Debate with Authors, Think by Yourself

Apologies for short absence

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Wed, 11 Mar 2009 22:32:00 +0000

Good evening,

I must apologise for not posting any interviews lately. I have been out travelling, preparing my upcoming studies, a journey which has taken some days to prepare. Yet, I'm sure I will be completly forgiven by stating that I had the most fantastic days in London, England.

All due interviews will be published soon, including those missing.

Debating with Jeanne L. Wilson - On Sino-Russian Relations

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Wed, 25 Feb 2009 10:41:00 +0000

Good morning,

Due to the first couple of months' intermitent contacts between myself and the interviewees, today I'll feature the second part of a previous interview, instead of presenting original work. Nevertheless, it is still great material and a nice chance for you to learn about interesting issues in today's world agenda. That said, you can find the first part of the interview: here.

Unlike the first five questions, these will focus modern issues linked to Sino-Russian relations. From the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to China's demographic dilemmas, ranging such diverse issues as Medvedev's presidency and the new Great Game in Central Asia, or economic interdependence between the two countries.

Here is PhD Jeanne L. Wilson's second contribution to "Debate with Authors".

Hope you enjoy it!

1. Despite otherwise good neighbouring relations, there are Russian strategic advisors alerting for China’s demographic pressure spilling over the boarder in Outer Manchuria. Although with a Border Treaty signed after the Cold War, are there any reasonable threats to this borderline issue?

The reports that millions of Chinese now reside in the Russian Far East are clear fabrications, as is the perception that China has an explicit policy in place to take control of the region. But simple demographics make this a troubling question for Russia: the area is sparsely populated with declining populations in many regions. Meanwhile, the fact is that millions of Chinese reside in the Manchurian region of China alone. Russia faces a significant challenge in devising a workable immigration policy that will provide a legal basis for the entrance of Chinese labor into the region, and further provide for the integration of the Russian Far East into the Asian-Pacific community.

2. In terms of international organizations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a key instrument in Central Asian politics. An historic “backyard” of Russia, how politically active and successful is the organization regarding the negotiation of both countries’ interests in the region?

The SCO was originally a Chinese initiative, and the Russians did not devote much attention to it in the Yeltsin era. The Putin administration came to see this as a mistake, and the dynamics of interaction between the two are now more balanced. Russia also has other avenues such as the CSTO. The two states share important congruent interest in the stability of the region, in the suppression of terrorist activities, and in preventing the ascendancy of the US as a dominant player. At the same time, they are economic competitors, especially on the issue of energy procurement, and Russia wishes to preserve its historic role as the dominant external force in the region.

3. With Russia’s mineral wealth and China’s devouring dependence on such resources, what future can we expect of this economic interdependence? Who benefits the most from whom?

This is another area in which the relationship is not achieving great successes. China has a great need for energy, which Russia possesses, but Russia would prefer to diversify its energy relations in the Asian-Pacific Region. The Russian government under Putin was not enthusiastic about foreign ownership of Russian energy companies, and clearly wants to retain control over the energy sector, or at least keep it under private national ownership for the most part. The current situation in which oil is transported from Russia to China by train is not satisfactory in terms of both cost and supply, but the two states are been negotiating for years over pipeline projects. Whether the pipeline project from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean will have a separate spur into China is still unclear, dispute years of discussion.

4. With Presidents Putin and Ahmadinejad declarations to establish an economic integration bloc of the Caspian Sea, mostly in mineral resources policies, China appears to be in a more vulnerable position to sustain its development and international ambitions. With a new Great Game now unfolding, does China have a well defined strategic role on energy issues has that it plays in Africa?

It is clear that China has become a major participant in the African energy market. I believe that the uncertainties with Africa make it very difficult to have a well defined strategic role. The Chinese have found themselves the object of considerable unfavourable publicity with respect to their relations with the Sudan government. The problem in Africa is not just the issue of dealing with other competitors, but the complexities of dealing with the domestic governments selling the energy.

5. President Medvedev’s second stop in his first international and opening tour was held in Beijing, amidst some fears, particularly in the West, of a growing polarization of the international society. To conclude, what are your expectations for the ongoing Russian presidency in regard to Chinese relations, and others?

I expect that Russian-Chinese relations will continue to be positive, as each side perceives the development of the relationship to be in its interest. In the short term, at least, the two states will continue to share a congruence of opinion on most international issues. A peaceful border between the two is also in the interests of both states. Both states also find the SCO to be a beneficial mechanism for dealing with regional issues in Central Asia. Although trade has greatly increased between the two, there seems little evidence that the structural imbalance between them will decrease greatly: to Russia’s dismay, China is primarily interested in Russia’s primary products, particularly energy.

Despite the claims made earlier, the military-technical relationship does not also seem to have great promise for the future.

Blogger's Shoutbox features Stéphane Taillat from 'En Vérité'

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Mon, 23 Feb 2009 15:26:00 +0000

Good morning,

It looks as if I am approaching in a handful of blogging scholars who have studied at King's College London, not only because of my next interviewee, but also due to the upcoming posts. In fact, it is surprising to see such a wide number of academic blogs which manage to get us accustomed to high quality content and great inside information about some of the issues that people most write about, so often without adding anything new. Stéphane Taillat is a model representative of such distinguished college, who dedicates his research to conflict and insurgency studies.

Stéphane was born in France, and as such, his blog is in Victor Hugo's idiom. En Vérité is dedicated to the study of counter-insurgency in Iraq, an issue that also got him to do his PhD thesis on. As for past achievements, he is professor of History and Geography in high school, and holds a Masters in International and Security Relations. Officer of the Official French Army Reserve, I believe Stéphane is the first interviewee having a direct link with the Armed Forces, although I am sure there are more coming. If it were not rewarding enough, he is also a married bloke, father of three children. But that is all information you can obtain at his blog.

Here is a snapshot of "En Vérité".

As any good soldier, Stéphane made sure I got what I wanted in advance, regularly sending me e-mails with updated drafts of the interview, showing a fine commitment to make it as entertaining and correct as possible. While brushing up my French to prepare for the interview (although it was conducted in English), his articles provided a much needed second opinion about the War in Iraq, deviating from the overwhelming presence of anglophone literature both in books and in the internet. With a rich history of counter-insurgency, I was looking for someone from France (a Frenchman or Frenchwoman) for a long while, so I could get part of their perspective on the whole problem.

While talking about COIN in Iraq, Stéphane presented some solid arguments concerning the internal dimension of the US effort in securing the country, thus avoiding the labyrinth of "if..." scenarios. Answer number four particularly caught my eye, as it referred to the "cultural turn" in US COIN. To identify and understand the "Other" is an exercise I have not read much about in the months prior to the invasion, nor during the offensive. Furthermore, while referring to the parallel between Washington's position in Iraq, and France's former colonial war in Algeria, definately contributes to a major shift in studies about US Army's tactics in fighting insurgency. Portugal, too, dealt with a colonial insurgency in Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde (only marginally) and Guinea-Bissa, a war that extended for 11 years and eventually precipitated a coup d'État (or revolution, according to some) - the founding of our "modern" governing system.

So please enjoy reading, bearing in mind the variety of COIN doctrines and practices that History presents us.

1. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has recently published an article entitled "A Balanced Strategy" (Foreign Affairs, online version here) in which he claims the need to institutionalize some asymmetric tactics to deal with non-traditional threats. In the case of Iraq, do you find it to be the right way ahead, or are the current strategic objectives just wrongly deployed and pursued?

First, the problem is slightly different: the issue raised by SecDef GATES is essentially an internal one: The question is whether the US Military Establishment has to adopt new tactics and organizational structure/culture such as the need to develop cultural awareness, to raise a permanent corps of advisors or to pursue COIN training. To be sure, Force generation, Professional Military Education and Doctrine are truly the axis of effort for SecDef GATES, more than strategic objectives. According to my research, such efforts have been made to adapt and to learn inside US Army and US Marines Corps. So, GATES’ claims are not linked specifically to Iraq.

Second, it’s not to say that there are no flaws in current strategic objectives. But these goals are not, by themselves, wrongly deployed and pursued. Multinational Force Iraq and representatives of the Secretary of State and other agencies of US government have developed several strategies that are not at odds with the recommendations made by Secretary GATES. From 2004 onward, the strategy was to stabilize Iraq through the formation of Iraqi Security Forces and the providing of essential services and then through an extending presence to secure the population, followed by a transition to Governmental forces.

Third, in my view, the real problem lies more with the current “transition strategy” to Iraqi Security Forces. As in 2005 and 2006, such period is critical to security issues. Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces are very capable to design and launch their own operations. But, in some areas (like Sadr City or the Yarmouk Neighborhood) the departure of American Forces (except advisors and embedded training teams) could be a very difficult moment to manage for Iraqi forces.

I’d like to raise a final issue regarding US strategy in Iraq and the actual “learning” of DoD and US Government: the choice to invade Iraq and the following strategies and tactics implemented at the theater level could be compared to a (neo)colonial stance and policy. Such a view is problematic in that it ignores the very incidental nature of Iraqi context (especially endogen factors, like social ones). More, it ignores the interactions at the local level between US soldiers and Marines and the populace, which have more to do with cultural exchanges than with domination and colonialism. But this is an important issue to consider in order understanding actual and future reluctances in the Arab/Muslim world about US presence in Iraq, which could be construed as a resurgence of indirect rule.

2. US Gen. David Petreaus has also developed some important work when it comes to counter-insurgency and adapting the US Army to asymmetric threats, to which it has not yet been successfully and widely adapted to. From a military strategic point of view, what fundamental lessons are to be taken from the past 6 years in Iraq?

This is a very tough question whose answer will be discussed by future historians. But my researches suggest several lessons:
First, Iraq has seen a profound organizational learning in US Military. As others historical examples suggest, western armies involved in counterinsurgency can learn very well –and very quickly- the ins and outs of counter-rebellion, population control (“winning hearts and minds”) and intelligence raids. That is not to suggest that every army would have done the same as US Army and US Marines Corps. But this process is not uncommon in History.

Second, instead of seeing US military as a colonial power in a colonial project, one would be more accurate to describe its adaptation as a “RMA-oriented” COIN. More precisely, knowledge and know-how from colonial experiences have been ploughed back into a very specific COIN which is a mixture of technological discourses (about networks), political habits (outsourcing), and cultural roots (the massive use of firepower). The closest historical model is France vs. FLN in Algeria, not only on doctrinal matters and tactical ones (“oil spot strategy” in 2007 looked like the Plan CHALLE in 1960 and the Baghdad Security Plan like the Battle of Algiers in 1957) but also in population control (SAS and HTS, “quadrillage”, etc.). Yet, American COIN is a very specific one.

Third, the political question lies at the core of the 2007 “turn”. The reconciliation and alliances with the Sunnis proved to be the crucial factors. Besides, American tactics and operational art at this moment produced a very interesting output: the downturn of Moqtada Al SADR and the growing power of PM Nouri AL MALIKI. The PM has become the strongest man in the country and uses American Military presence to his own advantage.

Last but not least, the strategic turn lies in the hands of lower levels: the levels at which real interactions –truly a cultural encounter, although being unequal- between local populace and US military can occur.

3. To understanding counter-insurgency, one has to look at the networks of financing, recruitment, doctrination and operations in any theatre of engagement. Regarding Iraq, some of the most important insurgent threats (where linked to its financing or logistical support) come from Iran and Syria. In that matter, how could the US cope with such intertwined sources of insurgency, besides the strictly operational modification of its tactics?

Well, this issue lies not in the core of my researches. But I can provide some ideas. Iran and Syria have played an aggravated role in the insurgency, but they are not at the origin of it. By providing arms, foreign fighters, technologies and advisors, Iran is the most dangerous player in this game. But its breathing space is very thin: Iranians do not appear as friendly to most of Iraqis, even among the Shias. Bargaining is the most powerful tool to persuade Iran not to interfere in Iraqi affairs. Another mean is a more complete Border control, as it is with Syria.

