I am looking for a cite for a U. S. Grant quote. It was supposedly made while touring in France after the war when someone asked him what he’d learned from Napoleon.

I faced two problems during the war. One was the rifled musket behind works and the other was moving huge amounts of men and material by rail. Napoleon had nothing to say on either of them.

I’ve seen this several times but have not been able to find a source. Anyone know?

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Need Help With US Grant Quote

Previously I wrote about who really won the battle of Iuka. This time I am going to dig deeper into Rosecrans’ performance at that battle. Attention has often been deflected from Rosecrans by questions about where Grant and Ord were during the battle. A lot of ink has been spilled about ‘acoustic shadows’, mis-communication or more negative aspersions on Grant. But to me it seems to be the wrong question. We should be asking – where was Rosecrans?

Rosecrans proposed a plan to trap and crush the Confederates at Iuka: ”I telegraphed you, proposing that the force from Burnsville should attack the rebels from the west and draw them in that direction, and that I would move in on their rear by the Jacinto and Fulton roads and cut off their retreat.” A key component of the plan was to cover both the roads mentioned in order to cut off Price’s escape routes. Starting early on September 18th, the idea was that both forces should be in position by the end of the day so that attack could happen early on the 19th.

Ord advanced on schedule: on the evening of the 18th Ord’s lead units had pushed the confederate pickets back along the Burnsville Road a few miles outside Iuka. But as soon as Rosecrans starts, the plan starts to unravel. Late on the 18th he reported that Stanley’s division had gone the wrong way and thus was delayed and fatigued. This was blamed on a “fault of guide” but could just as well be blamed on a fault of leadership as it seems to me that ensuring the command moved in the right direction is part of a commander’s job. Where was Rosecrans as the 18th drew to a close? Not where he planned to be.

Still, Rosecrans was full of optimism and at 6am on the 19th he wrote to Grant that “Eighteen miles to Iuka, but think I shall make it by the time mentioned – 2 o’clock p.m.”. He did not make it by that time. By the afternoon he was still miles from Iuka. Since Rosecrans was struggling to get his men into position, the timetable he had worked out with Grant was thrown off. Grant had to alter the plan of action by ordering Ord to sit tight and wait for a signal. Where was Rosecrans mid-afternoon of the 19th? Not where he said he would be.

Finally getting near Iuka, Rosecrans made a crucial change to the plan by choosing not to cover one of the two roads. That morning he had written to Grant that “Hamilton will go up the Fulton and Iuka road; Stanley up the Jacinto road from Barnett’s.” But, without informing Grant, Rosecrans send his entire force down just one of the roads. There is a good argument that it was better to keep his two divisions together, but he could at least have detached some cavalry to watch the second road and delay the Confederates if they tried to escape on it. So where was Rosecrans as he approached Iuka? Not where he was expected to be.

As General Charles Hamilton, commanding the front of Rosecrans column, approached Iuka he encountered Confederates blocking his way. More Confederates arrived; they charged, pushing Hamilton back. Intense fighting continued until dark. In an article that appeared in Battle & Leaders, Volume 2, Hamilton wrote about trying to find Rosecrans several times during the battle: “Thinking General Rosecrans was in the rear, where he could hurry up the troops of Stanley’s division, I dispatched an aide with the request that General Rosecrans would come forward far enough to confer with me. …. I dispatched another officer, the only one in reach, for General Rosecrans … I dispatched my adjutant-general, Captain Sawyer, and a short time later another aide, Lieutenant Wheeler, with messages for General Rosecrans, saying that I considered it imperative he should come forward to see me, and should hurry forward fresh troops.” But, according to Hamilton, Rosecrans could not be found during the battle. Where was Rosecrans?

In their official after action reports, Hamilton and his subordinates didn’t refer to any support or direction coming from Rosecrans. In the reports from General Stanley and the commanders of his division there is mention of Rosecrans. Specifically Rosecrans was involved in the confusion over Mower’s brigade. Leading his brigade into action, Mower “found I only had one regiment with me”. From looking at the reports of Mower and his regimental commanders it appears that both Rosecrans and Stanley were issuing orders without communicating or coordinating with each other. Mower responded to Rosecrans, leading his regiment in one direction, while the other regiments responded to Stanley and went in a different direction. The chain of command broke down.

It seems to me that a closer look at the Battle of Iuka does not put Rosecrans in a good light. His management of the moving column did not go as expected; he did not cover both roads as planned; and he was not an effective battlefield presence.

—

Sources: WITH PRICE EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI By Colonel Thomas L. Snead and THE BATTLE OF IUKA By C. S. Hamilton, Major General, U.S.V. both of which appear in Battles and Leaders, Volume 2 published in 1887 and The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. ; Series 1 – Volume 17 Part I and II.

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Where was Rosecrans?

