The argument for free trade is a simple, logical proof. Trade is defined as voluntary exchange. From this it follows that all trades are mutually beneficial (ex ante). In other words, each party in a trade expects to benefit. If this were not so, then the exchange would not occur. Nobody will make a trade that they believe will leave them worse off. One would only make a disadvantageous exchange if it were involuntary—but this violates our definition of trade as voluntary exchange. Evidently, if all trades are undertaken because both parties expect to benefit, then any restriction of trade can only serve to eliminate gains from trade. Unrestricted free trade maximizes prosperity. This follows directly from the logic of voluntary exchange.

Now, if economists contend that tariffs are bad because they eliminate mutually beneficial exchanges and breed inefficiency, then they must also oppose sales taxes. For what is a sales tax but a tariff on trade between individuals? Sales taxes increase the cost of trades, eliminating mutually beneficial exchanges. They discourage specialization and trade, and encourage inefficient self-sufficient production.

Furthermore, this principle applies to all taxes that add to the marginal cost of production and trade. An income tax, for example, increases the marginal cost of producing for trade (a portion of each additional dollar earned is lost as taxes). This discourages production and reduces prosperity. It also encourages inefficient self-sufficient production (they don’t tax the work you do for yourself… yet). The only tax that wouldn’t harm incentives to produce and trade would be a tax of fixed amount unrelated to income or wealth (also known as a head tax). Of course, taking peoples’s money via taxation harms them, but a head tax wouldn’t do the added damage of reducing the incentive to produce and trade. Needless to say, a head tax would never be implemented in practice, as it would effectively end the welfare state.

In conclusion, if economists are to be consistent in their principled support of free trade, they must also oppose sales taxes on exactly the same grounds. If a tariff is a bad way to raise government revenues, then so is a sales tax. By the same principle, they must also oppose any tax related to income or wealth. These taxes harm the incentives to produce and trade. If economists are not willing to accept these conclusions, then they must also weaken their support for free trade.

At the most basic level, all goods are produced locally to some people (at least the producers and their neighbors). Why does the location of production matter at all? A head of lettuce moving in a refrigerated truck is the same as a head of lettuce sitting in the refrigerator of the local store. Transportation doesn’t change the nature of the product. Furthermore, “local” is an arbitrary point on a continuum—is local 100 or 1000 miles? Why not 101 or 1001 miles? Taken to its logical conclusion, localism implies that everyone should be a self-sufficient producer and eschew all trade—it doesn’t get any more local than that. To put it bluntly, localism is a bad idea, based on a non-understanding of the economics of trade. Trades are mutually beneficial (else they would not occur) on all levels: from local to global.

Consider an Alaskan and a Colombian trading salmon and coffee. Despite the great distance separating them, this arrangement is the cheapest way of providing the Alaskan with coffee and the Colombian with salmon. If they were to “buy local” they would have to resort to very costly (wasteful) methods of production (such as greenhouses or cold-water tanks) or forgo the product entirely. Needless to say, they are both much worse off without trade.  The general principle I’ve outlined is that cost, not location, is the key factor. Alaskans can produce salmon at a much lower cost than Colombians, who can produce coffee at a much lower cost than Alaskans. If the savings from using efficient production exceed the transportation costs, then they both gain by trading because they can acquire the other product at a lower cost than if it were produced locally. By specializing and trading, they minimize waste and conserve scarce resources. To forgo mutually beneficial trades because of location is to shoot yourself in the foot.

The economics lesson here is about scarcity. Since resources are scarce, we must economize their use in order to maximize prosperity. By using the lowest cost methods of production, we minimize the amount of resources that are used up in producing goods. This leaves more resources for the production of other goods, increasing our well-being. In other words, the least cost method is the least wasteful method. So rather than worry about where the product comes from, just look at its price. If local goods happen to be cheaper, then they were produced less wastefully. Same for faraway goods. (Keep in mind, however, that this only holds in a free market, as government distorts prices which hides true costs). A lower price means that less resources were used in bringing the product to you (including the resources used up in transportation). This is why so many goods are produced non-locally: the savings from producing in a more efficient location exceed the costs of transportation. We all benefit from these savings by enjoying more goods at lower prices.

