What I’m sharing here is a small tit for tat talk that took place between treasury and opposition benches. Chaudhary Nisar Ali of PML(N) was laughed at by the treasury bench for taking a lot of time, and still suggesting that he doesn’t want to take the N.A.’s time. This prompted quips from opposition benches. The surprise in the clip, is someone (i do not know, or which party did he belong to) calling out Rehman Malik as Rehman Dakait – twice – in the national assembly. Whatever we think or write about him, don’t think N.A. is a place for such remarks.

It was in early 2009, when amidst all the doom and gloom; I mentioned that we will re-take agencies one by one. And, since then, you folks have seen that we went on to re-take Bajaur, then Mohmand, Swat, Darra Adam Khel – etc. This operation, I believe, should therefore be seen as an extension of the Pakistan Army’s operations in agencies, and not in isolation.

Forces present in the TO (Theater of Operation; South Waziristan)

• 3 divisions of the Pakistan Army. – 21,600 troops. Reserve: 1 brigade / division, bringing the total to about 28,800 troops
• 3 Corps of the FC [South Waziristan Scouts, Shawal Rifles & Tochi Scouts]. Each corps has about 2000 men. Bringing the total number of fighting troops to 6000.
• Support units like Armor, Engineers, Supply and FACs (forward air controllers or ground liaison officers) are in addition to above mentioned troops.

Do mind that Waziristan is already playing host to 11 and 12 corps of the Pakistan Army. [Above mentioned troops, are in addition to these troops]

All in all, you’re looking at a number of about 60 to 80,000 active duty soldiers in this theater of operations.

Realistic goals of the operation?

I don’t believe, that any one is under the impression that the Pakistan Army is going to have it easy. IMO, it’ll be a slow going operation and that the Pakistan Army is already bracing for heavy casualties.

_{Picture courtesy BBC}

In addition to that, IMO this operation will not be an ‘extermination’ exercise – as certain analysts have pointed out – but one involving a ‘re-take and hold’ approach, within Mehsud dominated areas of South Waziristan. I expect denial of territory to the entire spectrum of militancy, to an extent that federal government can utilize political agent(s) for exerting full administrative control over the territory.

We are not going to be able to kill every Talib, or even take out their top leadership at the offset. But like in Swat, we can do plenty to ensure that the Khasadar and the FC forces are able to comfortably enforce the writ of the state.

Denial of territory to militants and re-establishment of governance structures in essentially lost areas is, in my opinion, the bare minimum we have to achieve.

Remember that these militants have destroyed the tribal customs and the very hierarchy of tribal leadership. Just in Waziristan, that amounts to 600+ elders murdered by these thugs (according to a 4 year old report).

So there is a genuine, traditional tribal leadership (well their offspring now!) which we can help rehabilitate. Provide enough security to them that they offer to federal government the historical role they used to play.

How would TTP react?

By now, many columnists from within Pakistan and outside have posed several questions pertaining to gauging TTP’s reaction to the operation – Questions such as; how do you think, TTP will respond to this operation? Apart from sending their cadres in settled areas of Pakistan, in order to create havoc, what else can we expect from them?

Well, the option of simply melting away, in my opinion, is simply not realistic, not anymore. Granted that some will definitely disperse, ultimately, the militants will balk at the idea of giving up their strongest of the strongholds just like that. You have to remember that South Waziristan is central to operations of not only TTP but also their “guests” so the idea that they will simply walk away quietly to somewhere safer is a non starter. They have invested 8 years worth of their time and effort to build up an environment and a support infrastructure that is conducive towards their militant activities.

They will give us a nasty fight and we should have no doubts about this.

Historically, it might be correct that militants used tactics of running away to an adjacent area when an operation was imminent, but do mind that we are talking about a time when entire Malakand, Mohmand, Bajaur, North and South Waziristan were firmly under their control and the state had largely walked away from its responsibility.

Now that luxury, at least to that extent, is simply not available for them.

If you folks can remember, it was in early 2009 – amongst all the doom and gloom that I’d mentioned that we will re-take these agencies one by one. And you’ve seen that since then we went on to re-take Bajaur, Mohmand, Swat and Darra Adam Khel, etc.

The point being that these people have literally run out of places to go to. Even if we are to assume that some of them manage to escape to Orakzai or parts of Kurrum – Ultimately, we’ll be more than glad to follow them there too because as and when their area of freedom shrinks, it makes easier to take them on where-ever they happen to be.

My take on the Operation

My take though is that there is too much at stake in Waziristan. Principally, TTP cadres may be able to trickle into settle areas to avoid a traumatic fate or to live for another day … but that luxury is not available to their “guests”. The Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs etc will have to fight it out because if they are caught, they’ll be sent home on the first available flight and in a country like Uzbekistan, they’ll be sent straight to a firing squad.

Why is Waziristan so important? Strategically speaking, it’s important for the same reason that Bajaur was important because it borders Afghanistan and offers cross border movement through an area with forbidding terrain. It provides TTP and their “guests” with access to move to/from Afghanistan. If and when they face heat in Pakistan, they move to Afghanistan.

It’s here, that the role of ISAF and ANA will come in to play, i.e. if they can manage to secure and seal their side of the Afghan border or not. Time for the Gov. of Pakistan and the Pakistani foreign office to ask them to ‘do more’.

Waziristan is not the end of it but think of it like climbing a mountain. In terms of counter insurgency, I think we would have climbed the major part of the mountain, if Waziristan is re-taken.

Last but not least, expect many attacks throughout Pakistan. I hope that I am wrong but that’s their modus operandi for exerting pressure, though a tactic of a bygone era, when public was not in favor of the war, itself.

That has now changed, especially in the aftermath of a successful operation (though military, while civilian rebuilding work is still lacking at many fronts) in Swat. Times have changed and so shall the results, this time around. InshAllah!

For our troops; good luck and god speed!

So it’s been a while since I last chose to share a few words with you folks. Sorry for that and hopefully you folks will respond kindly to my following entry.

Let me get straight to the point. We already know that Pakistan’s news media plays slave to its corporate interests. The aftermath of Saad Khan’s unfortunate death, if anything, only cemented the assertion that whatever makes news channels garner more viewer-ship and/or sell more copies of their news papers, is exactly what their anchormen and columnists will pitch in their talk shows and columns. And nothing else.

And what makes this practice all the more dangerous, in case of Pakistan (not withstanding the fact that we’ve essentially adopted paranoia as a state policy) – is the fact that Pakistanis have started basing their threat perceptions (local and regional), on what these news channels report or what their favorite columnist states – without ever thinking or making a conscious effort at trying to acquire more facts or even points of view before making up their mind.