Brett’s post last month on the new book by Frank Varney inspired me to write this post. In my view, the standard conclusion about the Battle of Iuka is wrong, but not in the way Varney would like. I agree that the winner of the battle has been unjustly overlooked, but its not Rosecrans that has been slighted. On the contrary he has enjoyed undeserved credit. The real winner of the battle was Sterling Price.¹

In mid September 1862, Price occupied Iuka, Mississippi, with his Army of the West. His mission was to stop Rosecrans from reinforcing Buell in Kentucky and possibly to head into Kentucky himself. He paused in Iuka to determine the appropriate course of action. But on the night of September 18th Price received an order from CSA President Davis that he was to unite with General Van Dorn, then south of Corinth. As a result he determined to depart Iuka the next day and had ordered wagons packed even before he encountered US forces moving his way.

Meanwhile, Rosecrans had proposed a plan to trap Price at Iuka. He would lead two divisions — commanded by Generals Hamilton and Stanley — by way of Jacinto to approach Iuka from the south while General Ord would lead another three divisions to approach Iuka from the west. They would catch Price between them, blocking off his escape route. Grant okayed the plan and on September 18th US forces began to move. By the next afternoon Rosecrans was approaching Iuka from the south.

Alerted to Rosecrans’ approach, Price dispatched a brigade to block him and then followed with a second brigade. Hamilton, leading Rosecrans’ column, deployed his men across the road. Price attacked — note that despite Rosecrans advancing toward Iuka, Price was the tactical attacker. Price was able to drive Hamilton back, capturing a battery and throwing several regiments into disarray. Hamilton’s situation was made worse by poor coordination with Rosecrans and confusion among the US troops — at one point US forces fired on each other. With the arrival of Stanley’s division, the US position stabilized; with the setting sun, the fighting ended.

Tactically the Confederates had gotten the better of the US forces. After the close of the battle, Price considered how he could attack Rosecrans in the morning; Rosecrans was concerned about being attacked. But during the night Price’s subordinates prevailed on him to depart. This was not a result of the battle — Rosecrans hadn’t driven him from town. Instead it was pointed out that Ord was west of town with a large force of fresh troops and that Price intended to leave anyway. Since Rosecrans had failed to block one of the roads, Price slipped away.

To recap, on September 19th Price was looking to leave Iuka in order to join Van Dorn while Rosecrans was looking to trap Price at Iuka; as Rosecrans approached, Price attacked and neutralized Rosecrans; Price then left, leaving the US trap empty. Price succeeded in his objective; Rosecrans failed at his.

Rosecrans was successful at one thing — friendly newspapers reported a victory. As a result it seems to me that the standard summary of Iuka has been shaped more by who better managed the press than by who achieved better results on the ground.

—

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Will the Real Winner of Iuka Come On Down!

I’m sure everyone has heard of the awful events in Santa Monica, CA, where a gunman shot several people. He used the ubiquitous AR-15, but he also had a pistol in his “arsenal” (which in California apparently means anything more than one firearm)—a reproduction Remington 1858 cap & ball revolver. Introduced in 1863, it was by war’s end the second most popular revolver.

The Remington normally shoots black powder but you can also get a conversion cylinder that will allow you to shoot modern smokeless centerfire cartridges (not the same as the post-Civil War conversions). It’s not terribly convenient as you must remove the cylinder and unscrew the end to reload, but it does work.

The Santa Monica police exhibited  the guns in a show & tell, and it was hard to tell whether the pistol was in the original cap & ball configuration or had the conversion cylinder (web opinions are divided). No matter, as you can plainly see by looking at the front of the cylinder that the gun is still loaded.

This is slightly amusing but also very scary, as these old pistols don’t have any sort of safety. They were normally carried with an empty chamber under the hammer to avoid accidents, but if there’s a live cartridge there and the pistol is dropped, gets a hard bump on the hammer, or the hammer catches on something and springs back, the gun will go off.

Let’s hope they figure this out.

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Santa Monica Shooter’s Civil War Pistol

Success, Failure, and Reconsideration

Although the flanking move by the 6^th Connecticut was in large part responsible for the collapse of the Confederate defense south of Battery Wagner they paid an unexpected price for their success. They had surprised the enemy and their own troops as well. As the 3^rd New Hampshire moved around the extreme right of the Confederate works they spotted unidentified troops across the field. The new line of troops “was supposed to be the enemy and a fire was opened on them.” The mistake was soon realized and “cease fire” was ordered. In the chaos of battle the order went unheard. One officer, understanding the danger of the situation, ran down the parapet waving his sword and “kicking their rifles right and left.” The firing stopped and no mention of casualties resulting from the incident was made. Credit for the rout was claimed by every regiment but the 7^th Connecticut promoted its case in the official report of CPT Sylvester H. Gray who wrote:

“the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers were first to land, the first in their batteries, and sent their card after Mr. Secesh in the shape of a few 8-inch shells, from a gun which they had just left in good working order.”

