. With decision to attack Geary he detached Jenkin’s South Carolina Brigade (under the command of Colonel John Bratton), further weakening the Confederate response at Brown’s Ferry, for the task.

The attack was planned for 2200 but the difficulty of movement down a narrow mountain path from their positions on the mountain delayed the approach of Bratton’s men until slightly after midnight. Bratton wisely chose to avoid the bridge, which he must have considered covered, and forded the stream nearby thus avoiding early detection by the Union pickets. Only a brief skirmish around 2230 by the advanced pickets of the 141st New York and the 48th Alabama of the Brown’s Ferry attack brigades threatened to reveal Bratton’s move. Fortunately for Bratton and his men after a few moments of heightened activity at the Union camp the uproar quieted. Bratton continued his deployment in close proximity to the Federal lines undetected. With the nearest supporting Federal units about three miles away Bratton had every reason to anticipate success against his isolated foe.

• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 1
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 2
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 3
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Conclusion

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 2

Author’s note:

Part 8 of the series on Major Ramon T. de Aragon. After the fall of Vicksburg, Major De Aragon’s brigade is recalled to Tennessee as the Yankee forces under Rosencrans advance on Chattanooga. Ector’s Brigade was to play a pivotal role in the opening of hostilities at Chickamauga Creek.

Chickamauga

For the first six months of 1863 Middle Tennessee was given a reprieve from the horrors of war. As the dramas at Vicksburg and Gettysburg unfolded, an impatient Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of War pressured Rosecrans unceasingly to move against Bragg and “liberate” the rest of Tennessee. Finally, on June 23, Rosecrans moved his army to the offensive and through a series of rather clever maneuvers, forced Bragg to fall back through the mountains to Chattanooga.

It was inevitable that Rosecrans would follow and attempt to take the city – Chattanooga was the rail center of the South and its capture would be a crippling blow to the Confederacy’s ability to move men and material. Bragg expected Rosecrans to cross Walden’s Ridge and attack Chattanooga from the North. Rosecrans knew this and obliged him by sending two brigades of infantry along with some artillery to do that very thing while the main body of his army crossed the Tennessee River to the West at Bridgeport, Alabama.

The constant struggle of the previous year had taken its toll on Bragg’s unreliable constitution and August 21, 1863 found him in the army hospital at Cherokee Springs near Ringold, Georgia. Jefferson Davis had declared a day of fasting and prayer for the entire South and most of the officers in Chattanooga were in church with the local citizenry when the Federal artillery of Captain Eli Lilly fired its first round from a ridge on the North bank of the Tennessee river. The Federal demonstration took the Confederates completely by surprise and convinced them that this was the main attack of Rosecrans’ army. Bragg had only Patton Anderson’s Brigade of infantry west of town and Bragg called him in from the Hog Jaw Valley opposite Bridgeport. The only Rebels left along the river in that area were the men of the 3rd Confederate Cavalry deployed as pickets.

Bragg had gone through channels earlier asking Joe Johnston for reinforcements and Johnston promised to send eleven brigades from Mississippi. Bragg now contacted Johnston directly but Johnston sent only the six brigades, numbering nine thousand men, of Walker’s and Breckinridge’s Divisions. Johnston later agreed to send the brigades of Brigadier Generals Evander McNair and John Gregg, but these only for a limited time. Major De Aragon’s regiment, as part of Walker’s Division, left Mississippi for Chattanooga by train on August 23. They arrived the evening of August 27 and were ordered into camp at Chickamauga Station ten miles east of Chattanooga. Breckinridge and his troops arrived on September 2.

On August 30, Bragg learned from a Stevenson, Alabama resident that the Yankees had crossed the Tennessee River at Caperton’s Ferry and the next day the 3rd Confederate Cavalry reported that the Bluecoats were in force on Sand Mountain. Having realized that he had been deceived, Bragg did not think that he could successfully defend the city and decided to practice a little trickery of his own. He would lure Rosecrans into the North Georgia mountains and there possibly defeat his army piece by piece. Even as the Federals were crossing the river, Bragg was planting “deserters” with a story of the Army of Tennessee in headlong retreat toward Atlanta.

After the fall of Vicksburg and the defeat of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg in July, President Jefferson Davis was willing to listen to any ideas. Beauregard had long suggested concentrating in Middle Tennessee troops from South Carolina, Mississippi and Virginia. Lieutenant General James Longstreet of the Army of Northern Virginia, prior to the Battle of Gettysburg, had proposed that he and Joe Johnston join forces with Bragg to defeat Rosecrans. Now he renewed his suggestion, submitting that Lee go on the defensive in Virginia and that Longstreet lead reinforcements to Tennessee. On September 5, Davis and Lee agreed to send Longstreet with the bulk of his corps, which included many men from Georgia, to strengthen Bragg’s army. Their route was originally to have been through Knoxville, but that town fell into Union hands on September 9. They were forced to take the longer way through North Carolina to Atlanta, then north to Ringold. Bragg had already ordered Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest and his cavalry to Chattanooga. Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner had also been called in from Knoxville. Earlier in the year, Lieutenant General William Hardee had been sent to Mississippi to take the place of General Pemberton, who had surrendered at Vicksburg. Davis sent Lieutenant General D. H. Hill also of the Army of Northern Virginia, to replace Hardee in the Army of Tennessee. When all reinforcements arrived, Bragg would have over seventy thousand troops to Rosecrans’ fifty-seven thousand. For the first time the Army of Tennessee had the expectation of meeting the enemy with a numerical superiority.

