Reassessing the Supreme Court’s Decision in Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v MV Kota Manis & Ors (2025)

Procedural Certainty, Admiralty Autonomy, and the Role of Judicial Discretion in award of Costs

Victor Onyegbado

Samuel Adedoyin

Introduction

On the 25^th April, 2025, the Supreme Court of Nigeria delivered its decision in Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v MV Kota Manis & Ors^[1] , (Geepee’s Case), a case that has sparked interest and commentary among maritime law practitioners. Three important points are notable from the judgment; the first two being hard matters of law and procedure applicable to admiralty practice in the country and the third, – perhaps even more important – a restatement of the court’s attitude towards diversionary antics of litigators. Their lordships held that;

1. the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA) is inapplicable to to admiralty actions,
2. admiralty proceedings are sui generis and governed autonomously by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA)/Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rule (AJPR) and
3. delay tactics resulting in devaluation of commercial claims will attract the award of significant costs against the offending party.

This commentary reviews the judgment’s doctrinal coherence and its implications for admiralty litigation in Nigeria.

Factual Background

The Appellants^[2], Geepee Industries Ltd and Staco Industries Ltd, commenced an admiralty action in rem before the Federal High Court in Lagos, arising from a fire incident onboard the vessel MV Kota Manis. The suit sought liquidated damages in the sum of N98, 456,146.97, general damages of N100,000,000 and N10,000,000 as cost of action. The Respondents filed a Motion on Notice challenging jurisdiction of the Court, citing non-compliance with section 97 of the SCPA, which requires endorsement for service outside jurisdiction. In overruling and dismissing the objection,  the Federal High Court held that the SCPA is not applicable to admiralty actions in rem and ordered the Respondents to file their defence to the suit. Dissatisfied with the ruling of the Federal High Court, the Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal on 7 grounds.  The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Federal High Court and held that the provisions of the SCPA applies to admiralty cases. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s ruling, reaffirmed procedural autonomy of the Federal High Court in admiralty cases, and imposed ₦20 million in costs against the Respondents.

Nature of Admiralty Actions and applicability of Sheriffs and Civil Process Act

The crux of the appeal is the applicability of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to admiralty claims, specifically to the issuance and service of the related originating process. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that admiralty actions are sui generis and governed exclusively by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules (AJPR). For context as to why this is important, in the cases of MV Arabella v Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corp, (MV Arabella’s case)^[3] and Western Star & Ors v BL Lizard Shipping Co Ltd^[4] The Supreme Court appeared to have taken a divergent view of the same issue.

Reconciliation with Existing Precedent

Before the decision in Geepee’s case, the position of the law on applicability of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to the Federal High Court (The Admiralty Court) was postulated in the MV Arabella’s case where the Supreme Court held that the provision of section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act are applicable in all High Courts, including the Federal High Court. Their lordships held thus:

The provision of the section has nothing to do with the coverage of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, which is nation-wide. It is therefore a total misconception of the law to contend that the provision of the section is inapplicable to the Federal High Court because the jurisdiction of that court covers the entire nation. See Pp. 220-221, paras. H-A

 The decision in MV Arabella was the subject of widespread and justified criticism. The Court did not consider that the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act was enacted before the establishment of the Federal High Court and, as such, could not have been intended to apply to it. Additionally, the Court disregarded the clear provisions of the Federal High Court Act and its Rules, which define “outside jurisdiction” as “outside the Federal Republic of Nigeria” but instead applied principles relevant only to State High Courts to the Federal High Court. Despite significant dissatisfaction with the ruling, lower courts remained bound by it under the doctrine of stare decisis. This position was subsequently altered by the Supreme Court in the case of Akeredolu V. Abraham & 4 Ors^[5], where the Court took a definite stand on extent of territorial jurisdiction of Federal High Court thus:

The nationwide jurisdiction of the Federal High Court provided for in section 19(1) of the Federal High Court Act is strengthened by Order 6 rule 31 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 (Now Order 6 rule 31(1) FHCR 2019) which provides that in the Order, ‘out of jurisdiction’ means out of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In respect of processes issued in the Federal High Court to be served on a defendant at an address in any State of the Federation or in the Federal Capital Territory, it is one to be served within the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal High Court which comprises all the thirty-six States and the Federal Capital Territory as set out by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). In essence, the territorial boundaries of the Federation of Nigeria are the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as its processes apply as a matter of law throughout the country as the processes of a single court issued within jurisdiction. Thus, all its processes, including the initiating processes such as writ of summons, are to be regulated and governed by the Rules made by the Chief Judge to regulate the practice and procedure in the court pursuant to the powers vested in him by section 254 of the Constitution. Agip (Nig)Ltd. v. Agip Petroli International (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 34.

