Miller v. McDonald’s Corp.
150 Or.App. 274, 945 P.2d 1107  (Or.App.,1997.)

Facts: Patron of fast food restaurant operated by franchisee (3K Restaurants), who had discovered foreign object in her food, sued franchisor. The Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Eric J. Neiman, J. Pro Tem., granted summary judgment to franchisor on basis that it did not own or operate restaurant.

Issue: Whether there was evidence that would permit a jury to find McDonald’s vicariously liable for those injuries because of its relationship with 3K Restaurants?

Holding: Yes. Patron appealed, and the Court of Appeals, Warren, P.J., held that factual issues as to whether actual or apparent agency relationship existed between franchisor and franchisee precluded summary judgment.

In Re Dorrance’s Estate
309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1932)

Facts: John T. Dorrance was the owner of the Campbell Soup Company, who at the time of his death owned homes in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey. One property known as “Woodcrest” was located in Radnor, Pennsylvania. The other property known as “Pomona Farms” was located in Cinnaminson township, Burlington County, New Jersey. Upon his death, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claimed that Dorrance was domiciled in Pennsylvania for the purpose of collecting estate taxes. The executors of the estate claimed that there was a mere occasional occupancy of the Radnor estate.

Issue: May expressions to the effect that a person desires to remain domiciled in one state prevail over actual removal to a residence in another state?

Holding: No.

Analysis: Pomona Farms was purchased by Dorrance in 1909. Woodcrest was purchased in 1925, and was occupied by Dorrance in December of that year, at which time the family’s entire personal effects were removed from Cinnaminson to Radnor. Thereafter, until the time of his death in 1930, Dorrance only made occasional visits to his former home in New Jersey. Before 1925, Dorrance employed ten servants in Cinnaminson, and after 1925 never more than four. Sixteen servants were employed at Woodcrest with another ten to twelve tending the grounds. The residence in Pennsylvania was consistently chosen by the Dorrance family for social events, and Dorrance traveled back and forth daily from Radnor to his office in Camden. Dorrance’s motivation for wanting to keep the appearance of domicile in New Jersey was due to their much more favorable tax treatment. The law is generally settled that as regards the determination of domicile, a person’s expression of desire may not supersede the effect of his conduct. Recitals in deeds and wills are not given particular weight in determining domicile in comparison with the evidence supplied by the daily life of the individual and his acts and conduct. Vague intentions of resuming a former domicile will not prevent the acquisition of a new one. By the act of removing his home and family from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, Dorrance acquired a domicile in the latter state. The evidence clearly establishes the legal domicile of Dorrance to be Pennsylvania, and accordingly there is due to the commonwealth an inheritance transfer tax, based upon the agreed value of his estate at the time of his death.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306 (1950)

Facts: New York had a statute (section 100-c) that provided for the administration of common trust funds. Those funds were formed by pooling numerous small trust estates into one fund for the purpose of investment administration. The accounts of the common fund were to be settled from time to time by a judicial proceeding called an accounting; beneficiaries of the constituent trusts (some of whose interests, names and addresses were known to the corporate trustee and others not) were to be notified of the accounting by publication. Central Hanover set up such a common fund; and that the first accounting, Mulane, special Guardian and attorney for persons known or unknown who might have an interest in the common trust fund, objected that, notice by publication was constitutionally inadequate.

Issue: Is notice to parties residing out of state by newspaper publication adequate when the parties addresses are known?

Holding: No.

Analysis: Notification by publication was adequate for the unknown trust beneficiaries but inadequate for the known beneficiaries. The means of notification employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopter account which it. The reasonableness and hands the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected … or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, but the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.

McQuade v. Stoneham
263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (Court of Appeals of New York 1934)

Facts: Plaintiff McQuade purchased 70 shares in the New York Giants baseball club from Stoneham. As a part of the purchase transaction, McQuade entered into an agreement with Stoneham in which McQuade would be made treasurer of the corporation and given an annual salary. The agreement was to remain in force as long as McQuade owned his shares. Later, McQuade was forced out as an officer when Stoneham failed to back him in board election. McQuade filed suit and the lower court refused to order reinstatement. However, McQuade was awarded damages for wrongful discharge, with a right to sue for future damages.

Issue: Whether the court should order specific performance of the control agreement?

Holding: No. Reversed and complaint dismissed.

Analysis: The minority shareholder — for which McQuade claimed he was being punished for protecting — did not complain about his discharge. Any duty owed by Stoneham was to the corporation, not to McQuade. Authority requires the court to hold a contract illegal and void if it precludes a board of directors, at the risk of incurring legal liability, from changing officers, salaries or policies or retaining individuals in office, except by consent of the contracting parties.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
59 Cal.2d 57 (1963)

Facts: Plaintiff Greenman brought an action for damages against the retailer and the manufacturer of a Shopsmith, a combination power tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe. Greenman received a Shopsmith as a Christmas present from his wife in 1955. In 1957 he bought the necessary attachments to use the Shopsmith as a lathe for turning a large piece of wood he wished to make into a chalice. After he had worked on the piece of wood several times without difficulty, it suddenly flew out of the machine and struck him on the forehead, inflicting serious injuries. About 10 1/2 months later, he gave the retailer and the manufacturer written notice of claimed breaches of warranties and filed a complaint against them alleging such breaches and negligence. After a trial before a jury, the court ruled that there was no evidence that the retailer was negligent or had breached any express warranty and that the manufacturer was not liable for the breach of any implied warranty. Accordingly, it submitted to the jury only the cause of action alleging breach of implied warranties against the retailer and the causes of action alleging negligence and breach of express warranties against the manufacturer. The jury returned a verdict for the retailer against plaintiff and for plaintiff against the manufacturer in the amount of $65,000.
Issue: Is a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.

