Let me put the impacts of upcoming elections aside, move away from “which party is right in their claims” discussions, and focus solely on IDF’s most recent communication activities. #pillarofdefense shows three divergence from the ongoing Israeli communication attempts: message, timing, and audience.

For years, communication surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been shaped by a ‘victimization’ narrative. Israel showed itself as the victim of terrorist attacks, whereas Palestine showed itself as suffering from Israeli domination and aggression in the region (including Israelis taking Palestinian lands). The most recent exchange between IDF and Alqassam Brigades moves beyond this victimization narrative and demonstrates elements of violence in an awesome coat of threat. What we miss while reading the “tweets” is the fact that both parties are calling for a killing spree in the region in the upcoming days! (And as we can see from Alqassam Brigades’ statistics, hundreds of people are really happy about it!). Dear Twitter users – I mean all of them, let it be the IDF officials, Alqassam Brigades, or individuals who want to support one party or the other -, please be aware of what you are tweeting or retweeting! 

Moreover, Israeli messages showed a revenge-oriented mindset. As shown in the initial tweet and the Wild Wild West-influenced poster, the Israeli operation was not being carried out for “protecting” Israelis from future attacks. There was a need for revenge.

Secondly, this communication “assault” was the first one to take place simultaneously with the military operation. IDF uploaded videos, pictures, and shared other critical information with the world wide web as the military operations were going on. Mavi Marmara crisis, for instance, followed a reactive communication understanding, where IDF shared information after the incident was over. In other words, IDF is not aiming to change the agenda, correct an action, apologize, or present its side of the story – IDF is creating the story!

Lastly, the choice of digital communication platforms (IDF Spokesperson’s Twitter account and the IDF Blog) might signal to an appeal to a younger and educated crowd – yet the tone in Israeli messages is too strong to influence educated people’s opinions. It is very unlikely for these messages to change the opinion of an anti-Israeli or an undecided individual. Even “worse” in terms of communication outcomes, pro-Israeli individuals might be disturbed by the elements of revenge and violence (as well as the militaristic tone) in these messages. I would argue these messages were crafted for mainly domestic Israeli consumption.

The title of this blog post is “How not to conduct digital diplomacy”. Just because digital diplomacy understanding is based on real-time communication tools, it does not mean you should write the first thing that comes to your mind. Just because it is digital, it does not mean it has no real life implications. Do we need more cyber bullies? While threatening to kill people or giving military ranks to the visitors of your blog, do not forget states conduct diplomacy to engage in negotiations, and peacefully resolve their conflict. 

This article is cross-posted from e-IR Journal. The original article can be accessed here.

These developments both in domestic and foreign policy spheres have fundamentally altered the Turkish identity. Yet, this new identity was not necessarily welcomed by each and every actor. Domestically, the new Turkish identity was seen as a threat to the secular-democratic regime. Foreign policy changes were conceived as an attempt to establish dominance in the region and to use potential partnerships with Arab/Muslim countries as an alternative to long-standing alliances with the Western countries. These unwelcoming reactions jeopardized both Turkey’s attempt to become a powerful actor in the region and its long-lasting role as a bridge between the East and the West. Turkey needs to rely on its public diplomacy and branding strategies now more than ever to ease ongoing foreign tensions and solve its conflicts with domestic stakeholders.

In this short article, I analyze Turkey’s current public diplomacy and branding practices. I argue that the current public diplomacy practices do not have the necessary structural and strategic understanding needed to improve Turkey’s reputation in the international sphere. Limited episodes of public diplomacy successes are either circumstantial or are caused by Erdoğan’s rhetoric, which is often driven by anger (Steinvorth, 2009). The former is not reliable in the long run while the latter usually is lauded in specific regions at the expense of alienating and angering other audiences. The new Turkish brand identity is influenced by the actions, speeches, and beliefs of Erdoğan and high-level AKP figures that seem to portray a big brother role for Turkey in the Islamic world. In order to better communicate with the rest of the world regardless of their religious affiliations and establish a stable brand identity, Turkey should focus on institutionalizing its public diplomacy attempts and should soften its anger-driven rhetorical style in controversial issues.

Public Diplomacy in Turkey

Public diplomacy, simply defined, is a “communication instrument used in governance” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). Therefore, in an attempt to assess the success of a given country’s public diplomacy strategies, one must connect public diplomacy practices to the overarching foreign policy goals. For the purposes of this research, I will rely predominantly on Nicholas Cull’s (2008) taxonomy of public diplomacy projects which takes “listening” as the basis of public diplomacy practice. I argue that this basis shows the difference between the traditional and contemporary understandings of diplomacy and foreign affairs. Diplomacy is no longer exclusive to interstate relations dominated by a professionally trained diplomatic corps. Public diplomacy sees various entities such as corporations, civil society, and even individuals as important actors in international affairs. Therefore, public diplomats should be aware of the desires and needs of all these various actors by “collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions” through listening(Cull, 2008, p.32).Cull then lists advocacy, exchange, cultural diplomacy, and international broadcasting as main methods of conducting public diplomacy. I also propose a minor addition of “high profile speeches/actions” to capture the rhetoric employed by Turkey. Led by a charismatic and regionally popular Erdoğan, it is not possible to capture Turkey’s soft power capacity without taking the Prime Minister’s speeches and actions into consideration. I will explain Turkish public diplomacy project within the “zero-problem with neighbors” foreign policy goals.