Globalization is often smeared as evil, but in truth, it is one of the greatest triumphs of human civilization. Localism is the real evil as it engenders waste, which can only bring poverty. Global free trade is the engine of worldwide prosperity and continues to be one of the most important solutions in the eradication of world poverty.

In his article “The Irrelevance of Responsibility,” Roderick Long presents an Aristotelian Golden Mean justification of the NAP. He argues that a flourishing human life requires striking a balance between the subhuman and the superhuman. Since reason is the essential human trait, a truly human life requires relating to others through persuasion. Dealing with others through force is subhuman; but refusing to use force against aggressors is superhuman. Thus the NAP—using force only in defense—represents a Golden Mean between the extremes of subhuman aggression and superhuman pacifism.

What follows is an excerpt from Long’s article (p. 119, 121-124).

***********

(1) Every person has the right not to be treated as a mere means to the ends of others. …

Man is a naturally political animal; and he who is without a polis by nature (and not through chance) is either base or superhuman. … He who is unable to share (in a political community), or who through self-sufficiency has no need to, is no part of the polis—thus, either a beast or a god.

The Aristotelian virtues, too, can be seen as a mean between the subhuman vice of overvaluing, and the superhuman vice of undervaluing, our vulnerable embodiedness. To err on the side of the beasts is to be excessively concerned with our animal nature, our physical desires and physical security; this is the error of the common people, whom Aristotle regards as all too prone to take pleasure and material advantage as their primary goals, and to neglect the possibility of higher values that may require us to sacrifice comfort or even continued existence. To err on the side of the gods, by contrast, is to treat human beings as disembodied intellects for whom the animal nature is irrelevant; this is the error of philosophers like Socrates who see knowledge and virtue as sufficient for happiness, and dismiss external goods as unnecessary, aiming for a transcendent self-sufficiency that is not an option for embodied beings like us.

For he who flees and fears everything, and endures nothing, becomes a coward; and he who fears nothing whatsoever and approaches everything becomes rash. And likewise he who indulges in every pleasure and holds back from none is undisciplined, while he who flees them all, as boors do, is an insensible sort.

Sober-mindedness and indiscipline are concerned with those pleasures that other animals also share in, which thus appear slavish and bestial. … Indiscipline seems to be justly reviled, since it belongs to us not as humans but as animals. … Those who fall short with regard to pleasures and take less enjoyment than they ought do not often arise; such insensibility is not human.

[Aristotle] used to say that some people are as stingy as if they were going to live forever, while others are as profligate as if they were going to perish the next day.

In short, one set of vices places too much value, and the other too little, on the animal side of human nature. How, then, can it be shown that principle (1) expresses an attitude appropriate to someone who is virtuous in Aristotle’s sense? That is, how can it be shown that (1) is the truly human attitude, that it neither falls short of, nor exceeds, what can properly be demanded of our humanity? Consider what Aristotle says about the political nature of human beings:

Now that man is more of a political animal than the bee and every other gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we say, makes nothing in vain, and among the animals only man has logos [reason, speech]. So while mere voice is an indication of pain or pleasure, and hence is found in other animals (for their nature reaches as far as this: having the perception of pain and pleasure, and indicating these to one another), logos is for revealing the advantageous and the disadvantageous, and so also the right and the wrong. For this is peculiar to man, as opposed to the other animals: to be the sole possessor of the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong, and the others. And a community of these makes a household and a polis.

