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Daf Yomi Idea Berachos 8a: Giving up on those who need something different

2020-01-12T15:21:00.001-05:00

The Gemara on page 8a states (from here):

וְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: לְעוֹלָם יָדוּר אָדָם בִּמְקוֹם רַבּוֹ, שֶׁכָּל זְמַן שֶׁשִּׁמְעִי בֶּן גֵּרָא קַיָּים, לֹא נָשָׂא שְׁלֹמֹה אֶת בַּת פַּרְעֹה.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: One should always live in the place where his teacher lives; thereby he will avoid sin. For as long as Shimi ben Gera, who according to tradition was a great Torah scholar and teacher of Solomon (see Gittin 59a), was alive, Solomon did not marry Pharaoh’s daughter. Immediately after the Bible relates the death of Shimi (I Kings, end of ch. 2), Solomon’s marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter is recorded (beginning of ch. 3).
וְהָתַנְיָא אַל יָדוּר!
The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that one should not live where his teacher lives?
לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דִּכְיִיף לֵיהּ, הָא, דְּלָא כְּיִיף לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, which says that one should live where his teacher lives, is referring to a case where he is acquiescent to his teacher and will heed his teaching and instruction. While this baraita, which says that one should not live where his teacher lives, is referring to a case where he is not acquiescent to him and that will lead them to quarrel.

The question to this teaching of the Gemara that should be obvious is; who cares if they quarrel? If following one's teacher is the right thing to do, you should live by them no matter what. Even if you will quarrel with your teacher, you are still being exposed to the correct guidance. One might even argue that it is more important for a quarrelsome person to live near their teacher!

To this inherent question Rashi offers a seemingly simple answer:

If he will acquiesce to his teacher's guidance, to accept his rebuke, then [the student] should live by the teacher. However, if he will not [listen to the rebuke or guidance of his teacher,] he should live far away from his teacher and thereby perform inappropriate deeds through negligence instead of deliberately.

This statement of Rashi actually has a very profound attitude attached to it that, I believe, is often missed and I personally disagree with.

Rashi's statement on the surface seems to make a lot of sense. If you are someone who will not listen to your Rabbi, then you should remove yourself from purposefully causing pain to your teacher and sinning against his words and guidance. However, on a deeper examination of this approach, one will see how superficial and dismissive this understanding of the Gemara can be.

As a disclaimer, I am not arguing with Rashi, but based on my superficial understanding of his explanation of the Gemara, and how most people read this Gemara, I think a deeper discussion is warranted.

I find this explanation of the Gemara truly disheartening. If a student disagrees with his or her teacher (or is too lazy to follow their guidance), that student should remove themselves from their teacher and any further teaching/constructive criticism the teacher may offer in the future?!?! And, the explanation given as to why this is a good idea is so the student should only not be listening to their teacher through negligence instead of an outright contrarian attitude.

Who does this help? We are basically saying that a member of the Jewish people who has, essentially, lost their desire to follow the Torah in the way their teacher has guided them should just go somewhere else and do the wrong thing and leave everyone else alone. But, its ok because they will only be doing the wrong thing because they forgot what they were taught (and are negligent). That seems much better than being close to a possible source of guidance who they will fight against.

This is a defeatist attitude and means Rashi is telling us that when someone argues and doesn't want to listen, you write them off as a lost soul. Do not engage with them, they will never discuss or come back once lost. It is over and better they just be negligent instead of belligerent.

This is how I understand this Rashi and it bothers me.

My understanding of the Gemara is different than what Rashi explains. See, Rashi gives us two choices, either you listen to your teacher and follow the rules, or you don't and you are transgressing the laws deliberately. However, there is another option. When the Braaisa says you should not live near your teacher and the Gemara says this is in a situation where you will not listen to him, why can't the Gemara mean that you should go find a different teacher that you will listen to?

In fact, the Gemara brings up the case of Shlomo hamelech (King Solomon) as an example for why you should live near your teacher. Shlomo did not marry the princess of Egypt as long as his teacher was alive. Why? Because it was the wrong thing to do and it eventually led him to pursue bad deeds, as the scripture tells us (Kings 1 Chapter 11):

King Shlomo loved many foreign women in addition to Pharaoh's daughter – Moabite, Ammonite, Edomite, Phoenician and Hittite women from the nations of which God had said to the Children of Israel, “Do not join them and they should not join you, lest they divert your heart away to follow their gods.” Such Shlomo clung to and loved. He had seven hundred royal wives and three hundred concubines; and his wives turned his heart astray. In his old age, his wives caused his heart to stray after other gods, and he was not wholeheartedly devoted to God as his father David had been.

This shows us that having a guide, such as a teacher, helps prevent a person from pursuing actions that will be negative for them. Obviously, if you have a teacher that you will not listen to, that won't help prevent you from pursuing bad deeds, or other counterproductive activities. However, the answer to not listening to your teacher is not leaving them and performing bad deeds in their absence, the answer is go find someone who can help guide you!

Similarly, there is a Gemara in Kiddushin 40a that states:

אמר רבי אלעאי הזקן אם רואה אדם שיצרו מתגבר עליו ילך למקום שאין מכירין אותו וילבש שחורים ויתכסה שחורים ויעשה כמו שלבו חפץ ואל יחלל שם שמים בפרהסיא
Rabbi Ilai the Elder says: If a person sees that his evil inclination is overcoming him, he should go to a place where he is not known, and wear black clothes, and he should cover himself in simple black garments, and he should do as his heart desires, but he should not desecrate the name of Heaven in public.

This Gemara seems to agree with Rashi's explanation of our Gemara, if a person can't help it, then he or she can just go sin, as long as they leave the rest of us alone and don't embarrass us.

However, Tosfos on this Gemara explains:

ויעשה מה שלבו חפץ - פי' ר"ח ח"ו שהותר לו לעבור עבירה אלא כך אמר ר' אלעאי יגיעת דרכים והאכסנאות ולבישת שחורים משברים יצר הרע ומונעים אדם מן העבירה.:
And he should do what his heart desires: The Rach (I think Rabbeinu Chenanel) explains, Heaven forbid that [Rabbi Ilai] is permitting for him to transgress a sin, rather he is saying that the travails of traveling and staying at inns, combined with wearing black clothes, will break the evil inclination and prevent him from carrying out the sin.

This is a fundamentally different way of approaching the problem. We know that people are not perfect and have desires that cause sin. Instead of writing them off, we offer advice to help them overcome the difficulties.

Now, these approaches can apply to help those who are sinning AND it can be applied to how we view the sinner. In a situation where a person is truly struggling and trying not to sin, this is advice for them. The sinner needs the extra steps they can take which may help prevent themselves from carrying out the misdeed. However, the situation where a person is defiant and does not want to follow their teacher needs to be told, not to stay away from their teacher, but to find a new one. This is how the person themselves should view these Gemaras.

The community should view these people as people who need aid. The sinner who cannot control themselves and needs to go sin, should be surrounded with a loving teacher and friends. If this person lives near their Rabbi, then their Rabbi can help prevent them from going to sin. However, in the situation where one does not respect or listen to their Rabbi, the answer is not to just go away. The answer is this person needs to find a community and a teacher that can relate to that person, so the sinner will respect the Rabbi! That is why we have so many Rabbis! There are many different types of people out there with different needs and points of view. To just give up on someone is a problem.

Unfortunately, I think we see Rashi's attitude all too frequently today. In the Jewish community there are many examples, but one important problem is schools that will not deal with children that fall "out of the box." This is a mistake! There are many things children with different "issues" can add to a school. Telling parents that their child has some behavior issues or needs extra help in certain areas and therefore they would be better served somewhere else, is heartbreaking. Children that need to go to public schools or less religious schools because of these factors is a problem.

I am not advocating compromising on religious values. However, I am advocating for a diversity in leadership and teachers that can deal with the diversity of personalities and issues in the modern orthodox community. Honestly, this is not just a modern orthodox problem, but all levels of Judaism.

Rambam- Yesodei HaTorah- Chapter 9 Halacha 4: Prophets Do Not Decide The Law, For 'It Is Not In Heaven!"

2019-06-04T19:17:00.000-04:00

וכן אם עקר דבר מדברים שלמדנו מפי השמועה או שאמר בדין מדיני תורה שה' צוה לו שהדין כך הוא והלכה כדברי פלוני הרי זה נביא השקר ויחנק. אע"פ שעשה אות. שהרי בא להכחיש התורה שאמרה לא בשמים היא. אבל לפי שעה שומעין לו בכל:

So too, if the prophet contradicts something that we learned from an oral tradition or says one of the laws of the Torah is [a specific way] because G-D commanded him that the law is so and the law follows so-and-so's opinion, this is a false prophet and he should [be put to death] through strangulation. [This is true] even if he performs signs since he came to destroy the Torah, since it says(Devarim 30:12) "It is not in heaven." However, we listen to him with all [commandments that are to last] for a finite amount of time.

Why is it so bad for a prophet to tell us which Rabbi to side with? He is not telling us a new law, only telling us which one of the Rabbis is favored by G-D. Why should this lead to him being put to death? One answer is given by the Maamer Mordechai:

לא בשמים היא וכו'. נ"ב אין להקשות ממ"ש בריש הפרק ויאמר שה' שלחו להוסיף מצוה וכו' דמשמע דוקא כשבא להוסיף או לגרוע הוא דנקרא נביא השקר אבל באומר הלכה כפלוני (דאיהו) [דאינו] מוסיף ולא גורע לא דהא גם הכא הוי שינוי דהא כיון דכתיב לא בשמים היא א"כ גם אינה בשמים להכריע הדין עם מי וא"כ כשזה בא ואמר הלכה כפלוני ואומר שה' שלחו א"כ נמצא דמכחיש כתוב דכתיב לא בשמים היא והכי דייקי דברי רבינו ז"ל ועיין בכ"מ ובפר"ח ודוק.

It is not in heaven, etc: This requires explanation. One should not ask based on what it says in the beginning of the chapter "The [false prophet] will say that G-D sent him to add a law, etc." That this seems to imply specifically when the [false prophet] tries to add or take away [a law] that he is called a false prophet, but if he says the law follows so-and-so, that [the false prophet] is not adding or taking away [a law, he is] not [put to death.] This [is faulty reasoning] because [a prophet telling us which Rabbi to follow] is a change [from normative Jewish practice] because it is written (Devarim 30:12) "It is not in Heaven." Therefore, it is not in heaven to decide who the law follows. If so, when this [prophet] comes and tells us, "The law is like so-and-so," and he says, "G-D sent me," we find that he is extinguishing the verse that writes (ibid), "It is not in heaven." This is the reasoning of the [Rambam].

The Torah tells us that no one is allowed to add laws or subtract laws from the list of commandments. However, the verse (Devarim 4:2) "You shall not add to the word which I am commanding you, nor take away from it, that you may keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you," only tells us that the prophet is not allowed to come and make up a new commandment. From where do we know that their status as a prophet has no authority over us in any matters of permanent law? That comes from the verse (Devarim 30:12) of "It is not in heaven." This verse teaches us that once the Torah was given, the Rabbis now have authority over the law and not G-D. Human logic and reasoning is how we decide matters and not through divine intervention. This is a foundational principle of Judaism and must be understood. The majority rules what is law, not G-D. As demonstrated in Babba Matzia 59b by the oven of Aknai as was described in the previous mishna.

Rambam- Yesodei HaTorah- Chapter 9 Halacha 3: To What Extent Must We Listen To The New Prophet

2019-06-02T19:42:00.004-04:00

וכן נביא שעבר על דברי עצמו והכובש נבואתו חייב מיתה בידי שמים ובשלשתן נאמר אנכי אדרוש מעמו. וכן אם יאמר לנו הנביא שנודע לנו שהוא נביא לעבור על אחת מכל מצות האמורות בתורה או על מצות הרבה בין קלות בין חמורות לפי שעה מצוה לשמוע לו. וכן למדנו מחכמים ראשונים מפי השמועה בכל אם יאמר לך הנביא עבור על דברי תורה כאליהו בהר הכרמל שמע לו חוץ מעבודת כוכבים. והוא שיהיה הדבר לפי שעה. כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל שהקריב עולה בחוץ וירושלים נבחרת לכך והמקריב בחוץ חייב כרת. ומפני שהוא נביא מצוה לשמוע לו וגם בזה נאמר אליו תשמעון. ואילו שאלו את אליהו ואמרו לו היאך נעקור מ"ש בתורה פן תעלה עולותיך בכל מקום. היה אומר לא נאמר אלא המקריב בחוץ לעולם חייב כרת כמו שצוה משה. אבל אני אקריב היום בחוץ בדבר ה' כדי להכחיש נביאי הבעל. ועל הדרך הזאת אם צוו כל הנביאים לעבור לפי שעה מצוה לשמוע להם. ואם אמרו שהדבר נעקר לעולם מיתתו בחנק שהתורה אמרה לנו ולבנינו עד עולם:

So too, a prophet that transgresses his own instructions and the [prophet] that suppresses his prophecy, [they] are sentenced to death by the heavenly court. By all three (A regular person that does not listen to the prophet, a prophet that does not listen to himself, and a prophet that suppresses his own prophecy) it says (Devarim 18:19) "I will interrogate him." This is true even if a prophet, who is known to us to be a true prophet (he has already been proven to be a prophet), tells us to transgress one of the [613] commandments that are stated in the Torah or [if he tells us to transgress] many [commandments] regardless of whether they are easy [commandments to keep] or difficult [commandments to keep], [as long as it is only for] a finite amount of time, it is a commandment to listen to him.

So too, we learned an oral tradition from the earlier Rabbis that, with regard to all things except idol worship, if the prophet tells us to transgress the words of the Torah, similar to how Eliyahu [transgressed commandments] by the Mount Carmel incident, we listen to him. [However,] it must be a temporary [change], similar to Eliyahu at Mount Carmel when he brought a burnt offering outside [of the Temple in Jerusalem] and [the Temple] in Jerusalem had already been chosen for [the area to bring sacrifices], and [the law states] that anyone who brings a sacrifice outside [of the Temple (once it has been designated)] is [punished] by being spiritually cut off from the nation. [Nevertheless,] because he is a prophet it is a commandment to listen to him [even if his statements contradict the Torah in this temporary fashion] since [in a situation such as] this it states (Devarim 18:15) "You shall listen to him."

If it would have been asked to Eliyahu and said to him "How could you uproot that which is written in the Torah (Devarim 12:13) '[Do not] offer sacrifices in every place.'" He would have responded, "This commandment was only referring to one who continuously sacrifices outside [of the Temple who] will be spiritually cut off from the nation, as Moshe had commanded. However, I only brought a sacrifice today outside [of the Temple] according to the word of G-D in order to destroy the [false] prophets of the Baal." In this regard, if any of the prophets command us to transgress [a commandment other than idol worship] for a finite amount of time, it is a commandment to listen to them. [However,] if they say [a commandment] is permanently uprooted they are put to death by strangulation, since the Torah states (Devarim 29:28), "For us and our children, forever."

One important implication we can glean from this Halacha is that a prophet that is going to change one of the commandments, even though it is only for a finite period of time, must be directly commanded by G-D to do this. As Eliyahu states (Kings 1 18:16):

וַיְהִ֣י ׀ בַּעֲל֣וֹת הַמִּנְחָ֗ה וַיִּגַּ֞שׁ אֵלִיָּ֣הוּ הַנָּבִיא֮ וַיֹּאמַר֒ יְהוָ֗ה אֱלֹהֵי֙ אַבְרָהָם֙ יִצְחָ֣ק וְיִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל הַיּ֣וֹם יִוָּדַ֗ע כִּֽי־אַתָּ֧ה אֱלֹהִ֛ים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל וַאֲנִ֣י עַבְדֶּ֑ךָ ובדבריך [וּבִדְבָרְךָ֣] עָשִׂ֔יתִי אֵ֥ת כָּל־הַדְּבָרִ֖ים הָאֵֽלֶּה׃

When it was time to present the meal offering, the prophet Elijah came forward and said, “O LORD, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel! Let it be known today that You are God in Israel and that I am Your servant, and that I have done all these things at Your bidding.

A prophet must listen to the word of G-D and convey the message as instructed and we must follow him. However, the question arises, can a prophet infer other ideas from his prophecy or must he only repeat exactly what G-D has commanded?

In the commentary on the Rambam named Avodat Hamelech on this Mishna it states:

ולפי דברינו יהיה כוונת רבנו לבאר דדוקא כשהנביא אומר כן בשם ה' כמו שאמר אליהו אבל אני אקריב היום בחוץ כדבר ה', משא"כ אם לא אמר כן בתורת נביא אלא בא לעשות סיג מעצמו לדבר תורה אף שהוא נביא מוחזק לא מהני ובעינן דוקא בי"ד לכך וכמ"ש בהל' ממרים

According to our words, the intention of our Rabbi (Rambam) is to explain that specifically when the prophet says [his commandment] in the name of G-D, like what Eliyahu said, "I offer this sacrifice today outside [of the Temple] according to the word of G-D." However, this is not true, [meaning we do not listen to him,] if he did not say it within the parameters of his prophecy, but rather as a way to make a fence around a Torah matter (biblical commandment) from [his own reasoning.] Even though he is an established prophet, this does not help (we do not have to listen to him), [rather,] we need the courts to [to make such a rule,] as is written [by the Rambam] in the laws of mamarim.

This is a very important point and a foundation of Jewish law. Prophets are not listened to because they are authority figures, but because they are simply repeating the word of G-D. Additionally, we only listen to them with regards to rebuke, that they are chastising us to follow the commandments, or if they tell us G-D is suspending or making an additional commandment for a FINITE amount of time. However, we DO NOT listen to a prophet to decide laws or to change any existing laws. We follow the majority of Rabbis to decide on the Torah laws. This is best illustrated in the story of the oven of Aknai where Rebbe Eliezar was arguing with the rest of the Rabbis in his day about whether the oven was pure or impure (Babba Metzia 59b):

חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי מן השמים יוכיחו יצאתה בת קול ואמרה מה לכם אצל ר"א שהלכה כמותו בכ"מ עמד רבי יהושע על רגליו ואמר (דברים ל, יב) לא בשמים היא מאי לא בשמים היא אמר רבי ירמיה שכבר נתנה תורה מהר סיני אין אנו משגיחין בבת קול שכבר כתבת בהר סיני בתורה (שמות כג, ב) אחרי רבים להטות אשכחיה רבי נתן לאליהו א"ל מאי עביד קוב"ה בההיא שעתא א"ל קא חייך ואמר נצחוני בני נצחוני בני

Rabbi Eliezer then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with Rabbi Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: It is written: “It is not in heaven” (Deuteronomy 30:12). The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the phrase “It is not in heaven” in this context? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai, in the Torah: “After a majority to incline” (Exodus 23:2). Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara relates: Years after, Rabbi Natan encountered Elijah the prophet and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time, when Rabbi Yehoshua issued his declaration? Elijah said to him: The Holy One, Blessed be He, smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me.

The point of this mishna in the Rambam is to clarify how and when we are supposed to follow a prophet and when NOT to follow a prophet.

Rambam- Yesodei HaTorah- Chapter 9 Halacha 2: One Must Follow The New Prophet As Long As He Doesn't Contradict Jewish Law

2019-05-27T12:14:00.000-04:00

א"כ למה נאמר בתורה נביא אקים להם מקרב אחיהם כמוך. לא לעשות דת הוא בא אלא לצוות על דברי התורה ולהזהיר העם שלא יעברו עליה. כמו שאמר האחרון שבהן זכרו תורת משה עבדי. וכן אם צונו בדברי הרשות כגון לכו למקום פלוני או אל תלכו. עשו מלחמה היום או אל תעשו. בנו חומה זו או אל תבנוה. מצוה לשמוע לו והעובר על דבריו חייב מיתה בידי שמים שנאמר והיה האיש אשר לא ישמע אל

דברי הנביא אשר ידבר בשמי אנכי אדרוש מעמו:

If it is true [that this new prophet will not change any of the laws of Judaism] then why does it say in the Torah (Devarim 18:18) "I will establish someone like you (Moshe) for the [Jewish people] from among their midst?" [G-D is] not bringing forth [a new prophet] to make a [new] religion, only to [remind the people] of the commandments of the Torah and to warn the nation not to transgress them. Like it says in [the book] of the last [prophet] (Malachi 3:22) "Remember the Torah of Moshe, my servant." Additionally, if the [prophet]commands us with regard to a matter [that the Torah does not speak about], for example go to such and such place or do not go, or wage war today or do not wage war, or build this wall or do not build it, then it is a commandment to listen to him and anyone who transgresses his command is worthy of the death penalty from Heaven, for it says (Devarim 18:19) "And it will be the man that does not listen to the [new] prophet's words that are spoken in My name, I will interrogate him."

The Rambam now tells us the authority of the new prophet and his use. A new prophet can not erase what had been previously established, he can only add additional ancillary commandments that, according to the Rambam's examples, are for that specific time and situation. This is keeping in line with the commandment that one is neither allowed to add or subtract from the Torah (Rambam Safer Shoftim in hilchos mamarim). The Rambam continuously makes this point to show that a true Torah observant Jew could never even consider christianity or Islam as this would require someone to believe that a later prophet is coming to essentially change the previous commandments. No matter what these "prophets" do, a Torah observant Jew can not believe them. The new prophet could perform great miracles or have convincing arguments, but nothing can change the previously established commandments.

This idea brings up one of the Rambam's main ideas (Yisodei Hatorah Perek 1 Mishna 11) "[G-D] never changes, since there is nothing that can cause Him to change." The idea that a prophet would come along and tell the Jewish people that certain commandments in the Torah are no longer to be followed would go against this basic concept of the Rambam. G-D does not change, therefore, it is impossible within the Rambam's conception of G-D that the religion that G-D created could experience any permanent change. It must be that when the Torah was initially given by Moshe, it was complete and would never be significantly altered.

The main utility of a new prophet is to remind us of the true Torah laws and that we should keep them. The additional use is that they can help guide us in matters of current events that are transient in nature like whether we need to build up protection for a future assault or if that will be seen as an aggression (build a wall or not), avoid a specific area or leave a specific area because of a future calamity (do not go to a certain place or do go), or perform a preemptive strike on an enemy or not (wage war or not). These concepts would not be found in the Torah as they are only appropriate for a specific time period and the Torah only contains that which is eternal and not bound to specific time periods. For example, war strategy against the Romans is only relevant against the Romans. Once that kingdom is gone or before they exist, there is no reason to speak of them. However, the commandments about sacrifices are relevant in any generation that has a Temple (Beis hamikdash), that is relevant in the first temple period, second temple period and it will be relevant again during the third temple period.

Breaks In Tradition, Rabbinic Authority, and The Reasons For the Commandments

2015-10-02T16:33:00.000-04:00

In Lawrence Schiffman's "Texts and Traditions: A Source Reader for the Study of Second Temple and Rabbinic Judaism." He brings up an idea about biblical interpretation that made me think about the oral tradition and whether it was a truly unbroken chain, given down from teacher to student, from Moses until today. First, let us look at the verses in the Torah that deal with the holiday of Succos (Vayikra 23:40-43):


מ וּלְקַחְתֶּם לָכֶם בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן, פְּרִי עֵץ הָדָר כַּפֹּת תְּמָרִים, וַעֲנַף עֵץ-עָבֹת, וְעַרְבֵי-נָחַל; וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם, לִפְנֵי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם--שִׁבְעַת יָמִים.	40 And you shall take on the first day fruit of the beautiful tree, branches of palm-trees, and leaves of thick trees, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the LORD your God seven days.
מא וְחַגֹּתֶם אֹתוֹ חַג לַיהוָה, שִׁבְעַת יָמִים בַּשָּׁנָה: חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם, בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי תָּחֹגּוּ אֹתוֹ.	41 And you shall celebrate a celebration unto the LORD seven days of the year; it is a statute forever, for generations; In the seventh month you shall celebrate it.
מב בַּסֻּכֹּת תֵּשְׁבוּ, שִׁבְעַת יָמִים; כָּל-הָאֶזְרָח, בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, יֵשְׁבוּ, בַּסֻּכֹּת.	42 You shall dwell in booths seven days; all that are home-born in Israel shall dwell in booths;
מג לְמַעַן, יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם, כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם: אֲנִי, יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם.	43 In order that your generations may know that I made the children of Israel dwell in booths when I brought them out of the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.

In the current tradition, we know that verse 40 is referring to the commandment of taking the Lulav

and Esrog. Therefore, we know these verses are teaching us that on Succos we have two main commandments, the taking of the Lulav with the Esrog and dwelling in booths. However, what if the interpretation of the verses was that the booths are to be made from the four species? What if these verses were all referring to only one commandment?

This is in fact what happened in the days of Ezra and Nechemia, at the beginning of the return of the exiles, according to Lawrence Schiffman. As it states in the book of Nechemia (8:14-17):

14And they found written in the Torah that the Lord had commanded, by the hand of Moses, that the Children of Israel dwell in booths on the festival in the seventh month.		ידוַיִּמְצְאוּ כָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה אֲשֶׁר יֵשְׁבוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בַּסֻּכּוֹת בֶּחָג בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי:
15And that they should announce and proclaim in all their cities and in Jerusalem, saying, "Go out to the mountain and bring olive leaves and leaves of oil trees, myrtle leaves, date palm leaves, and leaves of plaited trees, to make booths, as it is written."		טווַאֲשֶׁר יַשְׁמִיעוּ וְיַעֲבִירוּ קוֹל בְּכָל עָרֵיהֶם וּבִירוּשָׁלִַם לֵאמֹר צְאוּ הָהָר וְהָבִיאוּ עֲלֵי זַיִת וַעֲלֵי עֵץ שֶׁמֶן וַעֲלֵי הֲדָס וַעֲלֵי תְמָרִים וַעֲלֵי עֵץ עָבֹת לַעֲשׂת סֻכֹּת כַּכָּתוּב:
16And the people went forth and brought [these items] and made booths for themselves, each one on his roof and in their courts and in the courts of the House of God, and in the square of the Water Gate, and in the square of the Gate of Ephraim.		טזוַיֵּצְאוּ הָעָם וַיָּבִיאוּ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ לָהֶם סֻכּוֹת אִישׁ עַל גַּגּוֹ וּבְחַצְרֹתֵיהֶם וּבְחַצְרוֹת בֵּית הָאֱלֹהִים וּבִרְחוֹב שַׁעַר הַמַּיִם וּבִרְחוֹב שַׁעַר אֶפְרָיִם:
17And all the congregation of the returnees from the captivity made booths and dwelt in the booths, for they had not done so from the days of Joshua the son of Nun until that day, and there was exceedingly great joy.		יזוַיַּעֲשׂוּ כָל הַקָּהָל הַשָּׁבִים מִן הַשְּׁבִי \| סֻכּוֹת וַיֵּשְׁבוּ בַסֻּכּוֹת כִּי לֹא עָשׂוּ מִימֵי יֵשׁוּעַ בִּן נוּן כֵּן בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל עַד הַיּוֹם הַהוּא וַתְּהִי שִׂמְחָה גְּדוֹלָה מְאֹד:

First, in this story there is no mention of the lulav and esrog, which one would expect to find if they are discussing how great the observance of the holiday was. Second, in verse 15 it seems like all the materials they are gathering is only for the building of the Sukkah, not the lulav. Lastly, verse 14 uses the language of "finding," which is used when something new is discovered. Had they possessed a tradition of how to celebrate the Succos holiday, the verse would not have used the language of "finding." Therefore, the Rabbis of the time interpreted the verse as they saw fit, and that is why this holiday was, seemingly, celebrated without the commandment of lulav and esrog.