Confederate troops began leaving Chattanooga on the evening of September 7. Major General Walker had been given command of a “Reserve Corps” consisting of his and Brigadier General Saint John Liddell’s divisions. His new corps, including Major De Aragon’s regiment, moved south from Chickamauga Station by way of Greysville and Ringold.

The following day, as the sun was going down, Federal Brigadier General John Beatty of Thomas’ Corps stood at the top of Lookout Mountain. As he looked down McLemore’s Cove, a valley which lay between Lookout Mountain and Pigeon Mountain to the east, he saw long lines of dust moving south as Bragg’s columns seemingly “retreated.” When the mountain people of the area were questioned they all related stories of the Rebel army in disarray and fleeing in the direction of Rome, Georgia

Rosecrans set up his headquarters in Chattanooga and immediately ordered his Corps commanders in pursuit. He spread his forces over an immense area from Chattanooga south to Alpine, Georgia. Major General Thomas T. L. Crittenden’s Corps was anchored in Chattanooga with divisions moving south toward Ringold and through Rossville, Georgia to Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Major General George H. Thomas’ Corps, in the center, crossed the Raccoon/Sand Mountain Range to Lookout Valley. On September 9, his lead division crossed Lookout Mountain through Steven’s Gap and into McLemore’s Cove, some fifteen miles from Crittenden’s position. Major General Alexander McCook’s Corps moved far to the South through Winston Gap toward the towns of Alpine and Summerville, Georgia. No one noticed that Bragg had stopped his southward movement at LaFayette, Georgia and was waiting for an opportunity to strike.

Bragg’s cavalry had detected that Rosecrans’ army was spread too thin and Bragg determined to trap Thomas’ advance division, commanded by Major General James S. Negly, in McLemore’s Cove. Elements of Buckner’s Corps led by Major General Thomas C. Hindman were to enter the mouth of the cove to the North, trapping the Federals. Major General Patrick R. Cleburne’s Division of Lieutenant General D. H. Hill’s Corps was to cross Pigeon Mountain through Dug Gap and come down on Negly’s flank from the east when the sounds of Hindman’s attack were heard. Negly began to suspect that something was about to happen and solicited Thomas for support, prompting Thomas to send Brigadier General Absolam Baird and his division into the cove. Sensing a trap, both Federal divisions went back through Steven’s Gap and the golden opportunity was lost.

Lieutenant W. B. Richmond, Aide de Camp to Lieutenant General Polk, gave some general information regarding the movements of Major De Aragon’s unit during this period. Richmond wrote in his notes on Friday, September 11, that he reached Walker’s headquarters at the head of Dug Gap west of LaFayette just at dark. At 8:00 a. m. the following morning, the division had arrived at a new position on and to the right of the Ringold &LaFayette Road at the intersection of the Dalton Road just east of Rock Springs Church. Bragg had discovered Crittenden’s people at Lee and Gordon’s Mill and ordered Polk to attack with his corps. At 3:00 a. m. on September 13 Walker was ordered to take position on the left of Cheatham’s Division. At 6:00 a. m. Hindman was ordered into place between Cheatham and Walker. Finally, at 2:00 p. m. Walker was instructed to swing from right to left in order to strike the enemy, which was said to be at Pea Vine Church. By this time Rosecrans had deduced that Bragg was not in flight and was in fact concentrating around LaFayette. He pulled Crittenden back and brought in McCook and Thomas. Another chance to bushwhack a portion of the Yankee army had slipped away.

September 14, Bragg pulled his army back toward LaFayette and devised a third scheme. The next day he met with his corps commanders and outlined his plan to demonstrate against Crittenden’s troops at Lee and Gordon’s Mill while the rest of the army moved to the right as far as Reed’s Bridge Road, attack Rosecrans’ left flank and cut him off from Chattanooga. On September 19 Bragg addressed his troops telling them they should “march against the enemy and crush him”.

Rosecrans moved his headquarters to the Gordon Lee mansion at Crawfish Springs, Georgia At nightfall on September 17 the Yankees were in a line along the west side of Chickamauga Creek extending from Lee and Gordon’s Mill southwest to Bailey’s Crossroads in McLemore’s Cove. Rosecrans’ intelligence reports were poor. Signal Stations on Lookout Mountain could see columns of dust moving north but could not identify them. Finally there was enough information to determine that the Rebels were concentrating between Rock Springs Church and Pea Vine Church.

Bragg hesitated several days, long enough for Rosecrans to concentrate his forces, yet he did not wait for the reinforcements from Virginia to arrive before he decided to move. On September 17 only the vanguard of Longstreet’s Corps, Hood’s Texas Brigade, had arrived at Catoosa Station near Ringold.