In other words, Aristotle identifies the distinctively human capacity for reason and speech as the basis of our being naturally political animals, for it enables us to pursue our goals through discussion with one another. Moreover, Aristotle famously regards logos, reason or speech, as the essential trait around which a flourishing human life must be organized. This, it seems, is why Aristotle regards it as an essential component of a truly human life to deal with others politically, i.e., through reason and discourse—i.e., as conversation partners. But such an idea creates a strong presumption against the use of force, and in favor of relying on persuasion as far possible. Aristotle indeed affirms that it is unjust to rule by force rather than persuasion, insisting that statesmen should be as dependent on the consent of their subjects as doctors and pilots are on the consent of their patients and passengers, respectively. I think, however, that Aristotle’s insight points in the direction of a more radical critique of force than he is likely to have recognized. To deal with others by force is to act in a subhuman manner, like a beast of prey; we live a more human life (and therefore, in Aristotelian terms, a better life) to the extent that our relations with other people embody reason and persuasion rather than coercion. Therefore, the need to avoid the bestial type of vice gives the virtuous agent reason to accept an obligation to respect other people as ends in themselves, rather than to treat them as mere means to her own ends. If this high-level human end places a constraint on the pursuit of lower-level, animal ends, so be it.

This, however, gives us only the B-component of principle (1)—the prohibition on using the rights-holder as a mere means. This, by itself, does not entail the C-component—the permissibility of the rights-holder’s (or her agent’s) compelling others to comply with this prohibition. I suggest that what legitimates the C-component is the need to avoid the corresponding godlike type of vice, the pure pacifist position that requires the virtuous agent to cling to cooperation even when the other party abandons cooperation and resorts to aggression. The saintlike commitment to turn the other cheek accords less respect to one’s own material needs than they deserve. Principle (1) can thus be seen a striking an appropriate balance—a Golden Mean—between subhuman aggression and superhuman pacifism.

Consider the following thought experiment: suppose that the minimum wage is raised to $1000/hour. What are the implications? Evidently, most employers can’t pay that much and they’ll go out of business. If that weren’t so, we could all become fantastically wealthy just by decreeing a ridiculously high minimum wage. Now suppose that the minimum wage is lowered to $0.01/hour. Again, employers won’t pay that wage (even though they’d like to) because other firms are bidding for the same workers, and this drives wages up. The reason employers don’t pay the decreed wages is that wages are determined by supply and demand, not government edict. Firms hire workers with the goal of earning profits, while wages are costs. They competitively bid wages up to the point where the wage (cost) equals the benefit or extra profit gained from hiring that worker. So competition for profits practically ensures that workers get paid according to their productivity, according to the value of their labor. (In economics jargon, they get paid their discounted marginal revenue product.)

Now let’s trace out the effects of an increase in the minimum wage on the employers affected (e.g., those hiring unskilled labor). First, the increased labor costs lead some firms to lay off workers and others to shut down, since demand for their goods and hence their prices have not changed. But the downsizing and shutdowns reduce the supply of the goods, increasing their price. This new, higher price justifies the higher wage for those who kept their jobs, since they are now producing a more valuable product. The end result is that some workers lose their jobs, while the rest enjoy the higher wage. Consumers lose because prices are now higher.

Since workers are paid according to their productivity (like all factors of production), all the minimum wage does is to make it illegal to buy or sell labor beneath the price floor. The government is essentially saying: “You must be this productive to legally work in our country.” This is most harmful to the least skilled of workers, the ones we want to help most. They will be the first to be fired, and will be cut off from the chance to gain the work experience and job skills needed to earn a legal wage. Allowing such people to work for lower than minimum wages gives them a chance to work their way to a better life. To deny them the freedom to negotiate their own wages and to leave them legally prohibited from working is a moral outrage.

Some clever economists might argue that the minimum wage can increase the total wages paid to all workers. This could happen if the amount of workers unemployed was more than offset by the increased wage. But what is this except human sacrifice?! They would knowingly unemploy the most needy in order to increase the aggregate income of workers. This position is morally bankrupt and an insult to those who genuinely want to help the less fortunate.

