Physical intrusion was a search. The High Court made clear that the government had physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Thus, the Court concluded that it had no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. The conclusion was based on a common law trespass theory. The High Court declined to analyze the challenged action in terms of whether the targeted individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of the vehicle, which was exposed to public view.

Reasonable expectation of privacy. While five Justices, Sotomayor, Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan (in two concurring opinions), agreed with the majority that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred, they would have instead hung the analysis on the question of whether the long-term monitoring of the vehicle impinged on the targeted individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Finding that in this case it did, the concurring Justices rejected the prevailing view that GPS location tracking does not implicate a privacy interest because the location of the person or vehicle in public view is essentially not private, noting that a Fourth Amendment search also occurs “when the government violates a subjective expecta¬tion of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.

The concurring opinions devote substantial discussion to tracking that would not require physical intrusion, such as cell phone location tracking, and the fact that such tracking can create a host of information about an individual’s public, familial, political, religious and sexual activities. Technological developments require a more current application of Fourth Amendment law, according to the concurring Justices. Observing that technology appears to have outpaced legislation that would protect individuals from government use of tracking that is merely electronic, rather than that which is physically intrusive, the Justices also noted that legislation may now begin to catch up. Finally, the Justices supported the notion that private information disclosed to a member of the public for a limited purpose should not be thereby rendered outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

What does it mean for employers? The reasoning of the five concurring Justices carries implications for private employers because lower courts may incorporate a similar analysis and be more willing to find that an employer’s location monitoring of an employee amounts to an invasion of that employee’s privacy interests.

In recent years, employer GPS tracking of employees has become more common – perhaps for legitimate business reasons such as to confirm a suspicion that an employee is not working when he or she claims to be working, or to determine whether an employee is actually suffering an injury for which she has taken leave or is collecting workers’ compensation.

But employers should think twice about location monitoring that requires physical attachment of a devise to an employee-owned vehicle – engaging in such conduct may expose the employer to a common law action for trespass. However, such monitoring may be permissible in some circumstances when the device is attached to a company-owned vehicle.

Earlier this month, a federal district court in North Carolina found that a county employee who was discharged for falsifying time sheets and improper use of a county vehicle failed to show a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search violation resulting from his employer’s use of a GPS tracking device on his county-owned truck (Brookshire v Buncombe County, January 18, 2012, Howell, D). The location data garnered from the tracking device did not match the employee’s time sheets. The employee had also signed an MOU acknowledging that he did not have an expectation of privacy in items stored in the truck and that the vehicle could be searched at any time without notice. The decision, however, turned primarily on the prevailing view of the federal courts that there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy by a person traveling in a vehicle on a public roadway.

Taking a lesson from the Brookshire case, private employers that permit employees to use employer-owned vehicles should consider requiring those employees to sign an agreement acknowledging that the employee has no expectation of privacy in the vehicle or items located inside it, and that the employer has the right to access the vehicle without notice.

However, also incorporating a lesson from the concurring Justices in the Jones case, employers should avoid location monitoring during nonworking hours because such monitoring may impinge on the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even though the employee may be using a company-owned vehicle, cell phone or other electronic device.

Finally, the employer should conduct location monitoring only when it has a legitimate business need for doing so.

The Office found five of the seven social media policies to be overbroad and found that two were lawful; one of the two was lawful only after being revised. The Office found that several of the Facebook-related charges were unlawful because they stemmed from unlawful policies, but in one case, the Office recommended upholding the discharge because the employee’s comments were not work-related.

The memo does not reveal the names of the parties out of privacy concerns. Several of the cases are noteworthy, because they represent a departure from the majority of opinions issued by the Office finding no violation of the Act in social media-related cases.

In one case, after an employee at a collections agency was moved to a different call group, the employee blasted her management on her Facebook page. A conversation ensued with several co-workers in her post, with some of the colleagues saying that they were “behind” her. The employee was then fired. The Office found that the social media policy was overbroad because it prohibited “[m]aking disparaging comments about the company through any media, including online blogs, other electronic media or through the media.” That prohibition, found the Office, could be interpreted as restricting Section 7-protected statements, such as complaints of unfair treatment. Further, because the employee had initiated the conversation to complain about being moved to a less-desirable work group and because the conversation involved co-workers and the terms and conditions of employment, the Office found that the Facebook conversation was protected, concerted activity under the Act. Thus, the termination violated the Act.