 The above position establishes that the conditions set out in section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act are not applicable to issuances and service of originating processes at the Federal High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court in Geepee’s case tows this jurisprudential line and elucidates specifically on the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as specialized, sui generis and strictly regulated by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA) and Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules (AJPR). Definitive pronouncements made therein perhaps also disentangle the last remaining sticky strands from the web of cases that unfortunately were MV Arabella’s legacy. For instance, in MV Western Star & Ors v BL Lizard Shipping Co Ltd (Supra), the Supreme Court took a similar position on rules governing issuance and service of court process outside jurisdiction where an action in rem and an action in personam are combined in the same admiralty claim. The Court held that;

In admiralty matters, where an action in rem is combined with an action in personam, the provisions of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and the Admiralty Jurisdiction/procedure Rules are applicable in addition to sections 96, 97 and 99 or any other section of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, when considering the issuance and service of process out of jurisdiction. Touton S.A. v. Grimaldi Compagnia Di Navigazioni SPA (2011) 4 WLR (Pt. 1236) 1 referred to. (P. 506, paras. E-F). Per OKORO, J.S.C.

Consequently, the Court in that case found that the service of the 2nd Respondent outside of the court’s jurisdiction without compliance with section 97 of the SCPA was defective.

In Geepee’s case, the Supreme Court emphatically stressed the sui generis nature of admiralty actions and the inapplicability of procedural rules designed for conventional inter party litigation. The Court thus appeared to indirectly^[6] overrule its previous decision in the MV Arabella case and Western Star on the applicability the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and concluded that applying the SCPA to admiralty in rem claims and to the Federal High Court generally was not only erroneous but often leads to miscarriage of justice.  As they did in Akeredolu’s case, their lordships restated the position of law that the SCPA is not applicable to the Federal High Court because of the national territorial jurisdiction of the court.

This court has in some recent cases guided the lower courts as to the need to stick to the appropriate Rules of court for the cases coming before them. See the cases of Samuel v. APC (2023) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1892) 195; PDP v. Uche & Ors. (2023) LPELR – 59604 (SC), where this Court clearly held that sections 95, 96, 97, 98 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act are not applicable to the Federal High Court…. The lower court did not reckon with the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules which is the Rule applicable to this admiralty action. The question raised at the lower court was whether the writ in this action was issued and served in compliance with the law. The question to ask is simply which law? The lower court took that law to mean Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Section 97 of the said Act was reproduced in the judgment of the lower court and it was relied upon by the lower court to allow the appeal. This section of the law has no application not only to an admiralty action but to the Federal High Court itself. See the dicta of Stephen Jonah Adah JSC at pages 24 – 25 of the Judgement.

The Court’s reaffirmation of the procedural autonomy of admiralty in rem actions builds squarely upon established precedent^[7]; authorities that form the bedrock of a principle that is both practical and jurisprudential – special proceedings operate with special rules.  That the complexity and transnational character of maritime commerce necessitate procedural rules that are tailored to the exigencies of shipping and admiralty law is of course a given. Seen in this light, the Geepee decision is a response to an enduring conflict between the general civil procedure regime under the SCPA and the specialized framework under the AJA and AJPR. It signals a definitive statement by the Supreme Court that admiralty in rem actions are insulated from procedural encumbrances that are foreign to their structure and purpose. It also harmonizes jurisprudence by disentangling admiralty procedure from the general service rules, particularly those designed for inter-state service of processes.

Furthermore, this clarification carries substantial practical implications. For one, it shields admiralty litigants from the procedural pitfalls that can arise when there is a misapplication of the SCPA to maritime proceedings, potentially invalidating service and nullifying legitimate claims. Second, it offers commercial predictability and reinforces Nigeria’s credibility as a maritime adjudicative hub. By eliminating ambiguities surrounding the service of processes, it advances procedural efficiency—a value that the courts have repeatedly identified as central to the administration of justice.^[8] The decision in Geepee’s case puts to bed all confusion relating to the appropriate rules and procedure for Admiralty claims in Nigeria.