Most, rather all of us, are very much aware of the fact that the American public got played by their corporate media and their government into waging a war on Iraq based upon fallacious, misleading and downright doctored reports of presence of WMDs in that country. And how the entire exercise backfired on them.

And yet, when our own TV channels and newspapers try to ‘doctor’ our very own threat perceptions, we’re almost always eager to fall for the same bait. Why?

Think that’s not the entire truth?

• Well, tell me then, how is it that at one hand the media can get their hands on a ’secret’ letter sent to Interior Ministry by the US ambassador to Pakistan (refer: US ambassador Anne Patterson’s letter to Rehman Malik, asking for a NOC for weapons of illegal bore being acquired by Inter-Risk – a local security agency tasked with the security of certain American personnel and missions). And at the same time, have comprehensively failed, in the last 2 years, to publish the entire list of Red-Mosque students who perished in Operation Silence? The numbers of which, according to most of the reports emerging in the local media, is in thousands. Hint: What sells more?
• How is it that Hamid Mir, in his weekly columns, every other week – writes about alleged XE (previously Black Water) personnel openly brandishing automatic weapons in the capital city of Islamabad, threatening locals with impunity? And yet we don’t see a single news channel attempting to locate and actually ‘video-tape’ or ‘photograph’ these personnel? If they’re really out there in the open, walking or driving down our streets, what’s stopping the mainstream media from openly disclosing their presence? I can only think of two reasons:
  1. Either the local media is actually a party to the crime and is actively responsible for hiding their presence.

  OR

  2. They’re trying to garner more viewership for their channels and more sales for their newspapers by playing on our threat perceptions. Whilst no such threat actually exists.

This is not to suggest, that their assertion is essentially ‘wrong’. Specifically since in the aftermath of the leak of the letter from the US ambassador to Rehman Malik, the government acted by raiding the offices of Inter-Risk.

But that if such a threat actually exists, why do they spend thousands of hours ‘talking’ about this issue. When they can always set up an investigative team, tasked with capturing these folks on film, thus actually putting something concrete on the table.

From where I see it, they don’t do it because XE or no XE – the media doesn’t care as long as it can get the largely unsuspecting population to believe what IT HAS TO SAY. Our national security policy is essentially being tailored by news channels, or so it seems.

I might be wrong on both counts, so I’d really like to know as to what do you folks have to say about this?

WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia’h through Courts in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province, except the Tribal Area adjoining Mansehra district and the former State of Amb;

Download (PDF) – Complete Draft of Nizam-e-Adal Ordinance 2009, along with Nomenclature of Pakistani laws.

AND WHEREAS clause (3) of Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides that no Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or any part thereof, unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situated, with the approval of the President, so directs, and in giving such direction with respect to any law, the Governor may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction;

AND WHEREAS clause (4) of Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides that the Governor of a Province, with the prior approval of the President, may, with respect to any matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly, make regulations for the peace and good government of a Provincially Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof;

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers aforesaid, the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, with the approval of the President, is pleased to direct that the laws specified in column 2 of Schedule I shall apply to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas as afore said; and to make the following Regulation:-

1. Short title, extent and commencement. —

(1) This Regulation may be called the Nizam-e-Adl (Shariah) Regulation, 2008.

(2) It shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province, except the Tribal Area adjoining Mansehra district and the former State of Amb, hereinafter referred to as the said area.

(3) It shall come into force at once.

2. Definitions. — (1) In this Regulation, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

(a) “A’alim” means and includes a person having advance degree in tafseer-e-Quran, Ahadith-e-Nabvi (Sallallaho Alaihe Wasallam), and/or Fiqh-e-Islami from a recognized institution;

(b) “Chairperson” and “member” respectively mean the Chairperson or, as the case may be, a member of the Committee;

(c) “Committee” means the Committee constituted under paragraph 7;

(d) “Court” means the court of competent jurisdiction established and designated as such under this Regulation, and includes a court of appeal or, as the case may be, a court of revision;

(e) “Government” means the Government of the North-West Frontier Province;

(f) “Muavin-e-Qazi” means a person whose name appears on the current panel of Muavineen-e-Qazi drawn under paragraph 7;

(h) “panel” means the current list of the names of Muavineen-e-Qazi for a specified area;

(i) “paragraph” means a paragraph of this Regulation;

(j) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Regulation;

(k) “Qazi” means a duly appointed judicial officer as specified and designated in column 3 of Schedule II;

(l) “Qazi Court” means the court of competent jurisdiction established and designated as such under this Regulation, and includes a court of appeal or, as the case may be, a court of revision;

(l) “recognized institution” means the Shariah Academy established under International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985 (Act XXX of 1985) or any institution imparting Shariah training and recognized as such by Government;

(m) “Schedule”, means a Schedule to this Regulation;

(n) “Sharia’h”, means the injunctions of Islam as laid down in Quran Majeed and Sunnah-e-Nabavi (Sallallaho Alaihe Wasallam), Ijma and Qias.

Explanation.—In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression “Quran Majeed and Sunnah-e-Nabavi (Sallallaho alaihe wasallam)” shall mean the Quran Majeed and Sunnah-e-Nabavi (Sallallaho alaihe wasallam) as interpreted by that sect; and

(2) All other expressions, not expressly defined in this Regulation, shall have the same meanings as assigned to them in any other law for the time being in force in the area to which this Regulation applies.” .

3. Application of certain laws to the said area. — (1) The laws specified in column 2 of Schedule I, as in force in the North-West Frontier Province immediately before the commencement of this Regulation, and so far as may be, all rules, notifications and orders made or issued thereunder, shall apply to the said area.

(2) All the laws applicable to the said area, including the laws mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), shall so apply subject to such exceptions and modifications as specified in this Regulation;

4. Certain laws to cease to operate. —If, immediately before the commencement of this Regulation, there was in force in the said area any law, instrument, custom or usage having the force of law not corresponding to the Injunctions of Quran Majeed and Sunnah-e-Nabvi (Sallaho alaihe Wasallam) provisions of any of the laws applied to the said area by this Regulation, such instruments, custom or usage, as the case may be, shall upon such commencement, cease to have effect in the said area.

5. Courts, Judicial Officers, and their powers and functions. – (1) Any person to be appointed as Illaqa Qazi shall be a person who is a duly appointed judicial officer in the North-West Frontier Province. Preference shall be given to those judicial officers who have completed Shariah course of four months duration from a recognized institution.