Holding: Yes.

Analysis: In order to impose strict liability on a manufacturer under the circumstances of this case, it was not necessary for plaintiff to establish an express warranty. A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.. Implicit in the machine’s presence on the market was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built. To establish the manufacturer’s liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno
24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)

Facts: Escola was a waitress in a restaurant. She was putting away glass bottles of Coca-Cola when one of the bottles spontaneously exploded in her hand. She suffered a deep five-inch cut, which severed the blood vessels, nerves, and muscles of the thumb and palm of the hand. The top portion of the bottle, with the cap, remained in her hand, and the lower portion fell to the floor but did not break. The broken bottle was not produced at the trial, because the pieces had been thrown away by an employee of the restaurant shortly after the accident. Escola, however, described the broken pieces, and a diagram of the bottle was made showing the location of the “fracture line” where the bottle broke in two. One of Coca-Cola’s delivery drivers was called as a witness by plaintiff, and testified that he had seen other bottles of Coca-Cola in the past explode and had found broken bottles in the warehouse when he took the cases out, but that he did not know what made them explode. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, following the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Issue: Can the defendant’s negligence in delivering a defective bottle be shown under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur?

Holding: Yes.

Analysis: Although the instrument causing the injury was not under the exclusive control of the defendant at the time of the accident, the defendant did have control at the time the alleged negligent act took place (in this case, the filling of the defective bottle).

Upon an examination of the record, the evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the bottle here involved was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant by defendant. It follows, therefore, that the bottle was in some manner defective at the time defendant relinquished control, because sound and properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not ordinarily explode when carefully handled.

Justice Traynor, in a concurring opinion, argued that instead of deciding the case on grounds of negligence, a rule of strict liability should be imposed on manufacturers whose products cause injury to consumers. He felt that public policy demanded “that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.” He argued that manufacturers were better prepared to handle the costs of injury than individual consumers, and noted that California state law already applied a rule of strict liability to makers of foodstuffs which cause illness or injury.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York
447 U.S. 557 (1980)

Facts: During a fuel shortage, the Public Service Commission of New York ordered electrical utilities in the state to cease advertising that promoted the use of electricity. Three years later, after the shortage had eased, the Commission requested public comments on its proposal to continue the ban. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the ban.

Issue: May states regulate commercial advertising if it is in the states’ interest?

Holding: No.

Analysis: In commercial speech cases, the court has developed a four-part test: (1) Does the speech advertise or constitute false or deceptive advertising that is unprotected by the First Amendment? (2) Is the government’s restriction justified by a substantial governmental interest? (3) Does the law directly advance the government’s interest? (4) Is the regulation of speech no more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s interest? The commission’s argument fails the final test in that it restricts advertising about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in energy use.

Miller v. California
413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Facts: Miller was convicted of knowingly distributing obscene matter under the California Penal code for mass mailings of catalogs for adult material.

Issue: May a state identify and regulate obscene material without violating the First Amendment?

Holding: Yes.

Analysis: Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. State statutes designed to regulate obscene material must be limited. The scope of the regulation must be limited to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. The conduct must be specifically defined by the state law. The basic guidelines are: (a) whether the “average person” would find that the work would appeal to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Bradenburg v. Ohio
395 U.S. 444 (1969)

Facts: A Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism statute for advocating and teaching the need for violent and unlawful means to bring about industrial and political reform.

Issue: Did the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Holding: Yes.

Analysis: The court held that merely advocating or teaching violence does not rise to the same level as actually preparing for violent actions. In this case, the Ohio statute failed to draw that distinction and was violative of the First and Fourteenth amendments. “A conviction for incitement … is constitutional only if several requirements are met: imminent harm, a likelihood of producing illegal action, and an intent to cause imminent illegality.”

Notes: Syndicalism – a movement for transferring the ownership and control of the means of production and distribution to workers’ unions.

Schenck v. United States
249 U.S. 47 (1919)

Facts: Schenck was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage and attempting to cause insubordination in the military for circulating documents which stated that the conscription act violated the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Schenck appealed.

Issue: Is distributing anti-conscription literature during war time protected under the First Amendment?

Holding: No.

Analysis: The court stated that the “question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantial evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” During war, speech which would normally be protected, may be so damaging to the war effort, that it must be prevented. If actual damage to recruiting services was caused, the liability for the words which caused it could be enforced.