Turkey is a late-adopter of public diplomacy institutions. Despite long-running activities of public diplomacy nature by various state and non-state actors such as the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency and Turkish Red Crescent, a public diplomacy agency did not exist in Turkey until a few years ago. The Office of Public Diplomacy(Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü – OPD) was established in 2010 under the Prime Minister’s Office with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The objectives of this office is to: (i) ensure better coordination and cooperation between various public diplomacy actors in the country; (ii) improve Turkey’s reputation; and (iii) increase Turkey’s visibility and activity in international public opinion as they are listed on the OPD’s website.

Since its establishment, the OPD has launched various programs to connect with domestic and foreign audiences, and established online presence in Turkish, English, and Arabic. It is too early to argue for the effectiveness of these projects as certain public diplomacy projects tend to yield results only in the long term (Gregory, 2008). Yet OPD’s conceptualization of projects, and its lack of direct organizational contacts with the government press and broadcasting agencies, and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (thus diplomats and Turkish embassies and consulates across the world) make it difficult to stay optimistic about the effectiveness of these projects.

It is true that Turkey’s history, culture, and geography might seem attractive to certain audiences and thus constitute a great soft power capacity (Kalin, 2011). However if Turkey fails to effectively wield (Nye, 2011) its power or generate additional power through communication and relationship building (Zaharna, 2007), this soft power capacity will remain unused. The online presence seems to be limited to sharing information on various social media platforms. OPD publishes Twitter feeds in Turkish, English, and Arabic that reach out to around 16,000 followers (around 13,000 of which follow the Turkish feed). OPD Twitter accounts only follow other Turkish government and embassy feeds, and do not interact with any individuals or organizations except for rare occasions of retweeting other institutions’ posts. OPD also manages a Facebook page solely in Turkish with less than 1000 members. Similarly, offline information activities also ignore the role of listening and focus on sharing information with foreign press, and target audiences through projects such as Journalist Committee Program (Gazeteci Heyetleri Programı) and Informing Foreign Press Program (Yabancı Basını Bilgilendirme Programı). The former program invites journalists to Turkey for short-term visits. The latter invites representatives of foreign press representatives located in Turkey for monthly meetings. Both programs aim to make sure foreign press gets its information about Turkish politics and recent developments through Turkish resources – such as bureaucrats and politicians. In other words, these programs are geared towards sharing Turkish perspective on world events with the foreign media. OPD’s current bureaucratic position under the Prime Minister’s office limits its listening abilities due to the lack of direct access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resources such as Foreign Service Officers, embassies, and consulates. In other words, OPD seems to be more interested in broadcasting information than in listening.

Another important function of public diplomacy is advocacy – promoting certain ideas, policies, and interests to foreign publics (Cull, 2008, p. 32). Unfortunately, it is not possible to find any correlations between the main foreign policy issues as described by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and OPD’s projects. Addressing these policy issues such as Turkey’s position and policies on the Cypriot conflict, Armenian Genocide, and European Union membership, could help the country to realize its objectives.

International exchange programs – let it be at an academic or professional level – are not new to Turkey. However, these programs have been led by universities, several government agencies, and non-governmental agencies, without a long-term strategy or an overarching foreign policy objective. The high level conferences organized by OPD – the modestly and political correctly named Wise Men Conference Series (Akil Adamlar Konferansları) – do not go beyond bringing scholars to Turkish universities for speeches. These programs are unlikely to create long-term relations or communication bridges between Turkey and foreign audiences.

Turkey has also been active in cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting projects. More often than not, the cultural diplomacy projects have been carried out through various agencies, including expatriate Turkish populations, sporadically – again without a long-term strategy or an overarching foreign policy goal. Turkey’s international broadcasting is led by two state-owned broadcasting agencies – TRT (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu – Turkish Radio and Television Agency) and Anatolian Agency (Anadolu Ajansı) which are not directly linked to the OPD or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If Turkey wants to use public diplomacy properly as a device in the diplomacy toolkit, it is of uttermost importance to coordinate these programs and to strategize them based on the country’s foreign policy goals and objectives. Without structural guidance, any success in these activities will be circumstantial – as it was in the case of Turkey’s popularity in certain Arab countries through the soap opera Noor.

