Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Global Peace Operations 2012

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Sat, 03 Mar 2012 14:54:00 +0000

The United Nations Security Council authorized two new peacekeeping missions during 2011—the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)—the first missions since the joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established in 2007.

The Council also authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, clearing the way for a NATO air campaign that divided members of the Security Council. Following the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, the Security Council mandated the civilian UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a political mission, to help reestablish state authority.

Brought to you by NYU's Center on International Cooperation, the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations covers both UN and non-UN peace operations during 2011. The latest edition focuses on the role of peacekeeping operations in extending and consolidating state authority in post-conflict and post-crisis states.

This edition covers a year that saw continued overall growth in peacekeeping operations, albeit at a slower rate than past years. However, UN peacekeeping experienced a decline in the deployment of uniformed personnel, the first such decline since 2003. This is despite the two new peacekeeping missions.

Peacekeepers in 2011 were tasked with responding to a number of rapidly changing environments including supporting the referendum on South Sudan, and supporting its establishment as an independent state; elections in Haiti, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo; the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire; and wresting control of Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

All of these activities occurred against the backdrop of intense debate on the cost of peacekeeping, with increasing pressure to draw down a number of missions. The preoccupation with mission costs and the lighter footprint of these missions may indicate that a decade of large multidimensional peacekeeping missions may be coming to an end.

Global Peace Operations 2012

Overview of the US Intelligence Community via Prezi

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Mon, 27 Feb 2012 20:50:00 +0000

Quick Rundown on the Worldwide Threat Assessment

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 03 Feb 2012 14:00:00 +0000

The U.S. Intelligence/Security Chiefs have now offered Congress their agency's and Community's annual view on the state of the world.

The US Director of National Intelligence (James Clapper) delivered his "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community." He began with the usual acknowledgement that we live in complicated and volatile times, and that fiscal constraints don't make matters any easier. Here are a couple of excerpts on top-tier, overarching issues:

Threats:

...it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge.

Terrorism:

The next two to three years will be a critical transition phase for the terrorist threat facing the United States, particularly from al-Qa‟ida and like-minded groups, which we often refer to as the “global jihadist movement.”

- AQ leadership will become increasingly decentralized, and the organization is likely to become more fragmented.

- AQ's role will become increasingly symbolic, and will probabaly seek to execute smaller, simpler plots to demonstrate relevance to the global jihad AQ's regional affiliates

—al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab—will remain committed to the group's ideology, and in terms of threats to US interests will surpass the remnants of core al-Qa'ida in Pakistan

. ...a mass attack by foreign terrorist groups involving a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapon in the United States is unlikely in the next year, (although they) worry about a more limited Chemical, Biological or Radiological attack, particularly by lone actors.

in the near term the threat in the United States from homegrown violent extremists (HVE) will be characterized by lone actors or small groups inspired by al-Qa'ida's ideology but not formally affiliated with it or other related groups.

Iran:

The 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States shows that some Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived US actions that threaten the regime.

Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities (expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities) that better position it to produce such weapons.

Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

North Korea:

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia. We remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology.

Cyber Threats:

Cyber threats pose a critical national and economic security concern due to the continued advances in—and growing dependency on—the information technology (IT) that underpins nearly all aspects of modern society.

Among state actors, China and Russia are of particular concern ... entities within these countries are responsible for extensive illicit intrusions into US computer networks and theft of US intellectual property.

Nonstate actors are also playing an increasing role in international and domestic politics through the use of social media technologies.

Foreign Intelligence Threats (next 2-3 years):

Cyber-Enabled Espionage. FIS have launched numerous computer network operations targeting US Government agencies, businesses, and universities. We assess that many intrusions into US networks are not being detected. Although most activity detected to date has been targeted against unclassified networks connected to the Internet, foreign cyber actors have also begun targeting classified networks.

Insider Threats. Insiders have caused significant damage to US interests from the theft and unauthorized disclosure of classified, economic, and proprietary information and other acts of espionage. We assess that trusted insiders using their access for malicious intent represent one of today‟s primary threats to US classified networks.

Espionage by China, Russia, and Iran. Russia and China are aggressive and successful purveyors of economic espionage against the United States. Iran‟s intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber capabilities, have dramatically increased in recent years in depth and complexity. We assess that FIS from these three countries will remain the top threats to the United States in the coming years.

You can read about the array of Global Challenges and the entirety of Director Clapper's entire testimony HERE.

Armed Conflict Mapped Over Time and Location

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 17:16:00 +0000

Ralph Sundberg, a Ph.D. Candidate and Project Manager at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), manages the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) - an effort he began in 2009 to make reliable, geographically and temporally disaggregated data available to scholars of armed conflict.

The project’s first phase aggregates annual data from the 1989-2010 time period into three categories of organised violence: state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence.

Take a look at this short video of organized violence in 1989-2010. Based on the GED, is shows conflict events mapped over time and space.

Popout

The GED data can be found here: http://ucdp.uu.se/ged/

Armed Conflicts Declined Worldwide in 2010

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Wed, 14 Dec 2011 19:40:00 +0000

ACR-2011 Poster

Project Ploughshares just published its 2011 Armed Conflicts Report, which covers the 2010 calendar year. Ploughshares has assembled this report every year since 1987.

Here are some of the highlights:

In 2000, the number of armed conflicts worldwide began to decline. It blipped upward again toward the latter half of the decade, then stabilized in 2008-2009. In 2010, the number dropped, bringing it back down below the plateau.

In 2010 there were 24 active armed conflicts worldwide.

No new conflicts were added in 2010.

Conflicts in four countries--Nepal, Burundi, Sri Lanka and Uganda--appear to have ended.

Africa and Asia still host 75% of the world's armed conflicts, even accounting for the four that ended there.

Between 2001 and 2010 thirty two (32) conflicts ended, and only twelve (12) conflicts started or re-emerged. Only 5 of those 12 are still active.

Conclusion: While this trend means that very few new conflicts have emerged in the last decade, it also points to the protracted nature of many of the world’s armed conflicts, the overwhelming majority of which have been active for well over a decade.

You can check out these excellent resources for the ACR Report:

ACR 2011 Summary
Conflict Descriptions
Interactive Armed Conflicts Report map
Armed Conflicts Report Graphs
Download the 22" by 34" Armed Conflicts 2011 poster

Warthinker’s Digest- December 9, 2011

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 09 Dec 2011 15:10:00 +0000

Warthinker’s Digest- December 9, 2011

Warthinker’s Digest is a feature of the Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict blog that scans the scholarly literature from academia, government agencies, and major think tanks, highlighting new reports and documents bearing on the complexity of conflict and future trends in warfare. A must-read feature for defense and security strategists from all sectors interested in developing their “actionable intellect.”

