COMMUNITY LAW PARTNERSHIP AWARDED SOCIAL WELFARE CONTRACT

On 21st July the Legal Services Commission (LSC) informed us that we had failed to obtain a Social Welfare Law (SWL) contract to start on 14th October 2010. Since SWL is all we do this would have meant the end of the firm. We were refused a contract because we lost one point on one criterion in the tender process – the tribunals criterion.

Our appeal to the LSC was rejected. Therefore, we continued with our judicial review challenge that we had already lodged. The Law Society failed to back our court challenge despite a personal plea to Law Society President, Linda Lee.

On 2nd September the Law Society Gazette reported the initial hearing before Collins J where he stated: “I am bound to say this is a dreadful decision and on the face of it the approach [taken by the LSC] is totally irrational.”

The hearing was adjourned to 8th September. On 6th September the LSC stated that, after a verification process, they were offering us a contract which will allow us to continue with our work. We are delighted with this news. In these circumstances the court action has been settled.

We would like to thank all those who have provided us with letters and messages of support in this process – this support has been vital in enabling us to continue our fight. We would like to pay tribute to the barristers who have assisted us in our challenge: Marc Willers of Garden Court; Zia Nabi of 1 Pump Court; and David Lock of No 5 Chambers.

Above all we would like to thank and pay tribute to the loyal and dedicated CLP staff who have stuck with the partners through this most stressful process. We look forward to continuing to provide an excellent service to the homeless, others in housing need, and those with benefits and debt problems in the West Midlands and to Gypsies and Travellers nationwide for a long time to come.

Chris Johnson, Rosaleen Kilbane and Michael McIlvaney

The claim was for an order for sale of a house (“Alinora”) in which the couple were living. As Lord Justice Ward put it “It cannot be easy for them.” That sale should have caused no difficulty as Alinora was held on an express trust with beneficial interests in common in equal shares. The defendant did not resist the sale in principle, but counter-claimed on the basis that he had a beneficial interest in a home owned by the claimant in Poland. Thus he asked either that an order for sale be made of the Polish property or that the claimant compensate him for his interest in it (claimed as a half share).

No-one seems to have worried that this second property was located in Poland and so no-one considered whether Polish or English law should apply for any determination of the size of the defendant’s share or whether in fact Polish law on fractional co-ownership (which I understand would be the Polish equivalent of beneficial tenancy in common under a trust for land) would operate the same way as the English principles in Stack v Dowden.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the Recorder had failed to make a number of findings of fact. For example, concerning a payment by the defendant of £15,000 for work to be done on the Polish property, said by the claimant to have been a loan, the Recorder said:

“13. … It may have been a loan to him. Whatever the status of this payment in terms of the issues which I have to decide, it seems to be common ground that it was intended to be used, and was in fact used, to facilitate the erection of a roof to the Polish building which it was necessary to complete during the summer months.”

Well, was it a loan or not? If not, what effect did it have on any interest the defendant might have had in the Polish property? Neither of these questions were answered by the Recorder. For this, and similar failures, the Court of Appeal felt that the case should be remitted to a different judge for proper findings to have been made.

The interesting point in the case (apart from the Polish dimension) is that the couples were, for most of their cohabitation, engaged. Strangely no-one seems to have considered that this might be relevant until the case reached the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice Ward pointed out that section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 applied:

“2. Property of engaged couples

(1) Where an agreement to marry is terminated, any rule of law relating to the rights of husbands and wives in relation to property in which either or both has or have a beneficial interest, including any such rule as explained by section 37 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, shall apply, in relation to any property in which either or both of the parties to the agreement had a beneficial interest while the agreement was in force, as it applies in relation to property in which a husband or wife has a beneficial interest.”

Section 37 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 being:

“37. Contributions by spouse in money or money’s worth to the improvement of property

It is hereby declared that where a husband or wife contributes in money or money’s worth to the improvement of real or personal property in which or in the proceeds of sale of which either or both of them has or have a beneficial interest, the husband or wife so contributing shall, if the contribution is of a substantial nature and subject to any agreement between them to the contrary express or implied, be treated as having then acquired by virtue of his or her contribution a share or an enlarged share, as the case may be, in that beneficial interest of such an extent as may have been then agreed or, in default of such agreement, as may seem in all the circumstances just to any court before which the question of the existence or extent of the beneficial interest of the husband or wife arises (whether in proceedings between them or in any other proceedings).”

