I want to expand on the Turkish experience and my concerns about the “ethics” (as well as viability) of Turkey’s brand in this post.

Erdogan with his party’s youth branch (From HDN)

In  my article, I basically argued that:

- Ethics in place branding is contextual. The framework I propose is for “thinking about place branding”. Be aware of the social context you operate in.

- Place branding is political. Power and legitimacy are important concerns. It is not a construction or a promotion project! Place branding is a great demonstration of power!

- Place branding is “social” and “communicative”. Place branding is about norm production, it has the potential to change a place’s identity.

Overall, I say we should be thinking about (i) legitimacy (of the actors to brand/rebrand places), (ii) inclusion (of relevant and interested stakeholders), and (iii) consistency (of norms and values used in domestic and external consumption).

Police Academy, May 19, 2010

Introducing a new tradition for national commemoration days aims to change the context, and create new norms through exerting political power. It does mark a point where Turkey is trying to come up with a new brand identity. However, I have serious concerns about the “ethics” of this practice (and its efficacy).

In the “old” tradition, these days were celebrated in stadiums with parades. Now, stadium celebrations are only limited to the capital city. Erdogan, PM of Turkey, says that “Now May 19 is a real festival. Older celebrations used to recall those of iron curtain countries. May 19 is now a symbol of change and transformation”. Pro-government media also praised the celebrations as being the first civilian festival. Yet, the controversy did not end there.

Erdogan sees May 19th as a ‘battleground’. He continued hos remarks by saying “No one can dare to give a lesson to us, to the (AKP’s) youth on April 23, May 19 and October 29. To the contrary those who want to understand the spirit of these days should come here and learn from this youth. Turkey no longer belongs to a group of elitists or certain groups,” and “We have been treated as if we were foreigners, second-class citizens for decades. Years have passed but today I am openly saying that we are in rampancy”.

1) Legitimacy: As I tried to argue in my article, place branding is necessary only when there is a disagreement on the place’s brand identity. Creating a place brand identity is a regulative attempt, but should be communicative in its essence. Interested parties should be included in a Habermasian negotiation process. Yet, AKP’s and Erdogan’s attempts are based on a priori political power. I highly doubt such a political power makes AKP a legitimate actor in defining Turkish identity (as I tried to argue here after the 2011 elections).

2) Inclusion: This decision was carried unilaterally. With the growing politicization of media sources in Turkey (or with pretty much all media networks being controlled by pro-government groups), it is not possible to see any criticism of this “new” tradition.

3) Consistency: The message AKP is trying to communicate with this new tradition is the move towards a more civilian, liberal, democratic society where these commemoration days belong to the entire nation, rather than certain segments of the country. But, the change is also carried out as a reaction to former state-elites (most of whom are in prison because of highly questionable court cases). “Sorry about that! But elitists should know that we are in this country and are first-class citizens” says Erdogan, and defends the new tradition saying that “This policy is not for dividing the country or formatting generations. To the contrary we want to provide more freedom, but elitists and despotic intellectuals cannot understand this.”

In short,

- This “civilian” move in Turkey’s brand image is (at best) ethically questionable.

- Given the lack of legitimacy and inclusion, the only way to ensure its continuation is through a priori legal-bureaucratic power.

- The lack of consistency is likely to affect the efficacy of this move, as segments of domestic and external audiences are not sure whether the move is a “civilian” or a “conservative” move.

I stand by my earlier conviction where I said Erdogan and AKP are the biggest obstacles for effective use of Turkish soft power. The inconsistency, the “us vs. them” rhetoric, and the constant revenge seeking behavior (please see Erdogan vs. Turkish theater for another example) are likely to decrease Turkey’s persuasive power towards external audiences, and will keep alienating internal audiences.

Let me back up a little bit. Visual.ly is a new web platform where creative people share their infographics and data visualization projects with the public. Pinterest is a virtual pinboard where users can pin the photos they find on the internet. And as far as I can see, First Choice, a travel agency, bring these two new social media platforms together in their Conflict of Pinterest 2012 project, and launch (what I would like to call) their unintentional public diplomacy campaign.

