tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-68989806138525823532024-02-21T09:09:40.027-05:00The Florida Legal BlogA blog focusing on decisions from the Florida appellate courts and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.comBlogger1205125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-23459151012388126882016-11-04T17:02:00.000-04:002017-04-26T20:59:52.766-04:00Blog Dormant - November 4, 2016<div style="text-align: justify;">
As of November 4, 2016, this blog is dormant. See <a href="http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html">http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html</a></div>
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Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-42454602197251481622016-05-26T10:13:00.000-04:002016-05-26T10:13:30.169-04:00Foreclosure Sale Cannot Go Forward When Timely Filed Motion for Rehearing Is Pending<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In </span><i><a href="http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D15-2091.pdf" target="_blank">944 CWELT-2007 LLC v. Bank of America</a></i> (3D15-2091), <span style="font-family: inherit;">the Third District granted a petition for certiorari that sought to quash an order denying a motion to cancel a foreclosure sale. On the date of the scheduled foreclosure sale, a motion for rehearing directed to the final judgment remained pending. The court stated that "it is well settled that a foreclosure sale cannot be held while a timely motion for rehearing is pending because enforcement of a final judgment is suspended by the filing of the rehearing motion."</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">One other procedural issue was included in the opinion. The court stated that it "consider[ed] the Bank’s decision not to file a response to the petition as the
equivalent of a confession of error."</span></div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-24248821011176958292016-03-09T17:39:00.002-05:002016-03-09T17:39:42.929-05:00Fourth District: Clerk Has Judicial Immunity In Suit To Recover Payment for Fines in Unauthorized School Zone<div class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Mar%202016/03-09-16/4D14-1182.op.WR.Dissent.pdf" target="_blank">Zoba v. Coral Springs</a></i> (4D14-1182), the "boundaries of judicial immunity are challenged." The Fourth District's majority opinion, written by <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/May.shtml" target="_blank">Judge May</a> and joined by <a href="http://15thcircuit.co.palm-beach.fl.us/web/judge-gillen" target="_blank">Judge Gillen</a>, explained that the plaintiff/appellant argued "that the clerk of court (“clerk”) is not entitled to judicial immunity for collecting, apportioning, distributing, and retaining monies, in conjunction with alleged illegal traffic fines." </span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The facts are simple: "The plaintiff received a $600 traffic ticket for speeding in the school
zone. He paid his fine in full because failure to comply would result in the
suspension of his driver’s license." Later, "Plaintiff’s counsel received a ticket for
the same violation on a different date. He fought the ticket arguing that
the school zone was illegal because it was established in violation of county ordinance 23-6(d). He was acquitted." The plaintiff sought a return of the money collected by the clerk for fines issued and paid in what was later determined to be an illegal school zone. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The question in the case was whether the clerk of court was entitled to judicial immunity for collecting the fines before the school zone was found to be illegal. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Fourth District explained judicial immunity as follows:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">"[J]udicial immunity ‘insures that judges are immune from liability for
damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction [and] is
essential to the preservation of an independent judiciary.’” <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=105+So.+3d+650&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=17305428912731534902&scilh=0" target="_blank">Fong v.Forman</a></i>, 105 So. 3d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (second alteration in
original) (quoting <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=400+So.+2d+80&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=10026252083688891952&scilh=0" target="_blank">Berry v. State</a></i>, 400 So. 2d 80, 82–83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)).
“This doctrine has been extended to quasi-judicial officials, such as a clerk
of court, performing judicial acts.” <i>Id</i>. (citations omitted). “The reason for
extending immunity to quasi-judicial officers is because a strict guarantee
of immunity is necessary to preserve the[ir] effectiveness and impartiality.”
<i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=50+So.+3d+25&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=3255873671324703236&scilh=0" target="_blank">Fuller v. Truncale</a></i>, 50 So. 3d 25, 27–28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).</span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Further, the court explained that "[t]wo prerequisites must be met for judicial immunity to apply: '(1) the
ruling in question [must be] a ‘judicial act;’ and (2) there [must be]
jurisdiction to issue the ruling.' <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=50+So.+3d+25&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=3255873671324703236&scilh=0" target="_blank">Fuller</a></i>, 50 So. 3d at 28 (citations omitted).
'When these two prongs can be shown, the judge or quasi-judicial official
may claim judicial immunity, even if the ruling in question was unwise,
reckless, or malicious.” <i>Id</i>. (citation omitted)."</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">After analyzing the statutory authorization for the fines and the collection by the clerk, the court stated that:</span></div>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">These statutes and rules read together support the clerk’s argument
that his collection, apportionment, and disbursement of traffic fines is part
and parcel of the overall judicial process. Prior to the fine collection, the
person who has received the noncriminal traffic infraction may appear
before a court, or may waive that right and simply pay the ticket or enter
into a payment plan. Either way, the person participates in the
adjudicatory process or waives it. The clerk’s act of collection,
apportionment, and disbursement is part of that judicial process—it is a
judicial act entitling the clerk to immunity. And no one disputes the
jurisdiction of the court and the clerk to perform their respective statutory
duties.</span><br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">***</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Because the clerk’s collection, apportionment, and distribution of the
fines are both statutorily and judicially ordered, they fall within the
protection afforded by judicial immunity. </span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Having resolved the issue of judicial immunity, the court addressed "the elephant in the room," which was whether the clerk could be required to refund the money. The court stated that "Here, if the school zone is found to be illegal, then a traffic fine for an
infraction committed in the school zone is unconstitutional, but the
administrative costs the clerk earned by statutorily collecting the fine are
not. The clerk earned the costs for performing his statutorily and judicially
directed job.
Judicial immunity bars the clerk from having to defend against the
plaintiff’s claim and incur attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm the
dismissal of the clerk."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The majority opinion concluded by stating:</span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In
the complaint, the plaintiff alleged an unjust enrichment claim against the
clerk seeking to recoup all monies paid and retained. Today, we hold the
clerk immune from the underlying suit and defense of the suit, and affirm
the trial court’s decision on immunity.
What has yet to be litigated is whether the plaintiff can recoup monies
paid to the clerk should he succeed in obtaining a favorable final
judgment. There are several hurdles the plaintiff must first overcome: (1)
proving the school zone was illegally created; (2) defending the voluntary
payment waiver defense; and (3) whether the clerk must refund monies
beyond the administrative fees authorized by statute. Wisely, the trial
court foresaw the issue, but the case was not yet in the procedural posture
for the trial court to rule on it. See, e.g., <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=301+So.+2d+7&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=10775512829420085440&scilh=0" target="_blank">State v. Barber</a></i>, 301 So. 2d 7, 9–
10 (Fla. 1974). We save that issue for another day.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/warner.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Warner</a> wrote a dissenting opinion that began: "Although I agree that the clerk of court can assert judicial immunity for
the acts of collecting and distributing the traffic fines, including the
administrative fee, I cannot agree that there is any judicial immunity for
the retention of the portion of the fine which the clerk is allowed to keep in
a fine and forfeiture fund pursuant to statute. That is directed by statute,
not judicial discretion. See §§ 28.246(3); 318.21, Fla. Stat. (2010). In fact,
pursuant to section 28.246(3), as quoted by the majority, such funds are
disbursed “in accordance with authorizations and procedures as
established by general law,” not judicial authority. § 28.246(3), Fla. Stat.
