abu muqawama

This Blog Has Stone Cold Moved

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 20:02:00 +0000

Many thanks to the folks at Blogspot for hosting me and my crew these past 2+ years, but this blog has a new home at

http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama

Continue the conversation there. Bloggers, please update your blogrolls.

Triage: The Next 12 Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 17:24:00 +0000

I was hoping to roll out the new CNAS report on Afghanistan and Pakistan with the new and improved Abu Muqawama. Alas ... the new and improved Abu Muqawama is still dealing with a few glitches. Expect that online later today or over the weekend. (I will just say this, though: Old Abu Muqawama is to Blue Steel what New Abu Muqawama is to Magnum.)

In the meantime, digest the new report -- authored by me, Dave Kilcullen, Nate Fick, and Ahmed Humayun -- on Afghanistan and Pakistan that will be formally released next week.

When I arrived at CNAS, I was a bit hesitant to lead the team working on this report. As you all know, I last served in Afghanistan in 2004 and have spent most of the past five years in the Arabic-speaking world. One of the great things about developing expertise about one region of the world, though, is that when you look at new regions, you more quickly -- to borrow a favorite phrase of Donald Rumsfeld -- know what you do not know.

So with the blessing of CNAS, I hired Christian Bleuer, Josh Foust, and Nick Schmidle as consultants and to make sure I got my facts straight. I am not the "pro's pro" on Afghanistan, but luckily, I know plenty of people who are. This report, then, benefited greatly from the many readers -- some in the United States, some in Europe, some in Central Asia -- who took the time to provide suggestions and tell us where we were getting things wrong in earlier drafts.

The second reservation I had about this project was that the administration, U.S. Central Command, and the Joint Chiefs had already conducted three strategic reviews on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it looked as if the president had already settled on his policy and a strategy. How, then, to be useful?

What we agreed to do was to offer four operational recommendations -- two for Afghanistan, two for Pakistan -- and to then provide metrics for gauging whether or not the U.S. and allied strategy was succeeding or failing. In the end, I think we have managed to write both a provocative and useful policy paper.

This next week, LTG (Ret.) David Barno will lead a discussion on this paper at the CNAS annual conference. Andrew Bacevich and COL Chris Cavoli will also be there to provide critiques and to contribute to the discussion. I tried to recruit co-panelists who would both provide a balanced assessment of the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels. I also tried to find people who might disagree with parts of our argument. It should be a lively discussion. In the meantime, read the report and sound off in the comments.

Concepts, We Are Developing

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 16:51:00 +0000

General Mattis has a vision.

The Speech

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 14:26:00 +0000

Okay, it was a really good speech. I finally listened to it -- I had read it on paper yesterday morning -- and he nailed it. I mean, he botched a lot of the Arabic words (hijab, al-Azhar, etc.), but it was good. I suspect that I agree with the Washington Post that all anyone will remember will be the Israel stuff, and that's too bad. And I even agree with the very end of Krauthammer's unintentionally hilarious and epic whine about settlements today (in Israel, only far-right MPs struck the same tone as Krauthammer yesterday) when he says this might cause some leaders in the Arabic-speaking world to just sit on their hands and expect Obama to deliver Israeli concessions with no movement on their sides. (Because this was exactly the vibe I got during Abu Mazen's press conference with Obama last week.)

But still, it was a really good speech. I watched it using this cool interactive feature provided by the New York Times, so if you have not seen the speech yet, click here.

Drones

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 17:54:00 +0000

I love it when readers contact me with "You've probably already seen this, but..."

No, no, the odds are I have not already seen it. I really appreciate the tips from the readership, such as the one pointing toward this IISS briefing on drone strikes. (Thanks, JP.)

Does anyone else get the sense...

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 17:13:00 +0000

...that Obama's big speech in Cairo today is a bigger deal in the Western world than it is in the Arabic-speaking and Islamic worlds? The speech is only the #2 story on al-Jazeera right now, behind the clash between Palestinian security forces and Hamas in Qalqilya.

Marc Lynch, meanwhile, has as good an immediate analysis as you are likely to read anywhere.

The Lebanese Armed Forces: The Case for Continuing Aid -- Come Hizballah or High Water

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 13:13:00 +0000

I have said before that -- now that I am no longer based in Beirut -- this blog is probably not the go-to place for in-depth commentary on the Lebanese elections. But in the next few paragraphs I am going to make a case for continuing aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) no matter the outcome of this weekend's poll.