(2) In relation to proceeding with and conducting the criminal or civil cases, all powers, functions and duties conferred, assigned or imposed on Judicial Officers in the North-West Frontier Province under any law for the time being in force, shall, subject to application of such law in the said area and established principles of Shariah, be exercised, performed or discharged by them as designated in column 3 of Schedule II.

(3) A Zilla Qazi shall have the power to authorise, through the District Police Officer concerned, on the basis of special reasons to be recorded about improper investigation, either suo motto or on the request of the concerned Qazi or a party, any other officer of an investigating agency or establishment working within the area of his jurisdiction, in lieu of or in addition to, the investigating officer already authorised, to investigate a particular case and submit his report to the Zilla Qazi about details of his investigation and findings. Where necessary, the Zilla Qazi in the light of the report of the investigating officer specially authorised or any other information, may cause a magisterial inquiry to be conducted against the delinquent investigating officer.

(4) Subject to the general superintendence of the High Court, a Zilla Qazi shall supervise the work of subordinate Courts, and, through the District Police Officer concerned, the investigating officers and officers-in-charge of police-stations in relation to investigation of cases, and of the process serving staff, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, and shall ensure that all matters relating to investigation, in substance as well in procedure, are carried out strictly in accordance with the established principles of Shariah.

(5) It shall be the duty of every officer-in-charge of a police station to ensure that complete challan in each criminal case is submitted to the concerned Court within fourteen days from the date of lodging the first information report, except in a case in which the concerned Qazi has granted special extension of time for a specified period for the reasons to be recorded:

Provided that if any officer incharge of police station or investigation officer fails to submit complete challan within specified period, the Qazi concerned shall refer the matter to competent authority for disciplinary action against the police officer responsible for such delay, upon which necessary action shall be taken against him forthwith and shall be duly communicated to the referring Qazi.

(6) The officer-in-charge of a police-station shall submit a copy of the first information report to concerned Qazi within twenty four hours of its lodging, and inform the concerned Qazi from time to time, about the position and further progress of investigation of the case, and act on his directions, if any, concerning investigation of such a case:

(7) All executive authorities in the said area, including members of law enforcing agencies and members of other services of Pakistan, shall act in aid and assistance of the Courts, and shall implement their judicial orders and decisions.

(8) Government may, where necessary, issue such directions to any law enforcing agency as are necessary in relation to the service of Courts’ processes on the parties, witnesses or any other person, and, for any general or specific purposes, in order to ensure the conduct of such law enforcing agency in aid and assistance of the Courts.

6. Proceedings to be in accordance with Shariah. -

(1) A Qazi shall seek guidance from Quran Majeed and Sunna-e-Nabvi (Sallallaho Alaihe Wasallam) for the purposes of procedure and proceedings of conduct, resolution and decision, of cases and shall decide the same in accordance with Shariah. While expounding and interpreting the Quran Majeed and Sunna e Nabvi (Sallallaho Alaihe Wasallam) the Qazi shall follow the established principles of expounding and interpreting Quran Majeed and Sunna-e-Nabvi (Sallallaho Alaihe Wasallam), and, for this purpose, shall consider the expositions and opinions of recognized Fuqaha’a of Islam.

(2) No court shall entertain a suit unless the plaintiff verifies that copies of plaint alongwith supporting documents have been sent, through registered post with acknowledgment due to all the defendants, except in case of a suit for perpetual injunction accompanied by an application for temporary injunction.

(3) The pleadings shall be accompanied by attested copies of all relevant public and private documents and affidavits of all the unofficial witnesses duly attested by an Oath Commissioner. The affidavits so submitted shall be treated as examination-in-chief of such witnesses:

Provided that if, after submission of pleadings new issue arises in the opinion of court, the party intending to file may be allowed to submit fresh or amended affidavits of unofficial witnesses, as may be necessary for arriving at just conclusion of case.

(4) In all cases of civil nature written statement shall be submitted within seven days and where the defendant fails to do so his defence shall be struck off:

Provided that the court may extend time for filing of written statement in extra ordinary circumstances.

(5) After completion of evidence, the court shall ask the parties to argue, either verbally or in writing, on the adjourned date, and, if either of the party fails to do so, the court shall pronounce judgment on merits, without any further adjournment for arguments:

Provided that it shall be the duty of the court to make list of relevant reported judgments, referred to by any party as precedent, which shall form part of judicial record.

(6) No adjournment shall be granted to either party in any civil or criminal proceedings, except where the court is satisfied that adjournment is unavoidable. In such case the requesting party shall deposit the costs as may be determined by the court.

(7) Soon after the commencement of this Regulation, Government, in consultation with High Court, shall take necessary steps to establish as many courts to ensure expeditious dispensation of justice within prescribed time schedule.

(8) Where the number of pending cases at a time exceeds more than one hundred and fifty in a court of Zilla Qazi or, as the case may be, Izafi Zilla Qazi, or exceeds more than two hundred cases in a court of Aala Illaqa Qazi or, as the case may be, Illaqa Qazi, it shall be necessary to establish a new court to release the work load of the court concerned:

Provided that a Qazi posted in the said area shall be entitled to such additional special allowance as may be prescribed.

(9) A period of not more than six months for disposal of a civil case, and a period of not more than four months for disposal of a criminal case, shall be standard time schedule, excluding the time spent for Sulh proceedings.

(10) A Qazi shall finalize a case within the prescribed time schedule and, in case of any delay in disposal of any case beyond such schedule, shall report the cause and reasons of such delay to the Zilla Qazi or, as the case may be, to the High Court, and shall act on the directions issued by such court in that behalf.

(11) If the Zilla Qazi or, as the case may be, the High Court, upon examination of causes of delay, is of the opinion that the delay has been caused due to the delaying tactics of a party, it shall fix a penalty or cost to be recovered from the defaulting party and direct the court concerned to dispose of the case within an extended period of not more than one month.

(12) If in the opinion of Zilla Qazi or, as the case may be, of the High Court, presiding officer of the court dealing with the case or proceeding is responsible for delay in its disposal, the Zilla Qazi or, as the case may be, the High Court may, after providing him an opportunity of hearing, make an entry in his service record.

(13) The Muavin-e-Qazi shall remain associated with the entire judicial proceedings, and shall submit his opinion in writing, which shall be part of the record. Such a Muavin-e-Qazi shall honestly and prudently assist the court in arriving at a correct conclusion regarding the proper application of Islamic laws in the relevant references from Quran Majeed, Ahadith-e-Nabvi (Sallallaho Alaihe Wasallam), Fatawa and other books of Fiqh and Shariah of the recognized Fuqahah of Islam:

Provided that a Qazi shall mention the facts of attendance of Muavin-e-Qazi and his submission of written opinion in the order sheet of the case.