(emphasis added). The ultimate action is not judicial, but statutory. The
clerk was not acting as an arm of the court in retaining the funds; he was
retaining a portion of the funds at the legislative directive to help fund the
clerk’s office, the funding of which is a legislatively controlled action."</span></div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-30045089542363771182016-02-10T14:12:00.000-05:002016-02-10T14:12:39.697-05:00Fourth District: New Notice to Attorneys/Parties & New Administrative Order re: Agreed Extensions of Time <div style="text-align: justify;">
Last week the Fourth District issued a new Administrative Order regarding agreed extensions of time and an updated Notice to Attorneys and Parties. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
The Administrative Order regarding agreed extensions of time, Administrative Order 2016-01, can be downloaded <a href="http://jtk.bz/126DB+" target="_blank">HERE</a>. The Fourth District's updated Notice to Attorneys and Parties can be downloaded <a href="http://jtk.bz/126DB+" target="_blank">HERE</a>. </div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
The First District does not have an agreed extension procedure but the Second District, Third District, Fourth District (see above), and Fifth District do. The Second District's administrative order can be downloaded <a href="http://jtk.bz/bS7t+" target="_blank">HERE</a> (June 3, 2013); the Third District's administrative order can be downloaded <a href="http://jtk.bz/19C82+" target="_blank">HERE</a> (amended June 30, 2015); and the Fifth District's administrative order can be downloaded <a href="http://jtk.bz/1iXQI+" target="_blank">HERE</a> (March 8, 2013). </div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-62266623121903581722016-01-28T17:39:00.001-05:002016-01-28T17:39:46.634-05:00Court Where Lis Pendens Filed Obtains Exclusive Jurisdiction Over All Liens Until Judgment<div class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Jan.%202016/01-27-16/4D15-2036.op.pdf" target="_blank">Jallali v. Knightsbridge Village Homeowners Association, Inc.</a></i> (4D15-2036), the Fourth District again held that the court where a mortgagee files a lis pendens obtains exclusive jurisdiction over all liens on the property until final judgment. Therefore, the judgment entered in a case filed after the original lis pendens must be vacated.<br />
<br />
The court stated:</div>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify;">
In the present case, when the mortgagee filed its foreclosure action and
recorded its notice of lis pendens in May 2007, the association had not yet
recorded a notice of lis pendens with regard to its 2011 lien and 2012
foreclosure action....... </blockquote>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify;">
Accordingly, based on section 48.23, Florida Statutes (2015),
<i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=103+So.+3d+977&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=17424408642921902676&scilh=0" target="_blank">Quadomain</a></i>, and the cases cited therein, we conclude that the final
foreclosure judgment which the association obtained in the 2012 case was
void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction at that time. Exclusive
jurisdiction to foreclose on Jallali’s property was in the circuit court
conducting the mortgagee’s foreclosure action in the 2007 case.
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Jallali’s motion to vacate final
judgment of foreclosure.</blockquote>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-44404764206837817532016-01-27T10:50:00.000-05:002016-01-27T10:50:08.710-05:00Failure To Make Payment In Florida Does Not (Without More) Allow Court to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Jan.%202016/01-27-16/4D15-1907.op.pdf" target="_blank">Cornerstone Investment Funding v. Painted Post Group</a></i> (4D15-1907), the Fourth District reviewed a trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The procedural history is somewhat unique but the holding is not. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge "concluded that Post Group
had established both jurisdictional facts and minimum contacts between
Cornerstone and Florida sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over
Cornerstone."</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The Fourth District noted that to satisfy the requirements of personal jurisdiction, you must satisfy a two-pronged test. Specifically, personal jurisdiction may be exercised only when:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">(1) the
complaint alleges facts that would subject the defendant to Florida’s “long-
arm” statute,<span style="vertical-align: 3pt;"> </span>and (2) the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” to
meet traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice such that the
defendant could ‘“reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” due to its
actions. <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=554+So.+2d+499&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=6046498504720605418&scilh=0" target="_blank">Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais</a></i>, 554 So. 2d 499, 501 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=444+U.S.+286,+297&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=2649456870546423871&scilh=0" target="_blank">World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson</a></i>, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)); <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=56+So.+3d+86&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=7443197002328109532&scilh=0" target="_blank">Henderson v. Elias</a></i>, 56 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). </span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In this case, the plaintiff satisfied the first prong because "failure to pay on a contract requiring payment in Florida has been found sufficient
to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute conferring jurisdiction over breach of
contract actions. <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=867+So.+2d+434&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=17106460726770949478&scilh=0" target="_blank">Smith Architectural Grp., Inc. v. Dehaan</a></i>, 867 So. 2d 434,
436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)."</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">However, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the </span>second<span style="font-size: x-small;"> prong. The court stated:</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div class="page" title="Page 3">
<div class="layoutArea">
<div class="column">
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The mere fact, however, that Cornerstone allegedly breached a contract
by failing to make payments on the contract in Florida would not
constitute sufficient minimum contacts with this state to satisfy due
process. <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=785+So.+2d+557&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=2471043094295615591&scilh=0" target="_blank">Taskey v. Burtis</a></i>, 785 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
(“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts
exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in
suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the
forum’s privileges and protections.”); <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=8+So.+3d+1239&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=1094502896279670002&scilh=0" target="_blank">Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank</a></i>, 8 So. 3d
1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=826+So.+2d+391&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&case=5727987868452543824&scilh=0" target="_blank">Ganiko v. Ganiko</a></i>, 826 So. 2d 391, 394-
95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). As neither Post Group’s amended complaint nor
Goldin’s hearing testimony showed that any act beyond repayment of the
promissory note was required to be performed in Florida, Cornerstone does
not have sufficient minimum contacts with this state to support the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over it. </span></blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-90164716832511636892016-01-22T09:06:00.001-05:002016-01-22T09:08:11.048-05:00Petition For Certiorari Denied Due to District Conflict<div style="text-align: justify;">
In <a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Jan.%202016/01-13-16/4D14-2895op.pdf"><em>The First Liberty Insurance Corp. v. O’Neill</em></a> (4D14–2895), the Fourth District denied a petition for certiorari because the Fourth District had not decided the issue at the time of the trial court’s decision. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In this case, when the trial court entered the order the First District and the Fifth District had released conflicting decisions on the same issue. However, “at the time of the circuit court’s decisions, we had not addressed the issue of whether an insured, after obtaining a favorable result on its benefits claim, may amend the complaint to add a first-party bad faith claim instead of filing a new action on the bad faith claim.”</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Therefore, because there was no clearly established law, the petition was denied. The court stated:</div>
<blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Given the lack of binding authority from this court on the underlying issue, and given the split of authority between our sister courts on the underlying issue, we cannot say that the circuit court’s apparent decision to follow the First District’s authority was a departure from the essential requirements of the law at the time of its decision. Thus, because of that procedural posture, we are compelled to deny the petition for writ of certiorari and not decide the underlying issue until a final appealable judgment is entered.</div>
</blockquote>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-70946312626675573092015-12-31T09:01:00.001-05:002015-12-31T09:02:51.354-05:00The First Amendment Protections Afforded To A "Tattoo Establishment"<div style="text-align: justify;">
Is a city allowed to limit the number of tattoo establishments in a certain area? In <a href="http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201415354.pdf"><em>Buehrle v. City of Key West</em></a> (No. 14–15354), the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that “tattooing is protected artistic expression, but we reverse the summary judgment because, on the record before us, the City has failed to show that the ordinance is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.” <br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The opinion, written by Judge Jill Pryor, includes a discussion about the protection to be afforded tattoos under the First Amendment and rejects an argument by the City that relied on “a number of district and state court decisions drawing a distinction between the process of creating a tattoo and the tattoo itself.” The court stated that “consistent with the Supreme Court’s teaching, the right to display a tattoo loses meaning if the government can freely restrict the right to obtain a tattoo in the first place.” Therefore, the district court’s holding that tattoos are protected speech was affirmed. <br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