Bragg’s plan called for Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson, in command of a “provisional division,” and Forrest’s Cavalry, supported by Walker’s Reserve Corps, to cross Chickamauga Creek on September 18 at Reed’s Bridge and Alexander’s Bridge. They would then come down on Rosecrans’ left flank at Lee and Gordon’s Mill, driving him back into McLemore’s Cove where he would be trapped. The bridges were assumed to be beyond the Federal left. As the battle developed, Buckner’s Corps would cross the creek at Thedford Ford and Leonidas Polk and his corps would cross at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. D. H. Hill would be in support further upstream.

On the morning of September 18, Bragg’s army began moving. That day Ector’s Brigade consisted of the 29th North Carolina Infantry, 10th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted), 14th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted), 32nd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted), Stone’s Alabama Battalion Sharpshooters, Pound’s Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters, and Major De Aragon’s own regiment, the 9th Texas Infantry. Walker’s and Buckner’s Corps used the same road on the way to their crossing points and their units became entangled. It was early afternoon before they approached Chickamauga Creek.

Waiting for the Confederates at Alexander’s Bridge were Federal Colonel John T. Wilder and his “Lighting Brigade” along with Eli Lilly’s Artillery. The men of Liddell’s Division did battle with the Yankees for possession of the bridge while Ector’s and Wilson’s Brigades waited in support on either side of the road to the rear at a point due east of Lee and Gordon’s Mill.

Further downstream at Reed’s Bridge, Bushrod Johnson was held up by Federal Colonel Robert H. G. Minty’s Cavalry and the Chicago Board of Trade Artillery. While Johnson was fighting his way across Bragg became impatient. Major General John Bell Hood of Longstreet’s Corps had arrived on the field from Ringold and Bragg sent him to take command of the situation. A portion of Forrest’s Cavalry under Brigadier General H. B. Davidson crossed the creek at Fowler’s Ford, one half mile south of Reed’s Bridge, around 3:00 p. m. Minty, knowing he was flanked, fell back along the Brotherton Road to Lee and Gordon’s Mill. This left Wilder unsupported and when he learned that Johnson was moving down Jay’s Mill Road in his rear he too retreated in the same direction as Minty. His left came under fire from Davidson’s Cavalry as his men tore the flooring from the bridge, rendering it useless. The fight for Alexander’s Bridge had lasted four hours.

After Wilder and Minty retreated, Hood and Forrest began pushing for the Federal left at Lee and Gordon’s Mill as planned. They were stopped by Wilder who had regrouped and had been reinforced. The Rebels dug in where they were for the night. Buckner in the meantime had seized Thedford Ford at 2:00 that afternoon but didn’t cross – he had been waiting for Walker’s troops to appear on the opposite bank which was to have been his signal to advance. All night Wilder’s men listened as thousands of Rebels moved into position to the North.

Walker had been ordered, in his words, “to cross Chickamauga Creek at Alexander’s Bridge if practicable, if not at Byram’s Ford 1 ½ miles below.” He was told that he would have to fight for the bridge as it was held by the Yankees. As he could not use the damaged bridge after it was taken he had his infantry cross at Byram’s Ford. They reached the ford at 4:30 p. m. and it took all night for Walker to get all of his corps across. The ordinance wagons were not taken over till daylight because of the “rocky and uneven nature of the ford.” Wilson’s Brigade was left to guard the wagons and Ector’s Brigade bivouacked about a mile west of the ford. Walker’s Reserve Corps was now the extreme right of the Confederate army instead of being in the center as planned. The surgeons set up their hospital tents in the fields that lay along the creek between the two bridges.

By morning Bragg had three divisions on the west side of the creek. As they pushed for the Federal left flank Rosecrans grasped Bragg’s intent and began shifting his force north along the Chattanooga – Lafayette Road. During the night Thomas moved from his place in the middle of the Union line and passed across the rear of Crittenden, forming on his left. McCook shifted north to connect with Crittenden and became the right flank. The Yankee line now extended five miles from the McDonald house on the North to Lee and Gordon’s Mill to the South.

Bushrod Johnson’s Provincial Division had begun to move across Reed’s Bridge at about the same time Walker began his crossing at Byram’s Ford. As his last brigade, that of Brigadier General Evander McNair, marched across they were detected by pickets belonging to Union Colonel Dan McCook. McCook reported to Thomas that one lone Rebel brigade was isolated near the bridge. Thomas dispatched Colonel John Croxton’s Brigade of Brannon’s Division at 7:30 .a. m. on the morning of September 19 to capture this brigade and develop the enemy. Reed’s Bridge had been burned and Croxton thought he had the “lone” brigade trapped.

Meanwhile, Johnson’s Division moved south toward Lee and Gordon’s Mill and were replaced by Davidson and his cavalry in the vicinity of Jay’s Mill just off Reed’s Bridge Road. They routed Dan McCook’s Brigade and were there waiting for Croxton when he arrived. Croxton’s troops pushed the Rebel Cavalry back until Forrest himself arrived with one of his division commanders, Brigadier General John Peagram. Together they organized their line and stopped the Yankee advance. The Battle of Chickamauga had begun.

Early that morning Forrest had been ordered to move down the road toward Reed’s Bridge and develop the enemy. When he encountered Croxton’s troops he rode down Jay’s Mill Road looking for infantry and found Colonel Claudius C. Wilson’s Brigade of Walker’s Division. He asked Wilson to bring his troops forward but Wilson and Walker both insisted on written orders from Bragg before moving. At this time, Leonidas Polk sent forward Forrest’s own cavalry brigade under the command of Colonel George C. Dibrell.