In other words, where couples have been engaged, there is a statutory basis for enquiring into their respective contributions to the improvement of property, quite apart from any considerations that might arise under a Stack v Dowden analysis.

Whether s.2 would have made any difference in this case I do not know, but I thought it was worth drawing our readers’ attention to the provision. In my experience it is not as widely known as it should be.

Unlike most other civilised legal systems, English law does not have any simple mechanism for requiring the owners of land to contribute to the costs of managing or maintaining other land from which they benefit. There are archaic exceptions, such as the easement of fencing, and various legally imaginative solutions which have never been properly tested and as such are unused, for example by creating freehold covenants from the enlargement of very long leaseholds — as proposed by Professor Edward Burn. Attempts to change this, whether by the Law Commission, or by pressing for an extension of the rule in Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169 that the one who takes the benefit must also take the burden have failed.

English lawyers have instead resorted, as they usually do, to bricolage: co-opting the leasehold estate as a means of imposing financial obligations. We are so used to this situation I suspect we fail to realise quite how ridiculous it is, but I remember the horror expressed by an American colleague that we were using time-limited (and as it happens highly precarious) forms of ownership as a way of managing apartment blocks, simply because we had nothing better to offer.

Thus when well meaning governments created the right for the leaseholder of a house to purchase their freehold, a problem was created for large landlords who had, hitherto, been able to manage large estates using leasehold covenants. With their former leaseholders now freeholders it would be difficult to impose any general obligations on them, or for the landlord to retain any significant rights over the freehold land in order to continue to manage “their” estate.

The solution was section 19 of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967, which allowed the creation of what we have come to know as an “estate management scheme”. Such a scheme could provide for a landlord to be given powers of management and to retain rights against the freehold houses, the owners of which were (or might in the future) exercising their right to buy the freehold. In order to create a scheme one needed a ministerial certificate and the approval of the High Court, which meant that very few were made. I suspect that the introduction of section 19 was motivated with a very small number of large estate owners in mind (I’d be interested in readers’ comments on this point – or what experience they have with such schemes).

Section 19(6) required that such a scheme should make provision for its variation or amendment, or by enabling such variation to be done with the approval of the High Court. The LVT has replaced the High Court in all such schemes as a result of s.75 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (which also introduced new style estate management schemes that are rather easier to create).

Grosvenor Belgravia Estate Management Scheme was just such a scheme, adopted in 1974 for the benefit of the 2nd Duke of Westminster Will Trust. Mr Donath’s complaint was that the trustees had failed to prevent (or remedy) breaches of the scheme by residents, so that some properties were in need of repair and others had been converted into offices (which, one presumes, was contrary to one of the provisions of the scheme).

Mr Donath made an application to the LVT under 19 for the scheme to be varied so as to impose an obligation on the “landlord” to “use their best endeavours to maintain established standards in the area”. This to be done by informing property owners of any breaches of the scheme and using their powers under the scheme to enforce the relevant standards.

The respondent trustees position was that the LVT did not have jurisdiction to do so. Section 19, they said, envisaged a scheme being made entirely for the benefit of the landlord or former landlord and did not contain provisions for imposing obligations on the landlord. The LVT agreed and refused jurisdiction. An alternative argument of the trustees, that only the landlord had standing to bring a claim under section 19, was left open.

I think this must be the right conclusion – s.19 is clearly intended for the primary benefit of the landlord or former landlord. More generally I wonder how many schemes of this type exist and how well they are (or are not) enforced.

It is well known that notices under section 21(4)(a) of the Housing Act 1988 must give notice to a tenant that “after a date specified … being the last day of a period of the tenancy … possession of the dwelling-house is required”. This is an issue that has been before appellate Courts a surprising number of times. Most notably in MacDonald v Fernandez [2003] EWCA Civ 1219.

In Church Commissioners v Meya [2006] EWCA Civ 821, the Court of Appeal made a close reading of section 5 of the Act and held that it should be construed as reading that the periods of a statutory periodic tenancy created by that section “are the same as [the periods] for which rent was last payable under the fixed term tenancy.” In short, then, if I pay the rent under the fixed term quarterly then once the tenancy becomes periodic by way of s5 the periods remain quarterly, irrespective as to how rent was then paid. This leaves open two key questions:

1. What happens if the tenancy becomes periodic by way of contract and section 5 is not involved? and
2. What happens if the rent payment day is changed during the fixed term? Does this alter the start and finish dates of the periods of the tenancy when the tenancy becomes periodic?