(14) In criminal cases, the Investigating Officer shall prepare copies of the case file in triplicate, in addition to judicial file, so that the trial court may retain the judicial file for regular trial, and the remaining two files may be sent to the court concerned when requisitioned.

(15) The Muavin-e-Qazi, who has assisted the court, whose judgment, decree or order is under challenge through appeal or revision, may be called for hearing before the appellate or revisional Court.

(16) An appeal or revision under this Regulation shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the decision in the respective case, after sending its copies, through registered post with acknowledgement due, to the opposite party, and the appellate or revisional court shall decide the same within thirty days, without remanding it on any ground whatsoever:

Provided that such court shall have the power to rectify any illegality or irregularity or omission which, in the opinion of the said court, may result injustice to any of the parties.

(17) Any decree shall be executed, either by the court which passed it, or by the court to which it is sent for execution, within sixty days.

7. Muavin-e-Qazi and A’alim Wakeel:—(1) Government shall, as soon as may be, constitute a committee consisting of the following members, namely.-

(i) A serving judge of the High Court

nominated by the Chief Justice of that Court… …..Chairperson

(ii) Registrar, Peshawar High Court …………..…………Member

(iii) Secretary to Government of NWFP, Law Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights,

Department; …………………………………………..Member

(iv) District Coordination Officer of the district…………….Member concerned; and

(v) Two eminent A’alims from the concerned ………….…Members district.” .

(2) The Committee constituted under sub-paragraph (1), shall have the authority to select Muavineen-e-Qazi, and the names of such Muavineen shall be declared, by notification in the official Gazette, for each calendar year, for each district or protected area, in the form of a panel of up to thirty ulema of known integrity and good character, being well-versed in Sharia’h:

Provided that the names of such persons shall be retained on the future panel, unless the Committee, for reasons to be recorded in writing, decides to delete the name of any person from the panel.

(3) A Qazi shall, for the purpose of expounding and interpreting the injunctions of Islam relevant to the proceedings of a pending case, call upon one or more of such Muavineen-e-Qazi for his assistance.

(4) The Committee may register Ulema, each of whom to be known as A’alim Wakeel, who may be qualified to become Muavineen-e-Qazi to act as Wakeel in the Courts.

(5) Subject to sub-paragraph (6), the Committee may, either of its motion or at the instance of any person, take disciplinary action against a Muavin-e-Qazi or an A’alim Wakeel, and may delete his name from the panel of Muavineen-e-Qazi or as the case may be deregister an A’alim Wakeel.

(6) The Committee shall issue notice in writing to such Muavin-e-Qazi or A’alim Wakeel, specifying the charges against him, consider his written replay, if any, and, if he so wishes, personally hear him, for taking any action under sub-paragraph (5).

(7) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Committee may apply to the Committee, within one month of the announcement of the decision, for review and the decision of the Committee in review shall be final.

(8) A party to any proceedings before the Court may either conduct the proceedings personally or through special attorney or may duly authorise an Advocate or a duly registered A’alim Wakeel, to act as Wakeel of such party for the purposes of such proceedings:

Provided that the Court may provide the services of counsel to a party if, keeping in view the financial position of such party, it so deems necessary.

(9) The name of a person may be included in the panel, or, as the case may be, registered as Alim Wakeel, if he possesses a degree of Shahadatul A’almia or L.L.B. Shariah or B.A. (Theology), or L.L.B. from a recognized institution or university who has experience in Ilm-e-Fiqh and Sharia’h, and teaching of Islamic principles of Sharia’h and jurisprudence related to Islamic laws.

(10) The names of Muavineen-e-Qazi and A’alim Wakeel shall be notified in the Official Gazette, and deletion of any of such name, or as the case may be, deregistration shall also be notified in the official Gazette.

(11) Government shall provide funds to the concerned Zilla Qazi for payment to Muavineen-e-Qazi performing duty in courts within the district.

(12) A Muavin-e-Qazi shall be entitled to such honoraria as may be determined by Government, but shall not demand or receive, directly or indirectly, any pecuniary gain from a party or parties to a dispute pending disposal in, or has recently been disposed of by, a court in the said area.

(13) The concerned Zilla Qazi shall send his comments about the punctuality, regularity, efficiency, honesty, knowledge, capability and other aspects of character of each Muavin-e-Qazi and A’alim Wakeel, to the Committee, before the middle of the month of November in each calendar year.

(14) An A’alim Wakeel shall, for the purposes of conducting cases in Courts established under this Regulation, have the same status, rights, duties and liabilities as an Advocate or pleader appointed or registered under any law for the time being in force, may have.

(15) The Committee may, before the end of the current calendar year, in the light of the comments of the concerned Zilla Qazi, or on any other information or considering the needs of the courts in the concerned area, revise the panel, and may include therein or delete there from the name of any person for reasons to be recorded, and such panel shall be urgently notified in the official Gazette.

(16) The Committee shall meet once in every three months, and may also meet as and when necessary, for-

(a) preparation of panel of Muavineen-e-Qazi, and inclusion or deletion of the names of the persons in, or from, the current panel;

(b) registration or deregistration of A’alim Wakeel;

(c) revision of the panel for the coming year before the end of the current year;

(d) interview of persons for appointment as Muavineen-e-Qazi or registration as A’alim Wakeel;

(e) hearing the Muavin-e-Qazi or A’alim Wakeel, having objection to the deletion of his name, or his deregistration; and

(f) any other matter ancillary, consequential, incidental or relevant thereto.

(17) The Chairperson or, in case of his absence, his nominee, and two members shall form quorum for the meeting.

(18) A meeting may be convened at the request of two members, if the Chairperson, is of the view that the convening of the meeting is necessary.

(19) All the decisions in a meeting shall be taken by majority of votes of the total members.

(20) Government shall provide funds for all the necessary expenses of the Committee.

(21) The office of the Committee shall be located at a place determined by Government in consultation with the Chairperson.

(22) The Secretary of the Committee shall be a person or officer so authorised by Government after consultation with the Chairperson, who shall maintain the record and administratively deal with the business of the Committee.”.

8. Power to appoint Musleh. — (1) Any civil or criminal case, subject to mutual consent of parties, may be referred to Musleh before recording of evidence, either on the agreement of the parties regarding the names of such Musleh or Musleheen, or in case of their disagreement, to such Musleh or Musleheen whose names appear on the list maintained by the court for such purpose:

Provided that the cases falling within the purview of Hudood laws and cases by or against the Federal or Provincial Government or any statutory body or persons under legal disabilities shall not be referred for sul’h.

