I “met” Maureen via Facebook when I saw her post note in mid-March 2010, asking how she could find out the status of OSHA’s investigation of her husband’s death.  Before contacting her, I did a little research of my own and quickly learned that OSHA had finished its post-fatality inspection and closed the case on February 2nd (exactly six months after their investigation began.)  I telephone the young widow to break the news to her.   She responded with something like this:

“I feel like a fool. I’ve been sitting around waiting for OSHA to call or let me know, and now I find out they closed the case 5 weeks ago.”

I dreaded hearing, but anticipated her next question:“What did OSHA find?”

Regretfully, I had to explain information available on OSHA’s website indicates that neither company (here and here) was cited for safety violations related to her husband’s death.  No monetary penalties were assessed.  There was a prolonged silence over the phone line.

Fast forward to Monday, May 21, 2012.  One of my favorite investigative reporters publishes the next chapters of the  Revetta family’s story.  Writing for the Center for Public Integrity and in a story that appears in Mother Jones magazine  (and MSNBC), Jim Morris writes that Power Piping employees and other contractors were pressured by U.S. Steel to finish a rebuild of gas-processing equipment in the Clairton plant.  Morris interviewed Nick Revetta’s brother, Patrick, who also worked at the plant and on the premises when his younger sibling was killed. 

“There was just too much pressure.  They had to have that production, man.  Nick, he kept telling me they were shortcutting stuff, putting pressure on them to hurry up and get the job finished.”

OSHA officials did not interview Nick Revetta as part of their investigation.

The front-line OSHA inspector assigned to the case also recognized (and documented) that production pressure on the workers may also have contributed to the deadly safety hazards in the plant.  Morris writes:

“OSHA inspector [Michael] Laughlin’s voluminous notes reflect the frenetic work envrionment for U.S. Steel contractors such as Power Piping.  ‘They were pushing the manpower….U.S. Steel pushing…pushing people,’ Laughlin wrote while transcribing one worker interview. The winter before he was killed, Nick Revetta logged 60 days straight at the Clairton plant.”

Reading about the employers’ behavior as a cause of Nick Revetta’s work-related death is bad enough, but Morris’ investigation adds several more layers to the story.   He explains how OSHA inspector Michael Laughlin worked diligently to investigate the fatality, but failed to get the support he needed (and ask for) up the chain of OSHA command.  Laughlin knew the Revetta case required special expertise and time, and he didn’t have either.   Morris’ obtained email messages written by Laughlin to a supervisors.  His subject line simply read: “Help.”

U.S. Steel was giving the inspector the run-around, six other contractor firms were involved and these witnesses needed to be interviewed, a potentially key safety official had been fired and Laughlin needed to track him down, and on-and-on his email went.  Laughlin was also getting pressure to finish up two other major inspection cases.

One superior wrote back, telling Laughlin

“Relax. We’ll figure something out, don’t worry!  …Supposed to be a nice weekend.  Go out and hits some balls!”

Laughlin’s calls for technical assistance were prescient.   Ten months after Nick Revetta’s death, another explosion at the U.S. Steel plant rocked the town of Clairton.   When I received a news alert about the explosion, I called Maureen Revetta.   I knew she might be reliving her own nightmare of her husband’s death.  Maureen heard the firetrucks and ambulances rushing to the plant, and knew the situation was serious.  She’d learned that at least a dozen workers had already been transported to the hospital.  She wondered if the sirens foretold the birth of a new group of widows and single-parent children in Clairton because of uncontrolled hazards at the U.S. Steel plant.

In his investigative piece, Morris explains OSHA’s response to this subsequent explosion, as well an intermediary inspection conducted following a detailed, 10-page complaint filed by a U.S. Steel employee.   He explores the possibility that inspection “goals” or “quotas” or “performance metrics” or whatever you want to call them, may force OSHA field offices and their superiors to focus on quantity (of inspections) rather than quality.   His article certainly suggests it.

“OSHA emails obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveal the number-driven pressures that existed in Pittsburgh after Nick Revetta’s death.  In a message to then-deputy regional administrator Selker two months after the explosion that killed Revetta, inspector Laughlin acknowledged that ‘goals must be met’ but said the case was ‘clearly not done.’  his bosses nonetheless directed him to end the investigation.”