But, perhaps Lawrence Schiffman is incorrect and his analysis is off base. Nevertheless, there are other examples in the bible that appear to say the traditions of Judaism do not proceed from Moses onward in an unbroken fashion. For example, in Kings II (22:8-14) it says:

8And Hilkiah the high priest said to Shaphan the scribe, "I have found the Scroll of the Law in the house of the Lord," and Hilkiah gave the scroll to Shaphan, and he read it.		חוַיֹּאמֶר חִלְקִיָּהוּ הַכֹּהֵן הַגָּדוֹל עַל שָׁפָן הַסֹּפֵר סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה מָצָאתִי בְּבֵית יְהֹוָה וַיִּתֵּן חִלְקִיָּה אֶת הַסֵּפֶר אֶל שָׁפָן וַיִּקְרָאֵהוּ:
9And Shaphan the scribe came to the king and brought back word to the king, and said, "Your servants have melted the silver that was found in the Temple, and they have given it into the hands of the foremen of the work who were appointed over the house of the Lord.		טוַיָּבֹא שָׁפָן הַסֹּפֵר אֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ וַיָּשֶׁב אֶת הַמֶּלֶךְ דָּבָר וַיֹּאמֶר הִתִּיכוּ עֲבָדֶיךָ אֶת הַכֶּסֶף הַנִּמְצָא בַבַּיִת וַיִּתְּנֻהוּ עַל יַד עֹשֵֹי הַמְּלָאכָה הַמֻּפְקָדִים בֵּית יְהֹוָה:
10And Shaphan the scribe told the king, saying, "Hilkiah the priest gave me a scroll," And Shaphan read it before the king.		יוַיַּגֵּד שָׁפָן הַסֹּפֵר לַמֶּלֶךְ לֵאמֹר סֵפֶר נָתַן לִי חִלְקִיָּה הַכֹּהֵן וַיִּקְרָאֵהוּ שָׁפָן לִפְנֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ:
11And it was when the king heard the words of the scroll of the Law, that he rent his garments.		יאוַיְהִי כִּשְׁמֹעַ הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶת דִּבְרֵי סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה ויִּקְרַע אֶת בְּגָדָיו:

Here again we have the language of "finding" which implies that some new information was presented. However, with this source we do not need to rely upon our own interpretation. The Radak explains what happened. Radak (verse 8):

ספר התורה מצאתי בבית ה׳. דרשו כי אחז שרף את התור׳ והטמינו מפניו ספר תורה אחת והטמינוהו תחת הנדבך ועכשיו מצא חלק׳ ספר התורה הזח ורחוק הוא זה שחזקיהו שבא אחריו שרבצ תורה בישראל איך לא הוציאו וכמה ספרי תורה הניח חזקיהו במיתו אלא מנשה מלך זמן רב שהרי מלך נ״ה שנה ועשה הרע בעיני ה׳ כתועבות הגוים ובנה מזבחות לע״ג בבית ה׳ ודוא השכיח התור׳ מישראל ואין פונה אליה כי כלם היו פונים אל האלהים אחרים ואל תקית הגוים ובנ״ה שנה נשתכחה התור׳
I found a Torah scroll in the house of G-D. The [background] explanation is that Achaz burnt the Torah and one torah scroll was hidden from him, out of sight. It was hidden under stone wall (or idolatrous temple area) and now Chilkiah found this torah scroll. This incident is difficult to understand, because Chizkiyahu, who came after [Achaz] disseminated Torah throughout Israel, so how could they not find this Torah. Also, how many Torahs did Chizkiyahu leave [in the midst of Israel] when he died? Rather, Menashe ruled for a long time, he was king for 55 years, and he did such evil in the eyes of G-D, like the wicked deeds of the nations, and built alters for idol worship. He caused Israel to abandoned the Torah and they did not turn to G-D, because all of them were turning to idols and to the ways of the nations. So, after 55 years, the Torah was forgotten.

Here, we can see the Radak claiming that the tradition from Moses had been lost. Clearly, any oral tradition or explanation of the plain meaning of the written text was not found in these days. Thus, showing a broken link in the chain of a tradition from Moses.

This break in the link of tradition is not unique to biblical sources. In the Gemara, while speaking of the tradition of which plant is the Aravos (willow-branch) it states (Sukkah 44a):

א׳׳ל ר׳ זירא לר׳ אבהו מי א״ר יוחנן הכי והא״ר יוחנן משום ר׳ נחוניא איש בקעת בית חורתן עשר נטיעות ערבה וניסוך המים הלכה למשה מסיני אשתומם כשעה חדא ואמר שכחום וחזרו ויסדום
R. Zera to R. Abbahu, Did R. Johanan really say this? Did R. Johanan not say in the name of R. Nehunya of the Plain of Beth Hawartan that ‘the law of the ten plants, the willow-branch and the water libation were given to Moses on Mount Sinai’? [The other] was appalled for a moment and then he answered, They were forgotten and then they were re-instituted.

Rashi here states:

שכחום. בגלות בבל שכחו את התורה והמצות במקצת וזו נשכחה לגמרי.
They were forgotten: During the exile in Babylonia they forgot part of the Torah and the commandments and this [teaching of what the Aravos were] was completely forgot.

This idea is stated in other places in the Gemara as well. The following example is a discussion of when to use the closed form vs the open form of a letter (like a mem sofit vs a regular mem) (Shabbos 104a):

לא הוה ידעין הי באמצע תיבה הי בסוף תיבה ואתו צופים תקנינהו ואכתי אלה המצות שאין הנביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה אלא שכחום וחזרו ויסדום
People did not know which form came in the middle of a word and which one at the end, and the Watchmen came and ordained that the open forms should be in the middle of a word and the closed forms at the end. Still, [the text states] ‘these are the commandments’, which implies that no prophet is permitted to introduce an innovation hereafter? Rather, [we must say] this law [was in fact from heaven, but] was forgotten and the Watchmen established them again.

The point of this is to show that there is no unbroken chain from Moses to us with regards to the oral Torah. In fact, there are very few laws that were given over to Moses from Sinai. That is why the Gemara only has certain laws that we say they were a Halacha L'Moshe Mi'Sinai (A law given to Moses at Sinai from G-D). The rest of the laws are derived from logical discourse of the Rabbis.

There is no better illustration of this than the story of the Oven of Aknai (Babba Metzeia 59b) where there was a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis:

וזה הוא תנור של עכנאי מאי עכנאי אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שהקיפו דברים כעכנא זו וטמאוהו תנא באותו היום השיב רבי אליעזר כל תשובות שבעולם ולא קיבלו הימנו אמר להם אם הלכה כמותי חרוב זה יוכיח נעקר חרוב ממקומו מאה אמה ואמרי לה ארבע מאות אמה אמרו לו אין מביאין ראיה מן החרוב חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי אמת המים יוכיחו חזרו אמת המים לאחוריהם אמרו לו אין מביאין ראיה מאמת המים חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי כותלי בית המדרש יוכיחו הטו כותלי בית המדרש ליפול גער בהם רבי יהושע אמר להם אם תלמידי חכמים מנצחים זה את זה בהלכה אתם מה טיבכם לא נפלו מפני כבודו של רבי יהושע ולא זקפו מפני כבודו של ר״א ועדיין מטין ועומדין חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי מן השמים יוכיחו יצאתה בת קול ואמרה מה לכם אצל ר״א שהלכה כמותו בכ״מ עמד רבי יהושע על רגליו ואמר לא בשמים היא מאי לא בשמים היא אמר רבי ירמיה שכבר נתנה תורה מהר סיני אין אנו משגיחין בבת קול שכבר כתבת בהר סיני בתורה אחרי רבים להטות
This was the oven of 'Aknai. Why Aknai? Rav Yehuda said in Samuel's name: [It means] that they encompassed it with arguments as a snake, and proved it unclean. It has been taught: On that day R. Eliezer brought forward every imaginable argument, but they did not accept them. He said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let this carob tree prove it!' Thereupon the carob tree was torn a hundred cubits out of its place. Others say, four hundred cubits. 'No proof can be brought from a carob tree,' they retorted. Again he said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let the stream of water prove it!' Whereupon the stream of water flowed backwards. 'No proof can be brought from a stream of water,' they rejoined argued. Again he urged: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let the walls of the schoolhouse prove it,' whereupon the walls inclined to fall. But R. Joshua rebuked them, saying: 'When scholars are engaged in a halachic dispute, how can you interfere?' So they did not fall, in honor of R. Joshua, nor did they resume the upright, in honour of R. Eliezer; and they are still standing this way. Again he said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let it be proved from Heaven!' Whereupon a Heavenly Voice cried out: 'Why do you dispute R. Eliezer, seeing that in all matters the halachah agrees with him?!' But R. Joshua arose and exclaimed: 'It is not in heaven.' What did he mean by this? R. Jeremiah said: The Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because you have already written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, After the majority must one incline.

This story teaches us something incredible, that it doesn't matter what G-D originally intended for the Halacha to be, rather it only matters how the Rabbis interpret the Torah. The tradition that we have is not an unbroken chain of what G-D said to Moses, but of the leadership of the Rabbis telling us what they think the law should be based on the written word using their logic.

This idea is not new, in fact, it is stated straight out in the bible itself (Devarim 17:9-11):

9And you shall come to the Levitic kohanim and to the judge who will be in those days, and you shall inquire, and they will tell you the words of judgment.		טוּבָאתָ אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם וְאֶל הַשֹּׁפֵט אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם וְדָרַשְׁתָּ וְהִגִּידוּ לְךָ אֵת דְּבַר הַמִּשְׁפָּט:
10And you shall do according to the word they tell you, from the place the Lord will choose, and you shall observe to do according to all they instruct you.		יוְעָשִׂיתָ עַל פִּי הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה וְשָׁמַרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ:
11According to the law they instruct you and according to the judgment they say to you, you shall do; you shall not divert from the word they tell you, either right or left.		יאעַל פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ וְעַל הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֲשֶׁר יֹאמְרוּ לְךָ תַּעֲשֶׂה לֹא תָסוּר מִן הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל:

Rashi on verse 11 here even tells us (from chabad.org):

either right or left,: Even if this judge tells you that right is left, and that left is right. How much more so, if he tells you that right is right, and left is left!- [Sifrei]

ימין ושמאל: אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל ועל שמאל שהוא ימין, וכל שכן שאומר לך על ימין ימין ועל שמאל שמאל:

To further drive home this point, I will bring in the Rambam in the Sefer HaMitzvos (312th negative commandment):

The 312th prohibition is that we are forbidden from disagreeing with the Sages who pass down the Oral Tradition (may they rest in peace), or from deviating from any of their instructions in Torah matters. The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement (exalted be He), "Do not stray from the word that they declare to you."

And the 174th positive commandment:

The 174th mitzvah is that we are commanded to obey the Beis Din HaGadol and act in accordance with all their instructions regarding what is prohibited and what is permitted. There is no difference whether it is something they received by Oral Tradition; derived using one of the principle of Torah extrapolation; decreed in order to correct some laxity or in response to some other situation where they found it appropriate and that it would strengthen Torah observance. We are required to obey all such directives and to act in accordance with their words, not to transgress them.The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement (exalted be He), "You must keep the Torah as they interpret it for you [and follow the laws that they legislate for you]."

The Rambam is telling us that the Rabbis are the keepers of the tradition and that, although there is no unbroken chain for all the laws, there is an unbroken tradition of following the great Rabbis of the generation. Those are our leaders and they are the ones we must follow.

Still, why would G-D set up our religion in this manner? Are we not looking for the truth? Don't we want to know what G-D actually said to Moses? This setup seems to be telling us that G-D's original intention when giving the commandments to Moses is irrelevant. So then, what is the purpose of giving the Jewish people the commandments?

There is an argument in Babba Metzeia (115a) that is based on whether the commandents have reasons behind them (like to make us better people) or if they are just for us to perform because G-D told us to perform them:

אלמנה בין שהיא ענייה בין שהיא עשירה אין ממשכנין אותה שנאמר לא תחבול בגד אלמנה: גמ' ת״ר אלמנה בין שהיא ענייה בין שהיא עשירה אין ממשכנין אותה דברי ר׳ יהודה ר״ש אומר עשירה ממשכנין אותה ענייה אין ממשכנין אותה שאתה חייב להחזיר לה ואתה משיאה שם רע בשכנותיה למימרא דר׳ יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ור״ש דריש טעמא דקרא והא איפכא שמעינן להו דתניא ולא ירבה לו נשים ר׳ יהודה אומר מרבה הוא ובלבד שלא יהו מסירות את לבו ר״ש אומר אפילו אחת והיא מסירה את לבו ה״ז לא ישאנה א״כ מה ת״ל ולא ירבה לו נשים אפילו כאביגיל לעולם ר׳ יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ושאני הכא דמפרש קרא ולא ירבה לו נשים ולא יסור מאי טעמא לא ירבה לו נשים משום דלא יסור ור״ש מכדי בעלמא דרשינן טעמא דקרא לכתוב רחמנא לא ירבה ולא בעינן לא יסור ואנא ידענא מאי טעמא לא ירבה משום דלא יסור לא יסור דכתב רחמנא למה לי אפילו אחת ומסירה את לבו הרי זה לא ישאנה:
MISHNAH. A MAN MAY NOT TAKE A PLEDGE FROM A WIDOW, WHETHER SHE BE RICH OR POOR, FOR IT IS WRITTEN, THOU SHALT NOT TAKE A WIDOW'S RAIMENT TO PLEDGE. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Whether a widow is rich or poor, no pledge may be taken from her: this is R. Judah's opinion. R. Simeon said: A wealthy widow we take pledges from, but not a poor one, for you are bound to return [the pledge] to her, and you bring her into disrepute among her neighbors. Now, shall we say that R. Judah does not interpret the reason of the Writ (reason for the commandments), while R. Simeon does? But we know their opinions to be the reverse. For we learned: Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, [that his heart turn not away]; R. Judah said: He may multiply [wives], providing that they do not turn his heart away. R. Simeon said: He may not take to wife even a single one who is likely to turn his heart away; what then is taught by the verse, Neither shall he multiply wives to himself? Even such as Abigail! In truth, R. Judah does not Interpret the reason of Scripture; but here it is different, because Scripture itself states the reason: Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, and his heart shall not turn away. Thus, why ‘shall he not multiply wives to himself’? So ‘that his heart turn not away.’ And R. Simeon [argues thus]: Let us consider. As a general rule, we interpret the Scriptural reason: then Scripture should have written, ‘Neither shall he multiply [etc.].’ but ‘and his heart shall not turn away’ is superfluous, for I would know myself that the reason why he must not multiply is that his heart may not turn away. Why then is ‘shall not turn away’ [explicitly] stated? To teach that he must not marry even a single one who may turn his heart.

Here, the Gemara is introducing us to a fundamental argument, do the commandments have underlying LOGICAL reasons? Rebbe Shimon believes they do and Rebbe Yehuda does not. This leads to a statement made by Rambam (The Guide for The Perplexed in Part 3 Chapter 48):

When in the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the phrase, "Thy mercy extendeth to young birds," it is the expression of the one of the two opinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts of the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the other opinion [that the Laws have reasons].

The Rambam is telling us that, as a general rule, we follow the commandments and interpret them with the idea that they have underlying reasons, not just that G-D told us to do them. This is further elucidated by the Rambam (Guide for the perplexed Part 3 Chapter 31 Friedlander translation):

There are persons who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the commandments, and consider it right to assume that the commandments and prohibitions have no rational basis whatever... On the contrary, the sole object of the Law is to benefit us. Thus we explained the Scriptural passage, "for our good always, that He might preserve us alive, as it is this day" (Deut. vi. 24). Again, "which shall hear all those statutes (ḥuḳḳim), and say, surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people" (ibid. iv. 6). He thus says that even every one of these "statutes" convinces all nations of the wisdom and understanding it includes. But if no reason could be found for these statutes, if they produced no advantage and removed no evil, why then should he who believes in them and follows them be wise, reasonable, and so excellent as to raise the admiration of all nations? But the truth is undoubtedly as we have said, that every one of the six hundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcate some truth, to remove some erroneous opinion, to establish proper relations in society, to diminish evil, to train in good manners or to warn against bad habits. All this depends on three things: opinions, morals, and social conduct. We do not count words, because precepts, whether positive or negative, if they relate to speech, belong to those precepts which regulate our social conduct, or to those which spread truth, or to those which teach morals. Thus these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every one of the Divine commandments.

The commandments are there to make us morally, socially and emotionally better people. This is why the Rabbis are given such great power over the law, because they are supposed to guide us as to how best to understand the laws in a way that will improve us and update our morals and social constructs with an evolving society. The best example of the Rabbis doing this can be found in the Gemara in Babba Kamma (83b):

אמאי? עין תחת עין אמר רחמנא אימא עין ממש לא סלקא דעתך דתניא יכול סימא את עינו מסמא את עינו קטע את ידו מקטע את ידו שיבר את רגלו משבר את רגלו ת״ל מכה אדם ומכה בהמה מה מכה בהמה לתשלומין אף מכה אדם לתשלומין ואם נפשך לומר הרי הוא אומר לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח אשר הוא רשע למות לנפש רוצח אי אתה לוקח כופר אבל אתה לוקח כופר לראשי אברים שאין חוזרין
Why [pay compensation]? Does the Divine Law not say ‘Eye for eye’? Why not take this literally to mean [putting out] the eye [of the offender]? — Let not this enter your mind, since it has been taught: You might think that where he put out his eye, the offender's eye should be put out, or where he cut off his arm, the offender's arm should be cut off, or again where he broke his leg, the offender's leg should be broken. [Not so; for the Torah] comes to teach , ‘He that smiteth any man. . .’ ‘And he that smiteth a beast . . .’ just as in the case of smiting a beast compensation is to be paid, so also in the case of smiting a man compensation is to be paid. And should this [reason] not satisfy you, note that it is stated, ‘Moreover you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death’, implying that it is only for the life of a murderer that you may not take ‘satisfaction’, whereas you may take ‘satisfaction’ [even] for the principal limbs, though these cannot be restored.’

Here we see the Rabbis using one of the logical principles for biblical exegesis to teach that a barbaric act, taking an eye for an eye, should not be followed. They instead reinterpret the verse in a non-literal way in order to morally improve this law. This could only be done if we believe that there are reasons for the commandments, because then man can use his logic to try and figure out the reason. With the goal being moral, social and emotional improvement, that Rambam tells us, the Rabbis can then interpret the law following these guidelines. (Also, other laws that point out this idea are multiple wives and slavery that are no longer acceptable in Judaism)

Lastly, I want to share the words of the Meiri in his Sefer Hamidos:

Fulfilling the Mitzvos (Commandments) with the intent that they are being performed to serve the creator is sufficient for the masses and the nation. However, it is proper for individuals to try and understand all that is possible, according to their capabilities, [with regard to what are the reason for the Mitzvos]. As it says in Psalms (119:66), "Teach me good reason and knowledge; for I have believed in Your Mitzvos (commandments)." What [Psalms] means is that even though I believe in Your Mitzvos and I fulfill all of the Torah, I request to know the reason and wisdom [behind] them. This is not in order to doubt the witnesses that have testified that these Mitzvos are true, because I already believe in them. Also, my belief (emunah) does not rely on the study of these things to the extent that if I found a good connection I would believe or if I found something I considered a lie I would deny them, because this is Kefira (Heresy) and a removal of the religion completely.

The Meiri points out that the most learned of the people (aka the Rabbis) should try and understand the reasons behind the commandments. The reason for this is clear now, the Rabbis need to understand the reasons for the commandments in order for them to interpret the law appropriately. The oral tradition is based on the guiding principle that the Rabbis will lead us to a morally, socially and emotionally improved law. There is no unbroken tradition that teaches us what G-D actually said at Sinai, because it doesn't matter. Lo bashamayim hi, it is not in heaven. The Rabbis are here to guide us in the principles of Judaism through the laws that they interpret in a manner that is forever being tweaked based on our improved understanding of the reasons for the commandments.

Why Does the Story of Yehuda and Tamar Interrupt the Narrative on Yosef

2014-12-10T23:53:00.001-05:00

(Translations from Chabad.org)

In this week's parsha we have the sale of Yosef, the incident of Yehuda with Tamar and then the situation of Yosef with Potifar's wife. A question to ask is why does the story of Yosef's sale get interrupted by Yehuda's shameful story (that seems to have nothing to do with the overall narrative) and then immediately following Yehuda's story we continue the narrative of Yosef by the incident with potifar's wife? Do all three stories really have a lot more to do with one another than it looks like or are they unrelated?

First, we must understand the relationship between Yehuda and Yosef. Yehuda led the brothers to sell Yosef into slavery because, at this point, HE was the leader of the brothers. This can clearly be seen (Genesis 37:26-27),

26. And Judah said to his brothers, "What is the gain if we slay our brother and cover up his blood?		כו. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה אֶל אֶחָיו מַה בֶּצַע כִּי נַהֲרֹג אֶת אָחִינוּ וְכִסִּינוּ אֶת דָּמוֹ:
27. Come, let us sell him to the Ishmaelites, but our hand shall not be upon him, for he is our brother, our flesh." And his brothers hearkened.		כז. לְכוּ וְנִמְכְּרֶנּוּ לַיִּשְׁמְעֵאלִים וְיָדֵנוּ אַל תְּהִי בוֹ כִּי אָחִינוּ בְשָׂרֵנוּ הוּא וַיִּשְׁמְעוּ אֶחָיו:

Therefore, in essence, he was responsible for whatever happened to Yosef. In light of this, we can say that Yehuda was blamed for Yosef's sale (or death) by his father and his brothers. Yehuda came up with the sale AND the lie, as it says (Genesis 37:32),

32. And they sent the fine woolen coat, and they brought [it] to their father, and they said, "We have found this; now recognize whether it is your son's coat or not." לב. וַיְשַׁלְּחוּ אֶת כְּתֹנֶת הַפַּסִּים וַיָּבִיאוּ אֶל אֲבִיהֶם וַיֹּאמְרוּ זֹאת מָצָאנוּ הַכֶּר נָא הַכְּתֹנֶת בִּנְךָ הִוא אִם לֹא:

The brothers state, later on by their trip to Egypt, how much they regret what they did to Yosef (Genesis 42:21),

21. And they said to one another, "Indeed, we are guilty for our brother, that we witnessed the distress of his soul when he begged us, and we did not listen. That is why this trouble has come upon us." כא. וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל אָחִיו אֲבָל אֲשֵׁמִים | אֲנַחְנוּ עַל אָחִינוּ אֲשֶׁר רָאִינוּ צָרַת נַפְשׁוֹ בְּהִתְחַנְנוֹ אֵלֵינוּ וְלֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ עַל כֵּן בָּאָה אֵלֵינוּ הַצָּרָה הַזֹּאת:

This allows us to understand what happened to Yehuda. After the sale, the Torah tells us (Genesis 28:1),

1. Now it came about at that time that Judah was demoted by his brothers, and he turned away until [he came] to an Adullamite man, named Hirah. א. וַיְהִי בָּעֵת הַהִוא וַיֵּרֶד יְהוּדָה מֵאֵת אֶחָיו וַיֵּט עַד אִישׁ עֲדֻלָּמִי וּשְׁמוֹ חִירָה:

The brothers held Yehuda responsible for what they did and they were so distraught that they, essentially, banished him.

Summing up what happened in the first "ACT" of this week's parsha we can see two main things. First, Yehuda was a leader that used his power to commit a grave sin. Secondly, instead of admitting to the sin, he created this elaborate lie to tell his father and had all of his brothers go along with it. So, the first part of this week's parsha focuses on Yehuda's failure to admit to a sin and this, as far as everyone knew, resulted in Yosef's death. As previously stated, this is why Yehuda was "outside of the camp" after the sale of Yosef.

The next "ACT" in this week's parsha is Yehuda's incident with Tamar, that he slept with her and gave her his signet ring and staff. This story does not, as some people think, come to embarrass Yehuda, but rather to exonerate him.

In this occurrence we see Yehuda sin and have relations with a prostitute, as far as he knows (Genesis 38:15-16),

15. When Judah saw her, he thought she was a harlot, because she covered her face.		טו. וַיִּרְאֶהָ יְהוּדָה וַיַּחְשְׁבֶהָ לְזוֹנָה כִּי כִסְּתָה פָּנֶיהָ:
16. So he turned aside toward her to the road, and he said, "Get ready now, I will come to you," for he did not know that she was his daughter in law, and she said, "What will you give me that you should come to me?"		טז. וַיֵּט אֵלֶיהָ אֶל הַדֶּרֶךְ וַיֹּאמֶר הָבָה נָּא אָבוֹא אֵלַיִךְ כִּי לֹא יָדַע כִּי כַלָּתוֹ הִוא וַתֹּאמֶר מַה תִּתֶּן לִי כִּי תָבוֹא אֵלָי:

However, we see that when Tamar is suspected of sinning in a similar way, becoming pregnant with no husband, Yehuda is ready to condemn her to death (Genesis 38:24),

24. Now it came about after nearly three months, that it was told to Judah, saying, "Your daughter in law Tamar has played the harlot, and behold, she is pregnant from harlotry." So Judah said, "Bring her out, and let her be burned." כד. וַיְהִי | כְּמִשְׁלשׁ חֳדָשִׁים וַיֻּגַּד לִיהוּדָה לֵאמֹר זָנְתָה תָּמָר כַּלָּתֶךָ וְגַם הִנֵּה הָרָה לִזְנוּנִים וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה הוֹצִיאוּהָ וְתִשָּׂרֵף:

It seems a little strange that someone who sinned in a similar manner would be so fast to condemn another in a similar situation. But, this is just human nature. If someone sins in private then they are usually more likely to condemn that sin publicly than someone who is not even involved with that sin.

In any case, when Tamar sends Yehuda his signet ring and staff he immediately confesses to his sin and to Tamar's righteousness, the exact opposite of how he dealt with Yosef's sale (Genesis 38:25-26),

25. She was taken out, and she sent to her father in law, saying, "From the man to whom these belong I am pregnant," and she said, "Please recognize whose signet ring, cloak, and staff are these?"		כה. הִוא מוּצֵאת וְהִיא שָׁלְחָה אֶל חָמִיהָ לֵאמֹר לְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר אֵלֶּה לּוֹ אָנֹכִי הָרָה וַתֹּאמֶר הַכֶּר נָא לְמִי הַחֹתֶמֶת וְהַפְּתִילִים וְהַמַּטֶּה הָאֵלֶּה:
26. Then Judah recognized [them], and he said, "She is right, [it is] from me, because I did not give her to my son Shelah." But he no longer continued to be intimate with her.		כו. וַיַּכֵּר יְהוּדָה וַיֹּאמֶר צָדְקָה מִמֶּנִּי כִּי עַל כֵּן לֹא נְתַתִּיהָ לְשֵׁלָה בְנִי וְלֹא יָסַף עוֹד לְדַעְתָּהּ:

In fact, this occurrence proves that Yehuda had done teshuva on his previous actions. By Yosef, Yehuda lied to his father by the sin, but by Tamar, even though it was the most embarrassing thing he could have done, he admitted to his misdeed. Yehuda showed that he had changed his ways and therefore was reaccepted by the brothers and, to this day, the leader of the Jewish people is supposed to come from Yehuda. Thus, the Yehuda type of leader is a leader that makes mistakes, but can admit to them and correct themselves when in error.

Yosef had a very different problem from the one Yehuda had, he was being pursued by his master's wife. However, Yosef never gave in to temptation and was sent to jail because of his integrity. It seems a little backwards here, Yehuda sinned by sleeping with a harlot and admitted to it and was thereby forgiven, but Yosef never gave in to a married woman and was punished for his celibacy? How does that work?

The way I want to explain this is based on Rashi. Rashi says that Yosef, even in the house of Yaakov, would always make himself look nice and beautiful (Rashi Genesis 37:2),

and he was a lad: He behaved childishly, fixing his hair and touching up his eyes so that he would appear handsome. [From Gen. Rabbah 84:7] והוא נער: שהיה עושה מעשה נערות, מתקן בשערו ממשמש בעיניו, כדי שיהיה נראה יפה:

Basically, Yosef was a little vain, according to Rashi. This might have also been the source as to why Yosef told the brothers his dreams, because he was a little vain.