The first question will have to await another day because it was the second of these questions that came before DJ Batcup in Staines.

In this case S had let a property to A from 18th August 2007 to 17th August 2008 with a rent of £1,200 payable on the 15th August 2007 and 15th January 2008. A further tenancy was granted for another 12 months from 18th August 2008 to 17th August 2009, rent being payable bi-monthly in advance starting on the 11th August 2008. After August 2008 the tenancy continued on a periodic basis. A notice under section 21(4)(a) was served on 1 April 2010 seeking possession “after 17 June 2010 or, if later, the day on which a complete period of your tenancy expires next after the end of two months from the service of this notice.”

Basically if the periods of the tenancy were as set out in the tenancy agreement then possession should be given whereas if it was accepted by the Court that the start and finish dates of the periods had been changed by the changed payment provision then the notice would have to rely on its saving provision and could not therefore expire until 10 August. Proceedings were issued before 10 August and so this position would be fatal to possession proceedings.

Ultimately DJ Batcup came down on the side of ruling the notice valid and awarded possession.

This case actually raises a serious question as to what a period actually means. Following DJ Batcup’s view there is an indirect correlation between the payment dates and periods. In other words a periodic tenancy can run from period to period without there being a presumption that rent is due at the start of the period for that period. This is hard to credit and certainly runs counter to the usual rule at common law. The reasoning also runs counter to that of the Court of Appeal in Tadema Holdings v Ferguson where it was held that an agreed change in payment dates did change the periods of the tenancy for the purposes of a s13 rent increase notice. However, in Church Commissioners the Court expressly rejected the idea of a “symmetry between the statutory provision and the common law rule” when considering the length of a period.

We understand that this matter has been appealed to a Circuit Judge so there will be a further installment at a later date.

With thanks to James Browne of Lamb Chambers

Anthony Gold Solicitors
Housing & Public Law Caseworker
Based at Walworth Road office, SE17

Anthony Gold is looking for a caseworker to join our housing & public law team. The team is rated in both Chambers & Legal 500. The role involves supporting the team with a varied and interesting caseload. Applicants need excellent legal and interpersonal skills and an interest in social welfare law. An excellent opportunity to gain experience with the possibility of a training contract to follow.

Salary: £21,900 plus benefits.
For an application pack contact Corinne Dearsley, Office Manager,
Anthony Gold Solicitors, The Counting House, 53 Tooley Street,
London Bridge City, London SE1 2QN or
Email: corinne.dearsley@anthonygold.co.uk
Closing date: Friday 24 September 2010

This is a rather confused matter from the Upper Tribunal (Lands) sitting in Manchester. It is made all the more confused by a transcript which muddles parties and at one point suggests the LVT was in error in remitting the matter to itself.

At issue was the payability of a demand for £1,227.47. The questions were variously whether it was a service charge, whether the s.20 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 notification procedure had been complied with, or could be dispensed with, and particularly whether the demand complied with s.47 Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (and, on appeal, also s.48 L&T 1987 and s.21B of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985).

Mr Staunton, the appellant, is the leaseholder of a flat in Barracks Square, Macclesfield, unsurprisingly a former barracks. Kaye and Taylor, the respondents, owned the freehold of the flat and, together with a Mr & Ms Dykstra, the freehold of the former parade ground around which properties were set.

The brief outline of events was:

Beneath the parade ground is a sewer, to which the drains of 28 of the properties are connected, 15 of them via a further length of sewer serving only those 15 properties. The respondents told the LVT that in 2005 and 2006 a company called Genie Developments that owned buildings on the northern side of the square had commissioned surveys from Jet Rod Drainforce and Dyno Rod Drain Services. The surveys showed considerable tree root incursion into the sewers and suggested that rehabilitation was urgent. Genie Developments called several meetings of residents, encouraging the formation of a management company to raise funds and carry out the works that were needed, but they lost interest, and in November 2006 an informal committee called the Barracks Square Renovation Committee was formed by residents. Having obtained estimates from two companies for the remedial works the committee initially decided to accept the higher quotation on the basis that the specification was better. They divided the amount relating to the part of the sewer serving the 15 properties equally between those properties, and the rest they divided equally between the 28 properties. The total attributable to the subject property on this basis was £1,227.47. In the event the contract was let to another company that carried out the work in November 2007 and charged less. The amount attributable to the subject property on this basis was £999.32.