The Idiot Jihadist Next Door

Authors: Louis Klarevas, Foreign Policy, December 1, 2011

Klarevas examines the case of Jose Pimentel in New York. Pimentel was nabbed by NYPD while cobbling together a homemade pipe bomb. Some politicians were quick to offer Pimentel’s arrest as further alarming evidence of a growing and evolving “homegrown terrorism” threat from al Qa’ida. Klarevas questions that assumption, and presents the view that Pimentel is just the latest addition to a “list of boneheaded jihadist wannabes.” Why such a harsh accusation?

· Jose Pimentel launched a website that explicitly advocated violence against American citizens, along with bomb making instructions. Guess what? Authorities noticed.

· Pimentel, like others on Klarevas’ list, were seduced by the lure of bomb building but found the best they could do was to expend a lot of effort to create a clunky and not-so-awe-inspiring device that may or may not function as intended.

· Although Pimentel posted “how-to” instructions on his to share his “expertise,” the truth is he had trouble putting one together himself. He needed help. Fortunately, he found a knowledgeable associate to assist with the devices…. But his trusty assistant was actually and NYPD informant. Imagine that.

Examining the case of Jose Pimentel, one leaves with the impression that if he had used the time he spent chest-thumping on the interwebs to go outside and find a large stick, he probably could have done more damage with that than with his aspirational doomsday device.

Klarevas does not suggest that we ignore the threat of terrorism, but he does make an important point about not overstating the homegrown threat. Some of the bumblers on Klarevas’ wannabe list have tried. Few have succeeded. He wraps up with one of my new favorite quotes: “Just to put this in perspective, more Americans have been killed here at home by contaminated cantaloupe in the past few months than have been killed by violent Islamic extremists in the past decade!”

You can read the full article HERE.

Strategic Planning in Fragile and Conflict Contexts

Author: Center on International Cooperation // New York University

The primary audience for this research paper is the strategic planner in fragile and conflict-affected states [FCAS], understood broadly as any actor involved in either the formulation of national priorities to mitigate or recover from conflict, or the design of international strategies to support such priorities. The paper explores the tensions and tradeoffs incurred throughout the planning process on a range of engagement principles, including national ownership, prioritization, and sequencing. It aims to serve two purposes:

i. provide a broad concept of key elements of planning and

ii. identify key recommendations for engagement as well as policy and capacity gaps in the international community’s support of strategic planning processes.

The first section of the paper offers general considerations related to i. the tradeoffs and tensions inherent to strategic planning processes in FCAS, and ii. the challenges and opportunities that planners face, as a means to set the context and rationale for the guidance and recommendations presented throughout the paper. The second and third sections discuss the prerequisites for and the actual steps of the strategic planning process, with a focus on current practice and its range of tradeoffs and tensions, including challenges in formulating results for greater accountability and issues related, inter alia, to ownership, prioritization, and funding. The conclusion presents a summary of findings, along with key policy recommendations drawn from the analysis and the case studies, as well as suggested areas where further research could strengthen the international community’s capacities to support strategic planning processes. SOURCE: Center on International Cooperation // New York University // Hosted by Research for Development

You can read the full report HERE.

Violent Conflict and the Very Poorest

Author: Chronic Poverty Research Centre

Most so-called civil wars take place in poor countries. Non-war violence is also prevalent in countries with high levels of poverty. Non-war violence includes sexual violence, communal riots and pogroms, high urban homicide rates and gang violence, rural land and labour conflicts, and so on. Such violence is pervasive not just in the ‘least developed countries’ but also in large middle-income developing countries with high concentrations of extreme poverty: countries like Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. This much is clear even with a fairly narrow, straightforwardly physical definition of violence. This paper aims to set out the significance of understanding and addressing the links between violence and extreme poverty. Section 2 discusses the impact of violent conflict on the poor, and on the very poorest, while Section 3 examines the contribution of extreme poverty to the causation of violent conflict. Section 4 draws out conclusions. SOURCE: Chronic Poverty Research Centre

You can read the full report HERE.

Ten Years of Fragile States: What Have We Learned?

Author: Laurence Chandy, Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development

Ten years ago this month, the World Bank established a taskforce to examine how the development community, and the bank in particular, should approach fragile states. This project took on special significance in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, as Western governments awoke to the threats posed by weak and unstable countries, and expressed a new willingness to engage with them.

Looking back at the taskforce’s report, there is much that remains salient and even prescient. For instance, the report frames the development agenda for fragile states around a narrow prioritization of reforms, starting with security, stability and the rule of law; emphasizes the attainment of feasible, quick wins; and advocates looking beyond government channels for service delivery. Engagement strategies stress the need for sociopolitical analysis and much deeper forms of donor coordination. Many of these same ideas will, ironically, be presented as new innovations at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea later this month. SOURCE: Brookings Institution

You can read the full report HERE.

Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of “Transcending Clan Politics”

Author: Ahren Schaefer, Andrew Black

The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

Clan identity and Islam are central pillars of Somali society, with clan dynamics and inter-clan rivalries magnified by decades of state collapse. Al-Shabaab - the dominant Islamist militia controlling much of southern and central Somalia - claims to “transcend clan politics,” yet reality on the ground belies this claim, revealing that al-Shabaab seeks to manipulate local clan alliances and remains deeply influenced by clan politics. This analysis shows that despite al-Shabaab’s hard-line Islamist identity and pro-al-Qaeda rhetoric, many aspects of the group’s past and current behavior remain deeply rooted in Somalia’s local dynamics. Moreover, clan rules apply even to Somalia’s most feared Islamists. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

You can read the full article HERE.

Can You Predict World Events Better Than Most...?