Croxton sent back a report that he had encountered a large cavalry force and Brannon sent Colonel Ferdinand Van Derveer’s Brigade forward. Wilson came up on the left of Forrest’s cavalry and attacked Croxton’s right, prompting Croxton to send a message to Thomas asking which of the four or five enemy brigades in his front was the one he was supposed to capture. Dibrell advanced up Reed’s Bridge Road in search of Croxton’s rear and collided with Van Derveer’s infantry.

Bragg and Walker heard Wilson’s men engage the enemy and Bragg ordered Walker to attack with all the force he had. Forrest, however, had found Ector’s Brigade one-half mile away in the Youngblood field about the time Dibrell engaged Van Derveer. This time Forrest ignored Walker and called directly on Ector to come up. Wilson was pushing Croxton back on the left so he sent Ector in to support Dibrell on the right. The brigade arrived at Jay’s Mill soon after 9:00 a. m. They formed on the left of Dibrell’s Cavalry and attacked Van Derveer’s front. C. B. Kilgore, Adjutant of Ector’s Brigade, related this account after the war:

“On Friday night, September 18, 1863, Ector’s Brigade, of which I was adjutant, crossed Chickamauga Creek, and on Saturday morning, the 19th, formed on the extreme Confederate right, supporting General Forrest’s cavalry, which was very heavily engaged. The fighting soon became fierce for us, and we were barely able to hold our ground. General Ector became uneasy in regard to the protection of his right flank, and asked me to go to General Forrest and urge him to be very vigilant in his protection of it. I galloped up to where one of his batteries was engaged, as I had been told he was there. He had on a linen duster, with a sword and pistol on the outside of the duster, and was exposed to very heavy fire of infantry and now and then a shot from the enemy’s batteries. I said: ‘General Forrest, General Ector directed me to say to you that he is uneasy in regard to his right flank.’ He replied: ‘Tell General Ector that he need not bother about his right flank, I’ll take care of it.’ I reported to my commander, and about an hour later news reached us that Wilson’s brigade had been hard hit and driven back, and General Ector sent me again to Forrest to tell him that he was now uneasy about his left flank. I found him near the same spot, right in the thickest part of the fight, the battery blazing away and every man fighting like mad. I told him what General Ector had directed me to say, and this time he got furious. He turned around on me and shouted, loud enough to be heard above the terrible din that was in the air: ‘Tell General Ector that, by God, I am here, and will take care of his left flank as well as his right.’ It is hardly necessary to add that we were not outflanked on either side.”

Ector had the choice to charge or halt and return fire – he chose the latter. The brigade had no artillery support and the guns of Union Lieutenant Frank Smith’s Regular Battery tore holes in their line. They engaged in severe fighting till 11:00 a. m. when they were obliged to retire. As the brigade withdrew Union Brigadier General Absalom Baird’s Division came into position on Brannon’s right. Brigadier General John King’s Regular Brigade began a “passage of lines,” filing through Croxton’s line and opened fire on Wilson’s men. At that time the 9th Texas withdrawal took them across King’s front and distracted most of his brigade leaving only one battalion to face Wilson. Lieutenant Robert Ayres, 19th U. S. Infantry wrote the following in his report:

“We engaged the enemy and repulsed him, pursuing to the front some three-fourths mile and halted. Here the 9th Texas Regiment passing along our front from left to right, received our fire, which caused them to break and run, and many came into our lines as prisoners.”

Forrest ordered Wilson to pull out but he was struck by yet another Yankee unit before he could comply. At 11:00 a. m. the forest surrounding Jay’s Mill fell silent as the Rebels broke off the attack. The men of Ector’s Brigade along with Wilson’s troops fell back to the Youngblood field. General Forrest, in his report after the battle, had this to say about the performance of Ector’s and also Wilson’s brigades:

“Until the arrival of Major-General Walker (being senior officer present) I assumed temporary command of the infantry, and I must say that the fighting and the gallant charges of the two brigades just referred to excited my admiration. They broke the enemy’s lines, and could not be halted or withdrawn until nearly surrounded.”

Bragg ordered Walker to send Liddell’s Division to Forrest and at 11:00 a. m. ordered Major General Cheatham and his division up on the right to support Walker. Liddell hit Baird’s Division in a counterattack, surprising and overwhelming the brigades of Brigadier General John C. Starkweather and Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner. Federal Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson arrived on the field and with remains of Brannon’s and Baird’s units forced Walker back one and one-half miles.

By 12:00 noon Cheatham had formed immediately in the rear of Walker’s line of battle and hit the Federals hard at Brock field. There, he fought the Yankees to a standstill. His troops, however began to run out of ammunition at 2:00 p. m. and his right began to fall back until reinforced by Forrest.

Rosecrans’ moved his headquarters north to the Widow Glenn’s house a little after 10:00 a. m. He then started sending divisions north to reinforce Thomas. He focused his efforts on denying Bragg the Lafayette Road. By 12:35 p. m. Thomas had been reinforced and his line extended more than a mile from the Kelly field south past the Brotherton house.