(2) The Musleheen shall record their opinion with regard to a dispute referred to them with reasons therefor.

(3) Where a Musleh or, as the case may be, Musleheen, to whom a dispute has been referred for resolution, either fail or refuse to resolve it, or the Court is of the opinion that unnecessary delay has been caused, without sufficient reason, in resolving it, the Court, may, on the application of a party or suo motto, for reasons to be recorded, withdraw the order of such reference, and, after such withdrawal, it shall resolve the dispute in accordance with Shariah as if it were not referred for sul’h:

Provided that, in no circumstances, a case shall remain with a Musleh or, as the case may be, Musleheen for a period of more than fifteen days, and, on the expiry of the aforesaid period, shall stand withdrawn to the court for further proceedings.

(4) The Musleh or, as the case may be, the Musleheen, appointed for such resolution of the dispute, after hearing the parties and their witnesses, if any, perusing the relevant document, if any, and inspecting the spot, if need be, shall form opinion about resolution of the dispute, with reasons therefor, and submit a report of their opinion to the concerned court without delay:

Provided that, in case the opinion is not unanimous, the opinion of the majority members and the opinion of each dissenting member, separately or jointly, with reasons therefor, shall be so submitted.

(5) The Court shall, if it is satisfied that the opinion in a case referred to for sul’h under sub-paragraph (1) is in accordance with Shariah, make it the rule of the Court, and shall announce it as such, but, if the court comes to the conclusion that the opinion is not in accordance with Shariah, it shall declare the opinion, for reasons to be recorded, as null and void and shall start its proceedings for decision of such dispute in accordance with Shariah as if it were not referred for sul’h.

(6) The court shall, before proceeding further, provide an opportunity to the parties to submit objections, if any, to such report, and, if any, objections are so made, the court shall, after hearing the parties, decide about the correctness or otherwise of the objections.

(7) The court may either make the opinion of the Musleh or Musleheen, or the opinion of their majority, as rule of the court and decide the case accordingly, or, for solid and convincing reasons, reject such opinion and proceed further to decide the case in accordance with the established principles of Shariah.

(8) The court shall, keeping in view the actual expenses incurred by the Musleh or Musleheen, on travelling to, and stay at, the place other than the place of his or, as the case may be, their residence, and the time spent in dealing with the case, in particular circumstances of each case, fix the remuneration of such Musleh or Musleheen, to be paid by each party in such proportion as may be determined by the court.

9. Conduct of Judicial Officers. — (1) The conduct and character of each Qazi shall be in accordance with the Islamic principles.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all cases, suits, inquires, matters and proceedings in Courts, pertaining to the said area, shall be decided by the Courts concerned in accordance with Shariah:

Provided that cases of non-Muslims in matters of adoption, divorce, dower, inheritance, marriage, usages and wills shall be conducted and decided in accordance with their respective personal laws.

(3) Government may, from time to time, take such measures for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) as it may deem necessary.

10. Language of the Court and of its record. —All the processes and proceedings of the Court, including the pleadings, evidence, arguments, orders and judgements shall be recorded and conducted in Urdu or in English and the record of the Court shall also be maintained in the said language.

11. Powers to make rules. — Government, in consultation with the High Court, may make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Regulation.

12. Regulation to override other laws. —The provisions of this Regulation shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force in the said area.

13. Repeal. — (1) The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Shari Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 1999 (NWFP. Reg. I of 1999), and rules framed thereunder are hereby repealed.

What would you not give to escape those never ending, extremely nagging, getting-on-your nerves kind of calls by the moms, dads, wives and girl friends of the world. Who just would not budge from calling you every 10 minutes, if you happen to be stuck because of a car jam, a protest, bomb scare or even a car break down, to get an update on your present location. And it’s not that I’m implying that you mind their concern, but making a simple observation that in cases like these, such calls are bound to get on one’s nerves. What if you can instead, upload your location data, to your own website, in live? And share the link with your family or friends in order to let them know about your whereabouts, in live, if and when you choose.

Well, if you happen to have one of the GPS equipped, S60 / Windows Mobile cell phones, you can use your own hosting space, in order to put up a page which shall show your location in live, using Google Maps, for free (except for your regular carrier charges for data [GPRS/EDGE/3G] transmission). You can turn this service on or off on will, so privacy concerns should be limited.

For example, in order see my latest location update, click here.

Concept:

A GPS application downloads your co-ordinates, uploads them on to the web (using EDGE/GPRS/3G/WIFI) at a location of your choice. Once the data has been uploaded, a script is then used to convert the data into information that can be then be displayed on a Google Map, using Google Maps API.

What do you need to do, to get this done?

• Download the 3dtracking application for your Symbian / Windows Mobile cell phone.
  Symbian ver. 2.0 – Download
  Symbian ver. 3.0 – Download
  Windows Mobile – Download

• After installation, use the application to record some of your location data, and send it to the 3dtracking.net server.

• Head over to http://free.3dtracking.net, and login using your cell phone’s serial id or IMEI number, as your ‘username’ and ‘password’. Once inside, you can change your password from the ‘settings’ tab.

Publishing above location data on your personal website

• Get yourself a Google Maps API key. Head over to http://www.google.com/apis/maps/signup.html and register yourself. Do note that you’ll need to give an exact URL of the page that you’ll be setting up for this purpose. In my case, the API is registered to http://track.abdullahsaad.com.

• Log-in to your 3dtracking.net account, copy the MAP ID present in your account details area.
• Now, open a new file in notepad and save it as index.html or whatever name that you want to give it.

• Within the page, write the following code and replace phrases such as ‘Google Maps API key’ and ‘3dtracking Map ID’ with their respective values:

  Header

  <head>
<script src="http://live.3dtracking.net/js/general.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
<script src="http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2.84&key=Google API Key"
type="text/javascript"></script>
<style type="text/css">
v:* {
behavior:url(#default#VML);
}
</style>
<script type="text/javascript">
var map;
var kml;

  function onLoad() {
  if (GBrowserIsCompatible()) {
  map = new GMap2(document.getElementById("map"));
  map.setCenter(new GLatLng(0,0), 0);
  kml = new GGeoXml("http://free.3dtracking.net/live.kmz?guid=3dtracking Map ID", function() {
  kml.gotoDefaultViewport(map)
  });
  map.addControl(new GLargeMapControl());
  map.addControl(new GMapTypeControl());
  map.enableScrollWheelZoom();
  map.addOverlay(kml);
  }

  InitializeTimer(Reload, 60);
  }

  function Reload() {
  if (GBrowserIsCompatible()) {
  var url = RandomizeUrl("http://free.3dtracking.net/live.kmz?guid=3dtracking Map ID");
  kml = new GGeoXml(url, Fun(url));

  //add the new overlay
  map.addOverlay(kml);
  }

  // do another loop around
  ResetTimer();
  }

  function Fun(url) {
//remove the previous kml.
map.removeOverlay(kml);
}
</script>
</head>

  Body

  <body onload="onLoad()">
<div id="map" style="width: 800px; height: 600px; float:left; border: 1px solid black;"></div>
</div>
<br clear="all" />
<br />
</body>

• Upload this page on your server. You can now, use the 3dtracking application on your cellular device, in order to upload live tracking data on to your website.