The arguments against continuing aid to the LAF are well known and will be advanced by both Israel's more hard-core supporters in the Congress as well as some thoughtful people out of government who follow this issue closely. Elections matter, they will say, and Lebanon cannot expect us to continue to provide arms and training to the LAF if Hiz-bu-freaking-allah is leading the government. Additionally, David Schenker -- who worked this issue for the Department of Defense and who continues to follow Lebanon closely -- has a series of grave and not unreasonable concerns about the direction in which the LAF is heading.

These are persuasive arguments. In the following few paragraphs, though, I am going to lay out a case for why the United States should continue its support to the LAF along pre-2009 levels.

As Bilal Saab and others have argued, a coherent U.S. strategy in Lebanon requires long-term investments in the institutions of the state -- not money given depending on who happens to win a few extra seats in the Metn. Aid to the LAF has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Lebanon since the end of that country's civil war and should not be radically altered following this election. Because...
Nothing is really going to change. Hizballah is already in the government. There are rumors, in fact, that Hizballah will take fewer seats in the next cabinet than in this one -- even if their coalition wins. So we have been giving money to a government of which Hizballah is a part for some time now. Again, why should a few seats in the Metn change U.S. policy?
Hizballah doesn't need the arms we're giving the LAF. How effective do you think a few old tanks and some basic close air support would be against the IDF in a fight? Not very -- ask any Palestinian or Lebanese who fought in 1982 how well militias perform when they attempt to fight the Israelis using modern and advanced weapons platforms. As far as the combat was concerned in 2006, Hizballah hung in there with the IDF largely through really competent small units fighting with home-field advantage, a well-prepared rocket campaign, some pretty good information operations, and highly effective use of anti-tank munitions. (Not to mention a very good information campaign and a plan to provide essential services to its constituency both before and after the fighting ended. And I'm not even going to get into the IDF's myriad strategic and operational failings.) If I am a commander in the IDF and I think Hizballah is going to fight this next war with crappy hand-me-down tanks, I am licking my chops along the Blue Line. Those arms we are giving to the LAF are intended to help the LAF content with domestic threats. And against a group like Fatah al-Islam, rudimentary armor capabilities and (proposed) close air support platforms can have a devastating effect. Which leads me to my final point.
Pakistan. Yes, Pakistan. Once upon a time, way back in 1989, U.S. policy-makers made a very logical and seemingly intelligent decision to suspend our aid to the Pakistani military. Acting under the Pressler Amendment, George H.W. Bush (not a dumb man, that one) decided that unless we could determine Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, we should suspend the delivery of some much-prized F-16 aircraft. Again, this was a sound decision at the time. But looking back on it from 2009, it has cost us dearly. We do not have the kind of close ties with the Pakistani officer corps that we really need right now largely because we were "divorced" between 1989 and 2001 -- and those relationships cannot be built anew overnight. In 2009, we need the Pakistani military to fight Islamist militants in that country and have discovered that a) our two militaries cannot agree on a common threat and that b) we the United States do not have ties as close to the Pakistani Army as does the Taliban. In the future, I am guessing the ungoverned spaces in Lebanon -- the Palestinian refugee camps, specifically -- will continue to harbor violent transnational groups. We will badly need a local partner -- even an imperfect one -- to combat these threats. We should be trying to nurture relationships with the next generation of the Lebanese officer corps and security services if we're serious about the threat these transnational groups pose. (And if you don't see these groups as a problem, read this book.)

If you ask anyone in U.S. Central Command or the Department of Defense, they will point toward our aid to the Lebanese as being important for securing U.S. interests in the region. Those interests do not go away if a coalition including Hizballah wins this next election. Now this does not mean that the United States simply bankrolls the entire LAF -- as some people apparently believe that we should. The LAF, according to the CSIS, needs about $1 billion in immediate investment, and it is unreasonable to expect the United States to underwrite that sum. Because it also needs internal reforms that have nothing to do with external aid, and until those reforms are undertaken or until Lebanon has an agreed-upon national defense strategy, money will continue to be spent toward a bloated officer corps and to build the kind of military organization Lebanon's higher command wants rather than that which best serves the nation's interest.*

P.S. While we're on the Lebanese elections, I would be remiss if I did not recommend the profile of Michel Aoun by Elias Muhanna (Qifa Nabki to many of you) in this weekend's National. A timely reminder that the opposition is not just Hizballah. It's also a cantankerous old man and his followers.