4. If one could extrapolate from the case of Iraq, this is growing concern about the regular armies' capabilities to deal with increasingly decentralized, non-state groups that can, nevertheless, pose great risks to a country's national interest. Is a new RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) unfolding, one strongly impelled by insurgency-coin techniques?

Of course, one could speak of a New, COIN-oriented, RMA. Such a “Transformation” could occur, but lies in the very future at the time being. COIN is part of a very complex and long history (that of US Army and Marines) at the crossroads of many others, as was the RMA in the nineties. At the core of the problem lie two issues. The first implies the US Military establishment and its relations with civilian power. US Strategic culture has internalized the Jomini bias of the Clausewitzian principle of war to be politics by other means, in which bias lies the profoundly rooted rupture between Civilian Power and Military Power. RMA and COIN could be construed as a mean to exert assertive power upon the military by their civilian masters. The second issue is linked to US foreign policy since the end of the Second World War: what must be the role of this exceptional Superpower? RMA was a mean to reconcile projection of forces and protection of the “City on the Hill”. COIN is a more complicated way of doing this but can be interpreted as a new tool of the US Security Strategy.

If such a “Transformation” would occur, I predict an unexpected output of the process. In the core of US COIN lies the idea of a “cultural turn” to understand alien cultures and to be able to operate in a more secure environment. Reforms have been made to empower social sciences and culturally correct postures. Maybe one would see in the future a very different military establishment with more exchanges with the outer world…. This was a “chance” for French, British and Portuguese Military to manage a colonial empire in a time of industrial expansion and social transformations in European Societies. What occurred at the beginning of the 20th Century could repeat for US Society at the beginning of the 21st Century. This is more a hope than a certainty, but it could be a potential output of COIN in Iraq.

5. To conclude, what are your hopes for Obama's presidency when it comes to dealing with Iraq's security problems? Do you predict the implementation of a solid and sustainable 4 years solution, or will it still be as much a controversial issue as it was in November's presidential elections?

I don’t predict any major changes in the next year. President-elect Barack OBAMA is more and more close to military positions such as those of PETRAEUS. The actual process of Iraq’s stabilization is a fragile one: the rise of bombings in Baghdad and, more important, in Mosul and Kirkuk –where sectarian issues between Arabs and Kurds have not yet found a solution- shows us that the security situation, although not reversible, is potentially dangerous. So I predict neither a sustainable solution this year. My best hope lies in two events to come: provincial elections and the transition to ISF after the departure of US Forces from major cities….But I don’t see a major change in the immediate future. To be sure, actual trends bear a lot of uncertainty: will Mister MALIKI seize the power with the military tool forged by US advisors? How will the Shia get out of the provincial elections? What will be the status of the minorities in the country?

But I’m sure of only one thing: Counterinsurgency has produced many changes in the last five years… maybe it can produce more in the next four ones.

Debating with Alexander Wendt - On Social Sciences and IR

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Wed, 18 Feb 2009 09:24:00 +0000

Good morning,

If featuring exclusive interviews were not enough, plus having the big names of the blogosphere, here I am taking another step into bringing all the best in peace and war studies in the form of interviews. And what a wonderful surprise it is.

Peer Schoulten at Theory-Talks (whom I'll remember to interview for Blogger's Shoutbox) has so far done 25 interviews with "cutting-edge specialists" and the labelling couldn't be more accurate. If you think of any big name in the field of Theory of International Relations, he has probably been interviewed by Peer, and if he/she wasn't, you can count on it for the upcoming weeks. His work is simply remarkable, and it was very comforting to know there was such an intiative going on besides "Debate with Authors". More projects would be welcomed and promoted!

When asked to give permission for me to quote one of his interviews, Peer nodded without blinking. The funny part was that he answered in Portuguese! Studying in Portugal and Brazil along his academic career, he has learned Portuguese, along with Spanish, English, etc. It certainly made me feel this special bond with a fellow mate from the "Low Countries".

Unsure what great interview to quote, I decided to go for Alexander Wendt's, the father of Constructivism in IR. As great figures need not any presentations, here is (hopefully) the first partnership established between DATY and another project. I expect to feature more interviews taken from other sites, and you will only benefit from it.

So, for more quality interviews, please go to: Theory Talks

In order to read the full interview with Alexander Wendt, please click the following URL:

http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/04/theory-talk-3.html

Credits: Peer Schoulten

1. Nasim Taleb argues in his popular science book ‘The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable' that the most high-impact events in social science (or, in your formulation: a very small number of very important events) are unforeseen by dominant theories such as Neorealism and Neoliberalism. In your Social Theory, you show that similar ‘UFO's in IR are not accounted for by most approaches. That could make one doubt the predictive value of our work.

I don't think IR theory has ever predicted anything we didn't already know was going to happen. It's important here to separate anomalies in specific theories from unforeseen events in history. There will always be new ideas and events that no one can foresee, because social life is intrinsically open-ended. Any given generalization about the whole world might cover the past, but never the future - which makes life interesting.

With respect to anomalies, constructivism can handle some that other theories cannot, but it doesn't cover everything any more than any other theory does. I do hope the quantum argument I am developing will provide an umbrella to synthesize everything, but even that perspective won't allow us to predict the future with any great ability, simply because of free will and creativity. So, if people criticize IR theory for not predicting wars, conflicts and the like, I would say that's not what IR theory is for; predicting events in real world politics is what intelligence agencies are for, not social scientists (or at least theorists). Thus, I'm skeptical about IR scholars being able to prevent wars, except insofar as they can help us to think differently about world politics, which in the long run might stimulate a more peaceful situation.

2. What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?

Actually, I’m hesitant to name a specific debate. A standard answer for me would be, of course, the rationalist – constructivist debate, but in a sense I don’t care about that debate anymore. My own view – and what I tell my students – is that the most important thing to do, and maybe the hardest, is first to tell us something we don’t already know, and secondly to tell us something that makes people think about the world differently (otherwise, what’s the point?). That’s why I don’t feel much of a stake in the existing debates; my main interest these days is in new ideas, not old ones. And that’s also why I have PhD students doing research on the most diverse subjects possible, because I basically just ask them to tell me something I don’t know already.

3. What are your thoughts on the different proposals for constructivist methodology?

My view on methodology has always been eclectic, in the sense that I believe that research should always be question-driven and not method-driven. Thus, I have no stake in which method comes to be seen as most appropriate; my only concern is that one method not drive out the others, and in particular that quantitative formal-theory methods not become seen as the only way to do things. That would make IR method-driven and effectively exclude all kinds of interesting questions just because they don't fit inside that methodological frame. So if constructivists want to do quantitative work, great, but they shouldn't feel obliged to do so.

4. In 2003, you've published an article with the daring title Why a World State is Inevitable. Why is a world state inevitable?

I think there are two main reasons. First of all, there's the material argument: the cost of not submitting to a world state will become higher and higher over time, because the potential for catastrophic violence in the system is growing due to weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and so on. My main argument is basically that what individuals and groups most want is not security or power or wealth, but recognition of, and respect for, their rights. And since that can only be realized under law, we have a material basis for a world state.

Secondly, there is no good normative argument against a world state. The present system in effect empowers groups or states with the authority to kill foreigners without accountability. In an ideal world I think there is no good justification for having such a right. Especially liberals should not have any normative reason not to go for a world state. But it will take a long time.

5. Due to the wide variety of different approaches available in IR, a student might feel kind of lost in the field. Is International Relations going through an identity crisis?

It certainly has become an incredibly diverse terrain. I don't get the feeling that IR is having an identity crisis, but maybe we should have one. There are a lot of different - sometimes even contradictory - positions in IR, while in the United States for example a lot of people demand very rigorous science in order to find the Truth with a capital 'T', but I just don't share that way of seeing things - in order to advance, one has to accept that there are interesting positions in other fields from which we can learn a lot.

Blogger's Shoutbox features Christian Bleuer from 'Ghosts of Alexander'

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Mon, 16 Feb 2009 09:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

Christian Bleuer is joining us today for another Blogger's Shoutbox interview! And what a privilege it is to publish the following five questions and answers. I must confess I haven't visited Christian's blog as much as those of previous interviewees, but my occasional visits always end up in 15-20 articles reading sessions. Its design is not only inviting of pleasant reads, but his insights on issues that do not make to the frontpages are ever illuminating. Counting with "Ghosts of Alexander" on this initiave is certainly a sign of "Thumbs up!" for us to continue getting the biggest and the best bloggers talk about their fields of expertise.

Christian is a PhD student at The National Australian University's Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies. As he states, "my academic work focuses on rural and peripheral social, political and military dynamics in Afghanistan and Southern Central Asia. Of particular interest to me are local solidarity groups, identity and loyalty, especially how these factors affect survival strategies during conflict and competition." As the hottest topics are often those in which we see less innovation regarding methodologies and arguments, "Ghosts of Alexander" is rich in combining social and historical accounts of every day politics, with the larger geostrategic context from which most analysts see the war in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Christian's blog is also referred in most of well-known academic blogs dealing with peace and war studies, attesting to its quality material and regular publications.

Here is a snapshot of "Ghosts of Alexander".

As it happens with every academic blog, the reader is invited to follow some one else's research developments on a specific topic, and considering Christian's enrolment in The National Australian University's PhD programme, you're assured to access relevant opinions in every post. Because of today's information flooding, knowing how to choose where you'll invest your readership so to learn more about ever changing issues is essential, and few other blogs do it as well as Christian's. Ironically enough, we'll have another blogger talk about his military experience in Afghanistan the upcoming week, and to prove once again Christian's solid authority when dealing with these matters, you will see how well their arguments combine to provide an interesting account, away from the spotlights of big news channels.

If that was not reason enough to bookmark it, I'm certain the next passage will catch your eye. It reads as follows: "I have studied Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajiki and Russian during my time at Indiana University and I highly recommend their intensive summer language program (which includes Pashto). I am currently studying Farsi." Language is undoubtedly a key instrument in understanding what ever field within the social sciences, and when studying a different region or country than one's own, it is vital to be able to follow issues from inside that society. One can only do it by knowing their language, and Christian is on top of it. Any other way of studying it, if not completed by an in-depth knowledge through experiences of living there, or contacting people who go to the epicenter regularly, will soon to be faulty and misguided. A comparison could be drawn with early XX century anthropologists who studied far away communities by reading travellers' diaries and old literature. It would never be scientific work unless they actually visited the communities and witnessed first hand the main phenomena that characterized them.

Therefore, Christian's blog is a _must_ when it comes to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Before I leave you with the answers, you should read more about "Ghosts of Afghanistan" here (About Ghosts of Alexander).

Plus, here is his article published at ANU's Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies:

CAIS Bulletin Volum 15, Number 1 (2008)

Enjoy it!

1. President-elect Barack Obama has publicly declared Afghanistan will have a greater strategic importance in his presidency than it has had in previous years. Yet, troop build up doesn't necessarily mean more control of the situation, although positive results came out of the Surge in Iraq. What can we expect of this re-positioning?

The surge in Iraq helped reduce violence significantly there. But there are also other factors such as (a) the alliance with local Sunni elites and their networks against AQ (the “Sons of Iraq” strategy), (b) at times, the ceasefire with Sadr’s group (and, at other times, the defeats that Sadr’s group suffered), (c) the increased mono-ethnicity of neighbourhoods due to ethnic cleansing and the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons, (d) a relatively strengthened Iraqi government, and other factors. While some politicians may not acknowledge these factors, current strategists behind the official strategic review of the effort in Afghanistan (both military and civilian) stress a “whole” effort in Afghanistan that includes, beyond the military realm, improved and increased efforts in development and governance. They are under no illusion that a troop increase on its own is the answer.

2. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates also made an important article published, "A Balanced Strategy" (Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103/robert-m-gates/how-to-reprogram-the-pentagon.html) in which he claims that the Armed Forces are facing more demands than those of hard power. Peace-building and nation-building operations are cases in point. Is it a viable solution, considering Afghanistan's tribal, religious, patriarchal and agricultural society, historically distant of what one would call the European-type of nation-building?

Well, Europe is not too far historically removed from a “tribal, religious, patriarchal and agricultural society,” if one wants to go into the literature on nations and nationalism (and I would add that I dispute the popular assumptions about “tribalism” in Afghanistan). Of course, that “transition” took many generations, with mutual incentives and the creations of institutions and media that created realities. More to the point, the localized rural nature of many parts of Afghanistan isn’t the problem with “peace-building.” The last 30 years of conflict degrading those old institutions (formal and informal) and the underwhelming post-2001 international efforts are. Post-conflict resolution since WWII has been extremely problematic, so one would expect a conflict on the scale and duration that Afghanistan has endured to not be resolved, or even reduced, without escaping the mistakes of past post-conflict efforts around the world and in Afghanistan. Now the role of the military in this effort is going to require it to focus on more than just “hard power,” as similarly spelled out by the current counter-insurgency strategists.

The increased inability of NGOs, international development bodies and the Afghan government to work safely amongst the people requires either an extremely costly contractor or the military itself to carry out certain development projects. Some, such as infrastructure development can, with sufficient local consultation and Afghan government input, be successful. But most development projects are outside the military’s range of expertise, including of those civil affairs units. I’m sure the military would rather just create the “security space” for the Afghan government and NGOs to operate (not that these entities are uniformly good at what they do), which many of them can’t do in the south and east. And the NGOs themselves are, for the most part, strongly opposed to the military being involved in development work. To sum up, the military will attempt to do development and “nation-building” when they have to, such as in the high risk areas (or in the low risk areas for certain European militaries), but they would rather have others do most of that work.

3. Despite all of the coalition's technology might, the Taliban have reportedly used Al-Qaeda broadcasting techniques to spread its own message. Do you expect tensions to rise in Afghanistan, once troops are phased out of Iraq, thus forcing Washington to once again drag its military power in a fragmented and cost-demanding country? In other words, will the another "Vietnamese trap" be placed in Afghanistan, further entrenching already dire conditions?

Well, the Vietnam analogy doesn’t work. The Taliban is not at all like what the Americans, the South Vietnamese government and others faced in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong were so much stronger and popular in relation to the Americans than the insurgency in Afghanistan is to the Americans today. As for making predictions, experts have a great record of inconsistency, if not failure. And when they are correct it is usually only in a very broad sense (as in saying that “things will improve” or “things will deteriorate”). But I would guess that after two years the military effort may be the prime driver in having reduced the insurgency’s capabilities. But to capitalize on those prospective gains there will need to be a massive improvement and investment in development and governance. However, refer back to my qualification about predictions.

4. One of the issues academia is currently debating concerns the new diplomatic approach to Iran. Some argue nothing out of extraordinary is to be expected, as US' national interest will not be replaced, only slightly reshaped. Others say we're back into a soft-power era when a fundamental recycle in US' image abroad will be under way. What is your opinion about Obama's power to capture a whole new concept of the United States in the world, after such controversial years with President Bush?

I agree with the “slightly reshaped” argument and I expect the future approach to Iran to be more pragmatic. And with the new administration in Washington, plus the prospect of Ahmadinejad being voted out of office this year (not that I actually believe he is the real power in Iran), there is the possibility that the accompanied reduction in mutual paranoia levels may open some new avenues for cooperating on Afghanistan (I believe that the Supreme Council is more pragmatic than many have them portrayed as). As for Obama’s potential to “capture a whole new concept of the United States in the world,” I would venture that there will be an improvement during a honeymoon period, then a steady decline back to some realistic level, but not as far back down as the image of American foreign policy is now.

5. Finally, if one talks about Afghanistan, it is imperative to talk about Al-Qaeda. In a medium-long term strategy, the perception of that terrorist organization's capability to target important US/Western interests (i.e. governmental agencies, private enterprises, citizens and their investments, etc) is being shaped to make it look like it presents a significantly lesser harm than before. Do you find it to be an over-estimate, or can you identify significant changes in the ways and support Al-Qaeda used to enjoy to develop its operations?

Terrorism is not my focus, but it does seem clear that AQ’s ability to successfully carry out large damaging operations in the west has been significantly degraded. From there one can venture into the debate about terrorists requiring centralized leadership to function effectively and the other side that argues a decentralized “organization” that is spread through ideology remains just as dangerous. The passage of time will settle that argument.

Debating with Alexandre R. Rodrigues - On Portugal and NATO

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Wed, 11 Feb 2009 09:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

Ever since the build-up of centralized Armed Forces in the transition from the Medieval to the modern ages, any regime change has undoubtedly led to changes in its military ranks. Ranging from complete dismemberment (the case of the Republican Army after the fall of Saddam Hussein), to absorption into the invading army's personnel (as it frequently happened with the Ancient Empires), and several other variations in between.

In the particular case of Portugal, its 1974 revolution led to profound transformations. The only possible constant one can point without a doubt is that it remained a member of the NATO. As many other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Portugal has undergone profound transformations ever since its adhesion. For those non-founding members, this is even more so. However, what is interesting to see is that few were those that experienced great changes internally, while still respecting the responsibilities and duties of being a member of the alliance.

Considering that the alliance has a strong, yet not exclusive, military focus, the study of the modifications the Portuguese Armed Forces have witnessed while responding both to domestic and foreign constraints is important to understand how the alliance actually works as a framework for policies and actions internally. Also, Portugal is inserted in that class of countries that have a secondary role in Brussels, compared to the major powers that hold a bigger position in the international society, such as France and the United Kingdom, not to mention the US. Thus, the more important is realizing what efforts and challenges the country faced in recent decades, so a overlook of the alliance from "underneath" presents other dynamics that those seen through a "great power politics" lens.

By interviewing a Portuguese Vice-Admiral in reserve, a man I've been having the pleasure to work with at his project Jornal de Defesa e Relações Internacionais (Journal of Defense and International Relations), this week we'll have the opportunity to discuss not only Portugal's transition to democracy both as a country study and an area study - the Iberian Peninsula's relevance in the North Atlantic context. Furthermore, examining the country's efforts to keep its arsenal and capabilities at NATO's standards might give us some insights regarding the Eastern European countries that have joined in its latest enlargements.

Toward the end, Portugal's role within the Portuguese-speaking countries and the importance of the South Atlantic in a multipolar world will be debated with V. Adm. Rodrigues.

I hope it is of your liking, and as always, enjoy the reading!

(photo taken from here)

1. As Vice-Admiral of the Portuguese Navy in retirement, and considering many other positions you have occupied throughout your career, you have certainly followed with great attention the rebuilding of the Portuguese naval force and strategic concept over the last decades. From your perspective, what is the biggest challenge yet faced by the Portuguese Navy and that the one still to overcome?

It is difficult to isolate a single challenge faced by the Portuguese War Navy, even in such limited time span, let us say over the past five decades. There were many and with great impact.

Chronologically, in that period, what must be referred to is beyond a shadow of a doubt is the creation of the Marine Corps in the early 1960s, when the colonial wars started. For the Navy it was a matter of finding a way to more directly participate in the military effort that needed to be developed on land, beyond that occurring at sea, rivers, bays, etc. The creation of the Marine Corps was the solution found.

Without any structure or formation level to operation on land, it was necessary to start from zero, starting by sending a small team to the United Kingdom to participate in the commandos course of the British Royal Navy that then launched the foundations of the Marine Academy. Henceforth it was all a great challenge, especially in what regarded special personal formation for many that to rapidly readapt to a sometimes unexpected, sudden and radial reorientation of their careers. Young officials that expected to disembark once passed through the Naval Academy were brought in into the Marine Corps, first to undertake a specialization course and then to be shipped for a two years commission in Africa.

The other big challenges that the Navy surpassed over that period are related to re-equipment. The first occurred in the late 1960s when we experienced an almost complete renewal of the Navy, including the construction of four war vessels of the class “João Belo”, of four submarines, two series of new corvettes (ten in total), of patrolling boats and speedboats. The majority of these new tools introduced important technological advancements with substantial requirements on training personnel.

The second challenge was the coming into duty of the “Vasco da Gama” class vessels which, in fact, represented the biggest technological jump ever undertaken. At the same time, we experienced the introduction of air forces with naval helicopter operability as a complement to the vessels’ functioning; the most notable fact about this particular project concerned we completing operability within the very short period of around 2 years, when it was expected to take 3 times as much.

From then onward, the Navy assured its capacity to maintain multilateral naval forces control capability, as it occurred in 1995 in NATO’s Standing Naval Force, then embarked on a year-long mission to blockade the former Republics of Yugoslavia.
Notwithstanding the new challenges that the coming into force of new equipment will bring (especially the submarines) I do not think there reside the biggest challenges of the future. The main challenge will certainly by in finding imaginative solutions that will allow diminishing the difficulties of a low budget while modernizing to the recommended level.

2. The Portuguese Armed Forces have demonstrated their continuous public service in forums and international areas with acclaimed excellence (Afghanistan, Iraq, East-Timor, etc), considering the lack of resources and political priorities that sometimes restrict a freer and broadening strategic national interest. In a brief way, could you refer the various dimensions in which the Armed Forces are currently represented, and how do they interact to promote the national interest?

Portugal has a very positive and diversified register of participations in almost every military operations NATO and the EU have been involved, since the end of the Cold War.

However, many difficulties on the equipment level, where some deficiencies have been felt in several occasions, have managed to accomplish a level of success widely acknowledged. Around 30.000 troops from all three branches have gone through almost every territory in crisis or conflicts, or areas requiring humanitarian assistance. In same cases within the scope of international organizations above mentioned, others in an autonomous spectrum, as it happened in the intervention in Guinea-Bissau with the recovery of national and foreign citizens whose security the local government could no longer assure, due to a military coup that tried to overtake it.

Portugal also had two opportunities to claim NATO’s Standing Naval Force in 1995/1996 and in 2001/2002, the most prestigious rapid reaction force of the Alliance.

This record of military interventions abroad, within the collective effort of peace keeping and stability missions in the world, have built a channel to prestigiously reaffirm the national reputation and image, thus being an instrument of foreign policy that needs due consideration.

3. Now regarding NATO, the continuous enlargement toward East seems to be shifting a traditional communitarian priority on the Atlantic region where the strategic positioning of Portugal and other lusophone countries is more relevant, thus opting for a dialogue US-EU-Russia. Although considering the joint exercise between NATO and Cape Verde in 2006, is the Alliance’s agenda favourable or unfavourable to the rapprochement between the countries of the Atlantic Lusophony?

It seems very clear to me that the Alliance’s agenda, highly influenced by the strategic interests of the United States, is oriented into a global dimension with many objectives, instead of the traditionally regional spectrum of collective defence and single purpose. The importance of the Atlantic, that has always been the most visible side of its posture during the Cold War, has been succeeded by the recognition of the growing relevance of Asia, thus the emerge of a regional leadership led by the US in the area.

Africa also represents a new focal point of interest; the traditional ties of European countries that had an important presence in Africa are already started to be challenged by a massive presence of Chinese interests that are now adding up with the US’, despite the difficulties of penetration the latter have been experiencing (visible, for example, in the lack of support to establish a new command to Africa).

Portugal has in its favour the knowledge of the area and the way to handle situations that, holistically, represent an important asset to the Alliance; it will have much to benefit from the Portuguese contributions in this matter, hence the country might see a gaining importance to unfold within the Alliance. However, regarding a direct relationship with Africa, Portugal will not be benefited by NATO’s new approach; maybe it will even have to face with some mistrust.