Whoever was responsible the result could not be questioned. Taken were 11 pieces of mixed ordnance and 127 prisoners. The troubles for the fleeing defenders were not over. As they neared the relative safety of Battery Wagner the retreating men ran head long into reinforcements that had been sent to their aid. Men from the 7^th South Carolina Battalion and 20^th South Carolina were dispatched to Morris Island at the first sign of the attack. Landed at Cumming’s Point these men had run nearly the full length of the island. Exhausted they were caught up in the stampede towards Battery Wagner. The entire force became a retreating mob seeking the shelter of Wagner’s walls. Inside the fort at least one Confederate viewed the disorganized men and felt that “only a little dash on the part of the union army would have given them the whole island; all they had to do was press on.”

But press on they could not. The unexpected ease of their initial victory had worked against that aim. The assaulting troops were exhausted by two consecutive nights with little or no sleep and the mad dash after the routed enemy and also disorganized by the rapid turn of events. Although their close proximity to Battery Wagner and thus the enemy put them in harm’s way from further shelling the naval bombardment was stopped the guns at Fort Sumter now had them in range. Night was falling and the lengthy trip by the boats to get fresh troops over from Folly Island precluded any further action. Any assault would wait for reinforcements.

July 11^th Assault on Battery Wagner

While Gillmore struggled to get his reinforcements involved in the fight the Confederate command was succeeding.  The Federal diversions had failed to influence the flow of enemy troops into the area. The Terry’s James Island incursion had not tied up a significant number of Confederate forces. The second Union diversion, a raid by the 1^st South Carolina (US), failed to destroy the railroad bridge connecting Savannah to Charleston.  Reinforcements came in the shape of a mixed command of Georgians, under Col. Charles Olmstead. Around midnight this command was being ferried to Morris Island. More than 450 men of the 1^st Georgia, 18^th Georgia Battalion, and the 12^th Georgia Artillery Battalion were added to Battery Wagner’s defense.  Outside the walls 150 men of the 7^th South Carolina Battalion and 20^th South Carolina manned the rifle pits as pickets awaiting the anticipated Federal attack. They would not have long to wait.

At 0230 BG Strong ordered a sunrise attack on Battery Wagner.  Four companies of the 7^th Connecticut, under LTC Daniel Rodman, were selected to lead the assault. As the Union skirmishers moved forward the Confederate pickets, rather than contest the advance, retired down the beach behind a couple of scattered volleys. The well planned move cleared the fields of fire for the batteries in Wagner. The lead companies of the 7^th Connecticut were allowed to enter the moat before the guns released a massed barrage. Two fresh follow on regiments, the 76^th Pennsylvania and the 9^th Maine, were stopped short. The 76^th was driven to the ground while the 9^th struggled to regain organization after the stunning blasts. The 7^th was left unsupported to be devastated by the flood of rifle fire coming from the fort. Col Rodman searched in vain for the expected relief. Caught in the moat they could not move forward and retreat posed no great hope of relief. Grenades and small arms fire continued to pour in on his command. Finally, wounded and seeing no chance for assistance Rodman gave the every man for himself order.  Of the 185 men he led into the moat only 88 answered a roll call conducted after the assault.. Total Union casualties exceeded 335 men.

A tearful Strong met the retreating survivors with the cry of “Ah, my brave fellows, you deserved a better fate.” The assault had been a miserable failure and the 76^th Pennsylvania became the scapegoats. Major J. W. Hicks, in temporary command of the regiment, was accused of directing his attack at the wrong location and losing control of the men under the intense fire. Driven to the ground the unit was slow to recover and never advanced. BG Strong did not hesitate to place blame in his official report of the attack.  Writing of the 76^th Pennsylvania;

“The causes of their failure, and hence the failure of the assault, were, first the sudden, tremendous and simultaneous fire which all encountered, and second, the absence of their colonel, who was taken ill before the column was put in motion.”

The Confederates were in firm control of the narrow corridor to the northern part of the island. Another 56 days would elapse before Gillmore would have his prize.

The amphibious assault on the 10^th was a complete success. The Confederate defenses were caught by surprise and routed from the southern end of Morris Island. Only the inability to quickly support the attack prevented the Union troops from seizing the entire island. Given the chance to reinforce the Confederate command made the most of a tactically superior position at Battery Wagner. After the unsuccessful attack on Fort Wagner on the 11^th an order to put breaching batteries and mortar batteries in place on the Island was issued.  A set of works in front of the Confederate position defending the northern end of the island, Battery Wagner, was improved.  On the night of the 12^th the first parallel was started.  This original position was used as the starting point for the failed assault led by the 54^th Massachusetts.