Have fun and please do comment, if you found this post useful!

Pakistan army’s first operation in Swat

Federal government of Pakistan deployed troops of Pakistan army, in late 2007, in order to curb TNSM’s activities in the settled areas of Swat. The mission continued on for almost half a year and Pakistan army did manage to wrestle the control of valley of Swat back. Hundreds of militants were killed, caught or jailed. While the problem of militancy itself did not go away, it was significantly contained and people who formed the core of TNSM took refuge in Peochar Mountains which are remote and hard to reach, even for the military.

It was then that in order to fulfill promises made during the 2008 elections, the newly formed government of ANP in NWFP, pulled a plug on the operation and called the troops back. In addition to that, they also met TNSM’s demand of releasing all of their members from Pakistani jails, prior to the start of peace talks. It is due to these early peace deals that TTP/TNSM got the breathing space, they very much needed. Now, they were no longer cornered to a specific bit of terrain and did not have hundreds of fellows in jails anymore, since all of them got released. This resulted in giving another lease of life to the movement. Whatever ANP’s reasons were, this peace deal tossed Pakistan army’s efforts of the last six months out of the window like trash. All of the sacrifices made, including that of people of Swat themselves, and hard work done, went down the drain.

ANP has since been threatened by TNSM/TTP to give up their role in the government or else face retribution. Tens of its members have already been killed, and as of now, most of its ministers belonging to Swat valley are either residing in Peshawar or Islamabad. Here is to hoping that they learned their lesson, though I’m not counting on it.

What’s stopping the army from taking TNSM head-on like they took TTP in Bajaur?

In very simple words, the answer to that lies in the fact that we have far too many fronts open, at the same time. For example, we have a large deployment in Darra Adamkhel (a story in its own right) which is going to stay there for a long time to come. That place has been stabilized with great difficulty but thank God that we’ve managed to bring it under control. Bajaur is still an active battlefield, especially Mamond, Nawagai and Nawapass and even areas around Khar. Mohmand is burning and we are currently fighting there just like in Bajaur. An operation is active in Khyber agency and this area is likely to become more problematic over the course of next few months. And we happen to have a massive deployment around North/South Waziristan and these forces can definitely not be used for any other purpose. And, as if this was not enough, we have another fast rising hot spot in shape of Orakzai agency.

One of the questions that has always irked me, is that how militants in Swat are able to get their funding and weaponry, especially since Swat doesn’t share a border with Afghanistan? Let me put it this way; they have dozens of heavily loaded petrol/diesel guzzling 4×4 vehicles. They drive them a lot. No matter what you do, fuel is not cheap. Where do they get finances, for that? Whatever the source is, it’s the single biggest reason why they are still alive and kicking.

Now, take a good look at the areas on the map, marked in gray and their corresponding position with respect to the valley of Swat. And then ask yourselves, if it’s just a co-incidence that insurgency has suddenly gone up in all of the agencies, surrounding Swat. Answer that, and you’ll have the answer to the question, as to where do the artery which feeds this movement lie.

Unfortunately, since Pakistan Army is fighting on multiple fronts, it is going to take a considerable amount of time before everything goes back under control. And therefore, I don’t see Swat being stabilized anytime soon. My personal belief is that if we managed to pacify Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and Orakzai in the near future, it’ll considerably daunt operational capabilities of TNSM in Swat, scaling it down to an extent where they become insignificant.

We, as a nation, are paying a very heavy price for wasting the last eight years arguing as to whether or not we’re facing an actual insurgency or if we even need to confront such organizations. It’s now, that we’re truly finding out, the consequences of our inability to reach upon a consensus on issues such as terrorism. The inability to reach upon a decision is worse than actually making a bad decision. For in the case of the former, you’ve to not only live through the consequences of your actions but also repeat this perpetual cycle, until you’re actually able to stick your head out of the sand and confront the reality.

Why have military operations proven inadequate in curbing militancy in Swat?

In my opinion, there are several reasons why Swat problem is probably still not ripe for solution:

• People of Pakistan do not fully recognize and admit Taliban as a problem.
• ANP government has failed to adopt a clear cut stance against Taliban.

• There is evidence that the number of locals involved with TNSM, for reasons discussed in the first part of this post, is large enough to cause serious problems with military efforts.

• Inability of the civilian government to take advantage of space provided by Army i.e. when army clears a place, it’s then the responsibility for Police, FC and government departments to fill and deny this space to militants. This includes taking measures in order to delegitimize TNSM’s existence.

• A rather clueless media effort, on part of the government and the military, in order to better present their side of the argument. In any given week, we see more statements being released to the Urdu press by the spokespersons of TTP and TNSM than all press releases that come out of ISPR, within the same time period.

What needs to be done?

• First and foremost, we need to take care of the very cause that gives legitimacy to the existence of militant organizations such as TNSM i.e. implementation of a proper judicial and governance system in Malakand division. Nizam e Adl (A justice system based on Shari’ah laws, but produced by the government of Pakistan), should be – in accordance with the wishes of the local populace – promptly implemented. Do mind, that I’m not trying to imply that the government of Pakistan should capitulate to unjustified demands of TNSM, instead it should listen to common people of the area.

• Secondly, they should keep a strict control over means of communication in and out of the valley of Swat. That includes keeping a tab on all cellular traffic, emails, roads, bridges etc.

• Jam their most potent propaganda tool i.e. the FM transmitter.

• Find their source of funding and block it. For no movement, no matter how committed its followers are, can continue without money and active assistance in terms of weapons.

• Deal with FATA more urgently. Because as things stand, much of the funding and weapons being used in Swat, are originating from FATA. They need to cut the artery that starts from North Waziristan and goes all the way to Swat, through several agencies.