Despite the lack of any substantive soft power wielding/yielding activities, how is it possible to explain the rising popularity of Turkey – especially in the Middle East? The answer lies in Erdoğan’s behaviors and speeches which are closely followed and widely appreciated by certain foreign audiences predominantly in Muslim countries. As the 2011 PEW Global Attitudes survey shows, various publics in the region express high levels of confidence in Endogen (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011). After his heated debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos, he was greeted with “Hero of Davos” signs in Turkey, and people across the Arab world carried his pictures and Turkish flags in street demonstrations to show their support (Steinvorth, 2009).  Despite his initial hesitation, he publicly voiced his support to the protestors in the Arab Spring countries, earning him and his country more credibility and popularity (Diab, 2011). He made a high-profile visit to Somalia – a predominantly Muslim country – and tried to share the needs of this country that has been struck by drought and famine in the international sphere (Erdogan, 2011). He sanctioned a visit to Myanmar to help the Muslim minority in the country (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012). Erdoğan, with his rhetoric and actions, portrays the picture of a brother that is ready to answer the distress calls coming from Muslims all over the world.

Overall, the OPD’s vision and mission are in line with the “zero-problems with neighbors policy” understanding formulated by the current Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Under the guidance of Davutoğlu, Turkey started relations with African and Eastern/South Eastern nations, and strengthened its relations with the Middle Eastern countries.Unfortunately, this idealist policy has had its own share of failures. During the last five years, Turkey had issues with France, Canada,and Argentina over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide (Schleifer, 2011). Turkey is experiencing problems with various countries in the region as well, including tensions with Iraq over continuous border-crossings of Turkish troops, with Syria over Turkish rhetoric towards al-Assad, with the European Union over membership negotiations, and with Israel over several topics following the Mavi Marmara incident (Keating, 2011). Turkey’s stern rhetorical stance in the international arena – such as calling the EU negotiation process as unfair to Turkey, naming EU as a Christian club, arguing that “Western cultures are immoral” and accusing Israeli President Peres of murder – raises Turkish credibility and reputation in one part of the world at the expense of other parts. In brief, even though the failing “zero-problem foreign policy” could theoretically be saved by public diplomacy, high profile speeches/actions seem to exacerbate relations with majority of the world at the expense of raising profiles in parts of the Islamic world while the rest of public diplomacy activities remain largely uncoordinated.

Turkey’s Identity Crisis

What is the impact of this limited public diplomacy attempt on Turkish brand image? Erdoğan’s popularity in the Arab world creates certain problems with Western target audiences, as well as certain demographics inside the country. Turkish brand is embodied in the Erdoğan’s persona.

In earlier works, I argued for the importance of three concepts in branding: legitimacy, inclusion, and consistency (Sevin, 2011). A brand identity should be created in a communicative manner. Argumentation should be seen as an internal part of the process and should be valued as such (Hayden & Sevin, 2012). All parties and actors should be included in the process. Lastly, there should be consistency across the messages crafted for domestic and international consumption.

AKP has won three consecutive elections in Turkey, and with each victory Erdoğan has increased its power (Dombey, 2012). During the last decade, Erdoğan managed to reduce the influence of military in the political sphere, and restructured the judiciary branch and increased the influence of executive branch in judiciary appointments. Moreover with various questionable court cases aimed at the military, journalists, and Kurdish intellectuals, the opposition in Turkey has been weakened. Leaving the questions of democratic ideals aside, this new structure of Turkish public sphere makes it difficult to create a widely accepted and sustainable brand identity. Controversy and argumentation are important parts of creating place brand identities (Hayden & Sevin, 2012), however it is difficult to argue these processes can work properly within the current social and political configuration. Without social inclusion, political figures cannot argue for legitimacy in creating brand identities.

Consistency remains another important obstacle for the Turkish brand. AKP government is claiming to take Turkey to a democratic future, and this claim has seen acceptance both in the policy world and academia. However, the inconsistency between domestic and international messages/actions creates question marks about AKP’s capability to take the country to a more democratic future. Despite AKP’s promotion of democracy, tolerance, and individual liberties abroad,it is quite easy to find domestic actions on contrary to their international rhetoric – such as having highest number of journalists in prison, and prosecuting various high-profile opposition leaders and intellectuals based on questionable evidence.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Turkey’s newly found popularity in the Islamic world comes at a price. The country has alienated its educated intellectuals and caused its long-time non-Muslim allies to reconsider their relations. With the demise of the “zero-problem foreign policy” understanding, Turkey is in dire need of public diplomacy to promote its identity and to ease tensions with neighboring countries. In the age of (so-called) Twitter revolutions (Zuckerman, 2011) and real-time diplomacy (Seib, 2012), Turkey needs to understand and appreciate the impact of publics and public opinion in international affairs and the role of communication technologies in reaching out to target audiences. Turkey needs to learn how to listen to, as well as talk with, these publics. Without such an approach, it is difficult to argue that public diplomacy will be an effective governance tool.

Logistically, OPD is not designed to meet these challenges. As an office under the Prime Minister, OPD does not have access to the necessary logistical resources in order to create, coordinate, and execute large-scale projects. OPD needs to establish itself either as an independent institution or as an organic part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Erdoğan needs to loosen his tight grip on the office.

Strategically, public diplomacy needs to become more integrated to the foreign policy mechanisms. As the former US Undersecretary for Public Affairs and Public Affairs James Glassman famously said, public diplomacy is not a popularity contest – it is a foreign policy instrument(Glassman, 2008). Without these strategic connections, it would be naïve to expect any meaningful outcomes from public diplomacy projects.