4. In that sense, Brazil is apparently the key driving force of the Lusophony into the XXI century, one in which the possible role pursued by Portugal by be one of inter-relation between different political and economic spaces. What is the importance of the Armed Forces in promoting that political agenda? Do you foresee any substantial development in the relation between Portugal and the Lusophony?

The interests of Brazil in Africa, especially in Angola, are from the time being merely economic. That reality can, however, take from Portugal some of its current activity, although it does not collide with the maintenance of close ties that are expressed on the cultural and military fields, where technical cooperation agreements still have great potential in issues of common interest. Nevertheless, the latter issue will have to be thought of in different perspectives.

5. Going back to NATO, its reformulation process in the post-Cold War era seems to anticipate the creation of new problems. Not disrespecting its military aspect, that I personally see fit to face the arising problematics, it is in its political wing that most controversies arise. In a dual policy of closing-in / backing out with Russia, as witnessed in the Nato-Russia Council (NRC), the missile defence system, enlargement, spheres of influence and partnerships, what are the expectations of that relationship still “haunted” by some ghosts of the past? Is the enlargement justified in a long-term strategic concept, or a sheer “defensive progression” until faced with a better defined and opposite system?

The continuation of NATO’s enlargement process is risking, from my perspective, to be a destabilizing factor in the relations with Russia when the exact opposite would be advisable. The particular adhesions of Ukraine and George is causing the inflammation of a Russian nationalism and a stepback into a militaristic discourse that does not serve the purpose of strategic convergence.

In fact, it was the acknowledgement of this risk that led the Europeans to insist on the US to replace a strategy of accelerating the quick adhesion of these countries for a more precautious one.

Blogger's Shoutbox features Peter Kotare from 'The Stategist'

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Mon, 09 Feb 2009 09:11:00 +0000

Good morning,

Once again, and for the second time now, I present another fellow blogger dedicated to the studies of peace and war. His name is Peter, and his project goes by the name of Kotare, The Strategist.

Living in marvelous and exotic New Zealand, his posts and observations couldn't be more focal in today's international relations debates. With a keen sense of justice and a careful eye to spot the goods and bads of contemporary politics, his blog - "The Strategist" is a rich display of the variety of issues one could find by simply reading the newspapers. Yet, his extended sensitivity to approach whatever matters with equally righteous lenses makes it one of the most sober and entertaining blogs out there.

Here is a snapshot of "The Strategist".

I must confess I did not have the opportunity to exchange more than a couple of e-mails with Peter, and despite his refreshing availability to answer all the questions I posed, I could not tell in detail of his formal academic/professional achievements.

In a recent e-mail, after publishing this interview, Peter kindly informed me that he holds a Masters degree in Strategic Studies (Australian National University), and a BA Honours degree in History. Furthermore, he has experience in the fields of national security and nation building, so the +2 years of publishing at "The Strategist" are certainly certified to result from a wide research and work experience within International Relations. His posts on Clausewitz attest precisely that (for instante, read this and this).

Nevertheless, I find a general consensus from those commenting his posts that his points of view are both provocative and mind-opening. Moreover, the fact that the blog is not even a year old, makes it more of a surprise incentive for every one to add it to their bookmarks. As its description goes, "A journal on global affairs - war, politics, economics, strategy, technology, energy and the environment", there is no way you can miss at least a handful of interesting topics from which further your read with Peter's alerts in mind.

If that still did not caught your eye, a particular initiative of his certainly will. Named "Modern Security Thinkers", a specific article was prepared in order to provide a comprehensive list of all security pundits. And that's not all, the list is open for your own contribution, whatever your proposed author's nationality or epoch. But for those merely interested in expanding their bibliography on security issues, it is well worth the visit.

So before the interview, here are some suggested psots you might consider reading before going for the questions and answers. The list is taken directly from the blog itself:

Suppose we were an influence?

A Hedgehog strategy favours small countries

China: an empire of influence

Dark side of paradise

On security

Were are our strategic blindspots?

only to name a few...

Without further ado:

KOTARE, THE STRATEGIST

http://kotare.typepad.com

(photo taken from here, did I say his blog was sober?)

1. In your blog, your posts are often - if not always - quite critical of how international affairs are usually perceived through the media and "common sense". By dissecting what is said and what is happening, that gap allows you to quite straight forward in dealing particularly with US' global predominance. In your opinion, what are the major contradictions of those saying US hegemony will endure and prevail well into the 21st century?

The proponents of the American hegemony / American empire view seem to have a superficial understanding of history. They fail to realise that all empires wax and wane, some quite quickly. They also fail to understand that long run empires are successful because they have a broad and stable base - military, political, economic, trade, cultural, environmental.

By contrast, the idea of American hegemony seems predicated on continued military might and economic power. Both assumptions looking increasingly shaky. It downplays or misinterprets the activities of other actors, state and non-state, which seek to challenge American power, particularly in ways which do not play to American strengths. It ignores key vulnerabilities, e.g., US dependence on foreign oil sourced from unstable parts of the world. And it discounts the corrosive impact on American power of a range of developments, such as colossal military expenditure, domestic political and cultural divisions, and the "hollowing out" impact of organized crime.

2. Your recent comments on the Mumbai attacks express some concern about the state-of-the-art when it comes to the War on Terror. Are you supportive of it? Would you point other directions to face the threats that are allegedly at the heart of today's global insecurity?

As a concept the "War on Terror" is absurd. What is "terror"? Who are the enemies? What clear and realistic objectives can one possibly have in such an ill-defined war?

There are, of course, a number of terrorist groups that pose threats, of varying degree, to civilized societies around the world. Although the threats these groups pose should not be overstated, their activities have to be countered. Whether that is best done through means of war or as a legal and policing matter is another question. Where possible, and this probably works best within jurisdictions, terrorists should be classified as criminals, and dealt with through the criminal justice system.

At the global level, operations against terrorist networks like al-Qaeda and its affiliates should be much less about invading foreign places to deny terrorists sanctuary (Afghanistan), and much more about targeting terrorist leaders (especially "middle rank" leaders who do the organizing and lead the operations), interdicting financial flows, countering terrorist propaganda, and creating sophisticated and pervasive negative images of terrorist leaders and their characters and motives. Muslim communities in western countries are an enormous and untapped source of information, intelligence, ideas and expertise for western police, intelligence and military agencies. Excellent working relationships are crucial, particularly between agencies and with agencies and communities in other countries.

3. International Relations literature is reflecting a great deal on the impact these past years will have when it comes to drawing some future scenarios for the 21st century. Also, some institutions are putting forward their cards, with some more or less optimistic approaches. If you were asked to state your opinion, what would you point first when thinking about the major problems that will make the future's international agenda?

The key ones, in my view, are climate change (and its impacts), depletion of natural resources (oil, minerals, forest, water, fisheries, land), environmental destruction, overpopulation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In recent years there have been encouraging signs that governments are starting to grapple with these challenges, but progress is slow and people get distracted by things like "the War on Terror" and the invasion of Iraq.

4. Talking about the War on Terror is a must. Although recent reports have shown a slow yet relative improvement in respect to its two, most visible battlefronts: Iraq and Afghanistan, the future is still unclear about how these "mudholes" will develop. Do you feel like the timing has come to put forward one last effort to find a middle ground solution by allowing international forces to demobilize while leaving the countries with enough seeds to (eventually) prosper under UN missions? Or is Obama's exit-strategy a necessary evil before any further responsility lies upon his shoulders?

It's important that US forces remain in Iraq for some time, to consolidate the relative stability achieved there since early 2007. I don't see a role for the UN in Iraq. The country has a government, and it's now up to that government to try and make the best of a bad situation.

I'm in two minds about Afghanistan. On the one hand, the security situation throughout most of the country looks bleak, with the Taliban resurgent, and in many places operating viable alternative local governments. The west may be best to cut its losses now and get out.

On the other hand, coalition efforts in Afghanistan have been plagued by a lack of clear and consistent objectives, a lack of a strategy for achieving objectives, inadequate resources, and fractured command arrangements. With the US drawdown in Iraq, and Washington's attention switching to Afghanistan, a properly led, coordinated and resourced approach appears to be in the offing. This could, over time and if sustained, lead to significant results. Ideally, operations should focus on securing the Afghan population in rural and urban areas, cutting Taliban financial and supply lines, and splitting moderate local Taliban elements from hardliners.

5. To conclude, new threats and new technology are pushing forward the way we conceptualize warfare. Security itself is being thought over with every new event that makes world's headlines every other month. What are your expectations about the near future when it comes to security and stability? Are you confident Obama and some of the new world leaders will contribute to restore some of the magic lost during Clinton's years, or is the present condition too heavy a legacy to successfully manage it to a better end?

Obama will have his hands full dealing with the toxic legacies of the Bush administration and earlier administrations - such as the "War on Drugs", long-running conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, US stonewalling on climate change negotiations, and global perceptions of US arrogance. He'd be better to leave things like Afghanistan and Iraq to his officials, and keep his eyes on the main plays, e.g., re-engineering the US economy as a low carbon economy (which seems to feature in his economic stimulus package for the US economy), and leading meaningful global efforts to combat the impacts of climate change.

Debating with Ilya Baryshev - On Governance and US Power

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 05:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

For this week's interview, I have the pleasure of having with us my friend Ilya from the Russian Academy of Sciences, to talk about Governance, US power and the future of world politics. This interview has a special meaning because it gives us an insight that is often overlooked, one that comes from an equally excellent but not widely spoken of, Russian scholar. Furthermore, that "omission" is even more visible when one academically talks about US power. Thus I hope this interview be of special interest and extra debate.

Ilya and I met at a NATO seminar that was held in the Spring of 2007, and had plenty of talks about the topics an IR student would certainly discuss with his colleagues. As always, those precious times when you get some time off to dedicate yourself to a single project, be it a seminar or a journey, or elsewhat, you end up feeling you just didn't have enough debate, so I asked Ilya to answer a couple of questions for us, to which he agreed. The overall tone of the interview is thus one of companionship and straight-up talk, as any good debate should presume.

Because of the importance the following topics have in today's IR literature, and their centrality in answering some of the most relevant questions we have in this new century, I will excuse myself to add any personal comments, and without further ado, let you with this debate.

Enjoy the reading!

(photo taken from here)

1. Studying at a faculty dedicated to the international relations of the Northern Americas, your insight in its history and present grants you a unique perspective on how world politics are processed, namely in the US and Canada. To begin with, could you clarify us about the range of areas you have studied in the past and how does a Russian higher education institution view the so-often-criticized core of today’s international system?

The Institute for the US and Canadian Studies is among leading think tanks in Russia and worldwide in terms of international relations and particularly US and Canada (and their beliefs and ideas in terms of world order, international security, etc.). However I want to talk to you on my own behalf so that nothing will constrain me from speaking frankly. As you know official positions very often differ from the ones people believe in. And it is up to the person to decide whether to be a playback or an ipodiator (ipod+negotiator) or not. Let’s get back to topic. The Russian higher education system doesn’t differ that much from the European (one of the examples is its transition in accordance with Bologna process). So you may find all political schools from realists to globalists being taught there. And it’s up to the person to decide what views suit the most to him. And as for me I am doing research on governance in international relations. (Apart from the work on my thesis I am doing research on international security, foresight, forecasting, and lobbyism).

2. Regarding the fall of the last historic period on which we could scientifically determine what were the dynamics and intertwined relations between global contenders and regional powers – the Cold War -, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, we witnessed the affirmation of Washington worldwide. In your opinion, what were the main aspects that lead the US to victory?