In another case, the Office found that an employer unlawfully terminated an administrative assistant who posted comments on Facebook complaining about being reprimanded for her involvement in her fellow employees’ work-related problems. The employee had complained on Facebook about the termination of one of her co-workers, saying that she did not like that the employee was fired “for asking for help.” The employer told her not to give her opinion to co-workers who came to her for advice. She complained on Facebook about that order and the employer terminated her, citing the most recent posts and an earlier post in which she suggested that her manager displayed sexist attitudes. The Office found that the termination violated the Act, because the Facebook posts concerned terms and conditions of employment and because the employee’s co-workers had participated in several of the conversations. The Office also found that the employer had terminated the employee because it was concerned about where her conversations about terms and conditions of employment could lead.

In a third case, the Office found that a termination resulting from Facebook complaints about a mutual supervisor violated the Act. The employee initiated a Facebook conversation with co-workers after she was angered by the promotion of another co-worker. That conversation involved accusations of mismanagement and failures to provide raises or reviews. The employer terminated two of the employees and disciplined two others over the posts, and the Office found that the employees were engaged in protected concerted activity when they posted comments on Facebook because multiple employees were involved in a discussion that focused on terms and conditions of employment. The Office found that the terminations violated the Act, even though the employees had not made any plans for future concerted action, saying that the conversation was an “indispensable” step towards possible self-organizing.

In a fourth case, the Office found that an employer violated the Act when it terminated an employee who had participated in a co-worker’s Facebook conversation. The conversation focused on the allegedly negative attitude of a mutual supervisor, which they blamed for poor workplace morale. The employee blamed the supervisor and said she “hated the place,” and the employer terminated her. The Office found that it was “well established that employee complaints and criticism about a supervisor’s attitude and performance may be protected” and that, in the instant case, the employee’s post was part of employees’ concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, both because it was a continuation of earlier employee complaints to management about the supervisor, and because it was part of a discussion of shared concerns about terms and conditions of employment. Even though the employee’s comments focused on her own dissatisfaction, the Office found that the comment arose in the context of an ongoing discussion of terms and conditions of employment.

The Office also found that the comment had not lost the protections of the Act under the Board’s Atlantic Steel decision. Although the comment could have undermined morale, it was made during a discussion of terms and conditions of employment. The Office found that the “nature of the outburst” and “location” inquiries of Atlantic Steel combined to require consideration of the impact of the fact that the Facebook discussion could be viewed by third parties. The employer had argued that the employee had publicly disparaged the employer, thus justifying her termination, but the Office found that although the comments were critical, they were not defamatory and were not critical of the employer’s business policies or product. Thus, the Office found that the statement was protected language under the Act.

An employer’s social media policy was at the heart of another case in which the Office found that the policy, seen in the proper context, would not be seen as inhibiting protected actions. The policy allowed the employer to ask employees to confine their social networking to matters unrelated to the company, if securities regulations so required. The employer then barred employees from discussing in any form of social media “embargoed information,” such as pending reorganizations. The Office found that the rules were not unlawful, because even though the requirement could be construed to restrict employees from communicating regarding their terms and conditions of employment, in the overall context, employees reasonably would interpret the rule to address only those communications that could implicate security regulations. The Office also noted that employees do not have a protected right to disclose embargoes on corporate information and, thus, could not reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit communications about their working conditions.

Similarly, in a fifth case, an employee’s criticism of his employer following a deadly workplace shooting did not lose the Act’s protections. After the shooting, the employee had asserted that the employer’s conduct led to the shooting and frequently criticized the employee’s management style in published letters to a newspaper and in online comments on the paper’s website. Eventually, the employee posted a presentation online that he had made to his local council, charging the employer with Charging Party made a presentation multiple unfair labor practices filed, forced policy changes, unfair firings, harassment, and workplace bullying. The employer fired the employee, and the Office found that the comments were protected conduct, because they dealt with an ongoing labor dispute and because they were “the logical outgrowth” of conversations the employee had with co-workers about the terms and conditions of employment.