Structurally, Turkey needs to understand the importance of relations. More and more scholars are leaving the concept of soft power behind, and stress the importance of engagement through concepts such as social power (van Ham, 2010) and soft power differential (Zaharna, 2007). The country has to start building its public diplomacy on listening and engaging with foreign audiences in order to establish itself as a credible and powerful player in the region.

Rhetorically, Turkey needs to continue embracing the entire world. As a secular country with a Muslim population, Turkey has always enjoyed good relations with the Muslim countries and secular democracies. However, recent changes in the domestic politics and international arena kept pushing Turkey to over emphasize its Muslim identity – at the expense of its domestic stakeholders and Western allies.

Public diplomacy will prove to be a viable foreign policy instrument for Turkey in the upcoming years. The country claims to have the potential to become a regional power. In order to realize this potential, Turkey needs to discuss and reshape its brand identity through an inclusive process, and should move beyond a one-way communication understanding of public diplomacy. The keys to success in Turkish public diplomacy are to learn more about its target audiences through listening and to build relationships through advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange programs, and broadcasting.

This article is cross-posted from e-IR Journal. The original article can be accessed here.

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References

Copeland, D. (2009). Transformational public diplomacy: Rethinking advocacy for the globalisation age. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy,5(2), 97–102. doi:10.1057/pb.2009.4

Cull, N. J. (2008). Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 31–54. doi:10.1177/0002716207311952

Diab, K. (2011, September 22). Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Arab hero? the Guardian. Retrieved September 24, 2012, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/22/recep-tayyip-erdogan-arab-hero-turkey

Dombey, D. (2012, June 25). Rising power, growing questions. Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a99257ea-ab0c-11e1-b675-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27Q2ng464

Erdogan, R. T. (2011, October 10). The Tears of Somalia. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/10/the_tears_of_somalia

Glassman, J. K. (2008, December 1). Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to global engagement. Speech presented at the New America Foundation, Washington, DC.

Gregory, B. (2008). Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,616(1), 274–290. doi:10.1177/0002716207311723

Hayden, C., & Sevin, E. (2012). The politics of meaning and the city brand: The controversy over the branding of Ankara. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 8(2), 133–146. doi:10.1057/pb.2012.8

Hurriyet Daily News. (2012, August 7). POLITICS – Turkish FM to visit Myanmar to raise awareness. Retrieved September 24, 2012, from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-fm-to-visit-myanmar-to-raise-awareness.aspx?pageID=238&nID=27234&NewsCatID=338

Kalin, I. (2011). Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. Perceptions, 16(3), 5–23.

Keating, J. (2011, December 22). Turkey: The land of “zero problems” has an awful lot of problems. Foreign Policy Blogs. Retrieved from http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/22/turkey_the_land_of_zero_problems_has_an_awful_lot_of_problems

Nye, J. (2011). The future of power (1st ed.). New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

Pew Global Attitudes Project. (2011). On Eve of Elections, a More Upbeat Mood in Turkey. Pew Resarch Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/06/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-more-upbeat-mood-in-turkey/

Schleifer, Y. (2011, December 22). Turkey: Fallout from French-Turkish Spat Over Genocide Bill Could be Widespread. EurasiaNet. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64754

Seib, P. (2012). Real-time diplomacy politics and power in the social media era. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137010902

Sevin, E. (2011). Thinking about place branding: Ethics of concept. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 7, 155–164. doi:10.1057/pb.2011.15

Steinvorth, D. (2009, January 30). Erdogan’s Feeling for Rage. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-turkey-israel-clash-at-davos-erdogan-s-feeling-for-rage-a-604650.html

van Ham, P. (2010). Social power in international politics. New York, NY: Routledge.

Zaharna, R. S. (2007). The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2(3), 213–228. doi:10.1163/187119007X240505

Zuckerman, E. (2011, January 14). The First Twitter Revolution? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/14/the_first_twitter_revolution

Your place has six ounces of brand.

Recently, I was introduced to the Country Brand Ranking created by Bloom Consulting. Unlike the other commercial products, CBR focuses on facts and figures through international agencies, and look at the branding messages to rank countries.

CBR ranks countries based on trade and tourism only through a two-step research design. In the first step, Bloom-Consulting looks at the economic and tourism impact. In the second step, they look at the the promotion attempts of countries. The end result is a ranking, and categories of brands. You can access the Tourism report here, and Trade report here.

Overall, CBR introduces a new fresh outlook on measurement in nation/place branding. Their ranking is quite sophisticated, and the categorization of brands brings a quite necessary outlook on nation brands. Nations/places are quite different from each other – conceptualizing them as the same product/service, or as locations that produce the same/comparable product/service.

My only criticism towards CBR is the underdeveloped the link between performance/impact and brand messages. I cannot whether CBR ranks ‘brands’ or ranks solely ‘performances’ and carries out a parallel branding research. I am definitely looking forward to reading more about CBR and to seeing more rankings annually.