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Tue, 27 Sep 2011 12:56:00 +0000

Editor's Note: In March, I shared on this site the opportunity to participate in a "Forecasting World Events" study. If you are already signed up for that study, you are not eligible to participate in this one. But if not, and if you love the thought of anticipating questions like whether Hugo Chavez will be President of Venezuela, whether Italy will default on its foreign debt, whether US troop levels in Afghanistan will drop below 50,000, whether a Category 4 or 5 hurricane will make landfall in Florida, or whether Apple will become the most valuable company in the world ... please read on!-RB

Call for Research Participants

The System for Prediction, Aggregation, Display, and Elicitation (SP♠DE) team would like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in an interactive, online research study aimed at exploring the field of forecasting. This is a federally funded research effort sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) to learn how judgments made by a widely dispersed and diverse group of individuals may be used to increase forecast accuracies. Your participation will include providing forecasts to questions relating to economic, political, cultural, and global security domains via an interactive website. Your predictions to these questions may be based on your individual knowledge or based on available information provided to you by other research participants.

Eligibility Information: U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older with expertise in specific subject matter may be eligible to participate. Additionally, individuals with diverse educational levels (e.g., bachelor’s degrees to Ph.D.s) across a range of disciplines are preferred.

Study Duration: The research study is expected to commence in summer 2011 and conclude in 2014. Although we encourage you to participate in the study as long as possible, we understand that some individuals will not be available to do so for the entire three year length of the program. In such instances, please know that you may withdraw at any time.

Participant Involvement: Since data collection for this effort is in the format of an online survey, you will have the flexibility of offering your forecasts around your schedule. We encourage you to stay active with the study’s website throughout your involvement with the study.

Economic Considerations: In addition to providing the field of forecasting invaluable data, you will be financially compensated for your involvement with the study. You will be paid $575 for responding to approximately 100 forecast problem sets listed on the study’s website over the course of one year. Responding to forecast problem sets includes original responses to a forecast problem, updates to the forecast problem over time, and additional input in regards to specific forecast problems. Additionally, you will be further compensated $575 for each additional year that you provide forecasts to approximately 100 forecast problem sets for up to three years of participation. If you decide to withdraw from the study prior to the study’s first year of completion, you will be compensated in accordance with how long you have been active in the study up until that point.

Staff Support: Although you will have a great deal of freedom in regards to your study participation (e.g., when/how often you visit the website, how long you wish to participate, etc.), support from the research staff is never more than a phone call or email away. Our dedicated support staff is readily available to answer any questions/concerns that you may have, arrange payments, and ensure that your participation in this research effort is a positive experience.

Even More Study Details: To register as a participant or just to learn more about this unique research opportunity, please visit the SP♠DE website at www.iSPADE.net. Once you have registered, you will be contacted by a member of the research staff to determine your eligibility and obtain some preliminary information about you. Finally, participation in similar, online forecasting research studies sponsored by IARPA is prohibited while you are involved with the SP♠DE program. Thank you in advance for your interest and consideration.

SP♠DE is managed by The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc., including members from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Martin Research and Consulting (MRAC), and Mercyhurst College.

Mohsen Milani Discusses Libya Turmoil

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Wed, 24 Aug 2011 22:32:00 +0000

Iran’s Ties to the Taliban

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 12 Aug 2011 01:59:00 +0000

August 10, 2011 | 11:59am

Mohsen Milani

What is the status of Iran's relations with the Taliban today? Have there been significant changes since 2001?

The Islamic Republic of Iran has no official relation with the Taliban. Nor do the Taliban have an office or a representative in Tehran, as do many non-state actors, such as HAMAS. At the same time, Tehran has recognized that the Taliban have remarkable resiliency and are an integral component of the Afghan society that cannot be ignored. As there have been persistent reports that President Hamid Karzai, the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia all have opened their channels of communications with the Taliban, Tehran is determined not to become marginalized and seems to have tried to open its own non-diplomatic and secret channels of communication. But the Taliban are not monolithic, and it is not clear with which faction Iran is seeking to establish relations.

How has Iran’s view of the Taliban changed since the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001?

Iran’s views of the Taliban have changed considerably since 2001. Iran did not recognize the Taliban government and considered them an ideological nemesis and a major security threat that was created by Pakistan’s ISI, with generous financial support from Saudi Arabia partly for the purpose of spreading Wahhabism and undermining Iran. When the Taliban were in power in the 1990s, Iran, along with India and Russia, provided significant support to the Northern Alliance, which was the principal opposition force to Taliban rule and eventually dislodged them. Iran also contributed to dismantling the Taliban regime and to establishing a new government in Kabul in 2001.

Today, the Taliban have evolved into a formidable armed organization fighting U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Ironically, the strategic interests of Tehran and Taliban have converged today, as each, independent of the other and for different reasons, oppose the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and demand their immediate and unconditional withdrawal.

Is Iran providing tangible financial, military or political support for the Taliban?

There have been numerous public reports about support for the Taliban coming from Iran. There are reports that elements within the Revolutionary Guards may have transferred long-range rockets to the Taliban and provided training for the Taliban. In February 2011, British forces reportedly intercepted in Afghanistan a shipment of 48 122-mm rockets that they claimed had originated from Iran. Spokesmen of the Islamic Republic have consistently denied all these allegations. Such denials, even if we assume their validity, do not preclude the possibility that non-state actors within Iran may be used by the government to provide weapons or training to some factions within the Taliban organization.

From a strategic perspective, the Iranian government looks at the Taliban as a useful enemy that is undermining the interests of its other enemy, namely the United States. Therefore, it should not be surprising at all if the Iranian government supports the Taliban or if it looks the other away as behind-the-scenes support is provided by Iran’s non-state actors to the Taliban. Such support, however, appears to be very limited. The apparent goal is to empower the Taliban sufficiently to remain a major headache to the United States, but not to an extent that would allow them to seriously undermine the Karzai government or become the dominant force in all of Afghanistan.

What is Tehran’s position on a Taliban-controlled government in Kabul?

A Taliban-dominated government is clearly not in Iran’s long-term interests, since it would generate considerable tension and conflict between Iran and Afghanistan and would inevitably lead Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, becoming dominant foreign powers in Afghanistan, which Tehran vehemently opposes. At the same time, Tehran has for many years maintained that political stability in Afghanistan can be achieved only if the government reflects the rich ethnic and sectarian diversity of Afghanistan itself. Iran, more than anything else, wants to see a stable and friendly government in Kabul. Tehran now seems convinced that without Taliban participation in the government, as a partner but not as the main force, stability would be unattainable.

What is the state of Tehran’s relations with the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai?

The bilateral relationship remains friendly, but not devoid of tension. Karzai has deftly managed to simultaneously have good relations with Tehran and Washington. Tehran continues with its heavy involvement in Afghan reconstruction, and trade between the two countries has increased substantially.