Later, we see that Yosef was in a household where the master's wife would always try to seduce him. Perhaps Yosef should not have been making himself look nice all the time and thereby Potifar's wife would have stopped pursuing him (Rashi Genesis 39:6),

and Joseph had handsome features: As soon as Joseph found himself [in the position of] ruler, he began eating and drinking and curling his hair. Said the Holy One, blessed be He: “Your father is mourning and you curl your hair! I will incite the bear against you.” Immediately afterwards“his master’s wife lifted up her eyes.” [from Tanchuma Vayeshev 8] ויהי יוסף יפה תואר: כיון שראה עצמו מושל, התחיל אוכל ושותה ומסלסל בשערו, אמר הקב"ה אביך מתאבל ואתה מסלסל בשערך, אני מגרה בך את הדוב מיד:

We see from here that, at this point, Yosef had not changed his ways, he was the same. Being sold into slavery never evoked a character change in Yosef. Yehuda, on the other hand, was able to realize his faults and do teshuva. This could be a possible explanation as to why all of these three stories are together and why Yosef was punished, but Yehuda was exonerated. These three stories teach us the power and importance of Teshuva. Yosef did not become humble and change his ways until after he was imprisoned, but Yehuda was able to change his ways once he realized his own hypocrisy.

This difference is seen in two different leaders later on in Tanach as well, King Saul and King David. King Saul had sinned by the war with Amalek by not listening to G-D and then denying his sin. As it says (Samuel 1 15:14-26),

14. And Samuel said, "What then is this bleating of the sheep in my ears? And the lowing of the oxen which I hear?"		יד. וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל וּמֶה קוֹל הַצֹּאן הַזֶּה בְּאָזְנָי וְקוֹל הַבָּקָר אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי שֹׁמֵעַ:
15. And Saul said, "They brought them from the Amalekites, for the people had pity on the best of the sheep, and the oxen, in order to sacrifice to the Lord your God: and the rest we have utterly destroyed."		טו. וַיֹּאמֶר שָׁאוּל מֵעֲמָלֵקִי הֱבִיאוּם אֲשֶׁר חָמַל הָעָם עַל מֵיטַב הַצֹּאן וְהַבָּקָר לְמַעַן זְבֹחַ לַיהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְאֶת הַיּוֹתֵר הֶחֱרַמְנוּ:
16. And Samuel said to Saul, "Desist, and I shall tell you what the Lord spoke to me last night." And he said to him, "Speak."		טז. וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל אֶל שָׁאוּל הֶרֶף וְאַגִּידָה לְּךָ אֵת אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהֹוָה אֵלַי הַלָּיְלָה וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ דַּבֵּר:
17. And Samuel said, "Even if you are small in your own eyes, are you not the head of the tribes of Israel? And the Lord anointed you as king over Israel.		יז. וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל הֲלוֹא אִם קָטֹן אַתָּה בְּעֵינֶיךָ רֹאשׁ שִׁבְטֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אָתָּה וַיִּמְשָׁחֲךָ יְהֹוָה לְמֶלֶךְ עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל:
18. And the Lord sent you on a mission, and said, 'Go, and you shall utterly destroy the sinners, the Amalekites, and you shall wage war against them until they destroy them.'		יח. וַיִּשְׁלָחֲךָ יְהֹוָה בְּדָרֶךְ וַיֹּאמֶר לֵךְ וְהַחֲרַמְתָּה אֶת הַחַטָּאִים אֶת עֲמָלֵק וְנִלְחַמְתָּ בוֹ עַד כַּלּוֹתָם אֹתָם:
19. Now, why did you not hearken to the voice of the Lord, but you flew upon the spoil, and you did what was evil in the eyes of the Lord?"		יט. וְלָמָּה לֹא שָׁמַעְתָּ בְּקוֹל יְהֹוָה וַתַּעַט אֶל הַשָּׁלָל וַתַּעַשׂ הָרַע בְּעֵינֵי יְהֹוָה:
20. And Saul said to Samuel, "Yes, I did hearken to the voice of the Lord. I did go on the mission on which the Lord sent me, and I brought Agag, the king of Amalek alive, and have utterly destroyed the Amalekites.		כ. וַיֹּאמֶר שָׁאוּל אֶל שְׁמוּאֵל אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַעְתִּי בְּקוֹל יְהֹוָה וָאֵלֵךְ בַּדֶּרֶךְ אֲשֶׁר שְׁלָחַנִי יְהֹוָה וָאָבִיא אֶת אֲגַג מֶלֶךְ עֲמָלֵק וְאֶת עֲמָלֵק הֶחֱרַמְתִּי:
21. And the people took from the spoil, sheep and oxen, the best of the ban, to sacrifice to your God in Gilgal."		כא. וַיִּקַּח הָעָם מֵהַשָּׁלָל צֹאן וּבָקָר רֵאשִׁית הַחֵרֶם לִזְבֹּחַ לַיהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בַּגִּלְגָּל:
22. And Samuel said, "Has the Lord (as much) desire in burnt offerings and peace-offerings, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than a peace-offering; to hearken (is better) than the fat of rams.		כב. וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל הַחֵפֶץ לַיהֹוָה בְּעֹלוֹת וּזְבָחִים כִּשְׁמֹעַ בְּקוֹל יְהֹוָה הִנֵּה שְׁמֹעַ מִזֶּבַח טוֹב לְהַקְשִׁיב מֵחֵלֶב אֵילִים:
23. For rebellion is as the sin of divination, and stubbornness is as idolatry and teraphim. Since you rejected the word of the Lord, He has rejected you from being a king."		כג. כִּי חַטַּאת קֶסֶם מֶרִי וְאָוֶן וּתְרָפִים הַפְצַר יַעַן מָאַסְתָּ אֶת דְּבַר יְהֹוָה וַיִּמְאָסְךָ מִמֶּלֶךְ:
24. And Saul said to Samuel, "I have sinned, for I transgressed the Lord's command, and your words, for I feared the people, and I hearkened to their voice.		כד. וַיֹּאמֶר שָׁאוּל אֶל שְׁמוּאֵל חָטָאתִי כִּי עָבַרְתִּי אֶת פִּי יְהֹוָה וְאֶת דְּבָרֶיךָ כִּי יָרֵאתִי אֶת הָעָם וָאֶשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלָם:
25. And now, forgive now my sin, and return with me, and I shall prostrate myself to the Lord."		כה. וְעַתָּה שָֹא נָא אֶת חַטָּאתִי וְשׁוּב עִמִּי וְאֶשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לַיהֹוָה:
26. And Samuel said to Saul, "I shall not return with you, for you have rejected the word of the Lord, and the Lord has rejected you from being a king over Israel."		כו. וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל אֶל שָׁאוּל לֹא אָשׁוּב עִמָּךְ כִּי מָאַסְתָּה אֶת דְּבַר יְהֹוָה וַיִּמְאָסְךָ יְהֹוָה מִהְיוֹת מֶלֶךְ עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל:

This is similar to Yosef. Saul was a humble person and because of his inability to control his humbleness he allowed himself to sin. Not only did he sin, but he denied the fact that he was doing the wrong thing. Yosef, too, could not even realize that beautifying himself was the wrong thing to do.

However, the story of Dovid shows someone who sinned, a terrible sin as is explained elsewhere on this blog (http://markset565.blogspot.com/2010/06/what-happened-between-bas-bat-sheva-and.html), was able to immediately repent when his errors are pointed out to him. He did not deny the sin, but immediately accepted the rebuke and changed because of it.

This is the lesson we must take away, Saul and Yosef were great people, but they could not understand where they were lacking. This is why Yosef not only was sold into slavery, but was then thrown into jail, and why Saul lost his kingship. However, Yehuda and Dovid committed even greater sins than Yosef or Saul, but because they were horrified and disappointed with themselves because of their sins they repented and kept or regained their leadership roles. This just shows how great the act of repentance is.

Rambam- Yesodei HaTorah- Chapter 9 Halacha 1: No Prophet Can Alter The Torah and G-D's Knowledge of the Future

2014-10-07T12:10:00.001-04:00

דבר ברור ומפורש בתורה שהיא מצוה עומדת לעולם ולעולמי עולמים אין לה לא שינוי ולא גרעון ולא תוספת שנאמר את כל הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם אותו תשמרון לעשות לא תוסף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו. ונאמר והנגלות לנו ולבנינו עד עולם לעשות את כל דברי התורה הזאת. הא למדת שכל דברי תורה מצווין אנו לעשותן עד עולם. וכן הוא אומר חוקת עולם לדורותיכם. ונאמר לא בשמים היא. הא למדת שאין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה. לפיכך אם יעמוד איש בין מן האומות בין מישראל ויעשה אות ומופת ויאמר שה' שלחו להוסיף מצוה או לגרוע מצוה או לפרש במצוה מן המצות פירוש שלא שמענו ממשה. או שאמר שאותן המצות שנצטוו בהן ישראל אינן לעולם ולדורי דורות אלא מצות לפי זמן היו. הרי זה נביא שקר שהרי בא להכחיש נבואתו של משה. ומיתתו בחנק על שהזיד לדבר בשם ה' אשר לא צוהו. שהוא ברוך שמו צוה למשה שהמצוה הזאת לנו ולבנינו עד עולם ולא איש אל ויכזב:

It is a clear [idea] in the Torah that it (the Torah) is a [conglomeration] of commandment[s] that were established to last forever. It is not [meant] to have any changes, deletions, or additions, as it says (Devarim 13:1), "Everything I command you, be careful to do it. You shall neither add to it, nor subtract from it." It also says (Devarim 29:28), " But the revealed things are for us and our children forever: that we must fulfill all the words of this Torah." This is to teach us that all of the words of the Torah are commands for us to perform, forever. It also says (Vayikra 23:14), "An eternal statute throughout your generations."
It also says (Devarim 30:12), "It is not in heaven." This teaches us that the prophet does not have permission to [reveal a] new [law that was not revealed previously.] Therefore, if a prophet arises from among the men of Israel or from among the nations and performs signs and wonders and then says that G-D sent him to add a commandment, to delete a commandment, to explain one of the existing commandments in a way that was not heard from Moshe, or he says the commandments that Israel were commanded to follow were not meant for the generations, but only for a specific time, this [person] is a false prophet because he is coming to contradict the prophecy of Moshe! His death penalty is strangulation because he [falsely claimed] to be speaking in the name of G-D, but he was not really commanded [by G-D.] For, [G-D] commanded Moshe that this testament (the Torah) was for us and our children for eternity and [G-D] is not like a man, who lies.

The Rambam here is introducing us to the idea that once the Torah was given to Moshe, that is the final draft of the Torah. G-D was working on the Torah and was "tweaking it" until he finally gave it to Moshe and the Jews at Mount Sinai. However, once G-D gave the Torah, that was it. There was no more alterations, G-D wanted the Torah that was handed over to be the final draft. Any further alterations were unnecessary. Therefore, if a prophet comes and says, "G-D wanted to tweak the Torah a little more," we call him or her a liar. The reason is because the Torah was given and it is "no longer in heaven!" Man was given the perfect code.

How do we know this code was perfect and no future alterations are necessary? For starters, it was given to us by G-D. If G-D is perfect and omniscient then the code he gave us must apply for all time.

This brings me to an interesting and very important discussion, does G-D know the future and if he does, how can there be free will?

This has been a personal struggle for me and I believe I have a decent explanation. However, first let me state the dilemma clearly. The problem is this: If G-D knows what a person will do, then how does that person have free will to perform that action? Is the person not forced into performing that action because G-D already knows it will occur?

There are three main sources to discuss if you are interested in the rationalist approach to G-D's foreknowledge. The statements made by Rabbi Akiva, the Rambam and the Ralbag. Let's start with Rabbi Akiva.

It states in the name of Rabbi Akiva in Pirkei Avos (Ethics of our fathers, 3:15), "All is foreseen, and freedom of choice is granted." This does not help us understand anything. It is a simple statement that allows us to say that we have freedom of choice, but G-D knows everything. It seems like a contradiction, but it isn't and we must take Rabbi Akiva's word for it. This is a very unsatisfying answer.

The Rambam gives us a little more, but not much. He bases his opinion on his approach to divine attributes (found in The Guide section 1 chapters 51-68). Basically, the Rambam says G-D's foreknowledge does not remove our freedom from our choices (See The Guide section 3 chapter 20). The reason for this is because we don't understand the idea of G-D Knowing something. G-D does not have features that are knowable. We do not have the ability to understand any attributes of G-D, therefore, we can not understand why His knowledge of events does not contradict our free will, but it does not. This answer is more detailed than Rabbi Akiva's, but it is still very unsatisfying.

The Ralbag's answer is intriguing, because he has such a unique approach to G-D's foreknowledge. He explains (In section 3 of The Wars of The Lord) that G-D does not know the future, because the future has not yet occurred, but G-D knows all of the possible outcomes based on different decisions that a person can make.

All three of these answers are difficult to take. Rabbi Akiva does not give any explanations as to why or how his statement is believable. The Rambam gives an explanation that would disallow any type of logic in Judaism, because if we can't really understand anything about G-D how can we truly understand what he said or passed down to us? Finally, the Ralbags approach would take away too much power from G-D. For, if G-D does not know the future, how can His Torah be relevant for all generations and unchangeable, like the Rambam says it is (Granted the Ralbag goes on to explain this difficulty, but the answers are still unsatisfying)?

I think the following approach makes the most sense. All of these previous approaches either lacked a way of explaining something or were the best effort for the thinking of their time. However, if we understand that space and time are finite and G-D exists outside of the finite universe, then we can understand that G-D knows everything that has occurred and everything that will occur. It is similar to watching a movie for the second time, just because I know what is going to happen in the movie, does that make the choices of the person in the movie any less of a choice? Also, it must be that G-D knows all future events in order for the Rambam's approach to be valid, because, as I stated earlier, if G-D did not know the future how could the Torah be unalterable? Obviously, the Torah would need to adjust as reality changed. However, with our approach, using a superficial understanding of space and time, we can somewhat understand how G-D's knowledge of the future works.

Rambam-Mishna Torah Yisodei Hatora Chapter 8 Mishna 3: Why a Prophet's Miracles Do Not Prove Anything

2014-05-04T22:03:00.001-04:00

לפיכך אם עמד הנביא ועשה אותות ומופתים גדולים ובקש להכחיש נבואתו של משה רבינו אין שומעין לו ואנו יודעין בבאור שאותן האותות בלט וכשוף הן. לפי שנבואת משה רבינו אינה על פי האותות כדי שנערוך אותות זה לאותות זה. אלא בעינינו ראינוה ובאזנינו שמענוה כמו ששמע הוא. הא למה הדבר דומה לעדים שהעידו לאדם על דבר שראה בעיניו שאינו כמו שראה שאינו שומע להן אלא יודע בודאי שהן עדי שקר. לפיכך אמרה תורה שאם בא האות והמופת לא תשמע אל דברי הנביא ההוא. שהרי זה בא אליך באות ומופת להכחיש מה שראית בעיניך והואיל ואין אנו מאמינים במופת אלא מפני המצות שצונו משה היאך נקבל מאות זה שבא להכחיש נבואתו של משה שראינו וששמענו:

Therefore, if a prophet arises and performs great wonders and miracles and tries to contradict the prophecy of Moshe, our teacher, we do not listen to him and we know with certainty that those wonders [were performed with] trickery and magic. For, the prophecy of Moshe, our teacher, was not [based] on the signs [he performed] so we could compare this sign to another [prophet's] sign. Rather, we saw with our eyes and heard with our ears like [Moshe] heard. This [prophet that is giving a prophecy that contradicts Moshe's prophecy] is similar to witnesses that testify to a man concerning something that he saw with his own eyes, [but they claim to have] seen something different than what this man saw and different from what this man heard, therefore, this man knows with certainty that these are false witnesses. Therefore, the Torah says that if a false prophet comes with signs and wonders, you should not listen to his words, because this [false prophet] is bringing you signs and wonders to contradict something that you have seen with your own eyes. And since we only believe in wonders because of the commandments that Moshe commanded us, how can we accept this sign that is being brought to contradict the prophecy of Moshe that we saw and we heard?

The Rambam here bases this Mishna on a foundation of his philosophy. The Rambam believes that there is no such thing as an unnatural event that occurs in this world, except for those things that G-D built into creation to be unnatural. This is found in the Rambam's explanation on the Mishna in Avos (Perek 5) that speaks about the ten things that were created on the eve of Sabbath. Over there, the Rambam says that all miracles and wonders are within the realm of the natural.

With this in mind, we can understand his stance that a prophet producing a miracle proves nothing, because this miracle is within the realm of nature. However, the Torah, G-D and Moshe's prophecy are supernatural and thus, "untouchable" by any subsequent prophet. Every miracle is a natural phenomenon and thus can not be used to overrule something supernatural that is experienced with the senses. This is why we believe in miracles only because of Moshe's prophecy, because that is what brought the supernatural into this world. Without Moshe speaking to G-D and the Jewish people witnessing it, we would not believe that anything is supernatural.

Rambam Yesodei HaTorah Chapter 8 Halacha 2- Why There Was No Need For Moshe To Provide Miracles For People To Believe Him

2013-12-01T10:54:00.000-05:00

נמצאו אלו ששולח להן הם העדים על נבואתו שהיא אמת ואינו צריך לעשות להן אות אחר. שהם והוא עדים בדבר כשני עדים שראו דבר אחד ביחד שכל אחד מהן עד לחבירו שהוא אומר אמת ואין אחד מהן צריך להביא ראיה לחבירו. כך משה רבינו כל ישראל עדים לו אחר מעמד הר סיני ואינו צריך לעשות להם אות. וזהו שאמר לו הקב"ה בתחילת נבואתו בעת שנתן לו האותות לעשותן במצרים ואמר לו ושמעו לקולך. ידע משה רבינו שהמאמין על פי האותות יש בלבבו דופי ומהרהר ומחשב והיה נשמט מלילך ואמר והן לא יאמינו לי. עד שהודיעו הקב"ה שאלו האותות אינן אלא עד שיצאו ממצרים ואחר שיצאו ויעמדו על ההר הזה יסתלק הרהור שמהרהרין אחריך שאני נותן לך כאן אות שידעו שאני שלחתיך באמת מתחילה ולא ישאר בלבם הרהור. והוא שהכתוב אומר וזה לך האות כי אנכי שלחתיך בהוציאך את העם ממצרים תעבדון את האלהים על ההר הזה. נמצאת אומר שכל נביא שיעמוד אחר משה רבינו אין אנו מאמינים בו מפני האות לבדו כדי שנאמר אם יעשה אות נשמע לו לכל מה שיאמר. אלא מפני המצוה שצוה משה בתורה ואמר אם נתן אות אליו תשמעון. כמו שצונו לחתוך הדבר על פי שנים עדים ואע"פ שאין אנו יודעין אם העידו אמת אם שקר. כך מצוה לשמוע מזה הנביא אע"פ שאין אנו יודעים אם האות אמת או בכישוף ולט:

We find that [the Jewish people] that [Moshe] was sent to, they were witnesses to his prophecy that it was truth and[, thus, Moshe] did not need to perform another sign for them. For [the Jewish people and Moshe] were witnesses [for his prophecy] similar to two witnesses that see an occurrence together, that both of them are witnesses that the other is speaking the truth and neither of them have to bring proof to each other. Therefore, with regards to Moshe our teacher, all of the Jewish people were witnesses for him after the events of Mt. Sinai and he did not need to perform a sign for them.

[This idea is backed up by the conversation between G-D and Moshe by the burning bush, specifically] this that G-D said to [Moshe] at the beginning of his prophecy, at the time [G-D] was giving [Moshe] the signs that he was to perform in Egypt: And G-D said (Shemos 3:18), "They will listen to your voice." Moshe, our teacher, knew that one who believes because of a sign has fault, suspicion and suspect in his heart. [Therefore, Moshe tried to] abandon [the idea] of going and he said (Shemos 4:1), "They will not believe me."

[Moshe pursued this course] until G-D made it known [by telling Moshe,] that these signs will only last until the [Jewish people] left Egypt. [However,] after [the Jewish people] will leave and they will stand at this mountain (Mt. Sinai) I (G-D) will remove the suspicion that they suspected after you (Moshe) for I will give you a sign here that it will be known that I sent you, in truth, from the beginning and there will not remain in their hearts any suspicion. This is what the verse [means] when it says (3:12), "This will be for you a sign that I sent you, when you take out the [Jewish] nation from Egypt you will worship G-D on this mountain."

[The only sign that removes all doubts is that the Jewish people saw G-D speak to Moshe with their own eyes, therefore,] you will find the statement that every prophet that arose (or will arise) after Moshe, our teacher, we do not believe in him (or her) solely because of the sign [he or she performs. The reason for this is] because it would be said that if he (or she) performs a sign then we will listen to him (or her) for everything that he (or she) says. However, [the reason we believe this prophet is] because of the commandment that Moshe commanded in the Torah and said (Devarim 18:15), If a sign is given, "to him you shall listen."

[This can be] compared to the commandment that we make a judgement by the word of two witnesses, even though we do not know if their testimony is true or false. Similarly, it is a commandment to listen to this prophet [that has a sign] even though we do not know if it is a true sign or magic and trickery."

The Rambam here is trying to clarify his position as to how valid prophecy is and how it can be utilized. In this halacha, the Rambam is setting up the reason as to why no prophet could ever come to nullify or permanently alter the prophecy of Moshe. His point, although subtle, is that the only prophecy that can be determined to be true by others is the prophecy of Moshe. All other prophets can be lying. This is why all future prophets depend upon Moshe's prophecy and can not contradict his prophecy. This is how the Rambam can immediately brush off any claims of the Muslims or Christians.

I find the Rambam's point of view refreshing for several reasons. Mainly, the Rambam does not believe in mysticism and this idea shines through in this chapter of his Mishna Torah. The idea that one should be suspicious of anything that can not be seen with your own eyes is lacking in most circles. Only in the scientific community, and even then it is not constant, are people only swayed by empirical and reproducible evidence. An argument from authority without any tangible evidence is, according to the Rambam, inherently flawed. The sole reason that we believe Judaism is the correct religion is, simply put, because of the witnessed events at Mount Sinai. Without that single event, according to the Rambam, we would not be obligated to follow Judaism or even believe in G-D.

This point can not be over stated or overemphasized. People who claim to have prophecy or special powers and do not even produce a sign are certainly to be ignored. For, even if they had a sign we can not be sure they are telling the truth. With this as a foundation for Judaism, I think, people would stop making arguments from authority and be more open to intelligent discussions.

Giving a Get (Document of Divorce) In Jewish Law

2013-11-15T08:56:00.001-05:00

I saw this discussion over on daattorah.blogspot.com and I felt I needed to comment:

Disappointed in HNNovember 7, 2013 at 1:56 PM DT --
I realize it must be difficult to answer these all day, I should have been more brief and specific in order not to confuse. I read R' Dovid Feinstein's letter, it doesn't answer question -- a very simple question, is it halachically legitimate to use a get as leverage in a divorce proceeding. I.e., "I will not give you this get unless and until I get what I want." I did happen to read your brother's lengthy letter regarding the fact that ma'us u'lai is not a strong enough reason to "force" a get. Again, I refer to R' Sternbuch's teshuva that clearly indicated that the husband "should" give a get in that scenario. But, again, I've been lengthy...

Daas Torah November 7, 2013 at 2:08 PM
I haven't found any teshuva which says that it is not legitimate. Furthermore often the husband is simply trying to gain that which is his according to the halacha - do you consider that illegitimate also? Again the issue is whether it is halachically or morally wrong to use the get as leverage for what you think you deserve. The answer seems to be no. BTW this applies also to a wife refusing to accept a get which Rav Eliashiv doesn't seem to think is immoral

Daas TorahNovember 7, 2013 at 2:35 PM
There should be demands which are unacceptable - but I haven't seen any discussion of what constitutes an unacceptable demand.

Disappointed in HNNovember 7, 2013 at 3:04 PM My personal feeling, which seems to have some support from halacha, is that any husband who sits down with his to'ein and says ok, let's talk division of assets and custody and when I'm satisfied I'll give her a get, is a pretty bad guy...

---End of discussion---

Now, I think the point that Disappointed makes is a very important one. Can or should a Get ever be used as leverage for a man to receive what he wants, especially when halacha says he should receive it, but the woman won't let him have it? I am clearly no expert, but I have learned Maseches Gittin and hilchos Gittin, so I do feel like I can share my opinion.

The idea that one can use a Get as leverage is clearly a perversion of Judaism, plain and simple. The only time a man can withhold a Get is if he believes the marriage can be saved and he wants to remain married to the woman. Otherwise, halacha dictates that a Get must be given.

For example, if a woman cheats on her husband and there are not two witnesses to convict her, but the husband saw her cheating or knows from some other source, he must give her a Get. Now, one might think he is allowed to withhold a Get in this situation to cause her to suffer like he has because of her cheating, but the Gemara is clear that he must divorce her, aka give her a Get. Once a man is no longer going to live with his wife as man and wife he is supposed to, according to halacha, give her a Get. In a situation where he knows she cheated he is forbidden to live with her as husband and wife and must, therefore, give her a Get.

The question here is not whether we can force him or not and if that forced Get would be kosher or not. That is a technical and ridiculous question. The fact of the matter is, if someone is withholding a Get after a civil divorce where it is clear they will never live as husband and wife again that person is not following halacha. It is as if they are eating non-kosher, desecrating shabbos, having illicit relations, etc... Why do I compare it to the three big sins? Well, these cases where a man is withholding a Get become very public. Therefore, this is a pubic sin, not to mention a Chilul Hashem. We know that if a person is holding a gun to your head in public and says eat that cheeseburger, the Rambam is clear that one must give up his or her life and not eat that cheeseburger. Why? Because we know the reason the gun holder is doing that is specifically to cause the Jew to desecrate the commandments in front of an audience. Here too, the husband is desecrating G-D's name in public. He is transgressing more than just being "bitul an aaseh" (Not doing a positive commandment), but he is causing pain to the woman.

Even if you want to claim that the woman caused him pain, that does not make it ok for the man to cause pain to the woman. There is no revenge claus in the Torah, I am sorry, but there is not. Even if the woman was horrible to the man, the Get is not something that should or even can be used by the husband, according to Jewish law. Only a wicked or misguided person would use a Get as leverage.

Recently, someone wrote a post about withholding a Get if the woman makes false claims against the husband in order to receive full custody of the child. This is a classic case of two wrongs do not make a right. Just because the woman is clearly evil does not mean the man should demean and degrade himself to go down to her level. She obviously does not fear G-D or care about His commandments. However, a G-D fearing man needs to follow halacha and do what is right. One must have faith in G-D and His laws. Should I cheat in business because everyone else is doing it? Should I lie because I will then get what I want? Should I kill because then I will receive benefit? If you answered no to these questions why would you withhold a Get? If you answered yes to these questions you are not really an orthodox Jew, so do what you want.

Rambam-Yisodei HaTorah-Perek 8 Halacha 1: The Basis For Jewish Belief

2013-10-14T11:59:00.001-04:00

משה רבינו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות שעשה. שהמאמין על פי האותות יש בלבו דופי שאפשר שיעשה האות בלט וכשוף. אלא כל האותות שעשה משה במדבר לפי הצורך עשאם. לא להביא ראיה על הנבואה. היה צריך להשקיע את המצריים קרע את הים והצלילן בתוכו. צרכנו למזון הוריד לנו את המן. צמאו בקע להן את האבן. כפרו בו עדת קרח בלעה אותן הארץ. וכן שאר כל האותות. ובמה האמינו בו במעמד הר סיני שעינינו ראו ולא זר ואזנינו שמעו ולא אחר האש והקולות והלפידים והוא נגש אל הערפל והקול מדבר אליו ואנו שומעים משה משה לך אמור להן כך וכך. וכן הוא אומר פנים בפנים דבר ה' עמכם. ונאמר לא את אבותינו כרת ה' את הברית הזאת. ומנין שמעמד הר סיני לבדו היא הראיה לנבואתו שהיא אמת שאין בו דופי שנאמר הנה אנכי בא אליך בעב הענן בעבור ישמע העם בדברי עמך וגם בך יאמינו לעולם. מכלל שקודם דבר זה לא האמינו בו נאמנות שהיא עומדת לעולם אלא נאמנות שיש אחריה הרהור ומחשבה:

The Jews did not believe in Moshe, our teacher, because of the signs he performed. For one who believes [in anything] because of signs has a blemish in his heart since it is possible that a sign was done through trickery and magic (and this person's faith is reliant on a fallacy). Rather, all the signs that Moshe performed in the desert were done out of necessity. [They were] not done to bring proof [as to the validity] of his prophecy. It was necessary to drown the Egyptians, so the sea was split and they were dunked in it. We (the Jews) needed sustenance so the manna was brought down [from the sky] for us. They (the Jews) were thirsty so the stone was split [and water came forth] for them. The congregation of Korach rebelled against [Moshe] so the earth swallowed them. And so too by all the other signs (miracles).