*Lebanon is a delightful case study for the "emulation" school of military innovation theory. Some senior commanders in the LAF, having grown up in the armored community, want Lebanon to have a mechanized army with the latest and greatest tanks and vehicles. Never mind the fact that such an army -- due mostly to Lebanon's size -- would get crushed by either the IDF or the Syrian Army in a conventional fight. Sometimes armies desire to look like what they think a "modern" army should look like rather than what would be most militarily effective. Militias can do the same thing -- just look at the PLO in 1982. (Why did they need all that artillery and vehicles? So the IAF would have something to shoot at?) Effective military organizations, meanwhile, adopt the kind of force structure that makes sense in terms of their threat environment and the kinds of conflicts they expect to face. Pop quiz: How many tanks does Hizballah own? ... Exactly.

And take your Jomini with you! (Updated)

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 19:10:00 +0000

Michael Cohen asks:

Over at abu muqawama, Andrew Exum makes an audacious claim about the proper metric for success in Afghanistan. In responding to a WSJ article about the military's growing use of body counts to measure succes in Afghanistan, Exum writes:
In the context of a counterinsurgency campaign -- which we can all agree we're engaged in -- enemy body count is a poor metric. Civilian body counts, by contrast, are a better metric -- the fewer civilians dying, the better. . . I know the public affairs officers in Afghanistan are trying their best, but by publicizing enemy body counts as part of one's communications plan, you create the impression that we ourselves are using enemy body count as an effective metric to track success and failure. Which I hope to goodness we are not.
First of all, we don't all agree that we're engaged in a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Indeed, I'm pretty sure President Obama would not agree that we are engaged in a full-fledged counter-insurgency campaign. (Perhaps COIN-lite or Skim COIN).
Beyond that point, forgive me for asking the obvious question - and at risk of being derided as an old fashioned, lost in the weeds, conventional warrior - but isn't the point of war-fighting to kill the enemy?

Where, dear readers, would you like me to start with this one?

Let's start with my "audacious claim". Civilian casualties were the metric we used to gauge success in Iraq in 2007. This is nothing audacious to anyone who has followed U.S. operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. General McCrystal is saying the same thing, in fact, about Afghanistan:

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General McChrystal said the measure of American and allied effectiveness would be “the number of Afghans shielded from violence,” not the number of enemies killed.

If we were fighting, oh, Nazi Germany, the killing of the enemy might be enough to win the war. In an irregular fight in which the enemy does not have a fixed number of troops or when killing civilians might actually create more new enemy combatants than you can kill, that's not really an option.

Moving on, are you serious? Is there really someone left out there that thinks the goal of war-fighting is the destruction of the enemy's fighting forces and not the accomplishment of political aims? Really? Aren't we past this? Has Antoine Henri-Jomini been reincarnated as a fellow at the New America Foundation?

Look, I realize that I am preaching to the choir (choir = people who have read Chapters One and Two of Book I of On War), but the destruction of the enemy's fighting force is just a military objective and not necessarily the end itself.

The political object -- the original motive for the war -- will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.

For goodness sake, that's on the eighth friggin page of On War! Could you not read at least that far? Now this, from Chapter Two of Book I:

The purpose in question may be the destruction of the enemy's forces, but not necessarily so; it may be quite different.

A few weeks back, a political scientist I know broached the theory that Michael Cohen is a secret GOP plot to re-convince voters to never take Democrats seriously when they talk of defense policy. I laughed when he said this, but I am now thinking he might be right. C'mon, man, we get that you don't like counterinsurgency. Great. But give me this: surely the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the pundit has to make is to establish the kind of war about which he is running his mouth off.

Update: My comments sections, for once, keeps its cool when I do not. Check out what Ryan (6:44) and SNLII (8:34 and 8:34) have to say.

Rid, Exum and War 2.0

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 14:08:00 +0000

Those of you who do not live in the DC area or could not attend yesterday's event can listen to Thomas Rid and me discuss his important new book here. (Pardon the scratchy audio.)