Short term visitors from Egypt (Picture from @BasbakanlikKDK)

1 – Public diplomacy is not a ‘domestic issue’: The current government’s foreign policy initiatives tend to be derived from domestic policy arguments. In other words, AKP sees foreign policy as an arena to fight its domestic ideological battles. So far, public diplomacy projects and initiatives seem to follow a similar line. Most of the products and updates are in Turkish, showing Turkish citizens how the governments before AKP failed to fulfill certain governmental responsibilities. Turkey should formulate public diplomacy goals and objectives on contemporary needs of the society (as well as in line with foreign policy objectives) Also, it won’t hurt to produce documents in foreign languages.

2 – Public diplomacy is not a ‘government agenda item’: Currently, the Office of Public Diplomacy is under the Prime Minister’s office in Turkey. Actually as the current coordinator, Ibrahim Kalin, mentioned, public diplomacy has to be a continuous attempt. Yet, its continuity should not be based on an assumption that AKP will keep getting re-elected. It should be a non-partisan policy area. Turkey should break the link between the Prime Minister’s office and the Public Diplomacy Coordinator’s office.

3 – Public diplomacy is not about ‘information sharing’: Actually, social scientists figured this point out as early as 1960s. Communication cannot change the attitudes of target audiences if they already have a strong opinion about a given issue. Assuming/expecting that people will be pro-Turkey when they learn more about Turkey is practically being naive. Turkey should focus on relationship building, and institutional partnerships.

4 – People won’t love us just because we are this awesome nation: Public diplomacy is not about showing off how great Turkey is. Every other nation in this world believes they are great. Public diplomacy should be about finding commonalities between nations, not on bragging. Turkey should find out what values, policies, and capabilities can make Turkey more ‘attractive’ for foreign target audiences.

- From 7 to 51(-ish): In 1956, the first Eurovision contest welcomed participation from only seven countries. It was not until 1975, the contest reached a new level of awesomeness (yes, that’s the year Turkey first participated). Throughout the years, 51 countries showed up at least once. If I am not mistaken, most recent new comer was Azerbaijan in 2008. In other words, Eurovision has been with us for more than half a century, and still more and more countries want to be a part of it. It is indeed a sign of being a part of a larger Europe.

- From high-tech experiment to not-so-high tech experiment: Eurovision was created to bring the war-torn Europe together. This part, we all know. What we sometimes miss is the fact that Eurovision was also a technological experiment! (Another reason why Eurovision is still controlled by European Broadcasting Union). Currently, it is not a great challenge to broadcast/webcast a live event, yet 1956 was quite different. Eurovision shows that Europe can tackle down technological challenges.

- From “native” languages to “English”: Eurovision also changed its format, participants, and expectations from songs. Earlier entries were performing with orchestras, whereas we are moving towards a more ‘pop’ or ‘pop-rock’ performances. With the introduction of “tele-voting”, countries started to participate with English songs, thus losing some intercultural aspect of Eurovision… (Wouldn’t it be cool to hear 40 something songs in 40 something languages?)

- From “local” rhythms to Bieber-esque songs: With the strong influence of music industry, songs started to become more pop à la Justin Bieber. Below you can see the winners from 1956 and 2010.

In short
What do you do when an event that symbolizes the history, cultural diversity, and technological achievements is seen as “trashy Euro-pop”?

2012 marked my tenth year anniversary where I practically stopped doing anything else and watched Eurovision, and I know I am not alone. Yet Europe’s external audience does not understand the importance of the event. The FP post goes ahead and says that it is no surprise America is the king of cultural exports given the quality of Eurovision entries.

My recommendation is simple: “Engage”. Engage with your external audiences to explain why Eurovision is important, why millions of people keep watching it. Hear their concerns (and probably even update your contest accordingly).

If Eurovision is going to a branding opportunity, if Europe is going to communicate its brand identity through the contest, it is probably not a bad idea to follow the basic rules of communication and stop solely broadcasting messages.

I want to expand on the Turkish experience and my concerns about the “ethics” (as well as viability) of Turkey’s brand in this post.

Erdogan with his party’s youth branch (From HDN)

In  my article, I basically argued that:

- Ethics in place branding is contextual. The framework I propose is for “thinking about place branding”. Be aware of the social context you operate in.

- Place branding is political. Power and legitimacy are important concerns. It is not a construction or a promotion project! Place branding is a great demonstration of power!

- Place branding is “social” and “communicative”. Place branding is about norm production, it has the potential to change a place’s identity.

Overall, I say we should be thinking about (i) legitimacy (of the actors to brand/rebrand places), (ii) inclusion (of relevant and interested stakeholders), and (iii) consistency (of norms and values used in domestic and external consumption).

Police Academy, May 19, 2010

Introducing a new tradition for national commemoration days aims to change the context, and create new norms through exerting political power. It does mark a point where Turkey is trying to come up with a new brand identity. However, I have serious concerns about the “ethics” of this practice (and its efficacy).

In the “old” tradition, these days were celebrated in stadiums with parades. Now, stadium celebrations are only limited to the capital city. Erdogan, PM of Turkey, says that “Now May 19 is a real festival. Older celebrations used to recall those of iron curtain countries. May 19 is now a symbol of change and transformation”. Pro-government media also praised the celebrations as being the first civilian festival. Yet, the controversy did not end there.