Users can vote for the most beautiful country either by tweeting about the project or pinning a related photo on Pinterest. Based on popular voting, Conflict of Pinterest shows the most beautiful country in an interactive map. First Choice manages to promote itself, the project, and have auxiliary impact on place brand images.

Practically, Conflict of Pinterest acts as an aggregator for social media data, and encourages people to voice their opinion.

Questions I have in mind for the project (and hopefully questions I might answer when the voting period ends):

1 – What is the impact of visual rhetoric on social media and place branding relations?
2 – What is the impact of cool graphics on user participation? (or should we get cooler graphics if we want to do e-diplomacy?)
3 – What is the impact of internet penetration on the results?
4 – Does anyone vote for a country expect for their home country.

Mobile Turkish Coffee House in front of the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC

Turkayfe.orgstarted out as an idea in May 2009, and the website went live in May 2010. From our very early days, we did our best to learn from our mistakes, and to improve our project. As a doctoral candidate studying public diplomacy, and a dilettante practitioner; I tried to use my practical experience in my academic studies and vice-versa.

During the Mobile Turkish Coffee House project, which started on April 26th, 2012 (and goes until May 19th, 2012), we travel to five states in northeast United States, and serve free Turkish coffee. We also host coffee culture events, which include lectures and presentations, in Washington, DC, New York, and Boston.

Washington, DC Coffee Culture event (Team members in the picture l to r, Gizem, me, Tugcem) Photo by Jackie Chi

Here are a couple of things I learned during our trip in terms of connecting theory and practice of Public Diplomacy:

You need theoretical guidance…even in the last three feet : One question we kept asking ourselves was about where we stood in the larger picture. Why are we doing this project? Why Turkish coffee> Why northeast US? What can we achieve? The answers to most of these question are available in the literature, from consubstantiation to strategic marketing. Unless, projects are based on theoretical studies, mere exposure cannot produce results (like this quite okay video clip)

Projects designed based on research results are effective : Turkayfe.org is an online project. But shortly after we launched our website, we realized that offline communication, face-to-face contact was quite important in generating traffic, encouraging content creation, and more importantly establishing a community. The research we presented at TASSA also showed us that we needed more offline communications. Even though the project is only halfway done, our weekly report showed that our traffic has increased by 10 times…
Theory and practice are two different worlds : While public diplomacy in academia means reading, writing, and discussing, the term has very different applications in the real world. I traveled with the Mobile Turkish Coffee House in DC and New York, distributing coffee for three days and hosting two events. We brewed more than 4000 cups of coffee, hosted more than 250 people in our events, washed around 200 coffee mugs and pots, and had two parking/permit problems.
So, when planning Public Diplomacy campaigns, one should not forget that the field is quite different from the planning room.

And here is a short promo video, our video producer Jackie Chi has put together:

As I have mentioned earlier, I have several doubts about NBI as a robust measurement scale. Below, I’ll try to organize my ideas under three headings:

- What is NBI good for? When should NBI be used?

- Why doesn’t NBI measure ‘nation brands’?

- Why is NBI’s understanding of nation brands incomplete (if not entirely wrong)?

Let me shortly explain what NBI is, for those of you not familiar with the measurement scale. A joint venture of Simon Anholt, and GfK Roper, NBI uses Anholt’s Nation Brand Hexagon, and examines the six dimensions of country images: exports, governance, culture and heritage, people, tourism, and investment and immigration. A survey is conducted annually in 20 countries to rank a total of 50 countries.

When is NBI useful?

A quick disclaimer: I have my own ontological and epistemological issues with NBI. If you want to see an academically robust measurement scales, I recommend you to follow the works of Dr. Sebastian Zenker, and Dr. Andrea Insch. Both scholars present very intriguing methods to evaluate place (most of the time, city) brands.