Still, Tehran has not abandoned its support for its traditional allies among the non-Pushtun Afghans, notably the Northern Alliance and the Shiite Hazarats. Tehran continues to express its displeasure with the way Kabul has handled the relatively free crossing of the Jondollah terrorist group into Iran, and with the flow of narcotics into Iran.

The major tension between Kabul and Tehran, however, is their diametrically opposed views regarding the presence and future of U.S./NATO troops. Tehran has attempted in vain to convince Karzai to call for the withdrawal of Western troops. Tensions between the two neighbors are likely to increase if there is a new agreement between Washington and Kabul about establishing permanent U.S. military bases in Afghanistan.

How does Iranian influence in Afghanistan compare to its influence in Iraq? Which of the two countries is more important to Iran strategically?

Strategically, economically, and ideologically, Iraq is much more important than Afghanistan for Iran. Iran also exerts much more influence and has much more leverage in Iraq than in Afghanistan. Iran’s friends are much more organized in Iraq than they are in Afghanistan. Trade between Iran and Iraq has increased substantially, surpassing trade between Iran and Afghanistan. Iraq is now one of Iran’s major trading partners.

Politically and ideologically, Iran is much closer to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad than to the Sunni/Pushtun-dominated government of Hamid Karzai. While good relations with Karzai are important for Tehran, the relationship does not have profound international ramifications. Afghanistan’s strategic importance for Iran lies in the fact that American troops are stationed there. The case of Iraq is fundamentally different. Close relations between Tehran and Baghdad -- two major oil exporters -- or a political alliance between the two would be a game changer and would have significant economic ramifications for the world. It could also change the strategic balance of power in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

Read Mohsen Milani's article on Iran and Afghanistan in "The Iran Primer"

Mohsen Milani is chairman of the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida.

Seven Pillars of Small War Power

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Wed, 10 Aug 2011 17:26:00 +0000

How might we think differently about a “center of gravity” in an environment where asymmetric strategy dominates and power is diffused? Insurgencies and movements of resistance are dynamic, living systems powered by social dynamics.Successful insurgent movements leverage their available sources of power to gain the sympathy of the broader population and to mobilize a small cadre of armed forces. For the insurgent, these dynamics—the power of rising expectations, the power of the people, the power of the underdog, the power of agility, the power of resistance, the power of security, and the power of belonging—become the pillars of small war power. For the counterinsurgent, each of these pillars presents both a potential hazard and an exploitable vulnerability.

The full article from Military Review is available for free download HERE.

Global Peacekeeping Operations

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Sat, 30 Jul 2011 03:02:00 +0000

New York University’s Center on International Cooperation recently released The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011, a comprehensive monitoring effort that began in 2006. The 2011 Report focuses on managing peacekeeping transitions: defined as the withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation and the handing over of responsibility to national authorities, another international presence, or other regional and local actors.

Overall, global peacekeeping—in terms of total troops, military observers, and police—grew by 32% over the year to reach more than 256,000 peacekeepers in 2010 – compared with nearly 194,000 in 2009. However, despite continued growth, these numbers belie a considerable slowing in the rate of increase for UN peacekeeping operations – reflecting the operational, political and financial pressure to scale down in overall size.

No large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations have been mandated in the past four years, and the Report suggests a waning interest by the international community in taking on any new ones. Nevertheless, the need for stabilizing intervention continues in areas like Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, Haiti, and possibly Libya.

HERE you can read an article by Andrew Sinclair, published in the Journal of International Peace Operations, that summarizes some key findings from the Report

Rethinking policy responses on fragile states

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Thu, 21 Jul 2011 17:10:00 +0000

Rethinking policy responses on fragile states

Fernanda Faria

Executive Summary

The evolving policy discourse on fragile states has covered many of the criticisms made of the concept itself and its policy implications, including the need to be context specific, build on local systems of governance, engage for the long-term and beyond state institutions, and consider how having an international presence affects internal power dynamics. While new and innovative approaches have started to emerge in some of the academic work being done on fragile states (eg, the emergence of “hybrid political orders”, the role of non-state actors), there is still a gulf between policy discourse and practice. In an attempt to address the fragmentation of the actors, mandates, objectives, cultures, and bureaucratic logics involved in peacebuilding and statebuilding, on-going efforts to improve international support to fragile states tend to focus mainly on internal organisation, means, knowledge, capacity, policy coherence and coordination.

As laudable and difficult as such efforts may be, they risk merely covering up other more fundamental shortcomings of the international action being taken in fragile contexts. Ultimately the main driver for change in the way international actors operate in fragile states is politics. International support needs to build on an understanding of the local political context – including the internal political dynamics that operate both among local actors and between them and external actors – and go beyond state-centred approaches that fail to take on board how fragile states actually operate. There is also a need for clearer political guidance and greater transparency around the role of international actors and the political motivations, objectives and impact of their interventions in fragile states.

The issue of “fragile states” had been addressed in academic literature and policy circles well before it started to attract increasing political attention post 9/11. The formation and/or crisis of the state, which is at the basis of the fragile states debate, has long been researched and debated in academic literature, especially in relation to state formation in the post-colonial period. The political use of the notion of the weak, failing or failed state is not new either and, as pointed out by Jonathan Di John, was specifically used to justify colonial rule. However, it re-emerged more prominently as part of the international policy agenda in the 1990s as a result of different (albeit inter-related) humanitarian, development and security concerns and priorities that began to adopt policy approaches which sought to address fragile states in a comprehensive manner.

Good governance a core concern

As the first section of this paper outlines, policy approaches to fragile states have been influenced by, among other things, poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the concepts of human security and “responsibility to protect” (R2P), new approaches and modalities for aid effectiveness, democratic governance, conflict prevention and resolution, and the “war on terror”. However, these are not necessarily convergent or complementary policy agendas and have thus resulted in varied, and sometimes divergent, policies and political approaches and goals. Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus among international actors that peacebuilding and statebuilding should be the overarching goals guiding policy thinking and external assistance in fragile states.

At the core of international concerns and current policy responses in fragile states is the issue of good governance. International actors, and many people in developing countries, increasingly see governance as the “missing link” in the security-development nexus, and a key reason why cooperation policies have largely failed to promote sustainable development and stability. Governance has thus come to be a key feature of donor strategies in fragile states. However, despite donor rhetoric about upholding/supporting governance in fragile states, commitment, in practice, appears to be much more tentative and ad hoc.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas merge

The evolution of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas, as well as the many challenges and tensions faced and caused (intentionally or not) by external interventions and support in fragile contexts are discussed in the second section of this report. Both agendas combine development, governance, and security and appear to be increasingly joined-up.