What is the reason we believe in [Moshe's prophecies? Because of] the events at Mt. Sinai that our eyes saw them and not a strangers [eyes] and our ears heard them and not another's [ears. These events were] the fire, the sounds (thunder, voices?), the lightning, and then [Moshe] approached the fog and the voice [of G-D] spoke to him and we heard "Moshe, Moshe, go and say to them such and such." And so he said, "Face to face G-D spoke with you." And so it says (devarim 5:3), "G-D did not make this covenant with our fathers."

From where [do we know] that the events at Mt. Sinai, in and of themselves, are a proof to [Moshe's] prophecy that [we should believe] it has no faults? For it says (Exodus 19:9), "Behold, I am coming to you in the thick cloud in order that the nation will hear when I speak to you and also that they will believe in you forever." This implies that before this [event, the Jewish people] did not have a belief in [Moshe] that would last forever, rather it was a belief that was speculation and apprehension.

This idea that the Rambam brings down is of critical importance. Signs, wonders and miracles are completely WORTHLESS when it comes to having a belief in anything. Jesus stood on water, the Baal Shem Tov flew across the world, and so on. These "miracles" have nothing to do with a JEWISH belief in G-D. The ONLY reason a Jew should believe in G-D is because of eyewitness proof. Just like I know my parents exist because I am an eyewitness, or I know president Obama exists because other people have told me he does and I see him on television. This is the Jewish belief in G-D, it is not some she said he said confusion, it is based on actually witnessed events.

This is the basis for the Rambam's belief in G-D, that this event at Mt. Sinai actually happened. It isn't something that occurred in a dream or was verified through "miracles," it was based on an event in reality that can be substantiated.

Autopsies In Halacha

2013-09-10T13:13:00.000-04:00

Since I am a pathology resident, I do a fair amount of autopsies (50 are required to graduate). Therefore, it was incumbent upon me as an orthodox Jew to look into the legal challenges with this subject. I have become accustomed to ask my questions to Rabbi Tendler, but since I was reading through the Nishmat Avraham and I found this paragraph I thought I would share:

and here are the sources:

The previous pages of the Nishmat Avraham go through why it is forbidden to perform an autopsy on a deceased Jew. He quotes one opinion that it is allowed for learning medicine, but firmly brushes that opinion aside and says it is irrelevant since most opinions say it is forbidden. He goes on to say how even if the person himself, let alone his family, requests an autopsy or donates the body to science since they do not have ownership over their body their words are meaningless and an autopsy may not be performed.

The only time an autopsy may be performed is when it will somehow save a life. (Most, if not all, autopsies are not done to save lives.)

The reason I find this specific paragraph intriguing is because the law in the Shulchan Orech (Yoreh Deah 349:1) which all of this is derived from equates a Jewish corpse and a non-Jewish corpse. Why then are there so many special rules by a Jewish corpse, but a non-Jewish corpse can so easily be used?

I have not looked through all of the sources since I am limited with my referencing materials. However, using Hebrewbooks.org I was able to find a good Shulchan Orech, Yoreh Deah that had many commentaries. There, I was able to find the Pischei Teshuva on this halacha (Yoreh Deah 349:1) which gives a foundation to the seemingly lenient opinion by non-Jews, but the much stricter opinion by Jews. It says that the prohibition that one may not benefit from a Jewish corpse is biblical, but not benefiting from a non-Jewish corpse is only rabbinically prohibited.

This actually helps explain HOW one could be allowed to perform an autopsy on a non-Jewish corpse when there is minimal reason and a Jewish corpse would need a maximal amount of reason, but I still need to understand WHY it should be that one is biblically prohibited and one is only rabbinically prohibited. I hope to translate one or both of Rav Moshe Feinstein's Responsa on this subject in the coming days.

Dogmas In Judaism, Specifically The Incorporeality of G-D

2013-07-28T03:40:00.000-04:00

I was reading through "The Torah U~Madda Journal" from 1993 and I found a fascinating article written by Marc Shapiro. He was responding to an article written by Rabbi Yehuda Parnes in the inaugural issue (1989). Rabbi Parnes suggested that it is forbidden to study heresy, which he explains is "areas that spark and arouse ideas which are antithetical to the tenets of our faith." Rabbi Parnes then went on to clarify as to what he meant by "tenets of our faith" by stating "areas that may undermine the yod gimel ikkarei emunah (the Rambam's 13 principles of faith)." Marc Shapiro then goes on and systematically shows why these principles are not real dogmas of Judaism by revealing that there is much argument on the Rambam from other great Jewish thinkers with regards to these thirteen principles. Therefore, anyone who claims the thirteen principles as dogma are excluding many Rishonim and Achronim from Judaism. In essence, Shapiro proves that these thirteen principles should not be the litmus test for what is heresy.

The most interesting example of Shapiro's analysis is by the Rambam's third principle of faith, the incorporeality of G-D. Shapiro claims that "anthropomorphic views were widespread among both masses and scholars, especially among Ashkenazic Jews." I find this fascinating for several reasons. First, I will bring down a nearly exhaustive list of sources proving that many scholars did, in fact, hold of this view. I believe this is necessary because of all the lies and denials of certain historical facts that some in the orthodox Jewish world claim because of their unease with this truth. They would rather deny the existence of these opinions than deal with them intellectually. Therefore, I am stating all of the sources from Shapiro's research.

Here is the list:
1) Raavad Hil. Teshuva 3:7. This is the correct version of the gloss; see David Kaufman, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der Judischen Religonsphilosophie des Mittelalters (Gotha, 1877), 487-88. See also Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres (Cambridge, 1962), 282ff (There are more for this source, but I think these two should suffice.)
2) Ketav Tamim of R. Moses b. Hasdai Taku, a Tosafist.
3) Bernard Septimus, Hispano Jewish Culture in Transition (Cambridge, 1982) 79 writes, "It seems likely that the views of Moses b. Hasdai do approximate a significant body of Franco-German opinion." See also D. Kaufmann, op. cit., 484ff; Isaiah Sonne, 'A Scrutiny of the Charges of Forgery against Maimonides' 'Letter on Resurrection,'" Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 21 (1952): 110-16.
4) Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Frankfurt, 1853) 47, 91. Abraham ibn Daud reports masses of Jews believe G-D to be a material being.
5) Yedaiah Bedershi writes how it is well known that the belief in G-D's corporeality was spread throughout virtually all of Israel in "previous generations (i.e. before Maimonides was able to reverse matters.) She'elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Lvov, 1811), #418 (p. 47b).
6) R. David Abudarham testifies that Jews held this view in Abudarham ha-Shalem.
7) The anonymous author of Ma'amar Hasekhel testifies to this fact as well.
8) R. Isaac ben Yedaiah testifies to this fact as well. See M. Saperstein op. cit., 185-86
9) R. Moses of Salerno testifies to this fact as well. See J. L. Teicher, op. cit., 84-85
10) R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn shem Tov (The well known commentator on the guide.) testifies to this fact as well. Commentary to Maimonides' introduction to the Guide (p. 10a in the standard edition)
11) R. Moses Nahmanides speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. A. Lichtenberg, op. cit., III, 9d; Kitvei Ramban, ed. Chavel (Jerusalem, 1963), I, 345.
12) R. David Kimhi speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. Lichtenberg, ibid., III, 3c.
13) R. Abraham Maimonides speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. ibid., 16ff.
14) R. Solomon ben Meshullam da Piera speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See the poems published by Hayyim Brody, Yedi'ot ha-Makhon le-Heker ha-Shirah ha-Ivrit 4 (1938): 102., ibid 34. See also ibid., 91 for another defense of the anthropomorphists and Ozar Nehmad 2 (1857): 85.
15) R. Samuel Sapurto speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 12. See also Sapurtos letter published in Ginze Nistarot 4 (1878): 44ff.
16) R. Shem Tov Falaquera speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See his letter in A. Lichtenberg op. cit., III, 23 ff. The letter is anonymous, but there are reasons to assume it is Falaquera, see Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1863), VII, 474.
17) R. Isaac ben Latif speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See He-Haluz 7 (1865): 91-92.
18) R. Moses Alashkar speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. She'elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Alashkar (Jerusalem, 1988), #117 (p. 312).

Now, the reason I find this so intriguing is for the simple fact that I have never heard the thirteen principles of faith challenged so forcefully. It was only recently that I was finally made aware that many people disagreed with the Rambam in these matters. Furthermore, I had no idea there were so many sources for such a widespread belief in the corporeality of G-D. However, the idea that people would believe in G-D being corporeal makes perfect sense, especially with the caveat that most of these people were Ashkenazim.

I am a big believer in the idea that local cultures influenced Judaism everywhere it went. Clothes, types of food and other regional customs in Judaism are, in my mind, reflective of local customs. Jews were clearly influenced by which communities they moved into. Nowadays, we can still see how eastern European dress is still being worn by those people who refuse to accept this idea. Therefore, it is logical to think that Jews that were heavily influenced by Christian culture, the Ashkenazim, probably believed in a corporeal G-D just like their Christian neighbors. However, the Sefardim, who were surrounded by Muslims, most likely rejected the idea of a corporeal G-D because that idea is rejected by Muslim culture.

However, after Rambam came out with his wildly popular Mishna Torah, this immense work was able to stamp out almost all thought of a corporeal G-D. Rambam's influence was not confined to just the idea of G-D's corporeality, but to all halacha and Jewish thought, as can be seen today. Almost all orthodox Jews know the thirteen principles of faith, they are printed in almost every siddur. The Rambam was one of the main sources for the final laws of the Shulchan Orech, the main law book for orthodox Jews. The Rambam's influence is probably greater than that of any other Medieval commentator, but we must remember, that does not make any idea that he considered wrong heresy. I think Shapiro does an excellent job of explaining this idea.

Residency

2013-07-21T23:12:00.002-04:00

So, I have not been posting for a good reason, I started residency this month. I am in a program that has an official "Shomer Shabbos" spot. I don't know how it happened (yes I do, lots of effort and hard work) but I never had to work on shabbos in medical school and now I will not have to work on shabbos in residency. That is pretty awesome. I like to think that I am just one of those people that G-D is intervening for (according to the Rambam), but then I would have to consider myself a super righteous person and that is probably not true.

Hopefully, after I get settled in my role, I will have some time to learn and post more, but right now it is hard enough keeping up with the weekly parsha. So, until we meet again I have much on this blog that anyone can view that I think is interesting. In fact, sometimes I parooz through this blog and, even though I am the author, I learn something new and interesting.

Guest Post- Heroic Deeds of Irena Sendler

2013-06-23T23:10:00.000-04:00

Yad Vashem was established in 1953 by the Israel's Remembrance Authority as the body that would represent the Israeli government and Jewish people in ensuring that the Holocaust would be remembered and the victims memorialized. In addition to creating exhibits which graphically depict the events of the Holocaust years Yad Vashem researches, documents and presents a wide body of information to the public which ensures that the world will never forget the suffering of the Jews during WWII.

As part of their work Yad VaShem honors Righteous Gentiles who, at great peril to their own lives and the lives of their families, helped Jews escape from the Nazi dragnet. Yad VaShem has honored tens of thousands of individuals, some who helped individual Jews who were fleeing for their lives and others who helped tens, sometimes hundreds of Jews.

Very few of the honored Righteous Gentiles were responsible for helping thousands of Jews during this era but in 1965 Yad VaShem honored one such woman, Irena Sendler, who was estimated to have saved over 3000 Jewish lives. Sendler's story was almost buried in history after Yad VaShem honored her but in 1999 a group of non-Jewish highschool students revived her story and created a project about her efforts.

Irena Sendler was a young social worker when the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939. She was an early member of the Zagota underground which specialized in helping Jews escape the Nazis and she worked with her Zagota comrades to find hiding places for Jews, forge documents and identify Church and government officials who were ready to assist Zagota in their mission.

In 1941 Sendler obtained false documents that identified her as a nurse and enabled her to enter the Warsaw ghetto with food and medicine. What she saw there convinced her that the Nazis intended to murder all of the ghetto's Jews and she began to smuggle street orphans out of the ghetto, hiding them under tram seats and leading them out through sewer pipes and other hidden passages.

Sendler also went door to door to convince parents that the only chance that their children had to survive would be if they allowed her to take the children to the other side of the wall. This was traumatic for Sendler who later described the scenes. "I talked the mothers out of their children" she said of the heartwrenching scenes which she experienced, day after day, as she led children away from their families. "Those scenes over whether to give a child away were heart-rending. Sometimes, they wouldn't give me the child. Their first question was, 'What guarantee is there that the child will live?' I said, 'None. I don't even know if I will get out of the ghetto alive today."

All in all Sendler and her Zagota comrades were able to smuggle over 2500 children out of the ghetto, often sedating them and hiding them in toolboxes, bags, luggage and even under garbage carts and barking dogs to distract the Germans as they crossed over from the ghetto. When the children arrived in the "safe" area of Warsaw the Zagota members took them to new hiding places in convents, orphanages and in sympathetic Polish homes.

Throughout the rescue operation Sendler recorded the names of the children on tissue paper which she stuffed into glass jars that were hidden in her garden. She hoped to be able to reunite the children with their families after the war or, if not, with their Jewish community.

In October of 1943 Sendler was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to the notorious Pawiak prison. The Germans tortured her and broke both of her legs but Sendler never revealed any information about the whereabouts of the children that she had rescued. She was sentenced to be executed but a last-minute bribe by her Zagota friends secured her release and Sendler lived out the rest of the war in hiding.

Sendler died at age 102 but before she died the students from Kansas met with her and interviewed her. The resulting project, Life in a Jar funded by the LMFF, became a website, a book and a performance that has been viewed by thousands of people in audiences throughout the world.

Is One Allowed To Learn In Kollel As A Career?

2013-05-29T13:53:00.001-04:00

Over on Rationalist Judaism, Rabbi Slifkin seems to point out that it is actually frowned upon by most Rishonim (Medieval Rabbis) to learn in Kollel as a career (See Here). The reason for this discussion is because of all the poverty found in the Charaidi world because they believe they can only sit and learn all day. They believe that the only proper path for an orthodox Jew is to learn in Kollel, or be a teacher in Yeshiva.

I would like to point out that there actually is something in the Midrash Tanchuma that seems to allow, or encourage, learning in Kollel (Quoted in Rashi on Breishis 49:13). The Midrash says (Parshas Vayechi:11),

זבולן לחוף ימים
קדם זבולן ליששכר.

Zevulun [will dwell] on the sea coast:

Zevulun [is mentioned] before Yissachar (even though Yissachar is older)

ולמה?
שזבולן עוסק בפרקמטיא ויששכר עוסק בתורה, עשו שותפות ביניהם, שיהא פרקמטיא של זבולן ליששכר, שכן משה ברכן, שמח זבולן בצאתך ויששכר באהליך (דברים לג).
שמח זבולן בצאתך לפרקמטיא, משום דיששכר באהליך עוסק בתורה.

Why?

[Because,] Zevulun dealt with commerce and Yissachar dealt with Torah. They made a partnership between themselves, that the commerce of Zevulun [would support] Yissachar. [This can be seen in] the blessing of Moshe (Devarim 33:18), "Rejoice, O Zevulun, in your going forth, and Yissachar, in your tents." [Meaning,] rejoice, O Zevulun in your going out to [deal with] commerce because Yissachar is in your tents dealing with Torah.

למה?
עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה (משלי י), לפיכך הקדים זבולן ליששכר, שאלמלא זבולן, לא עסק יששכר בתורה, ומתוך שנתייחד יששכר בתורה ולא עסק בפרקמטיא, ולא היה לו עמל בדבר אחר, לפיכך כתוב בו: מבני יששכר יודעי בינה לעתים (ד"ה א יב).

Why [should Zevulun be happy that Yissachar is dealing with Torah]?

"It is a tree of life for those who grasp it." (Mishlei 3:18, the hebrew reference is incorrect) Therefore, Zevulun is [mentioned] before Yissachar, because if it was not for Zevulun, Yissachar would not be able to deal with Torah. Since Yissachar was able to focus on Torah and not deal with commerce, and he did not have to bother with anything else, therefore it writes by him (Chronicles 1 12:32), "And of the sons of Yissachar, those who had an understanding of the times[, to know what Israel should do; their chiefs were two hundred, and all their brethren obeyed their word.]"

This Medrash seems to be very clear that Yissachar was learning all day because Zevulun was supporting him. In fact, Rashi (ibid) is even clearer,

Zebulun will dwell on the coast of the seas: Heb. חוֹף. His land will be on the seacoast. חוֹף is as the Targum renders: סְפַר, marche in Old French, borderland. He will constantly frequent the harbor of the ships, in the place of the port, where the ships bring merchandise, for Zebulun would engage in commerce and provide food for the tribe of Issachar, and they (the tribe of Issachar) would engage in [the study of] Torah. That is [the meaning of] what Moses said,“Rejoice, O Zebulun, in your going forth, and Issachar, in your tents” (Deut. 33:18) Zebulun would go forth [to engage] in commerce, and Issachar would engage in [the study of] Torah in tents. — [From Tanchuma Vayechi 11] לחוף ימים: על חוף ימים תהיה ארצו. חוף כתרגומו ספר, מרק"א בלע"ז [גבול], והוא יהיה מצוי תדיר על חוף אניות, במקום הנמל, שאניות מביאות שם פרקמטיא, שהיה זבולן עוסק בפרקמטיא, וממציא מזון לשבט יששכר והם עוסקים בתורה, הוא שאמר משה (דברים לג יח) שמח זבולן בצאתך ויששכר באהליך, זבולן יוצא בפרקמטיא ויששכר עוסק בתורה באהלים:

Rashi says, explicitly, that Zevulun was providing the sustenance (translated as food by Chabad.org) of Yissachar in order that Yissachar could learn Torah. That is the very definition of Kollel.

Also, the Medrash points out that because their entire tribe was devoted to Torah study, they were able to produce 200 wise men that were able to guide the nation. It took an entire tribe studying Torah in order to produce 200 wise men! This shows that this Zevulun-Yissachar bond is the best way to create Torah leaders that can guide the community.

Additionally, there is a Gemara in Sotah (21a) that seems to imply this type of Yissachar-Zevulun relationship is acceptable. The Gemara there states,

What means He would utterly be contemned(Shir HaShirim 8:7)?— ‘Ulla said: Not like Simeon the brother of Azariah nor like R. Johanan of the Prince's house but like Hillel and Shebna. When R. Dimi came he related that Hillel and Shebna were brothers; Hillel engaged in [study of] Torah and Shebna was occupied in business. Eventually [Shebna] said to him, ‘Come, let us become partners and divide [the profits]’. A Bath Kol issued forth and proclaimed (Shir HaShirim 8:7). If a man would give all the substance of his house etc.

This seems like an enigmatic piece of Gemara, but it is clearly talking about partnerships between one person learning Torah and another person supporting the learner. In fact, Rashi comes to give a little insight on why Azariah and R. Johanan are mention. He states (ibid),

He (Referring to Shimon the brother of Azariah) is a Tanna in the first Mishna in Tractate Zevachim. He learned Torah on account of his brother (Azariah) who dealt with commerce in order that they should split the merit of Shimon's learning, therefore he is called the brother of Azariah. So too Rabbi Yochanan learned on account of the Prince (Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi), for [the Prince] supported [Rabbi Yochanan.]

According to Rashi, this Gemara is pointing out that if two people go into a partnership where the other person is knowingly supporting them, then it is fine. If one person is committed to learning and the other person is committed to supporting them, this is considered appropriate. However, in the case of Hillel this was inappropriate, why?

The Eitz Yosef on the Ein Yaakov on this Gemara (Ein Yaakov Sotah 21a) tells us an important difference between Rav Shimon the brother of Azariah, Rabbi Yochanan and Hillel. By Rav Shimon and Rabbi Yochanan, the scholars were only able to learn full time because of their prior arrangements. Neither one would have learned full time had they not had these prior arrangements that they would be supported (note: not throught charity). However, Hillel was already learning full time, he was just in adverse poverty (note again: did not take charity). (My interjection) This can be seen from the Gemara in Yoma (35b),

Hillel the Elder that every day he used to work and earn one tropaik, half of which he would give to the guard at the House of Learning, the other half being spent for his food and for that of his family. One day he found nothing to earn and the guard at the House of Learning would not permit him to enter. He climbed up and sat upon the window, to hear the words of the living God from the mouth of Shemayah and Abtalion — They say, that day was the eve of Sabbath in the winter solstice and snow fell down upon him from heaven. When the dawn rose, Shemayah said to Abtalion: Brother Abtalion, on every day this house is light and to-day it is dark, is it perhaps a cloudy day. They looked up and saw the figure of a man in the window. They went up and found him covered by three cubits of snow. They removed him, bathed andanointed him and placed him opposite the fire and they said: This man deserves that the Sabbath be profaned on his behalf.

(Back to the Eitz Yosef) Therefore, when a rich person came to Hillel and offered to support him full time in order that they split the profits (money and reward in the next world), this was inappropriate.

These sources seem like irrefutable evidence that Kollel (or more accurately, learning while someone else is supporting) is something that has been around since before the first Temple and even after the second temple. Also, this is how the leaders of the Jewish people were trained.

However, there are some very important differences between the Zevulun-Yissachar bond, these cases reported in the Gemara, and the current Kollel system. First off, the Medrash's point is to show us that Zevulun is the greater partner because he supports Yissacher, that is why he is mentioned first in the Torah. Second, Yissachar and these Rabbis are not being supported by charity, he has made a partnership with Zevulun and the Rabbis made partnerships with their supporters. This is important because, as the Rambam says in the Laws of Torah Study (3:10),

Anyone who comes to the conclusion that he should involve himself in Torah study without doing work and derive his livelihood from charity, desecrates [God's] name, dishonors the Torah, extinguishes the light of faith, brings evil upon himself, and forfeits the life of the world to come, for it is forbidden to derive benefit from the words of Torah in this world.

Our Sages declared: "Whoever benefits from the words of Torah forfeits his life in the world." Also, they commanded and declared: "Do not make them a crown to magnify oneself, nor an axe to chop with." Also, they commanded and declared: "Love work and despise Rabbinic positions." All Torah that is not accompanied by work will eventually be negated and lead to sin. Ultimately, such a person will steal from others.

The current Kollel system seems to violate the words of the Rambam. Most of the Kollels seem to accept government welfare, which is charity and many other forms of charity (having someone going around collecting for a Kollel, especially when they say Tzedaka). (We can define government welfare as charity because only those who earn less than what the government considers liveable, or people who lie to the government and say they earn less, get it.)

Nevertheless, because of this Zevulun-Yissachar bond and the cases in the Gemara we can see that some Kollels are, indeed, permissible. First off, community Kollels found in the United States are perfectly acceptable for two reasons; 1) Most of the people learning in the Kollel often act as teachers, 2) If they are not teaching anything they are still not accepting charity because the town pays for the Kollel to be there the same way Zevulun supported Yissacher and the people supported the Rabbis. Secondly, a person who has a family member that is willing to support them while they are learning seems to fit in the Zevulun-Yissachar category as well.

The conclusion that I have reached is simple. Kollels that demand other people pay for them after the fact, take government money, or encourage their participants to take welfare seem foolish. That has no basis in the history of the Jewish people. Some Rishonim have allowed people to learn and be supported by charity, but I, personally, do not find their arguments grounded in anything but the "they will starve if you don't" logic. The proper way for a Kollel is, as stated, either be like one of the community Kollels that provide fantastic resources, or have someone make a Zevulun-Yissachar relationship, as seen in the Medrash and Gemara, and avoid charity all together. In these ways, it seems to me, Kollel would be allowed as a career.

The Purpose Of The Cloud Of Glory Directing The Jewish People Where And When To Encamp

2013-05-23T20:00:00.001-04:00

Reading through this week's Parsha, Behaaloscha, I could not help but notice something that bothered me. The verses say (Bamidbar 9:17-18),

17. and according to the cloud's departure from over the Tent, and afterwards, the children of Israel would travel, and in the place where the cloud settled, there the children of Israel would encamp. יז. וּלְפִי הֵעָלוֹת הֶעָנָן מֵעַל הָאֹהֶל וְאַחֲרֵי כֵן יִסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבִמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכָּן שָׁם הֶעָנָן שָׁם יַחֲנוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:

18. At the bidding of the Lord, the children of Israel traveled, and at the bidding of the Lord, they encamped. As long as the cloud hovered above the Mishkan, they encamped. יח. עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יִסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יַחֲנוּ כָּל יְמֵי אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכֹּן הֶעָנָן עַל הַמִּשְׁכָּן יַחֲנוּ:

This seem to be saying that G-D communicated His will directly to the people through the Cloud of Glory. When the cloud left the Mishkan that is when the Jews would break camp and start to travel, following the Cloud until it settled somewhere. That seems innocent enough, what is the difficulty?

Well, the Cloud's departure and settling to inform the people when to travel and settle should be wholly unnecessary. This would be appropriate if there was no Moshe that could speak directly to G-D. However, Moshe spoke directly to G-D, so why could he not just tell the people when to break camp and travel? Was he not the "King" of the Jewish people at this time? Did he no longer speak with G-D "face to face?"

We can begin to understand this idea through the last verse of this (ibid 23) chapter. It says,

23. At the Lord's bidding they would encamp, and at the Lord's bidding they would travel; they kept the charge of the Lord by the word of the Lord through Moses. כג. עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יַחֲנוּ וְעַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יִסָּעוּ אֶת מִשְׁמֶרֶת יְהֹוָה שָׁמָרוּ עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה בְּיַד משֶׁה:

Somehow, the Cloud leaving and settling was an indication to travel or encamp, but these things were only done through Moshe. As Rashi tells us (ibid 18),

At the bidding of the Lord…traveled: We learned in the [Baraitha] Melecheth HaMishkan [ch. 13]: When the Israelites traveled, the cloud would fold and spread itself over the tribe of Judah like a beam. They blew a tekiah (long blast), a teruah (series of short blasts), and another tekiah , but it (the Cloud) did not move on until Moses declared, “Rise up, O Lord” (10:35), and then the banner of the camp of Judah would travel. This [appears] in the Sifrei (84). על פי ה' יסעו: שנינו במלאכת המשכן, כיון שהיו ישראל נוסעים היה עמוד הענן מתקפל ונמשך על גבי בני יהודה כמין קורה, תקעו והריעו ותקעו ולא היה מהלך עד שמשה אומר קומה ה', ונסע דגל מחנה יהודה, זו בספרי:

and at the bidding of the Lord they encamped: As soon as the Israelites encamped, the pillar of cloud would mushroom upward and spread itself over the tribe of Judah like a canopy. It would not depart until Moses declared, “Return O Lord, to the myriads of Israel’s thousands” (10:36). This is what is meant by,“according to the Lord’s word, through Moses” (verse 23). - [Melecheth HaMishkan ch. 13]

ועל פי ה' יחנו: כיון שהיו ישראל חונים, עמוד הענן מתמר ועולה ונמשך על גבי בני יהודה כמין סוכה, ולא היה נפרש עד שמשה אומר שובה ה' רבבות אלפי ישראל, הוי אומר על פי ה' וביד משה:

Therefore, we see that Moshe was still in charge of when to depart and when to encamp, as seen in chapter ten. The Cloud only departed and it only rested according to what Moshe said. However, why was it necessary for the Cloud to depart when G-D wanted the Jews to travel and for it to stay when He wanted them to encamp? Why was this extra sign necessary? Why was just telling Moshe where and when to camp and Moshe conveying that to the people insufficient?