• Get their act together, on the information warfare front. If a single Al-Jazeera documentary can bring about a sea of change in the points of view of youngsters (it’s has since been downloaded, burnt on CDs and spread in different education institutes of Pakistan). Why can’t ISPR, which is in custody of hate material, training manuals and documentary proof of activities of such organizations, not come up with a much better and more detailed documentary? ISPR should also provide access to such material to private media channels, which in turn can help sway public opinion. While I’ve not much to hope for, from the likes of a particular channel that likes to portray itself as the bastion of truth and fairness, which it is anything but. Other private media outlets are still good at what they do. I’d really like to see Talat Hussain, being given an opportunity to do what Rageh Omaar did for Al-Jazeera.

• Try not releasing militants, as a precursor to holding peace talks with militants. Considering the fact that we’ve been fooled not once but at numerous times, the shame is on us for continuously falling for the same trap, again and again and again.

I’m not claiming that the points raised in my post, are somehow the silver bullet, which we need in order to get out of this quagmire. But it’s my sincere belief, that it’s at least a step towards achieving a solution. I’d really like to know, as to what do you, the readers, have to say about this topic. And how would you like to bring about an end to the insurgency in Swat?

In order to read the first part of this post, click here.

For the last year and a half, the fast-escalating crisis in Swat has gripped the attention of the entire nation of Pakistan. We have all been reading, mostly in awe, about the on-going insurgency in Swat, bombings of girls’ schools, high-handedness of Pakistan Army and FC personnel, in dealing with such militant elements and about hints of Indian involvement in creating and sustaining this fiasco.

It is going to be a two-part post. In the first, I’ll make an attempt at describing the history of TNSM (Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi) and their political and religious motives behind this war. In my second post, I’ll divulge in to details of Pakistan Army’s current operation(s) against this militant outfit, reasons why such operations have proved to be inadequate and what can still be done in order to bring this situation under control.

My motive behind this post is to try and present a rather detailed picture of the ongoing situation in Swat, in order to enable you – the reader – to make up your own mind about this war. Once you have done that, I’d like to read about it in the comments section, so please, do comment.

Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law – TNSM)

In order to understand how TNSM came in to being, we need to pay attention to the politics and economics of the Malakand region (which is TNSM’s primary base). In northwest Pakistan, three semi-autonomous states—Dir, Swat and Chitral—were amalgamated to form the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1970. The laws of Pakistan were extended to the area, setting aside old legal systems such as Shari’ah law in Swat, under the Wali of Swat. Failures of government of Pakistan, in the aftermath of this change, in upholding law and order and provisioning of cheap justice in the area resulted in the alienation of local populace from the writ and laws of the State of Pakistan. Which is why, when a legal and armed battle ensued in 1975, in the aftermath of a dispute between the government and timber merchants about forest royalties in the area, it drew immense popularity from local populace. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, in order to control the situation implemented a new legal system of governance in the area, under the now-infamous FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation). This order was then challenged first in Peshawar High Court and later in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, resulting in it being annulled. Thus creating a political vacuum, where an entire division was left without a proper justice and governance system. Do note that the precedent to get state’s attention through armed conflict and violence was set here. And the failure of government of Pakistan to address it in a prudent manner gave way to future repeats of such an occurrence.

Fast forward to the late 80s, when Sufi Mohammad, an activist of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and a cleric of Lal-Qila in Dir, had just returned to his native land from Afghanistan after his stint as one of the then celebrated ‘Mujahideens’. Being very convinced of his religious ideals, it was then that he decided to step in with the demand of enforcement of ‘Shari’ah’ (Islamic Law) in the Malakand division, in order to fill in the gap left in the aftermath of Supreme Court’s decision to annul FCR in Malakand Division. And thus TNSM came in to being.

TNSM’s first major action was its clamant demand for the introduction of Shari’ah law in Malakand Division (which, before the implementation of the 2002 devolution plan, included the present day districts of Malakand, Swat and Chitral), expressed at a gathering in Dir on May 9, 1994. It was not a mere slogan, the demand, in fact, was an ultimatum. Within a couple of weeks, TNSM took control of the area, including government offices and Saidu Shareef airport, through sheer force and announced the imposition of Shari’ah law. The group’s call to arms drew large numbers of experienced Afghan fighters from nearby city of Peshawar and Bajaur Agency. The Pakistani government, as always, acted belatedly, taking almost 6 months to formulate a reply. It was in November 94’, that Pakistani paramilitary troops (FC) were then sent in, in order to take control of the situation. The resultant operation led to the deaths of more than 40 people, including a member of the provincial assembly and more than a dozen paramilitary troops, before some semblance of normality returned to the area. A peace deal was then brokered between government of Pakistan and Sufi Muhammad, in which government of Pakistan agreed to implement Shari’ah law in Malakand divison. But Sufi Muhammad declared, only after a month of the declared ceasefire, that the implementation of Shari’ah laws in Malakand was defective and that he’ll continue his struggle towards the goal of implementation of Shari’ah in Malakand.

At this point in time, while TNSM went off the radar and public eye, due to ongoing proxy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan – it sustained its primary base of followers and continued building upon it. The political leadership in the country, for whatever reasons, failed to see and acknowledge that as a problem and thus didn’t feel the need to address it. The lack of proper implementation of the writ of government of Pakistan in Malakand division, its failure in providing means to deliver fast and cheap justice to people and a deteriorating local law and order situation made sure that TNSM never faced a dearth of followers.

The Resurgence

It was only after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent American campaign in Afghanistan that the government of Pakistan began to focus on TNSM. Sufi Mohammad by then was openly recruiting people to go to Afghanistan to fight U.S.-led forces. Soon he managed to cross into Afghanistan with approximately 7,000-8,000 volunteers to support the Taliban. When a majority of his soldiers had been either killed or captured, he returned home only to be arrested by government forces. He was ultimately convicted on April 24, 2002, along with his 30 companions, to seven years of imprisonment for inciting people to go to Afghanistan and for violating state restrictions. The organization was no longer a legitimate entity and was banned by President General Pervez Musharraf in January 2002. Some of its members drifted toward another extremist outfit—Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of the Taliban of Pakistan – TTP) which was, at that point in time, operating from Orakzai agency.

While the arrest of Sufi Muhammad dealt a real blow to TNSM, his son-in-law Fazle Hayat took over TNSM under the nom de guerre of Maulana Fazlullah and helped restore the structure of the organization. He soon began making broadcasts from an illegal FM radio station installed in his mosque at Imam Dheri, in the Mutta Tehsil of Swat district. Delivering two sermons a day, he preached his version of militant Islam. At this point in time, ex President General Pervaiz Musharraf chose not to address the situation; even ignored the blatantly militant messages being broadcasted through Fazlullah sermons over the FM radio, in order to further fuel the conflict. This, in turn helped him portray his image to the world as that of a sole barrier against militants taking over Pakistan.