I would say that it was a victory of the US as there was not a single person who knew that the Soviet Union would fall in 1991. It became a shock to the US, the West, and the world order itself. The Bipolar system was extremely well built. It was built to last for ages. Take a look at proliferation of WMD. It was a real problem at that time and is still acute. But have a closer look at how it was managed by two superpowers (USSR an US) – they handled the problem by creating a non-proliferation regime. This is what I call governance. And the principles that are behind it are the ones that lead to the collapse of Soviet Union and “the end of history”. I mean globalization, democratization, and obviously ineffectiveness of communist states in many aspects. There were many other reasons in political culture, human rights protection, attitudes to business, etc.

3. Moreover, and despite its reasons, after the Cold War the United States, along with several other parallel yet inferior powers (like Canada, Great Britain, France and others), managed to establish the foundations of a system that has been “exported” throughout the world, and that today determine most of the guidelines upon which world politics function. Can we talk about a north-american world system, with its own branches, points of force and of tension?

Tiago, compare your question with the following quote from the article “The End of History?” (1989) by Francis Fukuyama “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. You see the world is so diverse and different from academic reality of some researchers that you may fail to grasp its essence into one single concept.

In his other article (The Guardian, 3 Apr 2007) Fukuyama would write “The End of History was never linked to a specifically American model of social or political organisation… I believe that the European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look like at the end of history than the contemporary United States. The EU's attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a "post-historical" world than the Americans' continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military.” And who knows how EU is going to look like in 2020?

4. In many matters, however, that power’s influence and domination is being questioned by many emerging actors, both state-based, state-sponsored and/or non-state actors. One of the most pressing is related to the credibility, image and governance of the US in the international community and its multiple institutions and organizations. How do you see its role in dealing with present and upcoming issues? Does domestic public opinion and its external counterpart really determine the north-american decision-making process? If so, in what ways?

Definitely. Have a look at one of the definitions of the term global governance introduced by J. Rosenau: “Thus, global governance may be defined as the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated”. Be NGO’s, individuals and other non-state actors ineffective or even not herd noone would have introduced this term. Non-governmenal sector in the US is world’s eight largest economy!

5. Currently doing your PhD thesis, under the topic of Governance, it is becoming an issue of increasing importance, especially when you think under the theories of globalization and world politics management and dynamics. Would you like to quickly lecture us about some of the concepts and conclusions you have developed throughout your research?

Working definition of governance adopted by me from Viktor Kremenuk – a renowned professor and academic is the following: the ability to solve problems. To put it in another way it deals with: “Efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond the capacities of states to address individually”[1]. So, governance arises when you have several actors and a problem that concerns two or more actors and they are not able to solve it without uniting their resources. The complexity rises when the number of actors and problems increases. Plus you have to add that a state has to take into account nowadays not only the voices of other states but non-state actors as well. Issues that may help you see it involve extraordinary range of interdependencies – international security, sustainable development, environmental protection.

[1] Weiss T. and Gordenker L. (eds.), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. N.Y.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1999. p. 17.

The term governance in international affairs is rather new. For example common definition has not yet arrived to scholars of international relations. However the term itself gained its popularity in 1990ies. Among articles to read about it you may consider:

Bloomfield L. Rethinking International Governance. In: Facing the Challenges of the 21s' Century. 20th Anniversary Essays. Center for Applied Studies of International Negotiations (CASIN). Geneva. 2000; Finkelstein L. What is Global Governance? // Global Governance. 1995; Friedrichs J. Global Governance as the Hegemonic Project of Liberal Global Civil Society; Gordenker L. Weiss T. NGOs, the UN and Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996; Warner P. Governance in Global Civil Society // Global Governance / O. Young (ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997; Groom A., Powell D. From World Politics to Global Governance: A Theme in need of a Focus // Groom A., Light M. Contemporary International Relations. London: Pinter, 1994; Hewson M., Sincliar T. (eds.) Approaches to Global Governance Theory / New York: State University of New York Press, 1999; Lipscutz R. Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Nature from Place to Planet. New York: Suny Press, 1996; Massicotte M. Global Governance and the Global Political Economy: Three Texts in Search of a Synthesis // Global Governance. 1999; Rosenau J. Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics // Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics / J. Rosenau, E.-O. Czempiel (eds.). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Rosenau J. Governance in the Twenty-first Century // Global Governance. 1995; Spaeth K. Inside Global Governance. New Borders of a Concept (www.cpogg.org).

Blogger's Shoutbox features George Hageman from 'Military History Podcast'

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Mon, 02 Feb 2009 09:35:00 +0000

Good morning,

Today is the first day of Blogger's Shoutbox, the weekly initiative presenting what the blogosphere has best in peace and war studies. This is its debut, and we are starting big.

When deciding who should I try to interview first, there were not many doubts in my mind that George Hageman from Military History Podcast should make the grand inauguration. Many reasons would easily justify my decision, but I think one eventually overcame the others: his blog is a clear evidence that great things can be achieved when one truly commits himself/herself to do it, and opens his/her arms to the world. With more than 3.5 million downloads and a total of 41.359 subscribed listeners, George Hageman's podcasts have reached virtually every corner of the planet. There have been many critics, and none failed to recognize such an impressive feat.

Here is a snapshot of 'Militay History Podcast'.

During the last four years, he has produced 123 episodes about what he calls "the strangest anecdotes, innovative technology, and most significant events of military history". The repertoire is nothing but impressive, calling the attention of the media through various channels, such as the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the London Independent, and the Wall Street Journal (read more about the articles below).

Yet, more impressively, he achieved all of this by the time he was 15 years of age. It was with great surprise that some military pundits that followed his work found out he was to study Harvard for 2008/09, 3 years after the first episode. Yet, no merit is taken away by this fact, nor is it an argument for giving him more attention than he otherwise get had he been in his 20s. Good, serious work is to be valued regardless the particular traits of the author, and that is to put George Hageman in a category of other great and acclaimed bloggers made visible to millions. On their behalf, I express my sincere thanks for all the work done, and an appreciation for the commitment he honored to present new material every week to listeners like me.

Enough said, let us read what he has to say about a couple of questions I sent him. Prompt in his acceptance to reply to my questions, and always interested in exchanging whatever ideas about this initiative, it is with great pleasure that I leave you with the interview.

But before, here is more information about George Hageman and his Military History Podcast...

You can find him at:

He has been featured in:

Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Armchair General's WebOps
Wall Street Journal (1/21/06): Pursuits Page 2
School Library Journal: February 2006
Armchair General: April/May 2006
On10.Net Video Interview
Home Education Magazine's Resources
The London Independent
Educator's Podcast Guide

And do not forget to check out some of his products!

People's Liberation Army (China) vs. United States Armed Forces
Ancient World Maps--470 Years in 135 Seconds
Podcast Episode Collections on CD

MILITARY HISTORY PODCAST

http://militaryhistorypodcast.blogspot.com

(photo taken from here)

1. Your recent podcasts have strongly focused the multidimensional context upon which the Surge was undertaken, from the military framework to the difficulties in dealing with sectarian violence, popular uprisings, etc, as well as some of its consequences concerning US engagement in Iraq. In your opinion, what's the relation between the Surge with the considerable improvement of a country then perceived by many as in the brink of civil war and anarchy?

The surge is the most visible element of a new strategy in Iraq, spearheaded by General Petraeus and the bold new Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The reason why Iraq has been improving is not because of the surge, itself, but rather because of the sweeping change behind it. Since the implementation of the new doctrine, American troops have been working with Iraqi troops and Iraqi civilians, rather than alongside them. They are now beginning to win the hearts and minds, rather than just the battle. Of course, many Iraqis still resist the occupation, but it seems as though the Iraqi insurgents are finding fewer places to hide because the anti-American segments of the population are becoming smaller and smaller (due to the significant political and economic progress that the country has been making). Militarily, the US Army has reorganized itself into Brigade Combat Teams which are much more effective in contained, urban environments. So, although the surge put much-needed troops in the right place, the real difference can be attributed more to the change in strategy than the change in tactics.

2. The Iraq Study Group, also a topic of utmost importance featured in some episodes, came amidst widespread discontent with Bush's foreign policy posture. Claiming bipartisanship, it still remains a key document that seems to underlie many of the modifications in dealing with Iraq. Do you agree with Drezner's Washington Post article "The Grandest Strategy of Them All", that "the report offers nothing about how to promote democracy and human rights in the Middle East, focusing instead on the single-minded, amoral pursuit of the U.S. national interest"?
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/15/AR2006121501832_pf.html)

The Iraq Study Group report does, indeed, focus on America's interests in the region, but rightly so--it is an American document meant to address American problems for American policy-makers. This is not to say that America should not be concerned with human rights issues; it is simply to say that the Iraq Study Group Report is not the proper avenue for such concerns. I believe it was a very worthwhile document, as it kicked into motion the change in strategy and mindset by the Bush Administration. It seemed as though everybody except Bush accepted that we were losing in Iraq, and so a bipartisan commission was a good way to knock sense back into him. As for Drezner's implication that the United States should spread democracy in the Middle East, I believe it is dangerous to wish for such a sweeping change without considering the various circumstances--is the country ready for democracy...is democracy the best form of government in terms of human rights? We need to stop thinking of democracy as the ONLY worthwhile form of government. But that is another discussion entirely.

3. Regardless recent improvements on the ground, Iraq still remains a deeply problematic situation for more people than just north-americans. Considering the US' global positioning and power before Iraq - and 9/11 for that matter -, do you think we are definately and unchangebly going toward a multipolar world?

It was inevitable for the world to shift towards multipolarism, because there can only be one power base for so long. Although the past seventeen years have been unipolar, the two hundred years before that were multipolar...so it is only a natural process. I don't think America's quagmire in Iraq led to this new multipolarism, but rather, America anticipated an increasingly multipolar world and attempted to extend its muscle while it still could. We already see multipolarism in the form of East vs. West, America vs. China, Christianity vs. Islam. The only question is whether it will be a cold war or a hot war.

4. The President-elect and his foreign policy team have inherited a troublesome burden. Fukuyama states that it is up to this administration to "decide" whether the US will continue to be the hegemon for the next quarter of a century or not. What are your expectations for the post-Bush era?

America's true strength is not in its military power, but in what Joseph Nye referred to as "soft power"--the ability to lead by example, to sway through negotiation, and to "walk softly and carry a big stick" (as Teddy Roosevelt once said). America has the economic strength to remain the world's hyperpower for at least the next quarter century. What President-Elect Obama will control is whether this hyperpower status will be maintained through belligerance or through presence and bearing. Given Obama's support for international cooperation and his efforts to revive American stature in the world, it seems as though we are headed in a soft power direction. Obama has already restored a great deal of America's prestige, and he will only continue to do so once he is President. Fukuyama is right: this is a pivotal time, and America can live up to its ideals, or it can become yet another grumpy, declining empire.

5. Finally, and going back to your blog "Military History Podcast", one line of thought that accompanies the listener throughout most of the episodes is the concern to depict the main characteristics that shaped different forms of warfare in specific times. The combination of high-technology equipment with intelligence and counter-intel techniques is leading today's warfare to maximize the potential of the individual soldier. Where do you see this going, if you share the same opinion at all?

War today is just as gruesome as it was thousands of years ago. It may involve less people and it may be on a smaller scale, but when it gets down to it, there is still one man brutally sucking the life out of another man. As for the revolution in military affairs that seems to be occurring (first with satellites, then with UAVS, and next with Future Combat Systems), I don't believe the essence of warfare will change. America will still have a large standing Army that is only slightly more advanced than the other armies around the world. The technological advances will be so expensive that they will be confined to special forces units, who will become more precise and more mechanized (and possibly even automated). But all in all, the general idea of war will remain the same. Military history is a slowly-rolling steam engine, and the recent improvements in intelligence and equipment are only small steps in the general progression. Of course, there could be a drastic change on the scale of "the invention of air power" or "the nuclear bomb", but I don't think I have enough information to make any accurate judgment on such things.