Confederate Major General A. P. Stewart’s Division was sent to support Cheatham but a weak spot was detected in the center of the Union line near the Brotherton house and he turned left and attacked there at 3:15 p. m. His troops drove the enemy as far as the tan yard on the Dyer farm west of the Lafayette Road, capturing twelve guns. Federal Major General Joseph J. Reynolds had earlier organized a reserve line of some twenty guns on a ridge that ran through the Brotherton farm. He brought these guns and some nearby infantry to bear on Stewart’s troops and pushed him back across the road. Stewart’s arrival had, however, saved Cheatham’s left flank. Stewart committed his last brigade, that of Brigadier General William B. Bate, to the fight at 3:45 p. m. Bate’s men along with those of Brigadier General Henry D. Clayton broke the Union center shortly after 4:00 p. m., but Stewart had no more troops to send in to take advantage of the situation.

On the far left of the Confederate line, Hood’s Division drove elements of Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis Division across the Lafayette Road in fighting most bitter and disorganized. At 4:00 p. m. Major General Phillip Sheridan’s men arrived to stop the Rebels from claiming success at that point.

Bragg continued to send troops to his right in an attempt to get between the Yankees and Chattanooga. Major General Cleburne’s Division made a six mile march north from a point near Pea Vine Church, crossed Chickamauga Creek at Thedford ford, and joined a part of Cheatham’s Division in an ill conceived night attack against Thomas’ line at Winfrey field. The Confederates were repulsed with the loss of a most valuable officer – Major De Aragon’s old brigade commander, Brigadier General Preston Smith, who was killed during the assault.

At sunset on September 19, the LaFayette Road divided the two armies except on the Union left where the line turned slightly to the East. The day’s casualties were fairly evenly divided although the command structure of Bragg’s army was in somewhat better shape than that of his Union counterpart and Bragg had fresh troops that had not yet been engaged.

Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk arrived at Bragg’s headquarters, located near Thedford’s Ford, at 9:00 p. m. Bragg decided to once again reorganize his army, dividing it into two wings. Polk was to command the right wing, which would be made up of the divisions of Cheatham, Cleburne, Breckinridge, Liddell, and Walker. The left wing, consisting of Buckner’s Corps, Hindman’s and Bushrod Johnson’s Divisions, Longstreet’s Corps (under the command of John Bell Hood,) and the Battalions of Eldridge, Williams, and Robertson, would be commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet.

Longstreet arrived at Catoosa Station near Ringold at 2:00 p. m. on the afternoon of September 19, only to find that Bragg had sent no one to meet him. His horses arrived on a second train at 4:00 p. m. He and two aides, Lieutenant Colonels Moxley Sorrel and P. T. Manning, found their own way to the battleground, nearly being captured on the way. They finally came on Bragg asleep in his ambulance at 11:00 p. m. Longstreet woke him and they met for one hour as Bragg outlined his plan for the following day.

Bragg’s plan of attack for Sunday, September 20 was for D. H. Hill’s two divisions, those of Breckinridge and Cleburne, to attack at dawn on the right. Then Walker and Cheatham and on down the line to Longstreet attacking with Hood’s and Buckner’s Corps. Rather than the open fields that were the common location of major conflicts of the day, the battle along Chickamauga Creek was being fought in forests so thick that visibility was severely limited. Bragg’s order to his commanders was for each brigade to attack when they saw the unit on their right move forward.

Polk’s headquarters were located at Alexander’s Bridge. D. H. Hill had not been told of the meeting with Bragg and was unable during the night to find either Bragg or Polk and thus was unaware of the command change which made him subordinate to Polk. He also was completely in the dark as to the plan for the attack which he was supposed to lead in the morning.

The night of September 19 was extremely cold. The Yankee troops suffered through with little water as Bragg’s army held Chickamauga Creek. Polk awakened at 5:47 a. m. Sunday morning and listened in vain for the sound of the guns which would indicate the beginning of Hill’s attack. As time slipped by he learned that Hill never received any orders so he went about sending instructions to Hill and the division commanders of his wing. Bragg also wondered why his war machine wasn’t moving and sent aides looking for Polk. One Major Pollock B. Lee reported to Bragg that he had found Polk well behind the lines about an hour after sunrise, sitting on a farmhouse porch reading a newspaper and waiting for his breakfast. When informed of Bragg’s concern, Polk was quoted as saying:

 “Do tell General Bragg that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack – overflowing with anxiety, sir.”

At 9:30 a. m. the order to attack was finally given. Brigadier General Ben Hardin Helm of Breckinridge’s Division, who was incidentally a brother-in-law of Abraham Lincoln, led the “Orphan Brigade” forward seven hundred yards to a ridge two hundred yards away from the Yankee breastworks, occupied by Scribner’s and King’s Brigades, on the Alexander’s Bridge Road. The Federals watched in apprehension as the Rebel skirmishers fell back and their battle flags were planted on the crest of the ridge. Helm was silhouetted on his horse in the middle of his line. A brief silence fell over the field; then, screaming the “Rebel Yell,” the Kentuckians swarmed off the ridge.