However, the court reversed the district court’s holding that the regulation was constitutional. Citing the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “a municipality may regulate protected artistic expression only if the regulation (1) is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, (2) is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.” The City is required to satisfy this test, and present evidence that does so. <br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In trying to meet that burden, Jimmy Buffet was referenced twice in the record to support the ordinance. The court stated: </div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
Jimmy Buffett’s song “Margaritaville” was referenced twice in the record, once by Mr. Craig in his deposition and once by the City’s attorney in oral argument before the district court, to support the claim that inebriated tourists are likely to get and then regret tattoos if more tattoo establishments operate in the historic district. But the singer in “Margaritaville”—seemingly far from suffering embarrassment over his tattoo—considers it “a real beauty.” Jimmy Buffett, “Margaritaville,” on Songs You Know by Heart (Geffen Records 1985).</blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Clearly, the reference to Jimmy Buffett did not sway the Eleventh Circuit. In this case, the court stated that it did not doubt the legitimate government interest expressed by the city, but stated that the city had failed to meet its burden to show that the regulation would serve that interest. </div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-13248214751421210892015-12-23T09:55:00.002-05:002015-12-23T09:55:40.792-05:00Motion for Attorneys Fees in Original Proceeding Must Be Filed Before Disposition<div style="text-align: justify;">
In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Nov.%202015/11-12-15/4D15-2772.op.pdf" target="_blank">Geico General Insurance Company v. Moultrop</a></i> (4D15-2772, Nov. 12, 2015), the Fourth District wrote an opinion on a motion for attorneys fees <u>filed after</u> a petition for writ of certiorari was denied. The court stated:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
Rule 9.400(b)(2) provides that “in original proceedings” a motion for
attorney’s fees “shall be served not later than . . . the time for service of
the petitioner’s reply to the response to the petition.” Here, the court
denied the petition without requiring a response to the petition or,
obviously, a reply to a response. Having been first filed after the petition had been denied, the motion for appellate attorney’s fees is denied as
untimely. </blockquote>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-89539517047892476302015-12-16T15:38:00.000-05:002015-12-16T15:38:18.722-05:00Sanction Over Not Removing Prior Counsel From E-Service List Reversed<div style="text-align: justify;">
In <a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Dec.%202015/12-16-15/4D14-4927.op.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Houston v. McKnought-Smith</i></a> (4D14-4927), the Fourth District reversed a trial court's order sanctioning counsel and requiring the "former wife’s
attorney to pay attorney’s fees to the former husband’s previous attorney."</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The court "the previous attorney claimed that he had to
file a motion requesting that the wife’s attorney be ordered not to serve
him, and requesting attorney’s fees. In granting the motion and ordering
the payment of fees at a non-evidentiary hearing, the court failed to make
the necessary finding that the wife’s attorney acted in bad faith in serving
the husband’s previous attorney." Therefore, the order was reversed in order to allow for an evidentiary hearing. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
There were also two footnotes in the opinion. The second footnote stated that "it is difficult to believe that any <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=826+so.2d+221&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=4509702698968501250&scilh=0" target="_blank">Moakley</a> </i>bad faith can be shown by the wife’s
attorney’s service of two pleadings on the previous attorney (who had not
withdrawn on the record). However, because there was no evidentiary hearing,
all of the facts are not present. Nevertheless, it appears that professionalism has
eluded these attorneys, burdening both the trial court and this court."</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The first footnote indicates there was a question without an answer regarding e-filing. The court stated that "it is unclear whether the wife’s attorney could have prevented service through
the electronic filing portal on an attorney that the portal had listed for service." </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
I do not think the answer would impact the "it is difficult to believe" portion of the second footnote quoted above, because I think the court was indicating that it is difficult to believe that the conduct is sanctionable regardless of the ability to deselect a recipient. However, as shown below, page 6 of the Florida Court's E-Filing Portal <a href="http://archive.flclerks.com/e-Filing_Authority/Resources/Manuals/Updated_E-Service_User_Guide_July_2014.pdf" target="_blank">Handbook</a> shows that it is possible to deselect a recipient: </div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhoo6Be0Yxfonth_7-g27suU7J3fin6M-jlTSe7pF68Q7H79mqqVsrGoWpRlov62aqg02VA-6IXF0Eb7N10BAuSt2eBbWJepjFKJuVMuMS6JoJNQ_8R4SOTMJWWnBNEUoG8RN6CwsQPCrw/s1600/E-Service+Instructions.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhoo6Be0Yxfonth_7-g27suU7J3fin6M-jlTSe7pF68Q7H79mqqVsrGoWpRlov62aqg02VA-6IXF0Eb7N10BAuSt2eBbWJepjFKJuVMuMS6JoJNQ_8R4SOTMJWWnBNEUoG8RN6CwsQPCrw/s640/E-Service+Instructions.png" width="451" /></a></div>
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The entire <a href="http://archive.flclerks.com/e-Filing_Authority/Resources/Manuals/Updated_E-Service_User_Guide_July_2014.pdf" target="_blank">handbook</a> can be viewed <a href="http://archive.flclerks.com/e-Filing_Authority/Resources/Manuals/Updated_E-Service_User_Guide_July_2014.pdf" target="_blank">HERE</a>. It is also possible to remove yourself from a service list:</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhc9mqbeh5CJhCK5uKwLVD0IfnVvdUoB0y-Pux0F48mj5MdxquVLIq-ARBFOAbyaiEa2U3jv02vVPOj0pimXasv2jLWHa7rVqckNYK-L7Ng71T5rAKp8eQ5WCGUBKZcegIiajg79ir-PmA/s1600/E-Service+Removal.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhc9mqbeh5CJhCK5uKwLVD0IfnVvdUoB0y-Pux0F48mj5MdxquVLIq-ARBFOAbyaiEa2U3jv02vVPOj0pimXasv2jLWHa7rVqckNYK-L7Ng71T5rAKp8eQ5WCGUBKZcegIiajg79ir-PmA/s640/E-Service+Removal.PNG" width="588" /></a></div>
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See page 21 of the <a href="http://archive.flclerks.com/e-Filing_Authority/Resources/Manuals/Updated_E-Service_User_Guide_July_2014.pdf" target="_blank">handbook</a>.</div>
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Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-25923872856101305282015-12-12T22:03:00.000-05:002015-12-13T08:31:52.562-05:00The Length of Briefs<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0); font-family: "helvetica neue light" , , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Regarding the appropriate length for appellate briefs, <a href="http://www.1dca.org/judges/marstiller.html" target="_blank" title="">Judge Marstiller</a> (</span><span style="font-family: "helvetica neue light" , , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;">First Distrct Court of Appeal) noted on Twitter that the "sizematters":</span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2cayMXNImk4GWVUkyzoGVS6GuhDMjHK6SA1LByHSwAGegsHSwVimT3msbDgrRGc64MG1Pp73UQGUYfV-lD6LSI5Xh87hhwx97oawWiOIcNXefc1n79gLSzIMo-uSclpINqyl7y2x9fDU/s640/blogger-image-1373795821.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" class="" height="183" id="blogsy-1449975729940.8167" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2cayMXNImk4GWVUkyzoGVS6GuhDMjHK6SA1LByHSwAGegsHSwVimT3msbDgrRGc64MG1Pp73UQGUYfV-lD6LSI5Xh87hhwx97oawWiOIcNXefc1n79gLSzIMo-uSclpINqyl7y2x9fDU/s400/blogger-image-1373795821.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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Not too short or simple though, exactly as short as possible.</div>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="en">
Design for Startup: Everything about design for startups <a href="https://t.co/HopCqCVjg2">https://t.co/HopCqCVjg2</a> by <a href="https://twitter.com/umitakcn">@umitakcn</a> <a href="https://t.co/zBGMis0fCT">pic.twitter.com/zBGMis0fCT</a></div>
Product Hunt (@ProductHunt) <a href="https://twitter.com/ProductHunt/status/675856627212283905">December 13, 2015</a></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
</blockquote>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwwQqQaNDFyiLtOTvUK4J0VwQacF9MfcmzUA7lfWGc4LMqAa1oL6t-28TWmL6T2UmWFfGT2xpU9Ifj_il8UKn-b9y-QpQEwvmf-HtcNSxjD0Ca63BQyFs8IZmaEU240AYbwCAiXuugZc4/s640/blogger-image--1939991959.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" class="" height="207" id="blogsy-1449975729938.2192" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwwQqQaNDFyiLtOTvUK4J0VwQacF9MfcmzUA7lfWGc4LMqAa1oL6t-28TWmL6T2UmWFfGT2xpU9Ifj_il8UKn-b9y-QpQEwvmf-HtcNSxjD0Ca63BQyFs8IZmaEU240AYbwCAiXuugZc4/s400/blogger-image--1939991959.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-55610818103682690192015-09-17T10:35:00.000-04:002015-09-17T10:35:04.829-04:00Florida Appellate Practice and Advocacy, 7th Ed., by Raymond Elligett Jr. and John Scheb <div style="text-align: justify;">
A couple of new books have been released recently that are related to Florida law and the Florida courts, and I am linking to them in separate posts.<br />
<br />
The Seventh Edition of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Florida-Appellate-Practice-Advocacy-Seventh/dp/1514105934/ref=sr_1_1?sr=8-1&ie=UTF8&keywords=Florida%2BAppellate%2BPractice%2Band%2BAdvocacy&tag=theflolegblo-20&qid=1442497602" target="_blank">Florida Appellate Practice and Advocacy</a>, by Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and John M. Scheb, was released on June 1, 2015. Previous editions were (and might still be) available exclusively through Stetson Law School, and this edition is available exclusively from Amazon.com at the link below:<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1514105934/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1514105934&linkCode=as2&tag=theflolegblo-20&linkId=L6MWKBB7JLL32UI6"><img border="0" src="http://ws-na.amazon-adsystem.com/widgets/q?_encoding=UTF8&ASIN=1514105934&Format=_SL250_&ID=AsinImage&MarketPlace=US&ServiceVersion=20070822&WS=1&tag=theflolegblo-20" /></a><img alt="" border="0" src="http://ir-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/ir?t=theflolegblo-20&l=as2&o=1&a=1514105934" height="1" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" />
</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-77521783744174190752015-09-17T09:46:00.001-04:002015-09-17T09:46:14.205-04:00Fifty Years of Justice: A History of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, by James M. Denham<div style="text-align: justify;">
A couple of books have been released recently that are related to Florida law and the Florida courts, and I am linking to them in separate posts.<br />
<br />