Following the massacre of the 18^th Gillmore decided that the advantageous position of Battery Wagner made a successful assault impossible. Already strapped for troops, and denied further reinforcement by Stanton, the losses of the 11^th and 18^th convinced Gillmore to enter into a siege. To comply with his order 482 engineers of the 1st New York began a line of works against the fort, assisted by 200 members of the 3rd New Hampshire Infantry. Before the end of the campaign thousands would see duty in the trenches of Morris Island. The work here proved slow and more dangerous than expected. It also created an opportunity for the enemy to conduct operations of their own.

The Confederates also suffered a lack of troops and a July 12^th leader conference determined that they lacked the necessary resources to drive the Union forces from Morris Island. This however did not preclude operations in other areas. While Federal units and equipment were massed for the effort against Morris Island MG Terry’s forces on Sol Legare became increasingly isolated and vulnerable. On July 16^th a Confederate counter-strike drove them from the island and eventually from James Island as well. Nevertheless the siege work and placement of batteries on the southern half of Morris Island continued. On September 7^th, realizing the futility of further resistance the island was abandoned by Confederate troops. The fall of Morris Island did not, as anticipated by Gillmore, lead to the collapse of the Charleston defenses.
Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island (Campaign Series)

• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 1
• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 2
• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 3

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Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 3

Auctions are always fun to poke around in, wishing you had the money to buy some of those cool things. For some reason there seems to be a lot of Civil War stuff on the block lately.

[Full Disclosure: Other than having bought a few items from Heritage I have no connection with any of these houses.]

Rock Island Auction has a nice blog entry about the evolution of the Henry rifle.  I’ve mentioned it as well but this is a much more detailed look at the business end of things and the principals involved. One thing that comes through quite clearly is that while Oliver Winchester might not have known much about firearms (he started out in shirts) he was a very savvy businessman.

Their Civil War arms are listed here, but I thought the 1864 Henry worthy of mention. As you can see they fetch high prices.

Heritage Auctions in Dallas has a couple of auctions of interest. One is a Civil War and Militaria auction that has a lot of things like carte de visites of luminaries like Robert E. Lee, George Custer, and other generals; surgical instruments, drums, flags, and much more.

There is also an Arms and Armor auction coming up with numerous Civil War arms and accoutrements, including several rare Henrys.

A Legends of the Wild West auction has photos of Civil War personalities William Quantrill, Bloody Bill Anderson, Jo Shelby and Jesse James.

And finally an Americana auction that features several photos of Abolitionist John Brown, as well the leg shackles he wore during his incarceration at Charles Town prior to his execution.

UPDATE: Forgot to mention that there are also two complete (and working) period Gatling guns for sale. Just the thing for keeping the zombies at bay.

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Auction News

“The Very Boldness of the Project”

Vigorous preparations were made during the short window of time available. Troops from BG George C. Strong’s Brigade were designated as the spearhead. Three days of rations were prepared and final inspections conducted.  Because the assault was planned as a night attack, a band of white flannel was sewn or tied onto the left sleeve of the uniforms as a precaution against friendly fire. Medical teams, headed by Surgeon John J. Craven, established a field hospital on Folly Island. Their efforts were bolstered by the arrival of Clara Barton and the additional supplies she could provide. As darkness fell the troops were marched to the embarkation point on Folly Island Creek only to find no boats.

With everything else in place the one unmanageable variable had intervened. Heavy weather prevented the launches from arriving at the rendezvous point at the appointed time. Even had they done so it was also discovered that the engineers had not yet completed clearing obstacles from the mouth of Folly River.

The job of removing the obstructions was an incredibly difficult task and was probably not allotted enough time to be completed. Again to prevent early detection of activity that might signal the coming attack the work was not begun until the morning of July 8^th. COL Edward Serrell, commander of the 1^st New York Engineers, described the task;

July 8^th – Arrived in Folly River at 10 a.m. Orders were received to remove as many of the piles in the Folly River, as would admit the passage of the largest launches and the large scows. This was done the same night, by sawing them off underwater at a depth of 8 feet below low tide. 

A special saw bent in an arc was developed that allowed the work to progress rapidly. The process worked as described by Serrell;

The saw is worked by boring a hole in the pile to be sawed off. At the proper height above water and in this hole, an iron pin is inserted, upon which the saw-frame vibrates. Ropes from the rings at either end of the saw are taken to boats properly anchored, or held, as they were in this case, by sharp pointed poles thrust into the sand at the bottom of the river. At a given signal the ropes are pulled alternately and the saw vibrates. In this way, a pile 10 or 12 inches in diameter was cut off in an average time of from six to seven minutes; including the change from one pile to another, about ten minutes were occupied.

Despite their proficiency not enough piles could be removed in the available time. Gillmore was forced to issue new orders. True to his instructions of the 8^th the night time attack was scrapped in new instructions issued to his leaders.

The attack on Morris Island, ordered for this morning, but postponed in consequence of the inclemency of the weather and other unfavorable circumstances, will take place tomorrow morning at break of day, by opening our batteries at the north end of Folly Island.