A demand for the sum of £1,222.47 was sent to the appellant on 21 January 2008. It did not state the name of the landlord. It included the note: “Payee details: Barracks Square Renovation Committee”.

Mr S refused to pay as he had seen no problems with the drains and thought the works were to increase the value of another area of the barracks for developers. A claim was brought for £1,222,47 in the County Court in the name ‘Barracks Square Renovation Committee’. Eventually in that claim Kaye and Taylor were substituted as claimants. Mr S defended on grounds that the demand was invalid as a demand for a service charge as it did not give the name and address of the landlord, contra s.47 L&T 1987 and the s.20 L&T 1985 consultation requirements had not been met.

The County Court transferred the case to the LVT for determination of whether the service charge was payable; and if so whether it was reasonable; and whether the s.20 requirements and been met, or if not whether a dispensation under s.20za(1) should be made.

The LVT found that there was no provision in the lease to allow for the creation of a fund by service charge for repairs to the common parts. Although the lease contained a provision for the tenant to contribute to the costs of repairing the sewer, there as no corresponding obligation for the landlord to repair or keep in repair the sewer.

The ‘Barracks Square Committee’, which issued the demand and brought proceedings was not the landlord. Nor were Kaye and Taylor. The landlords were Kaye, Taylor and the Dykstras, jointly. There was no evidence that the costs claimed had been incurred by the landlords.

In the circumstances, there was no need to decide the s.47 issue, nor the s.20 consultation point, although had it been necessary, the LVT would have granted a dispensation and would have found a reasonable charge was £999.32.

Given that the tenant used the drain, there was an equitable obligation to pay. There was also the clear clause in the lease, but this was for the County Court to decide.

Mr S appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) and permission was given on 3 grounds: whether the respondents are the appellant’s landlords; whether the service charge claimed is in respect of a relevant cost; and whether the amount due is made not payable by sections 47 and 48 of the 1987 Act and section 153 of Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.

Held:
It was clear that the respondents were the landlords. They held the freehold title from which Mr S’s lease was demised. The LVT was in error in saying that Kaye, Taylor & the Dykstras were the landlord jointly.

The charge was a service charge:

The lease includes the following tenant’s covenant in clause 2:

“(ix) At all times hereafter to contribute and pay a proportionate part of the expense of maintaining repairing or renewing a) the gutters pipes and other things for conveying rain water from the demised premises b) the gas and water pipes drains conduits and electric wires and other gas water and electric installations in under or upon the upper flat or the reserved property or any part thereof enjoyed or used by the Lessee in common with the Lessor or other the owners and occupiers of the upper flat of the other reserved property …”

Under clause 2(iii) “the reserved property” includes “so much of the Barracks Square as is coloured brown” on the plan annexed to the lease and other land over which there are rights of way. The land coloured brown is the old parade ground.

The landlord’s covenants in clause 3 include the following:

“4) Not to cause or permit obstruction of any drain or pipe used in common with the Lessee for the passage of water or soil in connection with the reserved property.

5) Not to do or permit or suffer to be done in or upon the reserved property anything which may be or become a nuisance annoyance or cause damage or inconvenience to the Lessee or neighbouring owners or occupiers …

9) To pay a proportionate part of the expense of maintaining and repairing so much of the Barracks Square as is shown coloured brown on Plan Number 1 annexed…”

On the s.47. s.48 and s.21(B) point, the Court’s reference to the LVT had not included the s.47 point, however this did not preclude the LVT from considering the point. While on a referred case the LVT could go no wider than the pleaded cases, it was not limited to the expressly referred issues. The LVT had found that the claimants had provided no evidence that section 47 had been complied with. It also found the same in relation to section 48 and found that the relevant summary required by section 21B had not been provided.

However, it was clear that by the time of the LVT hearing, indeed by the County Court hearing, the landlords had provided their names and address. Mr S could be under no doubt that:

the claim was being pursued by the respondents and he had received correspondence from them as landlords. Since, therefore, the information had been furnished, under section 47(2) the amount demanded was no longer to be treated as not due.