Morris notes that OSHA inspector Michael Laughlin died in January 2012 after being struck by a car.

The painful, true story of Nick Revetta’s death casts a light on the workplace factors that lead to far too many on-the-job fatalities.   Employers are pushing workers to the brink, failing to invest in the equipment and personnel to do the job safely, and ignoring the knowledge and experience of their employees.  From the Upper Big Branch mine, to the BP Texas City refinery, to the U.S. Steel Clairton plant, workers may be the first to realize that their workplace is a  disaster just waiting to happen.

Michael Laughlin’s experience also seems to be telling us something similar.   Will OSHA pay attention?

Earlier this week, Ian Urbina reported in the New York Times that hundreds of oil and gas workers have been killed over the past decade in highway crashes. A CDC analysis found that one-third of the 648 oil field workers who died on the job between 2003 and 2008 were killed in these crashes. Workers falling asleep at the wheels of trucks after working long shifts are a major factor in this high rate of vehicle fatalities — but, Urbina explains, the industry continues to enjoy exemption from federal rules designed to keep sleep-deprived truck drivers off the road:

Members of and organizations affiliated with the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) received an Action Alert today urging them to tell USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack to withdraw his agency’s proposed rule on poultry slaughter inspection (77 Fed Reg 4408.) As written here previously and by the Center for Progressive Reform’s Rena Steinzor in “The Age of Greed,” the USDA proposal was developed in response to President Obama’s edict about regulations, and his call to agencies to eliminate “outmoded” and “excessively burdensome” rules. The change proposed by USDA involves shifting the responsibility for examining and sorting poultry carcasses with obvious defects from USDA inspectors to the assembly line workers.

NCLR in its Action Alert reiterates what others in the public health community have been saying about this ill-developed proposal: it fails to look at the dire consequences for the health and safety of the poultry workers on the assembly lines.

“Guadalupe, a mother of young children in North Carolina, can’t pick her kids up to comfort them when they cry. If she does, sharp pain shoots through her arms, chest, and back. Lifting used to be Guadalupe’s job. As a poultry processing worker, she spent hours each day reaching above her head to hang chicken carcasses on a production line. Keeping up with the line speed was almost impossible and her arms would go numb from the work. Eventually, Guadalupe’s doctor diagnosed her with a repetitive motion injury in her elbow and ordered her not to lift more than five pounds. When Guadalupe tried to follow the doctor’s orders, she was fired.

Guadalupe is no exception. Line speed is hurting many workers in poultry processing plants. Now, the USDA wants to let plants run their lines even faster–increasing the speed limit from 140 to 175 birds per minute! …Ironically, USDA wants to increase line speed as an incentive for poultry companies to “modernize” their plants to improve food safety. In reality, faster line speeds would turn back the clock to a dark chapter of American history when businesses had no responsibility for the health and safety of workers.”

by Dick Clapp

Judge Louis H. Pollak, who died on May 8, has been revered for his role as a civil rights lawyer, a volunteer for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, dean of two law schools, and respected jurist. As my colleague Sheldon Krimsky, PhD of Tufts University observed,

Pollak was one of those practical idealists who understood the role of law for public purpose. In his place we find new libertarian jurists who see the law for private purpose.

In addition to these well-deserved accolades, I wanted to add a personal recollection of him that took place in the course of our work on the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP).

In 2003, we invited Judge Pollak to participate in the first Coronado Conference on Scientific Evidence and Public Policy. We had convened a group of distinguished scientists, philosophers of science, judges and policy experts to present papers and discuss the use and misuse of scientific evidence in public policy, and the implications of the 1993 Supreme Court’s decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. We were honored to have Judge Louis H. Pollak participate in the conference, in part, because of his notable decision just a year earlier questioning the scientific reliability of fingerprint evidence in criminal cases (U.S. v. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,2002.))