Moreover, the postings were not sufficiently defamatory to lose the Act’s protections. The Office noted that Allied Aviation Service protects public comments that air “highly sensitive issues.” In the instant case, the Office found that many of the online comments related to the employer’s alleged role in the shooting and that, however inflammatory, the comments also related to ongoing labor disputes. Thus, the comments were protected.

Source: CCH Editorial Staff.

The study, co-authored by Amy Hageman, assistant professor of accounting, found that the more information companies disclose about their sustainable practices, the more they are viewed as being environmentally friendly — even if their actual environmental performance is not strong. The study will be published in the journal Accounting, Organizations and Society. Other co-authors include Charles Cho of the ESSEC Business School in France, and Ronald Guidry and Dennis Patten, both of Illinois State University.

The researchers investigated environmental performance and perceptions of environmental reputation. They analyzed the annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports and 10-K financial reports of companies listed in Newsweek magazine’s 2009 green rankings of large U.S. companies.

Researchers found that companies with the worst environmental performance have the best environmental reputation. These included companies from environmentally sensitive industries like utilities, oil and gas. “The data suggests that many companies that have the worst performance actually disclose more, likely because they have a greater incentive to promote sustainability practices like investing in green technology,” Hageman said. “We also found that more extensive firm environmental disclosure is associated with more favorable environmental reputation scores, suggesting that higher levels of environmental disclosure appear to mediate the potential negative effects of poorer performance on environmental reputation.”

Environmental disclosures are often left to companies and are not heavily regulated by a government regulatory body, she said. “Although annual reports disclose the financials of a company, corporations can use it more as a marketing piece to spin their own stories, including positive messages about being green,” she said.

Researchers also analyzed the North American Dow Jones Sustainability Index, which is purported to reflect companies’ leadership in terms of corporate sustainability. Investors interested in buying green companies often use the index as a shortcut instead of thoroughly researching companies, Hageman said. But not even the well-known index escapes the sway of corporations. “Companies listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index have a much better environmental reputation,” Hageman said, “but the corporations on the index are ones that are disclosing more information — not the ones that are necessarily performing better environmentally.”

More than 54 percent of Americans own stocks through individual stocks, mutual funds or retirement plans, according to Gallup. “If people are relying on this index to invest in green companies, they’re really being swayed a lot more by what companies say they’re doing about the environment rather than their actual performance,” Hageman said.

The index also may be hindering improved future corporate environmental performance, according to the study. “Disclosure may actually reduce the incentives that companies have for improving their actual environmental performance in the future, because disclosure tends to reduce the potential negative effects of poor environmental performance,” Hageman said.

Source: Newswise.

Prerule stage: Non Discrimination In Compensation: Compensation Data Collection Tool (RIN: 1250-AA03). On August 10, 2011, the OFCCP published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register (76 FR 49398) regarding the agency’s consideration of the development of a new strategic compensation data collection tool that will effectively identify contractors that are likely to violate EO 11246. In addition, the data collection tool may play a key role in the agency’s establishment-specific, contractor-wide, and industry-wide analyses. Through publication of the ANPRM, the OFCCP sought from stakeholders on issues relating to the scope, content, and format of the tool to ensure that it is an effective and efficient data collection instrument. The comment period on the ANPRM closed on October 11, 2011. The agency plans to complete analysis on these comments in March 2012.

Proposed Rule Stage: Construction Contractor Affirmative Action Requirements (RIN: 1250-AA01). The OFCCP plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to revise the regulations in 41 CFR Parts 60-1 and 60-4 implementing the affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11246 that are applicable to federal and federally assisted construction contractors. The regulations implementing construction contractor affirmative action obligations under EO 11246, as amended, were last revised in 1980. According to the agency, these regulations have proven ineffective at making meaningful progress in the employment of women and certain minorities in the construction industry. The OFCCP notes that analysis of 2006 to 2008 data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey for 27 on-site construction occupations reveals a significant disparity between the percentage of women in construction occupations in the construction industry and the percentage of women in construction occupations in all other industries. The representation of African Americans in the construction industry is substantially less than would be expected given their representation in all other industries. For example, in 23 of the 27 occupations analyzed, disparities were found in the representation of African Americans.