In sum, the minimum wage harms the very people it intends to help. It’s a moral outrage that ought to be instantly abolished. Freedom is the best policy to help the poor.

Recommended learning:

• Gene Callahan’s excellent analogy, in which he compares the minimum wage with a hypothetical “minimum stock price”. Find it in his book, Economics for Real People (free online), pages 189-194.
• Roger Garrison’s Mises University lecture. You can follow along by downloading his powerpoint.
• Mary Ruwart, Healing Our World (free online). A great book for leftists, Ruwart shows how government restrictions hurt the poorest to the benefit of the wealthy and politically connected.

“Capitalism is the best. It’s free enterprise. Barter. Gimbels, if I get really rank with the clerk, ‘Well I don’t like this’, how I can resolve it? If it really gets ridiculous, I go, ‘Frig it, man, I walk.’ What can this guy do at Gimbels, even if he was the president of Gimbels? He can always reject me from that store, but I can always go to Macy’s. He can’t really hurt me. Communism is like one big phone company. Government control, man. And if I get too rank with that phone company, where can I go? I’ll end up like a schmuck with a dixie cup on a thread.” —Lenny Bruce

A common refrain among people unfamiliar with libertarian theory is that corporations are the problem and government is the solution—that government needs to tightly regulate private business to rein in corporate greed. This view is fundamentally confused. It entails that private business—which derives its means by voluntary exchange—is the problem, while government—which derives its means through violence—is the solution.

First, greed is a universal feature of human nature that’s here to stay. Businessmen have always been and will always be greedy. And the rest of us are greedy too, in the sense of being self-interested. That includes the agents of the government. Since government can use violence to achieve its ends, we should be much more worried about predation by greedy politicians and bureaucrats.

Of course, businessmen are not angels. Like all people, they can be jerks and criminals. Adam Smith’s great insight was that businessmen benefit others not out of benevolence, but by their own greedy pursuits in a free market. Under the institution of free market competition, private predation can be minimized and the social benefits of greed can be maximized. But this cannot be achieved with a government in existence.

Greedy businessmen don’t passively submit to regulations, they lobby and do whatever they can to gain control of the regulatory body. Once they have access to the political means, they use it as a tool to hinder their competition, to the detriment of everybody else. Gabriel Kolko has shown that even the Progressive Era regulations were pushed through by big business to restrict competition. Where there is government, businesses will fight to control it for their benefit. Under government, the corporation becomes an exploiter.

In fact, free market competition is the best kind of “regulation”. Where there is competition, people have choice and can avoid businesses they don’t like. And businesses have incentives to publicize the misbehavior of their competitors. Competition is simply the best check on private predation. Furthermore, it can be supplemented by other voluntary measures, like boycotts, to seal any cracks. There is no reason to introduce legalized violence in the form of a government.

Government is not the solution, it is the root problem. Government brings with it the problem of public predation, and creates the avenues for systematic private predation. Advocating more government as the solution to private predation is like trying to put out a fire by dousing it with gasoline. Without government, private predation can be restrained through market competition. In other words, government is the ultimate cause and corporations are the proximate cause of the problems. Don’t be a branch-striker. Strike the root.

[Further reading: Roderick Long, Can We Escape the Ruling Class]

Hans Hoppe has found the answer. In his outstanding book, Democracy—The God That Failed, he shows that democracy is the cause of these modern ills. This is a very bold claim, given democracy’s current status as a secular religion. But Hoppe’s careful theoretical reasoning is airtight—this is a paradigm-shifting book.

The process of civilization

To understand how democracy destroys civilization, we must first understand how civilization comes about. Civilization is the outcome of saving and investment, in other words: capital accumulation. As people save and invest in capital goods (e.g., tools and machines), the production of goods increases—they become wealthier. With more resources at their disposal, saving becomes less costly, and people can invest even more in capital goods. This again results in greater production and a corresponding drop in the cost of saving and investing. This self-reinforcing cycle of capital accumulation is known as the process of civilization.