At the beginning of June, James M. Denham, a professor at Florida Southern College, released his book <i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Fifty-Years-Justice-District-Quincentennial/dp/0813060494/ref=sr_1_1?sr=8-1&ie=UTF8&keywords=fifty%2Byears%2Bof%2Bjustice&tag=theflolegblo-20&qid=1442496846" target="_blank">Fifty Years of Justice: A History of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida</a></i>. The court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, issued a press release about the book which may be viewed <a href="https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/about/mdfl-50_years_of_justice-press%20release.pdf" target="_blank">HERE</a>. The book is available from Amazon.com in print and Kindle versions at the link below:<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0813060494/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0813060494&linkCode=as2&tag=theflolegblo-20&linkId=JE7ZMAGESHEOI2NU"><img border="0" src="http://ws-na.amazon-adsystem.com/widgets/q?_encoding=UTF8&ASIN=0813060494&Format=_SL250_&ID=AsinImage&MarketPlace=US&ServiceVersion=20070822&WS=1&tag=theflolegblo-20" /></a><img alt="" border="0" src="http://ir-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/ir?t=theflolegblo-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0813060494" height="1" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" />
</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-63709492151831357152015-09-16T15:40:00.000-04:002015-09-16T15:40:11.107-04:00Question As To Whether Legislature Can Limit Attorneys Fees in Claims Bill Sent To Florida Supreme Court<div style="text-align: justify;">
In July, the Fourth District issued an <a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/July%202015/07-15-15/4D13-3497.op.pdf" target="_blank">opinion</a> discussed <a href="http://www.floridalegalblog.org/2015/07/fourth-district-legislature-entitled-to.html" target="_blank">HERE</a> in a post titled "Fourth District: Legislature Entitled To Limit Payment of Attorney's Fees In Claims Bill." Today, in <a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept.%202015/9-16-15/4D13-3497.cert.question.op.pdf" target="_blank">THIS</a> opinion, the court granted the Appellant's motion for certification as a question of great public importance and certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 768.28, FLORIDA
STATUTES, AND THE ADOPTION OF FLORIDA SENATE RULE
4.81(6), IS IT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR THE
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES PAID FROM A GUARDIANSHIP TRUST
ESTABLISHED BY A LEGISLATIVE CLAIMS BILL?</blockquote>
All three members of the panel concurred in the certification order.Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-45155475243378780682015-09-09T16:36:00.000-04:002015-09-09T21:43:11.108-04:00Fourth District: Medical Examination of Defendant Not Seeking Relief Must Occur Where Defendant Lives<div style="text-align: justify;">
In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept.%202015/9-09-15/4D15-2122.op.pdf" target="_blank">Bodzin v. Leviter</a></i> (4D15-2122), the Fourth District held that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it entered an order requiring the non-resident defendant "to appear for an
independent medical examination in Florida. <i>See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=593+So.+2d+568&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=8997852829454143722&scilh=0" target="_blank">Youngblood v. Michaud</a></i>,
593 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (independent medical examination of
defendant should occur only in county of defendant’s residence)."</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The majority opinion relied upon the <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=593+So.+2d+568&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=8997852829454143722&scilh=0" target="_blank">Youngblood</a> </i>case cited above, and held that the "Respondent’s reliance on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=686+So.+2d+771&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=11319534963668152285&scilh=0" target="_blank"><i>McKenney v. Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc</i>.</a>, 686 So.
2d 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), is misplaced." In <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=686+So.+2d+771&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=11319534963668152285&scilh=0" target="_blank">McKenney</a></i>, "the trial court required
a plaintiff to appear for an independent medical examination in the county
where the plaintiff filed suit, and our court concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion."</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In this case, it was the plaintiff seeking an IME of the defendant, a defendant that was not seeking affirmative relief. Therefore, the court stated that "here, the gravamen of the cause of action in this
case─investment fraud─has nothing to do with defendant’s condition.
Thus, <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=593+So.+2d+568&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=8997852829454143722&scilh=0" target="_blank">Youngblood</a></i>, and not <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=686+So.+2d+771&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=11319534963668152285&scilh=0" target="_blank">McKenney</a></i>, is on point."</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The court's majority opinion concluded as follows:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
There is no rule or statute which requires the defendant to testify at the
trial. <i>See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=321+So.+2d+82&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=14392755832557950411&scilh=0" target="_blank">Graber v. Gassman</a></i>, 321 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
Obviously, petitioner does not intend to testify at trial, and there is nothing
in this record to show that respondent has subpoenaed him and intends
to call him as a witness. Although petitioner does not object to the
examination, he objects to an examination outside of his state of residence.
If respondent still wishes to obtain an examination, she must schedule one
there. </blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The majority opinion was written by Judge Warner, and Judge Levine concurred. Judge Conner wrote a dissenting opinion. Judge Conner's dissent stated, in part, as follows:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
I respectfully disagree with the majority. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.360 does not limit its application to a party seeking affirmative relief.
Instead, the rule allows for the examination of a party “when the condition
that is the subject of the requested examination is in controversy.” Fla. R.
Civ. Proc. 1.360(a)(1) (emphasis added). I disagree that the rule works
differently depending on whether it is a plaintiff or defendant being
examined. I have found no case law in Florida that holds the rule works
differently, depending on which party is being examined.</blockquote>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-53386640707037962822015-07-15T13:48:00.002-04:002015-07-15T13:48:47.706-04:00Fourth District: Legislature Entitled To Limit Payment of Attorney's Fees In Claims Bill<div style="text-align: justify;">
In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/July%202015/07-15-15/4D13-3497.op.pdf" target="_blank">Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart& Shipley, P.A. v. State</a> </i>(4D13-3497), a divided panel of the Fourth District held that the "guardianship court’s decision to recognize the Legislature’s prerogative of
limiting the payment of fees and costs [in this case] to $100,000." The opinion was written by <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/Forst.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Forst</a>. <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/Conner.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Conner</a> joined the majority opinion and also wrote a concurring opinion. <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/ciklin.shtml" target="_blank">Chief Judge Ciklin</a> wrote a 19-page dissenting opinion. The majority opinion described the facts as follows:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
The law firm "represented the family in a five-week jury trial in 2007.
The jury found that Lee Memorial Health System’s employees had been
negligent and that their negligence had resulted in damages to Aaron and
his parents. The jury awarded Aaron over $28.3 million. His mother was
awarded $1,340,000 in damages, and his father was awarded $1,000,000.
However, the trial court found that Lee Memorial was an independent
special district of the State of Florida and, pursuant to the sovereign
immunity damage limitations in <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">section 768.28</a>(5), Florida Statutes (2007),
entered a judgment against the hospital in the amount of $200,000. The
trial court rulings were affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal.
<i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/johnson-v-agency" target="_blank">Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. Edwards</a></i>, 22 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).</blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In an attempt to recover additional funds beyond the $200,000 limit, the law firm submitted a claims bill to the Florida legislature. </div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
In 2012, after
a public campaign in support of the bill, the Legislature passed Claims Bill
2012-249, directing Lee Memorial to appropriate $10 million, with an
additional $5 million payable in annual installments, “to the Guardianship
of Aaron Edwards, to be placed in a special needs trust for the exclusive
use and benefit of Aaron Edwards, a minor.” Ch. 2012-249, § 2, Laws of
Fla. No monies were appropriated for the use and/or benefit of either
parent for their damages. The claims bill also included a stipulation
stating “[t]he total amount paid for attorney’s fees, lobbying fees, costs,
and other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed $100,000.” <i>Id</i>. § 3. It is this provision that is the focus of the matter before
us.</blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
After the $10 million had been paid into a trust for Aaron Edwards's needs, the lawyers ("with support from the Edwards family"), asked the court to allocate $2.5 million for attorney's fees. "The petition premised this request on a
25% fee cap provision in <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">section 768.28</a>(8) and on the argument that the
fees and costs limitation in the claims bill was unconstitutional." </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
On the merits of the issue presented, the court began with an analysis of sovereign immunity. </div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
The doctrine of sovereign immunity stretches back to the foundations
of Anglo-American common law. Espousing the maxim that “the King can
do no wrong,” Blackstone explained that “no suit or action can be brought
against the King, even in civil matters, because no court can have
jurisdiction over him.” <a href="http://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/bla-107/" target="_blank">1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *235</a>. However, should a subject of the Crown have “a just demand upon the
King, he must petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor
will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion.”