The Nature of Costs: Discretion, Deterrence, and Proportionality of Award

Another significant feature of the Supreme Court’s decision in Geepee’s case is the “punitive” ₦20 million cost award imposed on the Respondents. While the court’s discretion to award costs is undoubtedly anchored on section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, such discretion is guided by well-settled principles. Costs must be awarded judicially and judiciously. Ordinarily, the award of cost by the Court is to serve a compensatory rather than punitive purpose. It is to indemnify the successful party rather than punish the losing party, Guinness Nigeria Plc v Nwoke (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt 689) 135. Indeed, in the context of Geepee’s case, the justification for the award is more grounded in the need for systemic deterrence than in case-specific justice. The Supreme Court emphasized the harm caused by the prolonged interlocutory process, frowning at the fact that it took 12 years for the jurisdictional objection to be resolved at the expense of the substantive claim which remained dormant with its value virtually dissipated.

In our present case, the merit of the dispute that caused the action filed on 3 – 4 – 2013 has remained unattended to and frozen for over 12 years, as attention is diverted to and focused on the preliminary objection to the competence of the issuance and service of the originating process. This judicial approach cannot yield Justice as it causes the judicial process to be so unduly protracted that the final outcome is rendered meaningless. The claim for a total sum of N98, 456,146.97 was filed on 3 – 4 – 2013 when the exchange rate between the naira and US dollars was N161 to one US dollar (see www.exchangerates.org.uk). Today, 25th April 2025, the naira to US dollar exchange rate is N1,600.00. So, as at 3 – 4 – 2013, the dollar equivalent of N98, 456,146.97 was USD 611,528.86. As of today, the dollar equivalent of N98, 456,146.97 is USD 61,535.09. By virtue of S.124 of the Evidence Act these facts being of common knowledge in Nigeria, need not be proved as their knowledge is not reasonably open to question. This massive devaluation of the amount claimed for due to the failure to try and determine the merit of the claim for 12 years has rendered the pursuit of justice in this case illusory and meaningless.”  Per Emmanuel Akomaye Agim JSC at Page 2-3 of his

Concurring Judgment.

 The Supreme Court’s position on the award of cost in Geepee’s case can be said to be drawn out of a need to discourage filing of frivolous preliminary objections tailored to occasion miscarriage of justice rather than discourage legitimate appeals and distort the role of appellate review in developing the law. The decision in Geepee’s case aligns precedents like Okafor v Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt 1043) 521, where the Supreme Court sanctioned a cost award to deter manifest abuse of court process. In Okafor, the litigant flagrantly disregarded procedural rules, thereby justifying deterrent costs. The Supreme Court was uneconomical in condemning the use of technicality as a tool for delayed justice, when it described the Respondents’ objection as “manipulation of court process” to prolong litigation through jurisdictional objections. The position of the Supreme Court in Geepee’s case on the award of cost also aligns with precedents such as Nyesom Wike v Peterside & Ors (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt 1512) 452, where the apex court warned that “it is high time we stamped out the filing of frivolous and vexatious appeals. The award of punitive costs is one way to curb this.” Similarly, in Arubo v Aiyeleru (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt 280) 126, the court used cost awards to deter procedural mischief and to protect the integrity of the appellate process.

Implications for Future Admiralty Litigation

The judgment in Geepee’s case achieves a twofold objective: it clarifies procedural autonomy in admiralty claims and signals judicial intolerance for delay tactics disguised as legitimate procedural objections. Going forward, courts and litigants alike are reminded that:

1. a)Admiralty writs need not comply with section 97 of the SCPA which is in fact not applicable to issuance and service of any writ in the Federal High Court
2. b)Delaying substantive adjudication of causes through interlocutory appeals will be met with judicial censure.

Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v MV Kota Manis & Ors is a landmark in Nigerian admiralty jurisprudence. It upholds the procedural autonomy of admiralty actions and discourages procedural abuse. By it, their lordships have, as it were, republished the recipe for cooking the first course of the admiralty action meals and, for good measure, warned that adopting any other cook book may be costly – too costly.