After 35 years of service, Mr. Sherman Lynn Holmes, 55, retired from the Pine River School District. Before long though, he gave up the life of a retiree to work as a woodsman. It was his true calling and lifelong passion. He knew the woods and trees of northern Michigan like the back of his hand. He was well-known in the region as the go-to logger.

Mr. Holmes was working on February 1, 2011 for K & K Forest Products with two other men near Evert, Michigan. As he trimmed up a felled tree in a wooded area, his co-worker felled another large tree and it struck Mr. Holmes. He was fatally injured. Michigan-OSHA (MIOSHA) investigated the incident and cited the company for three serious violations. The State agency assessed a total monetary penalty $1,525. (The allowable maximum penalty is $7,000 for each serious violation.) His employer, K & K Forest Products paid the penalty and the case is closed.

So it goes with far too many investigations of workplace fatalities in the U.S. A measly civil fine is assessed, and business goes on as usual. The AFL-CIO’s annual “Death on the Job” report helps us see how true that is.

Those were the first words out of the mouth of the Southwest Airlines’ official when describing the incident on January 27, 2012 at Dulles International Airport that claimed the life of 25 year-old employee Jared Patrick Dodson. The five-year employee was driving a luggage cart when he was fatally struck by a three-story people mover used to transfer passengers across the airport tarmac.

Scott Halfmann vice president for safety and security said young Mr. Dodson was following all procedures correctly. He was in the proper travel lane. He stopped at all designated intersections. He followed the correct traffic pattern and at an appropriate speed. The trouble was, an airplane was parked in a non-standard area. This led the air traffic-controlled people mover to use a non-standard travelway. The result: an individual fatally injured at work.

Southwest Airlines’ Halfmann, along with Caroline Llewellyn and John Andrus, shared this story with a small group of individuals who know first-hand the pain and anguish of workplace fatalities. Families representing United Support & Memorial for Workplace Fatalities (USMWF) met with the Southwest officials earlier this week during a trip to Dallas, and told of their own experiences loving someone who went to work one day but never came home. The shocking difference for these families was hearing those first words from Mr. Halfmann’s mouth: “Jared did everything right.”

This time last week, many of us in the public health and workers’ rights community were still in shock by the Obama Administration’s decision to withdraw its proposed regulation to protect children who work on farms. Others weren’t really surprised and simply chalked it up to the Administration caving into energetic attacks by the American Farm Bureau, Republicans in Congress (and some Democrats, too) and anti-regulation spinmaster radio hosts. The proposal recommended that children aged 15 years and younger—who are being paid as employees—-be prohibited from doing some of the MOST dangerous tasks on farms. The 13 hazardous tasks included working in grain silos (where they can be fatally engulfed in grain), and working in a manure pit (where they can inhale deadly gases, pass out and drown in animal waste.) For some of the 13 hazardous tasks, child workers aged 14 and 15 would have been allowed to do some of these tasks if they received special training. Is that so unreasonable?

U.S. Labor Secretary Hilda Solis is well known for her passionate speeches about the Department’s commitment to address abuses of our nation’s most vulnerable workers, whether they are veterans and older Americans unable to get jobs, or immigrant workers who may not understand their rights to a safe workplace. When this proposal to protect children working in U.S. agriculture was issued last fall, Solis pronounced that U.S. children employed in agricultural jobs are some of the most vulnerable workers, and the rules on the books were 40 years old and seriously out-of-date. The senior official responsible for the proposal put it even more eloquently, noting that we don’t live in an ideal world where all employers assure the safety of their workers, including elementary school-age workers. Therefore, special rules to protect children are necessary.

Rick Brown, PhD, a sociologist by training, was a world renowned champion of public health. Thousands of occupational health, children’s health, and community health advocates who knew him are mourning his loss. Rick passed away two weeks ago of a stroke while lecturing in Kentucky.

His work on health care issues (especially the lack of health insurance for children) and his development of the California Health Interview Survey (CHIS) were just two of his major achievements. He was a longtime professor at UCLA School of Public Health, adviser to several U.S. Presidents, former president of the largest public health organization in the world, the American Public Health Assocation, and was even chair of the Airport Commission in our town of Santa Monica.