Cleburne did not receive the order to attack until 10:00 a. m. and so failed to move his division forward as planned. The Orphan Brigade split into two groups as they neared the Yankee line and the portion led by Helm was decimated. The two remaining Brigades of Breckinridge’s Division – those of Brigadier Generals Daniel W. Adams and Marcellus A. Stovall drove the enemy to the Lafayette Road where they stopped to regroup. The Rebels had finally succeeded in cutting the Federal line of communication and now threatened the only avenue of escape that was left – the road through McFarland Gap.

Between 9:00 a. m. and 10:00 a. m. Walker was sent for to support Hill’s attack. Brigadier General States Rights Gist and his brigade had just arrived on the field from Rome, Georgia where he had been on detached service. Gist was put in command of Walker’s Division and Colonel Peyton H. Colquitt was given command of Gist’s Brigade. Ector’s and Wilson’s Brigades, having taken heavy casualties during the fighting of the previous day, numbered about five hundred men each.

Gist was ordered to take the division into the fight behind Breckinridge’s line. D. H. Hill gave him instructions to send Wilson and Ector in behind Colquitt in support. After Helm was killed, Gist attacked through Helm’s line and was repulsed. Colonel Colquitt was killed in the assault. As the line fell back, the men of Ector’s and Wilson’s Brigades continued to fire from cover for about ten minutes till ordered by Hill to withdraw. Walker then sent word to Gist to support the advance of Liddell’s Division. Liddell engaged the enemy at the Lafayette Road but fell back. Gist’s Brigade halted on the road. Ector and Wilson came up on his left and bivouacked there for the night.

About 11:00 a. m. Rosecrans moved his headquarters north to a ridge west of the Brotherton house. All morning he had been shifting his forces north to reinforce Thomas. Major John Mendenhall began collecting idle artillery on a high ridge, south of Snodgrass Hill called Horseshoe Ridge. A courier named Captain Sanford Cobb Kellog reported to Rosecrans that a gap existed between the divisions of Major General Joseph Reynolds and Brigadier General Thomas Wood. Brigadier General John M. Brannon’s troops were there, but back from the line and obscured from Kellog’s sight by the trees. Rosecrans himself was not sure of Brannon’s position and at 10:45 a. m. sent an order to Wood to close up on Reynolds line. The firing in that area had abated and Wood read the order at 11:00 a. m. and moved to obey as Rosecrans had publicly censored him earlier for not moving his division promptly when instructed.

James Longstreet had the opportunity to survey the field for the first time that morning. He learned that the bulk of the enemy opposing his wing was concentrated in the woods west of the Brotherton farm, so he massed his wing opposite that point, some three hundred yards east of the Brotherton cabin. His column of eight brigades, eleven thousand men, was five brigades deep and one fourth mile wide – a formation of unprecedented depth. His front was about equal to the width of the Brotherton field. Longstreet gave the order to advance at 11:10 a. m. – ten minutes after Wood read the order to move his division to the North.

Wood’s move created a hole one-fourth mile wide between the lines of Jefferson C. Davis and Brannon. Through this hole roared three divisions of Longstreet’s wing. Federal Colonel Charles Harker’s Brigade moved first behind Brannon’s line. Colonel George P. Buell followed and his skirmishers were still in the Brotherton field when the Rebels reached the edge of the woods. Buell had only moved a brigade front when, in his words, “the shock came like an avalanche on my right flank.” As Brigadier General Evander McNair’s Troops hit his moving column, Buell watched the entire right wing and part of the center of the Federal army melt away.

Bushrod Johnson’s troops cut through the Federal line and pushed a mile through the Union center. Yankee troops of Sheridan’s and Davis’ Divisions along with the bulk of Van Cleve’s and Negley’s men ran from the field. At 11:45 a. m. five Confederate brigades came out of the woods and charged into the Dyer field. Rosecrans and corps commanders Crittenden and McCook were caught up in the rout and carried through McFarland Gap and north to Rossville. Rosecrans quit the field at 12:00 noon thinking the entire army, including Thomas, had been routed.

Bushrod Johnson later gave this most eloquent rendition of the scene:

“Our lines now emerged from the forest into open ground on the border of long, open fields, over which the enemy were retreating… The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of fire-arms – of whistling balls and grape-shot and of bursting shell – made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur.”

At 2:45 p. m., Longstreet is quoted as saying:

“They have fought their last man and he is running.”

The Rebels then came under fire from Mendenhall’s guns on Horseshoe Ridge. Polk had failed to break the Federal left so Longstreet decided that the left wheel he had planned was not practicable. He turned Hood loose against the Yankees on Horseshoe Ridge and Hood’s troops captured Mendenhall’s guns before being driven back by the combined forces of Federal commanders Wood, Opdyke, and Harker. Hood himself was wounded below the hip – the leg was condemned and later removed by Dr. T. G. Richardson at a house in Tunnel Hill, Georgia.

Thomas regrouped on Snodgrass Hill with what was left of his corps and the remains of the Federal right wing and was joined there by Major General Gordon Grainger and Brigadier General James B. Steedman of the reserve corps. Rosecrans had sent word for Thomas to hold till nightfall and then withdraw to Rossville. Rosecrans then went on to Chattanooga to organize the defense of the city. After sunset the Union forces one by one crept off through McFarland Gap. At 10:00 p. m. the brigade of Colonel Dan McCook was the last Yankee unit to leave the field.