Gen. Strong’s brigade, or so much of it as the small boats can accommodate, will embark tonight and hold itself in Folly Island Creek, ready to move forward and at the proper time occupy the south end of Morris Island.

 Lieut. Commander Francis W. Bunce, U. S. Navy, with four navy howitzer launches, will approach Light-House Inlet at daybreak by way of Folly Island Creek, and engage the enemy’s rifle-pits and batteries on Morris Island in flank and reverse, choosing his own position. He will cover Gen. Strong’s landing.

 Two regiments of infantry, a battery of light artillery and five Requa rifled batteries will be held in readiness to reinforce Gen. Strong promptly. Brig. Gen. Seymour will arrange and order all details.

Despite the difficulty with the primary assault the diversionary attack by BG Terry’s forces moved up the Stono River to Sol Legare Island. Elements of the 104^th and 52^nd Pennsylvania stormed the island and seized the connecting causeways to James Island.

At 2100 on the 9^th preparations for the revised assault began. BG Strong marched his brigade back to the embarkation point on the north side of the island.  The loading commenced with four companies (A, B, I, and K) of the 7^th Connecticut manning the lead boats. The 6^th Connecticut trailed followed, in turn, by the remainder of the brigade. By one count 80 boats were loaded but by some miscalculation or shortage the final regiment, 48^th New York, could load only four companies (A, C, D, and F).  With orders for strict silence the armada of boats pushed off, escorted by Bunce’s armed launches. The boats weaved their way through a maze of back channels until they neared the mouth of the stream at Lighthouse Inlet. There they found the engineers still removing piles to widen the access way.  They started the long wait for the signal to begin “under the cover of the tall marsh grasses along the shore.” The boats were so well hidden that one member of the 3^rd New Hampshire noted that a peek over the grass revealed “the batteries on Morris Island and the rebel sentinels walking their beats as though no enemy was near.”

Many of the men had severe doubts about crossing open water in fragile craft with the distinct possibility of being engaged by the Confederate artillery and pickets. One member of the7th Connecticut revealed that “when I learned what we were to do my knees shook so that I thought I should drop.” The battalion of the 48^th New York feared the passage of the river more than the fight on the other side. Writing in the unit history they remarked;

“We all feared a deal more that we might be drowned in the inlet, than any danger we should meet from the batteries when once our feet were on shore.”

The silent wait magnified the tension. To be discovered at this point would ruin the entire operation. Absolute quiet was the order.

At sea Dahlgren was preparing his vessels for their role in supporting the assault. He would be leading four monitors; Catskill, Nahant, Montauk, and Weehawken into action. The Catskill, serving as flagship, had under gone an overhaul to upgrade the armor plating on the deck and turret. The other vessels were in various stages of upgrade but to be safe Dahlgren ordered the other boats to lay off at a distance. Only the completely improved Catskill would be permitted to engage the Confederate batteries in close. Like the infantry laden boats across Lighthouse Inlet they waited for Gillmore’s signal gun

On Folly Island Gillmore waited until the last possible moment to order the unmasking of the Federal batteries. Calculating the time needed to clear the fronts of the batteries with the anticipated sunrise the order to begin the work was issued at 0415. In a flurry of action with axes and shovels the work progressed rapidly. As the sun started over the horizon the batteries were clear. At 0508 Gillmore ordered his guns to open fire. The sudden barrage caught the Confederate defenders from the 1^st and 21^st South Carolina Infantry completely by surprise. Some were so unprepared that they rushed to their positions shirtless. After an hour long bombardment, that seem much longer to the men waiting in the boats, BG Strong roared out;

“Forward! Pull, you oarsmen, pull for your lives!”

The preliminary bombardment had fully alerted the Confederate defenders. The boats were caught in open water with the element of surprise gone. Although severely outgunned the Confederate batteries and infantry did their best to respond to the situation. “We then received special notice and their whizzing shot and bursting shell were hurled into our midst.” With grim determination the men at the oars redoubled their effort. For most of the boats the crossing took only about twenty minutes, but a harrowing time it was. One boat (6^th Connecticut) was overturned by a shell spewing the human cargo as a “struggling mass” into the water that was “reddened with the blood of the dead and wounded.” Under the onslaught the courage of a few became infectious. In the 3^rd New Hampshire boats one officer who had been declared “a martinet” stood firm on the bow of his boat. Others followed his lead and the men rallied to stand “rifles firmly grasped” to form “one solid, courageous unit.”

It is doubtful that the new found fortitude made the rapidly approaching landing site any less gratifying. Some of the men could not wait and jumped from the boats early and into waist deep water. A close blast of artillery caused BG Strong to be one the early departures. He disappeared momentarily causing some concerned as only his floating hat marked the area. He reemerged and waded to shore. One of his boots had been sucked from his foot by the mud of the river bottom. He removed the other and in his stocking feet moved inland waving his sword and shouting “come on brigade.” The 7^th Connecticut sprang from their boats eager to engage the enemy batteries that were proving a serious annoyance. The first line of rifle pits was seized almost immediately. Companies B and I were advanced while A and K held the works and provided a base of fire. The forward companies entered into a short but vicious fight for the next set of works. Confederate infantry there, led by CPT Charles Haskell of the 1^st South Carolina Infantry, fought the invaders hand to hand until Haskell went down mortally wounded. Suddenly the defenses collapsed and began a mad rush rearward toward Battery Gregg.