Killing bad guys civilians

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 13:15:00 +0000

Afghanistan is all over the news today, and not all of what is reported is good. To begin, a U.S. military report has concluded that U.S. soldiers and airmen were at fault for civilian deaths in a 4 May air strike which provoked outrage among Afghans.

According to the senior military official, the report on the May 4 raids found that one plane was cleared to attack Taliban fighters, but then had to circle back and did not reconfirm the target before dropping bombs, leaving open the possibility that the militants had fled the site or that civilians had entered the target area in the intervening few minutes.
In another case, a compound of buildings where militants were massing for a possible counterattack against American and Afghan troops was struck in violation of rules that required a more imminent threat to justify putting high-density village dwellings at risk, the official said.
“In several instances where there was a legitimate threat, the choice of how to deal with that threat did not comply with the standing rules of engagement,” said the military official, who provided a broad summary of the report’s initial findings on the condition of anonymity because the inquiry was not yet complete.

It is worth noting that the investigating officer for this report was not some cuddly JAG officer who has never seen combat but rather one of the most respected special operators in the U.S. Army -- a man who has no problem, I can assure you, killing bad guys. (His ridiculous bio is here.) On the one hand, it's nice to see the U.S. military step up and admit fault. On the other hand, if this incident is emblematic of a culture in the U.S. forces in Afghanistan that plays free and loose with 2,500-pound bombs, that's not good at all.

Continuing the round-up of bad news, my longtime friend Sean Naylor -- a man I first met while on patrol in the Shah-e-Kot Valley in March 2002 -- reports from Afghanistan that the insurgents are getting better.

The insurgents’ modern gear and the relative sophistication of their tactics and marksmanship indicated that these were not local guerrillas. The use of body armor, helmets and smoke grenades is “fairly rare” anywhere in Afghanistan, and “most likely indicates a skilled group [of] … foreign fighters with funding and previous experience [and] training,” an Army source in Afghanistan said.
This view was supported by the fact that coalition interpreters monitoring the guerrillas’ communications said they heard two non-Afghan languages. One was Farsi, Cannata said, adding that the interpreters had specifically identified the language as such, rather than Dari, a language spoken in northern and western Afghanistan that is closely related to Farsi but is not usually spoken by the Pashtuns from whom the Taliban draw their recruits.
Farsi, or Persian, is the principal language spoken in Iran. But Cannata was quick to caution against assuming that the presence of Farsi-speaking insurgents indicated that Iranian operatives were fighting U.S. troops. “That doesn’t necessarily mean ‘Iranian,’ I wouldn’t want to lead anybody down the wrong route on that,” Cannata said. Versions of Farsi are also spoken in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

And finally, this might be the worst news of the day. Yesterday's hearings on Capitol Hill were kind of important, right? I mean, the confirmation of a controversial new commander for the war in Afghanistan should have attracted as much attention as the Spring 2007 hearing with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, right?

The U.S. Senate thought so as well and reserved three tables for the media. One of those tables -- one -- was actually filled. Two bloggers and a clutch of print media were present. That was it. Those of you wishing for the death of the hated MSM should be careful -- you might get what you want.

Dave Kilcullen on Aussie TV

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 20:21:00 +0000

Talkin' sense. Read the transcript and watch the video here.

In Afghanistan, we have a lot of support from the local population and we have, you know, a very large level of international community commitment. In Pakistan on the other hand, we've got 100 nuclear weapons, we've got Al Qaeda headquarters sitting right there in the part of the country that the government doesn't control. We've got a huge developed country and the potential for extremist takeover if this doesn't go well, and that's a problem that should really keep most of us awake at night because of the number of nuclear weapons involved and the fact this is a central part of South Asia, not some kind of backwater.

Charity Opportunities

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 20:02:00 +0000

Gang,

Allow me to take a break for one moment from all my counterinsurgenting to highlight two worthy causes to which I am tied. The first is that I will be going for an early-morning run on Saturday with some members of my local rugby team for the Susan G. Komen Race for the Cure. You can donate here. (Search for my name -- Exum, not Muqawama. Oh, and I'll be running in a pack and for fun, so please don't go expecting me to run sub-18:00.)