Erdogan sees May 19th as a ‘battleground’. He continued hos remarks by saying “No one can dare to give a lesson to us, to the (AKP’s) youth on April 23, May 19 and October 29. To the contrary those who want to understand the spirit of these days should come here and learn from this youth. Turkey no longer belongs to a group of elitists or certain groups,” and “We have been treated as if we were foreigners, second-class citizens for decades. Years have passed but today I am openly saying that we are in rampancy”.

1) Legitimacy: As I tried to argue in my article, place branding is necessary only when there is a disagreement on the place’s brand identity. Creating a place brand identity is a regulative attempt, but should be communicative in its essence. Interested parties should be included in a Habermasian negotiation process. Yet, AKP’s and Erdogan’s attempts are based on a priori political power. I highly doubt such a political power makes AKP a legitimate actor in defining Turkish identity (as I tried to argue here after the 2011 elections).

2) Inclusion: This decision was carried unilaterally. With the growing politicization of media sources in Turkey (or with pretty much all media networks being controlled by pro-government groups), it is not possible to see any criticism of this “new” tradition.

3) Consistency: The message AKP is trying to communicate with this new tradition is the move towards a more civilian, liberal, democratic society where these commemoration days belong to the entire nation, rather than certain segments of the country. But, the change is also carried out as a reaction to former state-elites (most of whom are in prison because of highly questionable court cases). “Sorry about that! But elitists should know that we are in this country and are first-class citizens” says Erdogan, and defends the new tradition saying that “This policy is not for dividing the country or formatting generations. To the contrary we want to provide more freedom, but elitists and despotic intellectuals cannot understand this.”

In short,

- This “civilian” move in Turkey’s brand image is (at best) ethically questionable.

- Given the lack of legitimacy and inclusion, the only way to ensure its continuation is through a priori legal-bureaucratic power.

- The lack of consistency is likely to affect the efficacy of this move, as segments of domestic and external audiences are not sure whether the move is a “civilian” or a “conservative” move.

I stand by my earlier conviction where I said Erdogan and AKP are the biggest obstacles for effective use of Turkish soft power. The inconsistency, the “us vs. them” rhetoric, and the constant revenge seeking behavior (please see Erdogan vs. Turkish theater for another example) are likely to decrease Turkey’s persuasive power towards external audiences, and will keep alienating internal audiences.

Let me back up a little bit. Visual.ly is a new web platform where creative people share their infographics and data visualization projects with the public. Pinterest is a virtual pinboard where users can pin the photos they find on the internet. And as far as I can see, First Choice, a travel agency, bring these two new social media platforms together in their Conflict of Pinterest 2012 project, and launch (what I would like to call) their unintentional public diplomacy campaign.

Users can vote for the most beautiful country either by tweeting about the project or pinning a related photo on Pinterest. Based on popular voting, Conflict of Pinterest shows the most beautiful country in an interactive map. First Choice manages to promote itself, the project, and have auxiliary impact on place brand images.

Practically, Conflict of Pinterest acts as an aggregator for social media data, and encourages people to voice their opinion.

Questions I have in mind for the project (and hopefully questions I might answer when the voting period ends):

1 – What is the impact of visual rhetoric on social media and place branding relations?
2 – What is the impact of cool graphics on user participation? (or should we get cooler graphics if we want to do e-diplomacy?)
3 – What is the impact of internet penetration on the results?
4 – Does anyone vote for a country expect for their home country.

Mobile Turkish Coffee House in front of the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC

Turkayfe.orgstarted out as an idea in May 2009, and the website went live in May 2010. From our very early days, we did our best to learn from our mistakes, and to improve our project. As a doctoral candidate studying public diplomacy, and a dilettante practitioner; I tried to use my practical experience in my academic studies and vice-versa.

During the Mobile Turkish Coffee House project, which started on April 26th, 2012 (and goes until May 19th, 2012), we travel to five states in northeast United States, and serve free Turkish coffee. We also host coffee culture events, which include lectures and presentations, in Washington, DC, New York, and Boston.

Washington, DC Coffee Culture event (Team members in the picture l to r, Gizem, me, Tugcem) Photo by Jackie Chi

Here are a couple of things I learned during our trip in terms of connecting theory and practice of Public Diplomacy:

You need theoretical guidance…even in the last three feet : One question we kept asking ourselves was about where we stood in the larger picture. Why are we doing this project? Why Turkish coffee> Why northeast US? What can we achieve? The answers to most of these question are available in the literature, from consubstantiation to strategic marketing. Unless, projects are based on theoretical studies, mere exposure cannot produce results (like this quite okay video clip)

Projects designed based on research results are effective : Turkayfe.org is an online project. But shortly after we launched our website, we realized that offline communication, face-to-face contact was quite important in generating traffic, encouraging content creation, and more importantly establishing a community. The research we presented at TASSA also showed us that we needed more offline communications. Even though the project is only halfway done, our weekly report showed that our traffic has increased by 10 times…
Theory and practice are two different worlds : While public diplomacy in academia means reading, writing, and discussing, the term has very different applications in the real world. I traveled with the Mobile Turkish Coffee House in DC and New York, distributing coffee for three days and hosting two events. We brewed more than 4000 cups of coffee, hosted more than 250 people in our events, washed around 200 coffee mugs and pots, and had two parking/permit problems.
So, when planning Public Diplomacy campaigns, one should not forget that the field is quite different from the planning room.