But at the end of the day, NBI is a very sophisticated product. GfK Roper still presents one of the most inclusive and informative measurement scale available to policy makers right now. So, when can NBI be useful? I, personally, see two areas where these numbers might be invaluable for policy makers:

• Market research: Let’s assume Country A just got very interested in Country B. Maybe Country A wants more tourists, influence some policies, or attract investment. In order to come up with feasible strategies, Country A has to know what Country B thinks about it. NBI can provide several quantified insights about Country B’s perception of Country A.

• Bureaucratic evaluation: Country A has just completed a branding campaign, or a major event took place in Country A. Policy makers want to re-evaluate their current situation. They want to see whether the campaign had any positive impacts or not. NBI, again, can show the change overtime.

Does NBI measure what it sets out to measure?

For the time being, I am going to assume that NBI’s definition of nation brand is flawless, and point out problems about data gathering – rather than research design.

• Sampling problem: Each year citizens from 20 countries are invited for an online survey – while controlling for age, and education level. Now, there are three problems with this sampling method. First of all, these 20 countries do not necessarily represent the world. Besides, if a country is going for a ‘regional brand’ (i.e. a regional political power status, increasing economic activities in a region), the sampling might be completely irrelevant. Secondly, the survey is online, therefore, your participants do not even necessarily represent their respective countries. Lastly, I am not sure about the consistency of these 20 countries across years. I do not know whether the same 20 is included in the sample – if not, a panel study is meaningless (Though I was informed the sampling might change according to client needs).

• Data triangulation: As a doctoral candidate, I am required by the law of nature to say triangulation at least once when I write something longer than 500 words. So here we go. In an era when we are talking about paradox of plenty (about information, not oil), why do we go ahead and collect information solely through an online survey? Individuals are voluntarily giving out information about their perceptions in blogs, on Twitter, and other social media networks. Why don’t we use those platforms to scrap data? Moreover, why don’t we use news pieces or other public resources? Why don’t we use focus groups? In other words, why don’t we get more data resources and triangulate our results? (And of course, by we, I mean GfK Roper).
• Difficult to change: During the last four years, top 10 countries did not change. Similar to Anholt, GfK Ropers representatives mentioned that it is not possible to change a country’s reputation overnight. Yet I believe, the reason for that is the questions asked in the survey about ‘perceptions’. It is not possible to increase a person’s familiarity with a country, its people, and/or products. Yet, within some certain audiences, it might be possible to change what a country stands for. Shortly speaking, overall reputation might not change overnight, but it might be possible to associate the place with new concepts in shorter time frames. These associations are not adequately measured through six quantified dimensions.
• Do you want to have a person from this country as a close friend?: I am sorry but really? This question? What can this measure? Do we have any idea about what a close friend is? Or do we know how people choose close friends? Anyhow, some survey questions seem to be very contingently related to the concepts measured. Moreover, 3 to 6 questions per item are asked. I argue the number of questions is too low to gather sufficient data to make claims.

Does ‘Nation Brand Hexagon‘ have construct validity?

I argue that Nation Brand Hexagon does not adequately define a ‘nation brand’. This complex social phenomenon cannot be described only with six categories. Even if it is described so, these six are based mainly on a neo-liberal economic understanding (or simply, free market competition).

• Is ‘branding’ a competitive concept? The ranking system clearly says yes. All countries have the same comparable brands, and can be ranked accordingly. But what does the ranking mean? USA has the best brand, so, do individuals all want to buy American products? Do we all want to visit the US? Or let’s look at the change from 2008 to 2009. So, does that mean more people wanted to immigrate to US in 2009? Branding is not necessarily a competitive concept. Yes, all countries are going to limited resources (investments, tourists etc), but they are using different rhetorical, political, and economic strategies. Therefore such a quantified, zero-sum approach to branding oversimplifies the nature of competition in the international arena, and underestimates the role of several factors.
• Is a “brand” a number? Of course not! Dr. Zenker has done a fantastic job in looking at current measurement scales (also, see his other publications for his proposed methods). However, NBI practically equates US brand to 68.88 in 2011.

What I learned from this press conference?