Second, that same local rugby team is running a casino night on 13 June that will benefit the Hoop Dreams Scholarship Fund. If you live in the DC area, paying $65 for an open bar and some ridiculous donated prizes is a great deal and benefits a worthy cause. Let me stress again the most important thing about that last sentence: open bar. Anyway, click here for a ticket.

Thanks,

Abu Muqawama

Metrics that Matter

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 18:26:00 +0000

NYT:

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General McChrystal said the measure of American and allied effectiveness would be “the number of Afghans shielded from violence,” not the number of enemies killed.

McHugh for the Army

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 15:36:00 +0000

I have been in a meeting for the past hour and a half and returned to read my comments and discover that John McHugh, a Republican congressman from upstate New York, will be the next Secretary of the Army pending confirmation. My initial thoughts on this are, first off, relief that a defense industry executive such as Arnold Punaro was not named. (No disrespect to Mr. Punaro, by the way -- for all I know he is a great American. I am just very wary of putting executives with responsibility for weapons systems like the Future Combat Systems in charge of the services trying to decide whether or not those weapons systems are good investments.) Second, I am really excited about this particular choice. McHugh is the latest of many pragmatic, centrist Republicans and Democrats to be installed or retained in President Obama's Department of Defense, and I have first-hand experience of Rep. McHugh's knowledge of defense matters and concern for our nation's fighting men and women. (I was once stationed at Fort Drum, near Rep. McHugh's hometown, and closely followed the degree to which he served as an advocate for soldiers in the Congress.) Third, this seems like really smart politics. The odds favor McHugh being replaced in his district by a centrist Democrat, wouldn't you say? Or at least a Republican set to get rolled by redistricting? (These are crafty folks, these Chicagoans occupying the White House.)

In the end, I think this is a good choice for both the U.S. Army and the country.

Confirm Him

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 13:29:00 +0000

Like many of you, I too will be watching today's examination of General Stan McChrystal by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I expect the Senate to erect four obstacles for McChrystal to negotiate before being confirmed:

The downward trajectory of the war in Afghanistan -- and what he intends to do differently.
General McChrystal's direct action special operations experience -- and how that will hinder or help him in his new role.
The alleged abuse of detainees by soldiers under McChrystal's command in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The aftermath of the death of Pat Tillman in Afghanistan.

I am very much hoping the hearing today focuses on the first two issues to the exclusion of the second two. Which is not to say the second two questions do not matter -- they do. But unless General McChrystal is found to have personally directed his men to abuse detainees in order to extract intelligence -- or did not take appropriate action to halt the abuse once he discovered it was taking place -- this should not be a serious roadblock to confirmation. It is indeed regrettable that no senior leaders (I count one U.S. Army Reserve brigadier general) have been punished for the abuse of detainees while lower-ranking soldiers have been prosecuted. But the failures that led to the abuse of detainees were a collective failure of the officer corps to prepare its soldiers for low-intensity combat and the proper treatment of detainees in a non-linear environment. (How can you execute the 5 s's when you can't speed anyone to the rear because there is no "rear"?) All of us -- from the Joint Chiefs on down to Lieutenant Exum -- deserve some blame for what happened.

And with respect to the Tillman Affair (full disclosure: I was in Afghanistan, with the Rangers, at the time, so I am hardly objective here), McChrystal was by all accounts not one of the officers in the chain of command who made really egregious errors or misjudgments -- he even warned off his high command from turning Ranger Tillman into some great hero before all the facts were in. Those who did make mistakes have by now been properly censured. The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family by the death of Ranger Tillman and the government's clumsy handling of the situation. (And nothing is ever going to stop dishonest hacks from using the circumstances surrounding the death to score ugly political cheap shots, slandering veterans while at the same time claiming to represent them.) And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family and their incredible sacrifice, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man the president, the Secretary of Defense, and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States and its allies the best chance of victory in Afghanistan and will best prevent the deaths of more brave U.S. soldiers -- not to mention Afghan civilians.

The debate, instead, should focus on those first two questions. I have come to fear that -- after the conclusion of the strategic reviews into Afghanistan and Pakistan -- there is no real sense of urgency in Washington to deal with Afghanistan. I know that sounds crazy, but given the number of things competing for time on the president's agenda -- North Korea, GM, Israeli settlers, health care -- Afghanistan is suffering again from a lack of attention, and there does not seem to be a unified interagency effort to push resources and focus attention toward the commanders on the ground.