Peacebuilding was initially associated with peacekeeping efforts in conflict and immediate post-conflict contexts, but the first generation of peacebuilding missions failed to stop some of those countries from slipping back into violent conflict. The shortcomings of those missions were partly attributed to having too narrow a focus on rapid political and economic reforms and placing too much emphasis on quick gains and a rapid withdrawal. Since then the concept of peacebuilding has thus expanded to include both the prevention of violent conflict and efforts to help bring about lasting peace. However, some see the inclusion of statebuilding as part of peacebuilding as problematic and possibly counter-productive.

Statebuilding, for its part, no longer focuses exclusively on the reconstruction of political institutions in the aftermath of conflict and state collapse, or on the role of institutional state actors alone. It is recognised as being primarily an endogenous process involving a diversity of actors and not just a top-down process, but also one in which state institutions have a key role to play. Many donors now believe that international actors must base their priorities on an understanding of the interaction and mediating processes between state and society at their various levels, as well as between social groups. It is also recognised that statebuilding is a complex, lengthy and non-linear process and that donors may need to be in for the long haul.
Gaps between the rhetoric and practice

While there is clearly an overlap between peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives, the merging of the two agendas is not without problem. The multitude of actors involved, all with different and sometimes conflicting political agendas, priorities, guiding principles and rules, funding mechanisms, experiences, timeframes and pressures to deliver renders agreement on a shared strategy and international coordination extremely difficult.

The final section examines the significant gaps between the rhetoric and practice of international donors, as well as the limitations of the role of international actors and their ability to support peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in fragile states. Operational, institutional, and intellectual barriers are standing in the way of changes to a donor approach that tends to be highly rule-based, technocratic and compartmentalised. New donor structures and approaches are being developed.

However, while institutional reorganisation and capacity-building, improved knowledge and understanding of the political economy of the context, greater awareness of and sensitivity to deeply contextual issues such as legitimacy, and greater attention to governance and security-related issues are all positive steps, they do not constitute a miracle cure for the fragmentation of the actors, mandates and objectives involved in peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. To counter this fragmentation, there needs to be a shared understanding of the political context and a political strategy on how to achieve common objectives and priorities. So far, despite the political rhetoric around ownership, alignment and context-based solutions and the recognition that diverse forms of state organisation exist, there appears to be little substantial change in the way international actors operate in fragile states.

This policy brief forms part of the NOREF project, supported by the Ford Foundation, on the internal and external dimensions of state fragility.

Read the full report HERE

Can we thank the U.N. for reducing armed conflict?

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Thu, 07 Jul 2011 19:23:00 +0000

Ernie Regehr, a Research Fellow at the University of Waterloo's Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, recently published an interesting and useful Background Paper, titled Armed Conflict: Trends and Drivers. The analysis leans heavily on a 2006 synopsis written by Gareth Evans of ICG, but Regehr also draws materials from Project Ploughshares' annual Armed Conflicts Report and the Human Security Report 2009/2010.

Armed Conflict is fundamentally defined as a political conflict involving armed combat by the armed forces of a state or the forces of one or more armed factions seeking a political end,in which at least 1,000 people have been directly killed in the fighting.

The good news is, when the dust settled on the conclusion of the Cold War, armed conflicts declined and the number continued to drop through the 2000s. The bad news (or part of it) is that "one-third of the conflicts that were underway in 1987 are still active today." So, if anyone needs a reminder, modern war is a marathon. It is also a breeding ground for mass atrocities. In fact about 85% of mass atrocities occur in the context of an existing armed conflict.

Regehr's paper thoughtfully acknowledges the increasingly blurry lines between political violence and criminal violence and the complexity of fitting terrorism into a specific category, but does not belabor the point.

The report then goes on to discuss different types of war, how wars end, and the human toll of armed conflicts. Death tolls are notoriously hard to count accurately, but based on estimates from the Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV) and from Ploughshares, the number may fall between 45,000 and 52,000 each year.

What drives these conflicts? With a nod to Thomas Ohlson and Alex Bellamy, the report suggest four major causes: Grievances, Identity (intergroup conflict), Capacity; and (Perceived) Absence of alternatives. It provides an interesting and thoughtful discussion of each.

The final section attempts to unpack the question of why armed conflict has declined in recent years and what implications those reasons might have for preventing conflict in the future. The report contains a concise list of explanations for international and civil wars drawn from the Human Security Report. These range from an increase in the number of democratic states and international institutions to growing economic interdependence, declines in ethnic discrimination, and "normative" shifts away from war. Citing Evans and the Human Security report, Regehr suggests a great deal of credit for for the decline in interstate wars goes to the United Nations (UN) and its bolstered efforts in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. Though the trends of declining conflict and increased UN diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives have certainly run concurrently, whether there is a causal link between them may remain an open question.

You can read the full report HERE.

Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 01 Jul 2011 17:54:00 +0000

CSIS analysts Anthony Cordesman (The Burke Chair in Strategy) and Andrew C. Gagel used data from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s (NCTC) World Wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) to examine patterns of terrorist attacks in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia from 2007-2010. Because the data end in 2010, the authors note, they do not reflect the wave of instability and unrest that swept through the region this Spring.

North Africa:

Algeria was the main hot spot for terrorism in North Africa. Most of the attacks were committed by militant extremists who are - or aspire to be - affiliated with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM's momentum is also creating a regional threat to SubSaharan Africa as well.

Middle East:

Terrorism in the Middle East is more ubiquitous and more diverse. Terrorist actors include semi-secular movements, Sunni and Shi’a extremist groups, and Jewish extremist groups. Their violence is committed in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and, Iraq. Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have driven much of the region's violence, but Hamas and the Islamic State of Iraq/Mujahideen Shura Council have contributed significantly as well, especially in Gaza an Iraq.

In southern Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continues to be an active source of terrorist violence. Within the Southern Gulf region, overall terrorist activity was lower, but most of the area's attacks occurred in Yemen and were linked to al-Qa’ida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).

Central & South Asia

Terrorist activity in the Af/Pak region accounted for much of the Central/South Asian terrorist violence from 2007-1010. In Afghanistan, Taliban drove much of the violence (which was most pronounced in Helmand and the Af/Pak border region) and killed, injured or kidnapped more indigenous Afghans during that time period than any other group. In Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) were responsible for most the most of known attacks and deaths there.