Debating with Isabel A. David - On Eastern Europe

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Wed, 28 Jan 2009 09:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

Russia and the issues of Eastern Europe have long influenced, if not determined, how Western Europe shapes its own identity, behavior and interests in IR. The examples are many and debriefing the major events in East-West relations in the European country would certainly fill hundreds of libraries (it is doesn't already, especially in the post-soviet states). On this interview we'll try to bring some of the most constant fracture-points and shed a new light into the underlying reasons why that relation is particularly intense in the Balkan peninsula.

As you know, too many and too important issues are at stake when one talks about the Balkans. Ranging from NATO's enlargement to the European Union's expansion (or is it vice-versa?), to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia's plausible re-emergence as a regional power, to the geopolitics of pipelines and natural gas, to ethno-nationalisms, etc., the Balkans are certainly a focal point in today's broad list of controversial area-studies. Of course we couldn't talk about all these topics, but I'm sure you'll find a particular issue of relevance throughout the next five questions and answers.

This week's guest interviewee holds a Masters in International Relations from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, and has developed research concerning Central and Eastern Europe and the challenges those regions pose to economic and political integration, whether in the context of NATO or the EU. Because of that, it is interesting to realize what some of the perspectives those communities share and reflect when dealing with the "old Europe".

That being said, I hope you find your reading worthwhile. Enjoy it!

1. There are many different geographical, cultural and territorial assertions, each reflecting a different conception of Eastern Europe. However, and independently of its conceptualization, it seems evident that it holds a great importance in the European context, one that is commonly referred to as the Euroworld. In your opinion, what is the correct definition of Eastern Europe, and how would you justify it?

In its geographical definition, Eastern Europe extends from Europe until the Urals, in Russia. To prove that, I have no doubt of the sense of Europeans the Russian people have. We have only to look at the incredibly rich Russian literature, namely Dostoievsky, to realize the self-perception that people has as the forefront guard of the European continent. That also applies to the populations of Russian ethnicity that inhabit the Asian part of the country, whether it is deeply in Siberia, in Irkutsk for example, or in its eastern most point, in Vladivostok, which in fact literally means “domain of the easterners”.

Out of curiosity, although it tells a great deal of Russia’s europeism, lies at the characteristic architecture of Russia churches, especially in its bulb-shaped domes, that appeared from the XVI century onward. That was when the Russians started defeating the Muslim peoples. Those domes reckon the turbants of those communities and symbolize Russian supremacy over them.
However, there is a problem of self-perception in this debate that cannot be ignored, one that is related with the fact of not being polite to use the expression “Eastern Europe” or “Oriental Europe” randomly, although it is commonly used to refer to the countries that once were beyond the Iron Curtain (with due exception to Tito’s Yugoslavia). In fact, “East” has profoundly negative connotation to most of those people, because it backs them away from that is Europe per se, a cultural and civilizational space, thus tying them to a past they would rather forget or pretend that never existed. Not surprisingly, they prefer to be inserted in Central Europe. I am talking about the Czech Republic (if we look at the map, it is in fact in the middle of Europe, a space that goes from the Atlantic until the Urals), Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia (Eastern there is meant as backward). They leave that category of Eastern to others, such as Russia.

To me, Central and Eastern Europe include perhaps a more cultural and religious space (the Pope’s arguments are not foolish at all) while referring only to those countries that belonged to the former Warsaw Pact and former Yugoslavia. I would only exclude countries like Turkey, or even the Armenians and Georgians, that are Christians, and other former soviet republics (with due exception to the Baltic countries of course).

2. However, and beside the geographical delimitation, it is hard to point out one single factor that will allow us to congregate all those populations under a banner. Would you agree with the fact that this region is a too diverse a chessboard to concede a medium-long term stability, one that allows the complete self-realization of nation-statehoods?

It is in fact an heterogeneous space. Ethnically, it includes Slavs (Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Slovenians, Russians, Ukrainians, Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, …), the Romanians (that are a mixture of Latinos and Slavs), the Hungarians, that belong to a different group, as the Finnish, Latvians and Estonians.

But I think that the nation-State is a myth. Even in what we call Western Europe there are too few states that match that notion: Portugal and few others. And I am not talking about those issues that have risen with immigration; I am talking about historical minorities that inhabit those places for a long time. France has problems with the Corsos, Bretons, Alsatians and Lorrainians (that speak German), Basques. Italy has German, French, Slovenian and Albanese speaking minorities. Spain has the Basques, Catalans, Galicians. Germany has a Frisian minority (that extends to the Netherlands to the South of Denmark) and a Czech one (the Sorben). And so forth…

In Central and Eastern Europe there are many interesting situations. Poland and Czechoslovakia have expelled their German populations after World War II (6 and 3 millions, respectively), so they have few problems… Although there is a Polish minority in the Ukraine. The biggest problem, one that has gotten in the relation between the neighbours, concerns Hungary, that has Slovakian, Romanian and Serb minorities, as half its territory was taken away at the end of World War I after Trianon (France), as it came out defeat for its alliance with the Central Powers. The Hungarians have conceded to those minorities full citizenship privileges. In fact, many families were separated because of those treaties signed in Versailles.

The Ukraine has around 100 ethnic minorities. The independence that a handful of these countries gained after the First World War has left minorities scattered everywhere, as they were related with the Austria-Hungarian Empire’s multinational trait, from which theses States were once a part of. Only Czechoslovakia had a true democracy and there were only few problems. Until Nazi Germany’s occupation in 1938…

It is interesting to realize that even today there are German speaking minorities in Hungary and Romania, as a result of the migration movements that started in the XIV century. Even more interesting is to check the word the Slavs arranged for “German”, one that has to do with the fact of such minorities having never learnt the language of the territories where they settled in: “Nemci”, which literally means “dumb”.

3. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the European Economic Community, that receded to the borders of modern day Russia, while the latter is looking for a war to occupy the empty space it left. Still, ever since the disputes between the Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian Empires that the Balkan Peninsula has experienced great instability, while its Northern part has fell into the constant advances and setbacks by Prussia, Russia and Poland suffered the famous “sandwich effect”. Will the European Union be able to solve this integration problem, as there is with the multi-dimensional issue of this region?

The integration of these countries in the European Union had to face firstly the economic difficulties and their problematic adaption to a “capitalist” model. In order for that to happen, the Union invested a large sum of money, even before their adhesion. At the beginning, the CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) looked at the EU with great enthusiasm, as it symbolized a return to Europe and a guarantee for their independence against the Russians. But, as more time and economic, social and political reforms were demanded in order to fulfil the indispensable criteria to join in, the expectations were transformed into scepticism and resentment. They were not sovereign before the fall of the Berlin Wall and they rapidly realized that they would not be so in the EU. Afterwards, some, like Poland, were seen as “agents” connected to the United States and called as “Trojan Horses” by the Germans.

We have to bear in mind that joining NATO happened before they joined the EU, as it more quickly answered their expectations, namely in assuring their safeguard against the former Slav brother, Russia. We also have to consider that it was due to the United States support that they became independent after World War I. We only have to remember the 14 Points of Wilson… In the other hand, exiting the Soviet bloc represented an entrance in the German sphere of influence, that promptly backed the CEEC’s adhesion in the EU for obvious economic interests, ones that they do not appreciate: a déjà-vu feeling, for the deep hatred they continue to feel toward the “Nemci”.

The CEEC clearly have a feeling of being “left overs” of History, that they are always the first ones to suffer when things go wrong. We only have to look at the Czech’s resentment that even before being the Britons and French sold them to the Germans in 1948, in Munich, and especially after integrating the Soviet orbit, had life standards comparable to those of Switzerland or Sweden. And if there is one thing that they CEEC know quite well is their History…

On the other hand, the EU has been favouring resentment over the minorities. One of the adherence criteria concerned the respect for the minorities in those countries, thus forcing them to grant them rights (namely cultural and political ones) as they appeared after the fall of the Soviet bloc. And those demands are not popular at all, in countries that were sovereign for a very limited period in time… It is a fact that most of those minorities use the EU to demand more and more from the governments of the countries where they live. Still, we also have the case of Russian minorities in the Baltics that continue to have reasons to complain about the treatment they’re being subject of, without having the EU to care much about it…

4. In what ways will Eastern Europe be the confrontations’ arena, directly or indirectly, between the European and Russian powers in their plans of regional establishment?

I would answer this by pointing out the above answer. I would only add that all great powers have a natural sphere of influence. That is the case of Russia, especially in the former-USSR republics, where there lie a significant number of minorities. It is obvious that with the entrance of NATO at the borders of those countries, Moscow perceives it as a grand provocation while they’re putting themselves in the line of fire… But geography has not been kind to them…

5. Still analysing the enlargement toward Eastern Europe, it seems that the core axis of the European Union is moving eastwards, dragging along a whole momentum that puts Portugal in a very difficult position. Is this movement an attempt for the European Union to rejuvenate its economy and foundational reason, or instead a necessary step toward the insurance of some stability and of a buffer zone against tensions in the region, before they pose greater threats to its future?

I once again redirect my answer to that I’ve given to question nº3. I’ll add that such a space of enormous wealth, as the EU, naturally seduces the populations that also want to benefit from it. In fact, the European Economic Community as it appeared in 1957, was supposed to be that attraction point for those countries subject of Soviet domination, so they would destabilize the entire bloc. Besides wealth, freedom is always an attraction. Now option for an enlargement toward the East should not only be seen from an economic point of view, with the opening of new markets and access to cheaper and more qualified labour force, but also as a stabilizing factor, in the sense that by expanding the wealth to these countries, the EU is thus avoiding to be flooded by populations looking for better living conditions. In that sense, the EU has too much of an economical spirit, and agreeing with Jean Monnet, father of the organization, “if I had to start from scratch again, I’d start by culture”.

Debating with Luiz M. Bandeira - On Brazil and its Emergence

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

Continuing with the high-profile series of interviews, this week's features one of the most influential political thinkers in Latin America, with books translated into several languages, including English, Spanish, French, Italian, German, among others. An outcast from the time of the Brazilian dictatorship (1964-85), he is currently Professor Emeritus at the University of Brasília (UnB).

Although extremely busy, I had the privilege of making him some questions mostly about Brazil's international relations history and contemporaneity. Considered one of the emerging countries, it is amazing to see how much effort the Brazilian academy has put in studying their background and present standing when it comes to international affairs, thus resulting in a solid yet evolving foreign policy. As I had the pleasure of studying at UnB via studentship, I confess my surprise when dealing directly with the staff at their International Relations Department. Extremely competent, the vast majority of them had post-doctoral degrees in some of the world's acclaimed universities like MIT, Oxford, Sorbonne, etc, they were fine examples of the benefits the linkage between the University and the State brings. There were, of course, black sheeps, but where are they not?

Nevertheless, that experience also allowed me to witness first hand a visible and vibrant windmill that is dragging all positive inputs into Brazil's foreign policy institutions decision-making. Besides translating all the major classical books of (mostly) Western literature, they are also producing their own insights about their place in the world. Some even claim for themselves the existence of a Brazilian School of IR, "an outlook" from the periphery as they say, distant from great power politics and their concerns with the balance of power and realpolitik. Theirs is one focused solely on peace, cooperation and development, contradiction the latter's conflict, competition and dominance triad.

The following interview with Luiz Moniz Bandeira is a strong statement of that intelectual positioning that has endured throughout the entire 20th century. What makes it particularly relevant for today's reflexion about the international dimension of Brazil perhaps has more to do with the United States' perceived decline as the hegemon and the built-up of other centers of power, than Brazil's unique ability to question the american world, even at the regional level of South America. Even so, Brazil is still gaining momentum in many of the world's arenas. From the G-20 of the developing countries, to Mercosul and Unasul, to G-4 and the BRICs, it is at its economic fron that would should expect further developments. Part of this interview, and of the second part that will be later published, concerns the efforts spent at translating economic gains in political advantages.