This NPRM would remove outdated regulatory provisions, propose a new framework for implementing affirmative action requirements in the construction industry, and propose other revisions to the affirmative action requirements that reflect the realities of the labor market and employment practices in the construction industry today. The proposed rule would also propose standards for designating projects “mega construction projects.” There may be some additional costs to contractors as a result of the increased scope of required actions. The benefits would likely include increased diversity in construction workplaces and increased opportunities for women and minorities to obtain on-site construction jobs. More detailed cost and benefit analyses will be made as the NPRM is developed.

The OFCCP plans to issue this NPRM in April 2012.

Proposed Rule Stage: Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors; Evaluation of Recruitment and Placement Results under Section 503 (RIN: 1250-AA02). The OFCCP has published a NPRM to revise the regulations in 41 CFR Parts 60-741 that implement the nondiscrimination and affirmative action provisions of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. For the first time ever, the OFCCP is suggesting that federal contractors would be required to set a hiring goal of having seven percent of their employees be workers with disabilities in each job group of the contractors’ workforce, but it is soliciting comments on the potential use of a utilization range between four and ten percent. To annually evaluate their utilization of individuals with disabilities, the NPRM proposes that contractors use the job groups established for utilization analyses under their Executive Order (E.O.) 11246 affirmative action programs. The proposed goal is derived primarily from disability data collected as part of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. This NPRM would also amend the regulations to require that federal contractors and subcontractors increase linkages and conduct more substantive analyses of recruitment and placement actions taken under section 503. It would also make revisions to recordkeeping requirements.

An ANPRM was published in the Federal Register on July 23, 2010 (75 FR 43116) and the comment period on the ANPRM ended on September 21, 2010. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on December 9, 2011 (76 FR 77056) and the comment period ends on February 7, 2012.

Proposed Rule Stage: Sex Discrimination Guidelines (RIN: 1250-AA05). The OFCCP’s regulations at 41 CFR Part 60-20 set forth the interpretations and guidelines for implementing EO 11246 in regard to promoting and ensuring equal opportunities for all persons employed or seeking employment with government contractors and subcontractors without regard to sex. This nondiscrimination requirement also applies to contractors and subcontractors performing under federally assisted construction contracts. The guidance in Part 60-20 is more than 30 years old. The OFCCP will issue a NPRM to create sex discrimination regulations that reflect the current state of the law in this area.

The OFCCP plans to publish this NPRM in April 2012.

Final Rule Stage: Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors; Evaluation of Recruitment and Placement Results under the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 as amended (RIN: 1250-AA00). The OFCCP has issued a NPRM that would revise the regulations in 41 CFR Parts 60-250 and 60-300, implementing the nondiscrimination and affirmative action provisions of VEVRAA. This NPRM would strengthen the affirmative action requirements for federal contractors and subcontractors. It would amend the regulations to require that federal contractors and subcontractors conduct more substantive analyses of recruitment and placement actions taken under VEVRAA and would require the use of numerical targets to measure the effectiveness of affirmative action efforts. The NPRM would also make revisions to recordkeeping requirements.

The OFCCP published this NPRM in the Federal Register on April 25, 2011 (76 FR 23358) and the comment period, which was originally June 22, 2011, was extended to close on July 11, 2011 (76 FR 36482). The agency plans to publish its final rule in July 2012.

The OFCCP contact on these matters is: Debra A. Carr, Director, Division of Policy, Planning and Program Development, Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Room C3325, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC, 20210. Phone: 202 693-0103. E-mail: ofccp-public@dol.gov.

When asked the impact of employees’ personal financial challenges upon work performance, roughly one in five — 22 percent — of HR professionals cited a “large impact.” Sixty-one percent noted “some impact” while 16 percent responded, “slight impact.” Only two percent of HR professionals observed “no impact” upon workers.