And here is a short promo video, our video producer Jackie Chi has put together:

As I have mentioned earlier, I have several doubts about NBI as a robust measurement scale. Below, I’ll try to organize my ideas under three headings:

- What is NBI good for? When should NBI be used?

- Why doesn’t NBI measure ‘nation brands’?

- Why is NBI’s understanding of nation brands incomplete (if not entirely wrong)?

Let me shortly explain what NBI is, for those of you not familiar with the measurement scale. A joint venture of Simon Anholt, and GfK Roper, NBI uses Anholt’s Nation Brand Hexagon, and examines the six dimensions of country images: exports, governance, culture and heritage, people, tourism, and investment and immigration. A survey is conducted annually in 20 countries to rank a total of 50 countries.

When is NBI useful?

A quick disclaimer: I have my own ontological and epistemological issues with NBI. If you want to see an academically robust measurement scales, I recommend you to follow the works of Dr. Sebastian Zenker, and Dr. Andrea Insch. Both scholars present very intriguing methods to evaluate place (most of the time, city) brands.

But at the end of the day, NBI is a very sophisticated product. GfK Roper still presents one of the most inclusive and informative measurement scale available to policy makers right now. So, when can NBI be useful? I, personally, see two areas where these numbers might be invaluable for policy makers:

• Market research: Let’s assume Country A just got very interested in Country B. Maybe Country A wants more tourists, influence some policies, or attract investment. In order to come up with feasible strategies, Country A has to know what Country B thinks about it. NBI can provide several quantified insights about Country B’s perception of Country A.

• Bureaucratic evaluation: Country A has just completed a branding campaign, or a major event took place in Country A. Policy makers want to re-evaluate their current situation. They want to see whether the campaign had any positive impacts or not. NBI, again, can show the change overtime.

Does NBI measure what it sets out to measure?

For the time being, I am going to assume that NBI’s definition of nation brand is flawless, and point out problems about data gathering – rather than research design.

• Sampling problem: Each year citizens from 20 countries are invited for an online survey – while controlling for age, and education level. Now, there are three problems with this sampling method. First of all, these 20 countries do not necessarily represent the world. Besides, if a country is going for a ‘regional brand’ (i.e. a regional political power status, increasing economic activities in a region), the sampling might be completely irrelevant. Secondly, the survey is online, therefore, your participants do not even necessarily represent their respective countries. Lastly, I am not sure about the consistency of these 20 countries across years. I do not know whether the same 20 is included in the sample – if not, a panel study is meaningless (Though I was informed the sampling might change according to client needs).

• Data triangulation: As a doctoral candidate, I am required by the law of nature to say triangulation at least once when I write something longer than 500 words. So here we go. In an era when we are talking about paradox of plenty (about information, not oil), why do we go ahead and collect information solely through an online survey? Individuals are voluntarily giving out information about their perceptions in blogs, on Twitter, and other social media networks. Why don’t we use those platforms to scrap data? Moreover, why don’t we use news pieces or other public resources? Why don’t we use focus groups? In other words, why don’t we get more data resources and triangulate our results? (And of course, by we, I mean GfK Roper).
• Difficult to change: During the last four years, top 10 countries did not change. Similar to Anholt, GfK Ropers representatives mentioned that it is not possible to change a country’s reputation overnight. Yet I believe, the reason for that is the questions asked in the survey about ‘perceptions’. It is not possible to increase a person’s familiarity with a country, its people, and/or products. Yet, within some certain audiences, it might be possible to change what a country stands for. Shortly speaking, overall reputation might not change overnight, but it might be possible to associate the place with new concepts in shorter time frames. These associations are not adequately measured through six quantified dimensions.
• Do you want to have a person from this country as a close friend?: I am sorry but really? This question? What can this measure? Do we have any idea about what a close friend is? Or do we know how people choose close friends? Anyhow, some survey questions seem to be very contingently related to the concepts measured. Moreover, 3 to 6 questions per item are asked. I argue the number of questions is too low to gather sufficient data to make claims.

Does ‘Nation Brand Hexagon‘ have construct validity?

I argue that Nation Brand Hexagon does not adequately define a ‘nation brand’. This complex social phenomenon cannot be described only with six categories. Even if it is described so, these six are based mainly on a neo-liberal economic understanding (or simply, free market competition).