1. If the invitation says there is going to be breakfast in the conference, you should not stop by Starbucks first.
2. GfK-Roper service is better than Anholt’s conceptualization. It is a research service that can be customized to suit client needs. You can get results for specific markets, target audiences, age groups etc. But the results that are shared with the public (see the table above) are plain invalid. NBI Top 10 list does not mean anything in terms of place/nation branding.
3. Brand Hexagon is a good visual SWOT analysis for countries. For instance Country C might rank #5 in overall, #1 in five of the six dimensions, and #39 in governance. Country D might rank in mid-2os in everything but tourism – where it ranks higher. Therefore, countries can see their weaknesses and strengths.
4. In short, I right now have a more favorable opinion of NBI – not as a robust branding measurement but as an important and sophisticated policy making support tool.

PS: I cross-posted this entry on Place Management and Branding Blog.

Is he really shaking hands with the kid?

Search trends in Turkey, keyword – Somali

As the Google Trends graph on the left clearly demonstrates, Turkey and Turks have always been interested (!) in Somalia and have wanted to learn more about the country through online resources. Similarly, newspapers have consistently (!) covered the situation in the country. In more serious terms, it is obvious that Somalia became an important issue for Turkish public opinion pretty much after Erdogan decided to start talking about the country and the situation. This visit was expected to “[draw] international attention to the plight of the drought-stricken country and Turkey’s leadership in the humanitarian crisis“. Erdogan and his groupies filled up two planes and landed in Mogadishu for a one-day trip.

Turkish celebrities sold a total of ’0′ albums in Somalia this past decade

When we take the visit at its face value, it does not make any sense. Yes, Somalia is definitely in need of international aid – but what Erdogan did was organizing a publicized high level visit to bring a one-time aid. Given the fact that Erdogan called Somalia a real test for civilization, pledged to re-open the Turkish embassy in the country, got Organization for Islamic Conference on board for more aid, and wanted to improve Turkish image, let’s try to look at this issue from a strategic point of view. This visit creates three different question marks in my minds:

Domestic question marks:

This charity drive is taking place during Ramadan, when people’s religious feelings are at a peak point. It is very difficult to evaluate whether government is taking advantage of this religious environment to get donations. Besides, Deniz Feneri case is still going on – so, charities might not be as trustworthy as they seem to be…

Domestic breaking point:
What about our people?! As I tried to show with the Google Trends graph, we don’t care about Somalia – not even a little bit. We heard about the country in 90s with the UN force, then forgot about it for a couple of years, then remembered with the pirate attacks. Government’s decision to give around $200m to Somalia is very difficult to defend given the fact that there are way too many people in need of such an aid in Turkey.

International question marks:
Now, there are a couple of international issues. Why did Turkey decide to help Somalia? It is not a neighboring country. It is not the only war-torn, poverty-struck country. So, why? Well, two answers come up: religion and oil. These answers give rise to several conspiracy theories: is Turkey trying to become the ‘leader’ of Islamic countries? Or let’s take another step further: is another power (mainly the US) trying to situate Turkey as the leader, is another power trying to access oil resources?

International breaking point:

Turkey, out of the blue, gives lots of money to Somalia – does not address any security issues, does not address any development issues but puts a great show on stage. Can we see Turkey as a credible actor in international arena after this act? I highly doubt that…

Public diplomacy question marks:

Did Erdogan try to gain ‘street cred’ in Islamic countries? After Iran, Libya, Egypt, and Syria; firstly this aid is not enough. Moreover, Somalia was not an important issue in Islamic agenda. Did Erdogan try to lead the West by example? Very unlikely. Several Western countries already have standing aid and development programs and are helping Somalia.

Public diplomacy breaking point

Erdogan’s declared message is ‘Somalia is a test for civilization’ and ‘Turkey will lead aid efforts’. Both statements are false and don’t mean much for the Western or Middle Eastern audiences. Somalia is not the only test for civilization and several countries have been actively helping the country for decades right now. This extravagant visit is not likely to make Turkey a ‘donor’ (and definitely ‘leader’) country in the eyes of the Western audiences. The issue is not ‘hardcore’ enough for the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, even though I accept that an aid is likely to improve Turkey’s image, this improvement will be quite limited.