“The source of money woes is unsurprising but the toll it’s taking on both workers and their employers, in addition to the persistence of the weak economy, are all troubling issues,” said Mark J. Schmit, Ph.D., SPHR, vice president of research at SHRM.

A closer look at the impact on work performance shows that:

• 47 percent of HR professionals noticed employees’ struggle with their “ability to focus on work;”
• 46 percent noticed issues with “overall employee stress;”
• 26 percent observed a negative impact on “overall employee productivity;”
• 24 percent said money woes are leading to “employee absenteeism and tardiness;”
• 20 percent are concerned about “overall employee morale;”
• 12 percent noticed a negative impact on “overall employee health;” and
• 7 percent said “working relationships with other employees” are the least impacted.

To understand what employer-sponsored financial education programs need to cover, the survey examined the sources of personal financial stress. Nearly half — 49 percent — of HR professionals said employees are stressed by an “overall lack of monetary funds to cover their personal expenses.” Some money woes were more specific like “medical expenses” and “saving for retirement” said 35 percent and 26 percent of HR professionals, respectively. Twenty-two percent of HR professionals attribute worker money woes to “credit card debt” and the same number also cited “home mortgage payments.”

Roughly 12 percent of HR professionals said “education expenses” were causing workers’ financial stress that was noticeable in the workplace. Education expenses include the employee’s own tuition costs, that for dependent children, or other family members.

More than half, 52 percent, of organizations represented in the survey currently provide financial education to their employees. A closer look shows that 79 percent offer access to an employee assistance program that includes financial counseling and resources. Sixty-eight percent provide financial education specific to employer-provided benefits such are retirement, medical insurance, and flexible spending accounts. Nearly half, or 47 percent, offer financial education limited to retirement-related planning. Among the 52 percent of organizations that teach employees about financial planning, 39 percent cover budgeting, paying for education, debt reduction, credit card use, homeownership, and taxes.

SHRM surveyed 458 randomly selected HR professionals from its membership.

Source: Society for Human Resource Management; www.shrm.org.

According to suit the EEOC filed in federal court in North Carolina, Craig Burns is a recovering drug addict who has been enrolled in a methadone treatment program since 2004 EDNC, No 5:11cv00430). In January 2010, United Insurance offered him a position as an insurance agent in its Raleigh office, conditioned upon his passing a drug test. After his drug test showed the presence of methadone in his system, the EEOC said Burns submitted a letter to United Insurance from his treatment provider explaining that he was participating in supervised methadone treatment program and taking legally prescribed medication as part of the treatment. However, upon receiving this information, the company notified Burns that he was not eligible for hire and withdrew its offer of employment, according to the Commission.

In addition to monetary damages, the two-year consent decree resolving the suit requires United Insurance to conduct training on an employer’s obligation to conduct an individualized assessment in determining whether an employee or applicant is disabled under the ADA; appropriate methods of determining whether an employee or applicant poses a direct threat under the ADA; and the obligation to engage in an interactive process under the ADA when an employee or applicant requests a reasonable accommodation. The company will also post a copy of its antidiscrimination policy at its headquarters in St. Louis.

“The ADA requires employers to make an individualized assessment of whether an individual can do the job rather than relying on fears or stereotypes,” advised Lynette A. Barnes, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Charlotte District, which includes the Raleigh Area Office, where the original charge of discrimination was filed.

CFOs were asked, “Compared to 12 months ago, are you more willing or less willing to negotiate salary with top job candidates?” Their responses: Much more willing (11 percent); Somewhat more willing (27 percent); No change (54 percent); Somewhat less willing (4 percent); Much less willing (1 percent); and Doesn’t apply/not hiring (3 percent).

The survey was developed by Robert Half International. It was conducted by an independent research firm and is based on telephone interviews with more than 1,600 chief financial officers (CFOs) from a stratified random sample of U.S. and Canadian companies with 20 or more employees.

Source: Robert Half International; www.roberthalf.com.

In such cases, if it appears likely that the case will not be resolved or arbitrated within a year, Solomon is suggesting that the Board should decide the case on the merits, rather than defer it. In addition, Solomon proposed applying the new policy to cases that have already been deferred for more than one year and has argued that such cases warrant a decision on the merits because of the Board’s expertise in such cases.