Thomas formed a defensive line along Missionary Ridge as far as Chattanooga Creek, but he and Rosecrans agreed that the position was untenable. He began to withdraw at 9:00 p. m. on September 21 and was gone before dawn. The Yankees had fallen back to their entrenchments around Chattanooga.

All of Bragg’s officers urged immediate pursuit of the Federal army. Forrest, having sent his men to hound the retreating enemy, sent a message to Bragg urging him to act: “Every hour is worth a thousand men.” Bragg refused to move because, unbelievably, he refused to accept that his Army of Tennessee had won a decisive victory. He cited the huge loss of the army’s horses and mules as reason enough to delay any pursuit. When he finally did move, instead of crossing the river to the North of Chattanooga and cutting off Rosecrans line of communication and supply, he advanced directly on the town and found the Union army well entrenched there.

The combined casualties of both armies for the battle were thirty-seven thousand one hundred twenty-nine. The casualties of Ector’s Brigade were fifty-nine killed, two hundred thirty-nine wounded, and one hundred thirty-eight missing. Colonel Young of Major De Aragon’s regiment was wounded through the left breast.

On September 22, Polk, in a communication from his headquarters near Mission Mills listed Walker’s Division as being “on the left of Anderson, who is on the Mission Mills & Chattanooga Rd, covering another parallel road with a good gap. Part of preparations to advance on Chattanooga.” Then in a circular from the headquarters of the Army of Tennessee in the field near Red House Ford on the same day, items I – IX are concerned with orders relating to the battle and preparations for the advance on Chattanooga. Item X:

“Brigadier-General Ector with his Brigade will report to General Johnston in Mississippi: The command will march to Ringold, or the northern terminus of the road, and there take the cars.”

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DE ARAGON, The Chronicle of a Confederate Surgeon – Part 8

I recently acquired Thunder Across the Swamp by Donald Frazier.  This is his second book on the Civil War in Louisiana and covers just a four-month time frame from February to May 1863.  I suspect that most who are interested in the Civil War know little about the action in southern Louisiana during early 1863.  This book is an excellent narrative of that time.

The first quarter of the book sets the scene and describes events in February and March.  The most enlightening and exciting aspect of this part of the book was the description of the naval actions.  The regional US naval commanders — Commander David Porter above Vicksburg, Rear Admiral David Farragut at New Orleans and Lieutenant-Commander Augustus Cooke at Brashear City (modern day Morgan City) — each tried to push past Confederate defensive positions while Major General Richard Taylor, the Confederate commander in Louisiana, sought to build up his waterborne force.    In this phase the Confederates generally got the upper hand, capturing or sinking several US vessels.  Of 12 boats sent into Confederate controlled territory, 2 were captured and put into Confederate service, 3 more were lost, and 4 were disabled.

Porter’s attempts to run passed the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg ended badly.  In February the Queen of the West made it downstream and briefly menaced Confederate commerce but when it tried to engage some of Taylor’s forces on the Red River it was crippled and captured.  Porter next sent the Indianola down the river only to encounter a Confederate task force that included the Queen of the West now flying Confederate colors.   Frazier’s description of the fight that followed, leading to the destruction of the Indianola, was thrilling.

Partially in response to the loss of the Queen of the West and the Indianola, Farragut decided to get his fleet above Port Hudson.  In a daring nighttime dash on March 14, he raced upstream passed the batteries but only two of his seven vessels made it.  One ship was destroyed and four others were disabled and drifted down river.  Later in March Porter sent two rams – the Switzerland and the Lancaster – to run by Vicksburg.  They suffered greatly from the Confederate batteries and the Lancaster was sunk though the Switzerland survived and joined Farragut.  Also at the end of March, Captain Thomas Peterson led the Diana in a probe of Confederate defenses in Bayou Teche.  He bit off more than he could chew, running into ambush.  The 3-hour fight and resulting capture of the Diana by Texas cavalry is dramatically told by Frazier.

The heart of the book is about the action that occurred along Bayou Teche in south central Louisiana during early April 1863.  Taylor hoped to bring his land and water forces together to strike towards New Orleans, but Major General Nathaniel Banks, the US commander in Louisiana, moved first, concentrating his forces against Taylor.  Banks launched a two-prong operation, advancing with four brigades directly against Taylor’s two brigades at Fort Bisland while sending a three-brigade division by boat on a wide flank movement to get into Taylor’s rear at Irish Bend.  Concurrently, as the land forces battled, the Queen of the West approached from the north to engage Banks’ US Navy support.  Discovering the trap closing around him Taylor retreated, slipping away on an overlooked bridge through a swamp near Franklin.  Frazier spends several chapters on the fighting at Fort Bisland and Irish Bend, giving a rich treatment to these relatively unknown battles.  I found the narrative of Taylor’s escape especially riveting.