For any enquiries or assistance on any of the issues raised above, please contact us – +2347043293271; info@akabogulaw.com.

End notes

[1] (2025) LPELR-81075(SC)

[2] The Appellants were represented the law firm of Akabogu and Associates

[3] (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt 1097) 182, 190.

[4](2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 489

[5] (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt.1628) 510 at 532 (paras. G–H)

[6] Where there are conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, the proper approach is to follow the decision that is later in time, as it is presumed that the Court has considered its previous decisions and decided to depart from them.’’ See Oladipo v. Moba L.G(2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1186) 117 at 134.

[7] “Where a statute or rule of court makes specific provisions for the commencement or conduct of an action or application, the parties must comply strictly with those provisions.” Ogunsola v. NICON (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 148. Also the Latin maxim (also regarded as a canon of interpretation) generalia specialibus non derogant translates to special laws take precedence over general ones. It is typically applied to the effect that when a specific law or provision conflicts with a more general one, the specific provision should generally be given precedence.

[8] Okotie-Eboh v Manager (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt 905) 242, 275; Ajayi v Adebiyi (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt 1310) 137, 157.

By Dr. Emeka Akabogu

In a flurry of pricing plyometrics, the Dangote Petroleum Refinery and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation have in the last few weeks, announced consecutive reductions of their ex-depot prices for premium motor spirit (gasoline). Largely, it has been the latter responding to the former. The price reductions of the two bulk suppliers have seen prices move from N990 to N890 to N865 and most recently, to N815. Clearly, it is great news for the consumer, and music to free market idealists.

But a note of caution – some petroleum marketers have suggested that the price reductions could be part of a careful business strategy to eliminate competition. Some complain of buying products for one ex-depot price, only to be undercut the next day with a price reduction by the same supplier. They are then left with unsellable stock unless they dispose of it at a loss. There are also cases of a bulk supplier picking and choosing who to sell to and at what price, or offering uneven incentives to different retailers. Dangote Refinery is reported for instance to have exclusive supply and pricing arrangements with specific offtakers, which enable them sell at rates lower than others. This has a potential of effectively distorting the market and disabling competition.

A range of marketers have reported suffering huge losses in the last few months. A sustained continuance of this pattern will drive many a petroleum marketer out of business before long, thereby opening the window for entrenchment of monopoly interests. This is the mischief that poses a grave danger to Nigeria’s energy security.

In competition law, there is a concept known as predatory pricing. It happens when a dominant market player employs a deliberate strategy of driving competitors out of the market by setting very low prices or selling below the incremental costs of producing the output. Once the predator has successfully driven out existing competitors and deterred entry of new firms, it can raise prices and earn higher profits. There are also other restrictive agreements or arrangements which have the effect of stifling and ultimately suffocating market operators who are not favoured by the dominant player.

Nigerian law is against such practice, and other trends as are considered anti-competitive. Section 72(1) and (2) of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Act prohibits abuse of a dominant position by an operator, by among other things, “selling goods or services below their marginal or average cost” (see section 72(2)(iv)).

Other types of restrictive agreements are also unlawful, including those that facilitate discriminatory pricing and exclusive dealing. For instance section 62(1) of the FCCPC Act prohibits any two or more undertakings from agreeing “to refuse to supply goods or services to dealers except on terms and conditions that are less favourable than those applicable to other dealers carrying on business in similar circumstances…”

The Petroleum Industry Act also specifically prohibits a license holder from discriminating between customers or classes of customers “in respect of access, tariffs, prices, conditions or standards of service” (section 213). In addition, it requires the regulator to “monitor market behaviour including development and maintenance of competitive markets”, “determine whether there is any anti-competitive activity being carried on” and “arrest situations of abuse of dominant power” (section 210).

There is no doubt that the dynamics occasioned by the entry of Dangote Petroleum Refinery into the market has thrust the Nigerian downstream petroleum market into uncharted territory. It is an opportunity for strong regulatory action, further development of the law and for Nigeria to set a benchmark for the rest of Africa.

Dr. Emeka Akabogu is a commercial lawyer and Senior Partner at the law firm, Akabogu and Associates.