Long story short, I hope Erdogan and others with him enjoyed their time in Mogadishu, and took lots of pictures. Because this trip will not generate any more influence than a touristic visit in long term. But well, who knows, we might get another term of temporary UNSC seat thanks to our African friends….

Never throw away party flags after an election

My conclusions in 2008, I argue, still reflect the reality. Erdogan symbolizes AKP in person – Erdogan is the party. He uses his personal identity to (i) reflect social values on politics, (ii) create a family analogy within the Turkish society (which is not new in Turkish politics), and (iii) play the ‘victim’ card. His rhetoric is built on conservatism, victimization, and populism. He uses conservative elements, nation vs. state comparison, and victimization stories. When talking about an ‘other’, he uses pressure in forms of majority (i.e. we got 50% of the votes), stability (i.e. remember the economy before 2002), and international consensus (i.e. headscarf is not banned in European countries).

Again, as a student of politics and international relations, I try to stay open-minded about different ideologies, strategies, parties, and people. My political opinion, stance, and beliefs (should) have nothing to do with my studies. However, there are two issues with AKP that I cannot accept, and therefore believe AKP and Erdogan are changing Turkish identity, and highly de-valuing ‘Turkish brand’.

Not rocking the ‘stache since 1990s

Issue Number 1: Erdogan’s mustache: Apart from the fact that it looks ridiculous, Erdogan’s mustache clearly states his political, ideological, and religious stance. Mustache has been an important aspect of politics in Turkey for a long time. Turks have been able to identify political allies and opponents through their facial hair for a long time. Erdogan’s conservative democrat (also called moderate Islamic in politically incorrect communities) mustache brings religion into the equation, therefore symbolizes a more coherent community. If you do not accept one of his principles, let it be AKP’s unquestionable (!) record of success or Sunni Islam, you are an outsider. Headscarf is the equivalent of mustache for women. Different religious sects in Islam wears the headscarf in a different way. Therefore, all individuals are able to identify and label each other when they meet.

So, what is the problem with that? Well, AKP is surrounded by a community that is coherent in terms of religious beliefs and political ideology. They are clearly labelled by mustaches and headscarves. Outsiders can be identified instantly. (By the way, here is a great post by Ali Erol on how outsiders are defined by insiders – in Turkish).

Baykal, where are you? Call us

Issue Number 2: Redefining the terms: Let’s face it, AKP never faced a ‘serious’ political opposition in Turkey (Also, one might argue that several court cases such as Ergenekon, and Balyoz, as well as numerous personal cases brought to court by Erdogan, and the fact that Turkey has the highest number of journalists in jail might have an impact on this lack of opposition). Within this framework, Erdogan and AKP have redefined several terms in Turkish political parlance. Let me highlight a couple of points from yesterday’s speech.

First of all, the 10th year celebration take place during an ‘Iftar’ dinner of twenty thousand people. Therefore, it is not surprising to find religious references in any given speech. However, following points should be noted:
Role of Turkey in bigger picture:

Her zaman zayıf olanın yanında olan milletimizin kalbi, Somali’deki kardeşlerinin yanındadır.
Our nation’s heart, that has always been with the weak, is with its brothers in Somalia.

Somalia is our newly found brother, and Turkey is expected to help developing countries. There is nothing wrong with being a contributor in development projects. On the contrary, it is a desirable position for Turkey within the international arena. Yet, given the facts that Turkey is sending ‘aid’ (prepacked food and other materials) to an Islamic country during Ramadan and that donations have been asked with Ramadan-themed commercials, Turkey seems to be aiming for a ‘protector of Islamic nations’ role.

Our ‘history’

Ama unutmayın o cehalet döneminde bile kimse kimseye kurşun sıkmazdı….Biz şuanda ramazan için sabrediyoruz ama ramazandan sonra bu barış işini tekrardan görüşürüz.
Don’t forget, even during the era of ignorance, nobody fired…We are not doing anything during Ramadan, but after Ramadan we will talk about this peace business again.