I think the answer to this question can be seen with the stories that follow about the Jewish people's complaints. These numerous complaints in the desert can be seen starting here (Bamidbar 11:1),

1. The people were looking to complain, and it was evil in the ears of the Lord. The Lord heard and His anger flared, and a fire from the Lord burned among them, consuming the extremes of the camp. א. וַיְהִי הָעָם כְּמִתְאֹנְנִים רַע בְּאָזְנֵי יְהֹוָה וַיִּשְׁמַע יְהֹוָה וַיִּחַר אַפּוֹ וַתִּבְעַר בָּם אֵשׁ יְהֹוָה וַתֹּאכַל בִּקְצֵה הַמַּחֲנֶה:

This was just the first of many. For the verses show, in chapter 11, that the Jews had so many complaints to the point that Moshe cried out (ibid 11),

11. Moses said to the Lord, "Why have You treated Your servant so badly? Why have I not found favor in Your eyes that You place the burden of this entire people upon me? יא. וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה אֶל יְהֹוָה לָמָה הֲרֵעֹתָ לְעַבְדֶּךָ וְלָמָּה לֹא מָצָתִי חסר א' חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ לָשׂוּם אֶת מַשָּׂא כָּל הָעָם הַזֶּה עָלָי:

These complaints were so severe that in next week's Parsha, Shelach, we have the story of the spies. This, of course, leads to the people rejecting the thought of trying to conquer the land of Israel. In turn, the rebellion of Korach ensues. Therefore, we see a bad situation turning worse until it turns into an open rebellion.

However, the nature of Korach's rebellion shows us that the doubts and complaints of the Jewish people did not rest with G-D, but with Moshe. As it says (Bamidbar 16:3),

3. They assembled against Moses and Aaron, and said to them, "You take too much upon yourselves, for the entire congregation are all holy, and the Lord is in their midst. So why do you raise yourselves above the Lord's assembly?" ג. וַיִּקָּהֲלוּ עַל משֶׁה וְעַל אַהֲרֹן וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֲלֵהֶם רַב לָכֶם כִּי כָל הָעֵדָה כֻּלָּם קְדשִׁים וּבְתוֹכָם יְהֹוָה וּמַדּוּעַ תִּתְנַשְּׂאוּ עַל קְהַל יְהֹוָה:

The reason for these complaints against Moshe is that Dasan and Aviram (maybe Korach as well) did not believe that Moshe was sent by G-D. This can be seen in the Dvar Torah that I wrote on Parshas Korach (found here). If this is the case, that there were still people that believed Moshe was doing somethings on his own, I believe there is a simple answer as to why the Cloud of Glory departing and resting by the word of Moshe was necessary and it did not suffice for G-D just to tell Moshe when to leave and when to camp.

The verse in Parsha Ki Sisa (Shemos 32:9) states,

9. And the Lord said to Moses: "I have seen this people and behold! they are a stiff necked people. ט. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה רָאִיתִי אֶת הָעָם הַזֶּה וְהִנֵּה עַם קְשֵׁה עֹרֶף הוּא:

and Rashi explains that this means (from Chabad.org),

stiff-necked: Heb. קְשֵׁה-עֹרֶף. [This is a description of stubbornness, meaning] they turned the hardness of the backs of their necks toward those who reproved them, and they refused to listen. קשה ערף: מחזרין קשי ערפם לנגד מוכיחיהם, וממאנים לשמוע:

The Jewish people are cynical and it is very hard for them to be convinced of the truth of something. It takes excessive amounts of proof to sway them to believe in something. However, once they believe in something it is nearly impossible to strip them of this belief. Nowadays, we look back and we see all of the Jews that gave up their lives simply because they would not convert or renounce their faith. They were stubborn in their belief in G-D because once the Jews, as a people, believe in something it is nearly impossible to expunge that belief from them.

(As a side point, I believe that this idea might have been emphasized in order to counteract people who say "people of ancient times were gullible and would believe anything." This idea counteracts that notion and shows that, at least the Jews of old, were cynical and would not just believe anything.)

This idea can be applied to the Jews in the desert as well. However, instead of being stubborn in their belief of G-D, as we see today, they were stubborn and cynical against a belief in G-D, originally. In fact, that is how G-D is referring to their stubbornness in Shemos (32:9). However, even once they were convinced of G-D's existence, they were cynical of Moshe's unwavering obedience to G-D's commands. With this in mind, I think it is fairly obvious as to why G-D felt it was necessary to have the Cloud of Glory signal, through Moshe, when the Jews should break camp and when they should encamp in different places.

The Jewish people continuously saw miracles, starting with the plagues in Egypt and culminating with the events at Mount Sinai. However, it was only on Mount Sinai that G-D spoke directly to the Jewish people and they believed, without a shadow of a doubt, in G-D's existence. Also, the only reason the people believed Moshe was sent by G-D was, simply put, because G-D told them so. Even so, G-D did not say anything about whether everything Moshe did was because G-D commanded it.

So, now that the Jews had already witnessed the events at Mount Sinai, they knew there was an all powerful G-D performing these deeds. Still, they were unsure of which commands came from G-D and which came from Moshe. Did Moshe have autonomy in certain respects or was G-D commanding everything? To solve this problem G-D made it that the Cloud of Glory, seen by everyone, would follow the word of Moshe. This symbolized that everything Moshe did was in accordance with the will of G-D. Moshe did not do anything without being commanded to do so by G-D. Every instance of breaking camp and setting up camp was only because G-D willed it.

This is also why Korach's rebellion was so devastating to Moshe. They claimed that Moshe was going against the will of G-D. This infuriated Moshe to no end because Moshe never did anything for himself, he only did things according to the will of G-D. That is why he exclaimed (Bamidbar 16:28),

28. Moses said, "With this you shall know that the Lord sent me to do all these deeds, for I did not devise them myself. כח. וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה בְּזֹאת תֵּדְעוּן כִּי יְהֹוָה שְׁלָחַנִי לַעֲשׂוֹת אֵת כָּל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הָאֵלֶּה כִּי לֹא מִלִּבִּי:

This idea can also help us understand a puzzling incident, Moshe hitting the rock, that happens later in Parshas Chukas. When G-D commands Moshe to perform a miracle that will supply the Jewish people with water He says (Bamidbar 20:8),

8. "Take the staff and assemble the congregation, you and your brother Aaron, and speak to the rock in their presence so that it will give forth its water. You shall bring forth water for them from the rock and give the congregation and their livestock to drink." ח. קַח אֶת הַמַּטֶּה וְהַקְהֵל אֶת הָעֵדָה אַתָּה וְאַהֲרֹן אָחִיךָ וְדִבַּרְתֶּם אֶל הַסֶּלַע לְעֵינֵיהֶם וְנָתַן מֵימָיו וְהוֹצֵאתָ לָהֶם מַיִם מִן הַסֶּלַע וְהִשְׁקִיתָ אֶת הָעֵדָה

However, when Moshe actually performs the Miracle he hits the rock instead of speaking to it (ibid 11),

11. Moses raised his hand and struck the rock with his staff twice, when an abundance of water gushed forth, and the congregation and their livestock drank. יא. וַיָּרֶם משֶׁה אֶת יָדוֹ וַיַּךְ אֶת הַסֶּלַע בְּמַטֵּהוּ פַּעֲמָיִם וַיֵּצְאוּ מַיִם רַבִּים וַתֵּשְׁתְּ הָעֵדָה וּבְעִירָם:

This striking of the rock leads G-D to punish Moshe (ibid 12),

12. The Lord said to Moses and Aaron, "Since you did not have faith in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore you shall not bring this assembly to the Land which I have given them. יב. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן יַעַן לֹא הֶאֱמַנְתֶּם בִּי לְהַקְדִּישֵׁנִי לְעֵינֵי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לָכֵן לֹא תָבִיאוּ אֶת הַקָּהָל הַזֶּה אֶל הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר נָתַתִּי לָהֶם:

Why such a harsh punishment for such a seemingly minor transgression? We see that G-D invested so much in Moshe. To the point that the people believed that everything Moshe did was according to the will of G-D. However, in this instance Moshe did something that was not according to the will of G-D. Therefore, G-D used this incident as a reason to tell Moshe that he could not enter the land. G-D had done everything He could in order to show the people that everything Moshe did was in accordance with G-D's will and Moshe went ahead and did something against the will of G-D. That was an extremely severe sin and it could have shaken the very foundations of faith for the Jewish people. G-D needed the people to be led into the land by someone who could make mistakes that were not directly associated with G-D.

Moshe gave us a foundation for our faith in G-D. The Jewish people, eventually, associated everything he did with the will of G-D. This required G-D to perform many actions through Moshe. However, once Moshe erred and showed that he was capable of doing something that was not in accordance with the will of G-D, it was realized that a different leader was needed to take the Jewish people to the next level, a new leader was needed to enter the land of Israel.

Returning to the original question, the Cloud of Glory was necessary because it was a continuous reminder to the Jewish people that Moshe was the direct messenger of G-D. Faith is an important thing, in order to instill faith in the "stiffnecked" people G-D needed to continuously reinforce the idea that He was communicating to them through Moshe. The Cloud of Glory was used for this purpose. In this way, Moshe was able to write the Torah and the Jewish people would believe that it was all straight from the mouth of G-D.

Rav Moshe Feinstein: Can A Jew Have Plastic Surgery

2013-05-17T01:10:00.000-04:00

The Responsa of Rav Moshe Feinstein in Choshen Mishpat 2:66 (In Volume 7 of Igros Moshe) can be found in the original Hebrew version Here. The following is my translation with my comments.

66. Is a Young Woman Permitted To Beautify Herself Through The Use Of Surgery Which Causes a Wound To Her Body?

Rav Moshe's Responsa:
It was asked of me if, in order to get married, a young woman can beautify herself through a doctor using surgery which causes an injury to her body. Is it permitted with regards to the prohibition of "Injuring Oneself?"

It is [found] in Tosfos, Babba Kama 91b heading Rather [this Tanna], that there is a prohibition to injure oneself even in a necessary situation. For example, [the case in the Mishna on 90b (found here) of it being forbidden for] a woman to uncover her hair in order to place an isar (some amount) equivalent of oil on her head for a benefit (she was damaging herself, by uncovering her hair, for a benefit, but it was still deemed impermissible). If so, even here (by having plastic surgery in order to get married) which is considered a great need, apparently it would be forbidden because it is a stretch to [try] and separate between a small need (this case quoted from the Mishna) and a great need (our case of a woman wanting to get married) as long as we can not find an explanation [of the difference] (between a great need and a small need).

However, we can ask a question on this [understanding of Tosfos] from the conclusion that this Tanna is Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe. This Tanna holds that a Nazarite is a sinner because he causes himself grief [due to] wine and there is a fortiori argument (kal vichomer in the Gemara found here) for the one that causes grief to himself with an injury (that he is also a sinner). [However,] it is clear that logic dictates if he (the Nazarite) had a monetary benefit or another type of benefit when he is causing himself grief by not drinking wine, this would not be forbidden. If this is so, then it also holds true by one who injures himself, which we learn from a fortiori argument [from the Nazarite,] that it should not be forbidden when there is a need (to cause the injury) for monetary gain or some other need. [Therefore,] how can Tosfos write that even if it is necessary (for some benefit) it is forbidden to injure yourself?

[To understand Tosfos] we need to say that [the case of] holding back from drinking wine for any beneficial reason is not considered to be causing grief since the beneficial gain (from not drinking the wine) is greater than the grief it causes. For, [if he were to] drink then he would not gain [anything] and this would cause even more grief [than not drinking in the first place] because he would lose [whatever beneficial] gain he would have attained if he did not drink the wine. [This means] all of the grief that occurs from withholding from drinking wine is only from the aspect of his desire to [drink wine] (meaning, a person only experiences suffering from withholding wine because he desires to drink it). [However,] by us he has a [greater] desire to [attain this beneficial] gain [he gets from not drinking] (Therefore, we see this guy is actually not suffering at the end of the day). However, injuring himself causes actual grief (physical, materialized injury) that is not from the aspect of [one's personal] desires, it is not interchangeable with the grief of not [attaining a beneficial] gain that is only [considered grief] from the aspect of a person's desire to profit. [In a situation] that a person wants to injure himself in order to profit, that he has a great desire to attain monetary gain and therefore is willing to suffer grief, this is [still] forbidden.

Furthermore, according to the [final] law we do not hold like Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe and, nevertheless, the Rambam decides in the beginning of Chapter 5 of Injuries (Chovel) that it is forbidden to injure oneself, like it is stated in the GRA Yoreh De'ah Siman 236 Seif Katan 6. If this is so (that the GRA is right about the Rambam holding that injuring oneself is forbidden) he is learning it from somewhere else (and not Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe) that it is [forbidden] in every situation, even when there is a need.

However, in any case, if it is necessary according to Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe to say that when it is needed [to injure yourself] it is permitted, that would be a proof that everyone holds [when it is needed then it is permitted] because we don't find anyone who argues [on Rabbi Elzarar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe.] Also, concerning the Mishna that is dealing even with [a case of] there being a need and Rabbi Akiva says it is still forbidden the Gemara brings it from Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe saying that even according to Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe it is forbidden to injure yourself even when there is a need (This reveals that, according to everyone, injuring yourself is forbidden even if there is a need). Therefore, it is necessary to say like I answered (Basically, that an actual injury to yourself is not allowed even if done for some type of gain, but a denial of a desire that causes you non-physical pain would be allowed).

Still, the Rambam writes in the beginning of chapter 5 of Injuries (Chovel) with regards to the prohibition of hitting an upright Jew, this [prohibition] is for hitting in the way of strife. According to another version it is referring to [hitting] in a derogatory fashion, see there (English, Hebrew). If so (that the injury is prohibited if it is done in the way of strife or degradation), with our situation (plastic surgery) that the injury is to beautify and there is no [injury] in the way of strife or degradation then the prohibition is not relevant. [Furhtermore,] if injuring a friend is only [prohibited] when done in the way of strife or a derogatory fashion then also with self inflicted injuries it is not forbidden when done to beautify because that [also] is not done in the way of strife or in a derogatory fashion.

This idea that my friend Rav Tuvia Goldstein SHLITA [learned] from the language of "And not just the injury itself, but all who injure upright Jews in the way of strife transgresses a negative commandment" that the condition of "the way of strife (that the Rambam says)" is only with regards to the blow and not the injury, does not make sense. For, whether it is [referring] to the injury or the blow, it is all learned from the one verse of (Devarim 25:3), "Do not add." This implies that, according to the Rambam, the adding of lashes is considered the way of strife and degradation and from this [verse] you are not able to learn about the blows that are not given in the way of strife or degradation. If so (that our logic is correct), then the injury is specifically included in the way of strife or degradation and this condition of "the way of strife" also applies to the injury (not just the blow) because it is irrelevant to try and separate a teaching in one verse (meaning, it is not the correct thing to do to separate the injury and the blow which are both learned from one verse).

A proof to the Rambam's opinion can be brought from that which was said in Babba Kama there (91b, translation in Soncino), "R. Hisda, whenever he had to walk between thorns and thistles used to lift up his garments Saying that whereas for the body [if injured] nature will produce a healing, for garments [if torn] nature could bring up no cure." If every injury is liable (forbidden to be done) how was it permissible for him (Rav Chisda) to go between the thorns and thistles without clothing [protecting his feet]? This would [definitely] cause an injury to himself and would be a transgression of the prohibition of causing an injury to oneself even though it was not his intention, but it is a pesik Reisha (sure thing that it is going to injure him) since it is a stretch to say it was done in a way that it was not a pesik Reisha (not a sure thing to injure him). Therefore, we need to say that the prohibition of injuring only applies if it is done in the way of strife and since [Rav Chisda] needed to walk [through the thorns and thistles] this is not considered the way of strife and there is no prohibition [for what Rav Chisda did.]

We need to say that there are [situations] of need that are prohibited when they are done with the intention to cause grief. For example, someone who tears [their clothes] because of a dead person that it (this tearing) causes extra grief [in addition to] his grief over the deceased and he wants to destroy [something] (this is not allowed). However, according to this, with [regards to the issue of] injuring oneself, it should also be prohibited for a person to scratch [themselves] because of the deceased. For, the desire and need is to cause [more] grief from this [scratching] and this is done in the way of strife and degradation which is prohibited even if there is a need, because the desire to have [added] grief is considered a need to him (the one mourning over the deceased). [The reason this is prohibited is because] the Torah prohibited injuring yourself in any way [that was done within the boundaries of strife and degradation.]

[However,] we can ask from this [law] of scratching because of the deceased that it required a different verse [to prohibit] it (Vayikra 19:28). [This seems to imply] that scratching because of another distressing factor, like a house that collapsed, or a boat that sank in the sea, there [seems to be] no prohibition, like that which is seen in the Gemara in Makkos 20b. It is difficult to suggest that [the verse that says you can not scratch yourself because of the deceased] is an extra prohibition and the exception to this prohibition is that of when the house collapses [and it is permissible to scratch yourself. However, this] is only an exception to that verse, but it is still prohibited because of the law of injuring yourself. [The reason it is difficult to claim this] is because Tosfos says in Sanhedrin 68a, with regards to the incident where Rabbi Akiva struck himself until blood flowed down upon the earth [after] the death of Rabbi Eliezer (See Gemara in English here) says, "There [is no prohibition of] scratching oneself [here] because he did it because of Torah [learning], like [Rabbi Akiva exclaimed, "I have a many coins] but no money changer to accept them" (Meaning, I have many questions on Torah, but no one to answer them). (Tosfos seems to be saying that one is allowed to scratch themselves if they are scratching themselves for a reason other than grieving specifically for the deceased. In Rabbi Akiva's case, he scratched himself because of all the Torah learning he would miss out on and that seems to be allowed without any prohibitions.)

However, we can still ask because of the [prohibition of] injuring oneself [it should be forbidden (to cause yourself extra grief through scratching). In fact,] Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna (Babba Kama 90b) holds that it is forbidden to injure yourself. And it is difficult to say (to give an answer to our question of it should still be prohibited under the law injuring yourself) that this (that one may scratch himself for any reason other than causing himself grief over the deceased) is like Rabbi Akiva of the Braisa (91a) and not like Rava that holds according to Rabbi Akiva of the Braisa it [really] is forbidden to injure [oneself (just like the Mishna),] because then we could ask from the Braisa in Sanhedrin (68a, where Rabbi Akiva actually injures himself).

[Furthermore,] we can't say that scratching is considered giving honor to the deceased by [showing that one is] especially grief stricken because of him (or her) to the point that a person scratches and causes groups [of scratches] in their flesh and, therefore, this [would not be] considered the way of strife (thereby it would not be forbidden). [The reason is,] even for honoring the deceased [in this way,] this is considered the way of strife and degradation since the honor of the grief and degradation is because of [the deceased.]

We need to say [the reason this scratching is not prohibited under the law of injuring yourself is] that he is silencing his grief with this [scratching and it] is like that which is said in Gemara Shabbos 105b. Rashi explains the phrase in the Mishna (there) about he who tears in anger according to Rav Avin who says it is a reparation, for it calms him down because he forgets his anger (this guy that is angry and tears something is soothed because the ripping makes him forget his anger). So too, when someone injures themselves it [helps] him forget and silences his grief and anger that he has from the deceased. Therefore, this is not considered the way of strife and degradation, [therefore,] the aspect of the prohibition of injuring himself is not present. Only because of another prohibition, that of scratching because of the deceased [is present. However, scratching oneself] because of his collapsed house or boat that sank is not prohibited and, therefore, Rabbi Akiva's [case] was permitted because his grief was over the Torah [learning and the scratching was] to quiet his grief.

I saw in the Orech La'ner in Yevamos at the bottom of 13b this question (about Rabbi Akiva saying it is prohibited to injure yourself, yet we see Rabbi Akiva injured himself) and his answer was [if you scratch yourself] because of honoring the Torah it is permitted, just like there is no [prohibition of] waste when mutilating [an animal] for a royal funeral (This is a transgression of wasting the animal, but since it is for the honor of royalty it is allowed because of the honor given). [However,] this does not appear to be correct at all because there is no honor for the Torah with this (scratching yourself). [In fact,] the Torah despises this kind of "honor." [Also,] in Tosfos it does not mention the word honor, rather [Tosfos explains that] he was grief stricken over the Torah [that he would miss out on] when it says "I do not have a money changer." Furthermore, this is found in the Shach in Yoreh De'ah Siman 180 Seif katan 10.

Additionally, the answer that [Rabbi Akiva scratched himself] unintentionally and did not expect blood to come out with his blow, just like the [story] of Rava in Gemara Shabbos 88a, "While the finger[s] of his hand were under his feet [and he ground them down, so that his fingers spurted blood,]" this is [also] not right at all. Over there[, by Rava,] his fingers were placed in a way that it was not a blow. Also, the grief (or pain) was minimal because the legs just happened to be [in a position] that crushed [the fingers] and he did not [even] think about it, that is why it is relevant to say that it was unintentional. However, where [Rabbi Akiva] hit himself with the intention to cause himself grief (pain) it should definitely enter his mind that [the blow could cause] blood to come out, so how is it relevant to consider that [Rabbi Akiva hit himself] without intention?

Also, we can not answer like that which the Bais Yosef holds in Yoreh De'ah there (Siman 180) that if it is a different grief (other than a deceased person) it is permitted [to scratch yourself] (The reason this answer can not be accepted, in my opinion, is because it does not answer the question. First of all, why is a scratching other than for a deceased person allowed from the aspect of injuring yourself? Second, why is injuring yourself on account of the deceased not prohibited under the laws of injuring yourself? Why does it need a separate verse?). So too, the Ramah holds this there (Siman 180 Seif Katan 6). Rather, we need to say as I have explained.

See the Shita Mikubetzet in Babba Kama 91b in the name of the Ramah that says that this [case] of Rav Chisda teaches us that a man is allowed to injure himself and we rule like him since he is a later [authority.] However, he asks on the Rambam why he says [injuring himself] is prohibited. But, [the Rambam] is as I have written that he only holds [injuring yourself] is prohibited if it is done in the way of strife.

However, it appears that we can ask from Sanhedrin 84b that Rav would not permit his son to extract a thorn [from his flesh, since in drawing it out he would make a slight wound. And the Gemara] asks, if so (that this is prohibited because it makes a wound) then it applies by other [people] as well (even if they are not a son). However, this injury is not done in the way of strife and degradation since his intention is to extract the thorn and there is no prohibition of "do not add" (Devarim 25:3, with regard to lashes). Also, this is not similar to a son [causing an injury to] his father which [the son is then liable] to [die by] strangling even if the wound is not in the way of strife or degradation, where the only exception is for healing (the son is not put to death if he causes an injury to the father while trying to heal, but he is put to death in other situations even if the injury was not caused in the way of strife or degradation).

And we need to say that there is a fear (in the case of Rav and there is a good question from this Gemara) that perhaps [the son] will injure [the father] more than what is considered the way of healing, like is found in the Nimukei Yosef in the name of the Ramban (19a on the pages of the Rif). The intention is that this (act of healing by the son for the father) should be done in a way that [the son] is able to be careful that he does not injure [the father] more than necessary. But, if he can not be appropriately careful because of the bother and this injury is larger [than necessary] it is considered [to be done] in the way of strife and degradation since it (the injury) was not needed for healing. [Also,] this warning, for a man is always considered forewarned, is like he did not think about the prohibition (for a son to injure a father) due to his laziness to [heed] the warning. Therefore, we find that he transgressed the prohibition of injuring through negligence. [Hence,] this is a good question (what we originally asked, that it should apply by other people as well) and it should be prohibited [for everyone] if there is this concern with a son to his father (that the son pulling out the thorn may damage his father more than necessary).

In fact, from the [idea] that the Gemara explains, that it is permitted to let blood from a friend, and we ask if it is permitted for a son to [let blood] from his father, this is a proof that the prohibition to injure, that we learn from (Devarim 25:3, with regard to lashes) "do not add," is specifically in the way of strife and degradation and not when an injury occurs during healing. However, with regard to injuring your father, that it simply says (Exodus 21:15) "Strike," there is room to say that even in the case of healing [the son] will be liable [for punishment] when there is no danger, for the law of saving a life pushes off [this law (but when there is no danger, healing does not push off any laws).] If so (that you are allowed to let blood from anyone and there is no prohibition of injuring because it is not in the way of strife and degradation), you can learn from this that also in a case that is not for healing, if the injury is in a way that is for his (the person receiving the injury's) good and it is not in the way of strife and degradation it is permitted, like the Rambam holds.

[Therefore,] we are forced to say that this question of it should also be forbidden for another (not just a son to a father) when removing a thorn is because there is a warning from injuring more than what is necessary [and if an injury does occur then it] is considered the way of strife and degradation, like I have answered.
Additionally, there is a proof from the story in Sanhedrin 89b of where Micah says to his friend, "Please, smite me," that the one who refused to smite [Micah] was punished by being stricken by a lion. The Gemara asks, "From where did he (the one who refused to smite Micah) know he should be punished?" The Gemara answers, "Where [the prophet is] well established (as a prophet) it is different" (Even though Micah did not give a sign that he was a prophet, since he was an established prophet, this "friend" should have listened to him. See the Gemara there for a better understanding). [The Gemara] needs to prove this [idea] from Avraham at Mount Moriah and Eliyahu at Mount Carmel (that they were listened to even though they had not performed signs because they were established prophets) and [the Gemara] does not prove [its point] from this [case of Micah] itself. If you don't say this (that Micah is an established prophet and, therefore, you believe he is speaking the word of G-D) it would be forbidden to listen to him (Micah) because of the prohibition of (Devarim 25:3, with regard to lashes) "Do not add." We see that from the aspect of the prohibition of "do not add" it was permitted [for the "friend" to hit Micah] since [Micah] said to him that it was the word of G-D that he should be hit and that [makes it] not the way of strife and degradation.

[Furthermore,] even if [Micah] was not yet established as a prophet and it was not permitted to trust him to transgress a prohibition, nevertheless, since he did not say that he should be hit because he wanted to injure himself, but rather because it was the word of G-D, and he believed this was [the word of G-D], in no way is this considered the way of strife and degradation. Also, [this friend of Micah was] permitted to believe [Micah] since he is a great and wise man and it would be appropriate for him to receive prophecy. [This is true since] even if there is no obligation to believe [a prophet] until he performs a sign and wonder, like the Rambam says at the end of Chapter 7 of Yisodei HaTorah. Nevertheless, [the Rambam holds] it is permitted to believe him when he is fit for prophecy since if the truth is like his words, then there is no prohibition at all. (Therefore, since the injury would not be in the way of strife or degradation it is allowed)

[Plus,] you can not push off the prohibition (of injuring) from the aspect that it is a command of a prophet because he is only permitted to be believed [to give a command] if he gives a sign or is an established prophet. However, if the prohibition of injuring applied in every situation (even if the injury would not be in the way of strife and degradation) and it was only because of the commandment of the prophet (that Micah was telling the friend to hit him), he would be obligated to transgress the prohibition of injuring and [the Gemara] would have proved this idea that a prophet who is established is different and does not need a sign from this case [of Micah] itself (and it would not have needed to bring Avraham or Eliyahu to prove this idea). If this is so (this explanation of the Gemara in 89b), then it would be a proof to the Rambam (that the prohibition of injuring only applies when it is done in the way of strife and degradation).

Accordingly, it appears from this [reasoning] that it is permitted for a young girl to beautify herself even if it is through causing an injury [to herself] since [the injury] is not done in the way of strife and degradation, but rather the opposite, [it is done] for her benefit.

See Sanhedrin 84b that Rav Masna says a son is allowed to let blood for his father because of the verse (Vayikra 19:18), " Love your neighbor like yourself," and Rashi explains Jews are warned not to do things to their friends that they do not want done to themselves. It is obvious that the intention is not for a person who does not care to do something to himself that he can then do that [action] to his friend, rather anything that is not for his [neighbors] benefit [is no allowed.] For example, a person who wants to cause himself affliction or injuries, this is definitely forbidden to do to your friend even according to the one that holds injuring yourself is permitted. Not only with regards to injuries [does this idea apply,] but even by a man that does not care about his shame. [This is] not only to uphold the Mishna in Avos Chapter 4 Mishna 4 that says, "Rabbi Levitas, a man of Yavneh, said be extremely humble," see over there the Rambam's commentary on the Mishna with the occurrence with "that" righteous [person.]