India was affected by a number of terrorist actors (both foreign and indigenous), but violence was driven principally by militant Islamists and Maoists. Groups with links to Pakistan were clearly the most dangerous. Continuing terrorist violence in Sri Lanka was mostly linked to ethnic civil conflicts.

You can read the full report HERE.

Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010. By Andrew C. Gagel and Anthony H. Cordesman. CSIS.

Reviewing U.S. Public Diplomacy

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Wed, 22 Jun 2011 18:01:00 +0000

Yesterday, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a discussion with Judith McHale, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. The event was titled: "U.S. Engagement with the World: A Review of U.S. Public Diplomacy." You can read a transcript of the session HERE or watch the video HERE - but I will highlight a couple of the key points below:

On defining public diplomacy (PD):

the way we define public diplomacy is basically our efforts to strengthen and expand the relationships between the government and people of the United States and people around the world.So it's the people-to-people component of diplomacy, which is why engaging a broad cross-section of the American public is critically important in that.

On the new target audience for US public diplomacy (PD): McHale began by noting that PD efforts used to focus on the elite because that's where state power was concentrated - but the global power structure is shifting. McHale says

In a world where power and influence truly belongs to the many, we must engage with more people in more places. That is the essential truth of public diplomacy in the Internet age.

But it is not just a diffusion of power that necessitates greater engagement. The landscape of actors looking to influence that power has broadened as well.

Today, we must contend with an increasingly savvy and motivated set of influencers on a global stage, each armed with a vast array of affordable, adaptable tools to spread their message.

We also have to counter lone extremists who pump their ideas into circulation as easily as legitimate actors.

On the perceived importance of PD and strategic communications among US senior leaders: McHale declared that President Obama and Secretary Clinton both "get" the concept of PD and its importance in supporting America's foreign policy objectives. McHale said:

We have brought public diplomacy perspectives in at the highest levels and emphasized innovation in the field to support our foreign policy objectives.

..at the beginning of the Bush administration, the strategic communications budget for the Defense Department was roughly 50, $60 million. By the end of it, it was close to a billion (dollars). So over eight years, you had $900 million increase -- something like 6,600 percent increase in funding in that area.

On Pakistan: McHale frankly acknowledged the complexity of managing America's relationship with Pakistan, but she believes that enduring the struggle is a better option than walking away.

The wrong thing would be to sort of become so discouraged that you pull back from trying to engage with the people of Pakistan or elsewhere, because only by continuing to engage, by continuing to find those areas where we can agree on and things that we can move forward, I believe that's the path for going forward.

On Syria:

I think we've been fairly consistent in saying, you either proceed with the reforms, or as the president said, he gets out of his way.

On China: McHale characterized China as being a challenging environment in which to operate, but she offered at least three ways in which the US is trying to increase its engagement in China:

The president's "100000 Strong" initiative aimed at increasing the number of American students studying in China.
Heavy reliance on social media.
Strengthening engagement with American businesses that operate in China.

WJP Rule of Law Index 2011 Report

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 17 Jun 2011 12:55:00 +0000

The World Justice Project (WJP) has just released its 2011 Rule of Law Index report. The project covers 66 countries, grouped within seven regions: Western Europe and North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. According tot he Report, adherence to the rule of law varies widely around the world and appears to be positively correlated with per capita income.

As used by the World Justice Project, the rule of law refers to a rules-based system in which the following four universal principles are upheld:

The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.
The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.
Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

The Index is based on data reflecting on the following nine dimensions (and 52 sub-dimensions) of the rule of law:

Limited government powers
Absence of corruption
Order and security
Fundamental rights
Open government
Regulatory enforcement
Access to civil justice
Effective criminal justice
Informal justice

Advancing the rule of law around the world is the central goal of the World Justice Project (WJP). Establishing the rule of law is fundamental to achieving communities of opportunity and equity—communities that offer sustainable economic development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights. Without the rule of law, medicines do not reach health facilities due to corruption; women in rural areas remain unaware of their rights; people are killed in criminal violence; and firms’ costs increase because of expropriation risk. The rule of law is the cornerstone to improving public health, safeguarding participation, ensuring security, and fighting poverty.

You can read the full report HERE.

National Intelligence Writing Contest

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Tue, 07 Jun 2011 21:43:00 +0000

Here's your opportunity to win $3,000, $1,500 or $750 through a National Intelligence Writing Contest sponsored by AFCEA and the Naval Intelligence Professionals. The deadline for submissions is June 30, 2011. The contest is open to everyone and can be approached from any relevant perspective: strategic, operational and/or tactical.

AFCEA International (AFCEA) and the Naval Intelligence Professionals (NIP) are both not-for-profit associations that support public and private sector intelligence professionals and the Intelligence Community. To help stimulate dialogue about intelligence and its role in national security, AFCEA and NIP have established the National Intelligence Writing Contest.

2011 Topic :

What are the major intelligence challenges we face in today's national security environment? Which one would you fix and how?

The contest offers a first place prize of $3,000, a second place prize of $1,500, and a third place prize of $750, plus the chance to be published in AFCEA’s SIGNAL Magazine and the NIP Quarterly.

Contest details, including the 2011 topic and submission guidelines are available HERE.

The contest deadline is June 30, 2011.

Memorial Day

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Mon, 30 May 2011 12:18:00 +0000

"Be convinced that to be happy means to be free and that to be free means to be brave. Therefore do not take lightly the perils of war."

--Thucydides

May God bless and comfort the family members of those who gave the ultimate sacrifice fulfilling their solemn oath to the US Constitution in service to this Great Nation.

USG Not Adequately Investing in Social and Behavioral Science Information for COIN

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 27 May 2011 17:08:00 +0000

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Defense Intelligence,Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)Operations study has issued its final report. The Task Force was asked to identify how Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence can be used most effectively to assess insurgencies, understand a population in their environment, and support COIN operations.

The Task Force reviewed existing literature and met with more than 100 senior‐ and mid‐level officials and representatives from across DoD, the Intelligence Community (IC), industry, non‐profit community, and academia involved in irregular warfare, COIN, ISR, and related activities.