The suddenness of the Confederate departure was a result of not only the loss of their leader but the appearance of Union soldiers at their flank and rear.  Colonel John Chatfield, of the 6^th Connecticut, apparently operating on his own initiative did not land his boats at the designated site. Instead, realizing that the enemy guns could not be depressed enough to engage them he had his men pull for the open ocean. At the mouth of Lighthouse Inlet they beached on the southeast corner of the island. The combination of loss of the leadership, fire from the monitors and the unexpected appearance of enemy troops in their rear proved too much; the defenders fled. The Confederate flag bearer was ordered to halt but did not. Unfortunately he could not out run the bullet of PVT Roper Houslow, of Co. D., who dropped him with a bullet to the head and captured the flag which was inscribed “Pocotaligo, Oct. 22, 1862.”  The rout was complete.

• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 1
• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 2
• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 3

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Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 2

I was in LaGrange, GA, last weekend for a family get-together and checked out their web page. Turns out LaGrange was home to one of the Civil War’s most colorful and unusual militia companies, the all-female Nancy Harts. Named after a heroine of the Revolutionary War, the group elected two local women as officers.

The women began their military training using William J. Hardee’s Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (1861) and met twice a week for drilling and target practice. The leaders offered prizes to the best markswomen, and after several mishaps, including shooting a hornet’s nest and a cow, the women became expert shots.

Although the Nancy Harts organized as a military unit, they served primarily as nurses. During the latter half of the war, LaGrange became a medical and refugee center because of its proximity to key battlegrounds and its intact rail line. LaGrange’s four hospitals were often full, and a number of residents, including nearly all the Nancy Harts, took patients into their homes for individualized care.

The “Nancies” never got a chance to fight but did surrender the town in 1865 to Union Colonel Oscar LaGrange, who treated the town leniently.

In another part of the web, Georgetown University law professor Randy Barnett pens an article about the forgotten career of lawyer and politician Salmon P. Chase, focusing on his antislavery activities and his interpretation that slavery was unconstitutional. The link is to an abstract but it’s a free PDF download.

Chase had been somewhat of a thorn in Lincoln’s side as well as a potential rival, so Abe sidelined him with a typically Lincolnian move—he accepted Chase’s resignation as Secretary of the Treasury, offered in one of his frequent fits of pique, but then nominated him for Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. This allowed Lincoln to get Chase out of politics and out of his hair while also packing the court with someone who could be trusted to be rabidly antislavery.

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Nancy Harts, Salmon Chase

Background and Plan
The nasty battle for Morris Island, South Carolina in the summer of 1863 was highlighted by the failed attempt of the 54th Massachusetts and other regiments on 18 July. The bold attempt, depicted in the film Glory, is most of what people know about the lengthy fight for control of this island at the head of Charleston Harbor. Sandwiched around the famous attack was a well planned and a well executed amphibious operation, a desperate defense and a successful, if not miserable siege operation. Lost on a stage that was dominated by the great battles occurring at the same time this campaign has been under represented.

Charleston was prominent, and remained prominent throughout the war, in the minds of Union leaders and soldiers as the symbolic seat of the rebellion. To capture the city would have been a coup for the Federals. They, however, never quite dedicated the necessary forces to accomplish that goal. Nevertheless, an effort was made with what was available. The hardships and sacrifices made by the soldiers on both sides during this campaign were incredible in the blistering hot, windswept sands and marshland of South Carolina coast. Seen as the key to controlling the entrance to the harbor and its defenses Morris Island became the focus of operations there.

Many places on the southern Atlantic seaboard either remained in Union control at secession or fell under Union control shortly thereafter. This was true on the South Carolina coast. In November 1861 a combined operation seized Port Royal and Beaufort. Expansion of this success northward to Folly Island by MG David A. Hunter was made possible by the Confederate abandonment of the Cole Island defenses at the mouth of the Stono River. To control the water traffic at the river and to defend his position on the island a series of works were built at the southern end of Folly Island. These works were manned by soldiers from a brigade of infantry, commanded by BG Israel Vogdes.

The threat to Charleston Harbor should Union troops move northward to James and Morris islands was obvious. It prompted the Confederate command to increase measures to defend these areas. On the northern end of Morris Island at Cumming’s Point Battery Gregg was constructed to guard the ship channel into the harbor and to add protection for Fort Sumter. Additionally Battery Wagner was added at the narrowest part of the island to protect the southern approaches to Battery Gregg. The southern end of the island was fortified by order of MG Beauregard starting March 10th.