Rather, even if it is a person's nature not to care that it is forbidden for him to mock his friend, on the contrary he is obligated to honor his friend, and [he does not care that] it is a great sin to whiten the face of your friend (embarrass your friend) from the prohibition of "you shall not bear a sin on his account" (Rashi says this means "[in the course of your rebuking your fellow,] do not embarrass him in public"). [and] if [the embarrassment] occurs in public the punishment is [the one who embarrasses] loses his share in the World-to-Come, like is explained in the Rambam in Chapter 6 of De'ot halacha 8 (Hebrew here) that the prohibition to embarrass a [fellow] Jew is even in private and [the Rambam] does not mention a difference to say that a humble person (who does not mind being embarrassed) is permitted to embarrass other people. If this [reasoning is correct then] also a man that wants to torture himself with afflictions and injuries, it is forbidden for him to afflict and injure his friend.

However, the intention of Rashi (in Sanhedrin 84b) that an injury like this, that is for benefit, like blood letting, that every man wants and desires to do this to themselves from the aspect of a person's love for themselves, it is not relevant to forbid him from doing this [beneficial] action to his friend and you do not need a verse to allow this [action.] Consequently, even for his father that the explanation does not say the liability for striking him is specifically when it is done in the way of strife and degradation and there is no verse to exempt healing, still it is impossible to forbid [this beneficial action of causing an injury] when it is for the good of the father, like the [case of] blood letting to heal even if there is no fear of danger or loss of life.

It is logical to say that even Rav Dimi bar Chinina (Sanhedrin 84b) that requires a verse to permit blood letting to heal his father and he makes a connection between injuring a man to injuring an animal, he is only referring to injuring his father [that requires a verse] that perhaps there is a loss of fear that comes with the injury and this levity occurs even when blood letting for healing purposes (but no verse is necessary to allow a person to heal a friend). Also, perhaps a verse is necessary if the father does not want an injury, even though it is for healing purposes, that [the son] is also exempt and permitted to do this like the law states in the Minchas Chinuch commandment 48 (the son is exempt from injuring his father against his will if it is for the purpose of healing). [Over there,] he holds that this is not known from "Love your neighbor as yourself" because we find a minority of people that do not want to be caused pain with an injury, even if they know this will heal them, in a case that there is no danger. Therefore, there is room [to claim] that we need to go according to the will of this [type] of person, even though he is from the minority, and we need a verse that connects [injuring a man] to injuring an animal that it is exempt when it is for the sake of healing even if it is against the will of the owners. Since [the healer] did not cause damage in [the animal], on the contrary he increased its worth, and it is not relevant to be liable to give anything for increasing value to a man even if it was against the will [of the owner,] so too it writes by injuring a man, dealing with his father, if it is to heal him [the healer] is exempt even if it is against [the] will [of the father. However,] Rav Masna holds (Sanhedrin 84b) that the verse is not needed because it is logical to follow after the majority of people [and not worry about the minority.]

[On the other hand] perhaps Rav Masna argues on this and holds that letting blood for the father against his will is forbidden when there is no danger and [Rav Masna] is not like the Minchas Chinuch. So too, it is possible that the Rambam decides [this way], according to what he writes in the 5th chapter of the laws of Mamrim halacha 7 (Hebrew here), that "If, however, there is no one else there capable of doing this but him and they are suffering, he may let blood or amputate according to the license that they grant him." This language implies that without the "license" of the father it would be forbidden for the son to let blood for [his father] for healing purposes because he (Rambam) decides [the law is] in accordance with Rav Masna.

The Minchas Chinuch takes this language of the Rambam and learns that his language is not specific. However, it is possible that it is specific and [Rambam holds] that it is forbidden to [heal your father] by force because he (the Rambam) is holding there is an argument with this between Rav Masna and Rav Dimi bar Chanina and [the Rambam] decides like Rav Masna. In any situation, the verse that Rav Dimi bar Chanina requires [is only for] one injuring his father [for healing,] but blood letting for a friend [in order] to heal him, that it is permitted even when it is not necessary, does not require a verse according to the Rambam. For, when [the injury is done] not in the way of strife and degradation (like an injury to heal) there is no prohibition. [Therefore,] even if we do not hold like the Rambam in this case since it (the injury inflicted for healing) is for his benefit, it is permitted in its simple understanding without a separate verse, [because it is included in] "Love your neighbor like you love yourself" that Rav Masna says.

But, perhaps what I wrote in the second explanation that Rav Dimi bar Chanina needs a verse for [a situation of] injuring his father against his will, perhaps he also needs a verse for injuring a friend for healing against his will. And, we know this from an "all the more so" [situation] that since injuring his father is permitted through a connection (to another verse), all the more so [injuring] his friend should be permitted. If we say that Rav Masna argues and [holds] that it is forbidden [to injure] his father against his will [in order to heal him,] perhaps he also holds that it is forbidden [to injure] his friend against his will [in order to heal him.] This requires further looking into. According to the law of the Minchas Chinuch it is obvious to him that it is permitted to [injure] his father [against his will for the purpose of healing him] and all the more so with [regards to] his friend.

However, if it is the will of his friend [to be injured in order to be healed] then everyone holds that it is permitted even without a verse. Also, even if we do not hold like the Rambam and we say that it is forbidden to injure in any way (not just specifically in the way of strife or degradation) since [this injuring] is for his benefit and according to his will [it is permitted] from the verse of "Love your neighbor as yourself."

If this is so, then by a young woman that wants to beautify herself, that it is for her benefit and according to her will, we can simply permit it even if we do not hold like the Rambam in his innovation that [injuring someone is only forbidden if done] in the way of strife and degradation.

There is a further slight proof that can be brought from Bechoros 45a that we learned if [the kohain] had something extra [on his body] and he cut it off, if it was forbidden to cut it off then the Mishna should have added in [the phrase] even though it is not permitted, like we learn in the first Mishna of the first (found here) and second chapter (found here) over there (in Bechoros) by someone who sells the [embryo of ] his donkey and [the embryo of] his cow to a non-Jew that we learn [the phrase] even though it is not permitted. [However,] here we do not say this, which implies that it is permitted [for the kohain to cut off extra parts of the body.] It is a stretch to say that these Mishnas argue on Rabbi Akiva of the Mishna in Babba Kama (90b) and hold that [really] a man can injure himself, for the Mishna does not bring this [case from Bechoros] according to the Tanna that argues [on Rabbi Akiva.] Rather, we need to say that since it (this cutting off an extra appendage) is for beautification [of the kohain] and is, therefore, for his benefit and he wants this, there is no prohibition of injuring involved.

From this there is a real proof for our case, that even more so by a young girl that good looks are very necessary and good for her, much more so than a man, for it is seen in Kesubos 59b, Rav Chiyya taught, "A wife [should be taken] mainly for the sake of her beauty." That it is certainly considered for her benefit [to have surgery to improve her looks] and it is permitted to be injured in order to beautify herself.
End of Rav Moshe's Responsa

I would just like to add that, for a man, this Responsa seems to say that he is allowed to have plastic surgery as well. The main reason I believe this is because of his last point with the Kohanim cutting off extra appendages. For a further look into this idea, see Rav Moshe's Responsa on a man caring about his appearance (found here).

Swapping The Holiness Of The Firstborns Of Israel To All The Levites

2013-05-09T00:22:00.001-04:00

The swapping of holiness from the eldest children in Israel to all of the Levites is a very peculiar occurrence. In this week's Parsha, Bamidbar, we see G-D request this transference. The text tells us (Bamidbar 3:45)

45. Take the Levites instead of all the firstborns among the children of Israel and the Levites' animals instead of their animals, and the Levites shall be Mine I am the Lord. מה. קַח אֶת הַלְוִיִּם תַּחַת כָּל בְּכוֹר בִּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶת בֶּהֱמַת הַלְוִיִּם תַּחַת בְּהֶמְתָּם וְהָיוּ לִי הַלְוִיִּם אֲנִי יְהוָֹה:

What is the purpose of this "transference" of holiness and how was it effective?

In order to give a possible answer we have to understand what this "transference" of holiness accomplished. The, apparent, reason for this holiness is the ability to perform the sacrificial service. This is seen from the Gemara in Zevachim (112b) where it describes the job of the firstborns before the transference of holiness.

BEFORE THE TABERNACLE WAS SET UP BAMOTH WERE PERMITTED AND THE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED BY THE FIRSTBORN; AFTER THE TABERNACLE WAS SET UP BAMOTH WERE FORBIDDEN AND THE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED BY PRIESTS.

The Ramban explains this idea very well, he says (ibid (3:45)

הנה הבכורים נתקדשו להיות לשם מעת שציוה (שמות יג ב): קדש לי כל בכור בבני ישראל באדם וגו'. והיו בכורים רבים בישראל, ולא נפדו עד הנה, שעדין לא נאמר למי יהיה הפדיון, כי עתה הוא שנתקדשו הכוהנים ועדין לא נצטוו במתנות הכהונה. והנה הם עומדים בקדושתן סתם, ויתכן שהייתה בהן עבודת הקורבנות כדברי רבותינו (זבחים קיב ב).ב).

Behold, the firstborns were made holy to G-D from the point when it was commanded (Shemos 13:2) "Make holy for me all of the male [human] firstborns of Israel etc." There were many firstborns in Israel and they were not redeemed (replaced) until now because it still was not said who it would be redeeming them. Even now that the Kohanim (priests) were sanctified there was still no commandment about the gifts that are given to the Kohanim. Behold, they (the firstborns) were standing with their simple holiness. It is possible that they (the firstborns) were performing the sacrificial service, like our Rabbis said (Zevachim 112b).

The Ramban continues:

ועתה החליפם בלווים והם פדיונם, וציוה שיפדו הנותרים, ונתן הפדיון לאהרן ולבניו כאשר היא מצווה לדורות.

Now (in this Parsha) [the firstborns] were swapped with the Levites and they were redeemed and it was commanded that the remainders (the extra 273 that had no Levite counterpart) be redeemed [through money.] The money redemption was given to Aharon and his sons just like the [redeeming of the first born] commandment that was for the generations (in the future).

The reason the firstborns had to have their holiness transferred to the Levites was because the sacrificial service had to be handed over to the Levites and the Kohanim. This transference was good enough to imbue holiness in the Levites for the present and the future. However, why does it seem like it did not work to remove the holiness from future firstborns? Levites can not be used to redeem firstborns nowadays, redemption of the firstborn is only possible through money given to a Kohain. Why is this so if redemption with a Levite worked during the time of the desert?

The answer can be found in the Chizkuni (ibid 3:45)

קח את הלוים תחת כל בכור בבני ישראל: מה שאין הלוים של עכשיו פודין את הבכורות הנולדים לישראל מכאן ולהבא היינו טעמא שהרי הלוים של עכשיו נולדו מאבותיהם הלוים שכבר פדו בכורי ישראל ואין הדין נותן שיהיה להם כח לפדות אותו יותר מפעם אחת וכל הבכורות של עכשיו אינם מבכורות שנפדו כבר בלוים במדבר אלא נולדים הם מפשוטי ישראל שלא נפדו מעולם והבכורות שנפדו בלוים במדבר אינן ידועין לפטור את הבאים מהן

Take the Levites instead of all the firstborns among the children of Israel: [The reason] the current Levites (In the time of Chizkuni) can not redeem (replace) the firstborns that are born to [regular] Israelites now and in the future is because the current Levites were born from their fathers, the Levites that already redeemed (replaced) the firstborns of Israel and the law does not give them the power to redeem more than one time. Also, all of the firstborns now are not from the firstborns that were already redeemed (replaced) by the Levites in the desert, rather they are from regular Israelites that were never redeemed (replaced) and the firstborns that were redeemed (replaced) with the Levites in the desert did not know to permit (basically, redeem or replace the future firstborns with Levites) the [children] that came from them (the people that were not redeemed).

This allows us to understand this transfer of holiness. The firstborns had a holiness (being designated by G-D) that set them aside to perform the sacrificial service. For some reason, it was decided that the Levites were to become the ones that would perform the sacrificial service in place of the firstborns. Hence, the holiness of the firstborns during the time of the "Generation of the Desert" was transferred to the Levites. The Levites acquired this holiness in such a way that it still carries on to their children today. However, the holiness in any firstborn that was born after this transference is still present because, unlike being a Levi, being a firstborn is not inherited. Therefore, the original firstborns were not able to "give away" the holiness of future generations. This is why the firstborns continue to be redeemed even today. The Rambam even lists this as one of the 613 commandments (Positive commandment 80). He also lists it in his Mishna Torah (Bikkurim 11:1, Translation found here),

מצות עשה לפדות כל איש מישראל בנו שהוא בכור לאמו הישראלית שנאמר כל פטר רחם לי. ונאמר אך פדה תפדה את בכור האדם:

It is a positive commandment1 for every Jewish man2 to redeem his son who is the firstborn of his Jewish mother, as [Exodus 34:19] states: "All first issues of the womb are mine" and [Numbers 18:15] states: "And you shall surely redeem a firstborn man."

Now that it is clear there was a transference of holiness from the firstborns to the Levites, specifically so the Levites could replace the firstborns in the sacrificial service, we need to understand why the Levites replaced the firstborns. For this we have a Midrash Rabba on our verse (found here) that tells us:

תחת כל בכור פטר רחם בבני ישראל בתחלה היתה העבודה בבכורות ולפי שקלקלו בעגל, זכו לוים על שלא טעו בעגל ליכנס תחתיהם. כי לי כל בכור וגו' כמה דתימא: קדש לי כל בכור וגו', לי יהיו אני ה'. לפי שהוא אומר: ואני הנה לקחתי את הלוים מתוך בני ישראל תחת כל בכור שומע אני מיום ההוא ואילך לא יהיו הבכורות קדושים?! ת"ל: יהיו מלמד שהם צריכין פדיון

"[The Levites were chosen] in the place of every firstborn, opening of the womb, of Israel (Bamidbar 3:12)." In the beginning, the sacrificial service was done by the firstborns and because they became spoiled through the [sin of the Golden] Calf the Levites merited to take their place because they did not err with the [Golden] Calf. "Because every firstborn is mine etc (ibid 3:13)." It is like that which is said: "Make holy for me every firstborn...for me they will be, I am G-D(ibid)." Because He said: I, behold, I am taking the Levites from the midst of Israel in the place of every firstborn. Should I think that from that day and onward the firstborns are no longer holy? [The Torah] comes to teach us with the words "they will be" that they (the firstborns) need to be redeemed (because they are still holy).

We see that it was the sin of the "Golden Calf" that caused G-D to reject the firstborns from performing the sacrificial service and choose the Levites in their stead.

The final idea I want to delve into that will complete this discussion is why did the sin of the "Golden Calf" cause the firstborns to lose their right to serve in the sacrificial service? Why was it that the sin of the "Golden Calf," a sin that only a small minority of Jewish people participated in, was so detrimental to the firstborns that they needed to hand over their holiness to the Levites? For this, we have to understand the nature of the holiness of the firstborn. For this idea I will use a Sefer called Eretz Chemda (Bamidbar 3:12):

Just like the firstborn is the first for impurity so too he is the first for holiness. Meaning, if impurity occurs, it is an extreme occurrence of impurity (they are the leaders). [On the other hand,] if holiness occurs, it is an extreme occurrence of holiness (They are the leaders). This that is written (Shemos 13:3), "Moses said to the people, 'Remember this day, when you went out of Egypt,'" was stated because the firstborns of Egypt sinned because of the impurity that occurred in them. So too, the firstborns of Israel are sanctified because of the holiness that occurs in them (This is why the previous verse of Shemos 13:2 talks about the holiness of the first born of Israel)...Behold, before the sin of the "Golden Calf" the sacrificial service was done [by the firstborns] without [their] choice and their holiness came from above (the firstborns were imbued with holiness from G-D) and because of this the firstborns are holy. However, after the sin of the "Golden Calf" the holiness (for performing the sacrificial service) came from below (the people had to imbue themselves with holiness)...And this that it says (Bamidbar 3:12), "As for Me I have taken the Levites from among the children of Israel in place of all firstborns among the children of Israel, who have opened the womb," The reason for "the Levites shall be Mine" is because they chose to be (the Levites imbued themselves with holiness). [However, when the verse says (Bamidbar 3:13)] "For all the firstborns are Mine," that is because of the inherent holiness [they were created with.] For when all of the firstborns of Egypt were struck down, right then [G-D] sanctified the [Jewish] firstborns. However, once the sin [of the "Golden Calf" occurred] the sacrificial service was taken from the firstborns and given to the Levites.

The Eretz Chemda teaches us an important aspect of firstborns. The reason the firstborns are holy is because G-D gives them a special characteristic of being zealous. This trait can either be used for purification or desecration. This is why the firstborns were so severely punished for the sin of the "Golden Calf," they were the ones held responsible because of their zeal. This is also why the firstborns of Egypt were the ones that were most severely punished, because this zeal leads to the firstborns being the leaders in either wickedness or righteousness.

The firstborns, because of their zeal which caused them to become leaders of the sin, had to take responsibility for the "Golden Calf." This distanced them from G-D and forced G-D to choose someone else to perform the sacrificial service. The Levites were a perfect choice because they chose to imbue themselves with the same holiness as the firstborns by rising up. As the verse says (Shemos 32:26),

26. So Moses stood in the gate of the camp and said: "Whoever is for the Lord, [let him come] to me!" And all the sons of Levi gathered around him. כו. וַיַּעֲמֹד משֶׁה בְּשַׁעַר הַמַּחֲנֶה וַיֹּאמֶר מִי לַיהֹוָה אֵלָי וַיֵּאָסְפוּ אֵלָיו כָּל בְּנֵי לֵוִי:

It is this zeal that the tribe of Levi displayed that allowed them to take the place of the firstborns. They showed their ability to lead in a holy way, unlike the firstborns that showed their ability to lead in a disgraceful way.

Thus, we see the original purpose of the firstborns was to perform the sacrificial services. The reason for this is because of their inherent holiness, as described by the Eretz Chemda. This holiness is a double edged sword because it can also lead to their downfall, which it did because it led to the sin of the "Golden Calf." This caused their holiness to be transferred to the Levites because the Levites showed self imbued zeal for G-D, which created their own holiness. This is why the Levites took over for the firstborns. Now, the Levites, because of inheritance, pass on their holiness, which allows them to perform the sacrificial services, to their children. However, the firstborns are still born with their holiness and that is why they must be redeemed.

Rambam's (Maimonides') View of Medical Care (Rationalistic Approach)

2013-05-06T16:44:00.001-04:00

The rationalistic approach to medical care, in Jewish thought, is best represented by Rambam (Maimonides). The reason for this, I believe, has to do with his view on G-D's role in the world. Where Ramban (Nachmanides) believes that G-D intervenes in every aspect of life, the Rambam believes "nature" is the dominant force in a person's life. G-D only intervenes for the extremely righteous and only on occasion. Rambam says (The Guide For The Perplexed 3:51):

But those who, perfect in their knowledge of God, turn their mind sometimes away from God, enjoy the presence of Divine Providence only when they meditate on God; when their thoughts are engaged in other matters, divine Providence departs from them...Hence it appears to me that it is only in times of such neglect that some of the ordinary evils befall a prophet or a perfect and pious man: and the intensity of the evil is proportional to the duration of those moments, or to the character of the things that thus occupy their mind... Hence it may occur that the perfect man is at times not happy, whilst no evil befalls those who are imperfect; in these cases what happens to them is due to chance (nature). This principle I find also expressed in the Law. Comp. "And I will hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured, and many evils and troubles shall befall them: so that they will say in that day, Are not these evils come upon us, because our God is not among us?" (Deut. xxxi. 17).

The Rambam believes that a normal person does not experience divine providence for the majority of their lives. It is only an extremely righteous and knowledgeable individual that experiences divine providence. Therefore, most occurrences are not due to G-D's direct intervention, but through chance (nature). This approach leads the Rambam to take a much more proactive approach to medical care. Medical care is necessary, in fact obligatory, because G-D did not cause this illness. Chance (nature) is what causes most illness and that is why a Jew needs to take care of himself by staying healthy and going to the doctor. Also, this is why a doctor has an obligation to heal and not just permission.

The Rambam's obligation for a person to seek out a doctor can be inferred from his introduction to Mishna Avos (Ethics of Our Fathers, Chapter 3)

Likewise, just as when people, unacquainted with the science of medicine, realize that they are sick, and consult a physician, who tells them what they must do, forbidding them to partake of that which they imagine beneficial, and prescribing for them things which are unpleasant and bitter, in order that their bodies may become healthy, and that they may again choose the good and spurn the bad

Rabbi H. Norman Strickman explains this excerpt to mean that the Rambam believes a person should consult a physician in times of illness. This idea is also seen in the Rambam's Mishna Torah (De'os 2:1, translation found here)

To those who are physically sick, the bitter tastes sweet and the sweet bitter. Some of the sick even desire and crave that which is not fit to eat, such as earth and charcoal, and hate healthful foods, such as bread and meat - all depending on how serious the sickness is. Similarly, those who are morally ill desire and love bad traits, hate the good path, and are lazy to follow it. Depending on how sick they are, they find it exceedingly burdensome...What is the remedy for the morally ill? They should go to the wise, for they are the healers of souls. They will heal them by teaching them how to acquire proper traits, until they return them to the good path.

It seems like the Rambam believes that the remedy for someone who has bad character traits is the same as for someone who is sick, consult a wise healer. By the morally ill, the healer is someone who can help them with their lack in morality. For a physically ill person, the healer is a physician. This can best be illustrated later on in this section of the Mishna Torah (De'os 4:1 translation found here)

Since maintaining a healthy and sound body is among the ways of God - for one cannot understand or have any knowledge of the Creator, if he is ill - therefore, he must avoid that which harms the body and accustom himself to that which is healthful and helps the body become stronger.

The Rambam clearly states that one must maintain a healthy body in order to properly serve G-D. He then goes on to list advice, as a physician, as to how people should maintain their health. So, it appears to be that the Rambam believes that there is an obligation, if not a necessity, for an ill person to consult a physician. (This allows us to contrast the Rambam with Ramban. The Ramban believes a person SHOULD NOT consult a physician as seen here.)

The Rambam's obligation for a Jewish Physician to heal is, actually, somewhat innovative. As pointed out by Benjamin Gesundheit (In Rambam Maimonides Medical Journal),

Maimonides did not accept this well known apologetic attitude of the Talmud towards medicine based on his philosophy of life (Weltanschauung), and he was the first Rabbinic author to understand medicine as a fundamental and a-priori religious duty anchored in a well known Biblical source and further supported by its Talmudic interpretation.

The reason for the Rambam's innovation is, as Gesundheit says, because of his philosophy of life. This also led him to a very interesting source for a physician's obligation to heal. Most commentators bring the verse from Shemos (21:19), "And he shall surely be healed." This is talked about in the Gemara (Babba Kama 85a)

The School of R. Ishmael taught: [The words] "And to heal he shall heal’’[is the source] whence it can be derived that authorization was granted [by God] to the medical man to heal.

However, this verse only creates permission for a physician to heal. Therefore, many commentators conclude that a physician has no obligation, only permission. That is why the Rambam learned a physician's obligation to heal from a completely different verse. This is seen in the Rambam's commentary on the Mishna (Nedarim 4:4),

There is a Biblical obligation for the physician to heal a sick Jew. This is included in what is explained about the verse (Devarim 22:2) "And you shall return it to him." [This includes] healing his body, for this is like when you see him in danger and you are able to save him with your body, your money, or your knowledge.

Ingeniously, the Rambam takes the obligation to return a lost object to mean anything that is "lost" must be returned. In this case, if a person has "lost" his health and a physician has the ability to "return" it to him, then the physician is obligated to do so. (See also Mishna Torah Hilchos Nedarim 6:8)

Rambam's unique source that leads to the physician's obligation to heal also leads to another innovation. A Jewish physician is obligated to heal even a sick non-Jew in a case where it will create a sanctification of G-D's name, a desecration of G-D's name if he does not, or simply because it is "the way of peace" (Laws of Theft and Lost Objects 11:3). We also see that the Rambam "practiced what he preached" from his letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon (found in Freidlander introduction to The Guide),

I reside in Egypt (or Fostat); the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day journeys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and when he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or two of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As a rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost dying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and Gentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return.

It appears that the Rambam believed treating non-Jews was just as important, in most situations, as treating Jews.

In conclusion, we see the approach of the most rationalistic Rabbi, Rambam (Maimonides). My personal belief (in congruence with the belief of other, more knowledgeable people) is that his approach to the medical profession stems from his philosophical outlook on life. He believes that G-D does not cause most illnesses directly, therefore, he believes that if man has the capabilities to cure those illnesses, he should. This is why, I think, he finds the acts of preventing one's own illness, seeking out a physician, and a physician healing not to just be permissible acts, but obligations. Many Rabbis before and after the Rambam would not even say it is permissible to seek out a physician and they barely even allow a physician to heal. In response to these Rabbis the Rambam would say, "But the Gemara is CLEAR!!! Return it to him, return his lost health. It's a Mitzva (commandment)!"

Reward In This World, The Afterlife, And Divine Providence

2013-05-03T10:03:00.001-04:00

One of the Corner stone's of Orthodox Judaism is the belief in an afterlife. Even though this belief is of the utmost importance, it is curious to see that the Rambam leaves it out of his thirteen principles of faith, or does he? The eleventh principle states (Translation taken from here):

The Eleventh Principle is that He, may He be exalted, rewards him who obeys the commands of the Torah and punishes him who violates its prohibitions; and, that the greatest of His rewards is the World-to-Come while the severest of His punishments is "being cut off."

This seems to indicate that the belief in the afterlife or the "World-to-Come" is part of the belief that there is reward and punishment. Therefore, it is essential for us to understand the varying opinions about reward and punishment if we are to understand the afterlife and vice versa.

In order to have this discussion I think we must first look in the Gemara in Kiddushin (39b) where the views of the afterlife are hinted at and reward and punishment are discussed (Translations from Gemara are Soncino):

MISHNAH. HE WHO PERFORMS ONE PRECEPT IS WELL REWARDED, HIS DAYS ARE PROLONGED, AND HE INHERITS THE LAND,BUT HE WHO DOES NOT PERFORM ONE PRECEPT, GOOD IS NOT DONE TO HIM, HIS DAYS ARE NOT PROLONGED, AND HE DOES NOT INHERIT THE LAND.

This Mishna seems to be telling us that reward and punishment are things that are given over in this world, as well as the afterlife. Rashi explains that "He is well rewarded" implies in this world and when it says "And he inherits the land" this refers to the World-to-Come. The Gemara will now discuss this idea. Continuing in the Gemara (ibid):

GEMARA. But a contradiction is shewn: These are the things the fruit of which man eats in this world, while the principal remains for him for the future world. Viz., honoring one's parents, the practice of loving deeds, hospitality to wayfarers, and making peace between man and his neighbour; and the study of the Torah surpasses them all.

This Braisah, let's call it Braisah A, (Tannaic literature, for a similar version of this found in the Mishna see Mishna Pe'ah) implies that it is only for these few commandments that a person is rewarded in this world and in the afterlife. Therefore, the Gemara tries to explain the apparent contradiction by saying (ibid),

Said Rab Judah: This is its meaning: HE WHO PERFORMS ONE PRECEPT in addition to his [equally balanced] merits IS WELL REWARDED, and he is as though he had fulfilled the whole Torah.

Thus, Rav Yehuda is explaining that our Mishna is dealing with a person that has equal amounts of sins and righteous deeds and then does a good deed. That good deed will cause him to be rewarded. Therefore, our Mishna is teaching something different than Braisah A. Our Mishna teaches us that a righteous act, meaning fulfilling a commandment, helps a person earn reward in this world and the afterlife if he has an equal amount of sins and righteous deeds (He now has 101 merits and 100 sins, before it was 100 merits and 100 sins). However, this leads to an untenable understanding of Braisah A:

Hence it follows that for these others (quoted in Braisah A) [one is rewarded] even for a single one! (And that makes no sense. How can a person have an infinite amount of sins and one good deed yet still be rewarded in this world and the next?) Said R. Shemaiah: That teaches that if there is an equal balance, it tips the scale.