As Hoppe explains in Chapter 1, people’s time preferences—their degree of present- or future-mindedness—determine the amount of saving and thus the rate of capital accumulation. A high time preference denotes a high premium on the present over the future: the cost of foregoing consumption in favor of saving is higher. Alternately, a low time preference denotes a low premium on the present over the future: the cost of foregoing consumption in favor of saving is lower. To illustrate, a person with a high time preference would engage in activities that pay out in the present (and even at the expense of the future), such as impulse spending, eating junk food, promiscuity, drunkenness, drug abuse, etc. A person with a low time preference would take on activities that pay out in the long term, such as saving and investing, maintaining good health, improving skills or education, developing a good reputation, etc.

The process of civilization is characterized by a fall in the time preference of society. As people become wealthier from the increased production of capital goods, the cost of saving (foregoing consumption) falls—their time preference falls. As this process unfolds, people become ever wealthier and more farsighted.

The decivilization effect of democracy

The existence of government weakens the process of capital accumulation. Under democratic rule, this weakening effect is considerably enhanced. Unless it is stopped, democracy will eventually raise time preferences to the point of capital consumption, and a self-reinforcing process of decivilization will be set in motion—ultimately leading towards the destruction of society.

There are many ways that democracy destroys civilization; the most significant being taxation, war, legislation, and redistribution. These effects are further amplified because public resistance to government is systematically weakened under democracy.

Taxation

Any and all taxation falls directly on producers—taxation is a penalty on production. As a result of taxation, the rate of return on investment is diminished. Saving to invest becomes less lucrative, so people consume more and save less than they otherwise would have. People become more present-minded and the process of civilization is impeded. The amount of taxation determines how significant this effect will be.

If the government is privately owned (i.e., a monarchy), then this effect will be limited. Since the government is his personal property, a monarch has an interest in both the present tax revenues and the long-term capital value of his kingdom. His incentive is to tax moderately, so as not to diminish the future productivity of his subjects, and hence his future tax revenues. On the other hand, if the government is publicly owned (i.e., a democracy), then this effect will be significantly more prominent. Since elected rulers are only temporary caretakers, not owners, of government property, their time horizons are very short—they’re very present-minded. They have no interest in the long term value of the government. Rather, their incentive is to maximize their own benefits while they are in power. Accordingly, democratic rulers tend to tax (and inflate the currency) as much as politically possible, even if it decreases the productivity of private citizens and hence future tax revenues. But this should come as no surprise, as public government, like all public property, is plagued by the tragedy of the commons.

Consider the analogy of public farming. Imagine a farmer who is given the use of some land to grow crops on, but he doesn’t own the land and only gets to use it for four years. His incentive will be to maximize his benefit over the four year term, without regard for the soil quality after the fourth year. Because he can’t reap the benefits of maintaining good soil quality after his term ends, his incentive is to deplete the soil to squeeze out as much benefit from it as possible before he loses its use—in other words, he engages in capital consumption. The same incentives are at work under public government. Without private property ownership, there can be no long-term economic planning.

War

While all governments can externalize the costs of war, a public government will be much more warlike than a private one. A king personally owns the resources that pay for the war and thus his incentive is to keep warfare limited (war is outrageously expensive) and pursue his foreign policy through peaceful means, such as contractual acquisitions of territory and intermarriage with other ruling families. Democratic rulers have no such interest in saving money—it’s not their money to begin with and they can’t privately pocket the funds if they don’t go to war. Consequently, democracies lack a major deterrent to engaging in warfare.

Democratic warfare is also excessively brutal. Once again, because the rulers have no incentive to save money, war spending is much higher, resulting in larger wars. And because the government is public, the government’s wars are the public’s wars: nationalist fervor sweeps the people and support for the war becomes the unquestioned norm. Wars also become open-ended ideological wars (e.g., “making the world safe for democracy” or the “war on terror”). The entire populace becomes part of the war machine, resulting in total war: domestic tyranny (extreme taxation and regulation), conscription, enormous war expenditures, mass destruction, and mass murder of both militants and civilians.

Legislation

Since the kingdom is the private property of the king, he has a strong incentive to uphold the integrity of private property law (the validity of his ownership of the kingdom depends upon it). The king also has an incentive to uphold economically beneficial law—private property law—to increase value of his kingdom. Democratic rulers have no private ownership stake in the government and thus have no incentive to uphold the integrity of private property law. Nor do they have an incentive to maintain economically beneficial law. On the contrary, they can benefit by creating artificial laws—legislation—that serve to undermine private property law for their own benefit. Under democracy, mountains of legislation erode private property law: property owners become increasingly restricted in what they can do with their property. As private property law is continually weakened, long-term planning becomes more and more uncertain and people become more and more present-minded.

Redistribution

Because of the electoral nature of democracies, special interest politics becomes the name of the game. In order to win an election, politicians must compete for the support of interest groups. The largest and most lucrative interest group (most votes) is the “have-nots”, and politicians can cater to them with wealth redistribution policies. Thus, democracies take on a redistributionist role: the welfare state is born. As basic economic reasoning tells us, if you tax productivity and subsidize non-productivity, you will end up with less producers and more nonproducers. A destructive cycle sets in: as producing becomes less and less lucrative and nonproducing becomes more and more so, welfare spending increases while production and thus taxable income decreases. Thus, welfare policies only exacerbate the problems they intend to cure. They reward present-mindedness and discourage future-mindedness and, if left to run their course, will inevitably lead to a Soviet-style economic collapse.

Public resistance

It’s worth noting that democracy’s tendency towards big government is significantly helped along by its public image. Any government ultimately rests on the consent of the governed, and democracy can more easily secure such consent. By fostering the illusion of self-rule (i.e., “We are the government”, “We are doing it to ourselves”), democracy systematically weakens public resistance to government interventions. Under monarchy, one has no hope of joining the ruling family and benefiting from the state’s activities. Under democracy, however, one has the opportunity to be part of a majority or even to become one of the rulers, and so can potentially benefit from state activities. Thus, monarchical subjects tend to be more resistant to government than citizens of democratic states. This acceptance allows democracies to become much larger and much more interventionist without igniting revolutionary sentiment.

Evidence

The devastation of democracy is clearly evident in the historical record. As Hoppe writes:

Let’s take a closer look at the historical evidence concerning taxation, war, legislation and redistribution under monarchy and democracy (discussed by Hoppe in Chapter 2):

Taxation

• Monarchy: 5-8% of national income; no inflation (commodity money).
• Democracy: Over 50% of national income; plus paper-money inflation. Remarks Hoppe: “Now, year in and year out the American government expropriates more than 40 percent of the incomes of private producers, making even the economic burden imposed on slaves and serfs seem moderate in comparison.” (pp. 243)

War

• Monarchy: Limited wars for settling territorial disputes. Battles fought by hired mercenaries with minimal bloodshed. Civilian life was unaffected by wars.
• Democracy: Total wars fought for ideological goals (“Liberty”, “Democracy”, “fighting terrorism”, etc.) and thus open-ended and grotesquely brutal. Civilian life is heavily disrupted by wars, not only because of domestic burdens (taxation, regulation and conscription), but because civilians are no longer considered “off limits” to combatants.

Legislation

• Monarchy: Kings were considered judges, not legislators. Law was considered fixed and immutable (and the king’s own property rights rested on its validity). Legislation was unheard of.
• Democracy: Rulers rise above the law, they become judges and lawmakers. Vast mountains of legislation regulate virtually every aspect of private life. This is effectively totalitarian power.

Redistribution

• Monarchy: Consumption state—wealth redistributed from subject to sovereign.
• Democracy: Welfare state—wealth redistributed not only from citizen to state, but between citizens. Public welfare spending typically amounts to 25% of the national product.

Ideological progress

Was the change from monarchy to democracy a step backwards? In practical terms, there is no question: democracy has had tremendously bad effects compared to monarchy. But in terms of ideological progress, democracy has been a (confused and pathetic) step towards more justice. While monarchy and democracy are both forms of unjust political rule, monarchy is exclusive rule by accident of birth while democratic rule is open to anyone. Democracy is fairer in the sense that the opportunity to rule is universal, whereas monarchy only allows for arbitrary family rule. In other words, if there must be rulers, then it’s more just that the rulers are selected through open competition than by arbitrary heredity. But this was the fateful error of the classical liberals: to see exclusivity rather than privilege as the problem. They merely replaced personal privileges (of the king) with functional privileges (of the democratic ruler). Of course, the real solution is to remove the privilege of ruling altogether, so that there is no ruler-ruled distinction.

To be sure, when democracy is rejected as illegitimate, we won’t be headed back to monarchy. Democracy will join monarchy as laughable and politically unthinkable. Given the natural human inclination to justice, we will move towards something perceived to be right and just. Anarchy, a society without rulers, is the pinnacle of this progress in political ideology. Once it dawns on the public that democracy is the dead-end sign on the road of statism, we will have a stateless society. Then the process of civilization will take off and humanity will prosper like never before.

The downside is that, until democracy is delegitimized in the public eye, we should expect an accelerating decivilization, and even the ultimate destruction of society through complete economic disintegration. Chances are that it won’t get that far, because the failures of democracy will become ever more apparent and people will eventually be forced to recognize their error if they want to maintain modern living standards. The sooner people realize that democracy is a social death wish, the less devastation we will have to endure. What we need then, is an ideological revolution to make the world safe from democracy! Democracy is insane—it ought to be called democrazy!

Conclusion

While all of this may seem no more than an intellectual curiosity, it has extremely important ramifications for the general public, as well as for minarchists. What better way of delegitimizing democracy than to show people that democracy is the destroyer of civilization and even worse than monarchy? People in democratic countries are deeply indoctrinated with a quasi-religious faith in democracy, so this is an explosive subject, but if used carefully it could ruin democracy forever in many minds. Democracy is the last remaining bastion of statism, and by attacking democracy we strike at the very heart of statism.

As for minarchists, if they are truly interested in limited government, then they must grapple with the fact that public government is prone to cancerous growth and that private government is the only sustainable form of limited government. Since they generally believe that democracy is legitimate while monarchy isn’t, this forces them into an awkward choice: either limited government through private government ownership (i.e., monarchy); or democracy (i.e., constitutional republic) and its inevitable big government. The cognitive dissonance is delicious!

Perhaps most importantly, Hoppe’s insight is the key to understanding and interpreting the 20th century. We now have the answer to the previously baffling question of why civilization is in decline despite enormous scientific and technological progress. It is public government that causes a vicious cycle of rising time preference, and is responsible for the accelerating destruction of society. It is public government that inexorably pushes mankind from civilization back to the jungle. Practically all social ills can be traced back to the effects of the democratic state, from war and poverty to dysfunctional families and widespread bad health. Happily, we also have the solution to this problem: a market anarchist society based on universal private property rights. Only by abandoning democracy and statism will we be able to reap the enormous increases in prosperity that we should expect from such incredible progress in science and technology.

Further reading

For more on this topic, see Democracy—The God That Failed, especially chapter 1. Chapter 2 contains a highly informative historical analysis of monarchy and democracy.

The thing is, they also consider the principles of liberty to be important. Constitutionalists believe that markets are better than central planning, but that government is necessary to protect liberty—that government is a necessary evil. This contradictory position mainly exists because they lack the understanding of the logical conclusion of the principles of liberty: the stateless society. But rather than just rejecting them as statists, we should reach out to them as potential libertarians in the spirit of gain orientation. Fortunately, an open mind and a little education are all that’s needed to arrive at a consistent pro-liberty position.

On practical grounds, Austrian economics is quite clear: the market always beats the State. Competition always beats monopoly. Why leave the government with any role at all if the market can provide us with everything we want? If the market is better than government in every other area, why would it fail in the so-called “essential roles of government”: national defense, police and courts? The functions of both national defense and police could be produced more efficiently by entrepreneurs selling protection services. Private courts would easily provide better, speedier and more affordable justice than government courts. Security and justice are extremely important, all the more reason not to leave them in the hands of a coercive socialist monopoly. There is no place for the state in a free society; anything the government can do, the market can do better.

The state is also incompatible with basic moral principles. For instance, it is morally wrong to initiate violence against another person. Yet this is all the State can ever do, using “the strong arm of the law”. Taxation is a perfect example, since a government couldn’t exist without it. Taxes are not voluntary, they must be enforced with coercion. Government can only tax you because it has the overwhelming power to force you to pay. If it didn’t have so much power, you could try to defend yourself. However, most people choose to pay because of this threat of violence (which, in any other scenario, would be recognized as extortion or robbery). If you don’t pay, and insist on not paying, you will eventually be staring down the barrel of a government gun. After your non-compliance with their written requests, they will initiate violence against you by arresting you and putting you in jail (otherwise known as kidnapping). If you resist their efforts and attempt to defend yourself, you will be shot (murdered). Notice that the government is the aggressor—it initiates the violence. The person who refuses to pay does no more than defend himself from their attacks.

The State is a destructive parasite that is inherently immoral. Government is socialism—even the smallest one. Les Antman nailed it when he wrote that “limited government is the theory that free market capitalism is best protected by a socialist monopoly.” There’s no way around it: the State must go.

Most constitutionalists have a healthy anti-government attitude. They just don’t realize that a society without government is both possible and desirable. They’re ripe for becoming full-blown libertarians.

To learn about the workings of a stateless society, I recommend reading Chaos Theory (only ~50 pages) [pdf version] or The Market For Liberty [also in pdf and audio-book]. Another excellent short introduction is Roderick Long’s Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to Ten Objections.

David Gross presents Like the withered stalk of a cattail posted at The Picket Line. David argues that there is growing awareness of the corruption in the central institutions of authority — government, economy, media, etc.

Andrew Q presents A Libertarian Defense of Property Redistribution posted at Capital Goods. He discusses Carson and Rothbard’s arguments on land theft and property redistribution.

Andrew Q also presents A Critique of Agorism posted at Capital Goods. Agorism is a novel strategy and merits further debate and discussion.

Scott Hughes presents What Freedom Means to Me posted at Philosophy Forums.

Francois Tremblay presents History is written by the idiots posted at Check Your Premises. He discusses the teaching of history and cautions anarchists in their choice of media.

John Petrie presents Toy lead-content regulations hurt small toy makers posted at Blagnet.net. Unsurprisingly, government regulations benefit big business while screwing the little guy.

John Petrie also  presents Saving is good, not bad, for American economy posted at Blagnet.net. John discusses the ecognorance of Keynesian pump-priming and the vilification of saving.

David Z presents Legalize ALL Drugs posted at No Third Solution.

Continuing with drug prohibition, see my article The Case Against Drug Prohibition. Not only is prohibition ineffective, but it causes crime, corruption, and increases the risk of overdosing.

That’s all for this edition, which will be the last due to a lack of interest. Thanks to everyone who submitted.

Check out the January edition, hosted at Democracy Sucks.

Send your submissions here before Feb. 28.  Pro-market or anti-state viewpoints only.

This is going to be the last edition, due to a lack of interest, so send in your best writing. Let’s make this the greatest Market Anarchist Carnival of them all!