As the Turkish nation, we are expected to draw our ‘historical’ lessons from the history of Islam in the Arab peninsula. Ramadan seems to point to an important reference point even in military operations. Thus, if one claims that contemporary Turkey can be seen as the continuation of an Islamic-Arabic tradition, he or she won’t be absolutely wrong.

What makes us a nation?

Zaten İmralı’daki Kürtlerin dininin Zerdüştlük olduğunu ilan etmişti. Acaba Kürtlerin dininin Zerdüştlük olduğunu kabul eden kaç tane bana Kürt kardeşimi gösterebilirsiniz?…Ben inanıyorum ki benim Kürt kardeşlerimin tamamına yakını İslam diyecektir.
The one in Imrali (referring to captured head of PKK, Ocalan) have declared Zoroastrianism as the religion of the Kurds. I wonder how many Kurdish brothers of mine you can show me who will agree that the Zoroastrian religion of the Kurds?…I believe almost all of my Kurdish brothers will says Islam.

While talking about terrorist movement in Turkey and autonomy claims, Erdogan refers to religion once again. Kurds and Turks should live together, as both believe in Islam.

Us vs. Them, State vs. Nation

Milletvekili olabilme hakkım engellenirken, milletimiz bütün karanlıkları aydınlatmak üzere ışıkları yaktı.
When my right to become a deputy was blocked, our nation hit the lights to illuminate the darkness.

Even though nearly a decade passed since the Assembly solved his problem, Erdogan comes back to the fact that he was not allowed to be elected back in 2002. However, he continues to ignore a contemporary problem of similar nature – for instance, there are two deputy-elects from CHP, one from MHP who are still in jail without any indictment. There are five more independent Kurdish deputy-elects in jail from other legal cases. Hatip Dicle, another Kurdish independent deputy-elect was stripped of his rights, and his seat was given to AKP. Therefore, the contradiction is not necessarily between the will of the nation and the bureaucratic structures of the state. It is between us vs. them. Erdogan was one of ‘us’, therefore nation sided with him against state. But these nine deputy-elects are ‘them’, therefore regardless of their situation, nation should not side with them. Hatip Dicle and other deputies might be considered ‘other’ because of their religious views, and ethnic background. Haberal and Balbay of CHP, and Engin Alan of MHP are ‘them’ because they do not share the same political ideas. As I tried to argue, you need to have the same ideas, beliefs, and ideologies with Erdogan to be one of ‘us’.

And finally, I can come to public diplomacy, nation brand, and public diplomacy part. Turkey’s ‘selling point’, so far, has been the bridge between the East and the West. Turkey is versed in the East and in the West. Consequently, Turkey is able to understand both sides and transfer messages. The impacts of this brand has been observed in Turkish diplomatic affairs, foreign military deployments, and public diplomacy attempts. After this swift change of identity, Turkish brand right now is not credible, is not stable, and belongs predominantly to the East. Turkish public diplomacy attempts targeting Western audiences will suffer, as they face the threat of being seen as too ‘foreign’. Eastern audiences might ignore Turkish messages, given the lack of stability and credibility. Even though Erdogan wants to take the role of protector of Islamic nations, he failed to do so in Egypt, Libya, and largely in Syria.

Long story short, in 10 years, Turkish identity and the majority of political terms in Turkey have been re-defined. In 2002, Turkey was a country which stood equally close to the East and the West. Right now, we stand far away both from the East and West.