A failed attempt to run the guns into Charleston Harbor in April led to a period of stagnation for the Department of the South and the Navy. In the Union high command there was a growing impatience toward the lack of progress being made in the effort to capture Charleston. The local Union commanders had both gone a long way to promote their exit from the theater. The army commander, Hunter, had embarrassed the administration with a local emancipation proclamation designed to increase recruiting in the black regiments he was forming from escaped slaves. Coupled with a failed program of interdiction based on raids on the transportation infrastructure to the city the administration saw fit to relieve him in May of 1863. The naval commander, Samuel Du Pont, also condemned himself. No advocate of operations against Morris Island, he stated;

“I pity the poor soldiers if they ever land there.”

An open blast at administration and navy policies regarding the use of armored monitors completed his departure. He was also excused on June 3, 1863.
To replace the departed Hunter the army turned to the man who had been so successful in the reduction of Fort Pulaski, BG Quincy Gillmore. Gillmore openly campaigned for the position and was rewarded for his enthusiasm by being named commander of the Department of the South. The Navy choice, Admiral Andrew Foote, was a bit less committal towards the mission but nevertheless was named by Secretary of the Navy Welles. Foote’s health almost immediately became an issue. When it was obvious that Foote would be incapable of taking part in an active campaign naval command fell to his hand selected second, John A. Dahlgren. Five days later on June 26, Foote died from complications arising from the infection of a leg wound suffered at Fort Donelson. Dahlgren would arrive to replace DuPont in early July. With the commands in place all that remained was the formation of a plan.

MG Gillmore’s success at Fort Pulaski translated into a similar concept in South Carolina. He viewed Fort Sumter as the cornerstone of the Charleston defenses. Gillmore believed that no operations against Charleston could be successful while the fort controlled the entrance to the harbor. He meant to remove the fort by use of massed firepower. Morris Island was an obvious target for his efforts. He wanted batteries placed on Cumming’s Point.

This position contained, a Confederate work, Battery Gregg, which supported Fort Sumter at the mouth of the harbor. If the island could be seized this battery could not only be negated as a defensive asset but reversed for bombardment of the fort. Once the fort was removed then the naval assets of Admiral Dahlgren could be turned loose in the harbor. Of course, this would require land based positions within effective range of the fort for the plan to succeed. This would be the first phase of the operation for possession of Morris Island.

Gillmore resolved to turn Folly Island’s northern end into an artillery platform for the support of an invasion of Morris Island. He ordered the construction of batteries to cover the intended target. To maintain a level of secrecy regarding his intentions Gillmore insisted that the new batteries remain masked until they opened. Construction under these circumstances posed a number of difficult problems. The selected location on the very tip of the island became separated from the rest of the island at high tide. Troop rotations and material transportation had to be coordinated with the tidal flows. LT Patrick Maguire of the 1st New York Engineers supervised the development of the works which was done exclusively at night. All work had to be done noiselessly to avoid being detected. The batteries were within easy range of the Confederate batteries on Morris Island and to be detected meant not only the end of secrecy concerning the impending invasion but extreme danger to the work parties. Remarkably ten batteries were built without revealing the Union presence. When the time came they would add the weight of 32 guns and 15 mortars to the operation.

In the second phase Gillmore had to assemble the necessary forces to conduct the attack. The Department of the South had approximately 22,000 men to cover their entire area of responsibility. More than half of these would be called together to execute the operations against Charleston Harbor. These men were formed in two divisions under the leadership of BG Alfred Terry and BG Truman Seymour . Although heavily weighted in favor of the infantry branch the task force also contained 750 engineers and artillery soldiers. Nearly all were veterans.

The intervening water obstacle mandated the cooperation of the Navy. The Union forces gathered boats and barges while Gillmore pleaded with a reluctant DuPont for assistance. For his part DuPont was fearful of pitting his monitors against the Confederate land based batteries. Fortunately his replacement, Dahlgren, arrived to replace the reluctant sailor. With just days to prepare Dahlgren ordered the tugs Dandelion and O. M. Petit to tow the assembled fleet of launches, cutters, and barges north from Port Royal.

Finally a design for the assault had to be generated. Using information about Confederate defenses gathered by chief scout CPT Lewis Payne (100th New York) on several boat trips to Morris Island as a basis Gillmore assembled his plan. Confidential instructions bearing date 8 July 1863, were as follows:

An attack upon Morris Island will be made at the rising of the moon tonight, by Brig. Gen. Strong’s brigade, of Brig. Gen. Seymour’s division.

1.This force will be embarked in small boats immediately after sunset, and will pass through Folly Island Creek to and across Light-House Inlet. A small detachment from this force will enter the creek to the west of Morris Island, and will land just north of the old lighthouse, seize the batteries there, and if possible turn them upon the enemy’s encampment north of them. The main column will land from Light-House Inlet, carry the batteries on the south end of Morris Island, and advance to the support of the detachment above mentioned. Two regiments and some field artillery will be held in readiness on the extreme north end of Folly Island, to be pushed over as reinforcements. To this end, Gen. Strong will send his boats back as soon as he has disembarked his command.