“She provided so much for us,” Beau Griffing said. “She wanted us to be able to be whatever we wanted to be,” added his brother, Christopher Griffing, 20.

Not quite five months ago, Kristine Griffing was working on a Bliss 150 ton shear press at the Eaton Corp plant, making valves and gears for the auto companies. Neither the press itself nor the feeder tables were properly guarded. That made the nip points, rotating parts and pinch points a deadly hazard for workers operating them. Ms. Griffing, a 17-year employee of the plant, was working the night shift on December 7 when she was pinned by this equipment. She was gravely wounded and died 16 days later from her injuries.

Federal OSHA conducted a post-fatality inspection at the worksite. An inspectors wrote citations for one serious violation for the employer’s failure to have the press and feeders guarded, and an other-than-serious violation for an incomplete injury log. The monetary penalty proposed by OSHA totaled $8,000, which includes the maximum allowable penalty of $7,000 for a serious violation.

As allowed under the OSH Act, the company and OSHA officials met for an informal conference and reached a settlement. In exchange for deleting the recordkeeping violation and reducing the penalty to $5,950, management at the Eaton Corporation plant in Kearney, NE agreed, among other things, to:

“improve its overall safety and health program to meet or exceed the guidelines as given in OSHA’s Safety and Health Management Guidelines (1989). Specifically, the company will put into place Action Plans that ensure effective implementation of these elements: (a) Management commitment and employee involvement; (b) Worksite analysis to identify existing hazards; (c) Hazard prevention and control; (d) Safety and health training of all personnel.”

OSHA expects this employer to take steps that go beyond mere compliance with regulations. The firm will be implementing a comprehensive system to identify and fix hazards, actively involve workers in that process, and provide them specialize training. Good thing, right?

The problem is: this site is already supposed to have an effective H&S program of this sort. Eaton Corporation’s Kearney plant is one of the OSHA-designated Voluntary Protection Program worksites, and has been since 1994. This worksite is supposed to have a stellar injury and illness prevention program, not just on paper but in practice. The OSHA website says these workplaces

“work cooperatively and proactively to prevent fatalities, injuries, and illnesses through a system focused on: hazard prevention and control; worksite analysis; training; and management commitment and worker involvement.”

In exchange for meeting these requirements, these workplaces are exempt from routine OSHA inspections. But as the Center for Public Integrity’s Chris Hamby reported last year, these VPP model workplaces may not be so stellar.

“Since 2000, at least 80 workers have died at these sites, and investigators found serious safety violations in at least 47 of these cases…. Workers at plants billed as the nation’s safest have died in preventable explosions, chemical releases and crane accidents. They have been pulled into machinery or asphyxiated. Investigators, called in because of deaths, have uncovered underlying safety problems — failure to follow recognized safety practices, inadequate inspections and training, lack of proper protective gear, unguarded machinery, improper handling of hazardous chemicals. These companies have rarely faced heavy fines or expulsion from the program. In death cases in which OSHA found at least one violation, VPP companies ultimately paid an average of about $8,000 in fines. And at least 65 percent of sites where a worker has died since 2000 remain in VPP today.”

Following the Center for Public Integrity’s reporting on OSHA’s VPP, and audits by the Government Accountability Office, (here, here) OSHA officials indicated the agency was conducting a top-to-bottom review of the program. In a December 2011 news story, deputy assistant secretary Jordan Barab said that a six-person team of OSHA field staff had completed their report and recommendations. Their document, he noted “is being reviewed and will have to go through the agency’s lawyers.”

I made an inquiry with DOL’s public affairs office to learn the status of this report. A spokesperson acknowledged my question and said he would check into it. I haven’t yet heard back from him.

Meanwhile, the Eaton Corporation ( NYSE: ETN) insists the plant is safe. The plant manager told a local tv station: “This has been a very, very safe facility.”

I’m not sure how this manager defines safety, but common sense alone tells me that an unguarded 150-ton press is a deadly hazard. Something was/is terribly amiss with their supposed model safety program. Those deficiencies didn’t happen overnight. I have to wonder, yet again, what OSHA is doing to ensure that worksites with the OSHA VPP designation truly are model workplaces with respect to injury and illness prevention.