Based on its investigation the Task Force arrived at the following observations:

DoD lacks a common understanding of COIN
DoD has assumed responsibility for COIN ISR by default
DoD ISR is narrowly interpreted to mean technical intelligence collection by airborne platforms
ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations that deal with populations in part because a comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for COIN does not exist
The U.S. Government is not investing adequately in the development of social and behavioral science information that is critically important to COIN
ISR support for COIN is currently being overshadowed by counterterrorism and force protection requirements
Increasing the focus of ISR for COIN on incipient insurgencies would provide more whole of government options and reduce the need for major commitment of military forces
New S&T solutions must address the crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and associated communications caused by the deluge of sensor data
New and emerging technologies and techniques can be employed to improve our understanding of COIN environments.

I would highlight here the fifth point:

The U.S. Government is not investing adequately in the development of social and behavioral science information that is critically important to COIN.

The report summarizes the problem in this way (p. vii):

Many, if not most, specific COIN ISR requirements are population‐centric and are not exclusively solvable with hardware or hard, physical science scientific and technical (S&T) solutions. One senior intelligence officer with years of field experience pointed out that 80 percent of useful operational data for COIN does not come from legacy intelligence disciplines. Good intelligence on COIN exists outside the traditional intelligence organizations. Anthropological, socio‐cultural, historical, human geographical, educational, public health, and many other types of social and behavioral science data and information are needed to develop a deep understanding of populations. Such data, collected and analyzed using the scientific method, is vital to COIN success.

The corresponding recommendation is as follows:

The DoD and IC should undertake discussions with authoritative representatives of the social sciences (e.g., the American Anthropological Association) to develop concepts by which the social sciences can be employed to gain sufficient understanding of the environments in which COIN operations might take place. DoD and the IC should develop and implement a program to support academic institutions nationwide in building research capabilities regarding countries and regions in which COIN operations might take place. DoD should build a stronger Foreign Area Officer program and more favorable career prospects for officers who engage in sustained country‐ and region‐specific specialization. The USD(I), USD(P), USD(AT&L), and the DNI should jointly develop this capability.

The report goes on to suggest that a new National Intelligence Manager (NIM) position could be created for COIN-specific intelligence requirements, and that the "NIM could advocate the stand‐up of an Institute of Intelligence for Behavioral Analysis that focuses on performing advanced analysis of group and social networks in regions susceptible to insurgencies."

Behavioral modeling and simulation - with a nod to ONR's Human Social Culture Behavioral Modeling Program (HSCB) - is presented as one potentially useful tool for analyzing a population, though it acknowledges some non-trivial challenges.

You can check out the full report HERE.

Center for Complex Operations Opens Site Access

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Thu, 26 May 2011 19:56:00 +0000

As of May 23, 2011 the CCO Portal site no longer requires member log-in for most content. All of the information once contained at this site, and more, is now available at CCOPortal.org. The staff at CCO hope the new user friendly website offers a more effective way to learn about past and current complex operations. You should check it out!

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO)

The CCO is designed to link U.S. Government education and training institutions, including related centers of excellence, lessons learned programs, and academia, to foster unity of effort in stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare – collectively called “complex operations.” The Department of Defense, with support from the State Department and USAID, established the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) as an innovative interagency partnership. Recognizing that unity of effort across disparate government agencies, and across DoD components, requires shared intellectual and decision-making frameworks, the CCO will connect education and training programs across the government to foster a ‘whole of government’ understanding, assessment and approach to complex operations.

The CCO was specifically established to:

Serve as an information clearing-house and knowledge manager for complex operations training and education, acting as a central repository for information on areas such as training and curricula, training and education provider institutions, complex operations events, and subject matter experts.
Develop a complex operations training and education ‘community of practice’ to catalyze innovation and development of new knowledge, connect members for networking, share existing knowledge, and cultivate foundations of trust and habits of collaboration across the community;
Serve as a feedback and information conduit to OSD and broader USG policy leadership to support guidance and problem solving across the community of practice;
Enable more effective networking, coordination and synchronization to support the preparation of Department of Defense and other U.S. Government personnel for complex operations;
Support lessons learned processes and best practices compilation in the area of complex operations; and
Identify education and training gaps of the Department of Defense and other federal departments and agencies and facilitate efforts to fill those gaps.

The CCO grew out of three separate but conceptually related initiatives. In the Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction called for the establishment of a Center of Excellence for Stability Operations. Likewise, the Irregular Warfare Roadmap from the Quadrennial Defense Review asked DoD to develop a similar center for IW. Meanwhile the State-DoD Interagency Counter-insurgency initiative sought to establish a Center of Excellence for Interagency Counter-insurgency. Rather than creating three new, duplicative centers, interagency stakeholders decided that a consortium, leveraging existing institutions, would be more effective and efficient. The CCO is also supportive and complimentary to the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization led NSPD-44 initiatives.

Society of National Security Professionals (SONSP)

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Mon, 16 May 2011 14:55:00 +0000

The Society of Nation al Security Professionals (SONSP) is a not-for-profit professional society dedicated to bringing together practitioners from a variety of professional disciplines with a common interest in improving the national security community of practice. SONSP welcomes past, present and future experts from a wide-variety of career fields to exchange information, experiences and best practices.

SONSP created several valuable tools to help our members excel in their individual career efforts while fostering a spirit of teamwork and cooperation among different communities.

SONSP Community of Interest Collaboration Center – web based tools for practitioners from the civil service, military, private industry and academia that provide the latest news from think tanks, news services, and federal departments on relevant topics related to national security. The resource library serves as an information clearing house for recent reports and information from a variety of sources.

SONSP Virtual Mentoring – is a career development feature that matches mentees with mentors based on a variety of factors such as personality traits, experience and professional interests. Powerful tools currently used by numerous Fortune 500 companies provide structure to the process and ensure realistic and achievable goals are set for the mentee.

SONSP Certifications – will set the industry standard for the national security practice. Professional certifications will be awarded to practitioners who possess the required knowledge and experience and complete our rigorous training and certification examination. Three levels of certification will be available commensurate with a candidate’s level of knowledge, experience, training and education. An SONSP certified professional will have a thorough understanding of national security theory and policy and will be a valuable asset to any organization with an interest in national security.

SONSP Scholarship Foundation – will provide financial support for individuals who wish to continue their professional development through traditional and non-traditional means.

SONSP supports the concepts outlined in Executive Order 13434 and will enable a broader audience to participate in this community.

From now through December 1, 2011, we are currently accepting new members and membership fees will be waived for the first year.

You can submit your application online HERE.

Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of Strategy

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Fri, 13 May 2011 21:33:00 +0000

This NATO Defense College Forum Paper is the penultimate in a series of workshops and publications regarding better integration of civilian and military efforts in response to contemporary security challenges.

Whether the preferred term is “interagency” (most common in American parlance), “whole-of-government” (frequently used by the British), or “comprehensive approach” (a term of art typically used within NATO, the UN and EU), it is widely recognized that effective integration of military and civilian capabilities is necessary for NATO to succeed in contemporary missions such as that of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and will likely be required in the aftermath of the No Fly Zone operations in Libya. However, NATO and its member states have generally done poorly in their attempts at putting the concept into practice. One of the reasons for this difficulty is the lack of common concepts and approaches towards the development of strategy by the civilian and military elements that must be involved in a comprehensive approach.

Chapters:

Integrating Civilian and Military Approaches to Strategy

The Persistent Problem of Civil Military Integration in War, The Illusions and Delusions of Smart Power

NATO’s New Strategic Concept: An Integration of Civil and Military Approaches, Strategy, Segmentation and Incrementalism – A Corporate Approach

All for One and One for All? – Forging Development, Diplomatic and Defense Partnerships under NATO’s New Strategic Concept

Interagency Challenges in Strategic Assessments

Joint Strategic Planning in Iraq: Optimism is not a Plan – Needed Changes for a Long War

UN Peace Operations - Year in Review 2010

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Thu, 12 May 2011 14:07:00 +0000

The United Nations (DPKO) has 15 current Peacekeeping Operations around the globe involving nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel (i.e., troops, police, and military observers) from 115 contributing countries, and another 20,000 civilian personnel.

The UN has involved itself in the "peacekeeping" business since 1948, with a cumulative cost over those 65 years of about $69 billion and nearly 3000 fatalities.

2010, they describe as a "watershed year" making significant progress in the longstanding operations in Liberia and Timor-Leste, and facing escalating challenges in theaters such as Chad, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire.

This report - UN Peace Operations - Year in Review 2010 - reviews the nature and scope of this past year's operations, and includes a section with "facts and figures" for the following:

United Nations peacekeeping operations
United Nations political and peacebuilding missions
Peacekeeping contributors
Top 10 contributors of uniformed personnel
Surge in uniformed UN peacekeeping personnel from 1991-2010
Top 10 providers of assessed financial contributions

Making Interagency Efforts Effective

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:23:00 +0000

Today's strategic environment is dominated by a need for "interagency" solutions. The activities of U.S. armed forces are "joint." The combatant command system is "unified." Global operations are "integrated" and conducted with "coalition partners." The U.S. National Security Strategy takes a "whole-of-government" approach. Success in the 21st Century requires the ability to work together.

Professor Richard Hackman, the Edgar Pierce Professor of Social and Organizational Psychology at Harvard, has done some of the finest and most innovative work on understanding how people come together, synthesize their expertise, and create effective "teams" in real world settings. He has closely studied teamwork in a range of populations from virtuoso musicians to intelligence analysts, in the latter case conducting one of the only research studies on analytic teams. I listen very closely whenever Richard speaks, and I always benefit from his wisdom.

The kind folks at The Situationist blog have graciously posted a video of Professor Hackman's recent lecture on "What makes an effective team", which he delivered to Harvard's Student Association for Law and Mind Sciences (SALMS). Thanks to them, you can benefit from Richard Hackman's insights HERE.

'Three Cups of Tea' - Fact and Fiction

noreply@blogger.com (Dr. Randy Borum) — Mon, 18 Apr 2011 15:58:00 +0000

The book: 'Three Cups of Tea' has been widely touted by many proponents of so-called population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine. According to the LA Times, an investigation by "60 Minutes" broadcast this weekend will cite multiple sources that contend some of the most inspiring stories in Greg Mortenson's books "Three Cups of Tea" and "Stones into Schools" are not true.

Significantly, Mortenson's origin story -- of being saved by a remote village in Afghanistan and promising to build a school for them -- appears to be a fabrication.

In a news release, the television program explains:

The heart of Mortenson’s “Three Cups of Tea” is the story of a failed attempt in 1993 to climb the world’s second-highest peak, K2. On the way down, Mortenson says, he got lost and stumbled, alone and exhausted, into a remote mountain village in Pakistan named Korphe. According to the book’s narrative, the villagers cared for him and he promised to return to build a school there. In a remote village in Pakistan, 60 MINUTES found Mortenson’s porters on that failed expedition. They say Mortenson didn’t get lost and stumble into Korphe on his way down from K2. He visited the village a year later. That’s what famous author and mountaineer Jon Krakauer, a former donor to Mortenson’s charity, says he found out, too. “It’s a beautiful story. And it’s a lie,” says Krakauer. “I have spoken to one of his [Mortenson’s] companions, a close friend, who hiked out from K2 with him and this companion said, ‘Greg never heard of Korphe until a year later,’” Krakauer tells Kroft. Mortenson did eventually build a school in Korphe, Krakauer says, “But if you read the first few chapters of that book, you realize, ‘I am being taken for a ride here.’ ”

The story of Mortenson's efforts to support education in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly their remote regions is widely known, and has helped draw many to his charity. Since opening his first school in 1997, Mortenson has been said to have been involved with establishing hundreds of schools,working with tribal leaders, Islamic clerics and militia commanders. He even
survived an eight-day abduction by the Taliban.

Yet the story of his abduction has been called into question. 60 Minutes reports:

In “Three Cups of Tea,” Mortenson writes of being kidnapped in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 1996. In his second book, “Stones into Schools,” Mortenson publishes a photograph of his alleged captors. In television appearances, he has said he was kidnapped for eight days by the Taliban. 60 MINUTES located three of the men in the photo, all of whom denied that they were Taliban and denied that they had kidnapped Mortenson. One the men in the photo is the research director of a respected think tank in Islamabad, Mansur Khan Mahsud. He tells Kroft that he and the others in the photo were Mortenson’s protectors, not his kidnappers. “We treated him as a guest and took care of him,” says Mahsud. “This is totally false and he is lying.” Asked why Mortenson would lie about the trip, Mahsud replies, “To sell his book.”

And according to "60 Minutes," Mortenson's charity, the Central Asia Institute, has spent more money in the the U.S. talking about education in Pakistan and Afghanistan than actually building and supporting schools there. The television program talks to charity waltchdog group that has concerns about the financial management of the group.

Who didn't they talk to? Greg Mortenson, who did not respond to their requests for an interview.