According to Rav Yehuda's explanation, we would conclude that Braisah A means to tell us that even if a person only does one righteous deed (one of the deeds in Braisah A), but has a list of sins he is still rewarded. This is remarkable and can not be true. Therefore, Rav Shemiah comes along and tells us Braisah A is only saying if a person has an equal amount of righteous deeds and sins, if one of the righteous deeds is on the list stated in Braisah A, they are still rewarded (even though this person has an equal amount of sins and merits).

Now that we understand the difference between Braisah A and the Mishna, because for some reason (which I am not going to explain now) they can't contradict each other (or be teaching the same thing), the Gemara quotes another Braisah, let's call it Braisah B, that seems to contradict this perfectly reasonable explanation that was proposed by Rav Yehuda and Rav Shemiah.

Yet is it a fact that he who performs one precept in addition to his [equally balanced] merits is rewarded? But the following contradicts it: He whose good deeds outnumber his iniquities is punished, and is as though he had burnt the whole Torah, not leaving even a single letter; while he whose iniquities outnumber his good deeds is rewarded, and is as though he had fulfilled the whole Torah, not omitting even a single letter!

According to Braisah B it seems to be that a person with more righteous deeds than sins is punished while a person who has more sins than righteous deeds is rewarded. This seems to contradict the interpretation offered by Rav Yehuda and Rav Shemiah of the Mishna and Braisah A. The Gemara now puts forth two possible explanations as to why Braisah B is not a problem. The first explanation is Abaye,

Said Abaye: Our Mishnah means that a festive day and an evil day are prepared for him,

I am going to explain Abaye according to Tosfos and talk about Rashi later because I think Rashi believes in something I am going to discuss later (see Tosfos' question on Rashi). Tosfos, in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, explains (My translation),

The Mishna prepares for a man a good day and an evil day in this world. [Also,] Braisah B's "IS WELL REWARDED" is explained just like it is in the Mishna [with regards to someone who has more sins than merits] there are times that [G-D] makes a good day for him (even though he is really wicked) in order that he accept his reward for a righteous deed in this world and on that day (that he is being rewarded) he is similar to someone who fulfills the whole Torah. However, the majority of the life of a wicked person is filled with bad because his sins are greater than his merits. [The explanation of] And it is bad for him [is with regards to someone who has more merits than sins and] there are times [G-D] makes for him a bad day in order to cleanse him of his sins in this world. On this [bad day] he is like one who burned the whole Torah. However, the majority of the days of a righteous person are filled with good because his merits are more numerous than his sins.

According to Tosfos, Abaye seems to explain Braisah B as discussing a different idea about reward in this world. Braisah B agrees, according to Abaye, with Rav Yehuda and Rav Shemiah's explanation of the Mishna and Braisah A . According to Braisah B, if you are a wicked person (more sins than merits) and you perform a righteous deed then you will be rewarded in this world. However, the majority of your days will be filled with punishment. If you are a righteous person (more merits than sins) and you sin then you will be punished in this world. However, the majority of your days will be filled with good. The originality of Braisah B is that it tells us a wicked person is still rewarded for his good deeds in this world and a righteous person is still punished for his wicked deeds in this world.

However, Rava comes to offer an alternate explanation. He says,

Raba said: This latter agrees with R. Jacob, who said: There is no reward for precepts in this world. For it was taught: R. Jacob said: There is not a single precept in the Torah whose reward is [stated] at its side which is not dependent on the resurrection of the dead.

Rava says, that Braisah B does not contradict anything, rather it is a dissenting opinion. He would explain Braisah B in the following way, according to Tosfos: A person who has a majority of merits and a minority of sins is punished in this world for his sins in order that he should receive the maximum amount of reward in the next world and a person who has a majority of sins and a minority of merits is rewarded in this world for his merits in order that he should not be rewarded at all in the World-to-Come. Braisah B disagrees with the Mishna and Braisah A since they hold the opposite, the righteous are rewarded in this world and the wicked are punished in this world.

We assume, according to Rava, that the Mishna and Braisah A are according to the mainstream views, that is why they must be reconciled. However, since Braisah B is according to a "Singular" opinion (known as Daas Yachid) it is not a contradiction to the Mishna and Braisah A even though it argues on them.

This is where we see the two views on reward and punishment. Rav Yaakov clearly holds that there is no reward given in this world and Rava explains that this is the view of Braisah B, a dissenting Tannaic opinion. However, Rava is implying that the Mishna and Braisah A are of the opinion that reward and punishment are meted out in this world according to who actually deserves it. Essentially, the Mishna and Braisah A believe, as we stated earlier, a righteous person should be rewarded in this world and a wicked person should be punished.

Rabbi Akiva seems to have a similar understanding to Rav Yaakov, according to Tosfos, that is seen in Ruth Rabbah (6:4, translation from artscroll)

One time [Elisha] was sitting and studying in the valley of Ginosar and he saw a man who ascended to the top of a date palm on the Sabbath, took the mother bird with the young, and descended safely. On Motzei Shabbos, [Elisha] saw another man ascend to the top of the date palm tree, he took the young after he had sent away the mother bird, he descended, and a snake bit him and he died. Thereupon, [Elisha] said, "It is written, 'You shall surely send away the mother and take the young for yourself, so that it will be good for you and will prolong your days' (Devarim 22:7); where is this second man's good and where is his prolonging of days?" And [Elisha] did not know that Rabbi Akiva had publicly expounded that verse as follows: "So that it will be good for you" in the world that is entirely good, "and you will prolong your days" in the world that is entirely long (i.e. the World-to-Come).

Here we also see that Rabbi Akiva understood that reward is not given to a person in this world, but in the World-to-Come. (In fact, Rabbi Akiva explains this verse in the exact same way Rav Yaakov does.)

However, if you have not noticed, Rav Yaakov, according to Tosfos, seems to imply that reward and punishment are given in this world even though he states, straight out, that they are not. According to Rava's explanation of Braisah B, Rav Yaakov says, in Tosfos' opinion, that reward is given in this world, at least, to a wicked person so that he should not get it in the next world and that punishment is given in this world, at least, to a righteous person so that he will not receive it in the World-to-Come.

This idea, that a righteous person can receive punishment in this world in order to receive his full capacity of reward in the world to come is also brought down in the name of Rabbi Akiva in Sanhedrin 101a:

Rabbah b. Bar Hana said: When R. Eliezer fell sick, his disciples entered [his house] to visit him.He said to them, ‘There is a fierce wrath in the world.They broke into tears, but R. Akiba laughed. ‘Why dost thou laugh?’ they enquired of him ‘Why do ye weep?’ he retorted. They answered, ‘Shall the Scroll of the Torah lie in pain, and we not weep?’ — He replied, ‘For that very reason I rejoice. As long as I saw that my master's wine did not turn sour, nor was his flax smitten, nor his oil putrefied, nor his honey become rancid, I thought, God forbid, that he may have received all his reward in this world [leaving nothing for the next]; but now that I see him lying in pain, I rejoice [knowing that his reward has been treasured up for him in the next].’ He [R. Eliezer] said to him, ‘Akiba, have I neglected anything of the whole Torah? He replied, ‘Thou, O Master, hast taught us, For there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not.

This Gemara also teaches us a new idea. This new idea is that any person, not just a wicked person, can receive his reward in this world and thereby lose his reward in the World-to-Come. It has even been explicitly stated in Tractate Arachin (16b):

The School of R. Ishmael taught: Anyone upon whom forty days have passed without [divine] visitation (some version of suffering), had received his world (his reward for the good things he has done in this world).

The final proof we can bring that Shows Rabbi Akiva believed there is reward for righteous deeds in this world is found in Gemara Shabbos (156b):

From R. Akiba too [we learn that] Israel is free from planetary influence. For R. Akiba had a daughter. Now, astrologers told him, On the day she enters the bridal chamber a snake will bite her and she will die. He was very worried about this. On that day [of her marriage] she took a brooch [and] stuck it into the wall and by chance it penetrated [sank] into the eye of a serpent. The following morning, when she took it out, the snake came trailing after it. ‘What did you do?’ her father asked her. ‘A poor man came to our door in the evening.’ she replied, ‘and everybody was busy at the banquet, and there was none to attend to him. So I took the portion which was given to me and gave it to him. ‘You have done a good deed,’ said he to her. Thereupon R. Akiba went out and lectured: But charity delivereth from death’: and not [merely] from an unnatural death, but from death itself.

Clearly, Rabbi Akiva holds that the reward for a good deed can be actualized in this world. Therefore, we see Rabbi Akiva holds that reward and punishment are meted out in this world. However, he also seems to be holding that reward can be "saved up" for the World-to-Come. Either way we look at it, Rav Yaakov, according to Tosfos, and Rabbi Akiva are holding that reward and punishment ARE given in this world, so I am unsure how they can be understood to be saying that reward for fulfilling the commandments in this world does not exist according to Tosfos.

The truth is, maybe this is not the correct way to understand Rav Yaakov. Maybe Tosfos' question on Rashi is not a good question. Also, If we remove Tosfos' understanding of Rav Yaakov then Rabbi Akiva and Rav Yaakov might not be saying the same thing. That would remove some very challenging difficulties. Perhaps this is the route to follow? However, to understand a possible answer, we must understand the possible views of how G-D interacts with this world, we have to understand divine providence.

According to Rambam, as stated in the "Guide For The Perplexed" (3:51), divine providence only rests on those who have intellects that qualify them for divine providence. All other beings are left to "chance."

Divine Providence is constantly watching over those who have obtained that blessing which is prepared for those who endeavor to obtain it. If man frees his thoughts from worldly matters, obtains a knowledge of God in the right way, and rejoices in that knowledge, it is impossible that any kind of evil should befall him while he is with God, and God with him. When he does not meditate on God, when he is separated from God, then God is also separated from him; then he is exposed to any evil that might befall him; for it is only that intellectual link with God that secures the presence of Providence and protection from evil accidents. Hence it may occur that the perfect man is at times not happy, whilst no evil befalls those who are imperfect; in these cases what happens to them is due to chance...It is now clearly established that the cause of our being exposed to chance, and abandoned to destruction like cattle, is to be found in our separation from God.

The idea of "chance" is something that I have referenced before (Individual Divine Intervention) and can be found in the Gemara (Mo'ed Katan 28a and Shabbos 156a-b). (According to the Rambam these Gemaras are talking about chance and not planetary influence because he does not believe in astrology.) In Mo'ed Katan it seems to be that "chance" is the dominant force ruling the world.

Raba said: [Length of] life, children and sustenance depend not on merit but [rather on] mazzal (chance). For [take] Rabbah and R. Hisda. Both were saintly Rabbis; one master prayed for rain and it came, the other master prayed for rain and it came. R. Hisda lived to the age of ninety-two, Rabbah [only] lived to the age of forty. In R. Hisda's house there were held sixty marriage feasts, at Rabbah's house there were sixty bereavements. At R. Hisda's house there was the purest wheaten bread for dogs, and it went to waste; at Rabbah's house there was barley bread for human beings and that not to be had.

We see that most things in life are not dependent on good deeds or sins, but on "chance." Great people are able to pray for things like rain, but that is a rare exception.

However, this seems to be an argument in Tractate Shabbos:

It was stated. R. Hanina said: Chance (The planetary influence) gives wisdom, chance (the planetary influence) gives wealth, and Israel stands under chance (planetary influence) (This view is in accordance with Rava from the Gemara in Mo'ed Katan). R. Johanan maintained: Israel is immune from chance (planetary influence)...Rab too holds that Israel is immune from chance (planetary influence). For Rab Judah said in Rab's name:...

Here we see that there is an argument whether chance is the dominant influence among the Jewish people or if G-D intervenes in the lives of Jews for righteous deeds. According to Rava and Rav Chanina G-D does not really intervene in the lives of righteous Jews. Only if they pray for a specific type of intervention are they able to receive direct divine intervention. Otherwise, even the completely righteous are left to "chance." On the other hand, Rav Yochanan, Rav and Rav Yehuda seem to be of the opinion that G-D will intervene for those that are extremely righteous even if they do not pray. This is best seen in the cases that follow in the Gemara in Shabbos (ibid):

From Samuel too [we learn that] Israel is immune from "chance" (planetary influence). For Samuel and Ablat were sitting, while certain people were going to a lake. Said Ablat to Samuel: ‘That man is going but will not return, [for] a snake will bite him and he will die.’ ‘If he is an Israelite,’ replied Samuel.'he will go and return.’ While they were sitting he went and returned. [Thereupon] Ablat arose and threw off his [the man's] knapsack, [and] found a snake therein cut up and lying in two pieces —Said Samuel to him, ‘What did you do?’ ‘Every day we pooled our bread and ate it; but to-day one of us had no bread, and he was ashamed. Said I

to them, "I will go and collect [the bread]". When I came to him, I pretended to take [bread] from him, so that he should not be ashamed.’ ‘You have done a good deed,’ said he to him. Then Samuel went out and lectured: But charity delivereth from death, and [this does not mean] from an unnatural death, but from death itself....

This is the first of three cases, but I think the point is clear. Therefore, I believe we can explain the apparent contradiction between Rav Yaakov's stated stance according to Tosfos and what we see in reality based on his view of divine providence. But first, let's explain the argument between Braisah B (which goes according to Rav Yaakov) and the Mishna and Braisah A (which goes according to Rav Yehuda and Rav Shemiah). If you noticed, the argument for whether Israel is governed by "chance" (excluding most possibilities of divine intervention) and whether Israel is not governed by "chance" (allowing for much more divine intervention) is between Rava (among others) on one side (Rava, the one who states Rav Yaakov's opinion) and Rav Yehuda (the same Rav Yehuda that explains the Mishna as referring to reward in this world). Essentially, Rav Yaakov can be said to be holding that divine providence is extremely limited (in accordance with Rava) and "chance" is what governs most occurrences in this world, therefore, righteous deeds are not rewarded in this world. Whereas, Rav Yehuda and his compatriots (Rav Shemiah and Abaye to name a couple) hold Israel is not ruled by "chance" (however, chance can effect them if there is no divine intervention) and divine intervention occurs all the time for righteous deeds. This is the foundation of the argument between Rav Yehuda and Rav Yaakov.

We can explain Rav Yaakov very easily now (not like Tosfos). According to Rav Yaakov G-D does not intervene and allows "chance" to rule the world. Therefore, we can explain Braisah B as follows:

He whose good deeds outnumber his iniquities is punished, and is as though he had burnt the whole Torah, not leaving even a single letter;

This means that a person who performs good deeds is left to "chance" and "chance" will be harsher to him than G-D would be. He will be treated just like someone who completely rejects the Torah. And the second part of Braisah B is as follows:

while he whose iniquities outnumber his good deeds is rewarded, and is as though he had fulfilled the whole Torah, not omitting even a single letter!

It is beneficial for a wicked person to be governed by "chance" because "chance" will be much kinder than G-D. In fact, "chance" will treat this wicked person just the same as if he were completely righteous.

If we interpret the Gemara like this then Rabbi Akiva is not similar to Rav Yaakov at all. Rabbi Akiva actually believes in reward and punishment in this world. The distribution of reward and punishment may be different than how it is explained in the Mishna and Braisah A, but he still believes in reward and punishment in this world.

Also, I believe this interpretation is how Rashi understands the Gemara. I will now quote Rashi as he explains Abaye (the interpretation that Tosfos argues on).

Said Abaye: Our Mishnah means that a festive day and an evil day are prepared for him: For we learned it is good for him (he is rewarded) and it is bad for him (he is punished) that it is made for him a festive day and a bad day. Someone who does an extra righteous deed that makes him have a majority of merits it is established for him in this world a festive day because he is repaid (punished) for his sins and it is fixed for him to have a festive day in the World-to-Come. [However, someone who does a righteous deed but] he has a majority of sins and we learn it is bad for him, because it is made for him an evil day for he is paid the reward for his righteous deeds here [in this world] to fix for him a bad day [in the World-to-Come.]

So, according to Rashi, Abaye is explaining Braisah B in accordance with Rabbi Akiva. However, it is not in accordance with Rav Yaakov. In fact, according to Rashi, Braisah B is just another idea that fits with how reward is distributed in this world. Rashi is saying that Braisah B, according to Abaye, tells us G-D can choose to reward someone in this world or in the next. Just like the story in Sanhedrin (101a) by Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva was worried that Rabbi Eliezer had already received all of his reward in this world because he had only experienced good in this world. However, once Rabbi Akiva saw that he was suffering he immediately knew that a "Festive Day" was set aside for him in the World-to-Come. Also, this fits well with the story of Rabbi Akiva's daughter in Shabbos (156b). She was clearly rewarded in this world for her act of kindness and that is why Rabbi Akiva started teaching that "Giving charity can save you from death."

To clarify Rashi's opinion on how to understand Abaye, the Mishna is saying that if a person performs one good deed and he had equal amounts of sins and merits, he is rewarded in this world and the World-to-Come. Braisah A is saying that if a person has an equal amount of sins and merits, but one of those merits is from the list of righteous deeds in Braisah A, he is still rewarded in this world and the World-to-Come. Finally, Braisah B, according to Abaye, is teaching us something very important. Even though the Mishna and Braisah A teach us reward is distributed in this world as well as the next, Braisah B tells us that it is possible G-D will choose to cause punishment in this world to a righteous person in order for him to receive more reward in the World-to-Come and that G-D will reward the wicked in this world in order to detract from their reward in the World-to-Come. Therefore, the Mishna and Braisah A tell us that it is possible G-D will reward someone in this world, but Braisah B tells us about the possibility that a person will also have his reward saved for the World-to-Come.

With this explanation there is no question on Rav Yaakov. According to Tosfos, it seems like Rav Yaakov does believe that, at least, wicked people are rewarded in this world and righteous people are punished in this world . However, Rava clearly states in the name of Rav Yaakov, "There is no reward for precepts in this world." This statement is not qualified, it is a blanket statement that would not work with Tosfos' explanation, in my opinion. No reward in this world means no reward in this world.

According to Rav Yaakov, there is no reward in this world because G-D does not intervene in this world for individuals. Rav Yaakov is of the opinion that "chance" governs the Jewish people (like we discussed earlier) and all reward is saved for the afterlife. On the other hand, Rav Yehuda and his group hold that G-D does intervene in this world and that is why reward can be received in this world as well as the World-to-Come.

Now, I would like to understand how it is that Rav Yaakov came to the conclusion that G-D does not intervene in this world. For this, we need only read a bit further in the Gemara (Kiddushin 39b):

[Thus:] in connection with honoring parents it is written (Devarim 5:16), that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with thee. In reference to the dismissal of the nest it is written (ibid 22:7), that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days. Now, if one's father said to him, ‘Ascend to the loft and bring me young birds,’and he ascends to the loft, dismisses the dam and takes the young, and on his return falls and is killed — where is this man's happiness and where is this man's prolonging of days? But ‘in order that it may be well with thee’, means on the day that is wholly good (the World-to-Come); and ‘in order that thy days may be long’, on the day that is wholly long (The World-to-Come)...R. Jacob saw an actual occurrence.

Rav Yaakov actually saw an incident that proved to him that there must be no reward for the righteous in this world. How could someone perform a righteous deed that the Torah explicitly states they will have a prolonged life if they perform it and then immediately be killed? The only way, in Rav Yaakov's mind, is to say the reward that is promised is only referring to the World-to-Come. If this is the case, then it must be that G-D does not intervene in this world. For, if all reward is saved for the World-to-Come, then why would G-D ever intervene? Whether you perform good deeds or wicked deeds, all reward and punishment is saved for the afterlife. There is no need for G-D to intervene on an individual level.

I would like to bring down some final thoughts on reward and punishment from the Meiri and the Rambam and how they, seemingly, understood this Gemara. The Meiri says (Kiddushin 39b, from here):

It is a principle of faith that there is reward and punishment both in this world and in the next world. One should not be confused by the apparent success of the wicked or the tribulations of the righteous. All is just. A righteous person may have committed certain transgressions. It is better to atone now for these sins, to prepare him for a "good day" in the world to come. The reverse is true of the wicked person. He receives his reward now to prepare him for a "bad day," that is, not to receive a share of the world to come.

So, we see that the Meiri holds of Rabbi Akiva's idea, that reward may be given to the wicked in this world in order to take away their share in the afterlife and punishment may come upon a righteous person in order to increase his share in the World-to-Come. However, he maintains the idea of the Mishna and Braisah A that reward and punishment can be given out normally (meaning, good fortune to righteous people and bad fortune to wicked people). As a side point, it seems like the Meiri holds like Abaye.

The Rambam, on the other hand, does not seem to agree with the Meiri and excludes Rabbi Akiva's idea from the final "halacha"(Teshuva 9:1, from here)

Thus, these blessings and curses can be interpreted as follows: If you serve God with happiness and observe His way, He will grant you these blessings and remove these curses from you in order that you may be free to gain wisdom from the Torah and involve yourselves in it so that you will merit the life of the world to come. "Good will be granted you" - in the world that is entirely good; "and you will live long" - in the world which is endlessly long, [the world to come].
Thus, you will merit two worlds, a good life in this world, which, in turn, will bring you to the life of the world to come. For if a person will not acquire wisdom in this world and he does not possess good deeds, with what will he merit [a portion in the world to come]? [Thus, Ecclesiastes 9:10] states: "There is no work, no accounting, no knowledge, and no wisdom in the grave."
[Conversely,] if you have abandoned God and become obsessed with food, drink, lewdness, and the like, He will bring all these curses upon you and remove all blessing until you will conclude all your days in confusion and fear. You will not have a free heart or a complete body to fulfill the mitzvot in order that you forfeit the life of the world to come.
Thus, you will forfeit two worlds for when a person is occupied in this world with sickness, war, and hunger, he cannot involve himself with either wisdom or mitzvot which allow him to merit the life of the world to come.

The Rambam is of the opinion that if you do good, only good will come of that. If a person follows the Torah and Mitzvot then he will be granted a life free from pain and suffering that will allow him to acquire as much knowledge as possible. This acquisition of knowledge will then propel this righteous individual into the World-to-Come. The Rambam (Guide For The Perplexed 3:51) holds, as we quoted earlier in this essay, any evils that befall a man who is righteous are due to "chance."

Hence it may occur that the perfect man is at times not happy, whilst no evil befalls those who are imperfect; in these cases what happens to them is due to chance...It is now clearly established that the cause of our being exposed to chance, and abandoned to destruction like cattle, is to be found in our separation from God.

Rambam's view seems very simple. You are rewarded in this world and the next for the good that you do and you are punished in this world and the next for the evil that you do. All the bad that happens to righteous people is by "chance" when the righteous person is not connected to G-D because G-D only gives divine intervention while someone is "connected" to G-D, like the Rambam explains. As a side note, Rambam appears to be holding like Rava's understanding of the Gemara. He holds that the Mishna and Braisah A are arguing on Braisah B and, therefore, he entirely ignores Braisah B. That is why the Rambam does not hold of this idea of Rabbi Akiva that righteous people receive punishment in this world and wicked people receive reward in this world. The Rambam only holds of the Mishna and Braisah A, that the righteous are rewarded and the wicked are punished.

The idea of Rabbi Akiva, that the Meiri endorses, seems difficult to understand. According to this idea, G-D sometimes decides to reward people, even righteous people, in this world. Why would G-D choose to reward some righteous people in this world and others only in the world to come? The Meiri's own explanation lacks clarity (Kiddushin 39b)

This is not to say that there cannot be a reward for good deeds in this world as well as in the next. It is the force of circumstances which may delay rewards until the next world. For example, assume that a person heeds his parent's order to fetch young birds, and to send the mother bird away before taking the chicks. How is it that such a person can die while performing two precepts, for each of which Scripture promises long life? The force of circumstances delays reward until the next world!

What is this force of circumstance that the Meiri talks about? Just because this righteous person dies that creates a "force of circumstance?" If G-D is going to reward this righteous individual, reward him, why does he die? Why would G-D choose to reward a righteous individual in this world if it detracts from the world to come? There are many ideas that are left unclear according to Rabbi Akiva's idea.

I feel much more comfortable with the Rambam. It makes a lot more sense to me. Therefore, if I have a Rishon that explains things that I can wrap my head around, I would prefer to follow him than a Rishon that is left unclear to me. It is interesting that Rabbi Akiva does not hold like the Rambam's viewpoint specifically because, as we saw in the Gemara in Shabbos 156b, he listened to stargazers who told him his daughter would die on her wedding day (he held that "chance," in some form, has power over people). Why he explains bad things happening to good people as punishments from G-D instead of "chance" or planetary influence is unclear to me as well.

I hope my explanation of the Gemara and the different viewpoints was as clear as possible. Hopefully, I will discuss the different opinions about what the afterlife entails. I have tried to express the different viewpoints about reward and punishment to the best of my ability. Any questions or comments are welcome.

What Should Individuals Focus On: Learning, Teaching, Or Performing The Commandments (Mitzvot)

2013-04-29T16:01:00.000-04:00

This Dvar Torah is l'iluy nishmas Ezriel Yehuda ben Eitan Eliezer

This week's Parsha, Bechukosai, discusses G-D's ultimatum with the Jewish people. It says (Vayikra 26:3),

ג אִם-בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ וְאֶת-מִצְוֹתַי תִּשְׁמְרוּ וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם: (from here)
If you will follow in my statutes and you will guard my commandments and perform them.

The following verses go on to expound how great it will be for the Jewish people if they follow this statement. However, G-D then says the second half of the ultimatum (ibid 14-15),

יד וְאִם-לֹא תִשְׁמְעוּ לִי וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כָּל-הַמִּצְוֹת הָאֵלֶּה:
טו וְאִם-בְּחֻקֹּתַי תִּמְאָסוּ וְאִם אֶת-מִשְׁפָּטַי תִּגְעַל נַפְשְׁכֶם לְבִלְתִּי עֲשׂוֹת אֶת-כָּל-מִצְוֹתַי לְהַפְרְכֶם אֶת-בְּרִיתִי:
14. If you do not listen to me and you do not perform all of these commandments.
15. And if you despise my statutes, and if your souls reject my laws and you do not perform all of my commandments to break my covenant.

The verses following this statement go on to expound upon all the the awful things that will occur to the Jewish people if this path is chosen.

However, I think a detailed analysis is warranted of what exactly these statutes and commandments are and what guarding them and performing them entails. These statements seem to be very vague for something that can lead to such great reward or such terrible punishment. Also, what happens if we perform the commandments, but do not follow in the statutes? Is that even possible?

I believe a good starting point for this topic is Rashi (ibid 3, translation from here),

If you follow My statutes: I might think that this refers to the fulfillment of the commandments. However, when Scripture says, “and observe My commandments,” the fulfillment of the commandments is [already] stated. So what is the meaning of “If you follow My statutes”? It means that you must toil in the study of Torah [Torath Kohanim 26:2] אם בחקתי תלכו: יכול זה קיום המצות, כשהוא אומר ואת מצותי תשמרו, הרי קיום המצות אמור, הא מה אני מקיים אם בחקתי תלכו, שתהיו עמלים בתורה:

And observe My commandments: You shall toil in the study of Torah in order to observe and fulfill [the commandments (Torath Kohanim 26:2). This is similar to, “[Hear, O Israel, the statutes and ordinances…] and learn them, and keep in mind to do them” (Deut. 5:1) ואת מצותי תשמרו: הוו עמלים בתורה על מנת לשמור ולקיים, כמו שנאמר (דברים ה א) ולמדתם אותם ושמרתם לעשותם:

Rashi explains that the verse is telling us three things. First, a Jew is responsible to learn the commandments. Second, a Jew is responsible to "keep the commandments in mind." Lastly, a Jew is required to perform the commandments.

Unfortunately, this is still a little unclear. What exactly is keeping them in mind? For this, we can take a look at the Ibn Ezra (ibid),

אם בחקתי...תשמרו ועשיתם: מצוה ללמוד וללמד ולעשות

If [you will follow] in my statutes...you will guard them and you will perform them: It is a commandment to learn, teach and perform.

The Ibn Ezra tells us the missing piece, to "keep the commandments in mind" means to teach them. Now we know all three parts to this ultimatum. G-D wants us to learn, teach and perform the commandments and this will allow us to attain great rewards. However, if we ignore the commandments and do not learn, teach or perform them, then we are doomed, as a nation, to a life full of trouble.