In conjunction with his push, Solomon issued a memo on Friday, January 20, directing regional staff to investigate whether there are significant backlogs or other probable delays in the grievance-arbitration process before making a determination to defer a case alleging Section 8(a)(1) and (3) violations. The memo states that if the arbitration of such claims are likely to be delayed by more than a year, the region should not defer the matter to the grievance-arbitration process, but should rather fully investigate the charge. If the charge is found to be meritorious, regional staff are directed to send the case to the Division of Advice. In addition, the memo directs regional offices to regularly monitor deferred cases, so that if the case is not in some way resolved within a year, the office could submit it to the Division of Advice.

The memo specifies that it applies only to union workplaces having a CBA with specific grievance-arbitration procedures. It also states that it applies to all pending cases, including those that have already been deferred for more than a year, but that it will not apply to typical Section 8(a)(5) cases, which often involve allegations of contractual violations.

Solomon is urging this revision now over concerns that delays in the arbitration process may “render enforcement of a Board order ‘pointless and obsolete.’” Solomon expresses concerns in today’s memorandum that by the time an arbitration decision leads to a Board decision, the nature of the workplace may have changed to such a degree that a Board order will have no effect.

His memo is an extension of an earlier directive that offered new ways for the Board to analyze arbitration awards to ensure that workers’ rights under the law have been addressed and protected.

Meanwhile, in an opinion piece in the National Review, former Member Peter Schaumber criticized the recent recess appointments of Sharon Block, Richard Griffin and Terence Flynn. Schaumber singled out the Griffin appointment for particular scorn, saying that his immediately prior employment, as general counsel for the International Union of Operating Engineers, should have disqualified him, based on the appearance of partisan views. Schaumber also said that the failure of both Block and Griffin to fill out a Senate questionnaire on potential conflicts of interest means that their suitability for the Board has not been established.

Source: CCH Editorial Staff.

Under the new rule, employers must also state that contraceptive services are available at sites such as community health centers, public clinics, and hospitals with income-based support. Churches, mosques, synagogues and other places of worship are already exempted from providing birth-control coverage.

• Military Service – In addition to the federal FMLA, many states also have laws providing for employee leave to care for family members deployed or injured in military service. The leave could also apply to time spent addressing issues that arise due to the call to active duty, such as making childcare or financial arrangements. Many states have also enacted laws which, like USERRA, protect the employment rights of employees who themselves took time off for military service. Employers covered by both federal and state law must follow the provisions most beneficial to employees.
• Emergency Volunteer Services – Many states have laws providing leave for, or protecting the employment rights of, employees who are volunteer firefighters or emergency workers. Some states provide this type of leave only for public employees.
• Jury Duty – Federal law prohibits employers from firing, threatening to fire, intimidating or coercing an employee because of jury service in a federal court. Nearly every state has a similar law and some states extend protection to employees called as witnesses in court proceedings.
• Voting – Many states have laws allowing employees time off to vote.
• Organ and Blood Donation – Many states require covered employers to give employees time off to donate bone marrow, organs, or blood.
• Domestic Violence – A growing number of states are requiring that certain employers grant leave to victims of domestic violence for purposes such as obtaining medical care or counseling, and attending court proceedings or meetings with prosecutors.
• School Activities – Some states require that covered employers give employees leave to attend school-related activities and conferences concerning their children.
• Disability Accommodation – Granting leave may be considered a reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability under the ADA or state discrimination laws. However, courts typically rule that an employer is not required to grant leave for an indefinite period of time, reasoning that this would either eliminate an essential job function or would cause an undue hardship.
• Religious Activities – The refusal to grant time off for an employee to observe his or her religion or attend a religious ceremony could be viewed as religious discrimination under federal and state law.

In addition to laws requiring that employers grant leave for certain activities, some states have “day of rest” laws requiring that employers give employees a certain amount of time off during each work week. Some of these laws apply only to certain industries. Employers that want additional information on their state leave laws should contact the state’s labor agency.