With the collapse of Taylor’s position in southern Louisiana, the dynamic in the theater changed.  The final third of the book covers the time between Taylor’s retreat and the siege of Port Hudson, roughly from mid-April to mid-May.  Banks had pushed deep into Louisiana but struggled with what to do next.  Communication with Grant was sporadic and so delayed that messages were obsolete as soon as they were read.  Despite his success against Taylor, Banks still faced significant natural and logistical obstacles in moving further.  Meanwhile, Taylor was regrouping in western Louisiana, collecting reinforcements from Texas.  In addition to describing the command-level decisions, Frazier fits in observations about the destructive nature of war, such as the plundering of the countryside by US troops and the impact of enlisting former slaves into the US army.  He also skillfully balances the micro-narrative with the big picture.  Obscure cavalry actions are described in action-packed detail while at the same time the regional strategic situation is clearly explained.

Frazier’s writing has a nice pace to it and he is descriptive enough so the reader understands the action without getting bogged down in the detail.  Likewise, the maps are simple, clear but with enough key information to help the reader.  While Frazier does not provide a stand alone description of the regional geography, the narrative and the maps are easy enough to follow that one gets a sense of the importance of the interconnected waterways.   There are a few awkward transitions and a few minor editing mistakes but not enough to detract from the overall experience. It’s a testament his writing that I would stay up longer than normal in order to finish chapters.  I highly recommend this book and I look forward to Frazier’s next work.

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Praise for Thunder

Introduction

The autumn of 1863 found Union forces in southern Tennessee in a very difficult position. The post-Chickamauga retreat into Chattanooga left the commander, MG William Rosecrans, in an impossible political/military predicament. Nearly every entry into the city was covered by the Confederates making adequate logistical support for his army impossible. Unfortunately, abandonment of the city for a more viable base of operations was denied by his superiors. The state of Tennessee had been won and there was no inclination in Washington to give any of it back. Caught in this conundrum the disheartened Rosecrans became moribund and his army withered on the slim vine of his poor logistics. Stagnation, however, was not part of the plan in Washington either. After several unsuccessful attempts to motivate Rosecrans into action he was replaced by MG U. S. Grant.

Fresh from his Victory at Vicksburg, Grant was not content to remain idle. At the suggestion of his chief engineer, BG William F. Smith, he adopted a bold plan to open his communications and move forward against the enemy. The operation called for an amphibious assault across the river to seize a bridgehead just out of range of the Confederate artillery. Once established on the far shore a pontoon bridge would be thrown and troops would be sent across with the goal of linking with MG Joseph Hooker’s column of XI and XII Corps troops marching up the Lookout Valley from Bridgeport.

All these moves were visible to the enemy on the mountain and were sure to be contested. Nevertheless, the plan was refined and implemented. The amphibious operation was a spectacular success and H ooker’s move up the valley to support the main operation progressed nearly unopposed. In an effort to secure his own lines of communication Hooker made a move that would lead to one of the very few examples of night combat during the entire war at Wauhatchie, Tennessee.

Hooker’s Move Initially MG Joseph Hooker’s movement to Tennessee was an emergency reaction to the need to reinforce Rosecrans in the immediate aftermath of Chickamauga. Portions of XI Corps and XII Corps were dispatched from the eastern theater by train with instructions to make no delay. MG Rosecrans fortified the demand for speed with a terse message to Hooker on 27 September;

“You will proceed from Louisville direct to Bridgeport without stopping at Nashville.”

Despite the prodding, Hooker’s move was anything but fast. Prior to their departure nearly all the units involved were forced to turn in their serviceable wagons and teams. Their orders included instructions to draw replacements at the Nashville depot. When they arrived there, however, they found nothing but derelict wagons and broken down animals. The advance stalled there as the quartermasters tried to assemble a train from the available dregs. Hooker finally determined to push on with just his infantry troops while a train was assembled from what could be scrounged. Additionally a wide dispersement of his troops to counter Confederate forays and unseasonably wet weather further delayed his arrival to Bridgeport. Once there he had to wait for the makeshift train of wagons that had been assembled from the dregs at Nashville to arrive.

In the interim MG Rosecrans had been ousted in favor of MG Grant. Hooker was called to Stevenson for a conference with the new commander. The meeting resulted in a bizarre clash of egos. While Grant and Howard hit it off immediately, Thomas remained aloof, and Hooker sent an aide to meet with Grant, claiming illness. Grant jumped at the opportunity to assert his authority and forced Hooker to visit him. Having sized up his commanders Grant issued no complete orders. Hooker departed the meeting and returned to Bridgeport. Grant sent orders to Hooker through Thomas on 24 October to continue his march to Brown’s Ferry, not as reinforcements but as an integral part of the new breakout plan.

Despite his reservations concerning the plan, Hooker reported crossing the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport on the 26th with the greater part of XI Corps, 2nd Division of XII Corps and a cavalry detachment consisting of one company of the 5th Tennessee and a part of a company from the 1st Alabama. The march followed the Wauhatchie wagon road that paralleled the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. The lead elements of the column reached Shellmound on the 26th and Whitesides on the 27th. On the 28th the march resumed with the division of BG John Geary at the rear. Geary’s division had been whittled down to barely 1500 men by detachments to secure the line along the route of march. At 1630 Geary’s weary men reached Wauhatchie and were ordered to stop and secure the town. Wauhatchie held an important road junction and abutted the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. It was a critical location to the maintenance of Hooker’s lines of communication.

• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 1
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 2
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 3
• Night Fight at Wauhatchie Conclusion

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Night Fight at Wauhatchie Part 1