• Is ‘branding’ a competitive concept? The ranking system clearly says yes. All countries have the same comparable brands, and can be ranked accordingly. But what does the ranking mean? USA has the best brand, so, do individuals all want to buy American products? Do we all want to visit the US? Or let’s look at the change from 2008 to 2009. So, does that mean more people wanted to immigrate to US in 2009? Branding is not necessarily a competitive concept. Yes, all countries are going to limited resources (investments, tourists etc), but they are using different rhetorical, political, and economic strategies. Therefore such a quantified, zero-sum approach to branding oversimplifies the nature of competition in the international arena, and underestimates the role of several factors.
• Is a “brand” a number? Of course not! Dr. Zenker has done a fantastic job in looking at current measurement scales (also, see his other publications for his proposed methods). However, NBI practically equates US brand to 68.88 in 2011.

What I learned from this press conference?

1. If the invitation says there is going to be breakfast in the conference, you should not stop by Starbucks first.
2. GfK-Roper service is better than Anholt’s conceptualization. It is a research service that can be customized to suit client needs. You can get results for specific markets, target audiences, age groups etc. But the results that are shared with the public (see the table above) are plain invalid. NBI Top 10 list does not mean anything in terms of place/nation branding.
3. Brand Hexagon is a good visual SWOT analysis for countries. For instance Country C might rank #5 in overall, #1 in five of the six dimensions, and #39 in governance. Country D might rank in mid-2os in everything but tourism – where it ranks higher. Therefore, countries can see their weaknesses and strengths.
4. In short, I right now have a more favorable opinion of NBI – not as a robust branding measurement but as an important and sophisticated policy making support tool.

PS: I cross-posted this entry on Place Management and Branding Blog.

Is he really shaking hands with the kid?

Search trends in Turkey, keyword – Somali

As the Google Trends graph on the left clearly demonstrates, Turkey and Turks have always been interested (!) in Somalia and have wanted to learn more about the country through online resources. Similarly, newspapers have consistently (!) covered the situation in the country. In more serious terms, it is obvious that Somalia became an important issue for Turkish public opinion pretty much after Erdogan decided to start talking about the country and the situation. This visit was expected to “[draw] international attention to the plight of the drought-stricken country and Turkey’s leadership in the humanitarian crisis“. Erdogan and his groupies filled up two planes and landed in Mogadishu for a one-day trip.

Turkish celebrities sold a total of ’0′ albums in Somalia this past decade

When we take the visit at its face value, it does not make any sense. Yes, Somalia is definitely in need of international aid – but what Erdogan did was organizing a publicized high level visit to bring a one-time aid. Given the fact that Erdogan called Somalia a real test for civilization, pledged to re-open the Turkish embassy in the country, got Organization for Islamic Conference on board for more aid, and wanted to improve Turkish image, let’s try to look at this issue from a strategic point of view. This visit creates three different question marks in my minds:

Domestic question marks:

This charity drive is taking place during Ramadan, when people’s religious feelings are at a peak point. It is very difficult to evaluate whether government is taking advantage of this religious environment to get donations. Besides, Deniz Feneri case is still going on – so, charities might not be as trustworthy as they seem to be…

Domestic breaking point:
What about our people?! As I tried to show with the Google Trends graph, we don’t care about Somalia – not even a little bit. We heard about the country in 90s with the UN force, then forgot about it for a couple of years, then remembered with the pirate attacks. Government’s decision to give around $200m to Somalia is very difficult to defend given the fact that there are way too many people in need of such an aid in Turkey.

International question marks:
Now, there are a couple of international issues. Why did Turkey decide to help Somalia? It is not a neighboring country. It is not the only war-torn, poverty-struck country. So, why? Well, two answers come up: religion and oil. These answers give rise to several conspiracy theories: is Turkey trying to become the ‘leader’ of Islamic countries? Or let’s take another step further: is another power (mainly the US) trying to situate Turkey as the leader, is another power trying to access oil resources?

International breaking point:

Turkey, out of the blue, gives lots of money to Somalia – does not address any security issues, does not address any development issues but puts a great show on stage. Can we see Turkey as a credible actor in international arena after this act? I highly doubt that…

Public diplomacy question marks:

Did Erdogan try to gain ‘street cred’ in Islamic countries? After Iran, Libya, Egypt, and Syria; firstly this aid is not enough. Moreover, Somalia was not an important issue in Islamic agenda. Did Erdogan try to lead the West by example? Very unlikely. Several Western countries already have standing aid and development programs and are helping Somalia.

Public diplomacy breaking point

Erdogan’s declared message is ‘Somalia is a test for civilization’ and ‘Turkey will lead aid efforts’. Both statements are false and don’t mean much for the Western or Middle Eastern audiences. Somalia is not the only test for civilization and several countries have been actively helping the country for decades right now. This extravagant visit is not likely to make Turkey a ‘donor’ (and definitely ‘leader’) country in the eyes of the Western audiences. The issue is not ‘hardcore’ enough for the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, even though I accept that an aid is likely to improve Turkey’s image, this improvement will be quite limited.

Long story short, I hope Erdogan and others with him enjoyed their time in Mogadishu, and took lots of pictures. Because this trip will not generate any more influence than a touristic visit in long term. But well, who knows, we might get another term of temporary UNSC seat thanks to our African friends….