Today is an opportunity for the Senate to focus the eyes of the nation back on Afghanistan and demand of General McChrystal how, exactly, he intends to carry out the president's strategy. How will he measure success? How will he secure the population? How will he ensure the passage of a free and fair election in August? These are serious question and are more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees. (And this blog has, for the record, always taken a firm stance against torture.)

In the end, the Senate should put General McChrystal through the wringer today, demanding he answer how, exactly, he intends to pursue victory. And then they should confirm him. Afghanistan is in a state of emergency, and policy-makers in Washington would best respond to it with a sense of urgency.

Update: There are some really good questions and comments in the comments section of this post. Just to clarify matters, I do not expect the Senate to rubber-stamp this appointment and fully recognize their Constitutional obligations and prerogatives. I just feel the seriousness of the situation in Afghanistan -- and the fact that our defense leaders feel General McChrystal is the right man to address those challenges -- should be foremost in the minds of policy-makers as they consider McChrystal's nomination.

Intern Nick Strikes Again

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 04:05:00 +0000

Well, CNAS loses a great intern, but the Naval Postgraduate School gains a new research assistant. Nick Masellis has left CNAS, but he has another contribution on SWJ:

...when I first arrived to the city and noticed the massive golden domes, I knew nothing of their significance; I knew nothing of the story behind the shrines and the history behind them; and I was still ignorant of the general cultural milieu. I was not at all unique – we all were mesmerized by the mosques and the culture around us, but had no clue where to begin in order to understand what they meant in the context of our presence among the people apart from: 1. do not get near the mosques; and 2. do not fire on them if fired upon from its vicinity. But more importantly, the prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be that we didn’t really have to understand anything beyond the latter. That seemed to be a reasonable tenant; after all, why would it be necessary to know such things about any given area, people or buildings? How, if at all, is it pertinent to the mission?

Threat of the Day

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 22:28:00 +0000

Okay, you all know I make a point of never blogging about Israel and the Palestinian Territories, but this paragraph from Akiva Eldar, tongue firmly in cheek, made me laugh today:

Instead of dismantling settlements, [Obama] would do better to dismantle the Iranian nuclear program. Otherwise Jerusalem will reassess its special relationship with Washington, and will reconsider its commitment to ensuring the qualitative advantage of the United States. If this situation continues, we may even stop vetoing anti-American decisions in the United Nations Security Council.

From the Dept. of Friends Selling the Books of Friends

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 19:13:00 +0000

I just finished moderating a great conversation with Thomas Rid about his new book, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age.

I cannot recommend this book highly enough. Those of you in the below post on Afghanistan had some good questions about information operations and how to measure their effectiveness. More than any other book or article I have read, Thomas and his co-author (Marc Hecker, the French scholar) explain the importance of information operations in contemporary insurgent conflicts and how some military organizations perform with skill while others fail. I have added this book to the counterinsurgency reading list we maintain and, again, would encourage you all to buy it (despite the prohibitive Praeger price).

The book, after carefully examining information operations of counterinsurgents and insurgents alike, puts forth several provocative theses, among them the idea that al Qaeda, because of the way their message only appeals to a small elite, will never grow to be a popular movement -- a true insurgency -- but that the governments of the West will never be able to eradicate the terror threat. The "long tail" idea at the end -- and how al Qaeda will always be a "terror" group appealing to a niche audience and never a true popular insurgency -- is really interesting.

For those of you who were unable to attend today's event -- and many of the blog's readers were there and were kind enough to say hello afterward -- we might get a sound recording of the event to post on the blog. Irony of ironies, we had a technological malfunction while discussing information technology, but hopefully the recording is still audible.

Afghanistan Lessons Learned

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 19:07:00 +0000

I'm a bit late to this new website featuring lessons learned for leaders deploying to Afghanistan. A reader tipped me off, but I have not linked to it until now. Promising, and needed.

Afghanistan: the Good and the Bad

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 15:21:00 +0000

Goodness gracious, what is going on my country? My co-religionists are assassinating people in their churches and the U.S. and Canadian governments, by the end of today, will own 72% of General Motors. Is there any good news out there? Maybe, uh, in Afghanistan?