<i>Id</i>. at *236. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
When the common law was exported to the American continent,
sovereign immunity came with it. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: center;">
***</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">Section 768.28</a>, Florida Statutes, is the codification of the state’s
limited waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions. A plaintiff’s recovery
against the state and its agencies or subdivisions is limited to no more
than $200,000 per incident. § <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">768.28</a>(5), Fla. Stat. (2007). Moreover, in
cases where a judgment exceeds $200,000, “that portion of the judgment
that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may
be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature.” <i>Id</i>. </blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
After an analysis of the legal opinions regarding the statute and its application when the legislature limited compensation to lawyers, the court turned to the case before it. The court stated that "in the instant case, as in <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=450+So.+2d+850&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=5234298985634917692&scilh=0" target="_blank">Gamble</a> </i>and <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=984+So.+2d+1265&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=9033667678009144321&scilh=0" target="_blank">Noel</a></i>, the Legislature passed a
claims bill that provided a specific amount of attorneys’ fees that was
significantly less than the amount contracted for between the Edwards
family and their law firm, Searcy Denney." Addressing the ultimate conclusion, and the dissenting opinion, the court stated:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Notwithstanding Appellants’ (and the dissenting opinion’s) arguments
to the contrary, <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=450+So.+2d+850&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=5234298985634917692&scilh=0" target="_blank">Gamble</a></i> and <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=984+So.+2d+1265&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=9033667678009144321&scilh=0" target="_blank">Noel</a></i>, and the reasoning therein, support the
guardianship court’s decision to recognize the Legislature’s prerogative of
limiting the payment of fees and costs to $100,000. A claims bill, both
before and after the enactment of <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">section 768.28</a>, is a “voluntary
recognition of its moral obligation by the legislature” and, as such, is firmly
entrenched in the sphere of legislative discretion. <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=984+So.+2d+1265&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=9033667678009144321&scilh=0" target="_blank">Noel</a></i>, 984 So. 2d at 1267
(quoting <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=450+So.+2d+850&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=5234298985634917692&scilh=0" target="_blank">Gamble</a></i>, 450 So. 2d at 853). “Parties cannot enter into a contract
to bind the state in the exercise of its sovereign power. . . . The legislature
was in no way bound to pass legislation conforming with the provisions of
the prior contingent fee contract.” <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=450+So.+2d+850&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=5234298985634917692&scilh=0" target="_blank">Gamble</a></i>, 450 So. 2d at 853. “That the
claim[s] bill is separate and apart from the constraints of an earlier lawsuit
is demonstrated by the supreme court’s recognition that [the] legislature
has the power to limit attorney’s fees in a claims bill, no matter what the
underlying fee contract provides[.]” <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=984+So.+2d+1265&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=9033667678009144321&scilh=0" target="_blank">Noel</a></i>, 984 So. 2d at 1267. “A claim[s]
bill is not obtainable by right upon the claimant’s proof of entitlement, but
rather is granted strictly as a matter of legislative grace.” <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=960+So.+2d+785&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=17624181564688283524&scilh=0" target="_blank"><i>Wagner v. Orange Cnty</i>.</a>, 960 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); <i>see also <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=740+So.2d+1205&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&case=12043305338655798125&scilh=0" target="_blank">United Servs.Auto Ass’n v. Phillips</a></i>, 740 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).</blockquote>
In conclusion, the court stated: "Appellants’ (and the dissenting opinion’s) dissatisfaction with the
limitation on attorneys’ fees and costs imposed in Aaron’s claims bill is
understandable, and the possibility of such a restriction in a claims bill
posits an additional factor to be considered by counsel in deciding whether
to take on representation in a case in this state involving a sovereign entity
defendant. Appellants’ reply brief states, 'If there is no reasonable
financial incentive for lawyers to take these type cases, the injured will go
unrepresented.' To what extent this is true is beyond our focus. Therefore, we affirm the guardianship court’s ruling."</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
As noted above, there were three opinions in this appeal. <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/Forst.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Forst</a> wrote the opinion, and was joined by <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/Conner.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Conner</a> who also wrote a concurring opinion. <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/ciklin.shtml" target="_blank">Chief Judge Ciklin</a> wrote a dissenting opinion.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/Conner.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Conner</a>'s concurrence states:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Anytime legal analysis traces back to Blackstone and the foundations
of Anglo-American law, one knows core legal values are being addressed.
I write to further explain why I cannot agree with the reasoning of the
dissent, although the dissent makes very cogent arguments as to why
Gamble and Noel should not control the outcome of this case. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The premise of the dissent is that by enacting <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">section 768.28</a>, Florida
Statutes, the legislature altered the “legislative grace” attribute of its
monetary awards by making a judicial or administrative award a
precondition for initiating the claims bill process. The argument is that
you can’t even try to pass through the doors of the legislature until you
successfully pass through the doors of the courthouse. Thus, the two
processes are welded; this means the “act of grace” analysis has been
“transcended” because the weld now raises the specter of “a chilling effect
upon the sacrosanct and fundamental constitutional right to access to our
courts.” </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The fly in the ointment regarding the dissent’s argument is the failure
to recognize that seeking redress from the legislature is fundamentally
different from seeking redress from the court. Every citizen has a
fundamental right to seek redress from the court because that is a core
function of the judicial branch of government. There is no fundamental
right to seek redress from the legislature because such is not a core function of that branch.</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: center;">
***</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Therefore, I agree with the majority opinion that unless our supreme
court changes course in its legal analysis regarding separation of powers,
arguments regarding impairment of contract, unconstitutional taking,
denial of due process and equal protection and all variations on those
themes are unpersuasive. </blockquote>
Finally, the 19-page dissenting opinion by <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/ciklin.shtml" target="_blank">Chief Judge Ciklin</a> begins, in part, as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
I respectfully dissent and offer my overall assessment of the crucially
important issues involved in this case, the ultimate resolution of which
will have deep and profound ramifications for many Floridians—and for
many years to come.</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: center;">
*** </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Because the claim bill’s limitation on attorneys’ fees and costs is an
unconstitutional impairment on the Edwards family and firm’s right to
contract, I would reverse. I have taken the liberty to also write to remind
the readers of this dissent and all Florida lawyers, that contingency fee
agreements are directly connected to every citizen’s right to access to our
courts. I cite to the Florida Code of Professional Responsibility which
contemplates the ethical and moral obligation of “us lawyers” licensed to
practice in this state, to always consider the contingency fee agreement as
the “poor man’s key to the courthouse.” Because of the enactment of
<a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/768.28">section 768.28</a>, which now requires that aggrieved individuals first invoke
the civil process of law before even approaching the Legislature for
sovereign immunity relief, the “key” should be easily accessible. The right
to this key is rich and deeply rooted in American history and it is a judicial
time-honored duty and responsibility to protect the inalienable rights of
our people in this regard. </blockquote>
</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-2190438171857882742015-07-01T15:55:00.000-04:002015-07-01T15:55:19.403-04:00Fourth District: Legislative Cap On Non-Ecomomic Damages In Personal Injury Cases Violates the Florida Constitution<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i><a href="http://www.4dca.org/opinions/July%202015/07-01-15/4D11-4806.op.pdf" target="_blank">North Broward Hospital District et al v. Kalitan</a></i> (4D11-4806), a panel of the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that a 2014 decision of the Florida Supreme Court required it to conclude that the legislative caps on non-economic damages in personal injury cases violates the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution. The Fourth District's decision began as follows:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">Estate of McCall v. United States</a></i>, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014), the
Florida Supreme Court determined that the caps on noneconomic
damages awards in wrongful death cases, imposed by <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2014/766.118" target="_blank">section 766.118</a>,
Florida Statutes (2005), violated the equal protection clause of the Florida
Constitution. <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/Index.cfm?Mode=Constitution&Submenu=3&Tab=statutes#A1S02" target="_blank">Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.</a> The instant case consolidates three appeals from a single medical malpractice incident with a final judgment
finding Appellants, defendants below (“Defendants”), liable for the injuries
and damages suffered by Appellee Susan Kalitan (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff’s
jury-awarded damages were limited by the trial court’s application of <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2014/766.118" target="_blank">section 766.118</a>, and Plaintiff’s cross-appeal challenges the constitutionality of those caps.</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Accordingly, this appeal presents an issue of first impression in the
post-<i>McCall</i> legal environment—whether the opinion (or, more accurately,
opinions) of the Florida Supreme Court in <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">McCall</a></i><i> </i>dictates our holding that
the caps on noneconomic damage awards in personal injury medical
malpractice cases are similarly unconstitutional. Although Defendants
attempt to distinguish the caps in wrongful death cases from those in
personal injury cases, and there are clear distinctions, <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">McCall</a> </i>mandates a
finding that the caps in <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2014/766.118" target="_blank">section 766.118</a> personal injury cases are similarly
unconstitutional. To conclude otherwise would be disingenuous.
Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s decision below insofar as it
reduced the jury’s award of noneconomic damages based on the caps in <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2014/766.118" target="_blank">section 766.118</a>. </span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Note that it is the 2014 version of <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2014/766.118" target="_blank">section 766.118</a> linked throughout the quote above. Section 766.118, Florida Statutes (2005), cited in the quote above, can be viewed <a href="http://archive.flsenate.gov/statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubMenu=1&App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=766.118&URL=CH0766/Sec118.HTM" target="_blank">HERE</a>. The 2005 version was apparently amended twice. <i>See </i><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit; line-height: 16.6000003814697px; text-align: start; text-indent: 13.3333330154419px;"><i> </i>s. 204, <a href="http://laws.flrules.org/files/Ch_2007-230.pdf" target="_blank">ch. 2007-230</a>; and s. 28, ch. <a href="http://laws.flrules.org/2011/135" target="_blank">2011-135</a>.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Next, the opinion explained the multiple decisions that make up the Florida Supreme Court's decision in <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">McCall</a></i>, and why the panel determined that the supreme court's plurality opinion in <i>McCall </i>must be followed in this case. The court seems to make it clear that whether or not you agree with the conclusion regarding the constitutionality of the caps is an issue to be taken up with the Florida Supreme Court - and therefore an issue this appellate court need not independently address. In conclusion, the court stated:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit;">CONCLUSION</span></b></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Per <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">McCall</a></i>, Plaintiff’s noneconomic damages were improperly limited by
the application of the caps in <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2014/766.118" target="_blank">section 766.118</a> and, accordingly, we reverse
the noneconomic damages award in the final judgment. Defendants have
asked this court to distinguish single claimant personal injury cases from
the multiple claimant wrongful death situation addressed in <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">McCall</a></i>.
However, we have found no basis to do so that would not conflict with the
reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court’s plurality and concurring
opinions, which strike at the underpinning of the Legislature’s caps on
noneconomic damages in general. So long as the caps discriminate
between classes of medical malpractice victims, as they do in the personal
injury context (where the claimants with little noneconomic damage can
be awarded all of their damages, in contrast to those claimants whose
noneconomic damages are deemed to exceed the level to which the caps
apply), they are rendered unconstitutional by <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=134+So.+3d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&case=14611924965122896685&scilh=0" target="_blank">McCall</a></i>, notwithstanding the
Legislature’s intentions.</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The trial court is directed to reinstate the total damages award as found
by the jury, though these damages may still be limited by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Also, in the corrected final judgment, the University
is not to be held liable for the damages attributable to the Nurse. As no challenge was raised as to liability in any other context, nor was a
challenge raised regarding Plaintiff’s economic damages award, those
portions of the final judgment are affirmed.
</span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The 14-page opinion was written by <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/Forst.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Forst</a>, and the opinion was joined by <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/ciklin.shtml" target="_blank">Chief Judge Ciklin</a> and <a href="http://www.4dca.org/judges/stevenson.shtml" target="_blank">Judge Stevenson</a>. Some of the briefs filed in this appeal are available at the links below:</span></div>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jtk.bz/1aJKy+" target="_blank">Appellee's Answer Brief/Cross-Appellant's Initial Brief</a> (filed July 22, 2013);</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jtk.bz/14Dtn+" target="_blank">Appellant's Reply Brief/Cross-Appellee's Answer Brief</a> (filed December 2, 2013);</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jtk.bz/1j6qb+" target="_blank">Appellant's Reply Brief/Cross-Appellee's Answer Brief</a> (filed December 3, 2013);</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jtk.bz/18Ef2+" target="_blank">Appellant/Cross-Appellee's Supplemental Brief</a> (filed May 12, 2014); and</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jtk.bz/15DRG+" target="_blank">Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Supplemental Brief</a> (filed May 23, 2014).</span></li>
</ul>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-4061605229992164902015-06-11T13:03:00.000-04:002015-06-11T14:07:24.162-04:00Florida Statute That Taxed Cable And Satellite Service At Different Rate Violates Dormant Commerce Clause<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i><a href="https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2013/5444/135444_DC13_06112015_095200_i.pdf" target="_blank">Directv Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Revenue, et al</a></i> (1D13-5444 & 1D14-0292), a divided three judge panel of the First District Court of Appeal held that Florida's imposition of a higher tax on satellite customers than on cable customers violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court began its opinion as follows:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This appeal arises from a final summary judgment finding that section
202.12(1), Florida Statutes, which imposes a higher tax rate on satellite services
than on cable services, is constitutional. The Appellants, Directv, Inc. and
Echostar, L.L.C. (“the satellite companies”), contend that the statute
unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce in both effect and
purpose, which is in violation of the Commerce Clause. We agree and reverse.</span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Generally, the complaint arises from a legislative change, "the
Communications Services Tax Simplification Law (“the CST”), which imposed a
differential tax rate for cable and satellite services." When that law was enacted, codified at § 202.12(1), Fla. Stat. (2001), cable service began being taxed at 6.8 percent and satellite service at 10.8 percent. " (taxing cable service at 6.8 percent and satellite service at 10.8 percent). Currently,
cable service is taxed at a rate of 6.65 percent, and satellite service is taxed at a rate
of 10.8 percent."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">"It is this difference in taxation rates
that the satellite companies allege[d] violates the dormant Commerce Clause," and the court agreed.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The court first addressed the state's argument that "the satellite companies cannot seek a tax refund because they failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedies." The court agreed that the satellite companies had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies but noted that "[i]f a
taxpayer is seeking a refund pursuant to section 215.26, Florida Statutes, and the sole basis for the refund is that the statute imposing the tax is facially
unconstitutional, the circuit court will have jurisdiction despite the taxpayer’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. <i>Sarnoff v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles</i>, 825 So. 2d 351, 357 (Fla. 2002). This exception is
known as the direct-file exception. <i>Id</i>."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The state argued that the direct-file exception, discussed above, did not apply because "this is not a facial challenge to the statute." The court disagreed, concluding that "[a] party can pose a facial challenge to a statute by
arguing that there is no set of circumstances where it could apply constitutionally
because of its discriminatory purpose or its discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">To the merits of the dispute, the court stated that the "The Commerce Clause states, 'The Congress shall have power to . . .
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states.' Article I,
§ 8, cl. 3, U.S. Const. Attendant with this grant of authority to Congress, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized a dormant Commerce Clause, which
limits the states’ power to regulate interstate commerce. <i>Simmons v. State</i>, 944 So. 2d 317, 329 (Fla. 2006). A state or local regulation violates the dormant
Commerce Clause if the regulation treats out-of-state commerce differently from
in-state commerce. <i>Reinish v. Clark</i>, 765 So. 2d 197, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">"There are three ways in which a statute can discriminate against out-of-state
interests: (1) it may be facially discriminatory; (2) it may discriminate in its
practical effect; or (3) it may have a discriminatory intent." <i>Citing Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep’t of
Treasury</i>, 490 U.S. 66, 75 (1989).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Applying this test, the court disagreed with the trial court and concluded that the cable and satellite providers, stating:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Here, cable and satellite companies provide multichannel television
programming to Florida subscribers. As such, they operate in the same market and
are direct competitors within that market. They differ in the deployment of
technology, the need for local infrastructure, and the additional services offered.