LVT’s decision set aside
Dispensation under s.20ZA given for the reasons given as hypothetical by the LVT
Service charge payable by Mr S in respect of the works
Service charge limited to £999.32

Comment
With all due respect, I think this decision illustrates a few difficulties in the transfer of cases between County Court and the LVT/Upper Tribunal. While the LVT and Upper Tribunal focus on the s.47 issue in terms of whether the charge could be said to be due and payable at the time of their hearings – the LVT finding no, but the Upper Tribunal finding that notice of landlord’s name and address had been given by ‘at least the time of the county court hearing’ – this doesn’t deal with the issue facing the County Court, which surely has to be whether the demand was payable at the date the claim was issued. On the apparent evidence, and in view of the claim being issued in the name of the ‘Barrack Square Renovation Committee, this would not appear to be the case.

There was also no apparent evidence that the s.21(B) requirements had been met.

“21B Notice to accompany demands for service charges
(1) A demand for the payment of a service charge must be accompanied by a summary of the rights and obligations of tenants of dwellings in relation to service charges.
(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations prescribing requirements as to the form and content of such summaries of rights and obligations.
(3) A tenant may withhold payment of a service charge which has been demanded from him if subsection (1) is not complied with in relation to the demand.
(4) Where a tenant withholds a service charge under this section, any provisions of the lease relating to non-payment or late payment of service charges do not have effect in relation to the period for which he so withholds it.”

However, it may be that there was evidence that suitable details had been provided.

I’m also not sure that the issue of the landlord is quite so clear cut. While Kaye and Taylor were certainly the landlords of Mr S’s flat, the affected drain was in the freehold held by Kaye, Taylor and the Dykstras. While this area was covered by ‘the area coloured brown’ in the plan to the lease, it is not clear, without more, how the costs of the drainage works were incurred by Kaye & Taylor as landlords of Mr S’s property, given the separation of the freehold interests since the grant of Mr S’s lease. But again, they may have been further evidence on this not referred to in the transcript.

Item 1. The Government is to bring s.318 Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 into force, finally according travellers on authorised sites the same security as those who come under the Mobile Homes Act. Hurrah.

Item 2. Planning circulars regarding construction of authorised travellers sites are being scrapped. Apparently because Councils complained about being forced to build on countryside and undertake compulsory purchase. Actual examples of either are welcome if anyone has come across them – we’d be interested.

Item 3. The regional strategies have already gone.

Item 4. ‘Plans for further powers for councils to combat unauthorised development’. Awaited…

Item 5. ‘New Homes Bonus Scheme’ to be extended to travellers’ sites, so councils get financial benefits for building authorised sites ‘where they are needed’. But what happened to the frozen Gypsy and Traveller site grant budget (or what was left of it)? That form of direct payment to Councils to develop sites has vanished.

Localism – it’s been tried before and didn’t work in this context. I’m not holding my breath for the sudden appearance of much needed authorised sites.

Meanwhile, Birmingham is worried about the Pope and trespassing Travellers. Don’t go near Birmingham without a ‘Pilgrim Pass’ on 19 September, apparently.

There is an argument, although not one vocally espoused by NL, that visiting Birmingham on that or indeed any other date would be penance enough to both qualify one as a pilgrim and to have 5 or 6 venial sins and possibly a mortal one wiped off the slate. But right now all I really want to do is pop Richard Dawkins into a two bed towable and head up the M6…

This is bad news if you are an appellant. The fee for seeking permission to appeal from the Lands Tribunal (i.e. if it was not given by the LVT) goes up from £40 to £200; the fee for lodging the appeal from £50 to £250 and while the hearing fee remains at 2% of the amount determined by the tribunal, the minimum and maximum fees rise from £100-£5,000 to £250-£15,000.

The reason given for this huge rise is that the the tribunals service aims to recover 50% of its costs from fees. That was achieved in 1996 when fees were last set, but the percentage contribution of fees has fallen to only 20%.

Nevertheless the rise amounts to a 400% rise in fees (albeit a smaller rise in applicable thresholds) over a period when inflation amounted to less than 50%. In real terms it is now much more expensive to bring a claim in the LVT than it was back in 1996.

It is really disappointing to see LVT users so badly served by this. Successive governments have created a regime of leasehold law of mind-numbing complexity and given most (but not all) of it to statutory tribunals which are often unable to deal with a dispute in the way a court would — for example because of lack of jurisdiction or case management powers — but expect individuals who may have little or no available cash to make use of the system without even a statutory power to make a proper award of costs (and thus permit a reasonable CFA regime).