Therefore, this is an attempt to bring the "voice of the voiceless" to an English-reading audience, and I hope it is of your liking. If it's the case, I have a couple more interviews with Brazilian scholars that deal more or less with the issues at stake here that I could publish, depending on the feedback. But anyways, it's now time for the interview.

Introduction to Brazil and its Emergence

noreply@blogger.com (Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício) — Mon, 19 Jan 2009 16:35:00 +0000

Good morning,

When one thinks about Brazil, we are thinking the future. One of the emerging powers that most attention is earning in international media, Brazil is simultaneously a reference for its promising economic figures, and problematic social isssues. Still, it is in its foreign policy that one finds the most surprising performances within the developing world. Proud of its diplomacy, surrounded by a troublesome neghbourhood and involved in several controversial issues, it certainly provides an interesting country study all-around.

Introducing the upcoming interview, with Latin American Foreign Policy and History pundit Moniz Bandeira, we will briefly deal with some of such topics, analysing the pros and cons of its emergence.

I personally had the opportunity to witness first hand its day-to-day struggle to improve itself internally, and prove itself to the world. Dealing directly with some of its most eminent scholars, closely connected to the Itamaraty, Brasília headquartered foreign office, it is impressive to see how all energies are gradually converging on developing a new vision of world politics. The previous national-developmentism programme, a somewhat loose coallition of reformist and progressive forces on both the right and left wings, gave way to a new search for an international insertion of Brazil's economy into the wider global markets. Insertion is thus the keyword when thinking about its foreign policy, one that consists of a set of rules and ideological traits that reflect Brazil's own interpretation of its place in the world.

That said, here are some topics on its agenda:
Military buid-up. Claiming sovereignty over a large part of its continental platform, consisting of more of 40% of its continental territory, Brazil is pushing forward several programs that will grant it with enough hard power to assure its due use and protection. Still, Chávez' Venezuela is contributing to a regional arms race that is dragging Brazil along. Buying 5 billion dollars worth of military equipment from Russia, Venezuela does not present itself as a threat to other latin american countries. Yet, Colombia's initiative to hunt down FARC rebels in neighbouring Ecuador established a dangerous preventive strike that could foster a wider sense of insecurity.

Economic fairness. A major producer of agricultural goods, such as coffee, cereals, cattle and soy, Brazil is always pushing demands of a fairer international market. In order words, developed markets such as the American or European have restrictions that prevent developing countries from exporting as much as they could, which is slowing down the latter's growth. Therefore, Brazil's participation in major conferences, the WTO, UN General Assemblies and such international events represent a priviledged stage to reinforce its reivindicate position.

Political self-righteousness. Recently earning a substantive voice on every debate concerning the XXI world order, the end of American unilateralism, claiming for a more democratic and representative international system, Brazil is keen to defend itself in every other forum. Expressing what is commonly known as third-world schizophrenia, it regularly claims something only to contradict itself immediately afterward. The duty of the international community to work together with Brazil to save the Amazon forrest by contributing with money, and denounces of foreign interference in its internal affairs concerning the Amazon and its natural resources, are cases in point. So in what self-righteousness is regarded , it doesn't distinguish itself from every other rising powers demanding a more center role in world affairs: it pursues the national self-interest, even if its values are contradictory in practice.

Not wanting to exhaust all of its main topics, it is important to bear these in mind while debating Brazil. Although a more complex issue than the above mentioned problems, I sincerely hope you do learn something from Bandeira's wisdom and extensive practical and research background.

So don't forget to check out "Debate with Authors" next Wednesday!

Debating with James R. Russell - On Armenia

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Wed, 14 Jan 2009 17:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

At first glance, this week's interview might appear as if I ran out of topics to debate and think about. On the contrary, at a time when the world is witnessing a somewhat resurgence of ethno-nationalisms, debating Armenia is debating Kosovo, Georgia, Palestine, ETA, Tamil Tigers, and many more phenomena frequently labeled as "secession movements". Because the dominating literature in IR is (unfortunately) from the USA, many of the issues that other, less visible countries face have been bypassed throughout history. It is only now that we are seeing a more pressing interest and need to study IR's "left-overs". Ethics, nationalism, language, ... countless topics are now featured in many covers and articles.

Armenia, therefore, alerts us for something that has been deemed as a statehood problem. Unable to account for the cultural, historical, religious, linguistic and beliefs' systems communities have, state-centered insights have ironically failed to look inside the box. Located in the Caucasus, geographically entangled between the Slavs in the North past Georgia, the Persians and Arabs in the South, the Azerbaijanis to the East and Georgians in the northern border, I fear it'd take us more time than available just to draw a clear painting of the Caucasus. Yet, if we add religion to the above equation, the problem only duplicates. Catholics, Ortodoxs, Muslims, resquices of Zoroastrianism and Animism... The construction of the modern State as we know it has resulted amongst savage battles between Catholics and Protestants, and these are both families of Christendom. How come we expect and even forcefully impel the imposition of modern statehood in such communities that multissecularly dealth with such amazing tensions?

This week's interview with James R. Russell might leads us to some acknowledgements that our (still) statist lenses missed. Mostly an historical account of the Ancient World's civilizations and relations in the region, here is laid the groundwork for the second part of the interview, and a bridge is created so we can debate contemporaneity.

James Russell is a Mashtots Professor of Armenian Studies at Harvard's Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, and has a successful career studying Armenia in its various periods and aspects. His Ph.D was taken at the University of London's School of Oriental Studies. His profile at Harvard is better at presenting the following interviewee than I am, but I'll leave you with some referrences to his written works:

Zoroastrianism in Armenia (ISBN 0674968506, 9780674968509)

Yovhannes T'lkuranc'i and the Mediaeval Armenian Lyric Tradition (ISBN 978-0-89130-930-7)

And a few recent articles:
"Problematic Snake Children of Armenia"
"On Mysticism and Esotericism amongst the Zoroastrians"
"The Mother of All Heresies: A Late Mediaeval Armenian Text on the Yushkaparik"
"The Armenian Shrines of the Black Youth"
"Polyphemos Armenios"
"An Epic for the Borderlands... the Mythologem of Alcestis in Armenia"
"Ezekiel and Iran"
"Scythians and Avesta in an Armenian Vernacular Paternoster."

Also on James Russell, please visit Wikipedia at: James R. Russell's page.

Without further ado, please enjoy reading the first part of this interview. Expect the second half 7 days from now: January 21st.

(photo taken from here)

1. In the Near and Middle East regions, we see the birth of those ancient empires that, later on, founded or determined the formation of civilization nitches which constitute the basis of modern times cultural blocs as the Iranians, Egyptians, Turks, Armenians, etc. In that sense, it seems that the Armenians have endured the passing of time despite its rivals further South. In a shortly manner, can you describe what reasons have made the Armenians different?

The Armenians after their conversion to Christianity created their own script and within a century had assembled a body of literature, both original and in translation, that effected a cultural re-orientation towards the Mediterranean from Iran and established a powerful and positive identity, rendering them impermeable to destructive external influences.

2. Still, the inherent characteristics of those ancient peoples are sometimes of very difficult interpretation. Not only have they been consecutively conquerors and conquered, as they seem the product of many and intertwined tribes. How can we explain the relative stability of the Armenian civilization until the Roman Empire?

Armenian society was conservative, decentralized, clan-based; so not susceptible to the kind of destruction that overtakes urban centers.

3. Despite very distinctive traits, it has evolved through different internal and external factors. One of the most important ones seems to have been the Roman Empire. Before Rome, the great empires that ruled the Near and Middle East, due exceptions to Alexander perhaps, all of them already had some territory or cultural influence from its regional tribes. Yet, the Armenians managed to escape roman annexation and expanded their dominion to the North, almost encircling the Black and Caspian seas. What influence did the Roman Empire have in Scythia, the Armenians’ empire in the II and I century BC?

The Romans conquered some of the Sarmatians and integrated them into the legions. But for the most part the Scythians were too far for contact— hence the relative ignorance of Classical sources regarding the Slavic languages, for instance, and the absence of Scytho-Greco-Roman cultural interchange north of the Black Sea littoral.

4. In the same time span, although with various transformations, the Persians evolved from the Elam Empire in the XIV century BC to the Achemenida Empire in the VI and V centuries BC. As your bibliography indicates, the links established between the Armenians and Persians are vital to understand those periods of time, namely that of Zoroastrianism. In Portuguese literature however, such matters are very rarely, if absently researched. Often referred as the mother of all three great monotheist religions, Zoroastrianism has definitely characterized almost all civilizations of the region. Following your investigations, what conclusions can we draw from that trilateral relation between Zoroastrianism, the Armenians and Persians?

Armenians constitute the one Christian community whose substratum is Zoroastrian, and this makes them inherently interesting. One wonders what Iran might have looked like in some counterfactual future had it opted for Christianity instead of Islam. The world would have been radically different. Well, the Armenians are an example of what such an Iranian Christendom might have been.

5. Despite its short longevity as Achemenida empire, the Persians kept their distinctiveness throughout its foreign occupation under Alexander, the Great, and it soon emerged to become even more powerful under the reign of the Sassanians. Is this evidence of some cultural superiority of the Persians as compared to its neighbouring tribes and peoples, one they claim until this day?

Persian culture values the arts and pleasures of life, and the profundities of literature. Assimilation into Persian culture rarely vexes anyone; the various nationalities of Iran tend rather to feel enriched.

Further debating Sino-Russian Relations

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Mon, 12 Jan 2009 09:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

The sino-soviet relations constituted a key debate in understanding part of the Cold War, as we had the opportunity to see with Professor Wilson's interview. In fact, the change at that time was so fundamental to the equilibrium that, apart from the emancipatory movements within the Western bloc, as it was the case with the European project, integration processes in Latin America, etc., it was with Stalinism and Maoism that a shift within international socialism arose. As Washington's doctrine pressuposed, «containment» would not do any good if it didn't engage with the Kremlin pro-actively. Thusly, the sinification of marxism-leninism was further advanced, which brought soviet global aspirations to a halt. Moreover, in some African countries where the soviet influence was playing a significant part in civil strifes, the Sino-Soviet Split impelled Moscow to withdraw and be replaced by Chinese military cooperation agents and funding.

Furthermore, the interview also served to highlight the comparative importance of strategic interests in the Asian continent that the two contenders held, plus those of the United States', while diminuishing the unparallel attention clashing ideologies used to enjoy until very recently. That is not to say that an ideological confrontation did not take place. There are plenty of tensions throughout the whole +40 years period to attest that, but the underlying principles of realpolitik subsisted the rise and fall of the great political common places of the East and West. With Russia and China apparently playing according to some of the West's rules, as open markets economies, liberal trade, international law abiding states (in certain areas at least), one would not say tensions amongst them disappeared.

Until today, major shifts are ocurring at different levels within the asian continent, but they involve great power politics. For those deeply immersed in transatlantic relations and models of cooperation, learning about today's asian politics represents in many ways a trip to XIX century Europe. Kissinger himself uses this analogy, although I would show my reservation in complying with it beyond a first introductory contextualization.

Perhaps more importantly for us in the West, is to study how the US handled its triangular policy. Even today it's a quintessential issue how to best accommodate (if possible at all), a rising China with a struggling Russia. Not only that, dealing with only one of them would be important enough to mark a generation's debate. One has only to remember the «soft landing» policy of senior Bush, and later continued by Clinton, which was intended to sustain the meteoric effects the crumbling soviet empire would have in global affairs. That took the US almost ten years and billions of dollars invested to assure not only Eastern Europe's relative stability, but also to avoid further desintegration in Central and Eastern Asia.