However, mere differences in how a service is provided is not enough to overcome
the fact that the companies compete in the same market and sell virtually identical
products at retail. </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Next, the court turned to whether there were "in-state interests," stating that "[i]n addition to a finding the companies at issue are similarly-situated entities,
courts must also find in-state interests to be present in order for the Commerce
Clause to be implicated." The court stated that the "Commerce Clause analysis focuses
not on the domiciles of particular corporations, but on whether a law results in
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests." In this case, "[b]ecause the sales
tax portion of the CST burdens interstate commerce by imposing a higher tax rate
on those communication companies that do not invest in local economies, it violates the Commerce Clause."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The court then turned to "effect case law," arguments concerning the "aggregate tax rate," and the state's arguments regarding operational differences. All three arguments made by the state were rejected, and the court concluded that "[b]ecause the CST has a discriminatory effect on satellite companies, it
violates the Commerce Clause, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">After concluding that the legislation had a discriminatory effect, the court next analyzed whether the statute had a discriminatory purpose. "To determine whether there is discriminatory purpose,
courts look to the language and the legislative history of the statute in question." Concluding that the trial court correctly limited its review to information in the actual legislative history, the court affirmed the conclusion that the record did not support a finding of discriminatory intent.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Based upon the finding of discriminatory effect, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. The court's opinion was written by <a href="http://www.1dca.org/judges/roberts.html" target="_blank">Judge Roberts</a>, and <a href="http://www.1dca.org/judges/swanson.html" target="_blank">Judge Swanson</a> concurred. A dissenting opinion was filed by <a href="http://www.1dca.org/judges/marstiller.html" target="_blank">Judge Marstiller</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Judge Marstiller's dissenting opinion stated, in part, as follows:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">I do not agree the satellite and cable providers are similarly situated entities
for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis; in my view, the majority
opinion fails to fully consider all the differences between the two.3
Mainly,
however, I disagree with the majority’s characterizing the cable providers’ use of
local infrastructure, reliance on local rights-of-way and employment of Florida
workers as in-state economic interests giving rise to the proscriptions of the
dormant Commerce Clause. As the trial court found based on the undisputed facts
brought out below, “[t]he cable companies may have more of a presence in the
state because of the nature of the technology they utilize in providing their
services, but the satellite companies have a significant presence in the state as
well.” Indeed, DirecTV and Echostar filed verified statements below averring that
each has employees based in Florida—DirecTV has independent contractors here,
as well—who are responsible for “sale of its services and installation, servicing,
and/or maintenance of its property.” I do not believe we can properly ignore or
discount these facts. Inasmuch as the cable providers and the satellite providers both have human and physical assets in Florida which they use to provide services
to their customers, they both have significant in-state economic interests. I fail to
see how, under these facts, the cable providers have local economic interests, but
the satellite providers do not. And I find nothing in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that would justify invalidating Florida’s CST based on one group’s
comparatively greater economic investment in the state where both groups have
economic investment here.</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">***</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">I also believe the majority opinion, in focusing solely on the extent of instate
economic investment by cable providers and disregarding in-state investment
by satellite providers, misapprehends the purpose of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Relying primarily on the fact that the cable providers use local rights-of way,
the majority opinion discounts the decisions of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Ohio Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
holding that the pertinent distinction between satellite providers and cable
providers is operational and not geographical. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">***</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The bottom line is that the dormant Commerce Clause does not protect
satellite TV providers from differential tax treatment simply because their
technology is not land based. It does not protect “the particular structure or
methods of operation in a retail market.” <i>Exxon Corp.</i>, 437 U.S. at 127. The
majority’s decision to invalidate Florida’s CST is inconsistent with this principle
and contrary to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. I understand the
concern over a taxing scheme that appears to favor one group of industry
competitors over another. But “‘applying the dormant Commerce Clause in cases
that do not present the equivalent of a protective tariff’—i.e., where the tax does
not draw geographic lines, favor local products, or promote local companies—[ ]
‘dramatically increase[s] the clause’s scope.’” <i>Levin</i>, 941 N.E.2d at 1194 (<i>quoting
Treesh</i>, 487 F.3d at 481). The majority’s decision takes that dramatic step, and I am not prepared to follow.</span></blockquote>
</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-26232398501449011532015-05-26T11:06:00.000-04:002015-05-26T11:06:10.591-04:002015 Amendments to the Federal Rules and Potential Changes in 2016<div style="text-align: justify;">
Last month, the Supreme Court sent to Congress amendments to the <a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frbk15_k536.pdf" target="_blank">Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure</a> and <a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf" target="_blank">Federal Rules of Civil Procedure</a>. These Amendments will become effective on December 1, 2015, absent Congressional action blocking the changes. The Bankruptcy Rule change only impacts Rule 1007. The Civil Rule changes relate to Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 55, and 84, and the
Appendix of Forms. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Much more interesting, in my opinion, will be the rule changes submitted next year and that will be effective on December 1, 2016. The entirety of the changes proposed for December 1, 2016, may be viewed <a href="http://jtk.bz/17nzJ+" target="_blank">HERE</a>. The proposed changes include a reduction in the length of appellate briefs and the elimination of the 3 mailing days provided by the rules. </div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
The comments period has closed for the changes proposed for 2016. There are 61 comments to the proposed appellate rule changes, and much has been written on the subject. With regard to the proposed civil rule changes, there are only 13 comments. I link to two specific comments, one from the <a href="http://jtk.bz/rwBK+" target="_blank">United States Department of Justice</a> and the other from the <a href="http://jtk.bz/rwBK+" target="_blank">Solicitor General of the United States</a>, but all are available at the following links: <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=USC-RULES-CV-2014-0003" target="_blank">Civil</a>; <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=USC-RULES-AP-2014-0002" target="_blank">Appellate</a>; <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USC-RULES-BK-2014-0001" target="_blank">Bankruptcy</a>; and <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004" target="_blank">Criminal</a>.</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-81119444408897951492015-05-13T23:55:00.001-04:002015-05-13T23:55:07.372-04:00After Merger, Claim May Be Continued As If Merger Did Not Occur<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <em><a href="http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2015/042015/5D13-3250.op.docx.pdf" target="_blank" title="">Fiorentino v BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP</a></em> (5D13-3250), the Fifth District reversed the foreclosure judgment. However, in a footnote the court cited to section 607.1106(d), Florida Statutes. That statutory section is titled "effect of merger or share exchange," and the cited provision states that "Any claim existing or action or proceeding pending by or against any corporation party to the merger may be continued as if the merger did not occur or the surviving corporation may be substituted in the proceeding for the corporation which ceased existence."</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Applied to the case before the court, the court noted the following:</span></div>
<blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">The record reflects that BAC merged into Bank of America effective July 1, 2011, and did not survive the merger. Pursuant to section 607.1106(1)(d), Florida Statutes, the claim may be continued as if the merger did not occur, or the surviving corporation, Bank of America, may be substituted in the proceeding. </span></div>
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</blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">While not a new law, it is a statutory provision that isn't referenced often.</span></div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-16962841327718309602015-04-29T11:24:00.000-04:002015-04-29T11:24:39.793-04:00U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Florida Ban on Judges Soliciting Campaign Contributions<div style="text-align: justify;">
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Today, in <i><a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1499_d18e.pdf" target="_blank">Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar</a></i>, the United States Supreme Court affirmed Florida Supreme Court's opinion upholding the Florida Bar's ban on judicial candidates soliciting campaign contribution. The opinion is broken into numerous parts, as described by the Court below:</div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
</div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, except as to Part II. BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined that opinion in full, and GINSBURG, J., joined except as to Part II.
BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined
as to Part II. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J.,
joined. KENNEDY, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
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The majority opinion began as follows:</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-align: justify;">
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the
opinion of the Court, except as to Part II. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-align: justify;">
Our Founders vested authority to
appoint federal judges in the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and entrusted those judges to hold their offices during good behavior.
The Constitution permits States to make a different choice, and most of them
have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate judges at the
polls. In an effort to preserve public confidence in the integrity of their
judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges and judicial candidates from
personally soliciting funds for their campaigns. We must decide whether the
First Amendment permits such restrictions on speech.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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We hold that it does. Judges are not
politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a
State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial
candidates like campaigners for political office. A State may assure its people
that judges will apply the law without fear or favor—and without having
personally asked anyone for money. We affirm the judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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And, the majority opinion concluded:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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The desirability of judicial
elections is a question that has sparked disagreement for more than 200 years.
Hamilton believed that appointing judges to positions with life tenure
constituted “the best expedient which can be devised in any government to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.” The
Federalist No. 78, at 465. Jefferson thought that making judges “dependent on
none but themselves” ran counter to the principle of “a government founded on
the public will.” 12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 5 (P. Ford ed. 1905). The
federal courts reflect the view of Hamilton; most States have sided with
Jefferson. Both methods have given our Nation jurists of wisdom and rectitude
who have devoted themselves to maintaining “the public’s respect . . . and a
reserve of public goodwill, without becoming subservient to public opinion.”
Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 579, 596 (2004). <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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It is not our place to resolve this
enduring debate. Our limited task is to apply the Constitution to the question
presented in this case. Judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to
speak in support of their campaigns. States have a compelling interest in
preserving public confidence in their judiciaries. When the State adopts a
narrowly tailored restriction like the one at issue here, those principles do
not conflict. A State’s decision to elect judges does not compel it to
compromise public confidence in their integrity. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-align: justify;">
The judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court is Affirmed.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
Justice Breyer’s concurrence is found on page 29. Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment, an opinion joined
by Justice Breyer as to Part II, begins on page 28. Justice Scalia’s dissent,
joined by Justice Thomas, begins on page 33. Justice Kennedy’s dissent begins
on page 46. Finally, Justice Alito’s dissent begins on page 52.</div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-40873569240776993532015-04-15T08:52:00.000-04:002015-04-15T08:52:25.885-04:00First District Explains New Mailbox Rule for Incarcerated Litigants<div style="text-align: justify;">
If you happen to be an incarcerated litigant, you should read the First District's opinion issued today in <i><a href="https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2015/0287/150287_NOND_04152015_071834_i.pdf" target="_blank">Roberto Rivera, M.D. v. Department of Health</a></i> (1D15-0287). In that opinion, the First District states as follows:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
We are concerned that incarcerated litigants may fail to
understand the effect of the amendment and write to ensure that incarcerated
litigants filing documents with the courts of this state are familiar with the recent
amendment to rule 9.420(a)(2), and that they understand the burden the rule places
on them to demonstrate timely filing. </blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
With regard to the amended rule, which is quoted in the opinion, the court stated:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
As amended, the rule provides that when the institution has a system
designed for legal mail that records the date a document is placed in the hands of
an institution official for mailing and the inmate uses that system, then the date of
filing will be presumed to be the date recorded by the institution’s legal mail
system. If the inmate does not use the system designed for legal mail, the date of
filing shall be presumed to be the date it is stamped for filing by the clerk of the
court. If the institution does not have a legal mail system, or it has a legal mail
system that does not record the date a document is placed in the hands of an
institution official for mailing, then the date contained in the certificate of service
is presumed to be the date of filing. </blockquote>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-14147701887486069072015-03-19T11:16:00.002-04:002015-03-19T11:16:42.695-04:00Florida Supreme Court: U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Ban On Life Sentences To Juveniles Applies Retroactively<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i><a href="http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2015/sc13-865.pdf" target="_blank">Falcon v. Florida</a></i> (SC13-865), the Florida Supreme Court unanimously answered a question that the state and federal courts have addressed with differing results. Justice Pariente wrote the unanimous opinion which began by stating the question presented to the court:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">The issue in this case is whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Miller v. Alabama</i>, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012)—which “forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders”—applies to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were
already final at the time <i>Miller</i> was decided. </span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The Florida Supreme Court noted that it would reach the same result "[a]pplying this Court’s test for retroactivity, as articulated in <i>Witt v. State</i>,
387 So. 2d 922, 931 (Fla. 1980)," and applying "the test for retroactivity set forth in <i>Teague v. Lane</i>, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989)." </span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The court held as follows:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">we conclude that the rule set forth in <i>Miller</i>
constitutes a 'development of fundamental significance' and therefore must be
given retroactive effect....Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold
that the Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Miller</i> applies retroactively to juvenile
offenders whose convictions and sentences were final at the time <i>Miller</i> was decided. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2), any affected
juvenile offender shall have two years from the time the mandate issues in this case
to file a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court seeking to correct his or
her sentence pursuant to <i>Miller</i>.</span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Based on our decision in <i>Horsley v. State</i>, No. SC13-1938, slip op. at 3 (Fla.
Mar. 19, 2015), we conclude that the appropriate remedy for any juvenile offender
whose sentence is now unconstitutional under <i>Miller</i> is a resentencing pursuant to
the framework established in legislation enacted by the Florida Legislature in
2014. <i>See</i> ch. 2014-220, Laws of Fla. </span></blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-18413363762075224232015-02-26T15:57:00.000-05:002015-02-26T15:57:42.858-05:00Judgment Cannot Be Corrected To Clarify Status Of Parties Years After Entry<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i><a href="https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2014/2757/142757_DC13_02242015_080436_i.pdf" target="_blank">Lorant v. Whitney National Bank</a></i> (1D14-2757), the First District "consider[ed] whether Florida’s Rule of Civil Procedure allowing for corrections of 'clerical mistakes,' encompasses authorization to supplement a final deficiency judgment by clarifying the party defendants’ status in the litigation almost three years after the entry of the initial judgment."</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">After a foreclosure judgment was entered:</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">the
court entered a final deficiency judgment as to Mr. Lorant and two other named
defendants in favor of the bank. The bank then sought to domesticate the final
deficiency judgment in Alabama against Mr. Lorant, but the Alabama courts did not
allow it. Under Alabama law, the deficiency judgment had to reflect that Mr. Lorant
was the sole remaining defendant and that all claims, rights, or liabilities of the other
parties had been adjudicated. <i>See Whitney Bank v. Lorant</i>, 148 So. 3d 1077, 1078 n. 1 (Ala. 2014) (Moore, C.J., dissenting).</span></blockquote>
</div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">After the Alabama court's refused to domesticate the judgment, the lender "filed a motion to correct a final deficiency judgment pursuant to Rule
1.540(a)’s allowance for the correction of 'clerical mistakes.' The bank asked the
court to modify its 2011 deficiency judgment to reflect that Mr. Lorant was the sole
remaining defendant and that all claims, rights, or liabilities of the other parties had
been adjudicated."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The court stated that:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Rule 1.540(a) specifically allows for the correction of “clerical
mistakes” and “errors” in judgments “arising from oversight or omission” for an
indefinite period of time. Rule 1.540(b), on the other hand, allows for the correction
of other mistakes or inadvertence in a final judgment for “a reasonable time . . . not
more than 1 year after the judgment[.]” The bank in this case filed its motion under
Rule 1.540(a), requiring a “clerical mistake” as opposed to some other kind of
mistake. Our court has recognized clerical mistakes include “only ‘errors or mistakes
arising from an accidental slip or omission, and not errors or mistakes in the
substance of what is decided by the judgment or order,’ the latter of which must be
corrected pursuant to Rule 1.540(b).” .... A trial court “has no authority under Rule 1.540(a) to make substantive
changes.” .... And relief under Rule 1.540(a) may not be appropriate where “[t]he
proposed amendment of the judgment substantially change[s] its impact and
effect.” </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Therefore, the court held that "[t]he mistake involved in this case resulted in the trial court 'supplementing' its initial final deficiency judgment in order to more definitively address the
litigation status of the three party defendants. This correction and supplement to the
previous final judgment represented a substantive change, not the sort of accidental
slip or omission permitted to be corrected under Rule 1.540(a). In fact, nothing in
the record indicates that a 'mistake' existed at all in the initial judgment; rather the
bank’s issue was that Alabama required these matters to be addressed in a
substantively different manner."</span></div>
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</div>
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Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6898980613852582353.post-24799152895866264462015-02-19T12:18:00.004-05:002015-02-19T12:18:53.499-05:00Be Specific: Order Vacating Judgment Pursuant to Rule 1.540 Reversed Because Motion Only Relied Upon Rehearing Rule (1.530)<div style="text-align: justify;">
In <i><a href="http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D14-0521.pdf" target="_blank">Foche Mortgage, LLC v. CitiMortgage, Inc.</a></i> (3D14-521), the Third District reversed a trial court's order vacating a judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540. The Third District stated that the movant only referenced Rule 1.530 in the motion filed in the trial court and did not reference or make argument relating to Rule 1.540. Therefore, the motion could only be construed pursuant to Rule 1.530, which requires a motion to be filed within fifteen days.* </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Because the movant only sought relief pursuant to Rule 1.530, and didn't reference or rely upon Rule 1.540, the motion was required to be filed within fifteen days of the entry of the order. Since it was not filed within that time period, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order appealed. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i>* Rule 1.530 was recently amended to allow fifteen days. The prior version of the rule, and the version applicable to the motion at issue in the opinion, was ten days.</i></div>
Jeffrey Kuntzhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10925269858866811740noreply@blogger.com0