Here is the abstract:

This article introduces a critical theory-induced approach to the concept of place branding to expose the ethical drawbacks within the field. The author argues that the dominant approaches and definitions of place branding limit the thinking of scholars to market-driven subjects, such as measurement, effectiveness and strategies. It is difficult even to discuss ethical issues at a conceptual level within these approaches. With an attempt to further investigate these widely ignored issues, place branding is redefi ned through a communicative action framework, and a two-step model of place branding is devised – composed of domestic communicative action (Step 1) and international communicative action (Step 2). Step 1 highlights (i) legitimacy and (ii) inclusion as ethical concerns, whereas Step 2 brings in the question of (iii) consistency between the messages in the domestic and international arena. Critical theory makes it possible to take an analytical look at the mainstream approaches and present ethical issues at the conceptual level. Future studies should aim to integrate this theoretical approach to the practice of place branding.

I will share the link to the publication as soon as it becomes available online.

Here is the article: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pb/journal/v7/n3/abs/pb201115a.html

Another AKP Victory: the End of Turkish PD?

After reading Ibrahim Kalin’s article on Al-Jazeera English, I realized I should write something once again Turkish PD, soft power, and Turkish identity. To be as ‘objective’ as possible, let me reiterate my political position. Kalin is an advisor to the Prime Minister, is very close to the inner circles of AKP. I, on the other hand, personally label myself as a liberal democrat and belong to a “radical secularism and pro-establishment stance” camp in Kalin’s parlance.

Radical Secularism’s gonna getcha! (Image from http://cartoonscaricatuer.blogspot.com/)

Kalin says that “AKP came to power at the end of 2002 and has since then implemented numerous political and judicial reforms, boosted the Turkish economy, and expanded foreign policy.” The economy is boosted with short-sighted reforms and is transformed into a ‘cash’ economy. The expanded foreign policy moved Turkey away from the Western world. The political and judicial reforms caused question marks about the objectivity, fairness, and even capabilities of several organizations. In other words, pretty much like every move in the social world, there is an opportunity cost to every administrative change. So far, the burden of all these opportunity costs have been on pro-secular, urban, educated population (also known as the middle/upper middle classes). I am not arguing what they do was completely wrong. I simply say that they way the reforms are presented do not, in any way, reflect the reality.

AKP still wants to change the constitution as it is “[..]an outdated constitution and cannot meet the demands of Turkey in the 21st century.” (Before I say anything, Americans – come on, a constitution over 200 years old? Really? And no changes since 1992? Will you drive a 92 model car? Time for a new constitution…). There are several ‘shortcomings’ of the Turkish constitution. I am pretty sure you won’t find more than a dozen people defending the current constitution. Yet, as we have witnessed two years ago, AKP sees constitution as inherently a party-politics based document and instead of drafting articles to meet the needs of Turkey, accuses everyone in the opposition of being pro-establishment and/or radical secular. Constitution is the supreme law, is a contract between the state and the citizens. I do not believe a PM who doesn’t know anything about gender equality and believes that men and women cannot be equal, who thinks it is okay to tell people how many kids they should have, who sees it within his powers to tell people to quit smoking by taking their packs can do this job. I’m sure that Erdogan believes he can, as he once summarized the powers of his office to an elementary school student by claiming that as the prime minister (for a day), she can hang and she can cut, because she has the authority.

Lastly, Kalin talks about “the polarisation of Turkish society over key political issues”. Turkey is not polarized over key political issues. Thanks to Erdogan’s rhetoric, we are polarized over anything and everything! As a rhetoric scholar identified Erdogan’s doctrine in a blog post, you have to choose your side! You either support AKP and its policies, or you are evil.

So, how are all these domestic issues related to soft power, public diplomacy, and identity? There are three main problems:

1) We forgot what democracy is. Under AKP governments, democracy is deduced to voting – actually to voting for AKP. If you vote for AKP, you are a good democrat. If you vote for someone else, you are a bad democrat, and should be grateful that AKP is a forgiving institution, they will tolerate you. Kalin said “Turkish voters have renewed their confidence in Prime Minister Erdogan and his rule in the country” and ignored all the demonstrations and protests against him. Because at the end of the day, voting is the sole tool to voice your opinions in AKP-land democracy. Unfortunately, the current generation will grow up without learning what democracy is – just as we grew up without understanding what being politically active means.
2) Opposition is a sin in Turkey. Kalin used a great sentence to summarize AKP-esqu thinking: ‘despite the opposition of the army and the opposition parties CHP and MHP’…. Despite the opposition of the opposition parties. I just assumed by definition opposition parties are there to oppose, but opposition is never welcomed. The most recent instance was the death of Metin Lokumcu, a retired teacher who lost his life during an anti-Erdogan protest due to the excessive use of tear-gas. PM Erdogan explicitly and implicitly told us not to feel bad about Metin, and to think about a police officer who got injured.