2. At the same time. Gen. Terry, with all his division except the One Hundredth New York Volunteers, will ascend the Stono under convoy of the navy, and make a strong demonstration on James Island, but will not unnecessarily hazard any portion of his command. Perhaps one or two regiments only need be disembarked. These should be pushed forward as skirmishers, under cover of the navy.

3. A naval force is expected to enter the main channel abreast of Morris Island, by or before sunrise tomorrow morning, to co-operate with the land forces.

4. Should the night attack fail from any cause, the assaulting column will withdraw to Folly Island, sending their boats to Folly Island Creek. In that event the batteries at the north end of Folly Island will open at daybreak or as soon thereafter as practicable. Brig. Gen. Seymour will arrange all the details.

• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 1
• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 2
• Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 3

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Gaining a Foothold on Morris Island – July 10-11, 1863 Part 1

A few days ago I wrote about the ‘Ewell Option ‘ — a plan for General Richard Ewell to strike at US forces in northern Virginia in April or May 1862 — and how instead Ewell decided to stick with Stonewall Jackson and support his efforts in the Shenandoah Valley. The resulting campaign became famous and elevated Jackson to heroic, even mythological, status. I feel that Ewell has not gotten his due; that he deserves more credit than he typically gets. So I offer this post in praise of Ewell’s contribution to the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862.

In his book Stonewall in the Valley Robert Tanner wrote “Had Jackson instead of Johnson taken a bullet at McDowell, Stonewall would have come down through the years in a much different light: one of the many eccentrics who crowd the war’s history, a good brigadier promoted beyond his competence”.  I think this idea could be extended all the way to May 21st. It was the events that followed that made Jackson famous.

As Jackson was returning from the Allegheny Mountains to the Shenandoah Valley in mid-May he directed Ewell to meet him at New Market so that they could attack US General Nathaniel Banks. In the past writers have attributed great insight to Jackson regarding how the campaign unfolded, but in an appendix to the second edition of his book Tanner wrote “compelling contemporary documents dispute the venerable view that Jackson always plotted to destroy Banks as he did and suggest a different initial plan.” While he was still to the west, Jackson was uninformed about Banks position, writing Ewell on May 15th  “Do you know where Banks is and what his force is?” Jackson just knew that he wanted to attack Banks. He ordered Ewell to join him at New Market because he intended to attack Banks head on at Strasburg. However, his cavalry and reconnaissance by some of his staff brought word that Banks was fortifying at Strasburg. The orders Jackson had received from General Johnston said it would be too hazardous to attack if the position was fortified and the high command in Richmond continued to call for Ewell to come east. As a result, Jackson was uncertain of how to proceed until, according to one of Ewell’s staff officers, Ewell proposed an alternative.

Ewell had spent the past few weeks along the Blue Ridge and had become familiar with the area. His scouts identified that the village of Front Royal was held by only a small force.  Front Royal could be reached quietly by moving down the Luray Valley between Massanutten Mountain and the Blue Ridge.  This would enable Jackson to avoid Banks’ fortified position, defeat a small US detachment and threaten Banks’ rear at Winchester. Jackson now had a plan and the army began to move on May 21st with Ewell’s division in the lead.

In the May 23nd attack on Front Royal and the subsequent march toward Winchester the next day, it was Ewell’s men  – especially Taylor’s brigade and Flournoy’s cavalry — that played key roles.  At Winchester on May 25th Ewell used a portion of his division to occupy half of Banks force on the east side of town while the rest of his division was sent to support Jackson.  Jackson struggled to make headway on the west side of town until he sent Ewell’s men, specifically Taylor’s brigade, in a flank attack which decided the battle in the Confederate’s favor.

A few days later it was learned that US General Charles Fremont was advancing from the west.  It would be a disaster for Jackson if Fremont got to Strasburg while the Confederates were north of there.  So Jackson sent Ewell to block Fremont. As Jackson raced his army south, Ewell held off Fremont near Strasburg and again near Harrisonburg.  On June 8th Ewell won the battle of Cross Keyes through skillful use of terrain and timing, waiting until the right moment to spring an attack that routed several of Fremont’s regiments. The following day Jackson engaged portions of US General James Shields’ division outside Port Republic.  The battle did not start out well.  Tanner wrote that “Ewell salvaged the day” and “Old Bald Head would not have realized it, but his arrival signaled a turn of the tide.”

As summarized above, Ewell provided the support, manpower, and leadership that produced results for Jackson.  Throughout the campaign he handled his responsibilities well. I think he deserves much greater credit than he typically has received for his contribution to this campaign.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

The Ewell Contribution