RPT appeal fees also go up.

Following our post here on the LSC’s statement in version 2 of its FAQ for the verification exercise on ‘not being able to do the number of matter starts bid for’ and which amounted to “Oops, have you overbid? Come here, you silly, give us a hug and we’ll make it alright by dropping your requirements”, the LSC has been fiddling with its FAQs again.

The answer to Question 3.2 in version 6(!) of the FAQ, released today (1 September) now reads as follows (in bright red):

3.2 I am concerned that I will not be able to deliver all the matter starts that I have been allocated, what should I do?
You will be required to deliver both the volume and breadth of services for which you have successfully tendered and been allocated matter starts in accordance with your bid and ranking (if applicable to your tender). However, as part of the verification process the LSC is giving successful applicants who are concerned that they will not be able to deliver the volume allocated to them an opportunity to review their allocation and request a reduction. Where such requests are received we will consider the implications for the procurement area with a view to reallocating any surplus matter starts to other providers in accordance with the allocation process set out in the IFA (answer updated 1 September 2010).

How to explain this change? Well, the LSC says:

We have today published an updated version of our verification FAQ. We have taken the opportunity to correct an answer where an incorrect earlier version had been uploaded in response to question 3.2.

Hmm. We should note that there was another version of the FAQ in the interim, v.5, in which the same answer to 3.2 was given as in v.2 (No, I have no idea what happened to v.3 or 4. They never appeared for public consumption, but whatever horrible errors v.4 contained, the answer to 3.2 apparently wasn’t considered to be one of them.) So that is two (public) earlier ‘incorrect versions’. We should also note that this is far from being a reversion to the answer given in v.1 (which was in effect “do the matter starts you have been allocated or else”).

I can only assume, being a tad cynical, that this is an attempt to avoid a challenge of the kind hypothesised in my earlier post (or indeed via procurement regs.). The practical effect is the same. The LSC can/will drop your required matter starts if you don’t think you can do them, but now hedged behind a presumption that you will do the matter starts and a request/considered response process on the part of the LSC.

But let us say a chunk of matter starts are ‘returned’ to the LSC in this way, what happens? The LSC say they will have a ‘view to reallocating surplus matter starts to other providers’, but in the next breath, at 3.3, we find:

3.3 Can I ask for my allocation of New Matter starts to be increased?
For the avoidance of doubt, there will be no increase to your awarded allocation of matter starts as a result of this exercise other than where receiving your full allocation was dependent on you recruiting for a post that was vacant at the time of your tender and you have done this.

‘There will be no increase to your awarded allocation of matter starts as a result of this exercise’ would appear to rule out the reallocation of ‘surplus’ starts to those who have already had an award. So, three options:
a) The LSC is quite simply terminally confused about what the hell it is doing
b) The LSC will award ‘surplus’ matter starts to those who already have a contract regardless of 3.3
c) The LSC will offer contracts of ‘surplus’ matter starts to bidders who did not get a contract award in the first place.

Frankly, my money is on a). I suspect b) would still be grist to a public law challenge of one form or another, as previously discussed. But c) is an intriguing proposition…

Anybody reading the Sunday Times will have seen Grant Schapps talking about an allocations Consultation Paper that CLG are preparing.  Apparently, this will propose giving local authorities the power to set up their own allocations policies with their own priorities, allowing local people priority over those nasty foreigners (other than those nice EEA nationals to whom we owe Treaty obligations, although that was on the inside page of the Sunday Times).  It was a joyous reminder of Royston Vasey speak – this is a local town for local people; “Welcome to Royston Vasey – You’ll never leave” (for lovers of the League of Gentlemen).  Now, don’t get me wrong, I’m all for law reform on allocations but anybody who has read the Cullingworth Committee report from 1969 will know that localism may not be all that it is cracked up to be and, anyway, don’t we have other equalities obligations etc now.  By way of preface to that CP, the National Housing Federation have issued their own discussion document (hat tip to AM for this link) which broadly proposes greater flexibility in the allocations process.

My problem with all this chat and very clever people seeking to rethink allocations is that I thought it was unnecessary as the 2009 Code of Guidance and impact statement (on which we have commented previously) made clear.  We already have localism, mobility, flexibility, a form of the big society consultation about allocations, etc etc.  I readily admit to being not that clever so can somebody tell me what’s going on – it really is perplexing.