Well, yes and no.

On the one hand, this encouraging article from yesterday's New York Times shows the way effective population-centric counterinsurgency operations can affect a region in Afghanistan.

“Compared with last year, it’s 100 percent different,” said Muhamed Zaker, an apple farmer from the area.

On the other hand, another article, in today's Wall Street Journal, explains the way in which the U.S. military, channeling Westmoreland apparently, is now using body counts as a metric in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, counting bodies is now more prevalent than it ever was in Iraq.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the military saw itself as fighting a few holdouts and, as often as not, reported their deaths. By 2005, however, commanders decided to avoid body counts, largely on the grounds they had proved unreliable, according to James Yonts, military spokesman at the time.

By 2007, it was apparent that Taliban, al Qaeda and other holdouts were actually conducting a full-fledged insurgency. The U.S.-led coalition realized that it -- and the Afghan government -- had to win the battle for legitimacy. At that point, public-affairs officers usually eschewed casualty reports because they feared that by focusing on killing, they would distract from the improvements Afghan authorities and their coalition backers were bringing to people's lives.

Body counts were "kind of a politically sensitive issue," says former Lt. Col. David Accetta, director of the 82nd Airborne Division's media operation at Bagram Airfield in 2007. Death tallies aren't "any kind of measurement or metric of success," says Mr. Accetta, who has since retired from the military.

Col. Cavoli, the former battalion commander, says his men fired thousands of rounds of artillery at insurgents along the Pakistan border during a tour lasting more than a year, ending in 2007. But "making the enemy irrelevant in the minds of the people was a much more profound defeat for the enemy than killing some of his members or even killing a lot of his people," says Col. Cavoli, who went on to teach counterinsurgency techniques to North Atlantic Treaty Organization officers.

The Army began a rethink when the 101st Airborne Division took over Afghan media operations in April 2008. Commanders worried the U.S.-led coalition appeared to be losing ground. The U.S. military routinely releases information about Americans killed in action. Since Sept. 11, 2001, 618 Americans have died in and around Afghanistan, 456 killed in combat. Remaining silent about enemy deaths gave the false impression that the U.S. was losing, says Lt. Col. Nielson-Green, spokeswoman for the 101st and a proponent of the new approach.

As far as I am concerned, Chris Cavoli has it right and the well-meaning gang in Afghanistan now is misguided. In the context of a counterinsurgency campaign -- which we can all agree we're engaged in -- enemy body count is a poor metric. Civilian body counts, by contrast, are a better metric -- the fewer civilians dying, the better. In our soon-to-be-released paper from CNAS on Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will have an entire chapter dedicated to metrics you can use to track the administration's new strategy. Enemy body count, I can assure you, is no where to be found. I know the public affairs officers in Afghanistan are trying their best, but by publicizing enemy body counts as part of one's communications plan, you create the impression that we ourselves are using enemy body count as an effective metric to track success and failure. Which I hope to goodness we are not.

Drone Strikes: The Pushback

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 13:21:00 +0000

A clutch of anonymous intelligence and military officials -- no doubt stung by the degree to which the efficacy of drone attacks in Pakistan has been questioned of late -- have hit back in defense of the strikes in an article written by the reliable Karen DeYoung in today's Washington Post.

Judging by reports from the region through late April, the Obama administration authorized about four or five Predator attacks a month, maintaining a pace set by the Bush administration in August. The CIA, which does not publicly acknowledge the attacks, operates the aircraft, chooses the targets -- ideally with the cooperation of Pakistani intelligence on the ground -- and has White House authority to fire the missiles without prior consultation outside the intelligence agency. A senior Pakistani official said the rate has not diminished in recent weeks, although "you don't hear so much about it" because the strike areas have been more isolated.

"There are better targets and better intelligence on the ground," the Pakistani official said. "It's less of a crapshoot."

A second U.S. military official agreed, saying, "We're not getting civilians, and not getting outrage beyond the usual stuff."

The article did not question the claims made by the officials or offer counter-claims. It did, however, leak this classified memorandum written by General Petraeus just four days ago:

"Anti-U.S. sentiment has already been increasing in Pakistan . . . especially in regard to cross-border and reported drone strikes, which Pakistanis perceive to cause unacceptable civilian casualties," Petraeus wrote. Nearly two-thirds of Pakistanis oppose counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, he said, and "35 percent say they do not support U.S. strikes into Pakistan, even if they are coordinated with the GOP [government of Pakistan] and the Pakistan Military ahead of time."