Then came the devastating earth quake of October 2005 in the north western areas of Pakistan. TNSM capitalised on this human catastrophe and re-energized itself. Volunteers from the TNSM led the vanguard of the relief work in the devastated areas of the NWFP. Not surprisingly, in the absence of timely official help, the locals came to admire these volunteers for their selfless devotion in helping the quake victims. TNSM at this point in time effectively started propagating that the natural calamity was visited upon the locals because they were becoming irreligious. The recommended remedy in their view was simple—living by a strict Shari’ah code i.e. defined by them. Striking when the iron was hot, they successfully campaigned for the destruction of television sets and video players. Due to the lack of education in the region, the message resonated with the locals and TNSM received a new lease of life.

Do mind, that a spineless effort on part of the MMA (Mutahidda Majlis e Amal – The combined platform of religio-political parties of Pakistan, which formed the government in NWFP from 2002 to 2007) to counter militant activities on part of TNSM was just as much responsible for furthering this crisis as ex President General Pervaiz Musharraf. MMA’s stance on militancy in Swat was in fact that of practical encouragement. First serious signs of trouble came when polio vaccination teams were attacked in Swat and MMA govt surrendered its own writ by asking ‘permission’ from TNSM that kids be given polio drops. TNSM, given the situation, further upped the ante by announcing their private security force to take care of matters of ‘law and order’ in the valley of Swat; Shaheen Commando Force. Police were being attacked left, right and centre. There were large scale desertions. Frontier Constabulary (FC) also surrendered in very large numbers. MMA government was still extremely hesitant to call in help from federal government. In fact they never did so. Eventually, TNSM took physical control of police stations, government offices and even Saidu Sharif airport. It was then that Federal government decided to take matters in to its own hands and called a meeting of the Security Council. Chief minister Akram Durrani tried to avoid pressure from federal government to deploy troops but things weren’t really in his control. Suicide bombing had started and a large number of FC troops were killed in ambushes that involved massive amounts of explosives. Federal government then deployed troops of Pakistan army, in order to wrestle the control of Swat valley back from TNSM.

Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi and Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Taliban of Pakistan – TTP)

TNSM, right after the Red-Mosque debacle, sought to forge ties with Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Taliban of Pakistan – TTP) led by Baitullah Mehsud, in a bid to provide an umbrella to all insurgent movements operating in several tribal agencies and settled areas of the NWFP. Since then, Fazlullah and his followers are toeing Baitullah’s line, whether they are issuing a decree, signing a peace deal with the government or scrapping the same. Therefore, it appears by all accounts that the Fazlullah-led militants are working in the same mould as the TTP.

To read the second part, click here.

As the fallout from November’s bloody siege in Mumbai focuses the world’s attention on Pakistan’s ability to control enemy fighters within its own borders, Al Jazeera investigates Pakistan’s role in the so-called war on terror.

For watching episode 1, click here.

As the fallout from November’s bloody siege in Mumbai focuses the world’s attention on Pakistan’s ability to control enemy fighters within its own borders, Al Jazeera investigates Pakistan’s role in the so-called war on terror.

For watching episode 2, click here.

“A Muslim can never conduct a suicide attack against his fellow Muslims; it has to be a Zionist cum American cum Indian conspiracy”.

How many times have you heard your friends say that, in a gathering whenever you get to discuss the terrible phenomenon i.e. Terrorism? Yet, they fail to cite a single such example of an Indian, American or Israeli who actually strapped bombs on his body, and blew himself on the streets of our beloved homeland.

So what really is the problem here?

Is it that Pakistanis, in general, fail to recognize the problem that terrorism poses? Is it that their religious convictions affect their judgment, when it comes to identifying such elements? Do they deliberately over look the danger, in spite of the suffering that it has brought them over the course of last few years? Is it because the media, at times, portrays such elements as the ‘grieved’ party? Or is it that they consider these elements the lesser evil of the two; US of A / Government of Pakistan being the bigger devils, of course.

Whatever the case be, the facts state that our sense of apathy towards terrorism and its victims is costing us dearly in terms of both human life and economy. And yet we fail to recognize the threat. Politicians would have you believe that terrorism will simply fade away once the Americans get out of Afghanistan. Religious leaders have either been threatened to maintain silence or they’re just too busy building a political career out of Islam, to actually care. While the Pakistani media, oh boy, the media wants you to remain contended after knowing that it’s Pakistan army and spineless politicians who are actually responsible for the existence of such elements. Not that I’m contending any of those assertions. But what really gets me ticked off is the fact that there is all this talk about sharing the burden of responsibility and yet no one seems concerned about tackling the issue itself. While our cities (yes Mengora, Sedo Sharif, Kalam and Peshawar are in fact our cities and towns) are being overrun by thugs and murderers operating under the banner of Taliban, those responsible for running this country are busy playing a game of passing the parcel, in this case, it’s the responsibility that gets passed from person A to person B and then back. And we’re stuck with perpetually repeating this cycle of practicing idiocy.

Such behavior is not only taking our eyes of the issue of terrorism itself but also giving the people of Pakistan a much skewed view of the reality. A view that overlooks the fact that it’s Muslims, yes they not only share our faith but claim that they’re doing it for the faith, are strapping bombs on their bodies and blowing themselves up amongst us. Instead of confronting that reality, acknowledging that it is a problem and then try finding a cure, we have instead chosen to stick our heads in the sand and make ourselves believe that it’s all part of a ‘global conspiracy’ against Muslims.

Now, I understand that Pakistanis are not really a monolithic entity and they, just like any other community, have different points of view which they owe to certain belief sets that have over time been instilled in them and the set of information available to them, at a particular point in time. This is where, I believe, comes the responsibility of the government and those who form public opinion to make the nation realize, that we are in fact facing a problem and that we cannot just shy away from our responsibility, not when it is affecting our lives and those of our dear ones, so severely. And to tell them, that if we did not choose to wake up to the reality, then we’ll be another one of those nations fighting a never-ending war against an insurgency that gets so bloody, that in the end no one knows what it is all about.

At least that is what I, as a Pakistani, wish they did.

In my previous post, my first question to Imran Khan made an assertion about sectarian groups forming an alliance with AQ and Taliban. After going through the following investigative report by the Guardian newspaper, it seems like I wasn’t that far off.

You can read the report here.