Nowadays, Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao's partnership intiatives, in and around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are already causing major concerns within the western hemisphere. Both establishing few - but important - milestones regarding security, defense and political issues, specifically energy security and military cooperation, the US and the EU will have to develop new approaches to tackle whatever issues they find endangered, whilst maintaing a stable international order. Russia and China, on the other hand, argue that they are only going multilateral, which is another way of saying they are contributing to the improvement of relations between all countries, as the UN Charter consecrates. In fact, it is important to bear in mind that China is now the strongest liberalizing force within the international trade market. Through a «no strings attached» approach to least developed countries, it is celebrating more trade deals than any other nation on earth. Yet, that would lead us to a totally different debate.

To conclude, I'll leave some questions on the table:

How useful is it to rethink Cold War history with new insights about the doctrine and practices within the communist camp, especially between the USSR and PRC?
Did Washington approach the Sino-Soviet Split with a clear view about the relative power of Beijing, or did it tend to use it merely for the purposes of the USSR-EUA confrontation?
What impact did Mao's Great Leap Forward have in soviet politics, as an alarm bell for the "progressist" forces within international socialism?

Debating with Jeanne L. Wilson - On Sino-Russian Relations

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Wed, 07 Jan 2009 17:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

Our introductory interview concerns a topic of great importance for contemporary international relations, as well as for those more interest in the historical aspect of IR. Sino-Soviet relations has remained, for many decades, a relatively unknown topic in western literature. Besides certain books of relevance, like those of Kissinger and Brzezinski, all others did not receive the same attention as they were due. For my personal delight, we'll have for the following week the opportunity to read one author that has somehow been following the road to "rescue" and bring them into modern days academic research.

Her name is Jeanne L. Wilson, M.A. and Ph.D. from Indiana University and a Professor of Political Science at Wheaton College, and currently doing research at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. As her profile there tells, her foremost interest is on "Russian-Chinese foreign policy relations and the comparative implications of Russia's transition experience". Among other works, she has published "Unexpected Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era" (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), a book that deals with several aspects of bilateral and multilateral relations in the Asian continent. From border issues to military deterrence, it thoroughly analyzes the emerge of a new framework under the Bolshevik regime, until the famous Split, leaving with a door open for a future partnership. Certainly noteworthy.

I'd recommend you take a quick peak at the book via Google Books. You can find a preview: here. Also, visit her profile at Davis Center's website: here.

After a brief presentation, it is now time to move on to the interview. In the end, I'll leave a couple of questions that could trigger further debate, based on the questions and/or answers here stated. Enjoy reading!

1. During Mao’s era, Sino-Soviet relations did not cope with the Chinese Communist Party’s ambitions from its closest ally. What are the reasons for this ambivalent alliance?

I believe there were a number of factors, some rooted in history, differing stages of development, different foreign policy interests, etc. I do not see the issue, as many do, as essentially ideological. Rather, the statement by Deng Xiaoping as to the reasons for the Sino-Soviet split seems quite persuasive: “the Soviet Union did not treat China on an equal footing.”

2. Each has claimed somehow ownership over the socialist doctrine. Still, many moves were made to evolve the orthodoxy introduced by Marxism-leninism. Can we speak of a doctrinal nationalization between the two powers?

I am not quite sure what is meant by “doctrinal nationalization.” If it refers to the notion of the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to national conditions and national culture, then I believe that one can speak in these terms. Mao Zedong, for example, was very explicit about the “Sinification of Marxism-Leninism” as a necessity for its adoption in China.

3. The Sino-Soviet Split was more than an ideological dissension; it was a global repositioning from two major players. How far did the gap go?

It seems to have gone quite deeply, when one considers that the border conflicts between the two in 1969 escalated into substantial military confrontation. In addition, one can consider the reports that the Soviet side actually contemplated a nuclear attack on China. But the global repositioning turned out to be detrimental to both sides and a factor in the development of the “strategic triangle” which brought the US into geostrategic calculations.

4. With the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the PRC has abandoned its political positioning as a socialist country in the international society. Can we speak of Xiaoping’s vision in liberalizing some sectors of the economy prior to the fragmentation, or did it only and visibly occur once there was no socialist movement to compete for?

To be technical, the PRC has not abandoned its ideological commitment to socialism, nor to Marxism-Leninism as a theoretical construct. What it has abandoned is the practice of socialism as it had historically been conceived and the adoption of the capitalist mode of production. China began this process in late 1978, over a decade before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was traumatic to China, not a source of relief.

5. With some analysts arguing against China’s lack of transparency in its defence budget, there are many concerns about the possible arms race it will trigger in the whole area. Considering its military agreements with Russia, what are today’s outlines concerning the armed forces of both countries?

Again, I am not sure what this question means. I do not know of any bilateral military agreements between Russia and China. The 2001 Friendship Treaty, unlike the 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, does not have a military component. The two states stress in their joint communiqués and through other channels their unanimity on issues of missile defense (actually this is not quite true—as they do not have wholly congruent positions on the topic of theatre missile defense), the militarization of outer space, non-proliferation, etc. The two states have participated in some joint exercises, most notably Peace Mission 2005 and Peace Mission 2007 (which were technically a component of SCO operations).

There is also the issue of military-technical cooperation, which is to say Russian arms sales to China, and the issue of the extent to which the two will engage in joint development projects. However, at present, China has reached a point of saturation with some arms purchases, is determined to develop its own fighter aircraft series, thus voiding the contract that it signed with Russian regarding licensing agreement for the Chinese production of SU-27 aircraft with Russian engines and avionics. Military-technical cooperation between the two at present appears to have stalled. Regarding the national defense strategies of the two, Russia continues to struggle with issues of military modernization and reform, while China is clearly focused on the modernization of its military, with Taiwan a major concern, and the acquisition of a blue water navy another priority.

Introduction to Sino-Soviet Relations

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:00:00 +0000

Good morning,

According to what has been previously promised, it is now time to introduce the first interview's topic: Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold, with a particular focus on the Sino-Soviet Split. For that purpose, I have invited Professor Jeanne Wilson who is now doing research at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Talking about Soviet Union and People's Republic of China is to talk about two of the main influence poles during the second half of the XX century. Both rooted in a Marxist-Leninist doctrine of power and social relations, they certainly shaped and reshaped what was then the Communist bloc. However, major differences set them worlds apart: i) Geography was not a problem for the Soviet Union at that time, and its strategic depth and extension allowed Moscow to play an unparallel role in European and Asian political affairs; as for the PRC, its aparent confinement to East Asia significantly reduced its manouvrability in extending its influence abroad. ii) Demographics in the Soviet Union, the biggest country in the world, presented serious problems for its population scarcity, affecting both its economy, politics and defense. China, on the contrary, was already over-populated for its territory, inciting more repressive mechanisms to hold a billion individuals under a one-party system. iii) Economics also led to a turbulent post WW2 period, with the PRC being made of agriculture labours, and relatively few urban communities. The Soviet Union's economy rested mainly on state-owned or state-planned sectors, from agriculture to industrial work, public administration or defense related entreprises. iv) ...

The list could go on forever, but the bottom line is that the common, "westernized" perception that Moscow and Beijing were on the same track when it came to view and act in a Cold War world was dramatically far from the truth. Thus, when in the 1960s Sino-Soviet relations degrated and allowed the United States to run its Triangular Strategy, stimulating a further separation between the two while favoring pro-Beijing policies, even if it meant deteorating its relations with Taiwan.

On the interview that will air next Saturday 7th, some of the most pressing tensions between the two "red countries" will be briefly discussed, while trying to shed some light on anther important bilateral momentum that is unfolding.

Here's what you need to know:

What? Sino-Soviet Relations

When? Saturday 7th, 9.00 CET

Who? Jeanne Wilson

How? Via e-mail

Why? Understanding Sino-Soviet relations will help us rethink Cold War dynamics between the two countries, and between them and others, while giving some insight into what might lie ahead

Debating with...

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Sat, 03 Jan 2009 22:06:00 +0000

Good morning,

After some preparatory work done at other initiatives I'm currently launching, namely "Peace and War Podcast" and "Clicking Lusophonia", it is time to officially announce the publishing schedule for "Debate with Authors". Throughout the upcoming months, this is what you shall expect to happen:

First off, the main and obvious attraction is the week's interview with scholars and practicioners, so to speak, to be published every Wednesday morning. In many ways, that will be the focal point of this blog's activity, although many other things will accompany it. Picking up from this project's title, "Debating with..." interviews will be published precisely at 9.00 CET.

The interview's topics will vary with not specific order. It might happen that one talks about the hot topic of the week, while others will refer to a more or less distant past. For instance, In the next couple of interviews you'll be reading about Ancient Armenia and Persia, while another will prompt discussion about the Sino-Soviet Split and Russian foreign relations. As it goes for the topic, there isn't any order in what concerns country studies. In one week we might debate China's role in the XXI century, while in the other talk about the Portuguese and Spanish empires, or whatever state/empire/kingdom we're dealing with.

As I've said, the initiative is not solely restricted to the interviews. Antecipating each one, you can also expect to find a somewhat introductory post. This will serve to "prepare" the reader to some of the background and perspective from which one should understand the following issue, so he/she can take the most out of the interviewee's contribution. Imagine, as in the case of Ancient Armenia, that you're not familiar with the topic at all, and don't quite see the purpose of having an interview talking about it. These posts prior to the interviews will try to shed some light on that, so everything makes a bit more sense.

Moreover, a similar post will be published on the aftermath of the interviews. They will draw some conclusions and possibly highlight some of issues that have not been properly addressed in the interview, so further analysis is stimulated. It's basically a way of presenting some ending remarks for those interested in the subject, or those who had not had the opportunity the interview at all.

So here's a brief recap of what you need to know, for the time being (note that a Blogger's Shoutbox is also due to commence in February).

What? Publishing interviews

When? Every Wednesday, at 9.00 CET

Who? Interviewees vary week by week

How? Presenting a "Debating with..." article that will feature some info about each interviewee

Why? Because it's a great chance for all to learn something new in a different way

Cool, what more?

Each interview will be preluded by an introductory post that shall highlight the following:

some background information
topic's relevance
perspectives from which to look at the topic

And a closing post, that will:

draw some conclusions
present alternative topics to discuss
add further remarks to the interviews

Voilà, the message has been given and some posts have already been scheduled. So be sure to tune in every Wednesday (at least!), or keep visiting us regularly so you don't miss a sparkle of the action.

Until then, see you next time.

Have fun

Opening announcement

noreply@blogger.com (TEMPUS PROJECT) — Thu, 01 Jan 2009 12:07:00 +0000

Good morning,

It's the beginning of a new year and "Debate with Authors" is now kicking off. So, first of all I'm due to give a brief explanation about what you'll be finding here for the next couple of months. This blog has the purpose of serving as a contact bridge between those interested in International Relations. We often struggle to get a moment for deeper reflexion within our every day lives, and long await for a moment's chance to weigh our latest findings about whatever issue at hand. Instead of providing a one-way source of knowledge (you try to take the most out of something), "Debate with Authors" will try to serve as a platform for interactive knowledge.

Thus I shall bring to you interviews with various intervenients in the many IR bubbles, both academic and non-academic worlds, so it's up to you to find the contact points between those bubbles (e.g. International Political Economy, Strategy, Military Affairs, International Law, etc), and burst them with whatever critics you might point out about the topic in debate. The end results I expect to be a proficuous discussion in order to everyone to learn a little something with the interview and following debate using the Comments section.

As I post more and more interviews, debates are still welcome for the previous ones, so hopefully we'll have many different boards on which to through our thoughts at. Until the first interview, that'll be published next Saturday (January 7th) (See the Schedules on the left navigation bar), I wish you a happy new year.

Be sure to drop by every Saturday and leave your comment. I'm sure the debate will start rolling. Have fun!