First off, it is my understanding that there is a growing divide in the special operations community about these strikes. No surprise, the direct-action side of the house is in favor of them, while the indirect-action guys are more skeptical.

Second, I should point out that -- appearances to the contrary -- I am not a hardliner about these strikes. If someone can demonstrate to me that these strikes are not a tactic substituting for a strategy and that they indeed fit into a coherent strategy, I will be a lot less skeptical about them. And if these strikes were accompanied by both effective strategic communications and properly resourced information operations, I would be even less skeptical. Oh, and if you throw in a proper incentive structure for the tribes living in the FATA and NWFP, I would be more or less happy.

But here's what's not going to sway my opinion: pointing out these drone strikes are killing more bad guys and less civilians than is reported in the Pakistani media. I know they are. But I am more concerned about these strikes are perceived than their actual BDA. And if they continue to contribute to the dynamic described by General Petraeus in his memorandum, then I remain an opponent of these strikes until the conditions in the above paragraph are met.

Reminder: Rid, Exum and War 2.0 at SAIS on Monday

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Sat, 30 May 2009 18:28:00 +0000

The Center for Transatlantic Relationsat the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Invites you to a Praeger/PSI book launch and
Lunch discussion on

War 2.0
Irregular Warfare in the Information Age

Thomas Rid (co-author is Marc Hecker)
Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
http://thomasrid.wordpress.com/2009/02/04/war-20

Andrew Exum
Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Founder of the counter-insurgency blog Abu Muqawama
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com

Dan Hamilton
Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations

“Thematically rich and masterfully constructed, this book shows how our wired-up world has changed the operational environment. War 2.0 is Clausewitz rebooted for the 21st century.”
Christopher Coker, Professor of International Relations, The London School of Economics, author of Humane Warfare

“High-tech revolutions are rocking the military and the media, toppling hierarchies, and upending traditional players. War 2.0 reveals how the old ways of war and communications are coming apart, and what the chaotic, self-organizing, networked future is likely to be.”
Noah Shachtman, Wired magazine, editor of Danger Room,http://www.wired.com/dangerroom

When: Monday, June 1, 2009Time: 12:30 pm – 2.00 pm
Where: Kenney Auditorium, 1740 Massachusetts Ave N.W., Washington, DC

RSVP to Gretchen Losee at transatlanticRSVP@jhu.edu (Please put *June 1, War 2.0* in the subject line) or call 202-663-5880 for questions.

Small Wars Journal is to Rolling Stone as Abu Muqawama is to Vice

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 29 May 2009 19:00:00 +0000

So are we bitter that our boss John Nagl nominated Small Wars Journal to Rolling Stone's "Hot List" instead of us? Naw. I'm pretty sure no one under 40 years of age reads Rolling Stone anymore, so it makes sense that my pleated pants-wearing boss would turn down Frampton Comes Alive! long enough to speak to some geriatric Rolling Stone journalist about the latest "hot" thing.

No, no, in all seriousness, congrats to Dave and the gang at SWJ. We'll be out behind the cafeteria dumpster smoking with the cool kids if anyone needs us.

Us. Nagl.

Caption Contest: Dogs and Cats, Con't

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 29 May 2009 17:29:00 +0000

Well, how is this for a motley crew? From left, that would be Gian Gentile, Celeste Ward, John Nagl, and myself. This picture was taken about five minutes ago -- and about ten minutes after Gian, Celeste and I had lunch together and debated the Surge, Afghanistan, and counterinsurgency doctrine without weapons being brandished or blood drawn. Incredibly, Gian and John had never before met, so I invited both Celeste and Gian up into the Lion's Den of all things counterinsurgency, where pleasantries were exchanged under a sign of truce. It was Christmas 1914 all over again, really.

Dogs and cats, living together. Mass hysteria!

noreply@blogger.com (Abu Muqawama) — Fri, 29 May 2009 15:52:00 +0000

Galrahn blogs on Kilcullen. What's next, me blogging on naval tactics? (Hey, I am reading Brodie right now.)