A retired teacher Metin Lokumcu who protested Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, chairperson of AKP after his meeting in Hopa in Artvin lost his life.

3) What is Turkey? What is a Turk? This is definitely not an ethnicity question. What I’m trying to say is we are losing the image of a modern democratic Turkey and Turkish citizen. Turkey is happy with the image as “an island of stability” in the Middle East. Our PM thinks it is okay to say ‘Is she a woman or a girl, I cannot tell’ about a protester. Public demonstrations, or call to public gatherings for the opposition parties, are officially ridiculed.

Is this a real mustache or not? I cannot tell…

Long story short, AKP and Erdogan’s Turkey is a ‘not-so-Middle Eastern’ Middle Eastern country, and Turkish citizen is a prayer/worker/voter male or a prayer/mother/voter female. Indeed this image might be beneficial for PD project towards the Middle Eastern countries in short term. But in the long term, the political oppression and move towards the Middle East are likely to backfire, and utterly destroy Turkey’s image as a modern democracy, and Turkish people as ambassadors showing the compatibility of Eastern and Western values.

PS: I hope I don’t get sued for this post (or for my comment about Erdogan’s mustache)

This post is published also on Place Management and Branding blog.

This summer, we are hosting two events, one in New York (June 11th) and another in Washington, DC (June 15th) to discuss the past, present, and future of Turkish coffee. So, if you are in town – stop by one of our events, grab a cup of coffee and join the conversation! Looking forward to seeing you all!

New York, Schedule, June 11th

Address: Turkish House, 821 United Nations 8th floor New York City, NY 10017
RSVP Link: http://turkishcoffeeculturenewyork.eventbrite.com
7:00 PM Event start time
7:15 PM Opening remarks
7:30 PM Ercüment Ackman, Capstone Advisor, Georgetown University Real Estate Graduate School – ‘Once Upon a time Turkish Coffee’
7:45 PM Göknur Akçadağ, History Expert Assistant Professor – ‘The American Perspective: Turks in the 19th – 20th centuries’
8:00 PM Gizem Salcigil White and Efe Sevin, Founders of Turkayfe.org – ‘Digitalizing Coffee Houses – Social Diplomacy Web 2.0 and Turkey’s International Digital Coffee House’
8:30 – 9:30 PM Reception

Washington, DC Schedule, June 15th

Address: Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, 2525 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington D.C., 20008-2826
RSVP Link: http://turkishcoffeeculturewashingtondc.eventbrite.com
7:00 PM Event start time
7:15 PM Opening remarks
7:30 PM Ercüment Ackman, Capstone Advisor, Georgetown University Real Estate Graduate School – ‘Once Upon a time Turkish Coffee’
7:45 PM Göknur Akçadağ, History Expert Assistant Professor – ‘The American Perspective: Turks in the 19th – 20th centuries’
8:00 PM Gizem Salcigil White and Efe Sevin, Founders of Turkayfe.org – ‘Digitalizing Coffee Houses – Social Diplomacy Web 2.0 and Turkey’s International Digital Coffee House’
8:30 – 9:30 PM Reception

The subject is not solely ‘branding’. However, my focus will be on branding. I will try to assess whether the recent changes in international relations are, well, changes or not. Did all these discussions on place branding, public diplomacy, soft power, etc. change the way we conceptualize international relations? Or is social media practically the communication version of an ICBM?

Long story short,
- Interesting place branding posts: Place Management & Branding blog
- Public diplomacy, politics, Turkey related posts: Reaching the Public
- Technical / methods-oriented posts: Again, Reaching the Public