This leads us to a very interesting question, what about the individual? The Torah is clearly only talking about the nation as a whole learning, teaching and performing the commandments, but how does this relate to the individual? Does the individual need to do all three, or do certain people learn and teach while others perform and thereby the nation, as a whole, does all three? Are all three aspects of learning, teaching and performing equal or is one more important than the others? These are all very important questions because the individual needs to know how to focus his or her energy. As I said, the nation as a whole must perform all three, since G-D is discussing this as a national reward and a national punishment for listening or ignoring, but individuals are not addressed.

There are two Gemaras that discuss what is greater; learning, teaching or performing the commandments. The first Gemara I will bring is from Babba Kama (17a, translation from Soncino),

Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said: I was once following R. Johanan for the purpose of asking him about the [above] matter. He, however, at that moment went into a toilet room. [When he reappeared and] I put the matter before him, he did not answer until he had washed his hands, put on phylacteries and pronounced the benediction. Then he said to us: Even if sometimes we also say. ‘He fulfilled [the law] (performed the commandment-e-man input) . . .’ we never say. ‘He expounded [the law](expounded the commandment because that is so great-e-man input)...’ (Someone asks a question on R. Johanan-e-man input) But did not the Master say: The importance of the study of the law is enhanced by the fact that the study of the law is conducive to [the] practice [of the law] (isn't the study of the commandments important because it leads to performance of the commandments?-e-man)? This, however, offers no difficulty; the latter statement deals with studying [the law] (studying the commandments is not so great and therefore that is why performance is greater), the former with teaching [the law] (teaching the commandments is the greatest thing you can do and that is why it is a real honor-e-man input).

This Gemara has several interpretations. However, this translation of the Gemara is according to Rashi. Just to summarize it; Rav Yochanan says that performing the commandments is not as great as "expounding" on the commandments. A question is asked that the dictum states that study of the commandments is only really important because it leads to the performance of the commandments and Rav Yochanan seems to be saying that the performance of the commandments is not as great as "expounding" upon the commandments (expounding is, originally, assumed to mean just studying). This difficulty is cleared up because Rav Yochanan says that just studying the commandments yourself is not as great as performing the commandments, but teaching the commandments to others is greater than performing them. So, according to Rashi, this Gemara is saying that the most important action is teaching the commandments to others, then comes performing the commandments and the least important action is studying the commandments.

However, there is a Gemara in Kiddushin (40b) that seems to contradict this. In fact, Rashi himself explains the Gemara in Kiddushin to be contradicting the Gemara in Babba Kama. It says (Kiddushin 40b, translation is Soncino),

R. Tarfon and the Elders were once reclining in the upper storey of Nithza's house, in Lydda, when this question was raised before them: Is study greater, or practice? R. Tarfon answered, saying: Practice is greater. R. Akiba answered, saying: Study is greater, for it leads to practice. Then they all answered and said: Study is greater, for it leads to action.

Rashi says on this Gemara that studying is greater than performing the commandments because if a person studies then he or she will be able to study and perform, both are in his or her hands. Rashi in Babba Kama (17a) says since the point of studying is in order to perform the commandments we see that the performance is more important because the end is more important than the means. So, which argument is correct?

Tosfos comes in Kiddushin (40b) to offer an explanation. He says a novice should learn first before performing the commandments, because if you do not first learn how to properly perform the commandments, then you will not perform them correctly. This is the case in Kiddushin, the Rabbis were talking about a novice and that is why one should learn first. However, if you are an expert and know how to perform the commandments, then performance is better than learning. This is the case in Babba Kama, they are talking about giving someone praise after their death. The greater praise is that he (the dead person) performed the commandments, because if he performed the commandments correctly then he obviously learned how to perform them correctly. This is also what Rabbeinu Tam says on the Gemara in Babba Kama (17a).

Another opinion is quoted in the Tosfos on Babba Kama, that of Rav Achai Gaon. He has a different version of the Gemara that leads him to come to a completely different conclusion. Until this point, everyone has agreed that teaching the commandments to others is the greatest thing a person can do for the simple reason which Rabbeinu Tam states, "That it brings the masses to perform the commandments." However, Rav Achai Gaon's version of the Gemara simply said,

Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said: I was once following R. Johanan for the purpose of asking him about the [above] matter. He, however, at that moment went into a toilet room. [When he reappeared and] I put the matter before him, he did not answer until he had washed his hands, put on phylacteries and pronounced the benediction. How could R. Johanan put on his phylacteries first, did not the Master say: The importance of the study of the law is enhanced by the fact that the study of the law is conducive to [the] practice [of the law]? This, however, offers no difficulty; the latter statement deals with studying [the law] (studying the commandments is more important than performing the commandments because studying brings about the performance), the former action (putting on the phylacteries first) with teaching [the law] (performing the commandments is more important than teaching the commandments).

According to this version of the Gemara, we learn the exact opposite lesson from that of Rashi. Studying the commandments is more important because it brings one to perform the commandments, but performing the commandments is more important than teaching them to others, because that, apparently, does not bring anyone to actually perform the commandments.

In all honesty, Rav Achai Gaon's version of the Gemaraa in Babba Kama fits much better with the Gemara in Kiddushin. In Rav Achai's version both Gemara's are saying that studying is preferred to performance because studying brings about performance. Meaning, because it brings about performance, if you study you will be able to study and perform, both are "in your hands" (as Rashi says in the Gemara in Kiddushin).

A side point, the Soncino brings up a very good practical reason for this discussion about which is better, learning or performing the commandments. He says,

This was a practical problem during the Hadrianic persecution, when both study and practical observance were forbidden, and the question was for which risks should sooner be taken. — Weiss. Dor., II, 125, Graetz, Geschichte, IV,p. 429

At this point we can say that Rashi and Tosfos would hold a novice should first learn and an expert should first perform the commandments. However, it seems like Rav Achai Gaon would hold that in every situation a person should first and foremost learn. Also, Rashi and Tosfos would say that, before anything, a person should risk his life to teach. However, Rav Achai Gaon would say that is the last thing a person should risk his life for.

To conclude this debate I would like to bring in the Rambam (Talmud Torah 3:3-4),

אין לך מצוה בכל המצות כולן שהיא שקולה כנגד תלמוד תורה אלא תלמוד תורה כנגד כל המצות כולן שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. לפיכך התלמוד קודם למעשה בכל מקום:
You do not have a commandment from all the commandments that is equal to learning Torah, rather learning Torah is equal to all the commandments because learning brings about performance [of all the other commandments.] Therefore, learning takes precedence to performance in every place.

היה לפניו עשיית מצוה ותלמוד תורה אם אפשר למצוה להעשות ע"י אחרים לא יפסיק תלמודו. ואם לאו יעשה המצוה ויחזור לתלמודו:

If [there is a situation] in front of [a Jewish person] that he can perform a commandment and learn Torah, then if it is possible for the commandment to be done by someone else he should not stop his learning. [However, if no one else can perform the commandment] he should perform it and then return to his learning.

The Rambam makes it very clear to us how he read the Gemara.The goal is for all commandments to be fulfilled. However, it is important for everyone to learn about the commandments as best as they can before fulfilling them. Therefore, if a person is learning, he should continue learning unless there is a commandment that will be left undone due to his learning.

This brings us back to our verse, "If you will follow in my statutes and you will guard my commandments and perform them." The Torah is telling us, as the Ibn Ezra points out, G-D wants us to learn, teach and perform His commandments. In my opinion, all three of these things appear to be equally important, but there is a practical difference. G-D tells us that, as a nation, we must do all three of these actions of learning, teaching and performing. However, in the book of Joshua (1:8, translation from here) G-D gives us some advice,

8. This book of the Torah shall not leave your mouth; you shall meditate therein day and night, in order that you observe to do all that is written in it, for then will you succeed in all your ways and then will you prosper. ח. לֹא יָמוּשׁ סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה הַזֶּה מִפִּיךָ וְהָגִיתָ בּוֹ יוֹמָם וָלַיְלָה לְמַעַן תִּשְׁמֹר לַעֲשֹוֹת כְּכָל הַכָּתוּב בּוֹ כִּי אָז תַּצְלִיחַ אֶת דְּרָכֶךָ וְאָז תַּשְׂכִּיל:

In order for us to be successful and to follow in the statutes, guard and perform the commandments, we need to learn as much as we can. The only way to make sure that we know how to properly perform and teach the commandments is to learn everything that we must perform. Therefore, the Rambam tells us learning is paramount, because without learning no other commandments can be fulfilled. However, performance of the commandments must be done, that is why if no other Jews can perform a commandment you must stop learning to fulfill that commandment. As long as some Jews are performing the commandments, that leaves others free to learn and teach the commandments so, when the time arises, they can also perform the commandments correctly in the way G-D desires.

A final thought on this subject. The Gemara in Berachos (35b) talks about this verse from the book of Joshua. I think it is very important to bring it into our discussion.

Our Rabbis taught (Divarim 11:14): "And thou shalt gather in thy corn." What is to be learned from these words? Since it says (Joshua 1:8), "This book of the law shall not depart out of thy mouth," I might think that this injunction is to be taken literally. Therefore it says, ‘And thou shalt gather in thy corn’, which implies that you are to combine the study of them (the words of Torah) with a worldly occupation. This is the view of R.Ishmael. R. Simeon b. Yohai says: Is that possible? If a man ploughs in the ploughing season, and sows in the sowing season, and reaps in the reaping season, and threshes in the threshing season, and winnows in the season of wind, what is to become of the Torah? No; but when Israel perform the will of the Omnipresent, their work is performed by others, as it says (Yeshayahu 61:5). "And strangers shall stand and feed your flocks. etc.," and when Israel do not perform the will of the Omnipresent their work is carried out by themselves, as it says (ibid), "And thou shalt gather in thy corn." Nor is this all, but the work of others also is done by them, as it says (Devarim 28:48), "And thou shalt serve thine enemy etc." Said Abaye: Many have followed the advice of Ishmael, and it has worked well; others have followed R. Simeon b.Yohai and it has not been successful. Raba said to the Rabbis: I would ask you not to appear before me during Nisan and Tishri so that you may not be anxious about your food supply during the rest of the year.

Also, in Pirkei Avos (2:2) it says,

Rabban Gamliel the son of Rabbi Yehuda the Prince said: Good is Torah study together with a worldly occupation, for the exertion in both makes one forget sin. All Torah study without work will cease and it will bring along in its wake sinfulness.

We can see from here that a person needs to focus on learning, teaching and performing the commandments. However, that is not all one can focus on. A person must find a balance that allows them to pursue the path G-D says is best for us. We must realize how to divide our time so we can learn, yet also perform the commandment of supporting our families. This is what Rabbi Yishamel says and it is, apparently, the most successful approach to Judaism.

In conclusion, the verses in this week's Parsha are not necessarily meant for individuals, they are meant to be fulfilled through the entire nation. Some people in the nation are supposed to be the learners and the teachers. Others are supposed to be the ones that perform the commandments. Yet, the majority are supposed to live a life of learning, teaching and performing the commandments as Rabbi Yishmael points out.

Understanding Shemittah (Sabbatical Year For The Land)

2013-04-28T12:43:00.001-04:00

This week's Parsha, Behar, discusses Shemittah (Vayikra 25) and it's laws. While introducing this law, the verse makes a reference to Shemittah that is similar to how the verse references Shabbos in the Ten Commandments (Shemos 20:10). It says here (Vayikra 25:2),

ב דַּבֵּר אֶל-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם כִּי תָבֹאוּ אֶל-הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם וְשָׁבְתָה הָאָרֶץ שַׁבָּת לַיהוָֹה:
Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, "When you come to the land that I am giving to you, you shall let rest the land, a rest for G-D."

And it says over there (Shemos 20:10),

וְיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי שַׁבָּת לַיהוָֹה
And the seventh day shall be a rest [day] for G-D.

These similarities can not just be a coincidence, there is some connection here that will help us understand the purpose of Shemittah as it relates to Shabbos.

The Ibn Ezra tells us on our Parsha something very vague (Vayikra 25:2)

וטעם שבת לה' - כיום השבת, וסוד ימי עולם רמוז במקום הזה.
The reason it says Shabbos for G-D is because this is like the Shabbos day. This is a reference, in this place, to the secret of the days of creation.

The Ibn Ezra helps us out here by telling us that Shemittah is related to the Shabbos day. No surprise there, but when we are looking for reasons for the Mitzvos this is a good starting point. We do not need to come up with some roundabout idea that references obscure ideas about the land and what not. The idea behind Shemittah is simple, it is another way for G-D to drive home a point that we are supposed to learn through observing the day of Shabbos. However, what is this point?

The Ibn Ezra goes on, in his commentary on the Ten Commandments (Shemos 20:8), to say that Shemittah comes to teach the same idea as Shabbos. However, he then goes on to explain the reason behind Shabbos and Shemittah.

והנה השבת נתנה להבין מעשה השם ולהגות בתורתו. וככה כתוב: כי שמחתני ה' בפעליך.
Behold, Shabbos was given in order that we should understand the works of G-D and to study His Torah. Like it is written (Tehilim 92:5), For You, G-D, have gladdened me with Your Works.

The point here, as clarified by the Yaheil Ohr (a super-commentary on the Ibn Ezra), is that the point of Shabbos and Shemmitah is so we can take time out of our busy lives and learn Torah. This is brought down in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Shabbos Chapter 15:3) in the name of Rabbi Berechia in the name of Rabbi Chiya bar ba. It says there,

The only reason Shabbos and Holidays were given was so we could deal with the words of Torah.

Just as a side point, I personally think that this teaches a very valuable lesson. Shabbos and Shemittah show us that during the week and during the six years before Shemittah we are supposed to be dealing with things that pertain to sustaining our lives. It is only during Shabbos and Shemittah that we are not supposed to deal with anything except learning Torah.

I concede that this could also mean something entirely different. It could mean that there are those of us who can not find someone else who will support us and allow us to just learn all the time. If that is the case, we must support ourselves during the six years before Shemittah and during the week. However, even if no one else is supporting us, we must take the Shabbos day and the Shemittah year and spend that year learning the Torah.

I think either of the previous explanations is plausible, but I think the first makes more sense because if you do not work during the six years before Shemittah or during the six days of the week, how are you supposed to appreciate Shabbos or Shemittah? What is the point of Shabbos or Shemittah if you are always learning?

Another explanation for the reason for Shemittah can be found in the Yalkut Peirushim Al HaTorah (Conglomeration of commentaries on the Torah). It says as follows (in the name of the Tzarur Hamor Vayikra 25:2):

Just like we are obligated to honor G-D and to honor other people, so too we are obligated to honor the land of Israel.

This idea can be understood much better and can be connected to Shabbos if we take the explanation of Shadal (also found here in Vayikra 25:2)

The commandment of Shemittah is similar to Shabbos because, just like the commandment of Shabbos is to reinforce in us that we are a holy (chosen) nation, so too the commandment of Shemiitah is supposed to reinforce the idea that the land (of Israel) is a holy (chosen) land... The holiness of the land is a reason for the nation to distance themselves from impurity and desecration with disgusting acts.

This second idea seems to be telling us that the holiness of the land and the holiness of Shabbos teach us two similar ideas. Shabbos teaches us the Jewish people should rest on the seventh day because they are a holy nation, therefore, they should not act immorally. Shemittah teaches us that the land of Israel is a holy land, therefore, we should not act immorally. Both ideas come to teach us the holiness of the Jewish people, however, they teach this from different angles. Shabbos teaches the Jewish people's holiness with regards to the individual. However, Shemittah teaches the holiness of the collective nation, because you can not act as an independent nation without a land.

These two ideas, that Shabbos and Shemittah were given so that we should learn Torah vs. Shabbos and Shemittah were given to teach us that we are a holy nation appear to complement each other. The first idea, learned from the Ibn Ezra, tells us what we are supposed to do on the day of Shabbos or during the year of Shemittah. The second idea, that of the Shadal and Tzarur Hamor, tells us what the day and year themselves actually teach us about the Jewish nation. The fact that we are supposed to learn the Torah on these days is because we are a nation of individuals that learn and follow the Torah and THAT makes us a holy nation.

Rambam- Yisodei HaTorah Perek 7 Halacha 7: Who Does A Prophet Prophesize To and Who Should We Accept As A Prophet

2013-04-23T21:51:00.000-04:00

הנביא אפשר שתהיה נבואתו לעצמו בלבד להרחיב לבו ולהוסיף דעתו עד שידע מה שלא היה יודע מאותן הדברים הגדולים. ואפשר שישולח לעם מעמי הארץ או לאנשי עיר או ממלכה לכונן אותם ולהודיעם מה יעשו או למונעם ממעשים הרעים שבידיהם. וכשמשלחים אותו נותנין לו אות ומופת כדי שידעו העם שהאל שלחו באמת. ולא כל העושה אות ומופת מאמינים לו שהוא נביא. אלא אדם שהיינו יודעים בו מתחלתו שהוא ראוי לנבואה בחכמתו ובמעשיו שנתעלה בהן על כל בני גילו והיה מהלך בדרכי הנבואה בקדושתה ובפרישותה ואח"כ בא ועשה אות ומופת ואמר שהאל שלחו מצוה לשמוע ממנו שנאמר אליו תשמעון. ואפשר שיעשה אות ומופת ואינו נביא וזה האות יש לו דברים בגו. ואעפ"כ מצוה לשמוע לו הואיל ואדם גדול וחכם וראוי לנבואה [הוא] מעמידים אותו על חזקתו. שבכך נצטוינו כמו שנצטוינו לחתוך את הדין ע"פ שני עדים כשרים ואע"פ שאפשר שהעידו בשקר הואיל וכשרים הם אצלינו מעמידין אותן על כשרותן. ובדברים האלו וכיוצא בהן נאמר הנסתרות לה' אלהינו והנגלות לנו ולבנינו. ונאמר כי האדם יראה לעינים וה' יראה ללבב:

It is possible that a prophet will have a prophecy specified for him in order to broaden his heart and to add to his knowledge to the point that he will know about great things that which he did not already know. It is possible that [the prophet] will be sent to a nation among the nations or to the people of a city or kingdom to point out to them and to make known to them what they should do or to stop them from intentionally doing bad things.

When [G-D] sends him, [G-D] gives him a sign and a wonder in order that the nation should know that G-D truly sent him. [However,] not everyone who performs signs and wonders should be believed to be a prophet [of G-D. Only] a man that it is known from the outset that he is fit to receive prophecy [because] his wisdom and his actions are greater than all of the people of his age and he goes in the path of prophecy, holiness, and separateness and after this he comes and does signs and wonders and says G-D sent me, then it is a commandment to listen to him, for it says (Devarim 18:15), "To him you shall listen." It is possible that [this person] does signs and wonders, but is still not a prophet, and there are [other] things behind this sign. Even so, it is a commandment to listen to him. [The reason for this] is since he is a great man who is wise and he is fit for prophecy, we establish him on his established status. This is how we have been commanded, just like we were commanded to reach a a decision in law according to two legitimate witnesses even though it is possible they are testifying falsely. [However,] since they are legitimate by us we establish [their status] as legitimate. We say about these things and similar ideas [the following (Devarim 29:28),] "The hidden things are for Our G-D and the revealed things are for us and our children." And we also say (Samuel 1 16:7), "Because man sees what is [revealed] to the eyes and G-D sees to the heart."

In this halacha, the Rambam makes known to us what types of prophecies a prophet receives. It can either be personal, for a group, or for an entire nation. Personal news seems to help a prophet expand their mind and knowledge in order for them to attain more prophecy and a closer connection to G-D. However, when the prophecy is for a group it seems to be in order to guide this group or nation in the proper actions and has nothing to do with attaining knowledge.

This next part of the halacha has to do with who we can accept as a prophet. Basically, it is not just anyone who seems to be righteous, but it must be someone who is known to have attained the level of "Sons of the Prophets" as the Rambam explains previously (See this post Yisodei HaTorah 7:5 Some May Receive Prophecy and Some May Not). This means that the person must be known to have acquired much knowledge and have great control over his mind. Even if someone receives a prophecy, it can not be given over to others unless the person who received the prophecy meets all of these criteria.

Personally, I think that, because of these requirements, every prophet first receives personal prophecies before he or she receives prophecies that are to be given over. It is only through the original personal prophecies that they are able to reach the level that everyone will accept him or her as a prophet. This further strengthens my idea that, although a person can work really hard to reach the level needed to attain prophecy, he or she can only succeed with G-D's assistance as I point out in Yisodei HaTorah 7:1 Prophecy's Place In Judaism.

Rambam- Yisdoei HaTorah Perek 7 Halacha 6: Moshe's Uniqueness As a Prophet

2013-04-22T19:44:00.002-04:00

כל הדברים שאמרנו הם דרך נבואה לכל הנביאים הראשונים והאחרונים חוץ ממשה רבינו רבן של כל הנביאים. ומה הפרש יש בין נבואת משה לשאר כל הנביאים שכל הנביאים בחלום או במראה ומשה רבינו מתנבא והוא ער ועומד שנאמר ובבוא משה אל אהל מועד לדבר אתו וישמע הקול מדבר אליו. כל הנביאים על ידי מלאך. לפיכך רואים מה שהם רואים במשל וחידה. משה רבינו לא על ידי מלאך שנאמר פה אל פה אדבר בו. ונאמר ודבר ה' אל משה פנים אל פנים. ונאמר ותמונת ה' יביט כלומר שאין שם משל אלא רואה הדבר על בוריו בלא חידה ובלא משל. הוא שהתורה מעידה עליו במראה ולא בחידות שאינו מתנבא בחידה אלא במראה שרואה הדבר על בוריו. כל הנביאים יראים ונבהלים ומתמוגגין ומשה רבינו אינו כן הוא שהכתוב אומר כאשר ידבר איש אל רעהו כלומר כמו שאין אדם נבהל לשמוע דברי חבירו כך היה כח בדעתו של משה רבינו להבין דברי הנבואה והוא עומד על עומדו שלם. כל הנביאים אין מתנבאים בכל עת שירצו משה רבינו אינו כן אלא כל זמן שיחפוץ רוח הקודש לובשתו ונבואה שורה עליו ואינו צריך לכוין דעתו ולהזדמן לה שהרי הוא מכוון ומזומן ועומד כמלאכי השרת. לפיכך מתנבא בכל עת שנאמר עמדו ואשמעה מה יצוה ה' לכם. ובזה הבטיחו האל שנאמר לך אמור להם שובו לכם לאהליכם ואתה פה עמוד עמדי. הא למדת שכל הנביאים כשהנבואה מסתלקת מהם חוזרים לאהלם שהוא צרכי הגוף כלם כשאר העם. לפיכך אין פורשין מנשותיהם. ומשה רבינו לא חזר לאהלו הראשון לפיכך פירש מן האשה לעולם ומן הדומה לו ונקשרה דעתו לצור העולמים ולא נסתלק מעליו ההוד לעולם וקרן עור פניו ונתקדש כמלאכים:

All of these things that we have said is regarding the path of prophecy for all of the early and later prophets except for Moshe (Moses), our teacher, the greatest of all the prophets. What is the difference between Moshe and all the other prophets? All the [other] prophets [prophesized] in a dream or a vision and Moshe, our teacher, prophesized while he was awake and standing, for it says (Bamidbar 7:89), "When Moshe came to the Tent of Meeting to speak with Him and he heard the voice speak to him..." Also, all the other [prophets] prophesized through an angel. Therefore, [since they prophesized through an angel] they saw what they saw as a parable and a riddle. [However,] Moshe, our teacher did not [prophesize] through an angel as it says (Bamidbar 12:8) "Mouth to mouth I speak with him." And it says (Shemos 33:11) "And G-D spoke to Moshe face to face." And it says (Bamidbar 12:8), "He beholds the image of G-D," meaning that there is no parable, rather he saw the subject's [in his prophecies] true meaning.

All of the prophets were in awe, scared, and fearful [during prophecy], but Moshe, our teacher, was not. For, the verse says (Shemos 33:11), "It was like when a man speaks to his friend." Like a man is not frightened to hear the words of his friend, so it was the strength of the mind of Moshe, our teacher, to understand the words of prophecy and he stood on his feet, whole.

None of the prophets could prophesize at any time they wanted, but this was not true of Moshe, our teacher. Any time that he desired to have [prophecy] the holy spirit (Ruach Hakodesh) would clothe him and prophecy would rest on him.

[Moshe] did not have to concentrate his mind and prepare for [prophecy] because he was [always] concentrated and prepared like the ministering angels. Therefore, he could prophesize at anytime, for it says (Bamidbar 9:8), "Wait and I will listen for what G-D commands for you." And this (that Moshe could speak with G-D whenever he wanted) was promised [to Moshe] by G-D, as it says (Devarim 5:27-28), "Go, say to them, you return to your tents and you (Moshe) stand here with me." This teaches you that all the prophets, when prophecy would leave them, they would "return to their tents" in order to fulfill their [sexual] needs like the rest of the nation, therefore, they did not need to separate from their wives. [However,] Moshe, our teacher, did not return to his first tent, therefore, he separated from his wife forever and everything similar to her (anything that had to do with sexuality, but he still had bodily functions). His mind became connected to the Rock of the World and the glory [of G-D] was never removed from being upon him and "his face became radiant" (Shemos 34:35) and he became holy like the angels.

The Rambam uses this halacha to point out that the previous five laws that he has talked about in this chapter do not apply, in any way, to Moshe. The Rambam goes through every possible aspect of prophecy and expresses why Moshe, as a prophet, was different than all other prophets.

Based on all the sources Rambam brings down, we can paint a picture of Moshe that allows us to understand why he was such a unique prophet. Was it that G-D made him into this type of prophet or was he the type of man that was, inherently, this type of prophet? Did G-D just say, arbitrarily, since I want to give the Torah now I need to make Moshe into a unique prophet, or did G-D see that Moshe was a unique prophet and decide to give the Torah because of him?

I would like to suggest, based on the Rambam, that Moshe was inherently a unique prophet and that is why G-D chose to give the Torah to him. The Rambam points out that Moshe was not afraid of G-D's prophecies, unlike all the other prophets, because of the strength of his mind. Moshe did not need to "return to his tent" to fulfill his sexual desires, because he had such perfect control over his mind that he could inhibit his mind from even thinking about sexuality. This is why the Rambam, in my opinion, believes Moshe is so unique, because his mind and his ability to acquire knowledge was the greatest to ever exist. The Rambam explains in this very chapter, that a person can acquire prophecy based on how well he perfects his mind and Moshe had the highest level of perfection, even reaching the level of the angels. This is why Moshe was so unique, it is not because he received the Torah, but rather he received the Torah because he was unique.

This can help us understand all of the aspects of Moshe's prophecies. Moshe did not need the medium of a dream or a vision because he did not need to communicate to G-D through an angel, for he was already on the level of an angel with regards to the strength of his mind. This is also why he did not have his prophecies in the form of a riddle, because all of these aspects are only present when you have to communicate to G-D through an angel. Moshe was not frightened by prophecy because he was not confused by the parables and riddles like all other prophets, he immediately understood what was being said to him. An example of this is if a foreigner comes up to you and says something in an unfamiliar language carrying a knife, you are worried. However, once his words are translated and all he said was, "Hello, my name is James," you are no longer frightened. Also, not only could Moshe prophesize while awake, but he could do it whenever he wanted. The reason for this is because, as is stated in this law of the Rambam, his mind was always ready for prophecy because of his ability to block out any thought that could inhibit prophecy. Moshe's mind was unique because it was practically on the level of the angels and not because G-D elevated him, as a person, to the level of the angels, according to the Rambam.


8. This book of the Torah shall not leave your mouth; you shall meditate therein day and night, in order that you observe to do all that is written in it, for then will you succeed in all your ways and then will you prosper.		ח. לֹא יָמוּשׁ סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה הַזֶּה מִפִּיךָ וְהָגִיתָ בּוֹ יוֹמָם וָלַיְלָה לְמַעַן תִּשְׁמֹר לַעֲשֹוֹת כְּכָל הַכָּתוּב בּוֹ כִּי אָז תַּצְלִיחַ אֶת דְּרָכֶךָ וְאָז תַּשְׂכִּיל: