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		<title>KluwerLawOnline.com - World Competition</title>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 21:02:19 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Editors Note June 2013</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013014</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Jos&#233; Rivas</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013015</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<p> <i>The online search and social networking industries are characterized by the concentration of large market shares among a very limited number of actors. Being advertisement-based media, search engines and social networking websites fall within the category of special types of markets known as two-sided markets or platforms. Two-sided markets or platforms have two distinct user groups which produce network benefits for each other. The platforms enable the user groups to minimize the transaction costs they would otherwise incur, in interacting with or searching for each other. Competition authorities cannot ignore the economics of two-sided markets in assessing market power in the search and social networking industries. This article provides a framework for defining the relevant market and for assessing market power in the industries of online search and social networking websites, focusing on the current leaders Google and Facebook and argues that online search and social networking websites may exert competitive constraints on each other, as they both operate in the relevant market for 'monetization of user's information by online advertising'.</i> </p><ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Florence Th&#233;pot, Teaching Fellow at University College London.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Are Anti-competitive Effects Necessary for an Analysis under Article 102 TFEU?</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013016</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<p> <i>This article deals specifically with the different effects-based approaches that have been taken to Article 102 prior to and after the European Commission's change of policy in this area of law. Studying this topic now is particularly important for three main reasons. First, Article 102 has recently been subject to a major policy review which generated much debate as to whether the Commission is required to show effects. Secondly, there have recently been some highly significant examples of the Court of Justice both supporting and rejecting the new effects-based approach to Article 102. Finally, the outcome of recent case law has some widespread implications for enforcement policy.</i> </p><ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, Senior lecturer in law at the University of Manchester.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Obstruction of Investigation in EU Competition Law: Issues and Developments in the European Commissions Approach</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013017</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<p> <i>This article examines the practice of the European Commission in fining undertakings for the obstruction of the Commission's investigation. For years, the Commission has fined such procedural infringements by qualifying them as an aggravating circumstance in the decision in the substantive case. In recent years, however, the Commission has increased its attention to cases of obstruction of investigation and has started fining them as autonomous infringements in standalone decisions. The Commission has, in the past few years, adopted three such decisions: E.ON Energie and Suez Environnement, both concerning the breach of a seal, and EPH and others concerning an IT-related infringement. In the appeal of E.ON Energie, the Court of Justice recently upheld the Commission's approach. While the move from circumstantial to standalone fining is commendable in itself, these standalone fines are set in a 'black box' that allows the Commission too much discretionary leeway. This raises issues of arbitrariness, proportionality and legal certainty. Therefore, it is submitted that the adoption by the Commission of fining guidelines for obstruction of investigation cases is warranted.</i> </p><ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Maurits ter Haar, Associate at De Brauw BlackstoneWestbroek, Amsterdam.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Interaction between Leniency Programmes and Damages Actions in Antitrust Law: Perspectives for Collective Redress</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013018</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<p> <i>This article addresses the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement and its relationship with public enforcement of competition law. In light of the recent initiatives taken by the European Commission, it is suggested that soft law instruments are incapable of guaranteeing a coherent approach, especially taking into consideration the need to balance the public and private interests involved in antitrust proceedings. This is particularly evident when appraising the links between actions for damages based on Article 101 TFEU and leniency programmes. The analysis of the case law of the EU courts and national tribunals reveals the tensions between the focus on cartels and the rights of competing undertakings and consumers to claim redress. The situation is hardly satisfactory given the differences in national regulations, on the one side, and the lack of binding EU measures, on the other. Hence, as advocated by the Commission in its Work Programme 2012, it appears preferable, and in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to harmonize domestic laws in this field via the adoption of a directive based on Article 103TFEU.</i> </p><ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Bruno Nascimbene, Full Professor of EU Law at the University of Milan, Faculty of Law.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Merger Control in China: Four and a Half Years of Practice and Enforcement  A Critical Analysis</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013019</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<p> <i>This article looks back at developments in the Chinese merger control regime from its entry into force until January 2013.The decisions published by the Ministry of Commerce are analysed, with particular reference to the imposition of remedies. The relevant guidance, and its development in the light of decisions is also considered, along with the broader enforcement patterns, including the extent to which decisions have involved non-Chinese parties. The argument is made that whilst there have been very significant steps taken in the development of the regime, there remain areas of concern, including the intrusive behavioural nature of the majority of remedies, the lack of clarity as to the operation of the substantive test, and a perceived imbalance in the targets of enforcement.</i> </p><ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Mark Furse, Professor of Competition Law and Policy, School of Law, University of Glasgow.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Presumptions, Market Dominance and Oligopoly in Europe and China: A Comparison</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013020</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<p> <i>The China Telecom and China Unicom case in China has shown that the Chinese competition authorities have, in the presumptions of market dominance under Article 19 of China's Antimonopoly Law (AML), a powerful weapon to combat anticompetitive conduct in oligopolistic markets. However, little is known about these presumptions. More particularly, how these presumptions shape the legal test of market dominance for multiple firms in China has not been evident. This article addresses this question using a comparative approach. It compares Articles 19(2) and 19(3) AML with their corresponding laws in Europe, namely the law of collective dominance in Article 102 TFEU. Findings show that these two sets of rules function very differently. A powerful distinction comes from the Article 102 TFEU's requirement of collective entity, which has thus far not been pursued by the law of market dominance in China. The result is that, unlike the European Commission, the Chinese competition authorities are more able to restrict the unilateral conduct of firms operating in a non-collusive oligopoly.</i> </p><ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>F&#233;lix E. Mezzanotte, ssistant Professor, School of Accounting.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>The Price of Inequality: How Todays Divided Society Endangers Our Future, by Joseph E. Stiglitz. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012)</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013021</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Maurice E. Stucke, University of Tennessee College of Law.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Competition Law in the BRICS Countries, edited by Adrian Emch, Jose Regazzini &amp; Vassily Rudomino. (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International (with IBA sponsorship, 2012))</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013022</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Mel Marquis</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>EU Antitrust Procedure, 6th edn, by N. Khan. (London: Sweet &amp; Maxwell, 2012)</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013023</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Anthony Dawes</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, edited by Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor M. Fox, Michal S. Gal &amp; David J. Gerber. (Cheltenham, UK &amp; Northhampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar, 2012)</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013024</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Andr&#233;s Palacios Lleras</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Private Enforcement of Antitrust Laws in the United States: A Handbook, edited by Albert A. Foer &amp; Randy M. Stutz. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012)</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013025</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Spencer Weber Waller, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Antitrust Law in Brazil: Fighting Cartels, by Eduardo Molan Gaban &amp; Juliana Oliveira Domingues. (Wolters Kluwer, 2012)</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013026</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Juli&#225;n Pe&#241;a</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>European Competition Law Annual (ECLA), 2009 The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, edited by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann &amp; Mel Marquis. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011)</title>
			<link>http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/WOCO2013027</link>
			<category>World Competition</category>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul><li>Content Type Journal Article</li><li>Part of Volume 36, Issue 2</li><li>Authors<ul><li>Valentine Korah</li></ul></li><li>Journal <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=WOCO">World Competition</a></li><li>Online ISSN 1011-4548</li><li>Print ISSN 1011-4548</li></ul>]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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